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David Hume (1711-1776) David Hume Was Born in Edinburgh, Scot- in 1751

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David Hume (1711-1776) David Hume Was Born in Edinburgh, Scot- in 1751 Study Questions 1. What is Hume’s objection to the belief in miracles, and what are his three arguments against attempts to establish the existence of God? 2. How is Hume’s “bundle” theory of the self different from his description of the “constant and invariable” impression from which we supposedly get our idea of the self? 3. How can we think that a succession of similar perceptions of a thing (e.g. a ship) identifies them as perceptions of the same thing? 4. Why does Hume say that our sense of self is due simply to the customary association of ideas (through resemblance, cause-and-effect, and memory) and is not based on any real connection? 5. In his Appendix to the Treatise, Hume says that all distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. How does his adoption of these beliefs complicate his ability to provide a theory of the self? David Hume (1711-1776) David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scot- in 1751. Hume also published Essays, Moral land, in 1711 and attended the University of and Political in 1741-42, Political Dis- Edinburgh in the 1720s. After studying for courses in 1752, and a six-volume History of several years, he went to France in 1734 and England (1754–62). Hume’s Dialogues Con- wrote his first major work, A Treatise of cerning Natural Religion was published post- Human Nature, published anonymously in humously in 1779. Unlike many of his philo- 1739. Hume was disappointed with how it sophical predecessors and contemporaries, was received, remarking that it “fell dead- Hume never held an academic position. He born from the press, without reaching such was nominated for positions at Edinburgh (in distinction as even to excite a murmur among 1744-45) and Glasgow (in 1751), but opposi- the zealots.” In the next few decades, Hume tion from clergy was decisive in both cases. reworked the content of the Treatise and Instead Hume was employed in a variety of published Philosophical Essays Concerning ways, for example, as a tutor to Marquess of Human Understanding (later: An Enquiry Annandale, as a private secretary to General Concerning Human Understanding) in 1748, St. Clair (who was involved in plans to invade Dissertation on the Passions in 1757, and An Canada) and to Lord Hertford (Ambassador Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to France), as a librarian for the Advocates 128 Library in Edinburgh, and as Undersecretary rational argument that establishes their exis- of State (Northern Department). tence). In Part Four Hume also discusses his In Hume’s first major philosophical work, account of the mind including personal iden- A Treatise of Human Nature, Book One tity, an issue he famously revisits in the concerns the understanding and traditional Appendix to the Treatise. issues in epistemology and metaphysics. The situation Hume faces with respect to Book Two is on the passions and discusses the self and self-consciousness is as follows. emotions. Book Three deals with morality in In light of his empiricist principle according light of the discussion of the passions in Book to which all ideas must be derived from Two. Thus, Hume’s Treatise covers many impressions, Hume looks for an impression traditional areas of philosophical inquiry. of substance and discovers that he can find Book One of the Treatise has four Parts. none. In Part Four of Book One, Hume recog- Part One lays out Hume’s empiricist princi- nizes that this general point applies to the self ples: All ideas are copies of impressions, All as well. For when he considers his own mind, ideas are related to each other by means of he discovers that he can find no impression of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. In an enduring and identical self (or immaterial light of these principles, Hume then gives an substance) that underlies all of his thoughts. account of our ideas of substances, modes, As he puts it: “For my part, when I enter most relations, and abstract ideas. Part Two dis- intimately into what I call myself, I always cusses ideas of space and time (e.g., whether stumble on some particular perception or they are infinitely divisible) and existence. other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or Part Three undertakes a detailed examination hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch of an important foundation of our knowledge, myself at any time without a perception and cause and effect relations. It also develops an never can observe anything but the percep- account of belief that builds on the theory of tion.” As a result, on Hume’s account, the self ideas introduced earlier. Part Four discusses a is nothing more than a collection or “bundle” number of implications of Hume’s theory of of perceptions rather than an immaterial sub- ideas and causality. Hume explains how his stance in which thoughts might inhere. How- theories do and do not result in skepticism ever, in a famous passage from the Appendix, with respect to reason and the senses. In the Hume expresses his dissatisfaction with this latter case, Hume is especially concerned to account, noting that it raises difficulties provide an account of why we believe in the which, though not “absolutely insuperable,” existence of bodies (given that there is no are “too hard for my understanding.” 129 Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Given this understanding of causality, Understanding is a shortened treatment of the Hume considers a variety of traditional philo- issues discussed in Book One of the Treatise. sophical issues in the Enquiry, at times Its main focus (after briefly introducing his coming to rather provocative conclusions. theory of ideas in §§ l–3) is on causality and For example, in § 8 he argues that liberty the implications of it for issues such as liber- (which we now call free will) is not only com- ty, miracles, and belief in the existence of patible with, but is actually required by deter- God. Hume’s main thesis is that the tradi- minism. Determinism holds because we do tional notion of causality, which involves a find a constant conjunction between motives necessary connection between cause and and actions and we have come to expect this effect, is mistaken. For in any single instance kind of correlation. If liberty is defined as a of causality, we do not see anything that con- power of acting or not acting according to the nects the cause and the effect with necessity. determinations of the will (i.e., as occurring In line with his general empiricist stance, when one’s action is not constrained by Hume notes that all one ever sees is one event external, non–volitional factors), then it is followed by another, whether the events are clear that everyone admits liberty. But obvi- the motions of bodies or thoughts in a mind. ously there is no conflict between the con- Nor is reason able to infer a priori any effect stant conjunction of motives and actions and from the presence of any given cause; there the absence of external constraints. Rather, would be no contradiction if the future did not the absence of external constraints seems to resemble the past, and if we were presented require the connection between actions and with an object that we had never seen before, motives, since moral judgments depend on reason would not be able to determine its the connection between motives and actions. various effects. Accordingly, Hume revises In § 10 Hume presents his famous argu- our notion of causality and, as an empiricist, ment against miracles. Technically, the argu- the only basis he can find for it is experience ment is not against miracles per se, but rather and habit. Thus, objectively, causality is against the possibility that we could have simply the constant or customary conjunction enough evidence to accept miracles (espe- of the cause and effect, whereas subjectively, cially those that are to be used to justify it is our expectation, formed on the basis of religious belief). If a miracle is defined as a repeated experience in the past rather than on violation of the laws of nature and the laws of reason, that one kind of event will follow nature have been overwhelmingly established another kind of event in the future. by our vast experience, then the evidence in 130 favor of a miracle will always be (and, as humans for their past actions), since neither Hume argues, has always been) less than, or the first inference nor experience can justify at least not greater than, our evidence for the the second inference. Second, one can never laws of nature. Since one should proportion infer the infinite aspects of God’s nature (e.g., one’s belief to the evidence (and since the omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevo- evidence for them is less than the evidence lence, etc.) from the merely finite effects of against them, or at least the evidence against the world. Third, if one has experienced a them cancels the evidence for them), one certain event only once, one might question should not believe in miracles. whether one can infer that a cause is required In § 11 Hume argues that attempts to at all. While these critical points could be establish the existence of God on the basis of taken to be hostile to Christianity (which causality cannot succeed. Hume makes three might justify the clergy’s opposition to main critical points. First, it is illegitimate to Hume), one could also view Hume’s position infer from certain effects (e.g., what we see in as neutral with respect to Christianity, for the world) to a cause (e.g., God) and then to example by being congenial to fideism, the infer further, unobserved effects from that view that one’s fundamental religious cause (e.g., that God will reward or punish convictions are not subject to independent, rational evaluation….
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