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Written Statement the Republic of Equatorial Guinea

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Written Statement the Republic of Equatorial Guinea INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CASE CONCERNING THE LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA (CAMEROON v. NIGERIA) (EQUATORIAL GUINEA INTERVENING) WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria) (Equatorial Guinea Lntervening) WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 PART 1: THE REASONS WHY EQUATORIAL GUINEA REQUESTED TO INTERVENE ............................................................................... 2 A. The Maritiine Boundary Carnerooii Requests the Court to Determiiie Prejudices Equatorial Guiiiea's Legal Rights and Iiiterests .......... W...:.................... 3 B. Camerooii's Ligne Equitable Falls witliiii tlie Maritiine Area Claiined by Equatorial Guiiiea ............... .................................................... 4 C. The Practical Inadequacies of Article 59 of tlie Statute iii the Circiiinstances of Cainerooii's Ligne Equitable ....................................... 5 PART II: IS THE POSITION ADOPTED BY EQUATORIAL GUINEA REASONABLE IN LAW? ................................................................ 8 A. Relevalit Facts ............................................................................................ 8 1. Salieiit Geographical Facts ......................................................................8 2. Relevant State Activity ... 3. Bouiidary Negotiating Hi a. Uiitil this case, Camerooii agreed tliat tlie maritime jurisdictions of Equatorial Guiiiea, Nigeria and Camerooii meet at a tripoiiit south of the Bakassi Peninsi~la 1 I h. Negotiatioiis with Cainerooii 14 c. Negotiations with Nigeria 15 B. Delimitation Methods ......................... ... ................................................ 16 PART III: THE LEGAL BASIS FOR EQUATORIAL GUINEA'S REQUEST ..................................................................... 17 A. Iiiteriiatioiial Courts and Triburials Take Care to Avoid Prejudice to the Legal Riglits and Iiiterests of Non-Party Tliird States ..................................... B. Camerooil Miscoiistrues the Frontier Dispute Case ...................................... 20 C. Caineroon Misconstrues the Libya/Malta Judgineiits ................................... 2 1 D. The Distinction Made by tlie Court in tlie East Timor Case as Applied to a Classical Maritime Boundary Third-State Sitiiatioii ............23 E. Maritime Tripoints are a Corninon Problein ................... .... ..................... 24 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 25 List of Annexes EGWS 1. Equatorial Guiiiea Note Verbal to Cameroon dated 25 August 1998 ............. A- I EGWS 2. Minutes of the Tliird Session of the Nigeria-Cainerooii Joint Meeting of Experts on Boundary Matiers, 11-13 August 1993, Nigeriaii Rejoiiider, Aniiex NR 173 ...................... ...................................................................... A-5 EGWS 3. Joint Commuiiiqué from the Meeting of Delegatioiis of Eqtiatorial Guiiiea and Cainerooii to Discuss Matters Related to the Maritime Bouiidary, 3 August 1993 ..................................................................................................... A- 19 EGWS 4. List of Coastal Basepoiiit Coordiiiates Provided to Equatorial Guiiiea by Cainerooii, 20 August 1993 ..................... ................................................... A-25 List of Maas Map 1 (para. 14) Tlie Median Line aiid La Ligne Equitable Map 2 (para. 26) Figure 10.4 froin tlie Nigeria11Rejoiiider Map 3 (para. 27) Map of the Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures, Republic of Camerooii, Depictiiig Cainerooii's 1999-2000 Licensing Round Map 4 (para. 30) Map 5 Accompanying Cainerooii's Application Depicting tlie Equatorial Guiiiea, Nigeria, Cainerooii Tripoiiit Map 5 (para. 30) Map Accompaiiying Camerooii's Mernorial (Aiiiiex C.M. 383, M52) Identifying the Geographical Coordinates of tlie Equatorial Guiiiea, Nigeria, Cameroon Tripoiiit Map 6 (para. 3 1) Caineroon Concession Map Illustratiiig the Tripoint (Caineroon Reply, Map R25) Map 7 (para. 56) Map Depicting the Area oii Malta's Side of tlie Mediaii Liiie wliicll Was Protected for Italy at Its Request iii tlie Libya/Maltcr Case 1, Ricardo Maiigiie Obama N'Fube, Miiiister of State for Labor and Social Security, Agent of tlie Republic of Equatorial Guiiiea before tlie Interiiatioiial Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary beiween Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria) (Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Iiereby certify pursuaiit to Article 50 of the Rules of the Court tliat tlie copies of tlie documents in tlie Annexes aiid the inaps appeariiig in tlie Written Stateinent of Equatorial Guiiiea are true copies of the origiiials or of documeiits in the referenced sources. 1 further certify pursuaiit to Article 51, paragraph 3 of the Statute of the Court tliat al1 traiislatioiis of docurneiits iii the Annexes to the Writteii Statemeiit are true to tlie origiiials. Ricardo Mangue Obama N'Fube Agent of Equatorial Guinea INTRODUCTION 1 This Wntten Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guiilea is siibmitted iil accordarice with the Order of 21 Octoher 1999 in the Case Concerning the Lund and Maritime Bounduiy Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria). III that Order the Court perrnitted Equatorial Guinea "to intervene in the case, pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute, to the extent, iii the manner and for the purposes set out in its Application for permission to intervene," aiid it established the tiine-limit for the filing of this Written Statemerit.' 2 The Application of Equatorial Guinea to which the Court's Order refers was filed witli the Court on 30 June 1999. Equatorial Guinea is clear in that Application that it does ]lot seek to be a Party to the case before the Court, that it is only concerned with the maritime boundary aspects of the case before the Court, and that: ". it is the purpose of Equatorial Guinea's intervention to inform the Court of Equatorial Guinea's legal rights and interests so that these may remain unaffected as the Court proceeds to address the question of the maritime bouildary between Cameroon and Nigeria."2 3 In the circumstances, as a non-party to the case, Equatorial Guinea does not seek a determination of its rights; as stated above, its purpose is simply to inform the Court so that its legal rights and interests may remain unaffected. 4 Protecting Equatorial Guinea's legal rights and interests iil this case does not iinply that the Court must endorse Equatorial Guinea's maritime claims as boundaries; it only requires a recognition that Equatorial Guinea's legal rights and interests as embodied in its maritime claims exist, that they are not unreasonable, and that they are not before the Court for determination and ' LandandMaritirne Boundav Behveen Canzeroon andNigeriu, Ordw of21 October 1999,I.C.J Reports 1999, para. 18. Application for Permission to lntervene of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (hereafter "EG Application"), Land and Maritime Boundary Behveen Cameroon and Nigeria, 30 June 1999, p. 6. authorized by Equatorial Guinea on its side of the median line, throughout the full period of Equatorial Guinea's independence, and even prior thereto, including the issuance of oil concessions and the active exploitation of continental shelf resources."J 8 Equatorial Guinea notes that in Cameroon's letter to the Court dated 16 August 1999 coinmenting on Equatorial Guinea's Application, and in Cameroon's Reply filed on 4 April 2000,s Cameroon for the first time reserves its position as to the median line as an appropriate maritime boundary between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea but it did not contest Equatorial Guinea's statement that Cameroon had never once prior to presenting its Memorial acted inconsistently with a median line maritime boundary between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. A. The Maritime Boundaw Cameroon Resuests the Court to Determine Preiudices Eauatorial Guinea's Leeal Rights and Interests 9 The most basic meanings of Cameroon's Ligne Equituble must be stated. They are, simply, that: 1) Cameroon believes the waters south and east of Cameroon's Ligne Eqzrituhle belong to Cameroon, not to Equatorial Guinea; 2) in spite of a long history of dispute and now agreement and cooperation, there would be no maritime boundary between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria; and 3) in spite of a long history of concurrence among the three States, there would be no Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon maritime tripoint. The implication of Cainerooiî's Ligne Equitable is that Equatorial Guinea's Biolco Island is entitled only to an enclave surrounded by Cameroon waters. 10 As iloted above, and as will be addressed more fully below, Cameroon's Ligne Equituble reflects a fundamental change of position, totally inconsistent with the diplomatic and legal actions of Cameroon which until this case have been based on the median line witli Equatorial Guinea and the determination of the tripoint between the three neighboring States. EG Application, pp. 7-8 (footnote omitted). ' Reply of Cameroon (hereafier "CR"), para. 9.143 11 Cameroon's Ligne Equitable is not only inconsistent with Cameroon's State practice. it is not consisteilt with Cameroon's request to the Court for a determination of its
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