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A Paris Reset on Hezbollah? Implications for French Interests and Lebanese Security

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A Paris Reset on Hezbollah? Implications for French Interests and Lebanese Security THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY n OCTOBER 2020 n PN87 President Emmanuel Macron talks with a French naval officer in view of the Beirut skyline and the wreckage from the August 2020 explosion. Photo: REUTERS MATTHEW LEVITT A Paris Reset on Hezbollah? Implications for French Interests and Lebanese Security n late September 2020, Hezbollah threw a wrench into French president Emmanuel Macron’s efforts to stabilize the Lebanese political system following the tragic August 4 explosion in Beirut. It did so by insisting that the party or its allies remain in control of key ministries as a condition of any future government or I 1 program of political reform. Hezbollah seeks to preserve its own interests, but it is also effectively serving as the militant defender of the corruption and cronyism of the current government system. President Macron’s response was uncharacteristically blunt for a French politician speaking about Hezbollah. In a public statement, Macron said, “Hezbollah cannot operate at the same time as an army against Israel, a militia unleashed against civilians in Syria and a respectable political party in Lebanon.”2 Within days, Israel released information about still more © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. MATTHEW LEVITT Hezbollah precision-guided-missile production facilities in residential areas of Beirut, underscoring HEZBOLLAH’S HISTORY OF ATTACKING the group’s use of Lebanese civilians as human FRENCH INTERESTS shields protecting the group’s military arsenal.3 Macron’s new take on Hezbollah reflects a position Though the narrative is little known, Hezbollah has a not often articulated by French leaders: that the long history of targeting French interests domestically group should not be considered a legitimate political and abroad. By contributing French personnel to the party in Lebanon worthy of respect so long as it also United Nations Multinational Force in Lebanon engages in acts of terrorism and militancy targeting (MNF), which aimed to end the country’s civil war, its neighbors. The natural extension of Macron’s and by supporting Iraq during its war with Iran, statement is that France should support efforts to France found itself in Hezbollah’s crosshairs by the have the European Union designate Hezbollah in its early 1980s. On August 5, 1983, operatives from entirety if the group—which its own leaders insist is a Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization—the group’s single, unitary organization4—continues to engage in terrorist wing (aka External Security Organization, or terrorist and militant activities. ESO)—fired rocket-propelled grenades at the French embassy in Beirut.9 The next day, the group targeted An EU designation of Hezbollah writ large would the French ambassador’s residence. Two months further French interests in Lebanon, the Levant more later, on October 23, 1983, Hezbollah suicide broadly, and even at home. Beyond Hezbollah’s bombers struck the barracks of U.S. and French political and militant machinations in Lebanon, forces in Beirut.10 Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad designating the group would help address its recent Organization claimed responsibility for the attacks, activities in France and its recruitment of French which killed 241 U.S. soldiers, 58 French soldiers, citizens as operatives to help carry out terrorist and 6 civilians. attacks abroad. In March 1984, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Consider, for example, that according to U.S. reported that French officials expressed concern about officials, Hezbollah has been stockpiling caches of pro-Iran militants targeting French interests in Lebanon ammonium nitrate—used to make explosives for and throughout the Middle East.11 The CIA believed terrorist attacks—in Europe, including in France.5 such concerns were warranted, citing the February 22 In September 2020, Bulgaria’s Specialized killing of a French soldier at a UN MNF position in Criminal Court convicted two Hezbollah operatives Beirut. On June 6, 1984, Hezbollah snipers killed one of conducting the July 2012 bus bombing at Burgas’s and wounded two French truce observers.12 Sarafovo Airport, which killed six and wounded many more.6 A third Hezbollah operative, French-Lebanese Even as Hezbollah kidnappings focused on Western dual citizen Mohammad Hassan El-Husseini, died nationals in Lebanon, including French citizens like carrying out that attack.7 Two plots in Cyprus, in Christian Joubert, Hezbollah started to expand its 2012 and 2015, also reveal telling touch points to targeting to Europe as well.13 In February 1984, France.8 Beyond these plots, a close look at recent Hezbollah operatives participated in the Iran-led Hezbollah illicit financing cases reveals a common assassination of a regime critic and Paris resident, French thread, underscoring that France’s Hezbollah Gholam Ali Oveisi, and his brother on Paris’s Rue problem is a factor not just of events in Lebanon but de Passy.14 That same month, the CIA reported that at home as well. Husayn al-Musawi, whose Islamic Amal group was then merging into Hezbollah, was entering into an 2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY MATTHEW LEVITT A PARIS RESET ON HEZBOLLAH? agreement with Venezuelan terrorist Carlos the Jackal retaliation. Today, a primary concern French officials (aka Ilich Ramirez Sanchez) to cooperate on terrorist articulate about designating Hezbollah in its entirety operations in Europe, especially those targeting is that the group could retaliate by striking French French interests.15 The CIA reported at the same forces serving in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon time that multiple sources indicated pro-Iran groups (UNIFIL).23 In fact, many countries have designated intended to target U.S. or French interests in Europe.16 Hezbollah in full, and in no case did the group respond with retaliatory attacks. Moreover, regardless The years 1985–86 saw more French citizens of whether France were to designate Hezbollah in full, kidnapped in Lebanon and additional attacks the group already targets French soldiers attached targeting French soldiers there, including the to UNIFIL. Indeed, while France has been effectively September 1986 assassination of French military deterred from taking action against Hezbollah, attaché Christian Gouttière outside the French the group periodically works to undermine French embassy annex in East Beirut.17 In June 1985, threat interests in Lebanon. After a Hezbollah arms cache levels were high enough that the CIA warned of exploded in July 2009 in Khirbet Selim, in southern an increased likelihood of “attacks against U.S., Lebanon, Hezbollah supporters attacked and French, or Kuwaiti interests in the near future,”18 given injured French peacekeepers sent to investigate the Hezbollah’s inability to achieve its goals through acts explosion.24 And in July 2011, Hezbollah detonated such as kidnapping Westerners in Lebanon. Then, a roadside bomb near Saida, Lebanon, wounding Hezbollah operative Fouad Ali Salah orchestrated a six French peacekeeping troops.25 Five months series of Paris bombings that terrorized the French later, in December 2011, a bomb left in a trash bin capital from December 1985 to September 1986.19 injured five French UNIFIL peacekeepers and two French authorities ultimately arrested Salah and passersby.26 Ultimately, France decided to fold its several other members of his cell in March 1987, territorial responsibility for the Blue Line central sector including Mohammad Mouhajer, a nephew of into a mobile quick-reaction force.27 Hezbollah leader Ibrahim al-Amin.20 The CIA would later assess that “Hizballah has been HEZBOLLAH ACTIVITIES IN FRANCE trying to extend its operations to Western Europe since at least January [1987], when three Hizballah terrorists, including suspected [TWA 847] hijacker Hezbollah activities undermine French interests not Mohammad Ali Hamadi, were arrested trying to only in Lebanon but at home as well. In public smuggle explosives through Frankfurt, West Germany remarks on September 17, 2020, the U.S. State and Milan, Italy.”21 This analysis appeared prescient Department coordinator for counterterrorism, Nathan when, in November 1989, Spanish authorities Sales, revealed that according to U.S. intelligence, arrested eight men, several of whom were Hezbollah “since 2012, Hezbollah has established caches of operatives, attempting to smuggle 440 pounds of ammonium nitrate throughout Europe by transporting plastic explosives packed into fruit jars from Lebanon first aid kits whose cold packs contain the substance.” into Spain. According to a French police report, the Such caches, he continued, “have been moved explosives were headed for France.22 through Belgium, to France, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland,” adding that “significant ammonium By the 1990s, this history of Hezbollah terrorist nitrate caches have been discovered or destroyed in plotting against French interests at home and abroad France, Greece, and Italy.” Sales concluded, “We had scarred French decisionmakers, who largely have reason to believe that this activity is still under- opted not to cross Hezbollah or Iran and risk terrorist way,” allowing the group to conduct attacks on short POLICY NOTE 87 3 MATTHEW LEVITT notice if instructed to do so by its leadership or that the Treasury exposed one of the most prolific financial of Iran.28 At the same event, Hans-Georg Engelke, supporters of Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization, state secretary at the Germany Federal Ministry of Saleh Assi, a dual French-Lebanese
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