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TOP SECRET W~UVl]~.:ill1 ~CS~CJLi.mV~ .:il~l3~1B~ ll IIJUJ tl l!l £5(!] UJ (!1(3 ~" 00(5(i)IIJ15 f 00 lil l11 ~ CbGllli I}) CBrn~~uml1ml] ~ §(3lJUl300Q[3Q u0£Dt:2 ) ) . P.L. 8 6-36 ------~ >~ NORMANDY: 1944 (U) ••••• ' ••••••••• I • I •• I •••••••• • I.... .. ... H ••• 1 TSS REVOLUTION (U) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ ~ ••••• ~(, ••••••• 8 SIG INT: 1990, Part One (U) ••••••••••••••••••••• •I.... ________.V• ......... 13 LETTERS (U) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •• ,.,,., •• , ••••••••••••••••••• 29 MORE F'REE GOODIES (U) ....................................................... 2 9 'FIIIS DOCUMENT <JON'FAINS CODEWORD Mh.TEIUitl.. Classified b:y USA/0SSH 123 2 TOP SECRET ~e9lassify ea1 Orisiaatias A@ea9y's geteR&iastiea Re~Yife~ eclassified and Approved for Release by NSA on -10-'1.2-20'1.2 pursuant to E.O. '13526. vlDR Case# 54778 DOCID: 4011953 Published by Pl, Techniques and Standards VOL. IX, No. 9 SEPTEMBER 1982 Editorial PUBLISHER At the end of the first year as editor, I BOARD OF EDITORS ought to have some profound thoughts, but I don't. The magazine is coming out more or Editor-in-Chief. L ICB32~/7119s) less regularly each month, and that was our Asst. Edi tor •••• :::]L--.---------1-( 1103s) first goal. Some of the other goals have been Production ••••••••••• ·I (3369s) met, including the matching of the distribu tion against the locator file. Same goals Collection •••••••••••••••• 1.--------, (8555s} remain ta be met. Cryptanalysis ••••••••••• ·I (53lls ),' Cryptolinguis tics ••••• I ( l 103s) Information Science.I (57lls) Language........ (816ls) Support.~ The purpose of CRYPTOLOG is to help you to Machine (468ls) do your tasks. Our emphasis is primarily Hathematics •••••••••1 •KBS18s) technical, but we don't always limit ourselves Puzzles •••••••••••••• David H. Williams K1103s) to the purely technical. Helping you do you Special Research ••• ,,, ••• Vera R. Filby ~7119s) job might be achieved by showing you how to do Traffic Analysis ••••••••• , .Don Taurone ps73s) something, or by letting you know that someone else has worked on something similar. It may also be done by making you more aware of what is going on around you, both in space (at the For subscriptions other end of the building) and in time (last send name and organization year on a related problem), because many of the best technical people are basically curi to: CRYPTOLOG. Pl ous people. or calll p369s For some of you, CRYPTOLOG offers an oppor tunity to stretch yourselves by writing; you might be surprised at how few readable writers there are in certain fields, whose output is To submit articles or letters. intelligible to readers outside their own ter via PLATFORM mail, send to ritory. Developing a reputation as a writer could give your career a boost. If you are cryptolg at barlc0S thinking about writing something and are wait (bar-one-c-zero-f ive) ing to be asked, call me and I'll ask you. (note: no 'O' in 'log') P.L. 86- 36 In years past, CRYPTOLOG often skipped a month in the summer. However, as an experi ment, we are offering instead an issue con taining three somewhat longer articles. Their subjects, interestingly enough, are the past, the present, and the future. F8R 8PFie !:At SSE 81it:I DOCID: ~-011953 TOP 3!e~T tflf Bftlt NORMANDY: 1944 (U} byl IP13 P . L . 86- 36 -· '""· :.. ,.. ~-· . -·...... ·-·-~ St 6 6 (J_f ----a a c:--- REVIEW: Six Ar~ies in Normandy, by John --fa+-- The salient advantages the Western Keegan, Viking, 1982, NY. allies had in the land battle were seapower, airpower, plentiful supplies, and COMINT. As a result, the GerlU4ns had to defend every (U) American, English, Scottlsh, Polish, where, and this left them too weak at qsny French, and ~t'lllan a1"111ies clashed in a points, and unable to move forces to the bat decisive land battle in Normandy from June tlefield. When they did try co move, the till September 1944, tn one of the cnajor cam radio co~municationa were deciphered in ti~e paigns of modern history. Ralf a million Ger to paralyze che movements and prepare lll8n troops we re lost, most of them killed; defenses. The cardinal contribution of COMINT their SO infantry di visions and 12 panier was that it allowed the Allied aralies to divisons had been reduced to 24 infantry divi defeat the German Schwerpunkt tactics by giv sions at quarter s trength, and 11 panzer divi ing prior knowledge of intentions. (6) In sions had shrunk from 150 to 10 tanks each. general, the Allied armies were no match, tsnk Even the destruction of the Army Group Center for tank or battalion for battalion, with the in June and J uly 1944 by 140 Soviet rifle and first-line Gerwan divisions. General Alan t ank divisions, which had cost 300,000 German Brooke, British Chief of Staff, considered the soldiers, was a l esser defeat. '.l'he Western Ger111ans the best soldiers in the world and Allies had coruiitted only 34 divisions to the tried to keep the British forces away from battle against the 62 German divisions. When them by a "peripheral" strategy, while the t he Cennans finally loet in Normandy, they Americans sought a direct cross-Channel attack lost all of Prance and fled in disorder to the to destroy the German Ar'lllies in the field. Dutch frontier. Normandy was the result of this prolonged diaseat on Allied strategy. (U) John Keegan, a l ecturer at Sandhurst whose previous book The Face of Battle became (U) The British had sound reasons for a minor c lasslc, has written synoptic accounts regarding the German A[{'!Jy with caution. In of six different dlvisions in their moat crit World War I the GeTIUan Army was the only one i cal battles in Normandy, to illustrate not in Europe that did not have ~utlniee. It only the key events in the battle seen froin marched out of the Rhineland in 1919 in per battalion down t o squad level, but also co fect order, still willing to fight. In Wo~ld i l lustrate so~ething of t he national character War II the Get111an soldiers fought until the of the different a nDies. Where did the troops last few days of the war and Germany had to be and we apons come from? Why did they fight? invaded and crushed; they would not surrender How did they fight ? How did they react to the as long as they could still fight. At Dieppe stress of 194 4 warfare? in 1942 an invading force of 5000 Canadian Sep 82 • CRYPTOLOG * Page l 'i'9P 868RB'f ~!!B R:tt DOCID: 4 0 11953 Ter seeae? YtUtM (U) At the end o! June, the Panzer d1vl- 1ion1 v•re coacaitt1d to the battle and t he 9t~ and 10th SS Panc•r•, Who lat•r de1troyed t~ Srltlah • nd PoUth 1>4rochutltl• ot ArnhH l)J . v~ce taken (roe the Kueatan froot end llOYed to t een. Yhert they •aa•h•d tnto the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Htghlandece 1n the ~scoctleh Corridor'" veat of Caen. An Ut.tkA d.crypt revealed the ••,••bly a r•• ol t he Cenaan 1tt•cking force and na val aunnery de1troyed the Ceruo eri.or b1foce st could eount l t1 attack in Corce. Thi• COM.INT a11J1t vaa he l p~ ful, for the Scott had no tank1 end only 1l• p0under &uns and PlAT antltenk woapona for thetr in••pecienced infantry, in their t1c1t beetle. to tight SS '•acer 1old1er1 \lfho began thett ver la Poi.nd •nd had epent 1ovorel ye.are tn araored W'arfare 1n R.u11ta. (U) ae~1 u•~ the CGT111an1 h~d no navy LeCt , excepL U-Boata, and no effective air force, they vere unable to dr1v4 oCf the supportioa talk (oree, vhtch f tted 00 co11tel caraett for veeke Vith long-r•ns• indirect tire. The1e Al lJed 111tt• wee• not alway• well u1Mi how evec, for the helple•• clt7 of Caen waa reduced to rubble by naval gi.inf1ce and then lurther dcva.acat~d by ~ <DA~tive atrat11te soldiers atc.e.c:k.ed e eoa$CU t own defended by .a bombing o~r•tion because Hoot&o=ery did not &•trlson of 400 Ceru.in aoldt•r• and ne.rly ell w•nt to •xpoee his troo_p:e to heavy l o11e1 by v ~r~ kflled t..n aptte of l2-c.o- l odd1. ftte t he G~t."-1bAn1. The Germane were not i n Ca~n. 10 Ceman Sold1e~s tn 1942 1orere tn France tra1n there V a$ no ailitPtY Tesult. lhe French. tng for OC" r-ehabllS cat1ng frOfll the a.oast.a n t~ytng to au~viue i n cellar•, vete burled ea111.pai&TI· !a 1944 ta.an)' of the delend1ng. undQr more rubble. Ari. lnaane daylwa, ~ced as dtviti ona at Normandy ~~re bodenstaendige a r efuge and hospltal in t he outsktrte of di vision ,, equipped vltb c a ptured fo r eign Caen, was devsstaLed by Allied bo•bJn.g. Th• weapons or other t.n terJor equtp~ent , v lt~out Ce r~so&, ~o ~ever. had to keep huge foraat1ons ~r•nspor c, $nd the soldters were old ot unfit. t ied u9 defending coasts from Norvay to ltel7 Thanks to the e ~cellent Allied ~nt ~llig ence, because they could not QCltch All i ed mobill ty ttost of 1-t froo CO~tNl' (&l thougb Ke~g_a.n doc..s .and to.tee !tt sea or in the a i r. As aoo.n aa not mention this}, the ini t ial landi ngs were t hey t cied to aove forces, COMI NT Teed the ir ..t.med •t che..9e relat.Jve weak spots .