TITLE V. — PRESCRIPTION Chapter 1

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TITLE V. — PRESCRIPTION Chapter 1 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES TITLE V. — PRESCRIPTION Chapter 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. In the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescrip- tion. COMMENT: (1) Defi nition of Prescription Prescription is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights thru the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law, namely, that the posses- sion should be: (a) in the concept of an owner (b) public (c) peaceful (d) uninterrupted. (Arts. 1106, 1118, Civil Code). (e) adverse. In order that a possession may really be adverse, the claimant must clearly, defi nitely, and unequivocally notify the owner of his (the claimant’s) intention to avert an exclusive ownership in himself. (Clendenin v. Clendenin, 181 N.C. 465 and Director of Lands v. Abiertas, CA-GR 91-R, Mar. 13, 1947, 44 O.G. 923). 1 Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2) Proof Needed Because prescription is an extraordinary mode of acquiring ownership, all the essential ingredients, particularly the period of time, must be shown clearly. (Boyo v. Makabenta, CA-GR 7941-R, Nov. 24, 1952). (3) Reasons or Bases for Prescription (a) Economic necessity (otherwise, property rights would re- main unstable). Director of Lands, et al. v. Funtillar, et al. GR 68533, May 23, 1986 FACTS: Where the land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33 years ago, and is no longer a forest land, and the same has been possessed and cultivated by the applicants and their predecessors for at least three generations. HELD: The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged. (b) Freedom from judicial harassment (occasioned by claims without basis). (c) Convenience in procedural matters (in certain instances, juridical proof is dispensed with). (d) Presumed abandonment or waiver (in view of the owner’s indifference or inaction). (4) Classifi cation of Prescription (a) as to whether rights are acquired or lost: 1) acquisitive prescription (prescription of ownership and other real rights). a) ordinary prescription b) extraordinary prescription 2 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1106 2) extinctive prescription (“liberatory prescription;’’ pre- scription of actions); (“Statute of Limitations’’). (b) as to the object or subject matter: 1) prescription of property a) prescription of real property b) prescription of personal rights 2) prescription of rights (5) Laches Laches (or “estoppel by laches”) is unreasonable delay in the bringing of a cause of action before the courts of justice. Thus, if an action prescribes say in ten (10) years, it should be brought to court as soon as possible, without waiting for 8 or 9 years, unless the delay can be justifi ably explained (as when there is a search for evidence). Note therefore, that while an action has not yet prescribed, it may no longer be brought to court because of laches. As defi ned by the Supreme Court, “laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. However, courts will not be bound by strictures of the statute of limitations or laches when manifest wrong or injuries would result thereby.” (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175). Arradaza, et al. v. CA & Larrazabal GR 50422, Feb. 8, 1989 The principle of laches is a creation of equity. It is applied, not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. (6) Rationale for Laches If a person fails to act as soon as possible in vindication of an alleged right, it is possible that the right does not really exist. 3 Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (7) ‘Prescription’ Distinguished from ‘Laches’ Mapa III v. Guanzon 77 SCRA 387 While prescription is concerned with the FACT of delay, laches deals with the EFFECT of unreasonable delay. David v. Bandin GR 48322, Apr. 8, 1987 FACTS: A and B, husband and wife, died intestate, leaving two children, X and Y. X had been administering the property until her death in Feb. 15, 1955. Plaintiffs, the children of Y, were given their shares of the fruits of the property, though irregular and at times little, depending on the amount of the harvest. On April 23, 1963, plaintiffs, the children of Y, sent a letter of demand to the heirs of X for partition, and on June 14, 1963, or within a period of approximately 8 years from X’s death, fi led their complaint against X’s heirs. HELD: Plaintiffs cannot be held guilty of laches, nor is their claim barred by prescription. Plaintiffs were not guilty of negligence nor did they sleep on their rights. Prescription generally does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co- ownership. While implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the rule does not apply where a fi duciary relation exists and the trustee recognizes the trust. Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court GR 67742, Oct. 29, 1987 In determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confi dential relationship between the parties is an important circumstance for considera- tion. A delay under such circumstance is not as strictly regarded as where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay. 4 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1106 Narciso Buenaventura & Maria Buenaventura v. CA & Manotok Realty, Inc. GR 50837, Dec. 28, 1992 The defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on the same change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescrip- tion is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fi xed time; laches is not. (8) Constitutional Provision The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public offi cials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescrip- tion, laches, or estoppel. (Sec. 15, Art. XI, The 1987 Philippine Constitution). (9) Cases Republic v. Animas 56 SCRA 871 Prescription does not run against the State, especially be- cause the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties has become a State policy. Aldovino v. Alunan III 49 SCAD 340 (1994) Prescription must yield to the higher interest of justice. Francisco v. CA 122 SCRA 538 Philippine jurisprudence shows that the fi ling of the com- plaint, even if merely for purposes of preliminary examination 5 Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES or investigation, suspends and interrupts the running of the prescriptive period. (10) Prescriptive Period on Registered Land covered by Tor- rens System Quirino Mateo & Matias v. Dorotea Diaz, et al. GR 137305, Jan. 17, 2002 FACTS: The land involved is registered under the Tor- rens system in the name of petitioners’ father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised with respect to the validity of the title. Immediately after petitioners discovered the existence of OCT 206 in 1977 or 1978, they took steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided the land between the two of them in an extrajudicial partition. Then petitioners fi led the case below to recover ownership and possession as the only surviving children of original owners, the late Claro Mateo. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bulacan, at Malolos, ruled that prescription and laches are applicable against petitioners, that real actions over an immovable prescribe after 30 years, that ownership can be acquired thru possession in good faith and with just title for a period of 10 years, and that ownership may be acquired thru uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of just title or of good faith. The Court of Appeals (CA) affi rmed that of the trial court, thus, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches may override a provision of the Land Registration Act on impre- scriptibility of title to registered land. Otherwise put, the issue raised is whether prescription and the equitable principle of laches are applicable in derogation of the title of the registered owner. HELD: A party who had fi led immediately a case as soon as he discovered that the land in question was covered by a transfer certifi cate in the name of another person is not guilty of laches. (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas, 92 SCRA 389 [1979]). An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribe in view of the provision of Sec. 44 of Act 496 (now 6 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art.

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