Study Questions 1. What is Hume’s objection to the belief in miracles, and what are his three arguments against attempts to establish the existence of God? 2. How is Hume’s “bundle” theory of the self different from his description of the “constant and invariable” impression from which we supposedly get our idea of the self? 3. How can we think that a succession of similar perceptions of a thing (e.g. a ship) identifies them as perceptions of the same thing? 4. Why does Hume say that our sense of self is due simply to the customary association of ideas (through resemblance, cause-and-effect, and memory) and is not based on any real connection? 5. In his Appendix to the Treatise, Hume says that all distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. How does his adoption of these beliefs complicate his ability to provide a theory of the self?

David Hume (1711-1776) David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scot- in 1751. Hume also published Essays, Moral land, in 1711 and attended the University of and Political in 1741-42, Political Dis- Edinburgh in the 1720s. After studying for courses in 1752, and a six-volume History of several years, he went to France in 1734 and England (1754–62). Hume’s Dialogues Con- wrote his first major work, A Treatise of cerning Natural Religion was published post- Human Nature, published anonymously in humously in 1779. Unlike many of his philo- 1739. Hume was disappointed with how it sophical predecessors and contemporaries, was received, remarking that it “fell dead- Hume never held an academic position. He born from the press, without reaching such was nominated for positions at Edinburgh (in distinction as even to excite a murmur among 1744-45) and Glasgow (in 1751), but opposi- the zealots.” In the next few decades, Hume tion from clergy was decisive in both cases. reworked the content of the Treatise and Instead Hume was employed in a variety of published Philosophical Essays Concerning ways, for example, as a tutor to Marquess of Human Understanding (later: An Enquiry Annandale, as a private secretary to General Concerning Human Understanding) in 1748, St. Clair (who was involved in plans to invade Dissertation on the Passions in 1757, and An Canada) and to Lord Hertford (Ambassador Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to France), as a librarian for the Advocates 128

Library in Edinburgh, and as Undersecretary rational argument that establishes their exis- of State (Northern Department). tence). In Part Four Hume also discusses his In Hume’s first major philosophical work, account of the mind including personal iden- A Treatise of Human Nature, Book One tity, an issue he famously revisits in the concerns the understanding and traditional Appendix to the Treatise. issues in epistemology and metaphysics. The situation Hume faces with respect to Book Two is on the passions and discusses the self and self-consciousness is as follows. emotions. Book Three deals with morality in In light of his empiricist principle according light of the discussion of the passions in Book to which all ideas must be derived from Two. Thus, Hume’s Treatise covers many impressions, Hume looks for an impression traditional areas of philosophical inquiry. of substance and discovers that he can find Book One of the Treatise has four Parts. none. In Part Four of Book One, Hume recog- Part One lays out Hume’s empiricist princi- nizes that this general point applies to the self ples: All ideas are copies of impressions, All as well. For when he considers his own mind, ideas are related to each other by means of he discovers that he can find no impression of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. In an enduring and identical self (or immaterial light of these principles, Hume then gives an substance) that underlies all of his thoughts. account of our ideas of substances, modes, As he puts it: “For my part, when I enter most relations, and abstract ideas. Part Two dis- intimately into what I call myself, I always cusses ideas of space and time (e.g., whether stumble on some particular perception or they are infinitely divisible) and existence. other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or Part Three undertakes a detailed examination hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch of an important foundation of our knowledge, myself at any time without a perception and cause and effect relations. It also develops an never can observe anything but the percep- account of belief that builds on the theory of tion.” As a result, on Hume’s account, the self ideas introduced earlier. Part Four discusses a is nothing more than a collection or “bundle” number of implications of Hume’s theory of of perceptions rather than an immaterial sub- ideas and causality. Hume explains how his stance in which thoughts might inhere. How- theories do and do not result in skepticism ever, in a famous passage from the Appendix, with respect to reason and the senses. In the Hume expresses his dissatisfaction with this latter case, Hume is especially concerned to account, noting that it raises difficulties provide an account of why we believe in the which, though not “absolutely insuperable,” existence of bodies (given that there is no are “too hard for my understanding.” 129

Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Given this understanding of causality, Understanding is a shortened treatment of the Hume considers a variety of traditional philo- issues discussed in Book One of the Treatise. sophical issues in the Enquiry, at times Its main focus (after briefly introducing his coming to rather provocative conclusions. theory of ideas in §§ l–3) is on causality and For example, in § 8 he argues that liberty the implications of it for issues such as liber- (which we now call free will) is not only com- ty, miracles, and belief in the existence of patible with, but is actually required by deter- God. Hume’s main thesis is that the tradi- minism. Determinism holds because we do tional notion of causality, which involves a find a constant conjunction between motives necessary connection between cause and and actions and we have come to expect this effect, is mistaken. For in any single instance kind of correlation. If liberty is defined as a of causality, we do not see anything that con- power of acting or not acting according to the nects the cause and the effect with necessity. determinations of the will (i.e., as occurring In line with his general empiricist stance, when one’s action is not constrained by Hume notes that all one ever sees is one event external, non–volitional factors), then it is followed by another, whether the events are clear that everyone admits liberty. But obvi- the motions of bodies or thoughts in a mind. ously there is no conflict between the con- Nor is reason able to infer a priori any effect stant conjunction of motives and actions and from the presence of any given cause; there the absence of external constraints. Rather, would be no contradiction if the future did not the absence of external constraints seems to resemble the past, and if we were presented require the connection between actions and with an object that we had never seen before, motives, since moral judgments depend on reason would not be able to determine its the connection between motives and actions. various effects. Accordingly, Hume revises In § 10 Hume presents his famous argu- our notion of causality and, as an empiricist, ment against miracles. Technically, the argu- the only basis he can find for it is experience ment is not against miracles per se, but rather and habit. Thus, objectively, causality is against the possibility that we could have simply the constant or customary conjunction enough evidence to accept miracles (espe- of the cause and effect, whereas subjectively, cially those that are to be used to justify it is our expectation, formed on the basis of religious belief). If a miracle is defined as a repeated experience in the past rather than on violation of the laws of nature and the laws of reason, that one kind of event will follow nature have been overwhelmingly established another kind of event in the future. by our vast experience, then the evidence in 130

favor of a miracle will always be (and, as humans for their past actions), since neither Hume argues, has always been) less than, or the first inference nor experience can justify at least not greater than, our evidence for the the second inference. Second, one can never laws of nature. Since one should proportion infer the infinite aspects of God’s nature (e.g., one’s belief to the evidence (and since the omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevo- evidence for them is less than the evidence lence, etc.) from the merely finite effects of against them, or at least the evidence against the world. Third, if one has experienced a them cancels the evidence for them), one certain event only once, one might question should not believe in miracles. whether one can infer that a cause is required In § 11 Hume argues that attempts to at all. While these critical points could be establish the existence of God on the basis of taken to be hostile to Christianity (which causality cannot succeed. Hume makes three might justify the clergy’s opposition to main critical points. First, it is illegitimate to Hume), one could also view Hume’s position infer from certain effects (e.g., what we see in as neutral with respect to Christianity, for the world) to a cause (e.g., God) and then to example by being congenial to fideism, the infer further, unobserved effects from that view that one’s fundamental religious cause (e.g., that God will reward or punish convictions are not subject to independent, rational evaluation….

Treatise of Human Nature, I.iv.6 (“Of Personal Identity”) There are some philosophers who imagine evidence, since no proof can be derived from we are every moment intimately conscious of any fact of which we are so intimately con- what we call our self, that we feel its exis- scious, nor is there anything of which we can tence and its continuance in existence, and be certain if we doubt of this. are certain beyond the evidence of a demon- Unluckily all these positive assertions are stration both of its perfect identity and simpli- contrary to that very experience which is city. The strongest sensation, the most violent pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self passion, they say, instead of distracting us after the manner it is here explained. For from from this view, only fix it the more intensely what impression could this idea be derived? and make us consider their influence on self This question it is impossible to answer with- either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a out a manifest contradiction and absurdity, further proof of this would be to weaken its 131

and yet it is a question which must necessarily never can observe anything but the percep- be answered if we would have the idea of self tion. When my perceptions are removed for pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I one impression that gives rise to every real insensible of myself and may truly be said not idea. But self or person. is not any one to exist. And were all my perceptions impression but that to which our several removed by death and could I neither think, impressions and ideas are supposed to have a nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the reference. If any impression gives rise to the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely idea of self, that impression must continue annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further invariably the same through the whole course requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If of our lives, since self is supposed to exist anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced after that manner. But there is no impression reflection, thinks he has a different notion of constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, himself, I must confess I can reason no longer grief and joy, passions and sensations with him. All I can allow him is that he may succeed each other and never all exist at the be in the right as well as I and that we are same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any essentially different in this particular. He of these impressions or from any other that may, perhaps, perceive something simple and the idea of self is derived, and, consequently, continued which he calls himself, though I am there is no such idea. certain there is no such principle in me. But further, what must become of all our But setting aside some metaphysicians of particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? this kind. I may venture to affirm of the rest All these are different, distinguishable and of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle separable from each other, and may be separ- or collection of different perceptions which ately considered, and may exist separately, succeed each other with an inconceivable and have no need of anything to support their rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and move• existence. After what manner therefore do ment. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets they belong to self, and how are they con- without varying our perceptions. Our thought nected with it? For my part, when I enter most is still more variable than our sight, and all intimately into what I call myself, I always our other senses and faculties contribute to stumble on some particular perception or this change; nor is there any single power of other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or the soul which remains unalterably the same hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind myself at any time without a perception and of theater where several perceptions success- 132

sively make their appearance, pass, repass, by a close relation, and this, to an accurate glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety view, affords as perfect a notion of diversity of postures and situations. There is properly as of there was no manner of relation among no simplicity in it at one time nor identity in the objects. But though these two ideas of different, whatever natural propensity we identity and a succession of related objects be may have to imagine that simplicity and iden- in themselves perfectly distinct and even tity. The comparison of the theater must not contrary, yet it is certain that, in our common mislead us. They are the successive percep- way of thinking, they are generally con- tions only that constitute the mind, nor have founded with each other. That action of the we the most distant notion of the place where imagination by which we consider the unin- these scenes are represented or of the terrupted and invariable object and that by materials of which it is composed. which we reflect on the succession of related What, then, gives us so great a propensity objects are almost the same to the feeling, nor to ascribe an identity to these successive is there much more effort of thought required perceptions and to suppose ourselves pos- in the latter case than in the former. The rela- sessed of an invariable and uninterrupted tion facilitates the transition of the mind from existence through the whole course of our one object to another and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continued lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish between personal identity as object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake and makes us substi- it regards our thought or imagination and as it regards our passions or the concern we take tute the notion of identity instead of that of in ourselves. The first is our present subject, related objects. However, at one instant we and to explain it perfectly we must take the may consider the related succession as vari- matter pretty deep and account for that able or interrupted, we are sure the next to identity which we attribute to plants and ascribe to it a perfect identity and regard it as animals, there being a great analogy between invariable and uninterrupted. Our propensity to this mistake is so great from the resem- it and the identity of a self or person. blance above mentioned that we fall into it We have a distinct idea of an object that before we are aware, and though we inces- remains invariable and uninterrupted through santly correct ourselves by reflection and a supposed variation of time, and this idea we return to a more accurate method of thinking, call that of identity or sameness. We have also yet we cannot long sustain our philosophy or a distinct idea of several different objects take off this bias from the imagination. Our existing in succession and connected together 133

last resource is to yield to it and boldly assert least with a propensity to such fictions. What that these different related objects are in will suffice to prove this hypothesis to the effect the same, however interrupted and satisfaction of every fair inquirer is to show variable. In order to justify to ourselves this from daily experience and observation that absurdity, we often feign some new and the objects which are variable or interrupted, unintelligible principle that connects the ob- and yet are supposed to continue the same, jects together and prevents their interruption are such only as consist of a succession of or variation. Thus, we feign the continued parts connected together by resemblance, existence of the perceptions of our senses to contiguity, or causation. For as such a suc- remove the interruption and run into the cesssion answers evidently to our notion of notion of a soul, and self, and substance to diversity, it can only be by mistake we ascribe disguise the variation. But we may further to it an identity, and as the relation of parts, observe that where we do not give rise to such which leads us into this mistake, is really a fiction, our propensity to confound identity nothing but a quality which produces an with relation is so great that we are apt to association of ideas and an easy transition of imagine something unknown and mysterious, the imagination from one to another, it can connecting the parts, besides their relation, only be from the resemblance which this act and this I take to be the case with regard to of the mind bears to that by which we con- the identity we ascribe to plants and vege- template one continued object that the error tables. And even when this does not take arises. Our chief business, then, must be to place, we still feel a propensity to confound prove that all objects to which we ascribe these ideas, though we are not able fully to identity without observing their invariable- satisfy ourselves in that particular nor find ness and uninterruptedness are such as con- anything invariable and uninterrupted to sist of a succession of related objects. justify our notion of identity. In order to [see] this, suppose any mass of Thus, the controversy concerning identity matter of which the parts are contiguous and is not merely a dispute of words. For when we connected to be placed before us. It is plain attribute identity, in an improper sense, to we must attribute a perfect identity to this variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is mass, provided all the parts continue uninter- not confined to the expression, but is com- ruptedly and invariably the same, whatever monly attended with a fiction, either of some- motion or change of place we may observe thing invariable and uninterrupted, or of either in the whole or in any of the parts. But something mysterious and inexplicable, or at supposing some very small or inconsiderable 134

part to be added to the mass or subtracted a body destroys its identity, but it is remark- from it, though this absolutely destroys the able that where the change is produced identity of the whole, strictly speaking, yet as gradually and insensibly we are less apt to we seldom think so accurately, we scruple not ascribe to it the same effect. The reason can to pronounce a mass of matter the same where plainly be no other than that the mind, in we find so trivial an alteration. The passage following the successive changes of the body, of the thought from the object before the feels an easy passage from surveying its change to the object after it is so smooth and condition in one moment to viewing of it in easy that we scarcely perceive the transition another and at no particular time perceives and are apt to imagine that it is nothing but a any interruption in its actions—from which continued survey of the same object. continued perception it ascribes a continued There is a very remarkable circumstance existence and identity to the object. that attends this experiment, which is that But whatever precaution we may use in though the change of any considerable part in introducing the changes gradually and a mass of matter destroys the identity of the making them proportional to the whole, it is whole, yet we must measure the greatness of certain that where the changes are at last the part, not absolutely, but by its proportion observed to become considerable, we make a to the whole. The addition or diminution of a scruple of ascribing identity to such different mountain would not be sufficient to produce objects. There is, however, another artifice by a diversity in a planet, though the change of a which we may induce the imagination to very few inches would be able to destroy the advance a step further, and that is by pro- identity of some bodies. It will be impossible ducing a reference of the parts to each other to account for this but by reflecting that and a combination to some common end or objects operate upon the mind and break or purpose. A ship of which a considerable part interrupt the continuity of its actions not has been changed by frequent repairs is still according to their real greatness, but considered as the same, nor does the differ- according to their proportion to each other, ence of the materials hinder us from ascribing and therefore, since this interruption makes an identity to it. The common end in which an object cease to appear the same, it must be the parts conspire is the same under all their the uninterrupted progress of the thought variations and affords an easy transition of which constitutes the imperfect identity. the imagination from one situation of the This may be confirmed by another pheno- body to another. menon. A change in any considerable part of 135

But this is still more remarkable when we In like manner it may be said without breach add a sympathy of parts to their common end of the propriety of language that such a and suppose that they bear to each other the church, which was formerly of brick, fell to reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all ruin and that the parish rebuilt the same their actions and operations. This is the case church of freestone and according to modern with all animals and vegetables, where not architecture. Here neither the form nor only the several parts have a reference to materials are the same, nor is there anything some general purpose, but also a mutual common to the two objects but their relation dependence on and connection with each to the inhabitants of the parish. Yet this alone other. The effect of so strong a relation is that is sufficient to make us denominate them the though everyone must allow that in a very same. But we must observe that in these cases few years both vegetables and animals endure the first object is in a manner annihilated a total change, yet we still attribute identity to before the second comes into existence, by them, while their form, size, and substance which means we are never presented in any are entirely altered. An oak that grows from a one point of time with the idea of difference small plant to a large tree is still the same oak, and multiplicity and, for that reason, are less though there is not one particle of matter or scrupulous in calling them the same. figure of its parts the same. An infant be- Secondly, we may remark that though in a comes a man and is sometimes fat, sometimes succession of related objects it is in a manner lean without any change in his identity. requisite that the change of parts is not sudden We may also consider the two following nor entire in order to preserve the identity, yet phenomena, which are remarkable in their where the objects are in their nature change- kind. The first is that though we are common- able and inconstant, we admit of a more ly able to distinguish pretty exactly between sudden transition than would otherwise be numerical and specific identity, yet it some- consistent with that relation. Thus, as the times happens that we confound them and in nature of a river consists in the motion and our thinking and reasoning employ the one change of parts, though in less than twenty- for the other. Thus, a man who hears a noise four hours these are totally altered, this does that is frequently interrupted and renewed not hinder the river from continuing the same says it is the same noise, though it is evident during several ages…. the sounds have only a specific identity or We now proceed to explain the nature of resemblance and there is nothing numerically personal identity, which has become so great the same but the cause which produced them. a question in philosophy, especially of late 136

years, in England, where all the most abstruse question naturally arises concerning this rela- sciences are studied with a peculiar ardor and tion of identity, whether it is something that application. And here it is evident the same really binds our several perceptions together method of reasoning must be continued or only associates their ideas in the imagina- which has so successfully explained the tion, that is, in other words, whether, in pro- identity of plants and animals, and ships, and nouncing concerning the identity of a person, houses, and of all the compounded and we observe some real bond among his per- changeable productions either of art or ceptions or only feel one among the ideas we nature. The identity which we ascribe to the form of them. This question we might easily mind of man is only a fictitious one and of a decide if we would recollect what has been like kind with that which we ascribe to already proved at large, namely, that the vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, understanding never observes any real con- therefore, have a different origin, but must nection among objects and that even the proceed from a like operation of the union of cause and effect, when strictly imagination upon like objects. examined, resolves itself into a customary But lest this argument should not convince association of ideas. For from this it evidently the reader, though in my opinion perfectly follows that identity is nothing really be- longing to these different perceptions and decisive, let him weigh the following reason- ing, which is still close; and more immediate. uniting them together but rather is merely a quality which we attribute to them because of It is evident that the identity which we attri- bute to the human mind, however perfect we the union of their ideas in the imagination may imagine it to be, is not able to run the when we reflect upon them. Now, the only several different perceptions into one and qualities which can give ideas a union in the make them lose their characters of distinction imagination are these three relations above and difference which are essential to them. It mentioned. These are the uniting principles in is still true that every distinct perception the ideal world and without them every distinct object is separable by the mind, and which enters into the composition of the mind is a distinct existence and is different, and may be separately considered, and appears distinguishable, and separable from every not to have any more connection with any other perception, either contemporary or suc- other object than if disjoined by the greatest cesssive. But as, notwithstanding this distinc- difference and remoteness. It is, therefore, on tion and separability, we suppose the whole some of these three relations of resemblance, train of perceptions to be united by identity, a contiguity, and causation that identity 137

depends, and as the very essence of these identity, but also contributes to its production relations consists in their producing an easy by producing the relation of resemblance transition of ideas, it follows that our notions among the perceptions. The case is the same of personal identity proceed entirely from the whether we consider ourselves or others. smooth and uninterrupted progress of the As to causation, we may observe that the thought along a train of connected ideas, true idea of the human mind is to consider it according to the principles above explained. as a system of different perceptions or The only question, therefore, which re- different existences which are linked together mains is by what relations this uninterrupted by the relation of cause and effect and mutu- progress of our thought is produced, when we ally produce, destroy, influence, and modify consider the successive existence of a mind each other. Our impressions give rise to their or thinking person. And here it is evident we correspondent ideas, and these ideas, in their must confine ourselves to resemblance and turn, produce other impressions. One thought causation and must drop contiguity, which chases another and draws after it a third by has little or no influence in the present case. which it is expelled in its tum. In this respect, To begin with resemblance: Suppose we I cannot compare the soul more properly to could see clearly into the breast of another anything than to a republic or commonwealth and observe that succession of perceptions in which the several members are united by which constitutes his mind or thinking princi- the reciprocal ties of government and subor- ple, and suppose that he always preserves the dination and give rise to other persons who memory of a considerable part of past percep- propagate the same republic in the incessant tions, it is evident that nothing could more changes of its parts. And as the same indivi- contribute to bestowing a relation on this dual republic may not only change its mem- succession amid all its variations. For what bers, but also its laws and constitutions, in is the memory but a faculty by which we raise like manner the same person may vary his up the images of past perceptions? And as an character and disposition as well as his im- image necessarily resembles its object, must pressions and ideas without losing his iden- not the frequent placing of these resembling tity. Whatever changes he endures, his sev- perceptions in the chain of thought convey eral parts are still connected by the relation of the imagination more easily from one link to causation. And in this view our identity with another and make the whole seem like the regard to the passions serves to corroborate continuance of one object? In this particular, that with regard to the imagination by making then, the memory not only discovers the our distant perceptions influence each other 138

and by giving us a present concern for our the present affair, namely that all the nice and past or future pains or pleasures. subtle questions concerning personal identity As memory alone acquaints us with the can never possibly be decided and are to be continuance and extent of this succession of regarded rather as grammatical than as philo- perceptions, it is to be considered upon that sophical difficulties. Identity depends on the account chiefly as the source of personal relations of ideas, and these relations produce identity. Had we no memory, we never identity by means of that easy transition they should have any notion of causation nor con- occasion. But as the relations and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible sequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitute our self or person. But degrees, we have no just standard by which having once acquired this notion of causation we can decide any dispute concerning the from the memory, we can extend the same time when they acquire or lose a title to the chain of causes and, consequently, the iden- name of identity. All the disputes concerning tity of our persons beyond our memory and the identity of connected objects are merely can comprehend times, circumstances, and verbal, except so far as the relation of parts actions which we have entirely forgotten, but gives rise to some fiction or imaginary princi- suppose in general to have existed. For how ple of union as we have already observed…. few of our past actions are there of which we have any memory? Who can tell me, for in- Appendix stance, what were his thoughts and actions on I had entertained some hopes that however the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March deficient our theory of the intellectual world 1719, and the 3rd of August 1733? Or will he might be, it would be free from those contra- affirm, because he has entirely forgotten the dictions and absurdities which seem to attend incidents of these days, that the present self is every explication that human reason can give not the same person with the self of that time, of the material world. But upon a stricter re- and by that means overturn all the most esta- view of the section concerning personal iden- blished notions of personal identity? In this tity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth view, therefore, memory does not so much that, I must confess, I neither know how to produce as discover personal identity by correct my former opinions nor how to render showing us the relation of cause and effect them consistent. If this is not a good general among our different perceptions…. reason for skepticism, it is at least a sufficient The whole of this doctrine leads us to a one (if I were not already abundantly sup- conclusion which is of great importance in plied) for me to entertain a diffidence and 139

modesty in all my decisions. I shall propose preceding perceptions. Our ideas of objects, the arguments on both sides, beginning with therefore, are derived from that source. Con- those that induced me to deny the strict and sequently, no proposition can be intelligible proper identity and simplicity of a self or or consistent with regard to objects which is thinking being. not so with regard to perceptions. But it is When we talk of self or substance, we intelligible and consistent to say that objects must have an idea annexed to these terms; exist distinct and independent without any otherwise they are altogether unintelligible. common simple substance or subject of inhe- sion. This proposition, therefore, can never be Every idea is derived from preceding impres- sions and we have no impression of self or absurd with regard to perception s. When I substance as something simple and individ- turn my reflection on myself, I never can ual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in perceive this self without some one or more that sense. perceptions, nor can I ever perceive anything but the perceptions. It is the composition of Whatever is distinct is distinguishable, and these, therefore, which forms the self. whatever is distinguishable is separable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions We can conceive a thinking being to have are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguish- either many or few perceptions. Suppose the able and separable, and may be conceived as mind to be reduced even below the life of an separately existent, and may exist separately oyster. Suppose it to have only one percep- without any contradiction or absurdity. tion, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive anything but When I view this table and that chimney, merely that perception? Do you have any nothing is present to me but particular notion of self or substance? If not, the perceptions, which are of a like nature with addition of other perceptions can never give all the other perceptions. This is the doctrine you that notion. of philosophers. But this table which is The annihilation which some people sup- present to me, and that chimney, may and do exist separately. This is the doctrine of the pose to follow upon death and which entirely vulgar and implies no contradiction. There is destroys this self is nothing but an extinction no contradiction, therefore, in extending the of all particular perceptions: love and hatred, same doctrine to all the perceptions. pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These, therefore, must be the same with self, In general, the following reasoning seems since the one cannot survive the other. satisfactory. All ideas are borrowed from 140

Is self the same with substance? If it is, them are felt to be connected together and how can that question have place, concerning naturally introduce each other. However ex- the subsistence of self, under a change of traordinary this conclusion may seem, it need substance? If they are distinct, what is the not surprise us. Most philosophers seem in- difference between them? For my part, I have clined to think that personal identity arises a notion of neither when conceived distinct from consciousness and consciousness is from particular perceptions. nothing but a reflected thought or perception. Philosophers begin to be reconciled to the The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish principle that we have no idea of external sub- stance distinct from the ideas of particular when I come to explain the principles that qualities. This must pave the way for a like unite our successive perceptions in our principle with regard to the mind that we have thought or consciousness. I cannot discover no notion of it distinct from the particular any theory which gives me satisfaction on perceptions. this head. So far I seem to be attended with sufficient In short, there are two principles which I evidence. But having thus loosened all our cannot render consistent, nor is it in my particular perceptions, when I proceed to ex- power to renounce either of them, namely, plain the principle of connection which binds that all our distinct perceptions are distinct them together and makes us attribute to them existences and that the mind never perceives a real simplicity and identity, I am sensible any real connection among distinct exis- that my account is very defective and that tences. Did our perceptions either inhere in nothing but the seeming evidence of the pre- something simple and individual or did the cedent reasonings could have induced me to mind perceive some real connection among receive it. If perceptions are distinct exis- them, there would be no difficulty in the case. tences, they form a whole only by being con- For my part, I must plead the privilege of a nected together. But no connections among skeptic and confess that this difficulty is too distinct existences are ever discoverable by hard for my understanding. I do not pretend, human understanding. We only feel a connec- however, to pronounce it absolutely insuper- tion or determination of the thought to pass able. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more from one object to another. It follows, there- mature reflections, may discover some hypo- fore, that the thought alone feels personal thesis that will reconcile those contradictions. identity; when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of 141

Study Questions 1. What does Hume mean by “Man is a sociable no less than a reasonable being. . . . Be a philosopher, but, amid all your philosophy, be still a man”? 2 What are the two classes of perception? And how are they distinguished? 3. What does it mean to say that all of our ideas (e.g. of God) are copies of our impressions? 4. Why is Hume not bothered by the possibility of having an idea not based on an impression (the missing shade of blue)? 5. How does Hume show that there are three—and only three—principles by which ideas are associated?

David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) Sec. I: Of the Different Species of Philosophy us feel the difference between vice and virtue; Moral philosophy, or the science of human they excite and regulate our sentiments; and nature, may be treated after two different they bend our hearts to the love of probity and manners, each of which has its peculiar merit true honor, so they think they have fully and may contribute to the entertainment, attained the end of all their labors. instruction, and reformation of mankind. The The other species of philosophers consider one considers man chiefly as born for action man in the light of a reasonable rather than an and as influenced in his measures by taste and active being and endeavor to form his under- sentiment, pursuing one object and avoiding standing more than cultivate his manners. another according to the value which these They regard human nature as a subject of spe- objects seem to possess and according to the culation and, with a narrow scrutiny, examine light in which they present themselves. As it in order to find those principles which regu- virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most late our understanding, excite our sentiments, valuable, this species of philosophers paint and make us approve or blame any particular her in the most amiable colors, borrowing all object, action, or behavior. They think it a help from poetry and eloquence and treating reproach to all literature that philosophy their subject in an easy and obvious manner, should not yet have fixed, beyond contro- and such as is best fitted to please the imagin- versy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, ation and engage the affections…. They make and criticism, and should forever talk of truth

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and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and conduct and behavior. The feelings of our deformity, without being able to determine heart, the agitation of our passions, the the source of these distinctions. While they vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by conclusions and reduce the profound philoso- no difficulties; but proceeding from particular pher to a mere plebeian. instances to general principles, they still push This also must be confessed, that the most on their inquiries to principles more general durable as well as most just fame has been and rest not satisfied until they arrive at those acquired by the easy philosophy and that original principles by which, in every sci- abstract reasoners seem, up to now, to have ence, all human curiosity must be bounded. enjoyed only a momentary reputation from Though their speculations seem abstract and the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but even unintelligible to common readers, they have not been able to support their renown aim at the approbation of the learned and the with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a wise and think themselves sufficiently com- profound philosopher to commit a mistake in pensated for the labor of their whole lives if his subtle reasonings; and one mistake is the they can discover some hidden truths which necessary parent of another….But a philoso- may contribute to the instruction of posterity. pher whose only purpose is to represent the It is certain that the easy and obvious phi- common sense of mankind in more beautiful losophy will always, with the generality of and more engaging colors, if by accident he mankind, have the preference above the falls into error, goes no further, but renewing accurate and abstruse, and by many will be his appeal to common sense and the natural recommended not only as more agreeable, sentiments of the mind, returns into the right but more useful than the other. It enters more path and secures himself from any dangerous into common life, molds the heart and affect- illusions. The fame of Cicero flourishes at tions, and, by touching those principles which present, but that of Aristotle is utterly actuate men, reforms their conduct and brings decayed. La Bruyère passes the seas and still them nearer to that model of perfection which maintains his reputation. But the glory of it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse Malebranche is confined to his own age. And philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure which cannot enter into business and action, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten. vanishes when the philosopher leaves the The mere philosopher is a character which shade and comes into open clay, nor can its is commonly but little acceptable in the principles easily retain any influence over our world, as being supposed to contribute 143

nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of can be hoped for in this particular, ether from society, while he lies remote from communi- the extent or security of his acquisitions. Man cation with mankind and is wrapped up in is a sociable no less than a reasonable being. principles and notions equally remote from But neither can he always enjoy company their comprehension. On the other hand, the agreeable and amusing or preserve the proper mere ignorant is still more despised, nor is relish for them. Man is also an active being anything deemed a surer sign of an illiberal and, from that disposition, as well as from the genius in an age and nation where the various necessities of human life, must sciences flourish than to be entirely destitute submit to business and occupation. But the of all relish for those noble entertainments. mind requires some relaxation and cannot The most perfect character is supposed to lie always support its bent to care and industry. between those extremes: retaining an equal It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a ability and taste for books, company, and mixed kind of life as most suitable to the business; preserving in conversation that dis- human race and secretly admonished them to cernment and delicacy which arise from allow none of these biases to draw too much, polite letters, and in business that probity and so as to incapacitate them for other occupa- accuracy which are the natural result of a just tions and entertainments. Indulge your pas- philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate sion for science, she says, but let your science so accomplished a character, nothing can be be human and such as may have a direct more useful than compositions of the easy reference to action and society. Abstruse style and manner which do not draw too much thought and profound researches I prohibit from life, require no deep application or and will severely punish by the pensive retreat to be comprehended, and send back melancholy which they introduce, by the the student among mankind full of noble endless uncertainty in which they involve you sentiments and wise precepts applicable to and by the cold reception which your pre- every exigency of human life. By means of tended discoveries shall meet with, when such compositions virtue becomes amiable. communicated. Be a philosopher, but, amid science agreeable, company instructive, and all your philosophy, be still a man…. retirement entertaining. Nor can there remain any suspicion that Man is a reasonable being and, as such, this science is uncertain and chimerical, receives from science his proper food and unless we should entertain such a skepticism nourishment. But so narrow are the bounds of as is entirely subversive of all speculation and human understanding that little satisfaction even action. It cannot be doubted that the 144

mind is endowed with several powers and iety; nor was it thought that the latter could faculties, that these powers are distinct from ever attain their proper object but at the each other, that what is really distinct to expense of the former. Among the selfish immediate perception may be distinguished passions were ranked avarice, ambition, by reflection, and consequently that there is a revenge. Among the benevolent, natural truth and falsehood in all propositions on this affection, friendship, public spirit. Philoso- subject, and a truth and falsehood which does phers may now perceive the impropriety of not lie beyond the compass of human under- this division. It has been proved, beyond all standing. There are many obvious distinc- controversy, that even the passions com- tions of this kind, such as those between the monly esteemed selfish carry the mind will and understanding, the imagination and beyond self, directly to the object; that though passions, which fall within the comprehend- the satisfaction of these passions gives us sion of every human creature; and the finer enjoyment, yet the prospect of this enjoyment and more philosophical distinctions are no is not the cause of the passion, but, on the less real and certain, though more difficult to contrary, the passion is antecedent to the be comprehended. Some instances, especially enjoyment, and without the former, the latter late ones, of success in these inquiries may could never possibly exist; that the case is give us a more just notion of the certainty and precisely the same with the passions denomi- solidity of this branch of learning. And shall nated benevolent, and consequently that a we esteem it worthy the labor of a philo- man is no more interested when he seeks his sopher to give us a true system of the planets own glory than when the happiness of his and adjust the position and order of those friend is the object of his wishes; nor is he any remote bodies, while we affect to overlook more disinterested when he sacrifices his ease those who, with so much success, delineate and quiet to public good than when he labors the parts of the mind in which we are so for the gratification of avarice or ambition intimately concerned? .…] [Moral perceptions, therefore, ought not But may we not hope that philosophy, if be classed with the operations of the under- cultivated with care and encouraged by the standing, but with the tastes or sentiments. It attention of the public, may carry its resear- had been usual with philosophers to divide all ches still further and discover, at least in some the passions of the mind into two classes, the degree, the secret springs and principles by selfish and benevolent, which were supposed which the human mind is actuated in its to stand in constant opposition and contrar- operations? Astronomers had long contented 145

themselves with proving, from the pheno- vast multitude and diversity of those actions mena, the true motions, order, and magnitude that excite our approbation or dislike, to of the heavenly bodies, until a philosopher at search for some common principle on which last arose who seems, from the happiest this variety of sentiments might depend. And reasoning, to have also determined the laws though they have sometimes carried the and forces by which the revolutions of the matter too far, by their passion for some one planets are governed and directed. The like general principle, it must, however, be con- has been performed with regard to other parts fessed that they are excusable in expecting to of nature. And there is no reason to despair of find some general principles into which all equal success in our inquiries concerning the the vices and virtues were justly to be mental powers and economy, if prosecuted resolved. The like has been the endeavor of with equal capacity and caution. It is probable critics, logicians, and even politicians; nor that one operation and principle of the mind have their attempts been wholly unsuccess- depends on another, which again may be ful, though perhaps longer time, greater resolved into one more general and universal. accuracy, and more ardent application may And how far these researches may possibly bring these sciences still nearer their per- be carried, it will be difficult for us, before or fection. To throw up at once all pretensions even after a careful trial, exactly to determine. of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, This much is certain—that attempts of this precipitate, and dogmatic than even the kind are made every day even by those who boldest and most affirmative philosophy that philosophize the most negligently. And has ever attempted to impose its crude dic- nothing can be more requisite than to enter tates and principles on mankind. upon the enterprise with thorough care and What? Though these reasonings concern- attention that, if it lies within the compass of ing human nature seem abstract and of diffi- human understanding, it may at last be hap- cult comprehension, this affords no presump- pily achieved; if not, it may, however, be tion of their falsehood. On the contrary, it rejected with some confidence and security. seems impossible that what has escaped so This last conclusion, surely, is not desirable many wise and profound philosophers up to nor ought it be embraced too rashly. For how now can be very obvious and easy. And much must we diminish from the beauty and whatever pains these researches may cost us, value of this species of philosophy upon such we may think ourselves sufficiently re- a supposition? Moralists have been accus- warded, not only in point of profit but of tomed up to now, when they considered the pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any 146

addition to our stock of knowledge in subjects greatest vigor, is that they represent their of such unspeakable importance. object in so lively a manner that we could But as, after all, the abstractedness of these almost say we feel or see it. But, unless the speculations is no recommendation, but mind is disordered by disease or madness, rather a disadvantage to them, and as this they never can arrive at such a pitch of difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care vivacity as to render these perceptions alto- and art and the avoiding of all unnecessary gether indistinguishable. All the colors of detail, we have, in the following inquiry, poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make attempted to throw some light upon subjects from which uncertainty has deterred the wise the description be taken for a real landscape. up to now, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy The most lively thought is still inferior to the if we can unite the boundaries of the different dullest sensation. species of philosophy by reconciling pro- We may observe a like distinction to run found inquiry with clearness and truth with through all the other perceptions of the mind. novelty! And still more happy if, reasoning in A man in a fit of anger is actuated in a very this easy manner, we can undermine the different manner from one who only thinks of foundations of an abstruse philosophy which that emotion. If you tell me that any person is seems to have up to now served only as a in love, I easily understand your meaning and shelter to superstition and a cover to absurdity form a just conception of his situation, but and error! never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When Section II: Of the Origin of Ideas we reflect on our past sentiments and affect- Everyone will readily allow that there is a tions, our thought is a faithful mirror and considerable difference between the percep- copies its objects truly, but the colors which tions of the mind when a man feels the pain it employs are faint and dull in comparison of of excessive heat or the pleasure of moderate those in which our original perceptions were warmth and when he afterwards recalls to his clothed. It requires no nice discernment or memory this sensation or anticipates it by his metaphysical head to mark the distinction imagination. These faculties may mimic or between them. copy the perceptions of the senses, but they Here, therefore, we may divide all the per- never can entirely reach the force and viva- ceptions of the mind into two classes or city of the original sentiment. The utmost we species which are distinguished by their dif- say of them, even when they operate with ferent degrees of force and vivacity. The less 147

forcible and lively are commonly denomi- nor is anything beyond the power of thought nated thoughts or ideas. The other species except what implies an absolute contradict- want a name in our language and in most tion. others, I suppose, because it was not requisite But though our thought seems to possess for any but philosophical purposes to rank this unbounded liberty, we shall find upon a them under a general term or appellation. Let nearer examination that it is really confined us, therefore, use a little freedom and call within very narrow limits and that all this them impressions, employing that word in a creative power of the mind amounts to no sense somewhat different from the usual. By more than the faculty of compounding, the term impression, then, I mean all our more transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or materials afforded us by the senses and feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And experience. When we think of a golden impressions are distinguished from ideas, mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, which are the less lively perceptions of which gold and mountain, with which we were we are conscious when we reflect on any of formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can those sensations or movements...above conceive, because, from our own feeling, we mentioned. can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to Nothing, at first view, may seem more un- the figure and shape of a horse, which is an bounded than the thought of man, which not animal familiar to us. In short, all the only escapes all human power and authority, materials of thinking are derived either from but is not even restrained within the limits of our outward or inward sentiment. The mix- nature and reality. To form monsters and join ture and composition of these belongs alone incongruous shapes and appearances costs to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in the imagination no more trouble than to philosophical language, all our ideas or more conceive the most natural and familiar feeble perceptions are copies of our impres- objects. And while the body is confined to sions or more lively ones. one planet, along which it creeps with pain To prove this, the two following argu- and difficulty, the thought can in an instant ments will, I hope, be sufficient. First, when transport us into the most distant regions of we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however the universe or even beyond the universe into compounded or sublime, we always find that the unbounded chaos where nature is sup- they resolve themselves into such simple posed to lie in total confusion. What never ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling was seen or heard of, may yet be conceived, or sentiment. Even those ideas which at first 148

view seem the most wide of this origin are nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived heights of friendship and generosity. It is from it. The idea of God, as meaning an readily allowed that other beings may possess infinitely intelligent, wise, and good being, many senses of which we can have no con- arises from reflecting on the operations of our ception, because the ideas of them have never own mind and augmenting, without limit, been introduced to us in the only manner by those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We which an idea can have access to the mind, may prosecute this inquiry to what length we namely, by the actual feeling and sensation. please; where we shall always find that every There is, however, one contradictory phe- idea which we examine is copied from a nomenon which may prove that it is not similar impression. Those who would assert absolutely impossible for ideas to arise inde- that this position is not universally true, nor pendent of their correspondent impressions. I without exception, have only one method, believe it will readily be allowed that the and an easy one at that, of refuting it by several distinct ideas of color which enter by producing that idea which, in their opinion, is the eye or those of sound which are conveyed not derived from this source. It will then be by the ear are really different from each other, incumbent on us, if we would maintain our though at the same time resembling. Now if doctrine, to produce the impression or lively this is true of different colors, it must be no perception which corresponds to it. less so of the different shades of the same Secondly, if it happens, from a defect of color; and each shade produces a distinct the organ, that a man is not susceptible of any idea, independent of the rest. For if this species of sensation, we always find that he is should be denied, it is possible, by the as little susceptible of the correspondent continual gradation of shades, to run a color ideas. A blind man can form no notion of insensibly into what is most remote from it; colors, a deaf man of sounds. Restore either and if you will not allow any of the means to of them that sense in which he is deficient by be different, you cannot without absurdity opening this new inlet for his sensations, you deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, also open an inlet for the ideas and he finds therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight no difficulty in conceiving these objects. The for thirty years and to have become perfectly case is the same if the object proper for acquainted with colors of all kinds, except exciting any sensation has never been applied one particular shade of blue, for instance, to the organ….A man of mild manners can which it never has been his fortune to meet form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty, with. Let all the different shades of that color, 149

except that single one, be placed before him, contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensa- descending gradually from the deepest to the tions either outward or inward, are strong and lightest, it is plain that he will perceive a vivid. The limits between them are more blank where that shade is wanting, and will exactly determined; nor is it easy to fall into be sensible that there is a greater distance in any error or mistake with regard to them. that place between the contiguous colors than When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion in any other. Now I ask whether it is possible that a philosophical term is employed without for him, from his own imagination, to supply any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), this deficiency and raise up to himself the we need but inquire from what impression is idea of that particular shade, though it had that supposed idea derived? And if it is never been conveyed to him by his senses? I impossible to assign any, this will serve to believe there are few but will be of the confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into opinion that he can. And this may serve as a so clear a light. we may reasonably hope to proof that the simple ideas are not always, in remove all dispute which may arise con- every instance, derived from the correspond- cerning their nature and reality. dent impressions, though this instance is so singular that it is scarcely worth our obser- Section III: Of the Association of Ideas ving and does not merit that for it alone we It is evident that there is a principle of should alter our general maxim. connection between different thoughts or Here, therefore, is a proposition which not ideas of the mind and that, in their appearance only seems in itself simple and intelligible, to the memory or imagination, they introduce but, if a proper use were made of it, might each other with a certain degree of method render every dispute equally intelligible and and regularity. In our more serious thinking banish all that jargon, which has so long taken or discourse this is so observable that any possession of metaphysical reasonings and particular thought which breaks in upon the drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, espe- regular tract or chain of ideas is immediately cially abstract ones, are naturally faint and remarked and rejected. And even in our obscure. The mind has but a slender hold of wildest and most wandering reveries, no, in them. They are apt to be confounded with our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, other resembling ideas; and when we have that the imagination did not run altogether at often employed any term, though without a adventures, but that there was still a connec- distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine that it tion upheld among the different ideas which has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the succeeded each other. Were the loosest and 150

freest conversation to be transcribed, there [congruity]; and if we think of a wound, we would immediately be observed something can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which connected it in all its transitions. Or which follows it [cause and effect]. But that where this is wanting, the person who broke this enumeration is complete, and that there the thread of discourse might still inform you are no other principles of association except that there had secretly revolved in his mind a these, may be difficult to prove to the satis- succession of thought which had gradually faction of the reader or even to a man’s own led him from the subject of conversation. satisfaction. All we can do, in such cases, is Among different languages, even where we to run over several instances and examine cannot suspect the least connection or com- carefully the principle which binds the munication, it is found that the words expres- different thoughts to each other, never sive of ideas the most compounded do yet stopping until we render the principle as nearly correspond to each other—certain general as possible. The more instances we proof that the simple ideas comprehended in examine and the more care we employ, the the compound ones were bound together by more assurance shall we acquire that the some universal principle which had an equal enumeration, which we form from the whole, influence on all mankind. is complete and entire. Though it is too obvious to escape obser- vation that different ideas are connected together, I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association—a subject, how- ever, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me there appear to be only three principles of connection among ideas, namely, resem- blance, contiguity in time or place, and cause or effect. That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original [resemblance]. The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry or discourse concerning the others 151

Study Questions 1. Why can’t we know by reason alone that the movement of one billiard ball will cause the movement of another? 2. Even if bodies have “secret powers” by which they nourish us, how is that not helpful in predicting that those powers will continue to nourish us in the future? 3. How is custom central to Hume’s distinction between imaginative fictions and belief? 4. Why can’t we even give an argument that the future will probably resemble the past? 5. What is the “curious speculation” that Hume refers to in Section VI of his Enquiry?

David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) Sec. 4: Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Euclid would forever retain their certainty Operations of the Understanding and evidence. Part I. Matters of fact, which are the second ob- jects of human reason, are not ascertained in All the objects of human reason or inquiry the same manner; nor is our evidence of their may naturally be divided into two kinds, truth, however great, of a like nature with the namely, relations of ideas and matters of fact. foregoing. The contrary of every matter of Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, fact is still possible, because it can never algebra, and arithmetic, and, in short, every imply a contradiction and is conceived by the affirmation which is either intuitively or de- mind with the same facility and distinctness, monstratively certain. That the square of the as if ever so conformable to reality. That the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the two sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelli- sides is a proposition which expresses a gible a proposition and implies no more con- relation between these figures. That three tradiction than the affirmation that it will rise. times five is equal to the half of thirty expres- We should in vain, therefore, attempt to de- ses a relation between these numbers. Propo- monstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstra- sitions of this kind are discoverable by the tively false, it would imply a contradiction mere operation of thought, without depen- and could never be distinctly conceived by dence on what is anywhere existent in the the mind. universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by 152

It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of a desert island would conclude that there had curiosity to inquire what is the nature of that once been men on that island. All our reason- evidence which assures us of any real ings concerning fact are of the same nature. existence and matter of fact beyond the And here it is constantly supposed that there present testimony of our senses or the records is a connection between the present fact and of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is that which is inferred from it. Were there observable, has been little cultivated either by nothing to bind them together, the inference the ancients or moderns, and, therefore, our would be entirely precarious. The hearing of doubts and errors in the prosecution of so an articulate voice and rational discourse in important an inquiry may be the more excu- the dark assures us of the presence of some sable, while we march through such difficult person. Why? Because these are the effects of paths without any guide or direction. They the human make and fabric, and closely may even prove useful by exciting curiosity connected with it. If we anatomize all the and destroying that implicit faith and security other reasonings of this nature, we shall find which is the bane of all reasoning and free that they are founded on the relation of cause inquiry. The discovery of defects in the com- and effect and that this relation is either near mon philosophy, if there are any, will not, I or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light presume, be a discouragement, but rather an are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect incitement, as is usual, to attempt something may justly be inferred from the other…. more full and satisfactory than has yet been I shall venture to affirm, as a general pro- proposed to the public. position which admits of no exception, that All reasonings concerning matter of fact the knowledge of this relation is not in any seem to be founded on the relation of cause instance, attained by reasonings a priori, but and effect. By means of that relation alone we arises entirely from experience when we find can go beyond the evidence of our memory that any particular objects are constantly con- and senses. If you were to. ask a man why he joined with each other. Let an object be pre- believes any matter of fact which is absent— sented to a man of ever so strong natural for instance, that his friend is in the country reason and abilities; if that object is entirely or in France—he would give you a reason, new to him, he will not be able, by the most and this reason would be some other fact: as accurate examination of its sensible qualities, a letter received from him or the knowledge to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, of his former resolutions and promises. A though his rational faculties are supposed man finding a watch or any other machine on entirely perfect at the very first, could not 153

have inferred from the fluidity and trans- buting all our knowledge of it to experience. parency of water that it would suffocate him, Who will assert that he can give the ultimate or from the light and warmth of fire that it reason why milk or bread is proper nourish- would consume him. No object ever dis- ment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger? covers, by the qualities which appear to the But the same truth may not appear at first senses, either the causes which produced it or sight to have the same evidence with regard the effects which will arise from it; nor can to events which have become familiar to us our reason, unassisted by experience, ever from our first appearance in the world, which draw any inference concerning real existence bear a close analogy the whole course of and matter of fact. nature, and which are supposed to depend on This proposition, that cause and effect are the simple qualities of objects without any discoverable, not by reason but by experi- secret structure of parts. We are apt to ima- ence, will readily be admitted with regard to gine that we could discover these effects by such objects as we remember to have once the mere operation of our reason without been altogether unknown to us, since we must experience. We fancy that were we brought, be conscious of the utter inability which we all of the sudden, into this world, we could at then lay under of foretelling what would arise first have inferred that one billiard ball would from them. Present two smooth pieces of communicate motion to another upon im- marble to a man who has no tincture of na- pulse and that we did not need to have waited tural philosophy, he will never discover that for the event in order to pronounce with cer- they will adhere together in such a manner as tainty concerning it. Such is the influence of to require great force to separate them in a custom that where it is strongest it not only direct line, while they make so small a resis- covers our natural ignorance, but even con- tance to a lateral pressure. Such events as bear ceals itself and seems not to take place, mere- little analogy to the common course of nature ly because it is found in the highest degree. are also readily confessed to be known only But to convince us that all the laws of by experience, nor does any man imagine that nature and all the operations of bodies with- the explosion of gunpowder or the attraction out exception are known only by experience, of a lodestone [or magnet] could ever be the following reflections may perhaps suf- discovered by a priori arguments. In like fice. Were any object presented to us and manner, when an effect is supposed to depend were we required to pronounce concerning upon an intricate machinery or secret struc- the effect which will result from it without ture of parts, we make no difficulty in attri- consulting past observation, after what man- 154

ner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in from that cause? May not both these balls this operation? It must invent or imagine remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball some event which it ascribes to the object as return in a straight line or leap off from the its effect and it is plain that this invention second in any line or direction? All these must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can suppositions are consistent and conceivable. never possibly find the effect in the supposed Why then should we give the preference to cause by the most accurate scrutiny and one which is no more consistent or con- examination. For the effect is totally different ceivable than the rest? All our reasonings a from the cause and consequently can never be priori will never be able to show us any discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard foundation for this preference. ball is a quite distinct event from motion in In a word, then, every effect is a distinct the first, nor is there anything in the one to event from its cause. It could not, therefore, suggest the smallest hint of the other. A stone be discovered in the cause and the first or piece of metal raised into the air and left invention or conception of it, a priori, must without any support immediately falls. But to be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is consider the matter a priori, is there anything suggested, the conjunction of it with the we discover in this situation which can beget cause must appear equally arbitrary, since the idea of a downward rather than an upward there are always many other effects which, to or any other motion in the stone or metal? reason, must seem fully as consistent and And as the first imagination or invention natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend of a particular effect in all natural operations to determine any single event or infer any is arbitrary where we do not consult experi- cause or effect without the assistance of ence, so must we also esteem the supposed tie observation and experience…. or connection between the cause and effect which binds them together and renders it Part II. impossible that any other effect could result It must certainly be allowed that nature has from the operation of that cause. When I see, kept us at a great distance from all her secrets for instance, a billiard ball moving in a and has afforded us only the knowledge of a straight line towards another, even suppose few superficial qualities of objects, while she motion in the second ball should by accident conceals from us those powers and principles be suggested to me as the result of their on which the influence of these objects contact or impulse, may I not conceive that a entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the hundred different events might as well follow color, weight, and consistency of bread, but 155

neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of should be extended to future times and to those qualities which fit it for the nourish- other objects which, for all we know, may be ment and support of a human body. Sight or only similar in appearance; this is the main feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion question on which I would insist. The bread of bodies, but as to that wonderful force or which I formerly ate nourished me—that is, a power which would carry on a moving body body of such sensible qualities was, at that forever in a continued change of place and time, endowed with such secret powers. But which bodies never lose but by communi- does it follow that other bread must also cating it to others, of this we cannot form the nourish me at another time and that like most distant conception. But notwithstanding sensible qualities must always be attended this ignorance of natural powers and princi- with like secret powers? The consequence ples, we always presume when we see like seems in no way necessary. At least, it must sensible qualities that they have like secret be acknowledged that there is here a conse- powers and expect that effects similar to quence drawn by the mind, that there is a those which we have experienced will follow certain step taken, a process of thought, and from them. If a body of like color and consis- an inference which wants to be explained. tency with that bread which we have formerly These two propositions are far from being the eaten is presented to us, we make no scruple same: I have found that such an object has of repeating the experiment and foresee with always been attended with such an effect, and certainty like nourishment and support. Now I foresee that other objects which are similar this is a process of the mind or thought of in appearance will be attended with similar which I would willingly know the foundation. effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the It is allowed on all hands that there is no one proposition may justly be inferred from known connection between the sensible qua- the other; I know in fact that it always is lities and the secret powers, and consequently inferred. But if you insist that the inference is that the mind is not led to form such a made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to conclusion concerning their constant and produce that reasoning. The connection be- regular conjunction by anything which it tween these propositions is not intuitive…. knows of their nature. As to past experience, All reasonings may be divided into two it can be allowed to give direct and certain kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or information of those precise objects only and that concerning relations of ideas, and moral that precise period of time which fell under reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact its cognizance. But why this experience and existence. That there are no demonstra- 156

tive arguments in the case seems evident, endeavor, therefore, the proof of this last since it implies no contradiction that the supposition by probable arguments, or argu- course of nature may change and that an ments regarding existence, must be evidently object, seemingly like those which we have going in a circle and taking that which is the experienced, may be attended with different very point in question for granted. or contrary effects. May I not clearly and In reality, all arguments from experience distinctly conceive that a body, falling from are founded on the similarity which we the clouds and which in all other respects discover among natural objects and by which resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or we are induced to expect effects similar to feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible those which we have found to follow from proposition than to affirm that all the trees such objects. And though none but a fool or will flourish in December and January and madman will ever pretend to dispute the decay in May and June? Now, whatever is authority of experience or to reject that great intelligible and can be distinctly conceived guide of human life, it may surely be allowed implies no contradiction and can never be a philosopher to have so much curiosity at proved false by any demonstrative argument least as to examine the principle of human or abstract reasoning a priori. nature which gives this mighty authority to If we are, therefore, engaged by arguments experience and makes us draw advantage to put trust in past experience and make it the from that similarity which nature has placed standard of our future judgment, these among different objects. From causes which arguments must be probable only, or such as appear similar, we expect similar effects. regard matter of fact and real existence This is the sum of all our experimental con- according to the division above mentioned. clusions. Now it seems evident that, if this But that there is no argument of this kind conclusion were formed by reason, it would must appear if our explication of that species be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, of reasoning is admitted as solid and satisfac- as after ever so long a course of experience. tory. We have said that all arguments con- But the case is far otherwise. [There is] cerning existence are founded on the relation nothing so like as eggs, yet despite their of cause and effect, that our knowledge of apparent similarity, no one expects the same that relation is derived entirely from experi- taste and relish in all of them. It is only after ence, and that all our experimental conclu- a long course of uniform experiments in any sions proceed upon the supposition that the kind that we attain a firm reliance and future will be conformable to the past. To security with regard to a particular event. 157

Now where is that process of reasoning to now ever so regular, that alone, without which, from one instance, draws a conclusion some new argument or inference, does not so different from that which it infers from a prove that for the future it will continue so. In hundred instances that are in no way different vain do you pretend to have learned the nature from that single one? This question I propose of bodies from your past experience. Their as much from the sake of information as with secret nature and, consequently, all their an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot effects and influence may change without any find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning…. change in their sensible qualities. This hap- pens sometimes and with regard to some When a man says, I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined objects. Why may it not happen always and with such secret powers, and when he says: with regard to all objects? What logic, what Similar sensible qualities will always be process of argument secures you against this conjoined with similar secret powers; he is supposition? My practice, you say, refutes not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propo- my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my sitions in any respect the same. You say that question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the one proposition is an inference from the the point; but as a philosopher who has some other. But you must confess that the inference share of curiosity—I will not say skeptic- cism—I want to learn the foundation of this is not intuitive, neither is it demonstrative. Of what nature is it then? To say it is experimen- inference. No reading, no inquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty or give me tal is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose as their foundation satisfaction in a matter of such importance. that the future will resemble the past and that Can I do better than propose the difficulty to similar powers will be conjoined with similar the public, even though, perhaps, I have small sensible qualities. If there is any suspicion hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at that the course of nature may change, and that least, by this means, be sensible of our the past may be no rule for the future, all ignorance, if we do not augment our know- ledge. experience becomes useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impos- I must confess that a man is guilty of sible, therefore, that any arguments from ex- unpardonable arrogance who concludes, perience can prove this resemblance of the because an argument has escaped his own past to the future, since all these arguments investigation, that therefore it does not really are founded on the supposition of that resem- exist. I must also confess that, though all the blance. Let the course of things be allowed up learned for several ages should have 158

employed themselves in fruitless search upon reflection, you produce any intricate or any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to profound argument, you, in a manner, give up conclude positively that the subject must the question and confess that it is not therefore pass all human comprehension. reasoning which engages us to suppose the Even though we examine all the sources of past resembling the future and to expect our knowledge and conclude them unfit for similar effects from causes which are similar such a subject, there may still remain a to appearance. suspicion that the enumeration is not complete or the examination not accurate. Section V: Skeptical Solution of These But with regard to the present subject, there Doubts are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or Part I. suspicion of mistake. It is certain that the ….Suppose a person. though endowed most ignorant and stupid peasants—no, with the strongest faculties of reason and infants—no, even brute beasts—improve by reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this experience and learn the qualities of natural world; he would, indeed, immediately ob- objects by observing the effects which result serve a continual succession of objects and from them. When a child has felt the one event following another, but he would sensation of pain from touching the flame of not be able to discover anything further. He a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand would not at first, by any reasoning, be able near any candle, but will expect a similar to reach the idea of cause and effect, since the effect from a cause which is similar in its particular powers by which all natural opera- sensible qualities and appearance. If you tions are performed never appear to the assert, therefore, that the understanding of the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, mere- child is led into this conclusion by any ly because one event in one instance precedes process of argument or ratiocination, I may another, that therefore the one is the cause, justly require you to produce that argument, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be nor have you any pretense to refuse so arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason equitable a demand. You cannot say that the to infer the existence of one from the appear- argument is abstruse and may possibly escape ance of the other. And in a word, such a per- your inquiry, since you confess that it is son without more experience could never obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If employ his conjecture or reasoning concern- you hesitate therefore a moment or if, after ing any matter of fact or be assured of any-

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thing beyond what was immediately present give the cause of this cause, but must rest to his memory and senses. contented with it as the ultimate principle Suppose again that he has acquired more which we can assign of all our conclusions experience and has lived so long in the world from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction as to have observed similar objects or events that we can go so far without repining at the to be constantly joined together—what is the narrowness of our faculties because they will consequence of this experience? He immedi- carry us no further. And it is certain we here ately infers the existence of one object from advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert that the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or after the constant conjunction of two objects, knowledge of the secret power by which the heat and flame, for instance, or weight and one object produces the other, nor is it by any solidity, we are determined by custom alone process of reasoning he is engaged to draw to expect the one from the appearance of the this inference. But still he finds himself deter- other. This hypothesis seems even the only mined to draw it. And though he should be one which explains the difficulty why we convinced that his understanding has no part draw from a thousand instances an inference in the operation, he would nevertheless con- which we are not able to draw from one in- stance that is in no respect different from tinue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to them. Reason is incapable of any such varia- tion. The conclusions which it draws from form such a conclusion. considering one circle are the same which it This principle is custom or habit. For would form upon surveying all the circles in wherever the repetition of any particular act the universe. But no man, having seen only or operation produces a propensity to renew one body move after being impelled by the same act or operation without being another, could infer that every other body will impelled by any reasoning or process of the move after a like impulse. All inferences understanding, we always say that this pro- from experience, therefore, are effects of pensity is the effect of custom. By employing custom, not of reasoning…. that word we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only Custom, then, is the great guide of human point out a principle of human nature which life. It is that principle alone which renders is universally acknowledged and which is our experience useful to us and makes us well known by its effects. Perhaps we can expect, for the future, a similar train of events push our inquiries no further or pretend to with those which have appeared in the past. 160

Without the influence of custom we should be process of the thought and understanding is entirely ignorant of every matter of fact able either to produce or to prevent. beyond what is immediately present to the Part II. memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends or to employ our Nothing is more free than the imagination of natural powers in the production of any man, and though it cannot exceed that effect. There would be an end at once of all original stock of ideas furnished by the action as well as of the chief part of specu- internal and external senses, it has unlimited lation…. power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of What then is the conclusion of the whole fiction and vision. It can feign a train of matter? A simple one, though it must be con- events with all the appearance of reality, fessed, pretty remote from the common ascribe to them a particular time and place, theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of conceive them as existent, and paint them out fact or real existence is derived merely from to itself with every circumstance that belongs some object present to the memory or senses to any historical fact which it believes with and a customary conjunction between that the greatest certainty. In what, therefore, and some other object. Or, in other words, consists the difference between such a fiction having found in many instances that any two and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar kinds of objects. flame and heat, snow and idea which is annexed to such a conception as cold, have always been conjoined together, if commands our assent and which is wanting to flame or snow is presented anew to the every known fiction. For as the mind has senses, the mind is carried by custom to authority over all its ideas, it could volun- expect heat or cold and to believe that such a tarily annex this particular idea to any fiction quality does exist and will discover itself and consequently be able to believe whatever upon a nearer approach. This belief is the it pleases; contrary to what we find by daily necessary result of placing the mind in such experience. We can, in our conception, join circumstances. It is an operation of the soul the head of a man to the body of a horse, but when we are so situated, as unavoidable as it is not in our power to believe that such an feeling the passion of love, when we receive animal has ever really existed. benefits or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of It follows, therefore, that the difference natural instincts which no reasoning or between fiction and belief lies in some senti- ment or feeling which is annexed to the latter, 161

not to the former, and which depends not on name of this feeling, and no one is ever at a the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. loss to know the meaning of that term, It must be excited by nature like all other because every man is every moment con- sentiments and must arise from the particular scious of the sentiment represented by it. It situation in which the mind is placed at any may not, however, be improper to attempt a particular juncture. Whenever any object is description of this sentiment, in hopes we presented to the memory or senses, it imme- may by that means arrive at some analogies diately, by the force of custom, carries the which may afford a more perfect explication imagination to conceive that object which is of it. I say then that belief is nothing but a usually conjoined to it; and this conception is more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady attended with a feeling or sentiment different conception of an object than what the from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this imagination alone is ever able to attain. This consists the whole nature of belief. For as variety of terms, which may seem so there is no matter of fact which we believe so unphilosophical, is intended only to express firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary, that act of the mind which renders realities, or there would be no difference between the what is taken for such, more present to us than conception assented to and that which is fictions, causes them to weigh more in the rejected were it not for some sentiment which thought, and gives them a superior influence distinguishes the one from the other. If I see on the passions and imagination. Provided we a billiard ball moving towards another on a agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop about the terms. The imagination has the upon contact. This conception implies no command over all its ideas and can join and contradiction, but still it feels very differently mix and vary them in all the ways possible. It from that conception by which I represent to may conceive fictitious objects with all the myself the impulse and the communication of circumstances of place and time. It may set motion from one ball to another. them in a manner before our eyes, in their true colors, just as they might have existed. But as Were we to attempt a definition of this sentiment, we should, perhaps, find it a very it is impossible that this faculty of imagina- difficult, if not an impossible task; in the tion can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is same manner as if we should endeavor to evident that belief consists not in the peculiar define the feeling of cold, or passion of anger, nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of to a creature who never had any experience of their conception and in their feeling to the these sentiments. Belief is the true and proper mind. I confess that it is impossible perfectly 162

to explain this feeling or manner of concept- three, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and tion. We may make use of words which causation; these are the only bonds that unite express something near it. But its true and our thoughts together and beget that regular proper name, as we observed before, is belief, train of reflection or discourse which, in a which is a term that everyone sufficiently greater or less degree, takes place among all understands in common life. And in philo- mankind. Now here arises a question on sophy we can go no further than assert that which the solution of the present difficulty belief is something felt by the mind which will depend. Does it happen in all these distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from relations that when one of the objects is the fictions of the imagination. It gives them presented to the senses or memory, the mind more weight and influence, makes them is not only carried to the conception of the appear of greater importance, enforces them correlative, but reaches a steadier and in the mind, and renders them the governing stronger conception of it than what otherwise principle of our actions…. it would have been able to attain? This seems Let us, then, take in the whole compass of to be the case with that belief which arises this doctrine and allow that the sentiment of from the relation of cause and effect. And if belief is nothing but a conception more in- the case is the same with the other relations or principles of association, this may be tense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination and that this established as a general law which takes place in all the operations of the mind…. manner of conception arises from a custo- mary conjunction of the object with some- I shall add … that as this operation of the thing present to the memory or senses. I mind by which we infer like effects from like believe that it will not be difficult, upon these causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the suppositions, to find other operations of the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not mind analogous to it and to trace up these probable that it could be trusted to the phenomena to principles still more general. fallacious deductions of our reason, which is We have already observed that nature has slow in its operations, does not appear, in any established connections among particular degree, during the first years of infancy, and, ideas and that no sooner one idea occurs to at best, is in every age and period of human our thoughts than it introduces its correlative life extremely liable to error and mistake. It is and carries our attention towards it by a gentle more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of and insensible movement. These principles of nature to secure so necessary an act of the connection or association we have reduced to mind by some instinct or mechanical tenden- 163

cy which may be infallible in its operations, more probable that the former would turn up may discover itself at the first appearance of than the latter, though, if it had a thousand life and thought, and may be independent of sides marked in the same manner and only all the labored deductions of the understand- one side different, the probability would be ing. As nature has taught us the use of our much higher and our belief or expectation of limbs without giving us the know edge of the the event more steady and secure. This muscles and nerves by which they are process of the thought or reasoning may seem actuated, so has she implanted in us an trivial and obvious, but to those who consider instinct which carries forward the thought in it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford a correspondent course to that which she has matter for curious speculation. established among external objects, though It seems evident that when the mind looks we are ignorant of those powers and forces on forward to discover the event which may which this regular course and succession of result from the throw of such a die, it objects totally depends. considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable and it is the very nature Section VI: Of Probability of chance to render all the particular events comprehended in it entirely equal. But Though there is no such thing as chance in the finding a greater number of sides concur in world, our ignorance of the real cause of any the one event than in the other, the mind is event has the same influence on the under- carried more frequently to that event and standing and begets a like species of belief or meets it more often in revolving the various opinion. possibilities or chances on which the ultimate There is certainly a probability which result depends. This concurrence of several arises from a superiority of chances on any views in one particular event begets imme- side and, according as this superiority diately, by an inexplicable contrivance of increases and surpasses the opposite chances, nature, the sentiment of belief and gives that the probability receives a proportional in- event the advantage over its antagonist which crease and begets still a higher degree of is supported by a smaller number of views belief or assent to that side in which we and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we discover the superiority. If a die were marked allow that belief is nothing but a firmer and with one figure or number of spots on four stronger conception of an object than what sides, and with another figure or number of attends the mere fictions of the imagination, spots on the two remaining sides. it would be this operation may, perhaps, in some measure 164

be accounted for. The concurrence of these uniform, we expect the event with the several views or glimpses imprints the idea greatest assurance and leave no room for any more strongly on the imagination, gives it contrary supposition. But where different superior force and vigor, renders its influence effects have been found to follow from causes on the passions and affections more sensible, which are to appearance exactly similar, all and, in a word, begets that reliance or security these various effects must occur to the mind which constitutes the nature of belief and in transferring the past to the future and enter opinion. into our consideration when we determine the probability of the event. Though we give the The case is the same with the probability of causes as with that of chance. There are preference to that which has been found most some causes which are entirely uniform and usual and believe that this effect will exist, we constant in producing a particular effect, and must not overlook the other effects, but must no instance has ever yet been found of any assign to each of them a particular weight and failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire authority in proportion as we have found it to has always burned, and water suffocated, be more or less frequent. It is more probable, every human creature. The production of in almost every country of Europe, that there motion by impulse and gravity is a universal will be frost sometime in January than that the weather will continue open throughout that law which has up to now admitted of no exception. But there are other causes which whole month, though this probability varies according to the different climates and ap- have been found more irregular and uncer- tain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, proaches to a certainty in the more northern or opium a soporific, to everyone who has kingdoms.… As a great number of views do taken these medicines. It is true, when any here concur in one event, they fortify and cause fails of producing its usual effect, confirm it to the imagination, beget that philosophers do not ascribe this to an irregu- sentiment which we call belief, and give its larity in nature but suppose that some secret object the preference above the contrary event which is not supported by an equal causes in the particular structure of parts have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, number of experiments and does not recur so however, and conclusions concerning the frequently to the thought in transferring the event are the same as if this principle had no past to the future. place. Being determined by custom to trans- fer the past to the future in all our inferences, where the past has been entirely regular and 165