The University of San Francisco USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences 1997 Aquinas's Account of Double Effect Thomas A. Cavanaugh University of San Francisco,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/phil Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Cavanaugh, Thomas A., "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect" (1997). Philosophy. Paper 33. http://repository.usfca.edu/phil/33 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. T. A. Cavanaugh, Philosophy, University of San Francisco Penultimate Draft of: Aquinas's Account of Double Effect, The Thomist, Vol. 61, No.1, January 1997, pp. 107-121. AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF DOUBLE EFFECT THOMAS A. CAVANAUGH UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO In this paper, I present Aquinas's account of double-effect reasoning (DER) -- often called the "principle," "rule," or "doctrine" of double effect. Often, if not always, DER is attributed to Thomas Aquinas tout court.i Yet, I will argue, Thomas's account substantially differs from contemporary double-effect reasoning (DER) insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of risking an assailant's life while contemporary accounts of DER focus on actions causing harm foreseen as inevitable.ii Of course, if DER applies to cases in which harm is foreseen as an inevitable result of an otherwise good action, it will apply to cases in which harm is foreseen as being a possible consequence.