CALL 11-23 Handbook [PDF]

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, MCFI, ABCA For Official Use Only JIIM CHALLENGES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Challenges in the Geographic Combatant Commands Table of Contents Introduction 1 Integrating Civilian and Military Activities 3 Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. Partner Nation Capacity Building: Setting Conditions for Success 15 Colonel Kenneth J. Crawford Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction: Introducing a Roadmap for Peace 23 Beth Cole and Emily Hsu “Africa’s Future Is Up to Africans:” Putting the President’s Words into Action 33 General William E. “Kip” Ward and Colonel Thomas P. Galvin Forward in Africa: U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. Army in Africa Major General William B. Garrett III, Colonel Stephen J. Mariano, and 43 Major Adam Sanderson Setting—and Capitalizing on—Conditions for Progress in Afghanistan 55 General David H. Petraeus Operation New Dawn: Building a Long-Term Strategic Partnership Through Stability Operations 63 General Raymond T. Odierno Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partnership Capacity 67 Admiral James G. Stavridis and Colonel Bart Howard Taming the Outlaw Sea 73 Admiral James G. Stavridis and Lieutenant Commander Richard E. LeBron i CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Compatible Interface 83 General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Dr. Biff Baker NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], USNORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] Commander Outlines 93 Focus Areas at Homeland Security Symposium Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Doscher ‘Mission One’ at NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command]: Defending the Homeland 97 Staff Sergeant Jim Greenhill The Parting of the Sulawesi Sea: U.S. Strategy and Transforming the Terrorist Transit Triangle 101 Charles “Ken” Comer Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula 109 Colonel David S. Maxwell The Top Seven Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the Americas 119 Frank O. Mora and Nicholas F. Zimmerman Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen, Major General Floriano Peixoto Vieira 129 Neto, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Nolan, Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, and Commander Joseph Althouse ii JIIM CHALLENGES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS Center for Army Lessons Learned Director COL Thomas H. Roe Division Chief Larry K. Hollars CALL Analyst Ken Teasdale, CALL Contractor Editor Karen Blakeman Graphic Artist Dan Neal, CALL Contractor The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended. Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system. iii JIIM CHALLENGES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS Introduction The following collection of articles focus on U.S. joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) activities, challenges, issues, and operations in the six U.S. geographic combatant commands (GCCs). Today, stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq rightfully receive the lion’s share of attention, priority, and media coverage. There are, however, many other challenges, potential dangers, and future threats in the other five GCCs that merit attention and continuous observation and evaluation. The GCCs operate in challenging and complex environments, tackling a vast array of JIIM challenges and issues each day. The intent of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is to illustrate some of the current challenges in this newsletter and highlight operations at the strategic or theater levels. This newsletter contains three overview JIIM articles. The remaining articles highlight challenges or issues specific to one of the GCCs; several were written by the GCC commanders. These articles cover a wide range of issues with the specific intent of informing the reader and sharing challenges, best practices, and lessons learned. The articles should not be considered all- inclusive. Topics include: • Building partnership capacity. • Full-spectrum operations. • Planning for potentially failing states. • Integrating civilian and military activities. • JIIM exercises and training. • Drug and human trafficking. • Piracy. • Transnational threats. • Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. • Disaster response. • Homeland security. • Establishing professional relationships. The articles in this newsletter — drawn from recent issues of professional journals or CALL and other joint archives and websites — were selected to capture current, relevant, JIIM articles that will inform Soldiers and leaders on challenges and issues and provide a useful document for personnel assigned to JIIM positions in the future. Many JIIM challenges are unique to a particular geographic region; others are shared challenges. If there is an overriding priority or theme to this collection, it is certainly the goal of building partnership capacity. This appears to be the top priority in each of the GCCs. 1 CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED Many ideas presented in these articles are personal opinion, and some may not be approved Army doctrine. The recommendations in these articles should always be validated with the latest approved joint and Army doctrine. CALL acknowledges and thanks the authors, professional journals, managing editors, and public affairs personnel who assisted in obtaining and reprinting these articles. Minor modifications to format were made to support the CALL newsletter format. In some instances, pictures that were not referenced in the narrative were deleted to save space and detailed biographies were removed to avoid the release of personal information. 2 JIIM CHALLENGES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS Integrating Civilian and Military Activities Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., Ph.D. Director of Military History and Strategy, Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College Reprinted with permission from the Spring 2010 issue of Parameters, U.S. Army War College. Americans have a predilection for neat categories of activity and clear divisions of labor. One manifestation of this tendency is emphasis on a clear division between military and political realms and a related belief in a clean separation of military and civilian activities. But war is a complicated and messy human phenomenon that defies easy categorization.The fundamentally political core of war admits to few natural limits. The stakes of war are usually profound, and therefore the effective remedies can be no less intense. The deliberately contested allegiance of the local population pulls all aspects of societal functioning into the ambit of a counterinsurgency. Denying success to insurgents demands comprehensive solutions that cut across the political, economic, and cultural elements of the afflicted society. In stable, mature social systems, efficient arrangements develop to meet agreed needs. Insurgents use violence to deliberately target these neat and optimized arrangements to tear apart the sinews of society. They often seek to undermine social delivery mechanisms. This behavior is why it is not sufficient (albeit still necessary) for counterinsurgents to simply counter the violence of insurgents; they also strive to defeat the population-centered insurgent strategy. The unequal utility of violence to affect societal frameworks, which are much easier to destroy than to create, requires counterinsurgents to take an expansive approach to the instruments of conflict. Counterinsurgents work to sustain, rebuild, or even strengthen societal structures in the midst of violence. This program of work requires both civilian and military efforts directed toward a comprehensive solution. It has been widely noted that the solution to an insurgency is more political than military; but make no mistake, violence defines the environment within which the instruments of counterinsurgents are brought to bear. In such a milieu, military forces are crucial to thwarting both the insurgents’ violence and the effects the insurgents seek to generate from that violence. Although conventional military efforts are necessary and important in counterinsurgency (COIN), they are only effective if integrated into a comprehensive strategy that addresses all relevant societal needs. This requirement is frequently expressed in terms of applying the appropriate instruments of national power. The logical relationship of agency to effort, however, is secondary to the necessary societal outcome. Put another way, solving a problem is more important than who solves it. Ideally, a society’s needs will be met by those organizations having the most appropriate expertise or comparative advantage in a particular task. Realistically, the counterinsurgents will have to rely on whoever can perform a particular task when and where it is needed rather than standing on formality about who should perform it. Quite frequently, the representatives of the counterinsurgents who are present and can act are the armed forces. Sheer capacity and the logic of one of the most fundamental aspects of warfare, the control of physical space (and the people and material in it), will often place members of the armed forces at crucial societal nodes. 3 CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED This article presents

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