Debating the East Asian Peace

DEBATING THE EAST ASIAN PEACE

Bjarnegaard-Kreutz_book.indd 1 12/04/2017 11:09 NIAS–Nordic Institute of Asian Studies NIAS Studies in Asian Topics 47 Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand d Søren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager (eds) 48 Plaited Arts from the Borneo Rainforest d Bernard Sellato (ed.) 49 Cambodia’s Economic Transformation d Caroline Hughes and Kheang Un (eds) 50 Ancestors in Borneo Societies: Death, Transformation and Social Immortality d Pascal Couderc and Kenneth Sillander (eds) 51 Creative Spaces: Seeking the Dynamics of Change in China d Denise Gimpel, Bent Nielsen and Paul Bailey (eds) 52 Red Stamps and Gold Stars: Fieldwork Dilemmas in Upland Socialist Asia d Sarah Turner (ed.) 53 On the Fringes of the Harmonious Society: Tibetans and Uyghurs in Socialist China d Trine Brox and Ildikó Bellér-Hann (eds) 54 Doing Fieldwork in China … with Kids! The Dynamics of Accompanied Fieldwork in the People’s Republic d Candice Cornet and Tami Blumenfield (eds) 55 UNESCO in Southeast Asia: World Heritage Sites in Comparative Perspective d Victor T. King (ed.) 56 War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar: The Kachin Ceasefire, 1994–2011 d Mandy Sadan (ed.) 57 Charismatic Monks of Lanna Buddhism d Paul T. Cohen (ed.) 58 Reinventing Social Democratic Development: Insights from Indian and Scandinavian Comparisons d Olle Törnquist and John Harriss (eds) 59 Fieldwork in Timor-Leste: Understanding Social Change through Practice d Maj Nygaard-Christensen and Angie Bexley (eds) 60 Debating the East Asian Peace: What it is. How it came about. Will it last? d Elin Bjarnegård and Joakim Kreutz (eds) 61 Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia d Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat (eds) 62 Warring Societies of Pre-colonial Southeast Asia: Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context d Michael W. Charney and Kathryn Wellen(eds)

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edited by Elin Bjarnegård and Joakim Kreutz

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Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Studies in Asian Topics, no. 60

First published in 2017 by NIAS Press NIAS – Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark Tel: +45 3532 9501 • Fax: +45 3532 9549 E-mail: [email protected] • Online: www.niaspress.dk

© NIAS Press 2017 While copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, copyright in the individual chapters belongs to their authors. No material may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission of the publisher.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-87-7694-219-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-87-7694-220-5 (pbk)

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x Preface i Contributors xi 1. Introduction: Debating Peace, Debating East Asia (Elin Bjarnegård and Joakim Kreutz) 1 2. Peace by Trade (Benjamin E. Goldsmith) 13 3. Peace by International Law (Shirley V. Scott) 36 4. Peace by Development (Stein Tønnesson) 55 5. Peace by External Withdrawal (Joakim Kreutz) 78 6. Peace by Avoidance of Religious Civil Wars (Isak Svensson) 98 7. Peace by Demographic Change (Henrik Urdal) 115 8. The Repressive Peace (Kristine Eck) 142 9. The Unequal Peace (Elin Bjarnegård) 159 10. The Trustworthy Peace? (O. Fiona Yap) 176 11. The Masculine Peace (Erik Melander) 200 12. The Unforgiving Peace (Holly L. Guthrey) 220 13. The Nationalist Threat to the East Asian Peace (Yongwook Ryu) 239 14. The Great Power Challenge to the East Asian Peace (Robert S. Ross) 260 15. The East Asian Peace – Will It Last? (Elin Bjarnegård, Kristine Eck, Holly Guthrey, Joakim Kreutz, Erik Melander, Isak Svensson and Stein Tønnesson) 281 Index 297

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List of Figures 0.1 Map of East Asia viii 1.1. Global estimates of annual battle-deaths from armed conflict, 1946–2014 2 2.1. ICB crisis onset and escalation rates, intra-regional dyads 19 2.2. Average dyadic intra-regional trade volumes 21 2.3. Intra-regional trade interdependence 22 7.1. East Asian youth bulges 1950–2015: Early-transition countries 127 7.2. East Asian youth bulges 1950–2015: Late-transition countries 127 7.3. East Asian youth bulges 2015 128 7.4. East Asian youth bulges 1950–2050: Selected countries 128 7.5. Youth bulges and support ratio: Republic of Korea 1950– 2015 129 7.6. East Asian support ratios 1950–2050: Early-transition countries 129 7.7. East Asian support ratios 1950–2050: Late-transition countries 130 7.8. Completed secondary education in East Asia 1970–2015 130 7.9. Gender parity in secondary education in East Asia 1970– 2050 135 7.10. Urban population five-year growth rates 1990–2050: Early- transition countries 135 7.11. Urban population five-year growth rates 1990–2050: Late- transition countries 136 7.12. Excess males aged 0–4 in selected East Asian countries 1970–2030 136 8.1. Respect for physical integrity rights in East Asia, 1949–2013 145 8.2. Respect for physical integrity rights in East Asia by country, 1949–2013 146 10.1. Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in South Korea 189 10.2. Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Taiwan 190

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10.3. Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Indonesia 191 10.4. Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in the Philippines 192 10.5. Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Malaysia 193 10.6. Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Thailand 194 11.1. Use of the word ‘honour’ or ‘honor’ over time 214 13.1. Number of Chinese vessels that entered the maritime and air space of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 2008–2015 251

List of Tables 8.1. Freedom House scores for East Asia, 2014 and 1972 147 10.1. Democratic peace over time for East Asia 186 12.1. Amnesties and truth commissions in East Asia 228 12.2. Amnesties, truth commission quality, and quality peace scores 233

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R U S S I A KAZAKHSTAN Nthn Terr. - Kurils Ulanbataar MONGOLIA

Sea of Beijing Japan Pyongyang N. KOREA JAPAN

Tianjin Seoul Tokyo S. KOREA C H I N A Yellow Sea Dokdo/Takeshima Jeju Shanghai Chongqing Nanjing East China BHUTAN Sea I N D I A BANGLA- KACHIN STATE Kunming Okinawa DESH Senkaku/Diaoyu MYANMAR YUNNAN Taipei SHAN Guangzhou Taiwan Strait RAKHINE STATE Hong Kong TAIWAN Naypyidaw Hanoi STATE Macao

KAYIN STATE LAOS Tonkin Luzon Strait Bay Gulf Hainan of Vientiane Paracels Luzon Guam (US) Bengal THAILAND Hue Scarborough Shoal Yangon Bangkok South Manila Subic Bay+ VIETNAM China CAMBODIA Sea PHILIPPINES Phnom Penh +Cam Ranh Bay Gulf of HCM City Thailand Spratlys Malacca Strait Sulu Sea Mindanao ACEH MALAYSIA Natuna Kuala Lumpur BRUNEI MALAYSIA Sumatra SINGAPORE

Kalimantan

Sulawesi WEST PAPUA

Jakarta Sunda Strait I N D O N E S I A Bandung Java TIMOR LESTE Lombok Strait © NIAS Press 2017 AUSTRALIA

Figure 0.1: Map of East Asia (underlying relief map © Mountain High Maps)

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Bjarnegaard-Kreutz_book.indd 8 12/04/2017 11:09 Preface and Acknowledgements

East Asia used to be the world’s deadliest battleground, but in the last four decades has witnessed only a fraction of the political violence seen in other world regions. This transition from widespread intensive warfare to relative regional peace constitutes an empirical phenomenon that differs from the traditional focus of security studies: identifying the causes of war. To address the dearth of research on this region’s transition to peace, an ambitious research programme was created with its base at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in Sweden between 2011 and 2016. This volume is the product of research and debates taking place within this East Asian Peace research programme, which gathered researchers from all over the world in order to address questions about how the East Asian Peace as a phenomenon can be conceptualized, explained and assessed. Besides Uppsala University, the programme included more than 20 research associates from all over the world as well as an international advisory board. The annual East Asian Peace conferences have been important debating grounds and meeting places that have laid the groundwork for the findings and debates presented in this book. The contributors to this volume include all of the members of the programme core group – Stein Tønnesson (programme leader), Erik Melander (deputy programme leader), Holly Guthrey (programme coor- dinator), Elin Bjarnegård, Kristine Eck, Joakim Kreutz and Isak Svensson – as well as research associates and/or conference attendees Benjamin Goldsmith, Shirley Scott, Henrik Urdal, Fiona Yap and Yongwook Ryu, and there is also a chapter by the advisory board member Robert S. Ross.

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The volume as it stands, and the debates presented in it, is thus clearly an outcome of the East Asian Peace research programme and we are grateful to everyone who has contributed to the programme. In particular, we wish to acknowledge the importance of the annual conferences that provided us with a platform to present, debate, and refine our analysis. These would not have been possible without the excellent work of our local conference organizers: Uppsala University in 2011, Yonsei University in Seoul 2012, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in Hanoi in 2013, Peking University in 2014, the Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore in 2015 and Uppsala University and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm in 2016. We are indebted to Riksbankens Jubileumsfond for generously funding the East Asian Research Programme under Grant m10-0100:1, ‘The East Asian Peace Since 1979: How Deep? How Can It Be Explained?’, which made the debates and discussions presented in this book possible. We wish to thank Gerald Jackson of NIAS Press for his support of this book project, and David Stuligross for his meticulous attention to detail in editing our drafts. We also extend our gratitude to Timo Kivimäki and an anonymous reviewer who provided us with both warranted criticism and useful suggestions to help sharpen the arguments of the book. We hope that this book will be of interest to academics and policy makers alike, especially those seeking to understand peace and contemporary security challenges in East Asia.

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Elin Bjarnegård is Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. Her research interests are within the field of comparative politics, with a particular focus on gender, masculinities, conflict, political parties and informal institutions. Kristine Eck is Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. Her research interests concern the organization and behaviour of actors who engage in organized violence. Benjamin E. Goldsmith is Associate Professor and Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the Department of Government and Inter national Relations, University of Sydney. His research focuses on international security, international public opinion, and atrocity forecasting. Holly L. Guthrey is Senior Researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Her research interests include transitional justice, post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding, victim psychology, and customary justice and reconciliation mechanisms. Joakim Kreutz is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. His research is on international relations and cross-national studies of civil war dynamics and resolution. Erik Melander is Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and Director of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme. His current research focuses on the implementation of peace processes, peacebuilding and human security after civil war, environmental stress and non-state conflict, and trends in armed conflict and peacemaking.

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Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College, and Associate, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University. His research focuses on Chinese security policy and East Asian security, including Chinese use of force and the role nationalism in Chinese defence policy. Yongwook Ryu is Adjunct Lecturer at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. His research interests are within the field of international relations with a focus on East Asia (China, Japan and Korea), ASEAN, identity and economic statecraft. Shirley V. Scott is Professor of International Relations and Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales Canberra. Her research focuses on the politics of international law. Isak Svensson is Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and former Director of Research at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. His three main areas of expertise are international mediation in civil wars, religion and conflict, and dynamics of strategic nonviolent conflicts. Stein Tønnesson is Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and leader of the East Asian Peace programme at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University 2011–2016. His research interests include causes of peace, war and revolution, national identities and nationalism, maritime disputes, and the pacifying impact of international law. Henrik Urdal is Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Editor of the Journal of Peace Research. His research focuses primarily on the impact of population and environmental change on armed conflict and political violence, and on the demographic and social consequences of conflict. O. Fiona Yap is Associate Professor at the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. Her main research interest is in comparative politics, with a focus on how strategic interactions between government and citizens in East and Southeast Asia affect economic policies, democratisation and anticorruption effectiveness.

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Introduction Debating Peace, Debating East Asia

Elin Bjarnegård and Joakim Kreutz

East Asia1 used to be the world’s deadliest battlefield. Indonesia, Korea and China were the battlegrounds of the three deadliest wars in human history, excluding WWII, and the more than 20 million deaths recorded in China’s Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) make this the most deadly civil war in history (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). Moreover, these big wars were not unique, as three quarters of the states in the region were involved in some international or internal armed conflicts between 1946 and 1979. During this period, these conflicts caused some 80 per cent of battle deaths in the world, in addition to violent excesses such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China, genocide in Cambodia, and politicides in Indonesia and Myanmar (Krain 1997; Tønnesson, Melander, Bjarnegård, Svensson, & Schaftenaar 2012; Kivimäki 2014). But then something happened. Figure 1.1 shows the dramatic decline in battle-related deaths from conflicts in East Asia during the 1970s. A less violent East Asia helped push the global number of battle deaths down, but what is remarkable is that East Asia became less violent both in absolute terms and also relative to other regions. In the 1980s, the global share of battle deaths from East Asia decreased to around 6 per cent and further to only 3.5 per cent in the following two decades. In 2014, only Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines were affected by low-level insurgencies, which combined caused less than 1,000 battle deaths – less than 1 per cent

1. East Asia here includes Mongolia, China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam and Timor-Leste.

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Figure 1.1: Global estimates of annual battle-deaths from armed conflict, 1946–2014

Millions 1.2 Global total East Asia 1.0

0.8

0.6

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Note: The graph uses best estimate and, when this is missing, the low estimate. Sources: Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005 (for 1946–1988), UCDP 2016 (for 1989–2014).

of the global total (Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015). This sudden and visible shift in the large region known as East Asia has attracted attention, and the phenomenon has become known as the East Asian Peace. For the last decade, the nature and causes of the East Asian Peace have been debated in conferences, reports, books and articles (early works include Ross 2003; Goldsmith 2007; Beeson 2007; Solingen 2007; Mack 2009; Tønnesson 2009; Kivimäki 2010); a development encouraged by a cross-national and cross-disciplinary research programme hosted by Uppsala University in Sweden. This anthology builds on some of the debates that have taken place within this research programme, and its title, Debating the East Asian Peace, alludes to the fact that we focus more on presenting and evaluating a variety of themes in relation to each other rather than offering incomplete answers to a complex question. While each chapter discusses processes and events in East Asia, the overall contribution includes insights to core general questions aimed

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toward understanding peace and conflict more generally. What is peace and how can it be studied? How can we characterize the East Asian Peace? What limits and conditions are associated with this peace? Can insights from East Asia explain overall regional trends of political violence? Does the way in which peace comes about affect the quality of that peace? Is the East Asian Peace under threat? If so, then why is this and where is the threat coming from? Many questions invite many answers, particularly when scholars from different traditions or with different ontological and methodological approaches engage them, and one another, on a common platform. By fostering such conversations, and by identifying both similarities and differences in existing research, we seek to advance the study of peace writ large and the understanding of contemporary domestic and international contentious politics in East Asia in particular. This book, which reflects the work of Uppsala University’s East Asian Peace Programme, does not demand consensus on these important issues. The research programme has focused on two overarching tasks: to explain how the East Asian Peace came about and to gauge its depth. One strategy for successfully accomplishing these tasks has been to encourage an informed debate among researchers. This book seeks to bolster continued debate, to refine arguments and to generate increased attention to the interlinkages as well as core disagreements between different approaches. Nuanced and inclusive debates are needed to deepen our understanding of such complex phenomena as regional peace. Every chapter constitutes a freestanding and unique contribution, albeit one that engages explicitly with arguments developed in other chapters. The book’s aims are multifaceted and ambitious and all chapters differ somewhat in disposition and methodology. What is consistent for all chapters, though, is the engagement with a theoretical argument explaining a particular definition of peace, an investigation or analysis of empirical material from East Asia and a concluding discussion about the prospects and challenges to the present stability in the region. In this way, each chapter contributes to a general academic debate, provides area studies knowledge and engages with current affairs. This introduction continues with a brief overview and background to the debate over the East Asian Peace, while also serving as a road map for the chapters that follow.

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Regional peace: the study of ‘peace’ in a ‘region’ The East Asian Peace was discovered as a regional pattern. While it is a well-established finding in the international relations literature that patterns of war and peace vary between regions (eg. Lemke 2002), some of the most prominent theories about peace focus explicitly on the regional level. In particular, this relates to the suggestion that peaceful interactions between states create so-called security communities in which the use of violence becomes unthinkable. It is unthinkable partly because there is an increased sense of community, constructed by common interests and increasing levels of trust (Deutsch, 1957). While there has been a conscious attempt to construct a security community in East Asia, this effort has met with many problems and it is disputed whether or not it has contributed to the regional peace itself (Acharya, 2001; Kivimäki, 2001). The fact that a regional pattern exists might be a coincidence: it does not necessarily mean that a ‘regional peace’ came about in the same way everywhere, or that its manifestations are similar across the large East Asian region. There are reasons for studying peace in a region, regardless of whether or not ‘region’ is an explanatory factor in itself. Buzan and Waever (2003) are among scholars who claim that, in general, a distinct middle level between state and global system is useful as a level of analysis. Such a regional focus can harness the wealth of knowledge generated by ‘area studies’ programmes around the world to statistical and comparative analyses. Case studies of individual states, or even individual conflicts, can be informed by or combined with comparisons between general trends in East Asia and the world, and vice versa. Both the state level and the global level should thus be included in analyses that focus on the region (Kuhonta, Slater and Vu, 2008). The region, however, becomes the hub of the analysis, to which conflict patterns and findings both from a national and global level are fruitfully compared. Regions are important in the analysis of international relations because they refer to the level where states are so close to one another that the security concerns of one may not be considered separate from those of the others (Buzan and Waever 2003). When focusing on one region only (rather than having a global perspective), it could also be argued that many potential explanatory factors can be held constant. In studying East Asia (or Southeast Asia or Northeast

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Asia, for that matter), we face a different situation: this region presents an unusually large variation on a number of factors that potentially could be important for explaining conflict levels, such as religious and ethnic diversity, regime types, state structures, processes of institutional reform, party systems and labour regimes (Kuhonta, Slater and Vu, 2008). This diversity can, of course, be employed methodologically so that East Asia can be seen as a natural laboratory where we look for common denomi- nators in an otherwise diverse environment. Diversity in backgrounds and approaches becomes easier to handle if contributions at the very least address the same phenomenon. The phenomenon under scrutiny is undisputed in this book: the purpose of the debate is to increase our understanding of the phenomenon referred to as the East Asian Peace.

Studying peace The majority of research intent on learning what creates peace in a country, a region or the world focuses on the factors that threaten or limit the peace. In the words of Geoffrey Blainey (1988: 3), ‘for every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace’. This observation can be expanded to studies on disputes, human rights, and beyond. A likely explanation for the lack of attention given to this topic is the difficulties in theorizing what peace is, as well as measuring empirically the incidences of peace beginning, spreading or remaining. As a consequence, existing knowledge about peace tells us something about the situations where war is less prevalent, when human rights are less suppressed, or when there is, relatively speaking, less suffering and pain for the population. This remains the case even for the well-known empirical patterns identified in the literature. While Steven Pinker (2011) and Joshua Goldstein (2011) convincingly present evidence for an overall global decline for many types of violence over decades and centuries, their explanations focus on the absence of factors that increase violence rather than identifying a theory of peace. Similarly, the so-called democratic peace is essentially based on findings around the absence of war between democratic states (Maoz and Russett 1993). Similar to the scholarly programme on the democratic peace, interest in the so-called ‘peace’ in East Asia originated as an empirical observation that needed scrutiny and explanation, with an eye to influence policy

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debates both on buttressing the East Asian Peace and drawing on this model to craft policies that might enhance peace elsewhere. Despite decades of warfare, there were suddenly no wars between major powers in the region (Solingen 2007). A closer look at the phenomenon reveals that the overall occurrence of conflict in the region declined and – in particular – that those conflicts which persisted were less violent than they had been, or than comparable conflicts continued to be in other regions (Tønnesson, Melander, Bjarnegård, Svensson, & Schaftenaar 2012; Kivimäki 2014). At the same time, however, military disputes between countries of East Asia have not declined since 1979 (Jones, Bremer & Singer 1996), and civil conflicts have been managed, rather than settled by peace agreements (Svensson 2011). While exploring these puzzles is important, and several of the contributions in this volume offer explanations for the decline of military confrontation in East Asia, our collective enterprise suggests additional insights that draw partly on the work of Benjamin Miller (2005; 2007): the same empirical pattern can be composed of either a ‘cold peace’ relying on balance-of-power and repression of grievances or a ‘warm peace’ built on cooperation and conflict resolution. We seek to understand when, why and how ‘warm peace’ has evolved. Going back to the early works in peace research, scholars have debated what peace is. This discussion has been reinvigorated by contemporary scholars who seek to deepen a traditionally conceptual dialogue by referring to concrete, real-world phenomena (Pinker 2011; Wallensteen 2015; Diehl 2016; Davenport, Melander, & Regan 2017; Tønnesson 2017). A central definition of peace remains Galtung’s (1969), which identifies peace simply as the absence of violence, but his conceptualization becomes more complex as he offers a typology of violence. Violence can either be personal (actively perpetrated by an individual) or structural (in which visible and invisible processes repress social justice). Galtung denotes absence of the former type of violence as negative peace and absence of the latter form as positive peace. From this perspective, the decline in battle-deaths and other forms of directly perpetrated violence in East Asia represents a negative peace. If a society reduces structural violence, it moves closer to a condition of positive peace. To explore both the characteristics and the depth of peace in East Asia, this book explores the prevalence of both negative and positive

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peace in the region. Galtung’s language of positive and negative peace is still used by many authors in this book, particularly to point to the fact that the reduction of one type of violence does not necessarily lead to a reduction in another form of violence. The conceptualization of peace as either negative or positive (or both) allows for an understanding that there are different forms of peace, and to investigate uneven developments of these different forms. There are, of course, other ways of conceptualizing different stages or aspects of peace as well. One such conceptualization is to refer to its sustainability, viability or quality (Tønnesson 2017). This conceptualization rests on an assumption of a peace continuum: the reduction of personal violence is seen as a milestone, and the reduction of structural violence implies deepening that peace. The use of negative and positive peace is well established, but given the empirical phenomenon of the East Asian Peace – the reduction of battle deaths – questions about the reach and quality of this particular peace are warranted. This is dealt with in chapters focusing on human rights and state repression, societal inequality, political ac- cessibility and discriminatory or exclusionary inter-communal norms. In this way, this volume contributes to the contemporary debate about the concept of peace, and provides insights with regard to whether the region might be expected to maintain its negative peace and perhaps be on its way toward a more genuinely positive peace.

Roadmap to the book The book will expose the reader to a variety of debates regarding the East Asian Peace, defined as a reduction of armed conflict between states, and its causes, costs, limits, and potential for survival. The book begins with rival, internationally oriented explanations of the regional East Asian Peace. It then moves on to explore the quality of the Peace, zooming in at the same time on domestic conflicts, including individual behaviour and attitudes on violence and peace. There are important interlinkages between the different parts of the book. First, while each competing explanation may well be valid for explaining the decline of armed conflict, all may, at the same time, identify causes of the type of peace that emerged. A peace that is initiated for economic reasons, or because there is declining interference by external powers, may also indicate a paucity of attempts at peace-building from

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the ground up. Another alternative is that part of the peace that we see is due to more efficient repression, that is, a peace in which opposition is quelled before or as it starts to mobilize. If this is the case, then the patterns of peace across East Asia are likely to be uneven, and there are several different explanations of several different types of peace. Although it is possible to read this book as a straightforward account that moves from explanations to consequences, and from the international to the national to the local, we see the chapters as a complex web of interlinked analyses that, taken together, not only give us a greater understanding of the East Asian Peace, but also, most importantly, raise a number of important issues that peace researchers should focus on. In Part One, Benjamin Goldsmith puts forward an argument for Peace by Trade in East Asia, making a causal claim regarding the observation that the escalation of interstate disputes became less common as international trade volumes increased. His explanation does not, however, address whether changes in economic openness are associated with changes in internal conflict. Shirley Scott argues for a Peace by International Law. Instead of international trade, she identifies several international treaties that have enabled China to take part in high-level, multilateral decision-making, thus contributing to China’s peaceful rise. China, being a great regional (and global) power, is thus considered a key to regional peace. Stein Tønnesson directly refutes the capitalist peace theory as put forward by Goldsmith, instead arguing for a Peace by Development. In East Asia’s developmental peace, the market did not lead the way; rather, a number of important national leaders have made strategic decisions to set national economic growth as their highest priority. This had the consequence that external conflicts were avoided, while domestic peace was achieved either by repression or by the building of legitimate institutions. Joakim Kreutz explains the East Asian Peace not by initiatives emerging from within the region and the conflicts per se, but rather as a Peace by External Withdrawal. He argues that the change depends on a shift in opportunities to use violence for political aims. States external to the East Asian region as well as states within the region actively supporting warring parties outside their own borders were both factors promoting and fuelling conflict in East Asia. In the mid-eighties, external powers shifted their efforts to supporting peace and stability in the region. Isak Svensson argues that the East Asian Peace may, in

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fact, be a Peace by Avoidance of Religious War. While religious wars have been become increasingly common, this is not the case in East Asia. In particular, the region has been relatively detached from global jihadist movements, possibly because East Asian states have high state capacities and have been able to diffuse potential military campaigns by religious militants before they escalate into larger-scale violence. Henrik Urdal points to a Peace by Demographic Change, reasoning that root causes of peace have been strengthened by demographic trends that include declining fertility rates and dissipating youth bulges. This has caused increased investment in employment for the young, which in turn has supported economic and political developments. More recent trends are also brought out, notably an ageing population that can lead to a ‘geriatric peace’. None of the explanations put forward for the East Asian decline in armed conflict addresses changes in preferences or values among the populace. Most concern international conflict and top-down approaches. Although it may well be the case that these are the main explanations for what we call the East Asian Peace, Part Two introduces some uncomfortable concerns about what this peace really entails: at what cost has it come about? who benefits from the peace? how deep is its reach? Kristine Eck argues that the East Asian Peace can be understood as a Repressive Peace. She questions the quality of an East Asian peace that is built on repression. Moreover, she also questions the durability of such a peace and suggests that countries that have bought negative peace at the price of human rights are likely to eventually experience contentious political upheaval and conflict. Elin Bjarnegård builds on this and also asks: who really benefits from such a top-down repressive peace? She characterizes the East Asian Peace as an Unequal Peace and demonstrates that the experience of human security in East Asia today depends on who you are and where you are from. Peacebuilding from the bottom-up has been largely lacking, and root causes of inequality and structurally differentiated vulnerabilities remain. Fiona Yap, who asks whether East Asia has a Trustworthy Peace, looks at the prevalence and issues behind mass protests in the region. Using survey material, she finds that the willingness to participate in protest is affected neither by trends in repression nor by economic downturns. Instead, protests increase as a result of decreasing trust in the legitimacy of the govern-

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ments, which causes instability and other potential challenges to the East Asian Peace. Erik Melander suggests that the East Asian Peace can be characterized as a Masculine Peace. Power transitions and history problems, he claims, only matter insofar as people are susceptible to them. Masculine honour cultures and warrior ideals can thus be seen as an underlying cause of war, and Melander presents worrying evidence that these ideologies are still important in East Asia. Holly Guthrey expands this concept in her chapter about an Unforgiving Peace, showing that there have been few real attempts at reconciliation in East Asia’s post-conflict societies. Instead of dealing with the history of violence and abuse in the region, East Asians actively try to forget and repress the past. While these studies paint a picture of contemporary East Asia as experiencing a relatively low-quality peace, none suggests a causal path via which the region may revert to its violent past. The final two chapters address challenges and threats to the East Asian Peace more explicitly. Focusing on a trend that may lead directly to conflict, Ryu Yongwook explores the Nationalist threat to the East Asian Peace and finds nationalist sentiments and ‘history problems’ abound in Northeast Asia. He argues that continued nationalism hinders the deepening of the East Asian Peace, which is hinged on the formation of an encompassing regional community, and that nationalist tensions may provoke conflict. Robert Ross focuses on the Great Power Challenge to the East Asian Peace. He emphasizes the Sino–US power struggle and argues that the East Asian Peace is a reflection of China’s temporary satisfaction with its territorial security along its land borders, even as the East Asian maritime environment was dominated by the United States Navy. However, he also warns that as China rises, it may no longer accept its limited ability to secure its coastal waters. Already, he claims, the power balance may be shifting as China devotes an increasing share of its defence budget to the modernization of its navy. The rise of China may thus be a challenge to the East Asia Peace if it threatens US–China relations. The final chapter, which is co-authored by the entire core group of the East Asian Peace Programme, draws out the main recommendations for the study of peace in the future, and the likely challenges facing the East Asian region.

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References Acharya, A. (2011) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge. Beeson, M. (2007) Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development. London: Palgrave. Blainey, G. (1988) The Causes of War. 3rd edition. New York: Free Press. Buzan, B. & O. Waever (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davenport, C.; E. Melander & P. Regan (forthcoming 2017) The Peace Continuum: What it is and how to study it. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deutsch, K. W. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Diehl, P. (2016) ‘Thinking about peace: Negative terms versus Positive Outcomes’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 10(1): 3–9. Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ Journal of Peace Research 6(3): 167–191. Goldsmith, B. E. (2007) ‘A Liberal Peace in Asia?’ Journal of Peace Research 44(1): 5–27. Goldstein, J. S. (2011) Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide. New York: Penguin. Jones, D. M., S. A. Bremer and J. D. Singer. (1996) ‘Militarized Intrastate Disputes, 1818–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 15(2): 163–213. Kivimäki, T. (2001) ‘The Long Peace of ASEAN’, Journal of Peace Research 38(1): 5–25. ——— (2010) ‘East Asian relative peace – does it exist? What is it?’ The Pacific Review 23(4): 503–26. ——— (2014) The Long Peace of East Asia. London: Ashgate. Krain, M. (1997) ‘State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(3): 331–60. Kuhonta, E. M.; D. Slater & T. Vu (2008) Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Lacina, B. & N. P. Gleditsch (2005) ‘Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths’, European Journal of Population 21(2):145–66. Lemke, D. (2002) Regions in War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mack, A. (2011) ‘The East Asian Peace: Explaining the Remarkable Decline

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in Political Violence in Northeast and Southeast Asia’ in Human Security Report 2009/2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maoz, Z. & B. Russett (1993) ‘Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986’, American Political Science Review 87(03):624–38. Miller, B. (2005) ‘When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace’, International Studies Review 7(2): 229-67. ——— (2007) States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettersson, T. & P. Wallensteen (2015) ‘Armed conflicts, 1946–2014’, Journal of Peace Research 52(4): 536–50. Pinker, S. (2011) The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined. New York: Viking. Ross, R. S. (2003) ‘The US–China Peace: Great Power Politics, Spheres of Influence, and the Peace of East Asia’, Journal of East Asian Studies 3(3):351–75. Solingen, E. (2007) ‘Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: The Foundations of War and Peace in East Asia and the Middle East’, American Political Science Review 101(4): 757–80. Svensson, I. (2011) ‘East Asian Peacemaking: Exploring the Patterns of Conflict Management and Conflict Settlement in East Asia’, Asian Perspective 35(2): 163–85. Tønnesson, S. (2009) ‘What is it that best explains the East Asian Peace since 1979? A call for a research agenda’, Asian Perspective 33(1): 111–36. ——— (2017) Explaining the East Asia Peace. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Tønnesson, S; E. Melander; E. Bjarnegård; I. Svensson & S. Schaftenaar (2012) ‘The Fragile Peace in East and Southeast Asia’ SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) (2016) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2016, Available at www.ucdp.uu.se, Uppsala University. Accessed August 22, 2016. Wallensteen, P. (2015) Quality Peace: Peacebuilding, Victory and World Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bjarnegaard-Kreutz_book.indd 12 12/04/2017 11:09 CHAPTER 2

Peace by Trade

Benjamin E. Goldsmith

How might the transformation of East Asia, from one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world before 1980, to one of the most peaceful from that date to the present, be explained? In this chapter I argue that the expansion of intra-regional trade plays an important part. I adopt a narrow definition of ‘peace’ as the absence of violent conflict. I focus on interstate conflict only and I claim that international trade can explain the particular pattern observed in East Asia after 1979: a lack of escalation to large-scale violence, but not a reduction in lower-level interstate disputes. In two recent articles (Goldsmith 2013b, 2014a) I provide theory and evidence supporting the argument that trade volumes in the region reduce the chance of interstate conflict escalation, and that trade volumes increased in a diffusion pattern after Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms. While relying on my previous analyses to support this argument, I also graphically present more recent data, from new sources, that are consistent with my earlier findings.1 My claims are limited, but I believe well-supported. I claim that East Asia’s massive trade flows are one piece of the puzzle, and the diffusion process I outline presents a plausible causal story for why trade spread and was able to have the impact on peace that it did, when it did. However, I do not claim to rule out all other plausible explanations, including some presented in this volume. Therefore, after recounting and reinforcing my argument, I turn to a discussion of some other potential explanations, how they may complement or compete with mine, and their potential

1. I consider East Asia (post-1945) to comprise Brunei, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), North Korea, North Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Thailand.

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logical or empirical shortcomings. My work connects most clearly with Tønnesson’s chapter on developmental states and Ross’s about great powers. Although there is important common ground, my approach is distinct from Tønnesson’s in that it relies on states’ interests and strategic interactions to explain reduced conflict, rather than leaders’ motivations to deliberately avoid conflict. My central criticism of Ross’s explanation is that it is indeterminate and, logically, could as easily lead to something very different from sustained interstate peace. I begin however, with a discussion of the particular challenges of attempting to explain an observed phenomenon such as the East Asian Peace, and how these concerns motivate my approach. I conclude by summarizing how my findings might address the questions outlined by Bjarnegård & Kreutz in the introduction to this volume, including on the durability of the East Asian Peace and theoretical and policy relevance beyond East Asia.

The East Asian Peace as a focus of analysis The East Asian Peace (EAP) research group represented in this volume was given deceptively straightforward marching orders: explain the reduction in regional conflict after 1979 and assess the depth and sustainability of the ensuing peace. As with most social science questions, it is important to unpack underlying assumptions that can crucially affect analysis. For example, are we to explain the difference within East Asia before and after 1980 and, if so, is the anomalous period the high- or the low-conflict one? Or, is the difference to be explained that between East Asia and other regions, such as the Middle East or Latin America, during the same time range? If there has been a fall in both internal and international conflict, are these supposed to have the same causes? Are causes to be sought in factors unique to East Asia, such as Confucian-influenced political culture, or in variables that are manifest in other parts of the world as well? Simply put, the East Asian Peace is a challenging research topic, and one might even wonder whether the right question is being asked. Understanding the causes of interstate conflict, including international war, is a major and long-standing research area in political science and other fields. Study of the causes of intrastate conflict, including civil wars, is another major area of research in which scholars have been especially active in recent decades. Understanding contentious politics and historical trajectories in Asia is yet another vast area of knowledge,

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stretching across as many disciplines and requiring often distinct skills and cultural and historical understanding. What is to be gained from focusing on a relatively few data points, in a relatively limited set of cases? One advantage might be to combine strengths from different areas of knowledge in new and productive ways, to focus on a potentially important observed phenomenon. It is appropriate that the multi-year process leading to this volume brought together scholars from a wide range of disciplines and research areas, and provided the opportunity – indeed, demanded – that we talk to each other, read and consider each other’s work, and integrate diverse feedback and differing approaches into our own work. Constructive tension has been part of the recipe for the EAP programme’s successes, including this volume. But there is another equally challenging, if less evident, area of tension. This is the tension between the pursuit of explanation for general patterns of behaviour that happen to be manifest in East Asia at a certain time, and the pursuit of an explanation for specific events in particular places at particular times. Such differences in the understanding of what sort of knowledge is being pursued, and what it means to ‘explain’ something, often arise from the different approaches across academic fields or research methods, and can be hard to reconcile either in practice, or, it is sometimes claimed, even logically. I see this as a false dichotomy. Discussion of the ‘levels of analysis problem’ in international relations has a long pedigree (see Ray 2001), and the tension between general and case-specific explanation is of a similar nature. Understanding a small number of events occurring at a particular place does not require a qualitatively different type of explanation, it just requires a theory and well-considered research design aimed at the research question. This may combine propositions from universally applicable theory, and it may also include ‘local’ qualifications or conditions which, given that they can moderate a general theory, are in their own sense ‘general’. Somewhat counter-intuitively, explaining a smaller number of events will probably require a larger number of variables and assumptions, because the predictions to be made will usually be more fine-grained than those regarding patterns that prevail over a large number of cases. This expected lack of theoretical parsimony raises a serious problem for any explanation and empirical analysis of East Asian Peace: the number of supposedly explanatory factors may be as great as, or greater than, the

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number of events to be explained. In statistical inference, this is sometimes called a ‘degrees of freedom’ problem. There is no doubt it is evident in this book, once all the different explanations are considered. That is not a criticism, but an acknowledgement of the difficulty of the task. Given these considerations, I have taken the approach that seeking explanations based on general, globally applicable theories is the most promising place to start. If global theories can be shown to apply, then apparent local idiosyncrasies may turn out to be spurious. I began by drawing on general liberal theories of the causes of interstate conflict. I found that a general theory regarding trade and conflict provides a good explanation, but the timing of trade expansion is tied to a particular decision by a particular East Asian leader. I have also found that the region- ally common ‘developmental state’ model of governance conditions the impact of my key variable of interest. It is useful to note that this occurs in a way that seems to challenge the expectations presented by Tønnesson in this book, opening up a potentially useful debate. Specifically, while Tønnesson claims that leaders of developmental states are exceptionally motivated to avoid interstate conflict for the sake of fostering development, I find that there is a weaker association of trade flows with pacific outcomes for developmental states than is the case for other states. In addition, because much of what is to be explained is actually the non-occurrence of events, that is, the lack of interstate war in East Asia after the Sino–Vietnam war of 1979, I use statistical analysis to examine variation in independent and dependent variables for patterns of association. When a large number of factors are present and may be relevant to an explanation of the non-occurrence of a war, at a particular place and time, when it was actually quite likely if not for factor X or Z, then a quantitative approach can have considerable advantages over qualitative process tracing or historical analysis. Of course I am also aware of the shortcomings of statistical analysis, including the specific approaches I have used. Considering my findings in conjunction with those from other authors’ contributions, using different methods and tackling somewhat different problems, no doubt will shed the most light on the questions we are addressing.

Liberal theory and the East Asian Peace Building on some of my earlier research (Goldsmith 2006, 2007), my contribution focuses on liberal theories of international relations. I also

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see this as a good way to test the theories, because explaining regional dynamics helps establish whether supposedly universal claims are useful in spite of potential effects of historical, cultural or other local particularities. Liberal theories of international relations acknowledge the roles of military force, the security dilemma and power balancing that are common aspects of realist approaches, such as that of Ross in this volume, but also argue that some factors condition and mitigate these power- based dynamics (Keohane & Nye 1977). Chief among the mitigating factors are domestic political institutions, interstate economic linkages, international organizations, laws and norms. While realists might expect that any period of peace will eventually be disturbed by a leader’s mis- calculation or a shift in the distribution of power (Waltz 1979), liberal theory is more open to the possibility of sustained interstate peace, such as Immanuel Kant’s expectation of ‘perpetual peace’ among republics. In earlier research (Goldsmith 2007), I found little evidence for a pacifying effect of democracy or international institutions in Asia, but some evidence for the association of trade interdependence with peace. But I also suggested that issues of imprecise theory or empirical measurement might be at play, such that the lack of support for general expectations could not be taken as definitive. Addressing the East Asian Peace provides an opportunity to return to these questions with more theoretical and empirical precision. My focus has been on domestic political institutions and interstate economic linkages. I find a pacifying role for each in East Asia. Most importantly for understanding the change after 1979, I find a dyad-level correspondence between the great expansion of intra-regional trade volumes after 1978 and the advent of the interstate East Asian Peace. The higher the absolute volume of trade between two states, the lower the chance of conflict escalation. This result remains robust after I control for a host of other potentially confounding factors, including trade interdependence, alliances and military balance. The trade–conflict linkage is the most important for the East Asian Peace because of timing. An explanation of a change in conflict patterns at a particular time and place should show temporal variation that plausibly links change in cause to change in effect. This was the case in my analysis of trade volumes among dyads in East Asia. It was also the case that the specific conflict pattern observed fit with my previously

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developed extension of trade-conflict theory: higher trade volumes discourage conflict escalation, but not initiation (Goldsmith 2013a). In East Asia after 1980, while there was little evidence of a reduction in the initiation of interstate disputes or crises at a low level, there was evidence that these were less likely to escalate. This pattern of continuing interstate tensions but decreasing risk of escalation was not evident in other regions of the world. Figure 2.1 illustrates this with comparisons to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America for 1947–2007.2 The figure uses data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set (Wilkenfeld & Brecher 2010), rather than the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set that I used in other studies of trade and conflict escalation (Goldsmith 2013a, 2013b, 2014a). ICB measures crisis onset based on the potential target state’s perception of direct military threat from another state, while MID assesses the first threat or use of force by one state directed at another. When I refer to ‘initiation’ in this chapter, I mean only this sort of militarization of a disagreement, that may escalate (immediately or at a later stage) to deadly violence. The frequency of the onset of new ICB crises among all intra-regional dyads is represented in Figure 2.1. Crises that reach the level of ‘Serious clash’ (one step below ‘All-out war’) are coded as escalating.3 Besides demonstrating that this East Asian pattern of continued onsets but reduced escalations can be found in another major conflict data set, the ICB data also cover more recent years than the MID data set (in their currently available versions).

2. I have truncated conflict escalation in the MENA region before 1950 (the First Arab–Israeli War) to a frequency of 0.06 when it actually reaches 0.12, in order to allow the scales of all graphs to be comparable at a maximum frequency of 0.06. This greatly improves what can be seen in the graphs. 3. A potential weakness of the ICB dataset is lack of specific information about coding for some categories in the documentation provided. Examples, but no coding rules, are provided for the categories No violence, Minor clash, Serious clash, and Full-scale war. The example of a Minor clash is the 1951 Hula Drainage crisis between Israel and Syria, while a Serious clash is the First Taiwan Strait Crisis between Taiwan and China (1954–55). While the former probably involved fewer than 100 battle-related deaths, the latter was of much larger scale, although exact figures are hard to find. More details for pre-1995 crises are provided in Brecher & Wilkenfeld (2000). This difficulty with discerning crisis severity is one reason I have preferred the MID data in previous analyses of escalation. I use ICB data here to demonstrate robustness.

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Figure 2.1: ICB crisis onset and escalation rates, intra-regional dyads

Interstate Crisis Frequencies by Region East Asia Middle East & North Africa 0 .02 .04 .06 0 .02 .04 .06

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Year of observation Year of observation

Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa 0 .02 .04 .06 0 .02 .04 .06

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Year of observation Year of observation

ICB Escalation ICB Onset

Source: My computations, using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set (Wilkenfeld & Brecher 2010).

Events in East Asia that reached the level of ‘serious’ crises after 1980 are between China and Vietnam (1984, 1987 and 1988) and Thailand and Laos (1987). These were relatively low-level territorial clashes. Although the data set stops in 2007, events between Thailand and Cambodia (2008–2011) and North and South Korea (2010) subsequently would also seem to reach that level. But these ‘serious’ conflicts nevertheless do not approach the levels of pre-1980 escalation in the region, including those that had limited involvement of external great powers such as China’s invasion of Vietnam (1979), Vietnam’s of Cambodia (1978), or clashes in the Taiwan strait in the 1950s. In other words, the pattern of no major interstate war in the region after 1979 is clear, and the severity of escalation of conflict short of war also seems demonstrably lower even after 2007. My argument for the role of trade volumes in this process was presented in two articles. First, I argue that trade volume plays a distinct role in the conflict process by providing effective tools for signalling

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resolve during interstate crises (Goldsmith 2013b). This draws on bargaining models of war (Reiter 2003). A fundamental assumption of this approach is that war occurs because states find it difficult to signal their resolve credibly. Because there are incentives to bluff, cheap-talk signals are easily dismissed, even when they accurately reflect high resolve to fight. In such circumstances, in which credible signals about the adversary’s true intentions are absent, a state is more likely to miscalculate the chances of prevailing in war, and thus enter a fight it would have otherwise avoided. Even though using trade as a signal of resolve in East Asia may be diluted by the so-called developmental state model of many regional states, I find evidence that it is strongly associated with a lower likelihood of conflict escalation in East Asia. While the overall opportunity costs represented by standard interdependence measures should deter crisis or dispute initiation, this factor is then priced into the bargaining process at the escalation stage. Trade volumes represent the availability of high-value or politically prominent traded goods or flows (e.g., food, energy, technology) that can provide further high-profile signalling tools above and beyond general interdependence. I show that while the inverse association between trade volume and escalation is not as strong in East Asia as elsewhere, it is nevertheless robustly apparent. I infer that close links between states and firms can reduce the credibility of signalling resolve by threatening to cut trade ties and the like, yet high trade volumes still provide relatively credible signalling tools in conflicts among East Asian states. In other words, I find that, even after accounting for a regional particularity, the general theory seems not only applicable, but capable of doing a lot of the heavy lifting in accounting for the lack of escalation. Although qualitative evidence of signals sent that caused events not to happen is notoriously hard to muster, trade has been used during recent crises in the region to signal in ways consistent with my expectations. Microchip trade between China and the Philippines has been raised in the midst of South China Sea tensions, cross-border consumer goods trade has been raised between Cambodia and Thailand during their dispute over sovereignty issues related to an important temple, and rare-earth metal exports have been cut during island-dispute tensions between Japan and China (Goldsmith 2013a, 2013b).

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Figure 2.2: Average dyadic intra-regional trade volumes (USD millions) 20,000 15,000 10,000 Trade Volume Trade 5,000 0

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year of observation

East Asia MENA Latin America Africa

Source: My computations, using the Correlates of War trade data set (Barbieri, Keshk & Pollins 2009).

Second, I argue that the timing of this increase in intra-regional trade volumes allows a plausible explanation for the observed reduction in conflict escalation (Goldsmith 2014a). Specifically, trade volumes among East Asian states began to increase in the mid-1970s, but did not take off at steep levels until the mid-1980s. This corresponds well to expectations that might follow if the decision of Deng Xiaoping to marketize and open the economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1978 was the catalyst of massive intra-regional trade expansion. Figure 2.2 illustrates this, relative to other regions, using data for 1947–2009 from the Correlates of War trade data set (Barbieri, Keshk & Pollins 2009). The graphs show average intra-regional trade flows among dyads in millions of inflation-adjusted US dollars.4 An important distinction between my argument and leader-focused, constructivist, or coalitional arguments, discussed below, is that it does not depend on

4. The base year for calculating constant dollars is 2009; deflator is from US Reserve Bank of St. Louis (https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPDEF#), accessed 21 January 2016.

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leaders’ intentions to avoid interstate conflict (only their preference not to lose a war). I need not assume that Deng chose a new path for China in order to avoid war altogether, nor that he saw avoiding war as necessary for success of his policies, nor that he was skilled and single-minded enough always to be successful at this. After all, he decided to attack Vietnam soon after beginning the reforms. Neither do I need to assume these things about all or most other regional leaders. Important for my argument about the East Asian Peace, the role of trade interdependence (the mutual dependence of states in the region on their trading relationships) does not provide such a temporal fit to observed conflict patterns. While there is evidence that interdependence in general can reduce interstate dispute onset (e.g., Hegre, Oneal & Russett 2010), East Asian interdependence reaches very high levels by the late 1960s, declines somewhat after that, and then increases again in the 2000s (Figure 2.3). This relatively constant level of interdependence from around 1965, across decades with and without high conflict levels, holds whether interdependence is measured as the portion of a state’s

Figure 2.3: Intra-regional trade interdependence .10 .08 ecnednepedretnI .06 .04 .02 0

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year of observation Latin America Africa MENA East Asia

Source: My computations, using the Correlates of War trade data set (Barbieri, Keshk & Pollins 2009). 22

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total trade represented by trade with a specific partner, as in Figure 2.3, or the portion of a state’s Gross Domestic Product represented by trade with a specific partner (Goldsmith 2013b, 2014a). Specifically, interdependence can be represented by a standard indicator using the least dependent state in the dyad, such that as this variable increases, both states will be more dependent on the trade relationship. Further, and crucially, I find no evidence of the ability of trade interdependence to dampen the risk of interstate conflict escalation to higher levels of violence, rather than preventing the outbreak of disputes to begin with (Goldsmith 2013a, 2013b, 2014a). Thus neither the timing of the change in interdependence levels, nor the specific part of the conflict process with which interdependence has an empirical association, seems to help explain the East Asian Peace. This does not mean that trade interdependence is unimportant to conflict in Asia, only that it is probably not the culprit in the mystery of the East Asian Peace.

Complementary and competing explanations In this section I discuss other theoretical approaches as candidates for alternative or complementary explanations of East Asian Peace. I highlight some of the most important and promising studies and perspectives, and provide some criticisms, but make no attempt at a comprehensive survey. Heterogeneous regional dynamics There is a rich if mainly older literature on regional patterns of conflict and cooperation. Perhaps the most sophisticated recent contribution is from Gleditsch (2002), who emphasizes trade and democracy as factors that may co-evolve with peace in regions throughout the world. He finds more support for the role of increasing trade flows in reducing regional conflict than for that of democracy (ibid. 184–190), which is generally consistent with my findings for East Asia. He emphasizes the regional context as potentially leading to causal heterogeneity for key variables, and also calls attention to the shortcomings of dyadic units of analysis for studying processes that may be monadic or multilateral. These are important cautions and temper the findings of my studies and many others. However, I would emphasize that my approaches to trade and regime type as factors affecting conflict are stated in explicitly dyadic terms.

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Justified scepticism that dyadic research designs are vulnerable to being confounded by unmeasured dependencies in the data should nevertheless not lead to dismissal of dyadic theory and evidence out of hand. A regional focus can also help alleviate such concerns. If peace, integration and regime-type tend to co-evolve at the regional level, then the remaining within-region variation could provide a more appropriate basis for assessing dyadic claims. As Gleditsch (ibid. 45) notes, within- region conflicts also may provide a more appropriate set of cases for understanding the impacts of trade and regime type, because they represent instances in which the ‘vital security’ of states is directly threatened. A broader category of regional studies focuses on particular political cultures and/or leaders in particular regions.5 Exceptional individuals and decisions can create lasting effects and path-dependencies, and political cultures can condition behaviour. These factors may lead to sui generis dynamics of conflict and peace across regions. Some studies point to particularities of East Asia that might explain its distinct conflict patterns, including historical approaches that emphasize the role of particular leaders, the lessons learned from particular events, and approaches drawing on constructivist frameworks emphasizing distinct localized norms and practices. Of direct relevance to the East Asian Peace proposition, some of these studies have focused on Asian values or the ‘ASEAN Way’, sometimes asking whether a security community (in which war is unthinkable) is developing in Southeast Asia. But the focus on Southeast Asia and its common norms, and the institution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, makes a poor fit for the East Asian Peace, which includes Northeast Asia (but see Acharya 2014 for a theoretical attempt to en- compass Northeast Asia). Kivimäki (2011) argues that the norms of the ASEAN Way have spread to Northeast Asia, reducing conflict. Empirical studies in this vein face the considerable challenge of measuring their key variables with sufficient degrees of reliability and validity, and distinguishing them from potentially associated factors like trade. Leaders’ public statements of course should not be taken at face value as evidence for their true beliefs and causes of their behaviour. Unfortunately, it seems

5. I have reviewed some of this large literature elsewhere (Goldsmith 2006) and here only touch on recent relevant work.

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to me that conceptual, measurement, and statistical issues have stood in the way of identifying compelling support for such arguments, and no consensus has emerged even within the constructivist school. Regional power configurations Can the East Asian Peace be explained using standard, power-based theories of international relations that focus on power balancing or power hierarchies? For example, a balance-of-power explanation could focus on the rapprochement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China from 1971, balancing the USSR, and then the improved relations between the USSR/Russia and PRC from the late 1980s, balancing the United States. A hierarchical approach might focus on the domination of the United States in the Asia-Pacific regional security architecture as the USSR found it increasingly difficult to project its ‘superpower’ status in Asia. But structural approaches to explaining systemic conflict patterns are often indeterminate when applied to specific conflicts or sets of conflicts. As Waltz (1979: 122) cautions, we should not ‘mistake a theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy.’ Realists would argue that bipolarity induces stability while multipolarity leads to more conflict. Mearsheimer (2001) notes the importance of regions, and expects regional balances to matter. All states seek regional hegemony, and a rising hegemon can cause regional conflict by inducing a structure of ‘unbalanced multipolarity’. This argument does not seem to explain the continued lack of intra-Asian conflict. One might argue that the most propitious time for regional peace from a balance-of-power perspective was from the 1971 Sino–US rapprochement through the fall of the USSR twenty years later. This period witnessed common US–PRC regional security interests, especially after the end of the Vietnam War, and the existence of a third power that each perceived as a greater threat, inducing their security cooperation. Unfortunately for advocates of structural theories as powerful explanations of specific foreign policy choices at specific times, the timing corresponds poorly to that of the observed East Asian Peace. Waltz (1979: 122) certainly did not see structural theory as capable of explaining the timing or substance of individual states’ choices with much specificity, or as he put it ‘why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’. The actual timing of the East Asian Peace is not off by a day but by a decade, and

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the fall of the USSR yet another decade later seems not to have had an impact on the continued East Asian peace. Ross’s approach in this volume builds on such realpolitik thinking (including the power-transition ideas discussed below) and provides a potentially compelling alternative. Ross reminds us that China was involved in many regional conflicts up to 1979 (and some into the 1980s), but very few afterwards, while the United States retrenched its regional presence to an extent after the Vietnam War. But the claim that peace followed Chinese achievement of its border and periphery security objectives, and China essentially become a satisfied, status-quo power, raises the question of the source of those objectives. China may fight when it perceives insecurity and refrain from fighting when it perceives security (see Ross’s chapter in this volume), but without a clear statement of why these perceptions are formed and change, the explanatory power is uncertain and there is a risk of ad hoc theorizing. If we assume that not all states or leaders perceive security in the same way given the same structural conditions, nor react to changes in their general capabilities (e.g., GDP growth) in the same way, the next step might be closer investigation of causal mechanisms in the decision processes. Another concern is whether it is necessary to assume, for explanations based on military capabilities, that China’s choices about when and how to develop its military are exogenous to its leaders’ intentions or perceptions. In addition, as important as China is, it should not be considered the only potential source of interstate conflict in East Asia. Conflict patterns among dyads such as Thailand–Cambodia, for example, should be addressed. Another challenging pair is North and South Korea, to which Ross devotes little attention, but for which my trade-based approach also provides no good explanation, if it is to be considered peaceful after 1979. The absence of sustained violent escalation in this dyad after the end of the Korean War seems to have more to do with the United States’ extended deterrent, and possibly China’s ability to restrain its ally, than with trade or other liberal variables. Power-transition theorists focus on regional hierarchies, which are assumed to be peace-inducing when a regional hegemon has a prepon- derance of power, while power parity (balance) and dissatisfaction with the status quo are assumed to be conflict inducing (Lemke 2002). The founder of this approach, A. F. K. Organski (1958: 445–447), in a fairly

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amazing and prescient prediction, was perhaps the first to anticipate the rise of China (and not the USSR) to challenge US power. Power- transition theory is frequently drawn upon by analysts of East Asian security and the rise of China. But its specific predictions for regional conflict are not necessarily clear. On the one hand, a regional hierarchy with one preponderant state at the top should discourage regional challengers. On the other hand, as a regional hegemon rises, it may threaten the global hegemon. The resulting tensions of an anticipated power transition can easily lead to region-level confrontations between the regional hegemon and proxies of the global hegemon, as well as the classic hegemon-challenger confrontation. Both realist balance-of-power theory and rival power-transition approaches speak to the risk of great power war or wars involving regional hegemons. These are very important sources of conflict. However, the indeterminacy of structural explanations is unsatisfying not only because such explanations speak to the risk of exceedingly rare events and therefore are unlikely tools to analyze with much precision conflict patterns over the span of a decade or two, but also because they have less to say about the behaviour of non-great powers. In my view, structural theories do not make strong predictions about the likelihood of militarized conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, or even China and Vietnam. Alliance ties and other connections to great powers matter, but expectations are indeterminate. Global structural bipolarity persisted during East Asia’s high- and low-conflict periods. In the post-World War II era, China’s rise as a potential regional hegemon may not be said to have begun until the 1990s. Global and regional power structure is undoubtedly important to East Asian security, but we need to consider additional factors in order to understand individual conflicts, or specific patterns like the low frequency of escalation in East Asia after 1979. Elite coalitions and agency While Tønnesson’s work, discussed below, has received considerable attention, the contributions of an elite-coalition approach, mainly associated with the work of Etel Solingen (1998, 2007, 2014), have not been emphasized as much as they might have in recent East Asian Peace scholarship. Solingen focuses on East Asia specifically, contrasting the relative absence of interstate conflict with the Middle East and other

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regions. She argues (1998: 19) that domestic political coalitions may be of two types for the purposes of basic foreign policy orientation: internationalist or statist-nationalist-confessional. Internationalist coalitions have preferences for interstate commerce and investment, economic growth and avoiding the economic opportunity costs of high military expenditures. Statist coalitions maintain power through nationalism or similar communal appeals, emphasize the military as a protector of sovereignty, and find foreign threats useful for maintaining domestic political order and support. These coalitions also form regional linkages and, where a region is dominated by ruling internationalist coalitions, they will seek to avoid military conflict. A region dominated by ruling statist coalitions will tend toward conflict. Solingen (2007) sees the causes of lower conflict in East Asia from 1965 onwards as due to the regional prevalence of ruling internationalist coalitions. Leaving aside the still-considerable levels of interstate conflict escalation between 1966 and 1979, I see these propositions as plausible but fundamentally untested. One issue is that the role of the coalitions themselves has not been satisfactorily decoupled from the economic linkages that give rise to them, and that they promote. Another issue is that some comparative case analyses claiming to provide support for the approach seem vulnerable to the criticism of selecting on the dependent variable. This may be said for the contrast between the Middle East and East Asia (Solingen 2007) and 1914 Germany versus 2014 China (Solingen 2014). When somewhat more attention is paid to case selection, interpretation of cases might seem selective, such as the apparent rise of internationalist coalitions in the Middle East leading to ‘momen- tous cooperative undertakings of the early 1990s’ (Solingen 1998: 15). In addition, the causal mechanisms through which internationalist coalitions increase the chances of peace, while statist-nationalist- confessional coalitions make conflict more likely, are not laid out clearly enough. The mechanisms are tied to elite preferences, not just state-level or firm-level economic interests. But an interest in global economic linkages does not preclude engaging in international conflict. Neither Israel, nor Cold-War South Africa, nor India since liberalizing in the 1990s found these to be mutually exclusive. In addition, if the major threat to domestic interests is the potential rise of a countervailing statist coalition, it is not clear why internationalizing elites would not engage in

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some external conflict to demonstrate their nationalist credentials and defuse such potential challenges. If the causal mechanism is, alternatively, simply economic interests that constrain the conflict behaviour of supposed internationalist elites, then it is not clear why it is necessary to focus on the elite coalition, rather than the value of the international economic linkages themselves to the state, to firms and to other specifically interested actors. Not all internationalist elite coalitions will be equally successful in establishing such economic linkages, nor will international linkages only exist in the presence of such elite coalitions motivated to establish, maintain or expand them. It is necessary to develop a better, more systematic way to measure such coalitions across many cases and across time before their impact independent of the actual economic linkages can be assessed. The risk of tautological reasoning from a lack of conflict to the presence and agency of supposedly ‘internationalist’ elites, and from the observation of conflict to ‘inward-looking’ elite coalitions as its cause (Mansfield & Solingen 2010: 154) is a concern.6 As far as I am aware, no version of coalitional arguments advances an explanation for the particular pattern of reduced escalation, but continued militarized interstate crises and disputes, that I contend defines the East Asian Peace. Equally fundamentally, ‘internationalization’ need not take a liberalizing form: currently, both China and Russia are pursuing strategies of international engagement in their regions, but Russia’s is primarily militarized, not marketized, and China’s seems to be a hybrid. Finally, I will briefly address the developmental-peace approach Tønnesson presents in this volume, which shares elements of the leader- based and coalitional approaches. It is entirely plausible that leaders of East Asian developmental states, supported by a coalition of political and economic elites who share the same outlook, would strive to avoid international conflict to foster economic development. There is an intersection with this developmentalism and my trade-volume argument, since the developmental-state model relies on export-led growth. Indeed (as with the coalitional argument) it would be surprising if this

6. It is not clear how coalition interests and correlated behaviour are kept distinct in coding schemes such as that in Solingen (2001: 528). Indeed, coalition identity (and coding) under a single leader can change ‘in response to changes in coalitional opportunities and/or external crises.’

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elite-agency-based argument did not account for some part of the East Asian Peace. However, I think key questions remain to be addressed. Theory and evidence do not align as well as Tønnesson implies. Specifically, it is not clear how this approach explains the continued frequency of post-1979 interstate disputes that do not escalate. It is also not clear how Tønnesson would explain the lack of escalation among regional states that do not fit the developmental model. Categorization of Vietnam as a developmental state from the initiation of the Doi Moi policy in 1986 also might be seen as problematic in two ways. First, the very idea that Vietnam is a developmental state has been challenged (Masina 2010), and, second, the timing is perhaps late to account for the observed East Asian Peace. More generally, the region-wide absence of escalation after 1979 does not appear to fit well with the disparate timing of the adoption of developmentalism by individual regional leaders. One area for useful further investigation, I believe, is to devise better ways to test theories about trade and other developmental-state related economic factors, against elite- and national-priority based arguments. Generally, I think it is more promising to inquire about the relative weight to be accorded to various factors emphasized in this volume in explaining the East Asian Peace, than it is to try to show that one is exclusively ‘right’ and another ‘wrong’.

Conclusions My analysis provides clear answers to some of this volume’s core questions. First, How can we characterize the East Asian Peace? The East Asian Peace can be characterized, at least in part, as a liberal peace, based on its exceptionally high intra-regional trade flows. I claim that this is a rationalist peace based in liberal theories of international relations, and not dependent on the developmental goals of specific leaders, nor on the political culture of developmental states in the region. High trade volumes between regional powers, specifically China and Japan, and the United States, are particularly important because they help these countries send each other clear, credible signals about security interests and intentions. As China continues to rise as the predominant regional power, the potential US–China power transition will have a greater chance of being peaceful to the extent that trade flows between the two remain high. Trade flows between China and major

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US allies like Japan are also important for avoiding conflict that pulls the United States in. Further integrating India into trade networks with China and the United States should make great-power peace more likely as a new Indo-Pacific order takes shape. Second, what limits and conditions are associated with this peace? My claim is probabilistic. I do not claim that there is no chance of regional conflict escalation, only that high trade volumes substantially reduce the probability. I echo Ross’s caution that deterministic and monocausal explanations are problematic. There is little reason to seek, or debate over, a ‘silver-bullet’ type explanation for all instances of conflict or peace in East Asia. It is highly unlikely that the variable I focus on, trade volume, helps us understand the lack of conflict escalation between North and South Korea since the end of the Korean War. Probabilistic assessments, and consideration of multiple factors, are more promising for understanding complex phenomena. I also argue that the pacifying effect of trade volumes is weaker than it would otherwise be, to the extent that the developmental state model persists in the region. Trade volumes are less-effective signalling tools for developmental states, precisely because they can more freely use trade in this way, incurring lower domestic political costs. A signal that is less costly to the sender, also carries less credibility. Third, can insights from East Asia explain overall regional trends of political violence? My approach has the advantage of being based on a general theory. It should apply to all regions, as well as to inter-regional dyads. The expectation is also linear. Other things equal, greater trade flows for any dyad lower the chance of conflict escalation. Fourth, does the way in which peace comes about affect the quality of peace? My theory anticipates, or at least allows, a relatively low quality of peace. High trade volumes do not deter states from militarized disputes, only from escalating them. For example, there is no contradiction between my theory and rising tensions over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Tensions can co-exist with high trade volumes, but the trade volumes reduce the likelihood that war will erupt. Finally, is the East Asian Peace under threat? If so, then why is this and where is the threat coming from? One potential threat is the slowing of the Chinese economy. Lower demand or production in China could reduce regional exports to China. A resulting slowing of regional economies

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would depress regional exports from China and depress demand and trade across the region. Slowing in the Chinese and other regional economies could also lead to greater protectionism, accelerating the trade reductions. These events would increase the risk of conflict escalation over, for example, maritime disputes. However, given the very high levels of intra-regional trade, and the export orientation and deeply integrated production networks in the region, I see these threats as moderate. I concur with many authors in this volume and numerous others that the rise of China as a military power and aspiring regional hegemon presents the major threat to regional interstate peace. But, I expect high trade volumes to remain a key bulwark against conflict escalation as China rises. There is little about structural, elite-coalition, individual, or norm- based explanations that is fundamentally inconsistent with my focus on liberal factors such as trade and regime type. The challenge of assessing the relative importance of these factors is one of evidence and inference, not (necessarily) competing theoretical logics. However, I do make some assertions about the inferences that are possible so far. Structural explanations are potentially hampered by their indeterminacy below the great-power conflict level. Organski’s foresight regarding China’s power transition remains relevant, but we need to know more in order to assess the depth and staying power of the East Asian Peace. Elite-coalition and developmental-peace theory have much to say about states’ preferences, but in the highly strategic context of international conflict, we need to understand more than elite preferences in order to understand dyadic (or higher order) outcomes regarding conflict and peace. When economic outcomes do not match elite ambitions, it is not clear that emphasis on development and openness will be maintained if nationalism and scapegoating are available to ruling elites or their challengers. My estimation of the future of the East Asian Peace, however, relies on the greater number of available, valuable and relatively credible signalling tools that East Asian leaders have, compared to their situation before 1980. If trade volumes among East Asian states remain high, I expect a persistent downward pressure on interstate conflict escalation in the region due to the enhanced ability of states to signal their true resolve over the issues at stake. My research also points to the relevance of another liberal proposition for East Asian security: the democratic peace. Specifically, I provide

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evidence that East Asian states with greater domestic political competition are less likely to target democracies (Goldsmith 2014b). This relates to the initiation stage of conflict. A more nuanced and theoretically considered specification leads to evidence for democratic peace in the region, contrary to my previous finding. This perhaps is not relevant for China’s chance of conflict with other regional states or the United States, but it is important for the chances of peace among the region’s democracies such as South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Indonesia and potential (re-)democratizers such as Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand. While the rise of China is a big unknown, both in terms of its growing regional ambitions and its relations with the United States, my findings are encouraging in the sense that China’s huge trade volumes within the region, and with the United States, will help these states more clearly understand each other’s true resolve and negotiate the issues at stake in the East and South China Seas, and elsewhere, while avoiding escalation to major violence.

Author’s note It has been an intellectually enriching and enjoyable experience to be involved with the East Asian Peace programme. I greatly appreciate the intellectual and organizational leadership of Stein Tønnesson, and all the work of the programme leadership group. I thank Stein, Elin Bjarnegård, Joakim Kreutz and anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. I am grateful for the funding for my research under the programme, and I am grateful for additional support for this research from the Australian Research Council (DP1093625).

References Acharya, A. (2014) ‘Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order’, International Studies Quarterly 58(1): 158–73. Barbieri, K., O. M. G. Keshk, & B. Pollins (2009) ‘Trading Data: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(5): 471–91: http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/bilateral-trade, accessed 20 January 2016. Brecher, M. & J. Wilkenfeld (2000) A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Geddes, B. (1990) ‘How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answer s You Get:

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Selection Bias in Comparative Politics’, Political Analysis 2(1): 131–50. Gleditsch, K. S. (2002) All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Goldsmith, B. E. (2006) ‘A Universal Proposition? Region, Conflict, War and the Robustness of the Kantian Peace’, European Journal of Political Science 12(4): 533–63. ——— (2007) ‘A Liberal Peace in Asia?’ Journal of Peace Research 44(1): 5–27. ——— (2013a) ‘International Trade and the Onset and Escalation of Interstate Conflict: More to Fight About, or More Reasons Not to Fight?’ Defence and Peace Economics 24(6): 555–78. ——— (2013b) ‘Different in Asia? Developmental States, Trade, and International Conflict Onset and Escalation’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific 13(2): 175–205. ——— (2014a) ‘The East Asian Peace as a Second-order Diffusion Effect’, International Studies Review 16(2): 275–89. ——— (2014b) ‘Domestic Political Institutions and the Initiation of International Conflict in East Asia: Some Evidence for an Asian Democratic Peace’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific 14(1): 59–90. Hegre, H., J. R. Oneal, & B. M. Russett (2010) ‘Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 47(6): 763–74. Keohane, R. O. & J. S. Nye (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Kivimäki, T. (2011) ‘East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11(1): 57–85. Lemke, D. (2002) Regions of War and Peace. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mansfield, E. D. and E. Solingen (2010) ‘Regionalism’, Annual Review of Political Science 13: 145–63. Masina, P. (2010) Vietnam between developmental state and neoliberalism: the case of the industrial sector. c.MET Working Paper 7/2010 (December): http://193.205.129.80/repec/cme/wpaper/cmetwp_07_2010.pdf, accessed 26 November 2016. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Organski, A. F. K. (1958) World Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Ray, J. L. (2001) ‘Integrating Levels of Analysis in World Politics’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(4): 355–88. Reiter, D. (2003) ‘Exploring the Bargaining Model of War’, Perspectives on Politics 1(1): 27–43.

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Solingen, E. (1998) Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ——— (2001) ‘Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts’, International Studies Quarterly 45(4): 517–55. ——— (2007) ‘Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: The Foundations of War and Peace in East Asia and the Middle East’, American Political Science Review 101(4): 757–80. ——— (2014) ‘Domestic Coalitions, Internationalization, and War: Then and Now ’, International Security 39(1): 44–70. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Wilkenfeld, J. & M. Brecher (2010) Codebook for ICB2 - International Crisis Behavior Project, Actor-Level Data set. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/ data/, accessed 23 January 2015.

Bjarnegaard-Kreutz_book.indd 35 12/04/2017 11:09 CHAPTER 3

Peace by International Law

Shirley V. Scott

The East Asian Peace phenomenon as identified by Stein Tønnesson (2009) refers to the reduced number and lower intensity of armed conflicts in East Asia in the period 1979–2005 in comparison to the period 1946–1979 (see also Bjarnegård and Kreutz in this volume). One of the biggest structural shifts in East Asia during the period under consideration has been the rise of China. Central to explaining the East Asian Peace and gauging its sustainability is China’s peaceful rise. This chapter understands peace as the absence of interstate war and examines international law as a factor that has contributed to the peaceful rise of China and thereby to the East Asian Peace. The chapter speaks with other chapters in this volume, such as those by Goldsmith on Trade and Tønnesson on the domestic development agenda. International law has been integral to structures of global power and governance during the era of the United States. It is the premise of this chapter that in a highly institutionalized global order, tension, if not conflict, would most likely come at the stage at which a rising power is subject to unfavourable systemic restraints. International law has facilitated the East Asian Peace because the foundational legal structures of global governance have been compatible with the increasing relative power of China. The chapter first reviews the relationship between international law and power, before outlining the key provisions of several cornerstone multilateral treaties that have facilitated rather than blocked the increase in relative power of China.

International law, institutions, and rising powers In comparison with previous rising powers, China has had to increase its relative power within a highly institutionalized international order.

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Ikenberry (2008: 92) viewed this as ineluctably positive, because he assumed it to mean that China would seek to uphold and support this order: ‘the more institutionalized and encompassing the existing order is, the more difficult it is for a newly rising state to overturn it – and the more likely it will pursue an accommodative strategy.’ Ikenberry thought it unlikely that China would seek to transform the global system because the United States and other capitalist democracies had established an ‘expansive and integrated – and deeply institutionalized – international order’ (Ikenberry 2008: 114). While broadly aligned with Ikenberry’s positive disposition towards international institutions, this chapter views such institutionalisation through the lens of international law. Liberal internationalists value norms and rules as aspects of institutions; however, they rarely analyse international law as a variable in its own right. This chapter suggests that it was not only the complexity of the institutionalization of the international order, but the specific legal provisions that constitute the framework of that order, that have determined the extent to which China has to date chosen to work within the current order. Most fundamentally, every international organization has a multilateral treaty as its constitutive foundation, and the specific provisions of that treaty – both its substantive provisions and those addressing the operation of the organization – membership, voting rights, treaty amendment and so on, are integral to the ensuing political dynamics. As such, they could be expected to facilitate, or alternatively to stymie, the ambitions of a rising power.

International law and power International law often conveys an image of, and is often thought of, as a relatively timeless feature of world politics. International law is, however, a far more malleable and evolving subsystem of world politics than the image conveys. International law can serve to moderate the effects of the conduct of realpolitik, but is better at doing so within the confines of an existing international order than during a period of fundamental order transition. This is because international law is integral to relations of power but at the same time has a degree of internal coherence and autonomy from political relationships. International law serves this function best when the distribution of power equates broadly with the

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distribution of legal rights and responsibilities and, indeed, where the values and norms embedded in law align with those influential in the system. If they were to coincide exactly, law would have no independent pull. On the other hand it would not be sustainable to have the two contrasting; in such a situation there would likely be either a radical shift in outlook and behaviour, or else the law would be simply ignored. The interrelationship between international law and politics presents a key methodological and conceptual challenge in investigating the impact of international law on the East Asian Peace and, in particular, on China. For while it is not wrong to look at the extent to which the rules, principles and concepts of international law have affected China’s behaviour, it is ultimately impossible to regard international law as an independent variable that has impacted on China without considering China’s own legal agency. International law was systematically trans- lated in the 1860s and as Japanese power expanded in the mid-1890s, international law ‘quite rapidly became a framework for constructing a new discursive global orientation among Chinese intellectuals’, Chinese world orientation changing from an East Asian construction to a world orientation based on concepts of national sovereignty and balance of power (Svarverud 2011: 306). China participated actively in the evolution of the law of treaties in the twentieth century. China had for a century from 1842-1943 been subject to a system of ‘unequal treaties’ that included conditions such as consular supervision of foreign nationals in China (Ku 1992-4: 69), the opening of ports to trade, and the cession or leasing of territories such as Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula to facilitate European and US trade. It was not until 1943 that new treaties were concluded with the United States and with the United Kingdom, followed in the next few years by those with France, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland and Portugal (Ku 1992-4).

China and the cornerstone treaties of the international system International law, and particularly the multilateral treaty, has been a particular feature of world politics during the US era (Scott 2012). International law operates at a global, regional, plurilateral (amongst a group of States with shared interests but which are not necessarily proximate in a geographic sense) and bilateral levels. Regional interna-

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tional law is interlinked with the global, just as regional political relations cannot be understood without taking into account the relations of the US – and other states external to Asia - with regional players. At a global level there is a set of multilateral treaties that is foundational to the post War international order. This includes the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Scott 2008). Let us now consider several cornerstone treaties of global governance as well as some regional and bilateral treaties and their specific provisions that have facilitated China’s rise in relative power. China has been legally positioned in relation to these treaties in a manner not true of other contemporary ‘rising powers’ such as India or Brazil. The fact that several cornerstone treaties of global governance have facilitated the peaceful rise of China has reduced the likelihood of China perceiving a need to challenge the current international order, in turn rendering far more likely peaceful regional relations.

The 1945 Charter of the United Nations The most important multilateral treaty of the post-World War Two era is the Charter of the United Nations. This section identifies two specific provisions from the Charter that have been particularly important to the peaceful rise of China. The foundational principles of the Charter All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.1 Article 2 of the UN Charter affirms sovereignty as a foundational principle of the international order with paragraph 1 stating that the Organization is to be based on the sovereign equality of all of its Members, paragraph 3 requiring states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, paragraph 7 prohibiting the United Nations from intervening in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, and paragraph 4

1. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, [1945] ATS 1.

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prohibiting states from using force in their interstate relations, or threatening to do so. The insertion of article 2(4) represented a radical contrast to the nineteenth century assumption that the right to go to war (or to remain neutral) was a fundamental attribute of statehood. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter has facilitated the peaceful rise of China in both a specific and a more general way. Despite the methodological difficulties in assessing the political impact of international law, there is no doubt that the world is a different place as a result of article 2(4) and the normative changes regarding non-use of force that were embedded in the UN Charter (Goertz, Diehl & Balas 2016). ‘Expectations of international violence no longer underlie every political calculation of every nation, … Even where force is used, the fact that it is unlawful cannot be left out of account’ (Henkin 1971: 544). So far as the input of legal advisers on national decision-making is concerned it can be said that the prohibition has often, though not always, been factored into decision-making processes in which use of force was a possible option (Scott et al 2010). Embedding a prohibition on first use of force in the Charter of the United Nations did not usher in an era of universal peace, but it did mean that using force for political gain would from then on be regarded as unacceptable. A state breaking that rule can expect to be censured by the international community as was the United States for its blatant breach of article 2(4) in its 2003 invasion of Iraq (Sands 2005). A study of 110 uses of force from 1945 to 1991 found that those likely to be most strongly condemned by the international community were those that most obviously breached this article 2(4) prohibition, whereas those aimed, for example, at dislodging a European power from a colonial territory, were far more accepted (Weisburd 1997). Of course, while couched in neutral terms, the prohibition serves to sustain existing territorial boundaries, and thereby indirectly supports the status quo. As applied to the rise of China and regional peace, the constraining implications have arguably been greater for the United States than for China. China was not likely to provoke a military confrontation with the world’s superpower at a time when it had no hope of victory. Article 2(4) has rendered it very difficult for the United States to consider using force – for example to prevent China from developing military bases in the South China Sea or to act pre-emptively to prevent China from growing in power to the extent of rivalling the United States.

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This has permitted China to invest at such large levels in developing its military capability and to display that capability in increasingly assertive ways in the South China Sea, while the United States essentially has its hands tied. The United Nations Security Council The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council.2 Although the Charter makes an exception for the (natural) right of self-defence, States acting in self-defence are expected subsequently to inform the Council of the actions taken in self-defence, the assumption being that the Council will then take over any remaining steps required to re-instate international peace and security. A second exception to the general prohibition is when authorised by the Security Council. The Council has the right to take other ‘chapter VII decisions’ that are bind- ing on all or specific States. Given the article 103 primacy of Council decisions over other legal obligations of States, and the special voting rights known as the ‘veto’ of the permanent members, membership of the ‘P5’ within the Council accords those States unrivalled institutionalised power over questions of international peace and security. That authority is further entrenched by the Charter’s amendment provisions also incorporating the veto for permanent members. On this basis, permanent membership of the Council has, at least subsequent to the immediate post-war period, been about enhancing and according legitimacy to power, as much or more so than about re- flecting power. Perhaps the most important international law provision that has facilitated a rising China being accommodated within the existing international system has been article 23(1), which in 1945 identified the permanent members of the Council as being The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. US President Franklin Roosevelt had from his first planning included China as one of the Great Powers, to be joined with the three great pow-

2. Article 23(1), Charter of the United Nations.

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ers of World War Two – the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union – to make the ‘Four Policemen’, and France was subsequently also included (Russell 1958). Britain and the USSR did not at first agree with the inclusion of China and there were in fact two sets of talks at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, one including the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, and the other less important talks including the United States, Britain and China. To the United States, China was not merely a friend of long standing, it was also the only independent ally in the Far East. It was thus the logical candidate for wartime and postwar leadership in the region, and American policy sought to strengthen the country militarily and politically to fulfil that strategic role. (Russell 1958: 955) Hildebrand (1990) explains that Roosevelt believed that treating the Chinese as responsible Asian leaders might foster their development along American liberal lines, thereby replacing the defeated Japan and preferable to what he regarded as the possible alternatives of revolutionary chaos, a return to colonialism, or Russian hegemony. The People’s Republic of China replaced the Republic of China on the UN Security Council in October 1971 following a two-thirds majority vote on General Assembly Resolution 2758. This replacement followed a Sino–US rapprochement, by which the United States took advantage of Sino–Soviet conflict to create a new regional balance of power (Hara 1999). China’s role as one of the P5 has nevertheless afforded it the opportunity, as a rising power, to contribute increasingly, as and when ready, to decision-making on major questions of global peace and security. China has played a valuable role in contributing a non-Western and developing country perspective to Council deliberations (Chan 2013). Writing in 2000, Morphet divided China’s behaviour on the Council into four phases of increasing engagement and independence of policy. The first was the decade following China’s first participation on the Council on 23 November 1971, in which China was learning the ropes. During the next three years, China fitted in more readily to its dual status of Third World country and permanent Council member. From 1986 to 1990, China was working more closely with the other permanent members; the fourth period was the post-Cold War period from 1990 to 1999, in which China had to deal with greater US dominance of the Council (Morphet 2000). China has continued to

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shift from its early passivity to become increasingly active participant in Council debates within the Council on the appropriate evolution of existing tools and development of new tools by which the Council can fulfil its mandate. China has been a strong advocate of the basic principles of international law as embodied in the UN Charter: – to ‘preserve and uphold statehood on the basis of respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity’ (Ku 2013: 346). A key concern of China since the end of the Cold War has been ‘the importance of protecting its own territorial integrity and sovereignty (and that of nonaligned countries, particularly since it was granted Observer status by the Nonaligned Movement in 1992) against Western-dominated international military, political, human rights and humanitarian intervention without agreement from the country concerned’ (Morphet 2000: 165). Given its history of intervention from colonial powers, the primacy accorded sovereignty in the Charter has been perceived as fundamental by China. Indeed, to many Chinese international lawyers, the ongoing debate in the West as to whether China will work within or adapt or even undermine the system of international law is likely puzzling. From this perspective, it is the West that has since the end of the Cold War sought to move beyond fundamental principles of international law embodied in article 2 of the UN Charter, including those prohibiting first use of force and non-intervention. In line with its emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention, China at first regarded peacekeeping ‘as another instrument of hegemonic powers to legitimize and support the expansion of their spheres of influence and to interfere in the domestic affairs of small and medium-sized countries.’ (Xue 2014: 9). Although it has become increasingly keen to participate in peacekeeping, China has remained sceptical of recent trends to broaden the mandates of peacekeeping operations, particularly in respect of ‘robust’ peacekeeping – that is peacekeeping in which there is no agreed peace process in place and it is therefore likely that force may need to be used (Xue 2014). China has been regarded as a norm ‘shaper’ in respect of the Respon sibility to Protect (Foot 2011), evolving from initial criticism to cautious acceptance, so long as the proposed norm is not used as an excuse for non-consensual military intervention (Garwood-Gowers 2013). China

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did not use its veto to prevent the Security Council resolutions on Libya, but was critical of NATO exceeding its mandate under Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) to target the Gaddafi regime and provide rebel groups with arms (Garwood-Gowers 2013). Together with Russia, China subsequently blocked resolutions that would have authorized military intervention in Syria.

The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty World War Two ended in the Pacific with the defeat of Japan in 1945. This was followed by a US occupation of Japan. The state of war between Japan and the Allied Powers was not formally terminated until the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) of 8 September 1951.3 US policy-makers did not want the defeated Japan to be a breeding ground of resentment as per interwar Germany. China had been ‘lost’ to communism in 1949 and, in 1950, had entered the Korean War as an ally of North Korea. By 1951, the United States was keen to finalise the SFPT and its terms need to be read within the context of the US focus on the Cold War and preventing the spread of communism in Asia, including in Japan. Chapter One of the SFPT gave the United States control of inter alia the Ryukyu Islands, and Chapter Four specified that Japan would relinquish all special rights and privileges in China, and provided for the revival of commercial treaties with the Allied Powers. Surrounding this was a network of treaties and administrative agreements, mainly of a hub and spokes bilateral and trilateral nature between the United States and its allies that, together, has been referred to as the ‘San Francisco System’ (Price 2001: 2). This System is distinctive precisely because, despite attempts both before and after San Francisco to construct a multilateral Asian security structure along NATO lines (Hara 1999), it was not constituted by a multilateral treaty and because, unlike NATO, it integrated economics with security features (Calder 2004). On the same day as the SFPT was concluded, Japan and the United States concluded a Security Treaty,4 and in 1960 the two countries signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.5 Key provisions

3. Treaty of Peace with Japan, 8 September 1951, 136 UNTS 45. 4. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp. 5. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.

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in the Security Treaty provided for collective self -defence in the event of an attack on Japan (article V) and the continuation of American bases in Japan (article VI). Together these treaties institutionalised Japan’s status as a junior alliance partner of the United States. Japan’s history of economic interdependence with China was through this system replaced by an economic interdependence with the United States. These treaties6 cross-reference Japan’s national constitution, and if a single provision were to be singled out as providing the context for China to focus on its peaceful rise, it would be article 9(2) of Japan’s 1946 constitution, which stated that ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained’ (see Tønnesson’s chapter in this volume). The San Francisco Peace Conference effectively cut Japan off from continental China by not including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and through its exclusion allegedly breaching World War Two agreements that there be no separate peace settlements, through refusing the insistence of both the Guomindang and the PRC that Taiwan should be treated as part of China for the purposes of the SFPT, and through requiring Japan to sign a bilateral treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1952 (Price 2001). The retention of Occupation-era military bases on Japanese territory also reinforced Japan’s strategic alliance with – and subservience to – to the United States and its estrangement from China (Calder 2004). The US retained geopolitical leverage in Northeast Asia through ambiguous territorial and boundary provisions in the Peace Treaty that ensured ongoing squabbling amongst Japan and the other countries of Northeast Asia (Calder 2004). With Japan and other US regional allies legally locked into an economic and military interdependence with the United States in a network of primarily bilateral treaties radiating from Washington, the United States retained geopolitical leverage such that it would have been difficult for Japan to move independently to block China’s rise. United States economic discrimination in favour of Japan as a strategic ally lasted at least until China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in December 2001 (Calder 2004).

6. E.g. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, article III.

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The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons were used for the first time in 1945, against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Given that their horrific destructive force was immediately apparent, it was perhaps surprising that not until 1968 did international law prevent states from assisting other states to acquire them. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),7 did not require nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals but did require those states that had not (yet) acquired nuclear weapons to pledge never to obtain them; while they were permitted to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, they were required by article III(1) to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to comply. The International Court of Justice has subsequently ruled that the threat or use of nuclear weapons may be lawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence.8 This has served to reinforce the significance of the divide between states possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons. The Republic of China (Taiwan) signed the NPT on 1 July 1968 and ratified it on 27 January 1970, the year before the UN General Assembly by Resolution 2758 (1971) recognized the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN. The PRC first sought to operate in the international arena under the nuclear umbrella of the USSR, which had in 1949 broken the US nuclear monopoly, but the Korean War would seem to have motivated Mao to pursue the bomb (Gobarev 1999). China first tested a nuclear weapon on 16 October 1964, thus within the 1945-1968 window when such practices were unregulated. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping who both had an enduring influence over China’s nuclear policy, viewed nuclear weapons primarily as tools for deterring nuclear aggression, an attitude that Fravel and Medeiros refer to as ‘“assured retaliation”: deterring an adversary with the threat of unacceptable damage through a retaliatory nuclear strike’ (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 49–50). It was not about achieving specific military objectives so much as demanding greater respect from the US, USSR and the international community as a whole. During the 1960s China publicly spoke in favour of the spread of nuclear weapons to counter the nuclear superpower 7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 169. 8. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226.

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duopoly (Scott 2010, 195), and like other Third World countries including India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Algeria, and Tanzania, was critical of the discriminatory nature of the NPT (Hunt 1996). The PRC acceded to the NPT on 9 March 1992. Just as article 2(4) of the UN Charter has functioned as a check on the process of change to territorial borders as they were in 1945, so have articles I, II, and IX(3) in particular of the NPT served as a check on the further horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Articles I and II contain the obligations of nuclear weapon States not to facilitate non-nuclear weapon states acquiring nuclear weaponry and article II prohibits non-nuclear weapon states from attempting to acquire them. Belonging to the nuclear weapon club was a helpful starting point from which to rise in relative power. For China, however, which was not an original signatory of the Treaty there were two other provisions of the treaty of particular importance. First was article IX(1) which permitted any State that had not signed the Treaty prior to its entry into force to nevertheless accede subsequently with no penalties for joining later. It was the second sentence of article IX(3) that crucially paved the way to China’s membership of the nuclear club. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. During the early years following China’s accession, there were, however, ongoing concerns regarding China promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which led to suspicion among the other nuclear states that China had breached the NPT (Feinerman 1995); indeed Mingquan Zhu (1997: 40) stated that ‘[c]ritics see China as a main violator of the international non-proliferation regime and as a major contributor to the danger of nuclear proliferation today.’ Nevertheless, the terms of the NPT meant that the legitimacy of China’s nuclear weaponry was upheld by the NPT. As befitting a major world power, China has had an important seat at the table on all nuclear negotiations in recent years, including those with Iran.

The 1994 agreement establishing the World Trade Organization The rise – or rejuvenation – of China has been in essence an economic rise; it was China’s economic growth that in the 1990s made possible its transformation into a modern military power (Nathan & Scobell 2012).

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Deng Xiaoping introduced the ‘reform and open door’ policy in 1978; this was a policy transition from self-reliance to ‘reform and opening’, from autarky to interdependence (Nathan & Scobell 2012: 244). From 1978 on, China’s GDP increased at an average annual rate of 9.6 per cent to reach $6 trillion in 2010 (Nathan & Scobell 2012). During this process, China’s economic rise ultimately required it to integrate into the key institutions of global economic governance, including what had been the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and in 1995 was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO). In nominating specific provisions of international law that have facilitated the rise of China, of particular importance has, then, been article XII(1) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which provided that Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO.9 China began its bid for membership in 1986 and, after 15 years of negotiations, China finally signed an Accession Agreement in 2001. China made ‘unparalleled commitments’ in order to join the WTO (Buckley & Zhou 2015: 153). Membership gave Chinese leaders the leverage they needed domestically to continue the transition to a market economy -– transforming inefficient state-owned enterprises and industries, establishing a rule of law, and enhancing transparency (Buckley & Zhou 2015). The US and EU had promoted China’s accession so as to facilitate their domestic stakeholders’ access to the world’s largest potential market. Although they have indeed reaped significant advantages, China has adopted a strategic approach to implementation, ‘reap[ing] the full benefits of its WTO membership in foreign markets, while protecting the development of its key industries and preserving its national values, culture, and identity, so that its opening up would serve its economic development’ (Buckley & Zhou 2015: 154).

9. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154.

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WTO membership has thereby boosted China’s continuing rise. Once in the system, China has been able to increase its influence gradually, transitioning from a passive rule taker to a country that will ‘shake’ the rules for its own purposes and even function as a rule maker (Gao 2011). A second key provision of the WTO Agreements facilitating China’s peaceful rise has been article XXIII of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which established a compulsory system of dispute resolution. Contributing to China’s influence in the System has been its active participation in the dispute resolution system. All new members are required to accept a formal dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). At first China avoided initiating complaints and, if sued, settled out of Court but since the 2006 auto parts case China’s behaviour has changed dramatically (Don Harpaz 2015). Since lodging its first independent complaint in 2007 China has been an active, if not aggressive, trade litigant, particularly against the US and the EU. China has, in turn, demonstrated a willingness to accept dispute settlement by the WTO as a ‘routine and legitimate means of resolving trade disputes’ (Don Harpaz 2015: 52). Economic interdependence is generally regarded as a factor contributing to China’s continuing peaceful rise relative to the US, despite China in security terms increasingly representing what Mearsheimer (2014) terms a peer competitor.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea10 The account has so far been one of key treaties of global governance incorporating specific provisions that have left the path clear for China to continue its rise in power relative to the US and to wield influence in major decision-making at a level commensurate with that increasing power. The premise of the chapter has been that we could have expected to see China thwarted in its ambitions to continue its rise, or else for it to barge ahead in a way that led to high levels of tension, if not outright conflict or breakdown of the global institutional architecture where its path was blocked. From this perspective, it is instructive to turn our attention next to another of the central treaties of the international

10. United Nations Convention on the North Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3.

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order that denies legitimacy to a major policy path of China: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). The LOSC was concluded in 1982 following nine years of negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The PRC had between July 1968 and April 1969 reconstructed its foreign policy and the new era of Chinese foreign policy placed considerable emphasis on winning the UN seat as well as on championing the interests of the Third World (Kim 1974). China participated in its negotiation and, despite not being fully satisfied with the final product, regarded the outcome as a significant step forward in moving the law of the sea away from being merely a means of advancing superpower hegemony over the oceans (Yuan 1984). China believed that Third World interests had been advanced through recognition, inter alia, of a twelve-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (Yuan 1984: 416). Somewhat ironically, given China’s active participation in its negotiation and overall satisfaction with the outcome, this is the cornerstone treaty that is currently thwarting China’s ambitions, insofar as it it does not contain provisions that accord China legitimate control over the adjoining enclosed seas to which China believes it has rightful claim. A Chinese atlas of 1947 indicated the extent of China’s authority in the South China Sea by way of an eleven-dash line. In 1953, this was reduced by two dashes to become the nine-dash line (Gao & Jia 2013). Of the cornerstone legal regimes that have been reviewed in this chapter, it is the LOSC that so clearly stands in the way of China pursuing its perceived maritime interests as a rising power. China’s desire to control vital trade routes and secure its ability to exploit energy and marine living resources along a 3000 -mile maritime arc running from the East China Sea to the south of the South China Sea may be among the motivations for its coercive behaviour of recent years in shoring up its position regarding several interlinked territorial and resource disputes (Dupont & Baker 2014). China has also undertaken considerable land reclamation and construction of artificial islands and military facilities.An arbitral tribunal constituted under annex VII of the LOSC on 12 July 2016 found inter alia that to the extent that China had enjoyed historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, those rights had been extinguished to the extent that they were incompatible with the exclusive economic

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zones provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal found no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the nine-dash line and strongly criticized China’s actions both for their effect on the marine environment and for aggravating the disputes (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2016). From a realist perspective, China’s coercive behaviour towards many of its neighbours, ‘including erstwhile friends’ (Dupont and Baker 2014: 79), is reminiscent of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine by which the US sought regional hegemony on its way toward becoming the primary global superpower (Mearsheimer 2014; Scott 2016). ‘If not wisely managed, these disputes could bring East Asia’s long peace to a premature and bloody end’ (Dupont and Baker 2014: 79).

Conclusions This chapter has explored the question of the extent to which international law has facilitated China rising in a peaceful manner, and thereby contributing to the East Asian Peace. The chapter has identified several treaties key to regional and global order that have been highly supportive of China’s interests, both in terms of substantive provisions and in terms of enabling China increasingly to take part in high level multilateral decision-making. The LOSC is notable as the one amongst this group of treaties that does not support China’s ambitions – in this case in respect of the South China Sea. From the perspective of this chapter, it is therefore not surprising that it is here that we are witnessing a potential flashpoint as a result of China’s increase in relative economic power vis- a-vis other states in the region and the United States.

References Buckley, R. & W. Zhou. (2015) ‘China’s Negotiation of the International Legal Order’, in L. Toohey, C. Picker, & J. Greenacre, (eds) China in the International Economic Order. New Directions and Changing Paradigms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Calder, K. (2004) ‘Security through prosperity: the San Francisco System in comparative perspective’ The Pacific Review 17(1): 135–157. Chan, P. C.W. (2013) ‘A Keen Observer of the International Rule of Law? International Law in China’s Voting Behaviour and Argumentation in the United Nations Security Council’ Leiden Journal of International Law 26(4): 875–907.

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Don Harpaz, M. (2015) ‘China and International Tribunals. Onward from the WTO’, in L. Toohey, C. Picker, & J. Greenacre (eds) China in the International Economic Order. New Directions and Changing Paradigms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dupont, A. & C. G. Baker (2014) ‘East Asia’s Maritime Disputes: Fishing in Troubled Waters’ The Washington Quarterly 37(1): 79–98. Feinerman, J. V. (1995) ‘Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player’. The China Quarterly 141: 186–210. Foot, R. (2011) ‘The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its Evolution: Beijing’s Influence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas’ St Antony’s International Review 6(2): 47–66. Fravel, M. T. & E. S. Medeiros (2010) ‘China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure’ International Security 35(2): 48–87. Gao, H. (2011) ‘China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker, and Maybe Rule Maker?’ in C. Deere-Birkbeck (ed) Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gao, Z. & B. B. Jia. (2013) ‘The nine-dash line in the South China Sea: History, status, and implications’ American Journal of International Law 107(1): 98–124. Garwood-Gowers, A. (2013) ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as the Norm?’ UNSW Law Journal, 36(2): 594–618. Gobarev, V. M. (1999) ‘Soviet policy toward China: Developing nuclear weapons 1949–1969’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 12(4): 1–53. Goertz, G., P. F. Diehl & A. Balas (2016) The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hara, K. (1999) ‘Rethinking the ‘Cold War’ in the Asia-Pacific’, The Pacific Review 12(4): 515–536. Henkin, L. (1971) ‘The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated’ American Journal of International Law 65(3): 544-548. Hildebrand, R. C. (1990) Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the search for Postwar Security. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Hunt, G. (1996) ‘China’s Case Against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: rationality and morality’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 3(2): 183–199. Ikenberry, G. J. (2008) ‘The Rise of China. Power, Institutions, and the Western Order’ in R.S. Ross and Z. Feng, China’s Ascent. Power, Security and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kim, S.S. (1974) ‘The Peoples Republic of China in the United Nations: A

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Preliminary Assessment’ World Politics 26(3): 299–330. Ku, C. (1992–4) ‘Abolition of China’s Unequal Treaties and the Search for Regional Stability in Asia, 1919–1943’, Chinese Taiwan Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 12: 67–86. Ku, J. (2013) ‘Remarks by Bing Bing Jia’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 107: 345–346. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. University of Chicago Press. Morphet, S. (2000) ‘China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. October 1971–December 1999’ Security Dialogue 31(2): 151–166. Morvay, W. (2000) ‘Unequal Treaties’ in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. IV. New York: North Holland, 2000: 1008. Nathan, A. J. & A. Scobell. (2012) China’s Search for Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Neff, S. C. (2006) ‘A Short History of International Law’ in M. Evans (ed), International Law 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 29–55. Permanent Court of Arbitration (2016) ‘The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Press Release of 12 July. Price, J. (2001) ‘A Just Peace? The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective’ JPRI Working Paper No. 78. Russell, R. B. (1958) A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940–1945. Washington DC: Brookings. Sands, P. (2005) Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules from FDR’s Atlantic Charter to George W. Bush’s Illegal War. New York: Viking. Scott, S. V. (2008) ‘The Problem of Unequal Treaties in Contemporary International Law: How the Most Powerful have reneged on the political compacts within which Five Cornerstone Treaties of Global Governance are Situated’ Journal of International Law and International Relations 4:2 (2008) 101–126. ——— (2010) International Law in World Politics. An Introduction. 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. ——— (2012) International Law, US Power. The United States’ Quest for Legal Security. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ——— (2013) ‘Looking Back to Anticipate the Future: International Law In The Era Of the United States’ in R. McGuire & C. Sampford, (eds) Shifting Global Powers London: Routledge. ——— (2016) ‘China’s Nine-Dash Line, International Law, and the Monroe Doctrine Analogy’ China Information (2016): 296-311.

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Scott, S. V., A. J. Billingsley & C. Michaelssen (2010) International Law and the Use of Force. A Documentary and Reference Guide. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Security International. Svarverud, R. (2011) ‘Re-constructing East Asia: international law as inter- cultural process in late Qing China’ Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 12(2): 306–318. Tønnesson, S & W. Zheng. (2016) ‘Rights Discourses and Legal Realities in China’s Quest for Maritime Territory’, unpublished manuscript. Weisburd, A. M. (1997) Use of Force. The Practice of States since World War II University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Xue L. (2014) ‘China as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council’. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis. Yuan, P. C. (1984) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from a Chinese Perspective’ Texas International Law Journal 19: 415–433. Zhu, M. (1997) ‘The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy’ The Nonproliferation Review 4(2): 40–48.

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Peace by Development

Stein Tønnesson

How can we explain East Asia’s transition from widespread, intense warfare for well over a hundred years to an era of regional peace that is now in its fourth decade? This peace is defined by a relative absence of armed conflict and a low number of conflict-related deaths.1 It has spared people of much suffering and provided room for immense economic and social improvement. When initiating the East Asian Peace programme at Uppsala University in 2010, we chose conflict related deaths – or ‘battle deaths’ – as our main dependent variable. The number of East Asian battle deaths fell dramatically from the 1970s to 1980s, declined further from the 1980s to 1990s, and has since stayed at a very low number (1–4 per cent of global battle deaths). This change is what we seek to explain. The main independent variable to be discussed in this chapter is national priorities: a key, albeit contested, finding from my research is that East Asia’s transition to relative peace was caused by a shift in national priorities from ideological nation-building to economic growth. When a national government’s paramount priority is development, then it needs and makes peace, if it can. Japan was the first to make the shift. Others followed, learning from Japan. Some never tried, while others tried and failed.

1. An ‘armed conflict’ is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.’ Battle deaths are all deaths – military as well as civilian – incurred in situations where two identifiable parties use armed force against each other, be it through bombard- ment, terrorist acts, assassinations or a clash between military forces. Indirect deaths from war related famines or disease are not included. Neither are deaths in one-sided violence or conflicts where we are unable to identify two parties. http:// www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/

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I shall first present my developmental peace theory, then compare it with rival theories, and finally demonstrate its superiority as an explanation for East Asia’s transition to peace. The chapter does not discuss the depth or sustainability of the East Asian Peace. I address these issues in a volume published simultaneously with this one: Explaining the East Asian Peace (2017).

The flying geese of peace My theory is inspired by the political economy literature on East Asia, which often refers to the ‘Flying Geese’ metaphor of the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu (1896–1974). He first used it in 1939. It describes a pattern of development among East Asian nations, aligned successively behind each other at different stages of growth in a wild- geese-flying pattern. When the labour costs in the most advanced country (Japan) became too high in a certain sector, its industries were moved to a next tier of geese, and so on, while the lead geese moved on to a more advanced technological stage. Akamatsu developed his model at a time when Japan controlled most of East Asia militarily. After 1945, when Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere fell apart, Akamatsu (1962) revised his Flying Geese model to assume a peaceful and non- militaristic form. Japan once again became the lead goose. In the 1960s, it was followed by South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, all former parts of its empire. In the 1970s, Indonesia came along. China, which had resisted the Japanese onslaught from 1931–45, joined the flock in the late 1970s, opening itself to Japanese trade and investments. In the late 1980s, Vietnam took wing as well. And in the 2000s, China bypassed the lead goose and became the world’s main engine of industrial growth. Following Akamatsu, developmental peace theory, as derived from the East Asian experience, could be called The Flying Geese of Peace Theory. Developmental peace theory emphasizes institutions, leadership and learning. State institutions must have the capacity to implement growth- promoting policies. National leaders must give top priority to economic growth and realize how internal and external stability further this goal. For a whole region to become peaceful, nations need to learn from each other and follow each other’s lead. Developmental peace theory is about the pacifying effect of government policies rather than markets. A developmentalist state must not

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cede power to the market; instead it uses the market mechanism both domestically and internationally to promote national development. The governments of developmental states use their control of the national economy to pursue their global economic interests. They promote exports, attract foreign aid and investments, receive loans, arrange access to advanced technology, and facilitate needed imports. The success of all such efforts depends on external and internal stability, and this is where peace politics comes in. The developmental state avoids open external conflict, and achieves domestic peace, through either effective repression or the creation of legitimate institutions, or a combination thereof. Globalization has not reduced the importance of states (Tønnesson 2004; Vu 2010: 1). It has transformed states from institutions focussed on the exercise of power over a bounded territory to actors that promote the interests of their homeland and citizens in the global marketplace. This transformation has been easier for well-established states than for young and fragile ones, less cumbersome for small centralized states than big federations, and smoother for developmental than liberal states. The liberal states are hampered by their ideology, which divides power among several government institutions and precludes them from taking a direct role in promoting corporate interests abroad. The illiberal state of Singapore, which in the mid-1960s seemed vulnerable because of its small size and lack of a hinterland, has formed itself into an ideal-typical developmental state, taking maximum advantage of the East Asian Peace while never forgetting its dependence on a stable system of international security (Leifer 2000). A developmental state is governed by a determined, economically oriented elite with a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy, a weak civil society, effective management of state owned as well as non-state companies, and an effective mix of repression and meri- tocratic, legitimate governance.2 As Eck emphasizes in this volume, the developmental state does not necessarily respect civil and human rights. In an East Asian context, Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore may be classified as developmental states. The same goes for Indonesia and Vietnam, perhaps also for Hun Sen’s Cambodia, while

2. The definition is inspired by Goldsmith (2013), which in turn is inspired by Leftwich (1995).

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the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, North Korea and Myanmar do not fit. The Philippines and Thailand are too liberal in the sense that the state does not effectively manage its business sector. In Thailand, the Crown Property Bureau and the Army own many companies, but the government does not control them. Laos, North Korea and Myanmar, while aspiring to be developmental, either have not developed sufficient state capacity or have given excessive priority to regime (as distinct from national) security or the interests of a few rich families. Further, some of these nations have been constrained by a lack of economic management skills, and by powerful military establishments that prioritize their own budgetary needs above the needs of the nation. Political leadership is central to the developmental peace, even more so than in general development theory. In autocracies as well as democracies, decisions on war and peace are taken by small groups of individuals (presidents, prime ministers, defence ministers, commanders-in-chief and rebel leaders). Leaders may be influenced by public opinion, yet they are the captains who decide where to sail in rough waters, and whether or not to shoot. So, their priorities are essential. This does not mean that one leader alone can set a nation on a new course. A priority shift requires a perceived crisis among a larger group, and the new priorities must resonate with the emotional needs of public opinion. The leaders who set the East Asian nations on a course toward peaceful development were not protagonists of any particular model of development, but rather pragmatists ready to try new ideas. The greatest of East Asia’s reformers, Deng Xiaoping, did not understand market economics. His dictum from 1961 ‘it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or yellow, so long as it catches mice’ is an expression of pure pragmatism. When Deng assumed power in 1978, he did not know what to do but was able to carry out reforms proposed by people with more economic expertise. As Deng would say, he groped for the stones while crossing the river. Learning was key. Regional peace came about as a cumulative effect of a series of national priority shifts, followed by learning from others. And Japan was the professor par excellence. When a new goose decided to take wing, it sent a delegation to study Japan’s experience. Developmental peace theory is inspired by Legro’s concept of ‘national purpose shifts’ as well as his work on learning, and Elliott’s use of Legro’s theory to explain Vietnam’s Doi Moi reforms (Legro 2000, 2008; Elliott 2012).

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A national shift to developmental peace is a process with the following sequence of political choices. A crisis brings new leaders to power. They decide to: •• prioritize state-driven economic growth, •• learn from other nations, •• strive for external and internal stability, •• accommodate the United States so they can avoid becoming targets of its hostility and benefit from its aid, investments and market access, •• reassure their neighbours, •• repress or accommodate internal opposition, and, as a result, •• achieve rapid growth (Overholt 2008; Tønnesson 2015). All choices stem from the same quest for national development, but the logic leading from one choice to the next is not deterministic. Leaders take different choices if they have other priorities, and they depend on the capacity of their government to implement their policies. Many leaders have tried and failed. In East Asia, all the most powerful nations have been able to shift to an economy-first policy, and their governments have had the capacity needed to implement reforms and keep the population under control. This allowed the region to enter its era of peace.

A short history The origin of East Asia’s developmental peace may be found in 1945–46, when Japan mended its broken wings. A partnership between two men, US General Douglas MacArthur and the ageing diplomat Yoshida Shigeru, was decisive. They were no pacifists. The warrior MacArthur, who governed Japan as a personal fiefdom from 1945–50, imposed a peace constitution in order to avoid trouble with America’s wartime allies. The conservative aristocrat Yoshida was keen to reconstruct the national economy and regain status as an independent nation. Despite his support of the peace constitution, he was not opposed to using violence; he repressed his country’s leftist workers movement in pursuit of his national goals. He became prime minister under US tutelage because he had not held any power during the war, and yet had close connections to the Emperor. Yoshida’s Japan was emerging from a profound crisis, with its cities in ruins. In a situation of national shame, Yoshida and his fellow ministers ‘embraced defeat’ (Dower 1991). This reflected

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a widespread Japanese attitude. Those who found defeat so dishonour- able as to make their life unbearable did not resort to guerrilla tactics or terrorism, but instead committed suicide (for the role of honour as a constraint on genuine peace, see Melander this volume). Not a single US soldier was killed in anger after Japan’s surrender, and the new Japanese Diet dutifully adopted its peace constitution, which forbade the nation from waging war or having an army. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is at the origin of the East Asian Peace. It was something entirely new: a major power, situated in a volatile region, prohibited itself from using force against others. The price of Japan’s WW II defeat was subordination of itself to America: it signed a treaty of alliance and allowed foreign bases on its territory. In exchange, Japan kept its emperor, gained formal independence and was presented with an opportunity for economic gain. Article 9 also helped other nations overcome their fear of a Japanese imperialist resurgence. In the 1920s–30s, Yoshida had advocated the use of force against opponents of Japanese interests in China, but he warned against getting bogged down in long-term warfare or risking conflict with the Western powers. After Japan’s defeat, he chose to work with MacArthur and made it his goal to forestall a return to militarism. Even at the height of the Cold War, Yoshida managed to keep military costs at a minimum, so he could concentrate on Japan’s economic recovery (Yoshida 1961; Dower 1988). Yoshida did not apply a British or American model. Instead he built on Japan’s Meiji era (1868–1912) reforms, which in their time had been inspired by Germany and other European countries. He built a new developmental state with a competent bureaucracy in the Ministry of Finance, and a new Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). With its national security guaranteed by the United States, Japan could create East Asia’s first developmental peace state. In 1949–50, when Mao took over China and North Korea invaded South Korea, MacArthur and the Pentagon regretted the peace constitution. They now wanted Japan as partner in war. Under US pressure, Yoshida allowed the creation of a self-defence force but declined to send troops to Japan’s former colony. Instead Japan made money on the war by selling goods to the US forces in Korea. This kick-started Japan’s boom. Japan repeated the trick when the United States bogged itself down in Vietnam.

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Yoshida’s unassuming foreign policy would be known as ‘the Yoshida Doctrine’. It was controversial both on Japan’s right and left, but allowed the country to achieve prosperity. Only after becoming rich did Japan stagnate in the 1990s. And despite being a staunch US ally, it has so far upheld its constitutional prohibition from taking part in any war. Others emulated Japan, setting economic development as their paramount goal. South Korea’s dictator Park Chung-hee (1961–79) was a former Japanese imperial officer who remained deeply inspired by Japan. He normalized relations with Tokyo in 1965 in exchange for Japanese aid and investment. He avoided war with North Korea and contributed troops to Vietnam in exchange for US aid, and set South Korea on a course toward prosperity by governing the market and promoting industrialization. When Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore was thrown out of the Malaysian Federation in 1965, it also applied a state-driven developmental policy, emphasizing political stability internally and externally, with astounding success. In 1966, Indonesia made a similar change under General Suharto’s New Order. He abandoned founding President Sukarno’s confrontational policy towards Malaysia, sought rapprochement with Japan and the United States, formed ASEAN in 1967 with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, and combined a successful economy-first policy with harsh internal repression. On Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo (prime minister 1972–78 and president 1978–88) abandoned his father Chiang Kai-shek’s dream of reconquer- ing mainland China and carried out instead a successful developmental policy based on boosted trade with Japan and the United States, implicit US protection under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and enhanced regime legitimacy through liberal reforms. After a national crisis caused by ethnic riots in 1969, Malaysia adopted a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, giving ethnic Malays a preferential stake in commerce and industry in order to enhance ethno-political stability. In 1981, when Mahathir Mohamad took charge, he modified the NEP by adopting a growth-promoting ‘Look East’ policy, inspired by Japan, and used emergency laws to prevent leftist as well as Islamist groups from disrupting ethnic and political stability (see Svensson in this volume). Most important of all: when Mao died in 1976, his Cultural Revolution ended and a sense of crisis spread within the Communist Party. In 1978, after a power struggle ended in the defeat of the Maoist

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‘Gang of Four’, Deng Xiaoping took charge. He gave up his Maoist conviction that there would soon be a Third World War, undertook study tours to Singapore, Japan and the United States, and set China on its road to peaceful development. Since March 1979, when China withdrew from a brief but bloody invasion of northern Vietnam, China has not engaged in any armed international conflict, except for a number of border skirmishes with Vietnam between 1980–87 and a naval battle with Vietnam in the Spratly island group in March 1988. Further, China’s huge internal security forces have deterred any armed rebellion on its territory. While China was making its transition, Vietnam was bogged down in counter-insurgency warfare in Cambodia and a fateful Soviet alliance. When Mikhail Gorbachev announced his perestroika reform movement and cancelled aid to Vietnam, Hanoi understood that it must emulate Japan, South Korea and China. Once party chief Le Duan died in 1986, the stage was set for Doi Moi, Vietnam’s version of reform, which paradoxically began at a time when Truong Chinh, the country’s veteran Marxist ideologue, served as party leader. After he died in 1988, his successors encouraged export-oriented industry and withdrew all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, normalized relations with China and the United States, and joined ASEAN in 1995, all of which helped to spur rapid growth. Once all these countries, which had sufficient state capacity to implement reforms while controlling their populations, had opted out of war in favour of development, the region entered its era of peace. The process of priority shifts and learning forms the basis for the theory of developmental peace. It covers both inter- and intrastate peace. The theory is singular and grounded in the discipline of history, and explains peace in one region only. Unlike most International Relations theories, mine is not a global theory that uses East Asia as a case. It is derived inductively from the East Asian experience and may not have relevance elsewhere. Yet it does not seem impossible that geese of peace might some day fly from battlefields in Middle Eastern, African or post-Soviet states. Nations like Kenya, Rwanda and Turkey have tried. Iran may now also be trying. As in East Asia, success requires a confluence of crisis, priority change, state capacity and learning, and an accommodating international environment with markets open to trade.

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As already mentioned, some East Asian nations have been unwilling or unable to take wing. Their failures may help discern the necessary conditions for success. Laos, Cambodia and Brunei have implemented parts of the model. Myanmar has tried since 2010–11. Its military junta retired in 2011, leaving President Thein Sein (2011–16) with a mandate to get rid of sanctions and catch up economically. Myanmar has long enjoyed international peace, but has been ravaged by internal warfare. A condition for its success will be cooperation and a clear division of labour between the civilian part of the government (led by State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi), the powerful military with its vast constitutional prerogatives, the elected national, state and regional assemblies, and the country’s many ethnic parties and armed ethnic groups. The big question is if they can reach a workable federal solution and focus on economic development. The past presidents of the Philippines have not been able to implement a developmental policy, nor have they managed to put an end to the country’s communist or Islamic insurgencies. Some presidents have tried (notably Fidel Ramos 1992–98). Their failures had much to do with weak state capacity; rich landowners could ignore or obstruct government policies. Under the presidency of Benigno Aquino III (2011–16), the government reached a peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) but failed to get Congress to adopt the necessary legislation. The highly controversial new president from 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, was quick to make a bid for peace with the communist rebels, and an indefinite ceasefire was agreed in August 2016. Duterte seems to be engaged in a radical attempt to make peace internally, using a mix of violent threats and generous offers, so he can concentrate on his plan to federalize the Philippines and attract Chinese investments that would enable Mindanao to catch up with Luzon. Duterte’s profile is not all that different from some of the region’s most famous developmental leaders. Yet, like Thailand’s former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, Duterte could end up as a failure if his impatience, anti-Americanism and disrespect for human rights provoke resistance from the Philippines’ traditional elite and officer corps. Thailand has enjoyed substantial growth despite the absence of a sustained developmental policy. King Rama IX (1946–2016) hewed to a retrogressive economic self-subsistence philosophy, and the Thai mili-

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tary has consistently eluded civilian control, seizing power on numerous occasions and withdrawing to the barracks only when its governance failures became too evident. Since 2004, Thailand has been unable to prevent a drawn-out insurgency in its Malay-Muslim south and, during 2008–11, the army engaged in a border conflict with Cambodia. Even worse for national cohesion has been the polarized power struggle in Bangkok between two national factions or ‘networks’ that compete with one another for the support of an independent-minded army (McCargo 2005, 2012). Since 2014, democracy has been suspended by a military junta with limited economic competence. The least developmental state in East Asia is North Korea. The Kim dynasty has never felt secure enough to open up for international trade and investment, instead seeking regime security through an expensive leader cult and a military-first policy (Songun), building nuclear weapons and thus provoking UN sanctions, which in turn have further boosted Pyongyang’s sense of insecurity and further condemned its people to poverty. Although the young Kim Jong Un claims to place economic development on a par with military security, he has in practice given top priority to acquiring a nuclear deterrent. To sum up, developmental peace theory identifies the East Asian Peace as a singular phenomenon, belonging to a specific era in one particular region. The states that did not join the peace either disturbed it (North Korea) or were unable to prevent violent opposition at home (the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar). The theory claims that the main factor behind the regional transition to peace is a series of shifts in national purpose among its main powers. I shall now compare developmental peace theory with other theories.

Liberal theories For a long time the liberal agenda was dominated by democratic peace theory, which is presented as an explanation for two widely observed phenomena: democratic countries rarely fight each other, and well- established democracies above a certain GDP level are unlikely to experience civil war. Liberal scholars have also emphasized institutionalised international cooperation, which precludes conflict by bringing nations together and instituting conflict resolution. In the last decade, many liberal scholars have sought inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s (1795)

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idea of peace through trade, describing their efforts as capitalist peace theories. Russett and Oneal (2001) combine all three factors in their influential book Triangulating Peace: when a region consists of (1) democracies that develop (2) international cooperation and are (3) open to integration through trade and investments, it most likely enjoys peace. This is a convincing theory if we want to explain how a region can solidify its peace and make it self-evident, as has happened in West/ Central Europe. However, peace triangulation does not explain how peace comes about in the first place. Peace within the EU is today probably over-determined, since it is based at the same time on shared democracy, trans-national institutions, and economic integration, although just one of them might have been enough to uphold peace. This, however, was not the case at the outset: the peace in Western Europe was created in the aftermath of the defeat of Nazi Germany by a shared fear of Soviet domination. Then it was bolstered by economic integration in the Coal and Steel Union, the gradual construction of the European Economic Community (EEC), which later became the European Union (EU), and shared democratic values. The adoption of democratic systems of governance became a precondition for new countries to join the EU. The long peace of East Asia is not built on a similar, triangular foundation, and may therefore be more challenging – and also rewarding – to explain. It is not over-determined since there are not three explanations that are all consistent with the available evidence. In East Asia, only one of Russett and Oneal’s explanatory variables is consistent over most of the region, and this is economic integration. This could mean that economic integration is the main explanatory factor when a region enters into a long period of peace, and that the two other factors in the triangle are spurious. Or it could mean that economic integration is sufficient to generate a fairly long regional peace but that trans-national institutions and shared democracy must be added in order for a regional peace to become perpetual. East Asia is composed of 16 recognized and one de facto state (Taiwan) with forms of governance that range from despotism (North Korea), to personal or military dictatorship (Brunei, Thailand), authoritarian party rule (China, Vietnam, Laos), unstable democracy with autonomous armed forces (Myanmar, the Philippines, Timor-Leste), semi-democracy

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dominated by one party (Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore), to stable democracy (Japan, Indonesia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan). Although democratisation may have led some countries to adopt peaceful policies, democratic peace theory cannot explain the East Asian Peace. As for international cooperation, all the East Asian states except Taiwan are UN members, and many have joined other global organizations. Scott (in this volume) shows how international law, and China’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council, have helped facilitate its peaceful rise. Yet political integration of East Asia remains limited. It maintains consultative frameworks around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summits, but has no regional organisation that even vaguely resembles the EU. Only since 2008 have China, South Korea and Japan held annual triangular summits. So the fact of the East Asian Peace may indicate that neither shared democratic governance nor regional institutional cooperation is a necessary condition for peace. Democracy and institutional cooperation no doubt make peace more sustainable, but a region may keep the peace for a long time even without those factors. The main factor that is common to both West/Central Europe and East Asia is economic integration through trade and investment. This provides a basis for capitalist peace theory, a good example of which may be found in Goldsmith’s chapter in this volume. Capitalist peace theory comes in several forms. There is, however, little agreement among proponents on how capitalism promotes peace (Mousseau 2010: 185). Some think capitalist nations are unlikely to go to war for domestic reasons: a cost-aware public does not allow adventurous policies. Others talk of dyads: interdependent nations do not go to war. McDonald (2009) goes as far as to identify five mechanisms by which interdependence leads to peace: a) using force becomes too costly for states depending on others through trade; b) as commerce grows, there is little to gain from plundering resources instead of buying them; c) trade establishes contact and mutual understanding; d) trade provides signalling mechanisms used to avoid conflict; e) regional trading arrangements institutionalize peace. Some point out that in a dyad, one side can depend more on the other than vice versa (Austria on Germany in the 1930s; Russia on China today). Some take into account that trade is not the same as dependence.

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A nation depends on its trading partners only if the imported goods or the export market are irreplaceable. Big markets like the United States and EU cannot be easily replaced, but small markets can. Transnational economic interdependence has in any case grown exponentially since the formation of transnational production networks managed by huge companies like Apple, Huawei, Toyota or Nike (Ravenhill 2014). Factories are placed in a country with low-cost labour, using machinery from a highly developed country, components from middle-income countries and financial services from a country with low- cost English-speaking clerks; the assembled product is finally exported to the EU or the United States. Each link in such production chains may be replaceable, but the chain itself relies on effective, unhindered and secure infrastructures, which in turn depend on stable international relations. What impact does the existence of such supply chains have on interstate relations? Companies expect governments to maintain a basic infrastructure, provide education and health services, regulate job markets, maintain law and order, issue permits with a minimum of red tape, and maintain a tax structure that does not hinder competitiveness. Companies dislike physical and legal hindrances, yet they expect legal protection of their property rights. Some states accomplish the competing tasks of repressing opposition (for the good of development) and maintaining a productive economic climate by assigning each task to a different governmental level. If a country has a decentralized system of governance, for example, then companies may deal directly with city, district or provincial authorities without bothering much about a central government whose repressive activities provide a business-friendly framework of social and political stability. If all of this shall contribute to peaceful relations between states, then the central governments, which decide on war and peace, must either themselves take into account the likely cost of a disruption of transnational production chains, or be influenced by business leaders. I have not seen studies of what transnational companies do to influence governments in crisis situations. The Sino–Japanese crises over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands in 2010 and 2012, neither of which brought a military confrontation, might lend themselves to such study if the confidential files on both sides could be opened to researchers (for useful beginnings in this direction, see chapters by Ryu and Ross in this volume). Did ei-

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ther side back away from escalation for fear of being defeated, or because it thought the cost of victory would be too high? In addition to making risk assessments and being lobbied by companies, governments may be influenced by the rise and fall of currencies, bonds or stocks. Such movements serve as signals from the market. We do not know how the 2015 crisis on the Chinese stock market influenced China’s foreign policy, but afterwards, in conjunction with a slowdown in China’s economic growth, Beijing turned less assertive and more diplomatic in its dealings with other countries than it had been in the first years of Xi Jinping’s leadership. Capitalist peace theory comes in two versions. The first emphasizes the domestic system, saying that if a national economy is free from direct government interference, and there is a strong civil society with dense, contractual relationships and a pervasive legal culture, governments are prevented from engaging in foreign policy adventures. Pacification thus comes in the form of societal influence on government (McDonald 2009: 17–18; Mousseau 2010: 189). The other version assumes that the global market influences state behaviour. Trade or trade expectations (Copeland 1996; 2003; 2015), cross-border investments, financial openness (Gartzke et al. 2001) and transnational production chains convey constraints and incentives for state behaviour through risk assessments, business lobbying and market signals. In the first version the state is above the market. In the second it is part of it. The first version distinguishes between liberal and illiberal states. A liberal state provides public goods such as health, education, policing and defence while macro-managing the economy through regulatory agencies that are empowered to enforce standards of behaviour, which in turn prevent market failures or abuse of market power. It is constrained by accountability mechanisms, a vibrant civil society and an independent business sector. A government that takes actions detrimental to the health of the economy will be punished by falling bond values, stock markets and employment. Following the theory’s logic, governments that take these concerns seriously are rarely tempted to engage in conflicts abroad. This is hardly convincing. Two of the world’s most liberal states, the United Kingdom and the United States, have fought numerous wars, and are fighting even as this book goes to press. Elected decision-makers in liberal states are less closely connected with business executives than

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their counterparts in developmental states, and may depend for their re-election on constituencies with scant regard for business interests. Democracies may have decision-making structures that fail to take anticipated costs into consideration. While the UK has not generally fallen into this trap, because of the strength and strong influence of its Treasury, the United States has often failed to integrate thrift into its decision-making. It has intervened militarily in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq even though its best economic and strategic experts foresaw a costly failure. Fluctuations in its stock markets have not had much dampening effect; indeed they have tended to react enthusiastically to military adventures. Niall Ferguson claims that the United States is more impulsive, less consistent and less calculating in its imperial policies than the British Empire used to be (Ferguson 2004). Donald Trump seems likely to uphold that tradition. The second theory is more plausible. Governments are acutely aware of their dependence on the global market. This cannot but enter into their calculations. I shall now concentrate on how the global version of capitalist peace theory challenges my own developmental theory.

Capitalist or developmental peace? It is difficult to find ways to test capitalist and developmental peace theory against each other. Most data are compatible with both. Liberal and developmental states are part of the same global system. A developmental state might abstain from using force either because of its developmentalism or due to its dependence on the global market. The East Asian Peace emerged in an era of unprecedented growth in intra- regional and extra-regional trade. This, again, is consistent with the expectations of both theories. A key difference is that capitalist theory focuses on structural con straints and incentives while developmental theory highlights the independent influence of leadership perceptions and priorities. Agency-based theories acknowledge the influence of constraints and incentives only to the extent that they are present in the decision-maker’s mind. Structural theories assume, without having to demonstrate it, that decision-makers assess economic risks and base their choices on such assessment. This leads to another difference. While capitalist theory provides a basis for predicting a lasting peace if only the capitalist system survives,

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developmental theory claims that future peace depends on the ability of decision makers to uphold the economy as their main priority, and see the cost of war as an unacceptable burden to economic progress. If we compare the developmental and non-developmental states in East Asia, it is striking that the latter – North Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar – have had more militarized disputes and internal armed conflicts than the region’s main developmental states – Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia. But then, the state’s capacity for repressing or co-opting rebels is part of the definition of a developmental state. Some attempts have been made to test capitalist and developmental theory by using historical evidence. Kivimäki has looked for unsuccessful developmentalist leaders, reasoning that existence of a developmental government that obtains peace without achieving economic growth would support the peacemaking potency of developmentalism. The clearest example he found was Ramon Magsaysay’s government in the Philippines (1950–53), which made peace internally during a period of sluggish economic activity (Kivimäki 2014: 94). Since it is unclear if peace came about as a result of Magsaysay’s quest for development, and since we talk about internal and not interstate war, the case can hardly be used to falsify any rival theory. However, Kivimäki also found an interstate case. From the formation of ASEAN in 1967, its members kept peace with each other even as intra-ASEAN trade diminished as a share of each state’s overall trade. This could suggest that peace was due to a shared developmentalist identity rather than economic interdependence. This is not a logical conclusion, however, if we take into consideration that the reduced share of intra-ASEAN trade in each country’s overall trade was not due to a reduction in the total volume of intra-ASEAN trade but to an increase in every ASEAN country’s trade with the rest of the world. Extra-regional and intra-regional economic integration may both have a pacifying effect on inter-state relations. A developmental state’s control of its business sector has several implications that may or may not promote peace. On the one hand, it can make a government more sensitive to economic risk because the government bears it more directly than a liberal state government. On the other, a developmentalist government may use the economy as a tool in its foreign policy, and gamble on expected gain. Goldsmith (in

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this volume) has looked for statistical evidence of differences in behaviour of liberal and developmental states. Intriguingly, he finds that while liberal states tend to avoid militarized disputes with other states, developmental states enter more frequently into such disputes, but prevent them from escalating. This could fit the contemporary situation in the Taiwan Strait, where the more and more liberal government in Taipei has sought to avoid militarized disputes, while the developmental PRC has used military threats and missile tests without going as far as to provoke a military confrontation. But then this may have more to do with the relative strength of the two sides.3 In the last few decades, Beijing has acquired a capacity for destroy- ing Taiwan’s infrastructure with land-based missiles deployed along the mainland coast, but has avoided any outright crisis since 1995–96, even in the period when President Chen Hsui-bian sought to alter Taiwan’s international status (2000–08). China is also expected to continue to show restraint although the current president Tsai Ing-wen (2016– ), who like Chen Hsui-bian represents the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), identifies independence as a long-term goal.4 She is expected to refrain from policies that could provoke military reactions from the mainland. If these expectations are fulfilled, could this outcome be explained mainly by the high level of cross-strait investments, trade and communication, or by the domestic functioning of Taiwan’s liberal political system? Or might it be due to the fact that both states are in a sense developmental? Or would it simply, as realists would contend, follow from the US policy of deterring the mainland and holding Taiwan back from seeking independence? The economic loss to be expected from a war has increased exponentially. This may have led to restraint on both sides. While the case of Taiwan is interesting, it is difficult to use it to weigh capitalist against developmental theory, since both are compatible with the evidence. However, if President Donald Trump should abandon the United States support for the One China policy and encourage Taiwanese independence, then the resulting crisis could test the relative impact of

3. A whole chapter of McDonald (2009) is dedicated to the Taiwan case, and Kastner (2015) provides a highly illuminating study of the impact of economic interdependence on cross-Strait relations. 4. For a realist explanation of why the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis did not lead to war, see Ross 2009: 133–78.

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nationalist emotions, regime security, geo-strategic calculations and economic risk in Beijing’s and Taipei’s decision-making. I have not found any conclusive statistical evidence to help settle the issue of whether developmentalism or economic interdependence is the most important factor. One reason why I have come to have more confidence in developmental than capitalist peace theory is my focus on the onset of regional peace. I have given less attention to how the peace has been maintained after it began. Capitalist peace theory does not provide a good explanation for the shifts to peace-promoting policies in Japan 1945–46, South Korea 1961, Indonesia and Singapore 1965–66, Taiwan and Malaysia in the 1960s–70s, China 1978, Vietnam 1986–89, Cambodia in the 1990s, or Myanmar 2010–11. These shifts were not caused by growing trade and interdependence, but rather by the lack of such; or maybe by a feeling of backwardness at a time when one’s neighbours thrived. When perceiving a national crisis, new leaders decided to opt for internal and external stability in order to catch up with others economically. One feature of capitalism was, however, essential: access to the United States and European markets. Without this option, the developmental states might not have emerged. Their trade expectations (Copeland 2015) were more important than their actual trade. Only after trade volumes grew did developmental states become more concerned with the economic risks that might accompany dangerous foreign policies. In other words, a peace fostered by a developmental state was later buttressed by capitalist peace incentives.

Realism Realist theory, as conveyed by Ross in this volume, offers itself as relevant to explaining the onset of regional peace. Japan had little choice in 1945–46 but to accommodate the wishes of its occupying power; in the 1950s–60s it was prevented by the United States from resuming normal trade and diplomatic relations with mainland China. This was power politics. China’s shift in 1978 was predicated on its rapprochement with the United States a few years earlier, and a shared Sino–US interest in containing the Soviet Union. As Kreutz emphasizes in this volume, Sino–US rapprochement and Sino–Soviet rivalry also led China to improve its relations with non-communist governments in the region and cease supporting communist rebels there, thus enabling some such

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governments to overcome internal strife. This created an international environment where developmental states, regardless of whether they were led by military dictators, communist parties or elected governments, could thrive on the global market. The cooperation established by China and the United States in the 1970s survived the repression of the democratic movement in Beijing in 1989, Gorbachev’s removal of the Soviet threat, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. China and the United States are still at peace today, although the relationship is marred by tension. It could be true, as Ross argues, that peace between the world’s two main powers has been made possible by a combination of US military predominance and Chinese nuclear deterrence, which together underpin an implicit arrangement: China is allowed to dominate the continent, while the United States is allowed to dominate the Asia-Pacific rim through alliance treaties and other security arrangements (Ross 1999; 2009: 4; Yan 2003: 35). Yet there is more to the East Asian Peace than geography, alliance patterns and deterrence. The United States has not so far contained China but has traded with it, invested in it, and encouraged its economic rise. And China has placed its revenue in US bonds and other assets. There is tension, yes, but as yet no Cold War or brinkmanship. The East Asian Peace has not so far resembled the ‘Long Peace’ between the US and USSR in the Cold War period. In spite of numerous Sino–US incidents at sea and in the air (notably when China has tried to intimidate Taiwan or prevent US military reconnaissance near its coast) Sino–US relations have not seen any arms race or missile crisis. Although China has invested heavily in modern weaponry and keeps a huge army, it has not allowed military expenditures to destroy its civilian economy in the way the Soviet leaders did and as Vladimir Putin has been doing. Instead, China, the United States and Japan allowed their economies to become more and more integrated and more and more interdependent – at least until 2014, when global trade began to decline. Only North Korea allows its economy to be destroyed by a ‘military first’ policy. In order to explain the ‘peace’ that reigns between the two Korean states, we have to resort to realism – although the priority given by South Korea to its own economic well-being also plays a role. South Korea’s choice not to attack the North militarily cannot be explained simply by North Korea’s military capabilities, US warnings or fear of

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China’s reaction. It is also because South Korea gives less priority to national unification than to the well-being of its own citizens. The same could be the case with China’s restraint vis-à-vis Taiwan. A key difference between the ‘Cold Peace’ between East and West Europe 1945–89 and the ‘Hot Peace’ in East Asia today is that the former included economic warfare. One of the three cornerstones in Russett & Oneal’s triangular theory remains present in East Asia: functional economic integration. Realist theory helps explain that it was possible for East Asian states to opt for peace but not that they actually did. They needed the right priorities. What made peace happen was a series of national priority shifts, following Japan’s lead.

Conclusion Developmental peace theory provides the most convincing explanation for the cumulative onset of the East Asian Peace. Yet it is time to admit that it does not provide a complete explanation for the regional transition. The contributions made by the other theoretical approaches represented in this volume, must be acknowledged. I would like to suggest precisely how each theory enters the general explanation while leaving national priority shifts as the key factor. The onset of regional peace in the 1970s–80s depended on Sino–US rapprochement from 1971 onward, continued Sino–US cooperation after the end of the Cold War and access to Western markets. This is where realist theory comes in. It explains how the opportunity structure emerged that allowed the onset of a developmental peace. The theory of capitalist peace does not belong here. It cannot explain the onset of peace but may provide a plausible explanation for why it would last. As long as the global economy grew, East Asia’s developmental states could expect to benefit from integration in the global market. Copeland and Snyder rightfully point out that governments are more likely to be motivated by their expectations for the future than by assessments of the current situation (Copeland 1996, 2003, 2015; Snyder 2016). China, as long as it expects to gain more influence in the future through continued economic growth, is likely to abstain from policies leading to open confrontation. Russia must, by contrast, expect to lose power, because of its reliance on oil and gas price fluctuations, its lack of business innovation and its sad demographic prospects. This could explain why it tries to capitalize on

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its military investments and use force in its foreign policy, while China does not (Tønnesson & Baev 2017). Luckily, there is no big country like Russia in East Asia. Japan is bound up in its alliance with the United States, and China is constrained by its developmentalism. And in spite of much talk of decline, the United States is not in a situation similar to Russia’s. United States demography and capacity for economic innovation and restructuring continue to give ground for bright expectations. Hence, it seems likely that the East Asian Peace will continue for some time, in spite of all the uncertainties created by a revisionist US presidency. Is the East Asian Peace viable in the longer term? It follows logically from the explanation above that the answer must depend on the capacity of national leaders in the region to uphold economy-first – or green growth – policies. If nationalist impulses (Ryu in this volume) and fears for national or regime security take precedence over national growth as a priority, the peace will be at risk. If there is a general economic recession, or China’s economy stagnates in the way the Japanese did in the 1990s, then it will be difficult to keep economic growth as an overriding priority. Although it should be even more important in times of crisis to prioritise measures aimed directly at crisis management, it is politically difficult to uphold goals that cannot be reached within a reasonable amount of time. Other goals then tend to take precedence. The extent to which economic development can remain an overriding priority in countries that have already reached a high level of prosperity, such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, also remains an open question. And then there is the worrisome factor that is already on everyone’s lips, the downward slide in Sino–US relations. Mutual fear and distrust have been mounting. So, perhaps it is time to acknowledge the essential contribution of Russett & Oneal’s triangulating theory: in order for the East Asian Peace to become truly sustainable, economy- first policies and transnational economic integration are hardly sufficient. A viable peace may need more than one foundation. Regional institutional integration and shared democratic values would no doubt make regional peace more sustainable.

References Akamatsu, K. (1962) ‘A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries,’ Journal of Developing Economies, 1(1): 3–25.

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Copeland, D. C. (1996) ‘Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations’, International Security 20(4): 5–41. ——— (2003) ‘Economic Interdependence and the Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations’, in G. J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press: 323–52. ——— (2015) Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Dower, J. (1988) Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. ——— (1991) Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: Norton. Elliott, D. W. P. (2012) Changing Worlds: Vietnam’s Transition from Cold War to Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ferguson, N. (2004) Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. London: Penguin. Gartzke, E., Quan Li & C. Boehmer (2001) ‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict’, International Organization 55(2): 115–45. Goldsmith, B. (2013) ‘Different in Asia? Developmental states, trade, and international conflict onset and escalation’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 13(2): 175–205. Kant, I. (1795) Zum ewigen frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. English edition (2007) as Perpetual Peace: Philiquarian. Kastner, S. L. (2015) ‘Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan’, International Security 40(3): 54–92. Kivimäki, T. (2014) The Long Peace of East Asia. London: Ashgate. Leftwich, A. (1995) ‘Bringing politics back in: towards a model of the developmental state’, Journal of Development Studies 31(3): 400–27. Legro, J. W. (2000) ‘The Transformation of Political Ideas’, American Journal of Political Science 44(3): 419–32. Legro, J. W. (2008) ‘Purpose Transitions. China’s Rise and the American Response’, In R. S. Ross & Zhu Feng (eds) China’s Ascent. Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 163–87. Leifer, M. (2000) Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability. London: Routledge. McCargo, D. (2005) ‘Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand’, The Pacific Review 18(4): 499–519.

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——— (2012) Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. McDonald, P. J. (2009) The Invisible Hand of Peace. Capitalism, The War Machine, and International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mousseau, M. (2010) ‘Coming to Terms with the Capitalist Peace’, International Interactions 36(2): 185–92. Overholt, W. H. (2008) Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Rand Corporation. Pantsov, A. V. & S. I. Levine (2015) Deng Xiaoping: A Revolutionary Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ravenhill, J. (2014) ‘Production networks in Asia’, In S. Pekkanen et al., The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press:348‒68. Ross, R. S. (1999) ‘The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First century’, International Security 23(4): 81–118. ——— (2009) Chinese Security Policy. Structure, Power and Politics. London: Routledge. Russett, B. & J. R. Oneal (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations. New York NY: W.W. Norton. Snyder, J. (2015) ‘Trade Expectations and Great Power Conflict – A Review Essay’, International Security 40(3): 179–96. Tønnesson, S. (2004) ‘Globalising national states’, in M. Guibernau & J. Hutchinson (eds) History and National destiny: Ethnosymbolism and its Critics. Oxford: Blackwell: 179–94. ——— (2015) ‘Explaining East Asia’s Developmental Peace: the Dividends of Economic Growth’, Global Asia 10(4):10–15. Tønnesson, S. & P. Baev (2017) ‘Stress-test for Chinese restraint: China evaluates Russia’s use of force’, Strategic Analysis 41(2): 139–151. Vu Tuong (2010) Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yan Xuetong (2003) ‘Decade of Peace in East Asia’, East Asia: An International Quarterly 4: 29–51. Yoshida Shigeru (1961) The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis. London: Heinemann.

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Peace by External Withdrawal

Joakim Kreutz

This chapter focuses on the role of external actors in making East Asia one of the most war-torn regions in the world for decades, and how active policy shifts by these external parties subsequently led to the East Asian Peace. Peace is defined as the absence of political organized armed conflict – both interstate and internal – even though external support also affects state repression (see Eck in this volume) and conflict intensity in the form of battle deaths in war (Bjarnegård & Kreutz in this volume). To identify variation in the external involvement, this study examines the region itself over time to see whether similar policy shifts by several actors combine to account for the pattern of armed conflict in East Asia. ‘External’ refers not only to states outside of the region (for example France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States) but also to situations of active involvement by regional powers in conflicts outside their own borders. In the first section, I outline three approaches that external powers can adopt towards conflicts: supporting armed force, non-involvement and supporting conflict resolution. I then empirically analyze the prevalence of each approach towards armed conflict in East Asia since the Second World War, finding a general shift over time away from supporting armed force towards supporting conflict resolution. This is followed by a discussion about possible explanations for this shift, including arguments found in the international relations literature such as power balancing (Waltz 1979; Ross in this volume), economic priorities (Goldsmith, Tønnesson in this volume) and regional institutions (Kivimäki 2011; Acharya 2014). I conclude that none of these theo-

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ries can fully account for these policy shifts, and instead contend that decisions by the external powers were made with an eye to their own domestic policy considerations. Many local East Asian actors were not supportive of new policies that promoted a reduced use of violence, and the civil conflicts least dependent on outside support have continued into the present. The implications of this argument for the future are worrying. It implies that many actors in East Asia may not be committed to the use of non-violence for political aims and that the region might experience new wars if external support for violent means becomes more widespread.

Defining external intervention in conflict There is a prominent tradition of scholarly work on how third-party involvement influences the use of violence both between and within states. External intervention can be broadly defined as ‘military and/or economic activities in the international affairs of a foreign country (…) with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the (…) forces’ (Regan 1998: 758) but very few studies explore the diversity of measures covered by this broad definition. Instead, most studies categorize intervention as third-party actions either in the form of military support or in the form of mediation to settle a conflict issue. From this literature, we know that third-party action has been proven to influence conflict dynamics, compared to cases without external actors. To sum up the state-of-the art findings from quantitative studies, we know that outside support in the form of troops, weapons or intelligence intended to strengthen one of the belligerents in conflict usually lead to escalating violence and longer conflicts (Regan 2002; Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2007; Cunningham 2010). At the same time, external interventions aimed at ending a conflict result in decreased violence, more likely peace settlements and more post-conflict stability (Walter 2002; Wilkenfeld et al. 2007; Fortna & Howard 2008; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon 2014). The reason why external support has such an impact with regard to both facilitating and resolving conflict is that third parties influence the capabilities of the belligerents. Considering there is always some risk for armed struggle, given that disputes and grievances exist (Ross; Ryu; Yap, all in this volume), then the opportunity cost of the use of force will

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determine whether or not we see war (Fearon & Laitin 2003). If one side perceives a greater chance of winning a military contest due to support from the outside, there is a greater probability that it will use armed force and be unwilling to compromise. This doesn’t only influence the prevalence of war, but also how violent conflicts will be. International wars involving alliances and civil conflicts with external supporters have been found to lead to more battle deaths than contained local disputes (Harbom & Wallensteen 2005; Lacina, Gleditsch & Russett 2006). When external actors, including intergovernmental actors such as the UN and ASEAN, instead deploy their support and resources for ending conflict and promote non-violent political means, this will shape the cost-benefit analysis of local political actors. Without external support, it will be more difficult to mobilize rebels while the international community can facilitate reforms that make it possible to address political grievances without having to resort to armed struggle. Third party presence has been found to be particularly important for negotiating and implementing peace in civil conflict, as it can help to overcome the commitment problem between warring sides as conflict wanes. After the end of fighting, the rebels need to demobilize and trust the government not to renege on the deal after they find themselves in a position of relative strength. By having external parties involved to monitor the situation as well as guarantee everyone’s security during implementation, this problem is reduced (Walter 2002). To conclude, external actors can choose to support military struggles, remain uninvolved or actively work for conflict resolution. The next section provides an overview of these approaches in East Asia over time, seeking to establish different general trends but also noting cases with different outcomes.

1946–1970: gunning for victory Most East Asian conflicts in the 1940s and 1950s can be traced back to the Second World War or earlier, both with regards to the conflict issues and how the warring sides were trained and armed. In China, the Kuomintang and the Communists were allied in the Second United Front against the Japanese 1937–46, while also preparing for the resumption of the Chinese civil war. Both could build up their forces during the world war. The KMT received substantial military support

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from the British and Americans, while the Communists captured much leftover war materiel after the Japanese surrender (Bagby 1992). At the same time, the Korean peninsula was divided into occupation zones controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, whose emerging Cold War rivalry created the precondition for the Korean War (Stueck 1995). In Southeast Asia, the years directly after the Second World War were characterized by resistance to the (re-)colonization of the region. When this struggle became violent, it primarily involved World War II veterans and the use of weapons supplied during that time. Local forces had been mobilized both to support and to defend against the Japanese advance throughout the region and, later, were an important part of the Allies’ counteroffensive. Forces that had fought against the Japanese featured in the subsequent independence movements in Indonesia, Indochina and Malaya, as well as insurgencies in Burma and the Philippines. In many countries, former pro-Japanese militias also became prominent during internal struggles, fighting either for the state or for the rebels. Such World War II legacies were replaced by more direct forms of external support, but still for reasons that were primarily beyond the region itself: emerging Cold War competition, the Communist victory in China, and US adherence to the domino theory.1 During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and Britain were willing to provide military resources and training, including tools of repression, for regimes seeking to contain the threat of communism. At the same time, both China and the Soviet Union offered assistance to ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘people’s’ wars across Southeast Asia. Indeed, among all government armies in the region faced with an insurgency in this period, Burma was the single exception; all others received substantial military aid from the outside.2 While this support was short of the actual decision to start the conflict, the presence of military aid shaped the policy choices of local East Asian political leaders. Knowing that support was available, and indeed more likely, if they showed commitment to anti- or pro-communist

1. While the ‘domino theory’ originated as part of the Truman doctrine in 1946, it was specifically linked to Southeast Asia by Eisenhower in 1954 (Olson & Roberts 2008). 2. Even in Burma, some officers received training by the United Kingdom and the US supplied military materiel as part of ‘anti-narcotics’ efforts (Seekins 2002).

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global struggles; all sides had incentives to avoid compromise or reconciliation in domestic politics. We will never know if leaders such as Park Chung Hee in South Korea, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, Suharto in Indonesia, Pol Pot in Cambodia and Ne Win in Burma would have been inclined towards repression no matter what, but the scope of the terror they used was certainly influenced by the substantial international backing they received while pursuing these policies. Another consequence of the perception that local conflicts were part of a global ideological struggle was the reluctance of third parties to encourage or support compromise. This should have been possible in East Asia after the Second World War considering that many political and armed movements had a legacy of contacts and co-operation across the left-right divide. Many local anti-Japanese or pro-independence forces were alliances of actors with different political preferences who were unified by nationalism and necessity. These included the Lao Issara in Laos, the Anti-Fascist Organization in Burma, and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, who after the war split into opposing sides in subsequent conflicts. With the exception of Burma, there were few attempts to promote power-sharing between these groups as the focus was on consolidating power by the use of force. Governments responded to the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, the Darul Islam and Permesta movements in Indonesia and the Communist Party of Malaya in the 1950s with military offensives that included human right violations.3 External parties participated in negotiations to end the violence only when they were unable to defeat their opponent. Arguably, the talks leading to the armistice in Korea 1953 and the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended French rule in Indochina were prompted mainly by external parties who sought to end their costly involvement in the conflicts. Local actors had limited opportunities to influence the agenda of the talks and were largely viewed only as loyal proxies to uphold the regional power-balance structures designed by the external powers. As part of this balancing, the external parties maintained their strategic interests in the region by limiting the agency of local leaders – regardless on whether the agency promoted right-left co-operation or aggression. This approach provides some stability to the region, such as US reluctance to support

3. In the Philippines, the rebellion could be quelled only after the army stopped perpetrating human rights abuses.

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Kuomintang attempts of invading mainland China from Taiwan or Burma. It did not, however, remove or settle contentious issues meaning that conflicts would resume or remain as pertinent security problems in East Asia for decades.

1970–85: a period of readjustment As the Cold war progressed, it took on different characteristics in East Asia than in most other regions of the world. In the Americas, in Europe, in Africa and in the Middle East, the superpower rivalry largely consisted of a duel between US- and Soviet-backed proxies, while in East Asia, internationalist communist support instead led to increasing fragmenta- tion among their local warring agents. The main reason for this was that the Cold War rivalry in East Asia evolved into a contest between three great powers after Sino–Soviet co-operation deteriorated in the late 1950s and onwards. After the 1969 armed clashes on their shared border, it was clear that the two had become competitors for influence. Another factor that influenced the effect of support provided to local actors by China was the within-party political struggles for influence and objectives in Beijing. The most visible period of this was of course the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966 and whose ideals spread, with Chinese support, among Communist movements in several other countries. A somewhat ironic example of the latter was the internal purges that took place within the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) by self- proclaimed ‘Red Guards’. These purges reduced the capacity of the BCP to keep up its insurgency against the Burma government. Consequently, the BCP was not fully capable of taking advantage of the huge increase in military support forthcoming from China in 1968, and their offensive could be halted before it reached central Burma (Lintner 1990b). The communist insurgency in Burma was just one of many conflicts underway in the region in the early 1970s, and most continued to be fuelled by external support. This was most telling in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, where troops from Australia, Canada, China, Cuba, New Zealand, North and South Korea, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States supported the locally recruited armies. As noted above, military engagement rarely led to termination of violence and the cost of the war efforts was becoming a domestic political issue for many external supporters. Protests against involve-

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ment in Vietnam occurred in the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and there was a public opinion shift towards emphasizing the protection of human rights as part of foreign policy. The latter was manifest, for example, in the introduction of human rights considerations in many legal regulations of US foreign policy starting in 1973, as well as in the raising of this issue as a potential basis for a joint European Community foreign policy (Forsythe 1987; Kreutz 2015). In autocratic countries, public opposition to the wars was obviously less important for the leadership than national security concerns. The Sino–Soviet split and eventual border clashes in 1969 meant that military resources had to be deployed to defend shared borders. Furthermore, Communist insurgencies in many Southeast Asian countries were unable to achieve relative military superiority, even with outside support from China or the Soviet Union. Another factor that may have been important was that some local parties were less ideologically committed to the Maoist ideal and so were willing to link with democratization movements, as for example in Thailand and the Philippines. Pressures from within the great powers eventually led to Sino–US rapprochement in 1971, which itself did not mark an immediate and drastic change in policy, but did suggest some indications of a gradual shift away from a winning-at-all-costs mindset. The United States continued to support many conflict parties it already had close relations with, including several governments (Poe & Meernik 1995), but this effort became increasingly reliant on covert action. Some requests for new backing were rejected, including requests for military aid from several Burmese and ethnic minority rebel groups as well as from US-trained Laotian militias after the Pathet Lao victory in 1975. At the same time, outright Western support for the South Vietnamese and Cambodian regimes was removed even though the Sino–Soviet/Vietnamese rivalry would continue to fuel conflict in this region for more than a decade to come. The case of Cambodia after the US withdrawal illustrates how the willingness to back warring sides lived on despite changes in inter-regional power politics. The Khmer Rouge regime that came into power in 1975 was supported by China and North Korea, but initiated border conflicts with its former comrades-in-arms in Vietnam (Kiernan 2002b) as well as Thailand. This at the same time as Hanoi sought to reduce dependence on their former patrons China after the war, leading

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them to ally with the Soviet Union (Chanda 1986). After the Khmer Rouge was ousted by the Vietnamese, it maintained close links with Beijing and quickly reorganized to fight against the new Phnom Penh regime. At the same time, the ASEAN countries were concerned by the Vietnamese involvement and convinced the United States to support non-communist rebel groups, leading to an unlikely rebel alliance of three factions receiving joint support from the United States, China and Thailand (Tillema 1989 ; Kiernan 2002a). Cambodia was the exception to the general Chinese approach in the 1980s, as Deng Xiaoping in general emphasized domestic economic development and cordial relations with neighbouring countries. While some support to insurgents continued, the level was gradually reduced. Chinese-based propaganda broadcasts for the Burmese Communist Party were shut down in 1978, for the Communist Party of Thailand in 1979, for the Communist Party of Malaya and the Indonesian Communist Party in 1981 (Heaton 1982; Lintner 1990a).4 Furthermore, the new Chinese regime actively pres- sured these groups to explore a negotiated end to their insurgencies. In Burma, this was not very successful, as the Communists showed up at the 1981 peace talks only to declare their commitment to keep fighting (Lintner 1990b). The Communist Party of Malaya was more willing to seek compromise, and a series of secret negotiations eventually led to the tripartite peace agreement between Communists, Malaysia and Thailand in 1989 (Ratanachaya 1996).

1986–2014: supporting the East Asian Peace By the mid-1980s, the possibilities of gaining external support for either violent repression or rebellion had substantively decreased across the East Asian region. For example, while the United States was complicit in the violent repression of the Gwangju democracy movement in South Korea in 1980, it publicly supported democratization in 1987 (Fowler 1999). Similarly, the United States supported the decision of the Filipino army not to suppress the democratization movement in Manila 1986, and intervened against subsequent military coup attempts in the country (Lee 2009). The latter example is a particularly useful indicator of US policy change, as the Philippines at the time was facing an escalating 4. The BCP headquarters moved across the border and continued to broadcast until the organization fragmented into ethnically defined groups in 1988.

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Communist insurgency. Earlier iterations of Communist insurgency, in the Philippines and elsewhere in the region, had motivated US support for military rulers and their more hardline approach to counterinsurgency. There was, however, still the issue of the most internationalized conflict in East Asia at the time, in Cambodia, where the warring sides were as polarized as ever (including disagreements within the rebel alliance). However, all the external backers were starting to grow tired of the war costs and aware that a decisive victory was not likely. Vietnam, the main supporter of the regime, had to consider a reduction of support from the Soviet Union following the end of the Cold War as well as the task of rebuilding the country after decades of war. China was focusing on economic reforms and improving its international reputation, while the American strategic focus had shifted towards Europe and the Middle East. The United States was also uncomfortable with being linked to the Khmer Rouge, whose policies of mass murder had been uncovered. Furthermore, China learned the cost of international condemnation after sanctions were implemented following the Tiananmen Square massacre, while US scandals such as the Iran-Contra affair led the American public voice its opposition to external military initiatives. For Thailand, the immediate advantages of war termination would be the return of Cambodian refugees from its border and the possibility of profit from cross-border trade in logging and other natural resources. In contrast to the external powers, the parties to the conflict were less interested in compromise, with the Khmer Rouge particularly committed to continued use of force. However, after the external parties threatened to cut off military aid, negotiations mediated by Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries began in 1988. At the same time, the Vietnamese started withdrawing advisers and troops that had supported the government side. The mediation team was expanded to include the great powers the following year, and the negotiations continued in Paris. On 23 October 1991, the three rebel groups and the government signed the Paris agreement and UN forces were deployed to oversee a transitional period and the holding of elections (Gottesman 2003). As it happened, only one of the signatories, KPNLF, completely complied with the settlement and demobilized; the others resumed armed clashes until 1998 (Peou 1999).

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The partial continuation of the war in Cambodia after the peace agreement is a telling example. Even though influential external backers for conflict had changed their preferences about the best way of achieving stability in East Asia, local leaders could still be opposed to compromise. Attempts to repress or defeat political opposition, whether violent or non-violent, has often been the primary policy chosen by regimes in for example Burma (Myanmar) (Steinberg 2001; Smith 2007), Indonesia (Osborne 1985; Schulze 2006; Salla 1997), and Thailand (Pathmanand 2007). It has not been particularly successful, as very few conflicts have ended in outright victory but instead continued as low-level insurgency or ceasefires without any lasting settlement of the conflict issue (Svensson 2011; Staniland 2012). An interesting feature of the remaining low-intensity conflicts in East Asia is that these have almost exclusively involved rebel sides that are less dependent on external backing for their war effort, but which have rather funded their war effort through illegal business or taxation of the local community.5 Further, the government side in these conflicts, including Burma, Indonesia and Thailand, was similarly relatively independent of external sponsors, meaning that the withdrawal of external support had a smaller effect on their warring capabilities. Today, despite a common preference to reduce conflict in the region, external powers do not agree on the means to end conflict; in particular China has rarely promoted actual peace settlements. Beijing has been willing to mediate ceasefires with Burmese insurgents, but these talks have rarely discussed the conflict issue or political reforms (Sun 2013). This approach appeals to the elites in many semi-democratic6 and democratic East Asian regimes, where politics is characterized by centralized elite pacts rather than an engagement with grievances for citizens in the periphery (Jones 2007; Boudreau 2009; Slater 2010). Consequently, relatively few of the wars in East Asia have been settled by peace agreements. Those that have, though, share some similar 5. This is not for want of trying. For example, since the civil war started in 1948, Burmese ethnic minority rebels have been requesting large-scale external support from the UK and the US, without success. Some of them, however, received limited support from Thailand or China during the conflict (Smith 1991; Lintner 1999). 6. The military has a direct, constitutionally defined political role in Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar. In China, Vietnam and Laos, it is institutionally subservi- ent to the ruling party.

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characteristics. Apart from Cambodia, all peace agreements have been signed in countries after – but not immediately in the wake of – democratization, where the United States previously has been an influential external supporter, and with substantial international mediation and peace implementation assistance (Möller et al. 2007). The first case was the Philippines, where new talks began with both communist and Moro insurgents immediately after democratization in 1986.7 However, these efforts had mixed success, as the negotiations with the Communists soon broke down. In contrast, eventual mediation support from the Organization of the Islamic Conference and a government offer of regional autonomy led up to a settlement in 1996 with the MNLF, the biggest Moro rebel group in Mindanao (Bertrand 2000). Other groups in the region, however, have continued with a low-level insurgency and another peace agreement was signed in 2014 with another group, the MILF. In Indonesia, democratization after the large-scale protests during the 1998 financial crisis brought into power a new leadership willing to discuss a settlement of the situation in Timor-Leste. The Timorese struggle for independence was arguably the most internationally visible conflict underway in East Asia at the time, as Portugal was pushing for the European Union to get involved and Timorese independence leaders Carlos Belo and José Ramos-Horta were awarded the 1996 Nobel peace prize for their commitment to non-violent means. Following UN mediation, Indonesia and Portugal agreed that the status of the territory would be decided by a referendum (Maley 2000). The referendum subsequently reflected a strong preference for independence. Democratization did not, however, completely change policy preferences within the Indonesian military, which set up and sponsored local militias to engage in mass violence during and after the referendum (on the effects of these actions, see Guthrey’s chapter in this volume). Consequently, Australian peacekeepers and de facto UN rule controlled the territory during the transition to Timorese independence in 2002. At the time, less international attention was given to the conflict in Aceh. As violence escalated in the region in 1999, Indonesia re-imposed

7. This round was preceded by a Mindanao peace agreement signed in 1976 under the Marcos dictatorship, but Marcos’ failure to implement the terms led to a resumption of the conflict.

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martial law and resumed a counterinsurgency campaign that included substantial human rights violations. While international mediation led to a short-lived ceasefire in 2002, fighting resumed until the next President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, came into office in 2004. Already during the election campaign, this former General declared his aim to settle the Aceh conflict, and he initiated peace talks immediately after taking office in October 2004. To facilitate the process, mediation was sought from former Finnish President Ahtisaari, who was trusted by the rebel side (Jemadu 2006; Morfit 2007; Gaillard, Clavé & Kelman 2008). After less than a year of peace talks, the parties signed the Helsinki Agreement in August 2005 and thereby ended the Acehnese conflict. While the international community was engaged in mediating the agreement, it had a more limited role for its implementation than in Cambodia and Timor- Leste. There was a limited monitoring mission as well as the provision of development assistance, although the latter was more aimed at rebuilding after the tsunami that hit the region in December 2004.

Discussion In the above description of war- and peacemaking in East Asia, I identify three broad periods during which external parties can be broadly characterized as (i) supportive of the war efforts; (ii) withdrawal; and (iii) supportive of conflict resolution processes. In general, these periods correspond with the temporal trend of conflict in Southeast Asia, while the international shift from support of war to support of peace occurred more rapidly but not as comprehensively in Northeast Asia. While the latter region has seen fewer conflicts since the 1950s, the characteristics of the security order, even there, roughly correspond with the proposed time line. From the 1980s onwards, there has been less focus on outright military balancing and more on the means for co-existence in the form of cross-border communications and joint economic benefits in, for example, China’s relations with Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. What can explain these decisions of external powers to stop supporting conflict and instead choose non-involvement or even support for conflict resolution and prevention? In the international relations literature, the dominant explanations for the prevalence of regional war and peace focus on three variables: power relations, economic factors and transnational institutions.

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The first explanation emphasises the role of great power balancing for regional stability. International relations scholars have suggested that rising powers will always seek greater influence and increased security (Morgenthau 1967; Organski & Kugler 1981), while existing hegemons have incentives to suppress rising powers pre-emptively (Waltz 1979). Essentially, this means that relative power shifts inevitably create tension between great powers. Per this view, which is described in greater detail by Ross in this volume, the crucial moments for the creation of the East Asian Peace were the Sino–US rapprochement in 1971 and the demise of Soviet power in the late 1980s. From a temporal perspective, this corresponds with the periods outlined in the empirical account above. However, while this argument can explain the reduction of support to local forces in conflicts where China and the United States supported opposite sides, it does not explain the increased ambition to settle conflicts where neither side had much interest. The conflicts in Indonesia, for example, were of limited importance for any of the great powers, and yet there was much international support for peace processes in both East Timor and Aceh. A more nuanced challenge to this argument, though, is that it doesn’t seem like the decisions at the time were based on any conscious intent to balance the international security order. China had sought to establish a foreign policy that was independent from Moscow as early as in the 1950s and could by no means expect that US rapprochement would be a possibility when clashes erupted on the Sino–Soviet border 1969. Indeed, ideological claims during the Cultural Revolution distanced China further from the United States, which at the time was dramatically increasing its involvement in Vietnam. For the decisions in the mid-1980s, the first suggestions of international support to end the Cambodia war came from Vietnam even before Soviet support declined. Three years after the resumption of contact with Washington in 1982, Vietnam encouraged the United States to commit to a more constructive role for security in the region and hinted that it could close Soviet access to naval bases in the country (Chanda 1986). This was a few months before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in Moscow and the subsequent change in Soviet policy. In both the 1960s and the 1980s, the policies of local actors shifted before the international system change; hence there is limited support for the claim that great power realignment directly led to the East Asian Peace. It is,

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however, entirely plausible that these systemic changes strengthened the processes of subsequent reduced foreign involvement in conflicts in the region. A second explanation for why states would choose to shift support from providing military aid to sponsoring conflict resolution efforts comes from theories on the beneficial influence of economic development and interdependence. In this volume, versions of this argument proposed by Goldsmith and Tønnesson both rest on the claim that the economic costs of war and its disruptive influence on trade should make war unattractive for rational political leaders. Goldsmith argues that the pacifying influence of trade interdependence is more likely to have a preventive effect on involvement in new conflicts than enhance the prospects of withdrawal or resolution of existing conflicts. His approach is, however, less applicable to the states that play the role of supporting parties in a conflict considering they will – potentially – suffer fewer disruptions on their own economy.8 Secondary warring sides don’t suffer destructive violence in their home territories, which means that trade volumes should be less affected. It may be claimed that there are incentives to offer support in settling conflicts in countries that are important trade partners or where a state has investments but, as shown by Goldsmith, the substantial increase in intra-regional trade only happened in the 1990s, which makes trade a consequence rather than a precursor of peaceful development. Tønnesson’s argument in this volume also emphasizes the importance of economic development, but he suggests that the pacifying effect is set into motion by leaders who decide to promote growth rather than conflict. With regard to policies of external support, this expectation corresponds well with the decisions by China and Vietnam to withdraw from their involvement in conflicts outside their borders in the 1980s, as well as ASEAN’s eventual activities as peacemaker in Cambodia. At the same time, though, ASEAN had been influential just a few years earlier in setting up support for the rebel coalition in Cambodia. Furthermore, while those East Asian countries which have enjoyed peace in in the last two decades have seen little external presence, there is still a willingness

8. Relatively speaking, the costs of war may still be considered as too high for the domestic audience, as seen in the US public’s opposition to the Vietnam war (Mack, 1975).

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to accept and request external support by those which continue to perceive a high risk of violent conflict. Repeated security assurances from the United States are of great importance for Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and many Southeast Asian states. This includes Indonesia, which in the aftermath of the Bali bombings 2002 expanded security cooperation with the United States as part of the war on terror, and the Philippines, which maintains US bases on its territory. Further, it could be expected that leaders who sought to promote economic growth would have been more active in conflict prevention and promoting peace settlements in its neighbourhood. While there are some indications of countries like China and Malaysia becoming more active as peace mediators in ongoing conflicts, this is essentially a feature of the 21st century and is undertaken by a different generation of leaders from those who supposedly changed priorities. A third theory that explains peace focuses on the role of institutions, which can be either formalized or a set of common norms. In East Asia, it has been suggested that the regional co-operation in ASEAN provides a normative commitment against the use of force beyond state borders, and that subsequent trade interdependence has spread this norm also to the northern states in the region (Kivimäki 2011). Indeed, both the 1967 ASEAN Declaration and, even more, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation emphasize the importance of regional peace and non- interference across borders. For a similar argument that is less focused on the adherence to norms, Acharya (2014) suggests that multilater- alism has developed because ASEAN and other regional fora create a stable international order in East Asia, and this stability has a pacifying effect. The region is not a security community like Western Europe, but instead is characterized by a web of networks that constitute a type of consociational institutional order that leads to cooperative security and multilateral balancing. While both Kivimäki (2011) and Acharya (2014) make strong cases for the importance of these factors in contemporary interstate relations in Southeast Asia, questions need to be asked as to whether they contributed to the region-wide shift from conflict towards peace. To begin with, there is still some uncertainty about to what extent these norms and institutions are influential throughout the region; as Ryu (in this volume) argues, hostile nationalism is much more prevalent in Northeast than in Southeast Asia. Yet, the decline

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of conflict was observed earlier further north. There is also a question whether the ASEAN policy of non-interference is aimed at promoting peace, or just a necessary self-determination clause to convince states to join a regional military alliance. ASEAN actively promoted support for rebels in (non-member) Cambodia in the 1980s, and has often used its non-interference stance as an excuse to distance itself from peacemaking initiatives in the region. The final question for the normative- institutional argument is: to what extent this is something new to the region rather than just a formalization of already established practices by the ASEAN members. Except for the Malay–Indonesian Konfrontasi during 1963–66, international conflict in this region has historically been rare. When wars have occurred, they were against external parties such as the Dutch, British, French and Spanish colonial administrations or the Japanese during World War II. Going back in time some hundred years in Southeast Asia shows that conflicts in the islands were primarily localized affairs, while most mainland wars occurred along the borders of the kingdom of Siam, or present-day Thailand (Lieberman 2009). This suggests that the most high-risk borders are between present-day Thailand–Myanmar and Thailand–Cambodia, which indeed also constitute the two border areas in south-east Asia where low-level armed clashes have occurred in the 21st century.9 In this chapter, I have sought to focus on the micro-level decisions and political changes that can account for the East Asian Peace. The evidence I have found suggests that this phenomenon was a not a result of international system change, economic developmental-peace or trade, or regional norms or institutions. In general, the proposed features of these explanations either existed but failed to influence state actions during the period when East Asia was excessively violent, or arose after peace had been established and were a result that peace. Instead, I contend that decisions by policymakers about whether to use violent means or not is influenced by their access to different options. In East Asia, there was for many decades a steady provision of weapons and training for states and rebels to rely on, which made the region the world’s battlefield. When powerful external supporters shifted their policies towards non-involvement or the promotion of conflict termination, this

9. 2001–02 saw clashes at the Thai–Myanmar border; there was a minor Thai– Cambodian conflict in 2011.

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eventually forced local actors to choose other strategies. While it seems that the decisions of external actors to change strategy primarily were made as a result of their own domestic political concerns, this question needs to be further explored in future research. My argument is further strengthened by my finding that conflicts terminated in East Asia as the region became peaceful were primarily those where external support was withdrawn, while the actors who drew strength locally (in Myanmar and the Philippines) have continued to fight. Looking to the stability of the East Asian Peace, the findings in this chapter are worrying, as they imply that local parties may not be committed to the use of non-violence. Such concerns mirror findings by scholars who focus on other aspects of peace than just the absence of war (Bjarnegård; Eck; Guthrey; Melander; Ryu; and Yap, all in this volume), suggesting that there remains a great need for peacebuilding in East Asia. A clear policy implication from this chapter is that external powers have an important role to play in such a venture. It is important that more resources are offered to promote the use of non-violence in politics and societies in East Asia, to prevent new conflicts that would tarnish the ‘Asian century’.

References Acharya, A. (2014) ‘Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order’, International Studies Quarterly 58(1): 158–73. Bagby, W. M. (1992) The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America’s Relations with China in World War II. Newark: University of Delaware Press. Bertrand, J. (2000) ‘Peace and conflict in the southern Philippines: Why the 1996 peace agreement is fragile’, Pacific Affairs 73(1): 37–54. Boudreau, V. (2009) Resisting dictatorship: Repression and protest in Southeast Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chanda, N. 1986. Brother Enemy: The War After The War. New York: Collier. Cunningham, D. E. (2010) ‘Blocking resolution: How external states can pro- long civil war’, Journal of Peace Research 47(2):115–27. Fearon, J. D & D. Laitin (2003) ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90. Forsythe, D. P. (1987) ‘Congress and human rights in US foreign policy: The fate of general legislation’, Human Rights Quarterly 9(3): 382–404.

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Fortna, V. P. & L. M. Howard (2008) ‘Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature’, Annual Review of Political Science 11: 283–301. Fowler, J. (1999) ‘The United States and South Korean democratization’, Political Science Quarterly 114(2):265–88. Gaillard, J., E. Clavé & I. Kelman. (2008) ‘Wave of peace? Tsunami disaster diplomacy in Aceh, Indonesia’, Geoforum 39(1): 511–26. Gleditsch, K. S. (2007) ‘Transnational dimensions of civil war’, Journal of Peace Research 44(3): 293–309. Gottesman, E. (2003) Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building. New Haven: Yale University Press. Harbom, L. & P. Wallensteen (2005) ‘Armed conflict and its international dimensions, 1946–2004’, Journal of Peace Research 42(5): 623–35. Heaton, W. R. (1982) ‘China and Southeast Asian communist movements: the decline of dual track diplomacy’, Asian Survey 22(8): 779–800. Hultman, L., J. Kathman & M. Shannon (2014) ‘Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting’, American Political Science Review 108(4): 737–53. Jemadu, A. (2006) ‘Democratisation, the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Resolving of the Aceh Conflict’, in A. Reid (ed.) Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem. Singapore: Singapore University Press. Jones, D. M. (2007) ‘The Southeast Asian Development Model: Non-Liberal Democracy with Market Accountability’, Southeast Asian Affairs 2007(1): 59–76. Kiernan, B. (2002a) ‘Introduction: conflict in Cambodia, 1945–2002’, Critical Asian Studies 34(4): 483–95. ——— (2002b) The Pol Pot Regime: Race, power, and genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kivimäki, T. (2011) ‘East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11(1):57–85. Kreutz, J. (2015) ‘Human rights, geostrategy, and EU foreign policy, 1989– 2008’, International Organization 69(1):195–217. Lacina, B., N. P. Gleditsch & B. Russett (2006) ‘The declining risk of death in battle’, International Studies Quarterly 50(3): 673–80. Lee, T. (2009) ‘The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule’, Comparative Political Studies 42(5): 640–69. Lieberman, V. (2009) Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lintner, B. (1990a) Land of Jade: A Journey Through Insurgent Burma. Bangkok: White Lotus.

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——— (1990b) The rise and fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program. ——— (1999) Burma in revolt: Opium and insurgency since 1948. Bangkok: Silkworm. Mack, A. (1975) “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” World Politics 27(2):175–200. Maley, W. (2000) ‘The UN and East Timor’, Pacifica Review: Peace, security & global change 12(1): 63–76. Möller, F., K. DeRouen, J. Bercovitch and P. Wallensteen (2007) ‘The limits of peace: third parties in civil wars in Southeast Asia, 1993–2004’, Negotiation Journal 23(4): 373–91. Morfit, M. (2007) ‘The road to Helsinki: The Aceh agreement and Indonesia’s democratic development’, International Negotiation 12(1): 111–43. Morgenthau, H. J. (1967) ‘To intervene or not to intervene’, Foreign Affairs 45(3):25–436. Olson, J S & R. W. Roberts (2008) Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945–1995. Oxford: Blackwell. Organski, A.F. K. & J. Kugler (1981) The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Osborne, R. (1985) Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Pathmanand, U. (2007) ‘Thaksin’s Achilles’ heel: The failure of Hawkish approaches in the Thai south’, in D. McCargo (ed.) Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence. Singapore: NUS Press. Peou, S. (1999) ‘Cambodia in 1998: from despair to hope?’ Asian Survey 39(1): 20–26. Poe, S. C & J. Meernik (1995) ‘US military aid in the 1980s: A global analysis’, Journal of Peace Research 32(4): 399–411. Ratanachaya, D. K. (1996) The Communist Party of Malaya, Malaysia, and Thailand: Truce Talks ending the Armed Struggle of The Communist Party of Malaya. Bangkok: Duangkaew. Regan, P. D. (1998) ‘Choosing to intervene: Outside interventions in internal conflicts’ Journal of Politics 60(3): 754–79. ——— (2002) Civil Wars and Foreign Powers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Salehyan, I. (2007) ‘Transnational rebels: Neighbouring states as sanctuary for rebel groups’, World Politics 59(2): 217–42. Salla, M. E. (1997) ‘Creating the Ripe Moment in the East Timor Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 34(4): 449–66.

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Schulze, K. E. (2006) ‘Insurgency and counter-insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh conflict, October 1976–May 2004’, in A. Reid (ed.) Verandah of Violence: The background to the Aceh problem. Singapore: Singapore University Press. Seekins, D. M. (2002) The disorder in order: The Army-State in Burma since 1962. Bangkok: White Lotus. Slater, D. (2010) Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian levia- thans in Southeast Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M. (1991) Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity. London: Zed. ——— (2007) State of strife: The dynamics of ethnic conflict in Burma. Washington D.C: East-West center. Staniland, P. (2012) ‘States, insurgents, and wartime political orders’, Perspectives on Politics 10(2): 243–64. Steinberg, D. I. (2001) Burma: the state of Myanmar. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press. Stueck, W. (1995) The Korean War: An International History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sun, Y. (2013) ‘China’s intervention in the Myanmar-Kachin peace talks’, Asia- Pacific Bulletin 200. Washington D.C: East-West Center. Svensson, I. (2011) ‘East Asian Peacemaking: Exploring the patterns of conflict management and conflict settlement in East Asia’, Asian Perspective 35(2): 163–85. Tillema, H. K. (1989) ‘Foreign overt military intervention in the nuclear age’, Journal of Peace Research 26(2):179–96. Walter, B. F. (2002) Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Wilkenfeld, J., K. J. Young, D. M. Quinn & V. Asal (2007) Mediating international crises. London: Routledge.

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Peace by Avoidance of Religious Civil Wars

Isak Svensson

Why have there been so few religiously defined civil wars in East Asia after 1975? This chapter maps the landscape of religious dimensions of organized violence in East Asia, and proposes a two-layered explanation for this question. As the patterns of wars worldwide have generally become dominated by religiously defined conflicts, and by Islamist civil wars in particular, I argue that the East Asian Peace cannot be explained without taking into account the region’s relatively low number of religious civil wars. If we conceptualize the East Asian Peace as a relative decrease or even absence of battle-related deaths (admittedly, a negative definition of conflict), then we need to explain something that has not occurred. This means that we need to think counterfactually: what types of wars could have occurred in East Asia during the last decades? One possible way to address this counterfactual question is to examine how armed conflicts have manifested themselves. Thus, whereas many chapters in this volume examine intra-regional dynamics, this particular chapter is more focused on how, and why, East Asia stands out from the global trends in religiously defined conflicts. Religiously defined civil wars – civil wars in which at least one of the warring parties defines the stakes in religious terms1 – have become the dominant form of political violence in the world today (Svensson 2012). In 2014, religiously defined civil wars accounted for no less than 75 per cent of the total number of ongoing civil wars. Although this

1. Examples could be to seek the establishment of an independent state of a certain religious character, establish rule of religious law, or gain an increased role for (one particular) religion in society.

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figure decreased to 73 per cent in 2015, religiously defined civil wars still made up the vast majority of civil wars in the world. The trend, however, is longer: since the turn of the millennium, religious civil wars have made up the majority of civil wars across the globe. Their frequency has increased over time; that is, more religiously defined conflicts have started than have ended. Yet, the increase in actual numbers over the last two decades has been marginal. The dramatic shift is in proportions: in 1975, only three per cent of all armed conflicts were religiously defined, in 2014, that figure had risen to 55 per cent of all internal armed conflicts. This shift reflects not only a mild increase in the number of religiously defined conflicts, but mostly a decrease in non-religious civil wars (Pinker 2011; Svensson 2012; Nordås 2010; Toft 2006). It is thus the proportion of religious civil wars that has grown. Research has connected this to their relative intractability: they tend to be bloodier (Toft 2006; Pearce 2005), more difficult to settle (Svensson 2007), and last longer (Horowitz 2009) than their non-religious counterparts.2 Yet, East Asia is a region that stands out from this global trajectory. It has experienced very few major armed conflicts over religious issues. In fact, between 1975 and 2014, only two religious wars, a mere six per cent of the world’s religious wars, took place in East Asia. Moreover, religion did not play a central role in any of these wars, but was rather a peripheral conflictual issue. This runs counter to the development observed virtually anywhere else on the globe, where the religious dimension has been overwhelmingly central to religious wars. In, for example, the Middle East, religion has played a central role in 87 per cent of religious wars. Centrality here refers to whether the religious demand is the only, or one of the major, demands stated by parties at the onset of conflict. Religious demands are instead peripheral when they are mixed with other types of demands, and when religious issues occupy a rather limited space. The peripheral role of religion even in East Asia’s ‘religious wars’ is surprising because, as I will argue in this chapter, the risk of genuinely re-

2. Religious dimensions in incompatibilities are measured by examining the claims by the insurgency groups at the onset of conflict. This method makes it impossible to evaluate whether or how claims vary over time within the same conflict-dyad, which admittedly is a major simplification. Future research should develop time-varying measurements of religious claims. For recent work on this question, see Isaacs 2016.

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ligious wars in the region has been potent, mainly in the form of religious contestation and grievances both in Southeast Asia and in China’s west- ernmost province of Xinjiang. For decades, scholars and security analysts have expected the region to become an arena for jihadist groups and violent conflicts (Gershman, 2002; Abuza, 2003). Following the events of 9/11, and under the impression of bombings in Bali and Jakarta as well as Indonesia’s successful hunt for the leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) there was much talk about an emerging Southeast Asian ‘second front’ in the global confrontation between secular governments and armed jihadist movements (Gershman 2002). Also, analysts have pointed out that religious inclinations among the East Asian populations are on the rise, including increasing popular support for radical Islamist parties. To varying degrees, countries in the region with a Muslim majority population have adopted religious laws, strengthened Islamic courts and implemented controversial legislation concerning apostasy (Hamayotsu 2012). However, despite predictions of jihadist civil wars and despite the increasing saliency of religious identities and religiously-anchored political aspirations, the kind of global jihad we know from the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Central Asia has not been seen in East Asia. During a time period of 40 years, there are only two years when armed conflict over religious issues has passed the threshold of 1,000 battle- related deaths (which is the conventional way of measuring ‘war’) in East Asia: the conflicts between (a) the government of Myanmar and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) in 1984 and (b) the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2000. Naturally, two years of religious civil war are bad enough, but in comparison to other regions of the world it is a surprisingly low number. First, let us bring up a few explanations of the religious peace in East Asia that I find unsatisfactory. The low number of religiously defined civil wars in East Asia cannot be explained by the absence of religious contestation. Religious identities and claims remain contested and religious actors are active in a small part of the organised violence in the region. East Asia has had its share of religiously defined conflict, and still does. From a global perspective, East Asia does not represent any unique pattern in this regard. After all, religion does play a role in the insurgencies in southern Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines, and there have been violent riots targeting specifically religiously de-

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fined groups (Muslim minority groups) in Myanmar. For example, in the Patani region of southern Thailand, initiatives by the Thai government to impose Thai language and Buddhist customs have met stern resistance among the mostly Muslim, Malay-speaking local population. There, separatists have long fought the government for independence or some form of self-determination for Patani (Liow 2006). Moreover, in the southern Philippines, armed conflicts between the government of the Philippines and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), on the other, were ongoing in 2014. Similar to southern Thailand, the central issue here concerns independence for Muslims in the Mindanao region. However, without disregarding current and past religiously defined armed conflicts in East Asia, they have been of a lesser magnitude and scope compared to those in other regions of the world. There have also been several cases of organised violence between communal groups (non-state armed conflict), and between groups with different religious identities. For instance, tensions and violence between Christians and Muslims have taken place in Indonesia. Indonesia’s Moluccan islands were the site of Christian–Muslim violence in 1999 and 2000, and religion was also a dimension of the fighting in West Kalimantan in 1997 and 2001. In January 1999, a fight between two youths from rival gangs in the town of Ambon, the provincial capital of the Moluccas, led to violent clashes that quickly spread across the Moluccan archipelago. The events even saw the Islamic fundamentalist group Laskar Jihad arrive and carry out attacks against local Christians (Noorhaidi 2006). West Kalimantan experienced new outbreaks of violence in 1997 and 2001 as mostly Christian Dayaks attacked Muslim Madurese immigrants. This violence, however, was not over religion but rather related to identity politics. The Madurese immigrants were opposed also by local Muslim Malays, who viewed them as ‘strangers’ with alien Muslim practices. Both the Moluccas and West Kalimantan had experienced earlier episodes of violence between similarly defined groups in the 1950s and 1960s. In the Philippines, tensions between Christians and Muslims, created by the state-orchestrated relocation of Christian Filipinos into the southern Muslim lands in Mindanao, and strengthened by a deep sense of injustice and marginalisation among the indigenous Muslim population of the area, have erupted in communal violence (Liow 2006).

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A second potential explanation can also be disregarded: the relatively low number of religiously defined civil wars in East Asia cannot be explained by a lack of religiously anchored grievances. Discrimination and repression of minority groups, which is one of the most important explanations behind religiously defined armed conflicts in general, continues in parts of the East Asian region. Many Uighurs of China’s western Xinjiang province perceive their traditional way of life to be under threat, and fear that they risk marginalization in their own territory by Han Chinese immigrants and the imposition of Han Chinese cultural hegemony. The grievances of the Uighurs are strengthened by the Chinese government’s suppression of dissent, which has accelerated in recent years. In Myanmar, anti-Muslim rhetoric and discrimination continues, as Freedom House reported in 2016. Political parties have actively avoided nominating Muslim candidates and the Parliament has taken measures that restrict religious conversion, interfaith marriage, and birth rates in certain regions of the country.3 Worst off is the Muslim Rohingya minority, rendered stateless by a 1982 law, whose treatment had been called a crime against humanity by human rights experts even before a 2014 law prohibited residents without full citizenship from forming political parties or contesting elections. And, prior to the celebrated elections of 2015, one million people, mostly Rohingya, allegedly had their voting rights revoked (Freedom House 2016). In short, the Rohingya are virtually excluded from political life. This formal exclusion is reflected in society, where Rohingya and other Muslims in Myanmar are the targets of riots and mob violence. Many of the grievances that laid the foundation for decades of armed conflict in the southern Philippines persist among the local Muslim population of Mindanao, which remains the most underdeveloped region in the country. The 2012/2013 Philippine Human Development Report (UNDP 2013) shows that nine out of the ten provinces in

3. A 2015 law mandates three-year birth spacing in specific areas of the country. The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights Chairperson, Charles Santiago, expressed concern that ‘This law, which was rooted in discrimination and is likely to be implemented in a discriminatory fashion, provides a clear basis for the government to continue its targeted persecution of minority populations, including Rohingya and other Burmese Muslims.’ http://aseanmp.org/2015/05/27/ myanmars-new-population-control-law-another-step-towards-ethnic-cleansing/, accessed 15 January 2017.

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the Philippines that have the lowest ranking in life expectancy, basic enrolment and literacy, and income levels are found in Mindanao. Fear of losing one’s influence and identity can explain why groups take up arms, and why religion is drawn into conflict dynamics. For example, the fear of becoming marginalised when losing their important role in the Burmese army was one of the factors that contributed to the mainly Christian Karen to rebel in 1948. Moreover, when in 1961 Burmese premier U Nu declared a Buddhist state, this triggered a Kachin rebellion as well. Similarly, moves to impose Thai language and Buddhist customs in the largely Muslim Patani region of southern Thailand must be seen as one of the most important causes of the religious conflict there. Related to this, empirical research has found a correlation between limits on religious freedom and the presence of religiously defined armed conflict (Basedau et al. 2015). While the causal relationship that underlies this correlation has yet to be fully understood, the examples of Myanmar and Thailand above indicate that the former might contribute to the latter, given an existing opportunity structure for violence. However, it might also be the other way around, namely that the presence of religious conflict decreases religious freedom. This represents an interesting potential venue for future research. A third influential explanation for the relative religious peace of East Asia is anchored in the region’s cultural practices and historical legacies (Kang 2014). The religious demography of the Confucian Northeast Asia, historically rather tolerant of religious minorities and with three nations completely dominated by a single ethno-linguistic group (Japanese, Koreans and Han Chinese) may not have been that conducive to religiously defined armed conflict. When it comes to the more religiously heterogeneous Southeast Asia, one cannot really say the same. That is where the East Asian religious conflicts (Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand) have, indeed, played out. In Malaysia, for example, religious divisions are an essential part of politics, as religion is one of the identity markers that distinguishes the three major groups in the country (Malay-Muslims, Indian-Hindus and religious-cultural- Confucian Chinese). Yet, the point is that difficult relations between Buddhists, Christians and Muslims (exemplified earlier in this chapter) could have led to more violence than what has been seen.

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Explaining the relative absence of religious civil wars in East Asia I argue that, together, two main and inter-related factors can explain the relative lack of religiously defined conflicts in East Asia. The first is that East Asia’s religiously defined conflicts in general, and the jihadist armed conflicts in particular, have remained rooted in local dynamics and contexts. Thus, the main explanation for the low number of religiously defined civil wars is that, unlike elsewhere around the world, the present intrastate conflicts have not created strong transnational conflict lines. One feature of the religiously defined conflicts in East Asia is, hence, the relative absence of internationalisation through external support or intervention. Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim country and Malaysia is also a globally important Muslim-majority country. The region also includes five additional states with ethnically concentrated Muslim populations, in four of which armed opposition groups continue to be active: the Malay Muslim south in Thailand (the former Sultanate of Patani), Rakhine State in Myanmar (the historical state of Arakan), Mindanao in the Philippines (part of the Sulu Sultanate), Xinjiang (East Turkestan) in China and Aceh (the former Aceh Sultanate, not currently active) in Indonesia. All of them can look back to a historical period when they had their own state or a high degree of national self- determination. Several attempts have been made by transnational jihadist groups to internationalise or globalise the uprisings among these Muslim populations. Furthermore, some small armed factions, notably the ASG in Mindanao and JI and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, have had links to the international jihadist movement. The founder and former leader of the ASG, Abdurajak Janjalani, fought alongside the mujahidin in Afghanistan in the war against the Soviet Union. He returned to the Philippines in the late 1980s with a vision to create an independent state for the Muslims of Mindanao by waging holy war against what he saw as a Philippine government dominated by Christians (Yoshihara 2006; Santos & Dinampo 2010). Under Janjalani’s command, the ASG is thought to have had links to al-Qaeda (Gunaratna 2005). However, the group fell from al-Qaeda’s favour after his death in 1998, as it de- centralised rapidly into a network of more or less autonomous cells which began putting more emphasis on criminal rather than terrorist activities (Read 2012; Cronin 2009). JI also had links to al-Qaeda. From

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their sanctuary in Malaysia, the group’s founders and leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir arranged for future recruits to travel to Afghanistan to participate in the war against the Soviets. These would then return with useful military and terrorist experience (Acharya & Asi 2006; Koschade 2006). Furthermore, they likely helped JI to grow into a regional (not just national) terrorist network with a presence in several Southeast Asian countries (Abuza 2008). JI became the most violent terrorist outfit in the region, with the 2002 Bali bombings representing its bloodiest crime. However, after 9/11, much of the al-Qaeda support, including its important financial contributions, is believed to have been cut off, partly through the United States’ heavy counterterrorism pressure on al-Qaeda (Oak 2010; Cronin 2009; Read 2012). Add to this the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang, which has occasionally had operational and ideological connections with jihadist movements in Central Asia and beyond. Still, so far, the ETIM has been dominated by a local discourse over local grievances and aspirations. Thus, a striking feature of the Muslim insurgencies in East Asia is a relative reluctance among the insurgents themselves to be drawn and integrated into the global jihadist movement. With religiously motivated goals, and with military means, they have largely remained committed to their own local agendas and organisational structures. International jihadism, in the form that has unfolded in the Middle East (Syria and Iraq), South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), Africa (Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali) and Central Asia (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), always starts from local grievances. Jihadist entrepreneurs exploit local grievances and pull young generations of local rebels into a larger and global conflict narrative, where they can see themselves as belonging to a unified global front – quite similar to what the international communist movement did in the past. Sometimes, however, leaders with a mainly local agenda and a high degree of local legitimacy do not want to subsume their cause to the struggle for a global caliphate. In East Asia, most Muslim armed groups (several of which wish to maintain and revive an identity linked to former local Sultanates) seem to prefer to stand outside the global jihadist campaign. Hence, the Islamic rebels in the region, such as the MILF in the Philippines or the Patani insurgents in the deep south of Thailand, have chosen to distance themselves from international jihadist networks rather than internationalise their struggles.

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So far, this highly interesting feature of current and previous religious conflicts in East Asia has received surprisingly little attention by scholars. It deserves a more central role in future studies on the topic. One might explore the circumstances under which religiously defined local armed conflicts are more or less likely to get pulled into or avoid trans-jihadi- sation. Strategic considerations could be relevant here. For example, the leaders of the Patani insurgent movement might have hesitated to cloak their cause in global jihadist garb because doing so could harm their goal of achieving some form of self-determination for provinces in southern Thailand. Doing so could undermine the legitimacy of the movement in the eyes of the local population and raise even bigger obstacles in the way of a potential negotiated solution to the conflict. While this is mere speculation, interesting parallels can be drawn to Indonesia and the case of JI: some radical Indonesian groups, formerly loyal to JI, began to distance themselves from the group after the 2002 Bali bombings (which resulted in over 500 casualties, including 200 deaths), in protest against the loss of innocent Muslim lives. Another reason for withdrawing their support was, allegedly, that they thought it disadvantageous to be associated with a high-profile group that had attracted so much domestic and international attention (Oak 2010). The other leg of this argument, supported by Kreutz in this volume, concerns the relative lack of internationalisation on the government side: those governments involved in fighting religiously motivated insurgents on their territories have received or sought fairly little support from external actors in their struggles. The obvious exception here is the Philippines, which has had support from the United States in its fight against the ASG. Otherwise, relatively few external actors have supported East Asian governments’ efforts to resolve religious conflicts by force. For example, international operations such as drone and air strikes, ‘boots on the ground’, and so on are seen in other parts of Asia, the Middle East and Africa to combat militant groups, but have not been present in East Asia. In relation to the absence or weakness of local insurgents’ bonds to, for example, the international jihadist community, there might be an important dynamic at work here. One could reasonably suggest that the lack of external intervention on the side of governments has hindered the rise of global jihadism in East Asia, because external interventions can provoke further escalations and play into the

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narratives of jihadist rhetoric. It could, reasonably, also be the other way around: since religiously motivated armed movements have remained localised, external actors (e.g. the United States and its allies) have had weaker incentives to get involved than they have had in other parts of the world, where conflicts threaten to spiral out of control and into areas of direct national interest. Although the direction of this correlation remains to be teased out, it is nevertheless an important feature of the East Asian region that the military campaigns both by governments and by rebels have been internationalised to a low degree. The second component of my explanation complements the first and is particularly relevant to Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore: it has to do with the state capacity of these East Asian states. Whereas my first component seeks to explain behaviour by both a rebel side (the decision not to be wired to international jihadist campaigns) and the government side (the relative absence of external support or intervention), the second is more exclusively tied to the government side. More precisely, harshly repressive measures on the side of the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean governments, including the strategy and tactics of their security services, can account for why the religiously defined conflicts have not spread beyond national boundaries, and why provocations and incidents have not escalated into full-scale civil wars in these countries. It is also important to recognise the repressive nature of the East Asian Peace (see Kristine Eck in this volume), which has helped to reduce militarised conflict, but has exacerbated other negative effects such as respect for human rights and personal integrity. The fact that Indonesia has been effective in at least downgrading jihadist movements should be seen from its historical perspective. Islamists have taken up arms against the Indonesian government in the past and even declared an Islamic state (the Islamic State of Indonesia or Negara Islam Indonesia) in West Java, in 1949. This took place in the form of a violent uprising by the Islamist group Darul Islam in the years 1953 and 1959–62, when the Islamists actively repressed and basically eliminated the communist movement on Java. Darul Islam was initially formed to fight Dutch colonial rule, but later challenged the new Indonesian Republic when it ignored the Islamists’ demands (Matesan 2014). The Islamic State of Indonesia offered a parallel state structure and the Darul Islam movement spread to other parts of the

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country. However, as the Indonesian government gained popular legitimacy throughout the country, it signalled the beginning of the end for Darul Islam. The central government was able to reach agreements with regional Islamist leaders and offer amnesty and other incentives to individual fighters, which successfully swayed them into deserting the rebel movement. After a period of gradual weakening, Darul Islam laid down its arms when its leader was captured in 1962. The Indonesian government also effectively dealt with more current challenges from religious extremist groups. JI, partly a late offshoot of the Darul Islam movement, was formally created in 1993 and, over the course of a decade or more, grew into Southeast Asia’s largest and most violent Islamist terrorist network. After the Bali bombings in 2002, Indonesian security agencies arrested hundreds of JI leaders. Even though a few cells in the network were able to carry out terrorist attacks during a couple of years after the government crackdown began, JI has not perpetrated any major attacks since the 2009 assaults on the Marriott Hotel and Ritz Carlton Hotel in Jakarta. A reliance on means of police and security, rather than military options, and by using them within a legal framework, may have been important explanations for the effectiveness of the Indonesian counterterrorism operations. Thus, Indonesia’s emphasis has been on a legalistic rather than militaristic counterterrorism strategy, and it has also combined hard and soft approaches that largely respect the rule of law (Matesan 2014). There has also been a limited, but still existing, political space and openness for raising religious aspirations within the constitutional system, notably in Indonesia and Malaysia. This applies in particular to political Islam. A combination of security measures and relative political freedom to raise religiously motivated political ambitions seem to have been part of the reason for the meagre reception of calls to jihad in Indonesia and Malaysia. In Indonesia, the fact that the jihadist ideology has had such little success should also be attributed to the country’s long tradition of a spiritual interpretation of Islam (Islam Nusantara or Islam of the Archipelago), which emphasises non-violence, inclusiveness and tolerance of other religions. This ‘Indonesian Islam’, born as Islam blended with local traditions and beliefs, dates back more than half a millennium and is now regarded as one of the most progressive Islamic movements in the world. The Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest

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Muslim organization, with an estimated 50 million members, carries on this tradition. Being pro-democracy, pro-tolerance and anti-extremism, it has launched a global campaign against jihadism, directly challenging the ideology of actors such as the Islamic State, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab (Cochranenov 2015). The power of Islam Nusantara and social movements such as Nahdlatul Ulama should not be understated when explaining the relative failure of jihadism in Indonesia, nor when it comes to the crucial task of making sure it does not gain root in the future. It can create the kind of strong counter-narrative necessary to lead individuals off the path of radicalisation. However, the combination between harder and softer approaches has not been implemented all over the region. Notably, in the case of Xinjiang and particularly since May 2014, the Chinese authorities have repressed almost all types and manifestations of political Islam, and the state continues to monitor closely various types of expressions of Muslim and Uighur identities. Beijing’s ban on traditional Uighur gatherings (often used by Uighur communities to counter alcohol and drug abuse among their young), which in February 1997 led to Uighur demonstrations against religious repression and ethnic discrimination, illustrates that state repression of the Uighurs has been ongoing for quite some time (Millward 2004; Amnesty International UK 2003). Meanwhile, economic investments in infrastructure and mining industries are meant to weaken the incentives for locals to support the secessionist forces. So far, this remains to be seen. Whereas the Philippine and Thai governments have relied predomi- nately on a ‘hard’ military approach in combatting armed insurgencies on their territories, the use of government force in these countries is an important explanation for why these insurgencies have escalated over time. At the same time, these governments have displayed some openness to political dialogue and negotiated solutions within constitutional frameworks. Notably in the Philippines, the government and the MILF signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March 2014. The CAB provides for the establishment of an autonomous Bangsamoro political entity in Mindanao, and consolidates previous agreements, signed by the parties in 2012 and 2013, within the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. This was the culmination of a long and laborious peace process, which, since its

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beginning in the early 1990s, had contributed to substantially reduced violence levels (Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015). While it represented a historic breakthrough in one of the most protracted armed conflicts in the world, concerns have been raised over a stalled implementation process. Thailand also has seen attempts at negotiations, often facilitated by delegations from neighbouring Malaysia, to which many Patani locals feel more associated. Formal talks between the government of Thailand and a separatist group abbreviated BSN-C (Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate) were held in Kuala Lumpur in early 2013 and ended with the parties signing a consensus document on a ‘Peace Process Dialogue’. However, there have been no negotiations since – a development that has been attributed to longstanding political unrest in Bangkok. Upon grabbing power in 2014, the current Thai government, led by prime minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, has made arrangements for a re-initiation of the peace process. But the dominant form of interaction between the Thai authorities and the southern rebels has been military.

Lessons learned and challenges for the future: can East Asia retain its ‘religious peace’? The low degree of internationalisation of religious conflicts and the state capacities of East Asian countries are interrelated. The relative – and it should be underlined that it is relative and not complete – detachment from the global jihadist movements, might be a consequence of East Asian states’ ability to remain in control of military campaigns against religious militants. There has been no America-led drone warfare as in South Asia, the Middle East and parts of Africa. Although American support and training have been given, for example, to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the main military tasks have remained domestic in scope. Religiously charged conflicts in East Asia have not been connected to global jihadist movements. In addition to what has been outlined above, this can partly be explained by the absence of a regional power willing to sponsor such movements (although Libya under the Gadaffi regime functioned as a sponsor for some of the armed Islamist groups in the region). The relatively low levels of religious civil wars in East Asia during the last decades may not be taken for granted. The region’s ability to

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contain, prevent or attempt to resolve religiously defined conflicts is an important feat, but there is no guarantee that the future will follow the past trajectory. East Asia remains a fertile ground for jihadist entrepreneurs who seek to wire local secessionist campaigns to a global narrative and struggle. The terrorist attacks in Jakarta in January 2016 are an indication of that, and a significant number of radicals from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and other countries in the region have travelled to the Middle East to fight alongside Islamic extremist groups. Yet, the reach of the Islamic State in, for example, Indonesia should not be overstated. The movement might be supported by a few hundred across the archipelago, but it remains a minuscule presence compared to organisations such as the 50-million-strong Nahdlatul Ulama offering resistance in the form of vital counter-narratives. The assertiveness (and sometimes xenophobia) of nationalist Buddhist forces in Myanmar remains a security challenge that may provoke religiously motivated violence at higher levels. Buddhists and Christians have mobilized politically in several parts of East Asia, sometimes quite aggressively and with armed violence. Meanwhile, Indonesia remains a key country and the analysis here should not be interpreted as suggesting that Indonesia is currently free from the problem of radical Islamism. Some analysts argue that it might instead be on the rise due both to the actions of conservative Muslim politicians who use religion to mobilize support, and to the generous amount of room granted to the voices of intolerance by Indonesian media (Hamayotsu 2013). It is also worth pointing out, while not necessarily tied to radical Islam, that there has been a documented increase in prosecutions of religious minorities on charges of insulting Islam (Crouch 2012), as evident in the 2016 blasphemy trial in Indonesia against Jakarta’s governor. I have tried to explain the lack of religiously defined conflicts in East Asia up to the present. What the future holds, we cannot know. There are worrying indications of trends towards internationalisation of the so far mostly locally oriented Muslim uprisings in the region. The Islamic State, which may be gaining a foothold in the region, will be quick to capitalise on such a development. Moreover, many militants have travelled to Syria to participate in the Islamic State’s violent campaign to establish a global Islamic caliphate, and the return of some of these militants may be a concern from a security perspective. Still, if East Asia

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can capitalise on some of its achievements, then there are important lessons that can be shared with many other parts of the world. To sum up, in this chapter, I am not trying to explain the East Asian Peace with the lack of religious conflict. Such an argument would be tautological and circular. What I claim, however, is that in order to understand what the East Asian Peace really is, we need to take the relative absence, or low-intensity, of religious conflicts in the region into account. Whereas religious civil wars have become the most common form of civil wars in the world over the last decades, they have largely been missing from the East Asian region. I explain the region’s resilience against high-intensity religious conflicts in terms of a lack of internationalisation of religious conflicts as well as, for some of the East Asian countries, repressive security approaches towards religiously motivated militant groups and relative openness to political channels for dealing with religious contestations.

References Abuza, Z. (2003) Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ——— (2008) ‘The social organization of terror in Southeast Asia: The case of Jemaah Islamiyah’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert (eds) Countering the Financing of Terrorism. Oxon: Routledge. Acharya, A. & R. A. Asi (2006) ‘Indonesia’, in Derek S. Reveron and Jeffrey Stevenson Murer (eds), Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism. New York: Routledge. Amnesty International UK (2003) ‘People’s Republic of China: No Justice for the Victims of the 1997 Crackdown in Gulja (Yining)’, Press Release, 4 February. Basedau, M., J. Fox, J. H. Pierskalla, G. Strüver & J. Vüllers (2015) ‘Does Discrimination breed grievances – and do grievances breed violence? New evidence from an analysis of religious minorities in developing countries’, Conflict Management and Peace Science (July 21): 1–23. Cochraneov, J. (2015) ‘From Indonesia, a Muslim Challenge to the Ideology of the Islamic State’, New York Times (26 November). Cronin, A. K. (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Crouch, M. (2012) ‘Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law’, Asian Journal of Comparative Law 7(1): 1–46.

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Freedom House (2016) ‘Myanmar’, Freedom in the World 2016. Freedom House. Gershman, J. (2002) ‘Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?’ Foreign Affairs 81(4): 60–74. Gunaratna, R. (2005) ‘Ideology in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Lessons from combating Al Qaeda and Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia’, CSRC discussion paper 05/42. Hamayotsu, K. (2012) ‘Once a Muslim, Always a Muslim: The Politics of State Enforcement of Syariah in Contemporary Malaysia’, South East Asia Research 20(3): 399–421. ——— (2013) ‘The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 43(4): 658–77. Horowitz, M. C. (2009) ‘Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading’, International Security 34(2): 162–93. Isaacs, M. (2016) ‘Sacred violence or strategic faith? Disentangling the relationship between religion and violence in armed conflict’. Journal of Peace Research 53(2): 211–25. Kang, D. C. (2014) ‘Why was there no religious war in premodern East Asia?’ European Journal of International Relations 20(4): 965–86. Koschade, S. (2006) ‘A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26(9): 559–75. Liow, J. C. (2006) ‘Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics’, Policy Studies 24. Washington, D.C.: East West Center. Matesan, I. E. (2014) ‘The Dynamics of Violent Escalation and De-escalation: Explaining Change in Islamist Strategies in Egypt and Indonesia’, (Dissertations - ALL. Paper 60). Millward, J. (2004) ‘Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment’, Policy Studies 6. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center. Noorhaidi, H. (2006) Lashkar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia. New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Nordås, R. (2010) ‘Beliefs and Bloodshed: Understanding religion and intrastate conflict’, (PhD Thesis), Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim. Oak, G. S. (2010) ‘Jemaah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase: The Many Faces of a Terrorist Group’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33(11): 989–1018. Pinker, S. (2011) The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why violence has declined. New York: Viking.

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Pearce, S. (2005) ‘Religious Rage: A Quantitative Analysis of the Intensity of Armed Conflicts’, Terrorism and Political Violence 17(3): 333–52. Pettersson, T., & Wallensteen, P. (2015) ‘Armed conflicts, 1946–2014’, Journal of Peace Research 52(4): 536–50. Read, M. (2012) ‘Abu Sayyaf Crime, Ideology, Autonomy Movement? The Complex Evolution of a Militant Islamist Group in the Philippines’, Small Wars Journal 8(10). Santos, S. M. & O. A. Dinampo (2010) ‘Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists’, in Diana Rodriguez (ed.) Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Quezon City: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement. Svensson, I. (2007) ‘Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(6): 930–49 ——— (2012) Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars. Brisbane: Unversity of Queensland Press. Toft, M. D. (2006) ‘Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War’, Security Studies 15(1): 34–69. United Nations Development Programme (2013) ‘2012/2013 Philippine Human Development Report’, Human Development Network.

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Peace by Demographic Change

Henrik Urdal

Explanations for the staggering transition from violence to peace in East Asia have primarily centred around domestic economic growth and political stability, economic integration and interdependence, stabilizing alliances and China as a regional hegemon (Tønnesson et al. 2013; chapters in this volume by Goldsmith, Ross, Scott and Tønnesson). In this chapter, an argument is put forward that a benevolent demographic shift in East Asia, which to some extent stems from deliberate population policies, has supported economic and political development and contributed to a further deepening of the structural determinants of peace in the region. While earlier works addressing the political and economic consequences of demographic change have primarily focused on highly aggregate population properties like overall population growth, and often conclude that demographic factors have little impact, more nuanced works suggest that particular demographic developments affect both economic growth (Birdsall & Sinding 2001) and political violence (Goldstone 2010), though with variations depending on the context in which they take place. While often neglected in the discussion of the economic rise of the ‘Asian Tigers’, it is well-established that increasing demographic maturity in some of the key countries in the region (notably Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and, later, China and Vietnam) is one important driver of the strong economic development and growth in export-oriented industry. Each of these countries has a large, young and relatively well-educated labour force and each is producing fewer children; in combination, these demographic changes allow public investments to be shifted (Birdsall & Sinding 2001). Hence, one cannot fully understand the ‘peace by trade’ (Goldsmith in this volume) and

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the ‘peace by development’ (Tønnesson in this volume) theses if the extensive demographic changes in the region are ignored. The question posed in this chapter is, do recent demographic trends in East Asia support peace? Arguably, declining levels of violence in the region are associated with the two most pressing demographic challenges currently facing many East Asian1 countries: a young age structure and a high level of urban population growth. In particular, the discussion of the importance of age structure transitions addresses both the potential security challenges related to ‘youth bulges’, and the ‘demographic bo- nus’ argument pertaining to the potential economic boost provided by an increase in the labour force. A key intervening factor, human capital measured as age-specific education, is discussed. The chapter further addresses some more specific claims about potential security implications of sex-selective abortion and the resulting ‘excess males’ in some countries, and the eventual population ageing of the demographically maturing countries, both of which arguably lead to concerns over some countries’ ability to maintain welfare levels and military spending at the same time. However, while these emerging population developments will likely pose political and social challenges to countries in the region, it is less clear whether they may pose traditional security concerns. Rather, as the countries in East Asia continue to move toward lower fertility levels and smaller youth cohorts, we are likely to see a decline in conflict risk as countries move through the demographic transition. An ageing population may arguably become more peaceful not only as a result of structural or material processes, but also as a result of a changing social mood. The chapter will discuss the possible mechanisms underpinning such a ‘geriatric peace’ (Haas 2007). In this chapter, peace is primarily understood relatively narrowly as the absence of armed conflict or other forms of political violence. However, current patterns of demographic change are also likely to affect the deepening of peace beyond the mere absence of war (Bjarnegård & Kreutz in this volume). Fewer children (and in China the rise of one-child families), could make parents more risk averse and perhaps

1. East Asia refers here to Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, The Democratic Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam.

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even resentful of militarization. Ageing populations could have a similar effect, as increasing shares of the electorate passes retirement age. Urbanization and expansion in education expose people to new ideas and have the potential to increase tolerance. The present study is restricted in important ways. First, demographic factors are rarely, if ever, the sole causal determinant of political violence. Typically, the relevance of demography depends chiefly on social, economic, political and ecological factors. While some key contextual factors are addressed, an extensive discussion is beyond the scope of the current project. Second, while the importance of demographic factors in violent revolutions has been discussed (Goldstone 1991), recent studies of demographic change and political violence (e.g. Urdal 2006) suggest that demographic factors appear to be more relevant for understanding low-intensity armed conflict than large-scale civil and interstate wars. Reference is also primarily made to the onset of such conflicts. Third, the current data structure only allows for systematic comparison across countries over time. However, country-level averages may mask very significant internal demographic variation, geographically as well as within sub-populations. Differential population dynamics between ethnic groups may be considered a potential security concern in its own right (Toft 2007). Fourth, the current focus is on political violence, while certain forms of demographic change, particularly rapid urbanization and excess males, may equally well be associated with increased social violence and unrest. Melander (in this volume) shows that most East Asian countries score low on gender equality, which is reflected in the preference for sons and the resulting high levels of sex-selective abortion and excess males in countries like China, Vietnam and South Korea. As Bjarnegård (in this volume) notes, human security issues, some of which pertain to gendered relations, extend beyond armed conflict. Hudson and den Boer (2004) argue that skewed gender ratios may increase levels of interpersonal violence and prostitution. Finally, demographic factors are not exogenous to other aspects of development that also contribute to the East Asian Peace.

Demographic change, development, and political violence Into the early 1990s, the discussion about the effects of demographic change was strongly polarized. Population optimists, often building on the work of Ester Boserup (e.g. Boserup 1981), maintained that population

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growth is a driving force for social change and economic development. Population pessimists, relying mainly on Malthusian arguments, argued that population growth is a threat to economic development and to the environment. The dominating view, though, was held by population neutralists who maintained that social change is largely determined by factors other than population change. Population neutralism was a position was embraced by neoliberal economists, reformist economists and radical Marxists, all of whom agreed that social institutions play a larger role than population for determining how societies develop. Empirical support for neutralism was given by studies showing that population growth is neither good nor bad for growth in per capita income (see Bloom et al. 2003 for an overview). During the last 15 years, however, these positions have been become increasingly obsolete as researchers have shown that age structure is more important than population size for understanding population effects on social and economic development. Most importantly, population growth that is concentrated to young dependent (under 15) age groups leads to stagnation or declining per capita income, whereas a growing working- age population has positive effects on economic growth (Kelley & Schmidt 2001). Thus, both population pessimists’ and optimists’ views can be supported by data, depending on the distribution of population growth across age groups. Neutralism, on the other hand, has become less and less convincing as new studies have demonstrated strong effects of demographic change on an increasing number of macroeconomic as well as political variables (see Birdsall, Kelley & Sinding 2001). The realization that both rapid economic growth in East Asia and per capita income stagnation in most of Sub-Saharan Africa are intimately linked to divergent demographic trends has led to a new interest in the idea of demographic transition as a potential driving force for social change in general. A demographic transition occurs when a society characterized by high death rates and high birth rates experiences a long- term reduction in both death rates and birth rates. The first countries to experience a modern demographic transition were found in Europe, North America and English-speaking Oceania. Later demographic transitions have occurred around the world, and today most people live in countries where both death rates and birth rates are at historically low levels. The idea of the demographic transition as a potentially universal

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process was formulated in the mid-1940s by demographers at Princeton University (Davis 1945). It has been much criticized and debated, but it has turned out to be a persistent empirical phenomenon. What has not been generally understood until recent years is that the demographic transition brings about a characteristic transformation of the age structure (Chesnais 1992). Declining mortality rates lead, first, to an increase in the child population and, later, to an increase in the young adult population. As long as the fertility rate remains high, the increase in the young adult population leads to further increases in the child population. The first part of the demographic transition, thus, is characterized by a rejuvenation of the population, that is, a strong growth of child and young adult age groups. When the fertility rate drops, this pattern is reversed. Growth in the child population slows down and can even become negative. Instead, population growth becomes concentrated to the working age population. The youth dependency rate (the ratio of the population aged 0–14 relative to that aged 15–64) drops dramatically and economic growth tends to accelerate. Later, when the large cohorts born during the early phase of the transition grow older, the old-age dependency rate (ratio of 65+ to 15–64 population) begins to increase. Since the mid-1990s, an increasing number of scholars have analyzed how shifts in the age structure during the demographic transition affects different aspects of society (for overviews, see Birdsall, Kelley & Sinding 2001; Malmberg 2008). They show that the early phase of the transition, which is characterized by growing child dependency, tends to be characterized by high poverty rates, large current account deficits, a high incidence of child labour and a low level of capital accumulation. Societies with a rapidly expanding young adult population tend to be characterized by high rates of out-migration, rapid urbanization and, as discussed below, higher risks of internal armed conflict. As the old-age dependency rate increases, there tends to be a relative decline in the per capita income growth rate, a lower savings rate and often an expansion of the public sector. Age structure transitions and political violence Armed conflicts are fought almost exclusively by young men,2 and the civil war literature has repeatedly visited the issue of whether demo-

2. This does not imply, of course, that young men are inherently violent. The vast majority of young men who live in conflict-affected countries do not engage in armed conflict.

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graphic transitions, that generally result in large youth shares popularly referred to as ‘youth bulges’,3 increase the risk of violent rebellion. The claim that age structure matters for conflict is rooted in two traditions in conflict research. First, youth bulges arguably produce increasing grievances due to social, economic and political exclusion, and thus motives for young people to engage in violent conflict (Goldstone 1991, 2001; Fuller 1995; Huntington 1996; Cincotta et al. 2003; Urdal 2006; Sachs 2008). Such motives may be amplified by the presence of masculine honour ideology, which is extensive in many parts of the region (Melander in this volume). Paid employment is often associated with honour, and the lack of jobs may render young men unable to provide for a family and reduce their marriageability. Second, large youth cohorts provide opportunities for rebel organizations. Opportunity factors in armed conflict relate to structural conditions that facilitate a rebel group’s war against a government. These may be conditions that provide the rebel group with extraordinary financial means to fight, or they may be factors that reduce the cost of rebellion, such as unusually low recruitment costs for rebel soldiers. The availability of large youth cohorts may be a factor that reduces recruitment costs through the abundant supply of rebel labour with low opportunity cost (Collier 2000). Rebel recruits join to obtain a private good, weighing the potential gains against the expected costs represented by the risk of being killed or maimed. Relative gains are high either when outside options are poor or when a rebel group can offer greater rewards through loot-seeking activities (Gates 2002: 116). Relevant for both perspectives, large youth cohorts are more likely to experience higher unemployment rates and downward pressure on male wages (Easterlin 1987; Machunovich 2000). But there is clearly no deterministic relationship between age structure and political violence. Although the challenges with providing opportunities for burgeoning young populations can be considerable,

3. As I explain below, youth is defined as the part of a population belonging to the age groups from 15 to 24. Youth bulges generally refer to youthful populations, and are measured as the percentage youth (15–24) out of the adult population (age 15 and above). However, ‘youth bulge’ should be understood as a measure of the youthfulness of the population, there is no precise threshold value by which we may say that we are observing a ‘youth bulge’. A youth bulge, while used widely in the policy community, is also a bit of a misnomer since the term ‘bulge’ suggests that later cohorts decline. This is no requirement.

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youth bulges may also be an important asset. Two key contextual factors are discussed here: rapidly declining fertility leading to a rise in the support ratio, and expanding educational opportunities. Changing support ratios Recent studies in economic demography suggest that youth bulges may indeed be a blessing rather than a curse (Birdsall & Sinding 2001; Kelley & Schmidt 2001). Large increases in the younger working-age segments represent a tremendous potential for economic productivity for economies that are able to take advantage of such resources. In particular, large youth cohorts that precede significantly smaller cohorts, thus experiencing declining dependency ratios, represent a possibility for economic growth. This phenomenon is generally referred to as a ‘demographic dividend’. Economic growth is generally seen as a pacifying factor (Hegre & Sambanis 2006), and age- or structure-driven economic progress could thus in principle curb violent conflict. However, the realization of demographic opportunities is not guaranteed (Pool 2007). In countries where population growth in the very young cohorts (between ages 0 and 14) is high, the financial costs associated with health care and education for economically unproductive younger cohorts can be significant. As countries experience declining dependency ratios, allowing societies to shift investments towards activities that may yield more immediate economic returns, the conflict risk associated with youth bulges may arguably decline given the pacifying effect of economic development (Hegre & Sambanis 2006). Earlier studies have found youth bulges to be associated with an increased risk of armed conflict and other forms of political violence (Urdal 2006, 2008), with regime instability (Cincotta & Doces 2012; Weber 2013) and with increased state repression (Nordås & Davenport 2013). Malmberg & Urdal (2016) find that youth bulges are associated with an elevated risk of conflict in countries that are in the early phases of their demographic transitions, but not in societies where the dependency ratio is declining. This could indicate that youth bulges are more of a blessing than a curse in demographically maturing societies, as large youth cohorts become an economic asset. Expansion of educational opportunities Education is generally expected to increase the opportunity cost of rebel labour. This implies that rebel recruitment becomes more costly and

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rebellion less likely as the level of education in a society rises (Collier & Hoeffler 2004). The validity of this argument rests on the assumption that education increases an individual’s prospects of labour and thus income. While the relationship between education and income is generally applicable the effect is context-dependent, in the Middle East and North Africa it has proven to be relatively weak (Dhillon & Yousef 2009). In countries with large potential pools of recruits, increasing educational attainment can act to reduce this pool, thus youth bulges may primarily be associated with an elevated risk of conflict in low-education societies. Barakat & Urdal (2009) found that it is primarily in in low-education contexts that large youth bulges are associated with an increased the risk of armed conflict. Hence, the potential that youth bulges destabilize societies in East Asia and elsewhere depends chiefly on political decisions regarding the investment in the human capital, in the form of education, and the structure of the economy and labour market. While governance structures of many East Asian states may not be strongly tuned towards addressing local grievances, the region has largely succeeded in making use of their demographic advantage through prioritizing education and pursuing a labour-intensive industrial economic development. Ageing populations While observers generally agree that age structure transition from very young to more mature populations have beneficial economic, social and security implications, continued declines in mortality and fertility will eventually lead to drastically increasing dependency ratios as large cohorts of old retirees are replaced by much smaller working-age cohorts. This scenario has led to concerns that ageing may reduce the military capacity of the ‘greying great powers’, not so much as a result of reduced manpower (as the increasing sophistication of military technology compensates for fewer boots), but as a result of decreasing ability and willingness to fund large military budgets (Haas 2012; Jackson & Howe 2008; Sciubba 2011). The demographic shifts that are taking place in East Asia will extend the challenge of ageing populations to many of the countries that are currently the economic engines of the region. While there are ways in which the greying great powers may be able to partly compensate for ageing (Sciubba 2011), and thus defy some of the most alarmist predictions, the scale of the transition will be so extensive that it may arguably be considered a security issue.

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Urbanization Seeing urbanization largely as a translation of rural overpopulation into urban settings, many scholars associated with the ‘resource scarcity’ school have emphasized rapid urbanization as a potentially destabilizing force (e.g. Cincotta et al. 2003; Homer-Dixon 1999; Homer-Dixon & Blitt 1998; Kahl 2006). Gizewski & Homer-Dixon (1995) point to three broad risk factors. First, rural–urban migrants are likely to experience economic marginalization and deprivation relative to other city dwellers, increasing their awareness of their own situation and hence potential for political radicalization. Second, migrants may experience difficulties in adjusting socially and psychologically to life in the city. Traditional sources to social authority and control are weakened. Third, the urban environment facilitates high levels of social communication, including greater opportunities for collective political action. Focusing on the interaction of demographic and economic forces, Goldstone (2001) argues that when high levels of urbanization combines with underdevelopment – where the job market and the economy cannot keep up with urban population growth – violence and instability may arise. Economic shocks in the form of economic recession, or even stagnation, could increase differences in and importance of economic privileges between individuals and groups, thus raising levels of dissatisfaction and grievances to the extent that it could spur violent reactions (Brennan-Galvin 2002: 132–3; Gizewski & Homer-Dixon 1995). While measuring urban population growth in China is complicated by the household registration, or hukou, system which formally does not recognize many urban residents, the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) also provides numbers for the de facto urban population (UN 2015: 77). The UN Population Division has estimated that the urban population growth has been between four and five per cent annually since 1990, adding an estimated 210 million people to the Chinese urban population in the 2000–2010 period alone (UN 2015). Goldstone (2001: 50) argues that China has managed to avoid social conflict and violence largely because of its strong economic performance. Excess males While there is a natural, biological excess of males in all societies in the world that ranges roughly from 2–5 per cent greater than females in the youngest (0–4) cohorts, in some societies the level of excess

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males is higher due to a strong cultural preference for male offspring. Historically, the skewed gender balance has been attributed to female infanticide, a trend probably exacerbated by modern technology, notably ultrasound, that paved the way for sex-selective abortions. As Bjarnegård (in this volume) argues, while the direct victims of armed conflict are mostly men, infanticide among newborn girls represents another form of violence that affects girls more severely than boys. While sex ratios have been particularly skewed in South and East Asia, notably India and China, considerable variation exists within countries, including rural-urban differences. Hudson & den Boer (2004) have suggested that great surpluses of young males who are unable to marry and form a family, so-called ‘bare branches’ who typically are of low social status, are likely to lead to increased antisocial behaviour. These individuals are more than typically amenable to recruitment into criminal and politically dissenting organizations, and thus represent a potential security risk. One response to this risk is a strengthening of authoritarian countermeasures. More generally, research on gender relations and conflict suggests that states with greater levels of gender equality also have lower levels of violent conflict (Caprioli 2001; Melander 2005). While countries with relatively normal gender ratios of men and women can still have extensive gender inequalities, skewed gender ratios are in themselves indicative of gender inequality. As emphasized by Melander (in this volume), masculine honour ideology remains a force that could undermine peace between and within the states of East Asia, and a strongly skewed sex ratio could amplify this challenge.

Data The demographic data originate from the most authoritative population database, the 2012 UN World Population Prospects (UN 2013).4 East 4. It should be noted that the population data for Myanmar are particularly uncertain. No national census was taken between 1931 and 2014, and the UN Population Division has used standard procedures to arrive at historical estimates, that is, it has extrapolated data from countries assumed to be at a relatively comparable level of demographic development to establish a likely demographic trajectory for Myanmar. The UN’s estimate for the 2015 population (54 million) is reasonably close to the total population size in the 2014 Myanmar census (51 million), yet we cannot evaluate the accuracy of UN estimates for age structure and other demographic properties discussed in this chapter.

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Asia as defined here made up about a third of the total world population in the 1950–2000 period, but is projected to decline to less than a quarter of world population by 2050. Japan’s population is expected to start declining around 2025, while Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, China and Thailand are projected to experience population declines before mid-century (UN 2013). All countries in the region are expected to continue the path towards lower mortality, hence declining fertility is the primary cause for the slowing of population growth and eventual population decline. Only six out of the 17 countries in the region (Timor-Leste, Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia and Indonesia) currently (2010–2015) have fertility rates above ‘replacement level’, which is the level of fertility a population needs in order to sustain its size in the long run. In the discussion below, reference is made to several demographic properties. Youth bulges are measured as the percentage of the adult population (age 15 and above) that is between 15–24 years old. The measure excludes those aged 0–14 in the denominator, otherwise youth bulges in countries with high fertility will be underestimated because the large under-15 populations deflate the youth bulge measure. A country’s support ratio is defined as the number of people in the labour force (population aged 15–64) per 100 dependents (the population aged 0–14 and above the age of 64). Urbanization is defined as the percentage increase in the urban population, here expressed in five-year periods. Excess males are defined as the number of boys exceeding 100 per 100 girls in the 0–4 year age group. Old age dependency ratio is defined as the number of people aged 65 and above as a percentage of the labour force (those aged 15–64).

Demographic developments and the East Asian Peace Age structure transitions Figures 7.1 and 7.2 display the developments in youth bulges in East Asia since 1950 and until 2015, separated into ‘early-transition’ and ‘late-transition’ panels. While Japan’s transition started early, causing youth bulges to start declining in the 1960s, the remaining early starters were led by Singapore, Taiwan and the Korea Republic, followed by Thailand, DPR Korea, China and Brunei. With the exception of Japan, this group nevertheless experienced youth bulges of around 30 per

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cent up until around 1990. In the second panel, the decline in youth bulges started some 10–15 years later, and the decline has not yet been as marked as for the early-transition countries. While declining fertility already has and will continue to lead to smaller youth bulges within in this group, four countries – Timor-Leste, Lao PDR, Cambodia and the Philippines – still had youth bulges of 30 per cent or more in 2010. The youth population in Timor-Leste is estimated to have peaked in 2015 at 44 per cent of the total adult population, making it one of the most youthful in the world. The Philippines has had one of the slowest downward trajectories in the region, owing to their continued relatively high fertility. Consistent with the ‘demographic dividend’ argument raised above, demographic changes in the region have largely preceded, and developed in parallel with, economic progress. In 2015, several demographically mature countries in East Asia are at or near OECD median of 15 per cent youth, most notably the most economically developed nations, but also Thailand and China (Figure 7.3). However, youth bulges in both Timor-Leste and Lao PDR are well above the average for the least developed countries, while the Philippines is only slightly below this level of youth. Considering long-term trends and projections in Figure 7.4, youth bulges will have declined to 18 per cent in Vietnam. They will also be declining in Lao PDR, the Philippines and Cambodia over the next three decades, all falling to below 30 per cent by 2020 expected to reach levels between 17 per cent and 21 per cent in 2050. Youth bulges in Timor-Leste are expected to decline from the peak of 44 per cent in 2015 to just above 30 per cent in 2050. Urdal (2006) initially estimated that a one percentage point increase in a youth bulge corresponds to a four per cent increase in the risk of armed conflict, when all other factors are equal. However, when taking into account the developments in dependency ratios, Malmberg & Urdal (2016) discovered that the risk associated with youth bulges differed significantly depending on whether youth dependency ratios were increasing or decreasing. Only in countries where the growth in the child population (0–14 years) was very strong, tying up more of societies’ financial resources in education and health care for children, were youth bulges associated with an increased conflict risk. In more demographically mature countries, where fertility has declined substan-

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tially and financial resources may thus be shifted to more economically productive sectors, large youth cohorts were not statistically associated with conflict. This suggests that youth bulges become less of a conflict risk factor as societies provide increasing economic opportunities.

Figure 7.1: East Asian youth bulges 1950–2015: Early-transition countries

35 Brunei 30 China DPR Korea 25 Japan 20 R. of Korea 15 Singapore Taiwan 10 Thailand 5

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

Figure 7.2: East Asian youth bulges 1950–2015: Late-transition countries 45

40 Cambodia 35 Indonesia Lao PDR 30 Malaysia 25 Mongolia 20 Myanmar

15 Philippines Timor-Leste 10 Vietnam 5

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

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Figure 7.5 displays the interaction in the Republic of Korea between youth bulges and the support ratio, the latter measuring the working population vs. dependents. While Korean youth bulges stayed above 30 per cent until 1985, the support ratio started to increase strongly from around 1970 contributing extensively to the country’s economic ‘miracle’ (Williamson 2001).

Figure 7.3: East Asian youth bulges 2015

40 30 20 10 0

China Brunei Taiwan Japan Lao PDR Malaysia Vietnam Thailand Cambodia MongoliaIndonesiaMyanmar DPR KoreaSingapore Timor-Leste Philippines Rep. of Korea More dev. regions Least dev. countries

Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

Figure 7.4: East Asian youth bulges 1950–2050 (projection): Selected countries 45

40 China 35 Indonesia 30 Japan 25 Lao PDR Philippines 20 Rep. of Korea 15 Timor-Leste 10 Vietnam 5

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

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The same increase in support ratios in the 1970s and 1980s can be observed across the ‘early transition’ countries (Figure 7.6), and this increase contributed to the strong economic growth in the region. However, for most of these countries, the support ratio has already peaked, and will decline significantly over the next decades as a result of low fertility and

Figure 7.5: Youth bulges and support ratio: Republic of Korea 1950–2015 40 300

30 200

20 Youth bulges Support ratio 100 10

0 0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

Figure 7.6: East Asian support ratios 1950–2050: Early-transition countries 300

250 Brunei China 200 Japan Rep. of Korea 150 Singapore Taiwan 100 Thailand

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

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ageing populations. The ‘late transition countries’ (Figure 7.7) are 15–20 years behind, with most of them experiencing an acceleration in support ratio only after 1985 and expected to peak between 2025 and 2050.

Figure 7.7: East Asian support ratios 1950–2050: Late-transition countries

300 Cambodia 250 Indonesia Lao PDR 200 Malaysia Mongolia 150 Myanmar Philippines 100 Timor-Leste Vietnam 50

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

Figure 7.8: Completed secondary education (age 20–24) in East Asia 1970–2015 1.0

China Mongolia 0.8 Rep. of Korea Japan Thailand 0.6 Cambodia Vietnam 0.4 Malaysia Singapore Philippines 0.2 Indonesia

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Lutz et al. (2007) using data from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).

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The decline in youth bulges and increase in support ratios in many East Asian countries since the 1970s is broadly consistent with the peaceful development in the region. In particular the early-transition countries have been peaceful, with the partial exception of Thailand, which has experienced regional conflict (Patani) since the early 2000s. In the late- transition group, the decline of political violence in Indonesia is consistent with the demographic maturing of the country. Myanmar’s decline in youth bulges only started to accelerate after 2000, but to date there is no apparent decline in violence in following this demographic transition. The Philippines, which has also experienced multiple armed conflicts over the past decades, has amongst the most slowly maturing populations in the region and is expected to experience continued relatively high youth bulges. However, the two countries with the largest youth bulges, Lao PDR and Timor-Leste, have not experienced recent armed conflict (intra-military fighting in Timor-Leste during 2006–08 did not reach 25 battle deaths per year, our benchmark for ‘armed conflict’). Education As discussed above, higher educational levels among youth are associated with a reduction in the effect of youth bulges on armed conflict. Generated from IIASA data (Lutz et al. 2007), Figure 7.8 displays the level of secondary education (of citizens aged 20–24) among the countries in the region. Again, the education data are largely consistent the pacification narrative, with China, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia making the greatest progress in education rates after 1970. While the Philippines continues to experience demographically-related challenges, its education levels are high and rising. Vietnam and Cambodia have the lowest education levels among the countries in the region, with only about half of the population aged 20–24 having completed secondary education in 2015, however, all countries included here now have education levels above that which Barakat & Urdal (2009) found to be associated with a particularly high risk in the context of youth bulges (below 40 per cent). Further, it is relevant to note that the gender gap in secondary education, which is generally associated with increased conflict risk (Melander 2005), has declined substantially; only Cambodia now has a significantly higher share of boys than girls in secondary education (17.6 per cent more boys in 2015). Figure 7.9 illustrates these gender dispari- ties, including a forecast to 2050 that shows further convergence.

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An East Asian geriatric peace? The maturing of East Asian populations brings about extensive ageing and increasing dependency ratios. In Europe and the United States, ageing populations have been addressed as a potential security challenge as they may affect a country’s ability and willingness to fund an extensive military capacity (Haas 2007; Sciubba 2011: 39). Arguably, the ageing that is happening more or less in parallel in all of the economically and military dominant states in East Asia may contribute to a reduction in conflict potential, or what Haas (2007) calls an East Asian geriatric peace. There are at least four distinguishable explanations for such development; two address material or structural changes and two capture possible developments in the social mood spurred by demographic changes. First, the demographic transitions in East Asia reduce the number of youth who could be mobilized for military service. In China, which historically has relied on having large armed forces, the number of women and men aged 20–29 is estimated to decline from 241 million in 2015 to 144 million in 2050, a reduction of 40 per cent. In South Korea, the decline in this age group will be 27 per cent, and in Japan 24 per cent. A demographic shortfall of recruits will not necessarily weaken the military capabilities of countries, however, as military prow- ess is expected to come to depend increasingly on superior technology, strong alliances and military efficiency (Sciubba 2001: 45). A particular demographic property of interest has been the increasing proportion of only-children in China, and whether this will affect the quality of recruits to the People’s Liberation Army. Only-children comprised 21 per cent of the PLA in 1996, and reached more than 50 per cent in 2006 (Li 2007: 27–31). However, there seems to be no difference in personality and general service achievement between only-child soldiers and non- only-child soldiers, while in technological training only-child soldiers actually outperform non-only-child soldiers (ibid.). Second, an aspect that is likely to be of greater significance for military capabilities in East Asia is the expected slowdown in economic growth combined with increased costs of elder care (Haas 2012; Sciubba 2011). As shown in Figure 7.6 above, the increase in the population above 64 years will cause the support ratio to decline from a peak of around 250 workers per 100 dependents to fewer than 150 for most demographically mature countries in East Asia by 2050. The population of retirees will

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make up more than a third of the total adult population. Sciubba (ibid. 57) argues that ‘military funding is perhaps the biggest challenge of ageing, as increasing proportions of elderly dependents drain financial resources that could be used for defence spending.’ According to Haas (2012: 55), Japan has already had to cut military spending in order to finance elder care, despite considerable security concerns. China is unlikely to be able to outgrow the ageing problem, and will get old before it gets rich (ibid. 57) even if the country manages to sustain economic growth at recent rates. Clearly, China’s generally lower levels of social benefits compared to most highly industrialized countries also lower expectations about expansion. Combined with a high level of social control and political repression, popular pressure for costly reforms is lower for China than for many other great powers. On the other hand China’s elderly population has relatively little savings and a weakening family structure, so many will rely heavily on social security pensions after retirement (ibid.). According to Haas, three quarters of all Chinese workers are without any pension coverage. While China established the National Social Security Fund in 2000 to finance the ‘unfunded pension liabilities that have been accumulated by state-owned enterprises’ (ibid.) the shortfall is already significant and any additional expansions in the pension arrangements will worsen fiscal constraints. A third possible mechanism linking ageing to the opportunity for peace is that societies with fewer children value each child even more, resulting in states being less able or willing to risk casualties of war (Sciubba 2011: 57). Luttwak (1994) argues that such societies will be less willing to send their children off to war, reducing their proneness to engage in war. It is unclear, however, whether the value of children is so elastic. Additionally, increasingly high-tech wars and declining casualty rates may reduce the overall concern. Fourth, older populations could cause changes in social mood that will result in a more peaceful development. Jackson & Howe (2008: 116) claim that ageing populations could be less willing to pursue more long-term, but possibly more collectively risky policies as people become more risk averse at higher ages. At the same time, older people’s ability to process new information and update their views also declines with age, potentially providing a reservoir for nationalist and exclusionary ideas. While increasing old age populations may not necessarily

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cause a decline in nationalist sentiment, less willingness to take risks could cause a greater move toward isolationist policies. To the extent that generational differences affect political outcomes and priorities, demographic shifts can also lead to political shifts. In Japan, the proportion of the electorate aged 65 and above will increase from 31 per cent in 2015 to 42.6 per cent in 2050. In South Korea, the increase is from 15.6 per cent to 40.4 per cent. In contrast, in Timor-Leste the proportion of elders will decline from 6.9 per cent today to 5.2 per cent in 2050. Implications for conflict In a recent conflict prediction model (Hegre et al. 2013) youth bulges and education levels were key predictors, along with other demographic factors like infant mortality and population size, and conflict history of the country and neighbourhood (measuring the level of conflict in neighbouring countries). The model generally predicts a decline in armed conflict worldwide. Yet the actual observed conflict level in East Asia was lower than the prediction for 2009, which suggests that there are pacifying factors in the region that are not well accounted for by the model. These could include regime stability, quality of government, level of social control, or the presence of a stable regional hegemon, all factors for which forecasts are not available and thus excluded from the model. The long-term prediction is one of declining conflict risk in East Asia – both compared to the estimated current risk and, in the longer run, also compared to the current observed level of conflict, which from 2013– 2016 was lower than the prediction expected. For 2017, three East Asian countries are among those with the highest conflict risk predictions, with the Philippines ranked as having the third highest risk globally (about 80 per cent of simulations forecast conflict), Myanmar fourth (74 per cent) and Thailand fifth (68 per cent). By 2050, however, the risk is predicted to decline to almost half in the Philippines and Myanmar, and to almost a third in Thailand. Conflict risk in China is expected to increase somewhat, from 10 per cent in 2017 to 19 per cent in 2050, mainly due to its large population as the model assumes a certain per capita conflict risk. While it seems reasonable to expect that the risk of internal conflict rises in countries with large, heterogeneous populations and large territories, it is by no means certain that these factors will be relevant in China in the future. Indonesia is the country in the region with the highest predicted conflict risk among those countries that did not have armed conflict in

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2009. Though the conflict risk is predicted to decline overall in East Asia, its relative share of the world’s conflicts is expected to increase as a result of sharper conflict risk declines in other world regions. A limitation of

Figure 7.9: Gender parity in secondary education (age 20–24) in East Asia 1970–2050 1.2

China 1.0 Mongolia Rep. of Korea 0.8 Japan Thailand 0.6 Cambodia Vietnam 0.4 Malaysia

0.2 Singapore Philippines 0 Indonesia

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Source: Lutz et al. (2007).

Figure 7.10: Urban population five-year growth rates 1990–2050: Early-transition countries 30

25 China 20 DPR Korea 15 Japan 10 Mongolia Rep. of Korea 5 Taiwan 0

-5

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Source: UN (2015) World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision.

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these models is that they do not take into account the implications of the demographic transition and the prospects for a demographic dividend from declining youth dependency ratios.

Figure 7.11: Urban population five-year growth rates 1990–2050: Late-transition countries

40 Mongolia Cambodia 30 Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia 20 Myanmar Philippines 10 Timor-Leste Vietnam

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Source: UN (2015) World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision.

Figure 7.12: Excess males aged 0–4 in selected East Asian countries 1970–2030

14 Brunei China

10 Northern Europe Taiwan Rep. of Korea 6 Vietnam

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 Source: UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

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Are urbanization and gender imbalance challenges to the East Asian Peace? Two other demographic developments feature prominently in the literature and are important, in East Asia; rapid urbanization and gender imbalances due to sex selective abortion. To what extent do these factors pose challenges to the East Asian Peace? Goldstone expresses concern about China’s ability to achieve economic growth that can support the demands of its growing urban population, which for some time has been among the highest in the world due to a ‘saturated agricultural sector’ (2001: 98). The level of urbanization varies significantly between countries in East Asia and, as displayed in Figures 7.10 (early-transition countries) and 7.11 (late-transition countries), urban population growth has declined significantly in all countries, though some countries (notably Lao PDR and Timor-Leste) will continue to experience moderate to high urban population growth rates in the coming decades. Despite ominous warnings about the security risk caused by strong and rapid urbanization, there is little evidence to suggest that this represents a challenge to the East Asian Peace. In two earlier studies, I found no statistical support for an association between strong urban population growth and armed conflict (Urdal 2005; 2008); similarly, a recent study of 55 major cities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa found no systematic relationship between urban population growth and ‘urban social disorder’, low-intensity violent and non-violent events, even in the context of economic shocks (Buhaug & Urdal 2013). While rapid urbanization cannot be assessed in isolation from economic and political factors, the general concern over urbanization as a potential source of social instability may be exaggerated. A concern over the possible security implications of a skewed gender distribution has arisen primarily as a result of high observed male offspring preference and sex selective abortion in India and China (Hudson & den Boer 2004). Figure 7.12 displays the gender difference in the 0–4 year old cohorts for the East Asian countries that are most affected by a skewed gender distribution. The strong increase in males in the youngest age cohorts is visible from the mid-1990s, first in the Republic of Korea. Similar patterns are later observed in Brunei, Taiwan, China, and most recently Vietnam. While gender skewedness is trending back somewhat, the divergence is expected to continue to be higher than natural gender

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differentials. And for China, which has the strongest differentials, recent imbalances will translate into almost 25 million excess men aged 20–39 years in 2030. Whether gender skewedness could translate into a greater risk of political violence is unclear. While Urdal (2008) found some support for excess males increasing the risk of violence in India, several of the East Asian countries experiencing major excess male challenges are arguably stronger and more capable of containing violence. As a demographic phenomenon, however, the changes are exceptionally powerful, suggesting that the social consequences could be extensive, potentially leading to negative externalities like increasing levels of social violence, prostitution and cross-border trading of women (Hudson & den Boer 2004).

References Auvinen, J. (1997) ‘Political Conflict in Less Developed Countries 1981–89’, Journal of Peace Research 34(2): 177–95. Barakat, B. & H. Urdal (2009) ‘Breaking the Waves? Does Education Mediate the Relationship between Youth Bulges and Political Violence?’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5114. Birdsall, N. & S. Sinding (2001) ‘How and Why Population Matters: New Findings, New Issues’, in N. Birdsall, A. C. Kelley and S. W. Sinding (eds) Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1–23. Bloom, D. E., D. Canning & J, Sevilla (2003) The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Boserup, E. (1981) Population and Technological Change: A Study of Long-Term Trends. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buhaug H. & H. Urdal (2013) ‘An Urbanization Bomb? Population Growth and Social Disorder in Cities’, Global Environmental Change 23(1): 1–10. Caprioli, M. (2000) ‘Gendered Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 37(1): 51–68. Cincotta, R. P. & J. Doces (2012) ‘The Age-Structural Maturity Thesis: The Impact of the Youth Bulge on the Advent and Stability of Liberal Democracy’, in J. A. Goldstone, E. P. Kaufmann and M. D. Toft (eds) Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 98–116. Cincotta, R. P., R. Engelman & D. Anastasion (2003) The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War. Washington, DC: Population Action International.

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Collier, P. (2000) ‘Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective’. in M. Berdal and D. M. Malone (eds) Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder: Lynne Rienner: 91–111. Collier, P. & A. Hoeffler (2004) ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’. Oxford Economic Papers 56: 563–95. Dhillon, N. & T. Yousef, eds (2009) Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press. Easterlin, R. A. (1987) ‘Easterlin Hypothesis’, in J. Eatwell, M. Millgate and P. Newman (eds) The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics Vol 2. New York: Stockton, 1–4. Fearon, J. D. & D. D. Laitin (2003) ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90. Gizewski, P. & T. F. Homer-Dixon (1995) ‘Urban Growth and Violence: Will the Future Resemble the Past?’ Occasional Paper, Project on Environment, Population and Security. Washington D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science and the University of Toronto. http://www.pop- line.org/node/296914. Goldstone, J. A. (1991) Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ——— (2001) ‘Demography, Environment, and Security’, in P. F. Diehl and N. P. Gleditsch (eds) Environmental Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview, 84–108. ——— (2010) ‘The New Population Bomb: Four Population Megatrends that Will Shape the Global Future’, Foreign Affairs 89: 31–43. Haas, M. L. (2007) ‘A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations’, International Security 32(1): 112–47. ——— (2012) ‘America’s Golden Years? U.S. Security in an Aging World’, in J. A. Goldstone, E. P. Kaufmann and M. D. Toft (eds) Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 49–62. Hegre, H., J. Karlsen, H. Nygård, H. Strand & H. Urdal (2013) ‘Predicting Armed Conflict, 2011–2050’, International Studies Quarterly 57(2): 250– 70. Hegre, H. & N. Sambanis (2006) ‘Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4): 508–36. Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1999) Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, NJ & Oxford: Princeton University Press. Homer-Dixon, T. F. & J. Blitt (1998) Ecoviolence: Links among Environment, Population and Security. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Hudson, V. M. & A. M. den Boer (2004) Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Isaacs, M. (2016) ‘Faith in Contention: Explaining the Salience of Religion in Ethnic Conflict’, Comparative Political Studies, June, pp. 1–32 Jackson, R. & N. Howe (2008) The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st century. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies. Kahl, C. H. (2006) States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kelley, A. C. & R. M. Schmidt (2001) ‘Economic and Demographic Change: A Synthesis of Models, Findings, and Perspectives’, in N. Birdsall, A. C. Kelley and S. W. Sinding (eds) Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World, eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 67–105. Li, X. (2007) ‘The Impact of Social Changes on the PLA’, in. D. M. Finkelstein and K. Gunness (eds) Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe. Luttwak, E. N. (1994) ‘Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids.’ Foreign Affairs 73(4): 23–28. Lutz, W., A. Goujon, S. K.C. & W. Sanderson (2007) Reconstruction of Population by Age, Sex and Level of Educational Attainment for 120 Countries 1970–2000. Laxenburg: IIASA. Machunovich, D. J. (2000) ‘Relative Cohort Size: Source of a Unifying Theory of Global Fertility Transition?’ Population and Development Review 26(2): 235–61. Malmberg, B. (2007) ‘Global Population Ageing, Migration and European External Policies: Geopolitical implications of the demographic transition’, in Various Studies on the Policy Implications of Demographic Change in National and Community Policies. Stockholm: Institute for Futures Studies. Malmberg, B. & H. Urdal (2016) ‘Ungdomspucklar och krig’, [Youth Bulges and War] Riksbankens Jubileumsfonds Årbok 2016. Stockholm: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, 67–90. Melander, E. (2005) ‘Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly 49(4): 695–714. Nordås, R. & C. Davenport (2013) ‘Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression’, American Journal of Political Science 57(4): 926–40. Sciubba, J. D. (2011) The Future Faces of War: Population and National Security. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Toft, M. D. (2007) ‘Population Shifts and Civil War: A Test of Power Transition Theory’, International Interactions 33(3): 243–69.

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Tønnesson, S., E. Melander, E. Bjarnegård, I. Svensson & S. Schaftenaar (2013) ‘The Fragile Peace in East and South East Asia’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm: SIPRI. United Nations (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Data available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/, accessed 12 December 2016. ——— (2015) World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. ST/ESA/ SER.A/366. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/ FinalReport/WUP2014-Report.pdf. Data available at http://esa.un.org/ unpd/wup/, accessed 12 December 2016. Urdal, H. (2005) ‘People vs. Malthus: Population pressure, environmental degradation and armed conflict revisited’, Journal of Peace Research 42(4): 417–34. ——— (2006) ‘A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence’, International Studies Quarterly 50(3): 607–30. ——— (2008) ‘Population, Resources and Violent Conflict: A Sub-National Study of India, 1956–2002’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(4): 590–617. Weber, H. (2013) ‘Demography and Democracy: The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Democratic Stability in the World’, Democratization 20(2): 335–57. Williamson, J. G. (2001) ‘Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Inequality’, in N. Birdsall, A. C. Kelley and S. W. Sinding (eds) Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press, 106–36.

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The Repressive Peace

Kristine Eck

This book’s point of departure is the stylized fact that East Asia has seen a disproportionate decline in the severity of intrastate armed conflict, compared with the rest of the world. This chapter explores the question of whether this decline may in part be the result of states successfully institutionalizing repressive strategies that inhibit dissent. I suggest that many East Asian states are able to police dissent effectively through the restriction of civil liberties and, in so doing, obstruct nascent opposition movements and that these institutional innovations explain at least a part of the domestic East Asian peace. Because they are built on the violation of citizens’ human rights, however, the peace they create is a fragile one. I thus speak to both of the main questions addressed in this book: how can the East Asian Peace be explained and how deep is it? Armed conflict does not appear out of the blue. It is preceded by periods of contentious politics, including group-level demands for reforms to the status quo that typically are publicly articulated prior to the outbreak of open hostilities. Why is dissent not managed peaceably before escalating to armed violence? Previous research has generally focused on answers that relate to institutional pathologies. Robust democracies contain channels for dissent that allow a regime’s opponents a pathway to articulate desires for reform and to affect policymaking through elections, referenda, petitions and other two-way channels of influence. Institutional checks and balances ensure responsiveness to the populace, and universal suffrage secures their enfranchisement. Some East Asian states, notably Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have consolidated such systems and manage group-level conflict through these mechanisms.1

1. It should be noted, however, that even democracies employ repression when faced with violent challengers (Conrad & Moore 2010; Davenport 1995).

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Regimes that do not offer channels for peaceable conflict resolution, however, must adopt other strategies for managing dissent. While institutionally inconsistent and authoritarian regimes can co-opt opponents and buy off dissent to a certain degree, they virtually always do so in conjunction with the deployment of some form of repression.2 Repression can mean many things. One of the primary distinctions is whether repression involves violence by state agents or not. This dichotomy is found in international human rights law: non-derogable rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – the prohibi- tions of murder, torture and slavery – by definition cannot be breached, while other human rights are derogable under certain conditions such as a state of emergency.3 The rights to life and bodily integrity have been the primary focus of political science research because they are considered to be fundamental. They are operationally defined as ‘physical integrity rights’, violations of which include acts like extrajudicial killings, disap- pearances, torture and political imprisonment. Studies of violent repression are in agreement that armed conflict is positively correlated with infringements of physical integrity rights by state agents (Conrad & Moore 2010; Davenport 2007; Davenport & Loyle 2012; Hill & Jones 2014), but are in disagreement about the effect of repression on the outbreak of armed conflict (Carey 2006; Gurr 1970; Gurr & Moore 1997; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Muller 1985; Ritter & Conrad n.d.; Shellman 2006; Sullivan 2014). Little systematic work has examined the effects of other, non-violent forms of repression on armed conflict,4 due in large part to a paucity of useful systematic cross-national data on violations of civil liberties. Thus we do not know whether states are able to substitute non-violent forms of repression for violent forms and whether the former might facilitate more efficient regimes of coercion and control. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it maps the repertoires of repression that are used in East Asia, making a primary distinction

2. See Davenport & Armstrong (2004) on the relationship between democracy and repression. 3. The freedoms of thought, conscience and religion, and certain conditions under which individuals cannot be imprisoned, are also non-derogable under the Inter national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 4. Some notable exceptions include Davenport (1995) and Rasler (1996).

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between violations of physical integrity rights (violent repression) and violations of civil liberties (non-violent repression). It then develops the argument that substituting non-violent for violent forms of repression is both more effective and obscures our understanding of the peacefulness of the region. It concludes with a discussion about the implications of current repressive practices for the East Asian Peace.

Repertoires of repression in East Asia While the decline of armed conflict in East Asia has been studied extensively (cf. Bjarnegård & Kreutz in this volume) there is little research that examines other forms of political violence, particularly state repression. Because there is the possibility that states may not bundle their use of violent and non-violent repression, looking at them in turn may provide insights into how East Asian states use repertoires of repression. The first question to consider is whether two-sided violence between warring parties (armed conflict) has been transformed into one-sided violence by the state against its population. Using the most comprehensive estimates of respect for physical integrity rights that currently exist, we can map respect for physical integrity rights in East Asia since the end of WWII.5 Figure 8.1 shows the level of respect for physical integrity rights, where higher values indicate greater respect for human rights. The figure suggests that there is not a substitution effect between armed conflict and violent repression in the regional aggregate. In fact, physical integrity rights have been increasingly respected in East Asia: the mean has increased from -0.5 in the 1950s to over 0.5 in 2014. This is a considerable improvement, though East Asia still lags somewhat behind the global average. A growing body of literature shows that improvements in respect for physical integrity rights may be due in part to the rising centrality of international law, which suggests in turn that the ratification of treaties like the UN Convention on Torture does lead to decreases in violations of physical integrity rights (Fariss 2014), though this may be conditioned on domestic institutions (Conrad & Ritter 2013; Lupu

5. These data come from Fariss (2014), whose latent variable model of repression attempts to estimate the ‘true’ level of repression by incorporating information from multiple sources and then quantifying the uncertainty of each estimate, conditional on the availability of each variable included in the model.

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Figure 8.1: Respect for physical integrity rights in East Asia, 1949–2013

Global average 1.0

0.5 More respect More 0.0

-0.5 Mean physical integrity Mean physical East Asian average -1.0 abuse More

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Eck and Fariss (2015).

2013, 2015).6 These findings dovetail with Scott’s argument (in this volume) that international law has contributed to declining violence in the East Asia region. Figure 8.2 breaks down these trends for each of the countries in the region, ranked in order from those with the highest to the lowest respect for physical integrity rights (averaged over the period). The dots are the point estimates and the lines represent 95% confidence intervals. A number of interesting patterns are discernable. First, many of the countries that show the greatest respect for physical integrity rights are those that have transitioned to consolidated liberal democracies, like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Note, however, that a number of countries associated with strongly restrictive policies towards political opposition also respect physical integrity rights. Brunei, for example, has the second-highest level of respect for human rights in the region. Human rights as a whole in the region have improved and this improvement is driven by a reduction in violent forms of individual repression, that is, physical integrity violations. But the high rankings of Brunei

6. Note that the findings on international law and repression are contested, and are generally considered to be poorer predictors of physical integrity rights violations than domestic variables (Hill & Jones 2014).

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Figure 8.2: Respect for physical integrity rights in East Asia by country, 1949–2013

3 Taiwan 3 0 0 -3 Brunei Japan -3 3 Singapore 3 0 Timor-Leste 0 -3 Rep. of Korea -3 3 Malaysia 3 0 0 -3 Mongolia Lao PDR -3

3 Vietnam Cambodia Indonesia 3 0 0 -3 -3

3 Thailand Philippines China 3 0 0 -3 -3

3 Myanmar DPR Korea Rep. of (South) 3 0 Vietnam 0 -3 -3

1950 1970 1990 2010 1950 1970 1990 2010 1950 1970 1990 2010 Source: Eck and Fariss (2015).

and Singapore in Figure 8.2 suggest that there is more to understanding the complex pattern of respect for human rights than meets the eye. What about non-violent forms of repression? Have states found a way to substitute non-violent forms of population control for the violence that once ran rampant in the region? This is an important distinction because, as repression becomes less violent, it also becomes less visibly manifest in the data that researchers and policymakers employ, making it easier to overlook. Using Freedom House data from 2014 and 1972 (the first year it collected these data), Table 8.1 contrasts with Figure 8.2.7 The table

7. Freedom House data has been criticized for methodological and coding problems, as well as for potential bias (see, for example, Jay Ullfelder’s many posts on this subject at https://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/tag/freedom-house/). While these critiques are well-founded and we should be cautious about over-interpreting the point estimates, the Freedom House data are nonetheless useful in a comparative perspective and provide the longest available time-series of respect for civil and political rights. The general picture they paint with regard to lack of respect for these rights in East Asia can be confirmed in case narratives of the region and other human rights sources.

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Table 8.1: Freedom House scores for East Asia, 2014 and 1972 2014 1972 Political Civil Political Civil rights liberties rights liberties Free Japan 1 1 Japan 2 1 Mongolia 1 2 Malaysia 2 3 South 2 2 Korea

Partly free East Timor 3 4 East Timor 3 3 Indonesia 2 4 Indonesia 5 5 Malaysia 4 4 Laos 5 5 Philippines 3 3 Philippines 6 4 Singapore 4 4 Singapore 5 5

Not free Brunei 6 5 Brunei 6 6 Cambodia 6 5 Cambodia 6 5 China 7 6 China 7 7 Laos 7 6 Mongolia 7 7 Myanmar 6 6 Myanmar 7 5 North Korea 7 7 North Korea 7 7 Thailand 6 5 South Korea 5 6 Vietnam 7 5 Thailand 7 5 Vietnam 7 7

Notes: (1) Some countries achieved independence after 1972. The values for these countries come from the first full year of independence; the start years are Brunei (1984), East Timor (2002), and Vietnam (1977). (2) Political and Civil Rights range from 1-7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. (3) Taiwan is not included in the Freedom House data. Source: Freedom House

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indicates that when it comes to political and civil rights, Brunei does not perform much better than North Korea. This suggests that the governments of East Asia may deploy very different strategies with regard to violent versus non-violent repression. While they are increasingly willing to respect physical integrity rights, the same is not necessarily true for political and civil rights. Freedom House recorded that in 2014 only three East Asian countries were fully free across 25 indicators of political rights and civil liberties, while the remaining 13 were only partly free or not free. The Freedom House data indicate that there has been little change since 1972, when it was first collected. While a few individual countries have shifted up or down (Mongolia and South Korea have improved while Malaysia and Laos have declined), the broader pattern is virtually identical. On the whole, the data indicate that the decline in battle deaths in East Asia over time has been mirrored by an improvement in physical integrity rights but not in political and civil rights. Indeed, with only a few notable exceptions, most countries in the region have remained at dismal levels over the past decades. We thus cannot rule out the possibility that one explanation for the decline in armed conflict in East Asia is that states have become better at implementing tight social and political controls, and that these in turn have inhibited the growth of opposition organizations. This suggestion complements Svensson’s argument (in this volume) that the lack of serious religious violence in East Asia is due in part to strong state capacity, which has enabled security apparatuses to repress effectively. Distinguishing between violent and non-violent repression, we can establish a set of ideal types on the basis of state behaviour. First are the non-repressors like Japan, South Korea and Mongolia, which engage in neither violent nor non-violent repression to any major extent. This does not mean that these societies are free from discrimination and other social ills, but the governments of these states respect citizens’ rights to physical integrity and the full expression of political and civil liberties. On the other end of the spectrum are all-around repressors that use both violent and non-violent forms of repression. Myanmar is an excellent example. Not only has its army been implicated in virtually every type of physical integrity violation imaginable, including torture, rape, murder and forced displacement, these violent tactics are accompanied

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by a far-reaching set of limitations on political and civil rights. Media freedoms are restricted, as are the rights to free speech and assembly. Religious freedoms are regularly encroached upon. While many observers have noted that recent reforms in Myanmar have led to improvements across these dimensions, it is also important to point out that as of 2016, violent campaigns continue in the ethnic border areas and that there is no independent judiciary or rule of law. The government has consistently failed to protect Muslims from being attacked by violent mobs, continues to arrest peaceful demonstrators and journalists, and has engaged in an extensive campaign against the Rohingya minority that has been characterized alternately as a crime against humanity or as a genocide (Freedom House 2016). Myanmar is a clear-cut and extreme example of an all-around repressor. But countries in this category can engage in violent and non-violent repression on a lesser scale as well. Cambodia, for example, regularly engages in arbitrary detention and political imprisonment, as well as torture and forced labour. Human Rights Watch reports that at least three individuals died under suspicious circumstances in 2015 (HRW 2016). Cambodia has passed laws allowing the government to restrict elements of civil society that are perceived to be critical to the regime, and has placed restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly. Similarly, Malaysia’s Sedition Act stifles criticism of the government by restricting free speech, while the Printing Presses and Publication Act provides another means for the government to censor and censure public dissent. Although demonstrations occur and are allowed by the police, participants are regularly arrested afterwards and prosecuted on unlawful assembly charges. Preventive detention of political opponents is frequent, and cases of police torture in custody as well as suspicious deaths are recorded annually. A local human rights NGO, Suara Rakyat Malaysia, documented at least 10 suspicious deaths in police custody in the first nine months of 2015 (HRW 2016). All-around repressors have at their disposal the entire toolbox of repressive tactics and use these both in tandem and in substitution, attempting to optimize their ability to suppress perceived opposition to the ruling regime. The particular mix of violent and non-violent tactics, as well as the individuals these actions are directed against, may change over time, but these states are characterized by a lack of respect for basic human rights.

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All-around repressors, particularly those which use high levels of violence, tend to receive considerable international attention and condemnation. Their flouting of basic human rights is done too blatantly for the international community to ignore. This is not necessarily the case, however, for the other category of repressive state: the soft repressors. These countries do not engage in violent repression, but they do restrict civil and political rights enshrined in international human rights covenants. Because they rarely or never engage in outright violence, these states tend to receive less international attention. As a result, they are often perceived to be ‘peaceful’ states. Yet this is to turn a blind eye to their violations of political and civil rights and the fact that their ability to restrict these rights is built on the threat of violence, i.e. that individuals will be imprisoned. In Singapore, the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression are tightly regulated and monitored by the state. Its Internal Security Act, an inheritance of British colonization, continues to be the legal cornerstone that enables the ‘preventive’ detention of political opponents for unlimited periods without charge or judicial review. Indeed, no evidence of criminal behaviour is needed; detention may be based on the government’s perception of threat potential. As a former Minister of Home Affairs stated, ‘the ISA allows an overall assessment of the threat posed by a person to be presented and considered in totality, unlike a criminal case that is tried before the courts which consider only specific acts directly related to that charge’ (Teo 2011). Theoretically, one could also conceive of a category of repressor state that uses exclusively violent methods. In practice, however, this is an empty set. States appear not to use violent methods without also deploying an array of non-violent measures in concert. Relating these ideal types to the East Asian Peace highlights the utility of incorporating repressive practices in conceptions of peace. The non-repressors are countries that adhere to common-sense notions of peace: in these states, dissent is managed through open and institutionalized channels that allow universal participation. These states do not impinge upon individuals’ ability to exercise basic rights. But in states that engage in repression we expect that ‘peace’ is of a different character. Such a peace is built at least in part upon the subversion of basic human rights and the forcible suppression of dissent. There is a tendency, however, to turn a blind eye to the nature of this peace, particularly in soft repressive states.

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This failure to appreciate the nature of soft repression can be particularly insidious when seeking to understand why some countries are ‘peaceful’ and when considering the nature of different types of ‘peace’. The distinction between violent and non-violent state repression matters for how we evaluate explanations of the East Asian Peace. Take, for example, Tønnesson’s argument (in this volume) that, in order to avoid open conflict that would disrupt economic growth, the East Asian developmental state represses or incorporates would-be rebels. Global large-N studies find that GDP and GDP growth is associated with reduced levels of physical integrity rights violations (Hill & Jones 2014; Conrad & Moore 2012; Poe & Tate 1994), but we have no empirical evidence that improvements to economic development are associated with increased respect for civil rights. Similarly, Yap argues (in this volume) that prioritizing economic growth over political development in East Asia has resulted in decreased levels of political trust and con- comitant increases in protests. However, her assumption that protests embody conflict may not be tenable. Protests are public and communal expressions of preferences in order to effect change and, as such, the very fact that people feel that they will not suffer repercussions for their involvement or that those risks are balanced by the potential benefits suggests greater health of the polity than do systems that appear peaceful because of their lack of open demonstrations of opposition, but which accomplish this placidity through the circumscription of human rights.

On the effectiveness of non-violent repression One of the dangers in distinguishing between violent and non-violent repression is that there is a tendency to assume that non-violent repression is a lesser evil and therefore to treat its presence as relatively innocuous. But non-violent repression may be particularly pernicious when it comes to inducing social control, precisely because of this tendency to underestimate it. To underscore this point, let us pause for a brief thought experiment. Consider the literature on totalitarianism, which takes the suppression of civil liberties to its natural extreme. The reason dystopian literature on totalitarian worlds is so terrifying is because the reader is invited to imagine a state that is able to induce individuals to police themselves and others. Recall George Orwell’s 1984: the state rarely needs to resort

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to violations of physical integrity rights because obedience is compelled by effectively institutionalized surveillance and self-censorship (Orwell 1961). Using the fictional world of 1984 as a counterfactual can be informative. The Big Brother government would score relatively well on respect for physical integrity rights: there are occasional violations, but these are not widespread. There is no ongoing civil war, nor even an effective resistance movement. In most respects, ‘Airstrip One’ (Orwell’s fictionalized Great Britain) would therefore fare quite well on measures of peace, were we to apply extant coding criteria – an irony that would surely not be lost on Orwell. The analogy is useful to highlight the idea that the terror induced by the consistent persecution of civil liberties constitutes an extreme violation of personal dignity and calls into question the assumption that civil liberties are of lesser importance in the hierarchy of human rights. The element of fear is instrumental in making non-violent forms of repression effective. Repressive tactics are typically interpreted as pun- ishments against individuals whom the state perceives as having violated its directives or who otherwise pose a threat, but repression is as much about signalling to a wider audience costs for future infractions and in doing so, inducing fear and self-policing. Research has found that previous patterns of repression can reduce the need for future repression by signalling future costs (Crabtree, Fariss, & Kern 2015; Duvall & Stohl 1983; Schnakenberg & Fariss 2014). If optimized, regimes can obviate their need for violence, or even for inflicting punishment; in the most efficient repressive systems, the threat of repression is sufficient for citizens to police themselves and each other. This self-regulation is particularly efficient for states because it reduces the costs of repression by absolving the state of the need to monitor and enforce restrictions on behaviour. This argument is more than just counterfactual hyperbole; it is also grounded in the observations of the researchers in charge of the oldest ongoing systematic human rights data collection effort. Wood & Gibney (2010: 370) argue that …there will be instances where a government is so repressive that, as a consequence, there are relatively few acts of political violence. For a state that is truly efficient in its use of coercive repression against its citizens, the repression from an earlier period will continue to repress citizens or deter challenges to the controlling regime in subsequent periods.

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Because the study of political violence tends to be empirically inspired, it is rarely reflected upon that there are both visible and invisible aspects of state repression. And while states have incentives to obscure information on their repressive acts, one can still study how individuals are physically harmed by the state (imprisoned, tortured and killed) although the data may be imprecise. While we are often unsure about the full scope of these activities or the details of every case, both activists and researchers have established methods by which they can generate estimates of the scale of state violence. One can also observe the laws that states pass and the civil rights which they impinge upon. But it is extraordinarily difficult to grasp the extent to which state repression affects the psyche; on the actions not taken as a result of repression, and on the thoughts that remain unspoken. McCamant (1984: 35) underscores that with regard to political repression, there are both a manifest expression and a latent one, and the invisible and latent one is by far the more important. We can “see” … the persons jailed for political reasons, the press censored, or the labour union funds confiscated, but the important impact is on the others, those who think it could happen to them if they should get out of line. Fear is what gives political repression its significance. Indeed, ‘quiescence represents the pinnacle of repressive success’ (Earl 2011: 263). Thus, before we dismiss non-violent regimes as being relatively peaceful compared to their more overtly violent relatives, we should consider the consequence of living in a society that has an efficient system of civil and human rights restrictions. Do individuals suffer psychological violence? What are the consequences of living under a regime that you know can harm you with impunity? In what ways does fear suppress the expressions of dissent in a population? Is this suppression tenable and stable in the long run?

Is a repressive peace sustainable? If we are interested in understanding the East Asian ‘peace’, we must ask what happens when violence is sublimated through repressive state policies. What happens when these policies become normatively and institutionally consolidated, as is the case in countries like Singapore

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and Malaysia? If we could look into the minds of the populace, would we find an acceptance of these restrictions on their freedoms; would a lifetime under such a regime imply a not only compliance but also an internalized acquiescence? Or would we find resentment? In essence: should we expect that there is a latent grievance on the part of that fraction of the populace which silently chafes under restrictions to their liberties and threats to the dignity of their persons? If so, under what conditions might this silent resentment be articulated? Theories of informational cascades developed in the post-Soviet context suggest that in at least some authoritarian contexts, citizens hold private beliefs that differ from their public statements and in which they have a latent grievance with the state. Once activated by the actions of first movers, latent conflicts can be transformed into widespread societal dissent, as was the case in Eastern Europe in 1989. The same idea has been applied to the Arab Spring: once catalysed, countries with repressive laws that had previously successfully prevented armed conflict suddenly experienced widespread protests and demonstrations. In some cases, particularly those where protests were met with repression, these situations escalated to full-on armed conflict. Should these two historical analogies guide our thinking about the East Asian Peace? Is there a widespread latent dissent that only needs the right spark to set the region aflame? Would the likelihood for armed conflict be greater if East Asia were not so repressive? Certainly, previous research on the relationship between democracy and political freedom leads us to expect that conflict would be less likely in East Asia if its constituent countries were to become consolidated democracies with fully representational systems which genuinely facilitated the adjudication of individual-level and group-level grievances through the electoral system and an independent judiciary (Davenport & Armstrong 2004). And while democratization and political reforms are afoot throughout East Asia in countries like Myanmar, one should be careful not to assume that such trends will necessarily be linear, as the case of Thailand exemplifies. Nor does electoral democracy necessarily equate with respect for human rights practice, as the Philippines and Indonesia illustrate. Democracy contains many elements, and many of Southeast Asia’s democratizing states have improved dramatically in terms of electoral rights or checks and balances on executive power, but

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remain problematic in terms of political and civil rights. Like all political processes, democratization witnesses struggles for power, which in turn can lead to negative externalities such as the suppression of civil rights. It is important, therefore, to maintain a conceptual distinction between political systems and respect for human rights; countries considered formally democratic may nonetheless impinge on human rights. So let us accept that in at least one counterfactual scenario, the quality of peace in East Asia could be deeper than at present. But what about the counterfactual scenario in which the regime types of the non-consolidated democracies in East Asia were to remain the same but the government ceased to deploy repressive measures against the populace? If Singapore allowed free speech, if Malaysia repealed its Security Offences Act, if Myanmar forbade human rights violations by its military and allowed a truly free press? Would the opportunity to express dissent openly without fear of retribution lead to mass action? And if so, in which countries? This question is far more difficult to answer. The literature on regime type and conflict suggests that weak states, and states that are in transition (even to democracy), are more likely to experience conflict as different interest groups seize the opportunity to stake their claims (Hegre et al. 2001). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a state that suddenly lifted the threat of repression would not be faced with a plethora of conflicting demands. Without having a system in which these demands could be adjudicated between and met, social unrest would be a likely outcome, though its nature and expression would depend on the context and constraints that activists face. This highlights the important distinction that a peace defined by non-violence need not be durable or sustainable, and that in approaching an understanding of the East Asian Peace, we need to consider all of its dimensions. Normative conceptions of peace suggest that when the laws and structure of a state repress fundamental human rights, this situation is qualitatively different from states in which peace is built on cooperative arrangements that adjudicate interests and respect human rights. From a research perspective, it is also important to differentiate between different types of ‘peace’ or non-conflict; those cases where peace is built on repression may be indicative of latent conflicts and, ultimately, fragility. The East Asian peace has been lauded for decreasing the amount of death and displacement in the region, and this conclusion has been

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drawn on the basis of measured battle deaths. Both in absolute and relative terms, East Asia has experienced a decline in fatalities from intrastate armed conflict. Harnessing these data as the primary evidence for an East Asian Peace suggests that the best proxy for peace is the absence of killing between combatants. But the absence of armed conflict can mean many things when thinking more broadly about what peace means. Concepts of ‘positive peace’ and ‘structural violence’ suggest that peace could, and perhaps should, be conceptualized far more inclusively. As Bjarnegård (in this volume) rightly notes, we must consider variation in types of violence and variation in who is exposed to violence if we are to understand the depth of the East Asian Peace. It is reasonable that battle deaths are the starting point for understanding peace in East Asia, but one must keep in mind that it is only that: a starting point. To understand peace, we need to ensure that we are not blinded by a too narrow focus on armed combat. In order to predict the likelihood of latent conflict in East Asia becoming manifest, we need to understand more about the foundations of repression. There are many ways to typologize repression: is it violent or not? are civil liberties denied? who is targeted? is targeting predictable? is repression applied consistently? which actors of the state engage in repressive acts? what oversight do they face? are the effects of repression on a society moderated by other institutions? The existing research on repression suggests that the answers to these questions may help us to understand better the conditions under which opposition might arise in repressive states. We need to understand both the origins of repression (why have states opted to use it rather than co-optation or concessions) as well as the consequences of repression. What are the implications of different types of repression for societies and, in particular, for the prospects of sustainable peace? The improvements to physical integrity rights in East Asia since the end of WWII are indeed laudable, but it is important that the decrease in overt state violence not overshadow other forms of human rights abuses. In considering the qualitative dimensions of ‘peace’, and in particular its durability, it is thus important to distinguish between different types of ‘peace’. Countries that employ a repressive peace are far more at risk for conflict down the road because the institutions which mediate conflict do not exist. The instability of repressive peace means that the East

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Asian Peace is a fundamentally fragile one which is at risk for an ‘East Asian Spring’.

References Carey, S. C. (2006) ‘The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression’, Political Research Quarterly 59(1): 1–11. Conrad, C. R. & W. H. Moore. (2010) ‘What Stops the Torture?’ American Journal of Political Science 54(2): 459–76. Conrad, C. R. & E. H. Ritter. (2013) ‘Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law’, Journal of Politics 75(2): 397–409. Crabtree, C., C. J. Fariss & H. L. Kern, ‘Truth Replaced by Silence: Private Censorship in Russia’, Working paper, 2015. Davenport, C. (1995) ‘Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions’, American Journal of Political Science 39(3): 683–713. ——— (2007) ‘State Repression and Political Order’, Annual Review of Political Science 10: 1–23. Davenport, C. & D. A. Armstrong. (2004) ‘Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996’, American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 538–54. Davenport, C. & C. Loyle (2012) ‘The States Must Be Crazy: Dissent and the Puzzle of Repressive Persistence’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence 6(1): 75–95. Duvall, R. & M. Stohl (1983) ‘Governance by Terror’, in M. Stohl, ed., The Politics of Terrorism. NY: Marcel Dekker, 179–219. Earl, J. (2011) ‘Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control’, Annual Review of Sociology 37: 261–84. Eck, K. & C. J. Fariss, ‘Respect for Human Rights in East Asia and the World’, Paper presented at the 5th annual East Asian Peace (EAP) Programme Conference, Singapore, 5–8 November 2015. Fariss, C. J. (2014) ‘Respect for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability’, American Political Science Review 108(2): 297–318. Freedom House (2016) Freedom in the World 2016. Washington, DC: Freedom House. Gurr, T. R. (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gurr, T. R. & W. H. Moore (1997) ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross- Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s’,

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American Journal of Political Science 41(4): 1079–1103. Hegre, H., T. Ellingsen, S. Gates & N. P. Gleditsch (2001) ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992’, American Political Science Review 95(1): 33–48. Hill Jr., D. W. & Z. M. Jones (2014) ‘An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression’, American Political Science Review 108(3): 661–87. Human Rights Watch (2016) World Report 2016. NY: Human Rights Watch. Lichbach, M. I. (1987) ‘Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 31(2): 266–97. Lupu, Y. (2013) ‘Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements’, International Organization 67(3): 469–503. ——— (2015) ‘Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements’, American Journal of Political Science 59(3): 578–94. McCamant, J. F. (1984) ‘Governance without Blood: Social Science’s Antiseptic View of Rule; Or, The Neglect of Political Repression’, in M. Stohl & G. A. Lopez (eds) The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Government Violence and Repression. London: Aldwych Press: 1–9. Moore, W. H. (1998) ‘Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing’, American Journal of Political Science 42(3): 851–73. Muller, E. N. (1985) ‘Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence’, American Sociological Review 50(1): 47–61. Orwell, G. (1961) 1984. NY: Signet Classic. Rasler, K. (1996) ‘Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution’, American Sociological Review 61(1): 132–52. Ritter, E. H. & C. R. Conrad (2016) ‘Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression’, American Political Science Review 110(1): 85–99. Schnakenberg, K. E. & C. J. Fariss (2014) ‘Dynamic Patterns of Human Rights Practices’, Political Science Research and Methods 2(1): 1–31. Shellman, S. M. (2006) ‘Process Matters: Conflict and Cooperation in Sequential Government-Dissident Interactions’, Security Studies 15(4): 563–99. Sullivan, C. M. (2014) ‘The (in)effectiveness of torture for combating insurgency’, Journal of Peace Research 51(3): 388–404. Teo, C. H. (2011) ‘Debate on President’s Address’, Parliament of Singapore Official Reports – Parliamentary Debates 88 (19 October): 270. Wood, R. M. & M. Gibney (2010) ‘The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re- Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI’, Human Rights Quarterly 32(2): 367–400.

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The Unequal Peace

Elin Bjarnegård

The phenomenon of the East Asian Peace builds on a so-called negative, or minimalist, definition of peace: a significant reduction of the number of battle-related deaths, that is, the relative absence of armed conflict. The explanations put forward in the first part of this book all seek to explain why the number of battle deaths has been reduced in East Asia. While there is no question that the reduction of battle deaths is of immense intrinsic value, in this chapter I explore whether there are peaceful gains in East Asia beyond this relatively narrow outcome. This question is raised in a tradition shared by the many researchers, peace activists and politicians who have pointed out that we can and should put greater demands on a truly peaceful society than the mere absence of organized violent conflict (e.g. Galtung 1969, 1985; Mani 2002). This also relates to an overarching debate about what the East Asian Peace really is and how it should be characterized. Tønnesson (2017) argues that peace should be narrowly defined and restricted to one dependent variable – battle deaths – in order to facilitate explanation. However, while I agree that precise indicators are useful, pragmatism cannot be allowed to trump validity. The choice of dependent variable should be based on a valid definition of peace. Secondly, Tønnesson argues that the absence of armed violence is a precondition for human well-being and goes on to say that ‘when few people are killed, there is normally also less fear of being killed’ (ibid. p. 5). This echoes the author and peace activist Ursula Franklin’s statement that peace should also be about the absence of fear (cited in Boyd 2005), but while Franklin goes on to discuss social justice and feminism as means to reach that end, Tønnesson seems to conflate the fear of being hurt or killed in battle with the fear of being hurt or killed in general. Building on earlier work

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(Bjarnegård et al. 2015), I argue in this chapter that while the East Asian Peace has significantly reduced the risk of being killed for those who traditionally participate in armed conflict, predominantly young men, it has not brought about human well-being or even a reduced fear of being hurt or killed for many other groups in society. The debate regarding the definition of peace is ongoing and has led to a plethora of different concepts, ‘peace with adjectives’: positive peace, sustainable peace, quality peace, viable peace, deep peace and re- silient peace, to name but a few. This chapter does not aim to present yet another adjective or to resolve this discourse, but it wishes to shift some of the responsibility to the defenders of minimalist definitions of peace. While a minimalist definition of peace (absence of armed conflict) can be seen as necessary for peace, researchers should at the very least be required to qualify that peace by delineating who was involved in that armed conflict and, as a consequence, who that peace is likely to benefit most. The end of an armed conflict does not necessarily imply the end of violence and insecurity for everyone (see e.g. Jarstad & Sisk 2008). While ending violent conflict may be a prerequisite for peace, we also need peacebuilding and reconciliation that deal with the many lasting effects that violent conflict creates and that redress structural inequalities. Structural inequalities cause differentiated vulnerability to the consequences of war and they may also, in themselves, be underlying causes of (recurring) conflict (Clark 2009; Mani 2002, 2005). Of course, structural inequalities and violence may also be persistent and unrelated to an armed conflict, in which case we may have even less hope that subsequent peacebuilding will be able to address them. Peacebuilding that results in a decrease of fear more generally requires a fundamental transformation of values (Boyd 2005). Changes in the attitudes of groups of people towards each other in a positive direction are indicators of peace processes that take place at deeper, psychological levels, and that are necessary if peace is to be built for a broad segment of the population and not just for those who take an active part in the fighting (Clark 2009). The explanations for peace put forward in this volume focus on factors that are linked to the reduction of battle deaths – the changed priorities of leaders (Tønnesson), the withdrawal of external powers (Kreutz), increased trade (Goldsmith), international law favour-

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ing China (Scott) or demographic change (Urdal) – without comment- ing on the extent to which these explanations may also be relevant for a deepening of the East Asian Peace. This chapter demonstrates that East Asian Peace has not benefitted everyone equally, because while the factors that led to a reduction of battle deaths managed to save young men from dying on the battlefield, they did not protect the soldiers’ children and wives from violence in the private sphere, nor did they manage to change attitudes towards groups that are perceived as different. Human security in East Asia is uneven, and it seems that progress toward any of the deeper conceptions of peace will require attention to factors that are not a part of the stories related to battle deaths. Discourses on human security, as opposed to national security, emphasize the experience of the individual. From the individual human being’s perspective, there is much to fear, including violence or threats of violence, natural disasters, diseases and hunger. Economic insecurity and threats to human dignity may also be included under human security (UNDP 1994). The increasing focus on human security has been criticized because it is too broad and makes for an unclear policy agenda (King & Murray 2001; Paris 2001). This chapter keeps a holistic focus, but narrows it down to an interpersonal perspective. The exploration of human security in East Asia yields some important insights that are obscured by the discourse on the East Asia’s battlefield peace. First, I will take a look at the consequences of armed conflict beyond battle deaths in order to determine the bias underlying a narrow definition of peace regarding who that peace is for. While battle deaths have been reduced, other experiences of war have often not been acknowledged and tackled in peace processes. I will then move on to issues of security that may be unrelated to previous armed conflicts, but that underline the fact that fear of violence and death may persist in societies that we, with a narrow definition of peace, call ‘peaceful’; stark and important subregional differences in human security remain in ‘peaceful’ East Asia. Finally, I will use survey data to demonstrate that tolerance of ‘difference’ is still low and that the absence of armed conflict may not have led people to think differently about their neighbours and fellow human beings. Some groups are more exposed to violence and fear than others. In short, I argue that human security in peaceful East Asia today is still contingent on where you are and who you are.

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Peace beyond reduction of battle deaths We know that war and armed conflict affect different groups of people differently. For instance, the overwhelming majority of participants in war, as well as of victims killed in armed conflict, are men. These patterns hold for different types of violent war deaths, including the deaths of civilians (Bjarnegård et al. 2015; Goldstein 2001). Thus, if the East Asian Peace is measured by violent war deaths alone, it could be described as a male peace, in which the risk of (some) men of being killed in armed conflict has been significantly reduced. Vulnerability in wartime, however, is not fully captured by a focus on violent war deaths alone. Although women run a smaller risk of being killed, war brings about other experiences and vulnerabilities, some of which are highly gender-specific. Women have more often seen a family member killed, and research indicates that women are at greater risk of sexual exploitation during conflict. These are the types of experiences that are likely to lead to long-term psychological problems and trauma. Likewise, studies indicate that while men are at greater risk of physical violence, women face a far greater risk of psychological violence, such as threats. It is also evident that non-active participants of war suffer from its consequences in terms of decreased access to food, health-services and infrastructure (Bjarnegård et al. 2015). Similar far-reaching consequences for broad segments of the population are seen after conflicts that take place at the community level, such as the destruction of trust and social networks, which take a long time to rebuild (Kaldor 1999; Korac 2006). War and armed conflict thus affect different groups of people in different ways, both while the conflict is ongoing and in its aftermath. There is an increasing understanding that this differentiated structural vulnerability should be taken into account, so that peacebuilding, for instance, does not only tackle the experiences, demands and traumas of combatants, but also takes into account the ways in which conflict has affected groups not actively participating in the fighting. Gender constitutes one of the most evident differentiated vulnerabilities in war. Despite the fact that women are deeply and specifically affected by armed conflict, they seldom participate in peace processes. This means that peace does not necessarily hold the same quality for women as it does for men (Gizelis & Olsson 2015). Peacebuilding processes usually reinforce the influence of recognized stakeholders in the conflict – often men. The violence and insecurity that more marginal-

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ized groups have experienced are, on the other hand, seldom brought to the negotiation table. The violence of armed forces that particularly target women is one example of violence that is often invisible and that therefore often continues well after the conflict is officially over. Several reports also show that domestic violence tends to increase during and after violent conflict. This type of gendered violence is not recognized as part of the problem to be solved through peacebuilding efforts. In addition, it is seen as stigmatizing and often shameful, and peace processes typically lack any discussion of this issue, much less a meaningful exploration of adequate measures to cope with the problems and traumas it causes (Björkdahl 2012; Cohen, Nordås, & Wood 2014; Copic 2004; Hedström & Senarathna 2015; True 2009). The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) in October 2000. In 2008 it was followed by UNSCR 1820 that pointed to the fact that civilians constitute the vast majority of victims in armed conflicts and that women are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence (UNSCR 1820). These resolutions have received international attention, they have been followed by other resolutions and they have contributed to putting issues of gender on the peace agenda. Nevertheless, despite these efforts, women are still often left out as decision-makers regarding matters of peace and security. The wars in East Asia came to a close around 1979, well before the passing of UNSCR 1325. Gender issues were certainly not on the agenda at that point, and research has also demonstrated that the East Asian Peace has not come about through an increase in peace agreements. East Asia as a region actually has had fewer peace agreements after 1979 than before, and fewer peace agreements than in other, less peaceful, regions of the world (Kivimäki 2014; Svensson 2011). As Guthrey (in this volume) notes, the lack of acknowledgement of wrongdoings against individuals, groups or states damages the building of trust and security. Ryu (in this volume) also points to how, despite decades of relative peace, there is not a development of a collective regional identity in East Asia, but instead nationalism still prevails and is even increasing. This indicates that attitudes towards other countries and groups of people are not necessarily changing as a consequence of peace and increasing interaction, but that stereotypes and views of ‘others’ may instead be cemented and confirmed in nationalist discourses.

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What Ryu doesn’t mention is the large literature on the different roles that men and women are assigned in relation to the nationalist project (see e.g. Cockburn 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997). Closely related to the argument put forward by Melander in this volume, this literature observes that the roles that men are expected to play in defence of the nation is often glorified. Militarized masculinity is a form of idealized masculinity that serves the purpose of spurring men to take part in the national project and to be prepared even to risk their lives for the greater good. Military masculinity thus idealizes risk taking and violence (Bjarnegård & Melander 2011; Goldstein 2001: 251–331; Kovitz 2003). Military masculinity is constructed in sharp contrast to the expected – and subordinate – role of women. In relation to nation-building, women’s primary roles are as mothers of future citizens of the nation. In the words of Winslow and Dunn (2002: 650), ‘[w]omen are seen as the bearers, not the takers, of life, and as the embodiment of peaceful rather than aggressive qualities.’ This view of women as essentially more peaceful has sometimes led to simplified suggestions that the inclusion of women in decision-making will more or less automatically lead to more peaceful societies. In the case of East Asia, this is clearly not the main explanation for peace. Women are politically under-represented in all of East Asia and the changes in their representation do not account for the peaceful development. Women are the least underrepresented in the countries whose parliaments are also the least powerful. And research shows that even in more democratic countries, women are not necessarily willing and even less able to influence matters of security. Women politicians are often sidelined in politics, left out of important alliances and given portfolios that are seen as more ‘feminine’ than foreign affairs or defence (Bjarnegård & Melander 2013). The robust findings that demonstrate a clear association between different measures of gender equality and different types of peace thus point to a more complex relationship (Caprioli 2000, 2005; Caprioli & Boyer 2001; Melander 2005a, 2005b). Hudson et al. argue that the way women are legally treated and protected in their state is the most telling predictor of whether a state will be involved in violent conflict, disregard international treaties or have strained border relations (Hudson, et al. 2009). Deeper value changes towards equality norms, decreasing glorification of militarized masculinities, stronger emphasis on collective

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identities as opposed to ‘othering’ and nationalism thus underlie these peaceful developments. Conflict termination can constitute a window of opportunity not just for addressing the differentiated vulnerabilities of war, but also for the increased participation and inclusion of various groups, which might prompt a transformation of gender relations and other inequalities more broadly. The question is the extent to which this window of opportunity is used. Peace negotiations in Myanmar offer a snapshot view of how women are largely excluded from peace talks. The people of Myanmar have experienced decades of armed conflict, particularly between the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and different ethnic groups. State-sponsored sexual violence against women in ethnic minority communities has been widespread. No one knows exactly how widespread, and the over 100 documented cases are estimated to be but a fraction of the actual cases that have taken place. A report released by the Women’s League of Burma claims that gang rape by the Myanmar Army against civilians is an institutionalized military practice; the sheer number of incidents, perpetrated throughout the country, renders individual-level explanations implausible. The reports describe the use of sexual violence as a counter-insurgency strategy and confirm that the vast majority of rapes took place during military offensives. Attacks were often very brutal, including a documented rape of an eight-year-old girl. Yet, de facto impunity seems to be the rule; incidences are not reported, perpetrators are not persecuted and the affected individuals are not included in the peace process dialogue, nor is there a discussion about accountability for these types of crimes (WLB 2014). Among twelve ceasefire agreements scrutinized by the Swedish Burma Committee in 2013, none included any references to women or gender (Hedström 2013). Women’s organizations in Myanmar have increased their attention to these issues and have become rather vociferous. Many of these organizations have come together in an Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP), but were nevertheless excluded as official stakeholders in the process that led up to the nation- wide ceasefire agreement that was signed by the government and some ethnic armed organizations in October 2015. A few women were present at the Union Peace Conference in January the following year. This conference was to mark the start of a public dialogue around the peace

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process. Khin Ma Ma Myo, who is a peace activist and a managing director of the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security Studies, recounts how she slowly realized that the statements she and other women made were simply not recorded in the official minutes (Interview with Ma Ma Myo on 4 March 2016). Even with vociferous women present, their voices and concerns were not considered. A recent report states: While conflict continues, the gender implications of such suffering and marginalisation are rarely factored in during discussions or initiatives for national reform. This neglect now has to end. In fact, although men have been the highest casualties in combat, it is very often women in Myanmar who have been the prime victims of conflict, whether through sexual violence, human trafficking and other rights abuses or such indirect consequences as reduced access to clean water and health services, the increase in female-headed households, and the inordinate burdens for women and girls in conflict-zones. Equally unaddressed, women have very often been denied participation in initiatives towards peace, a marginalisation that is reflected in the landscape of national politics. Far from women being a “secondary” or “sectoral” group within society, their equitable participation in national life is one of the most integral challenges in socio-political reform that faces the country today. (Transnational Institute 2016)

When large segments of an affected population are made invisible in the official discourse about a conflict and effectively excluded from negotiations, it also means that certain issues are left unaddressed and that support for the continued process is potentially undermined. What are potential outcomes of a partial, or shallow, peace? The rest of the chapter will discuss such consequences with reference to interpersonal violence and values concerning ‘others’ in East Asia. These countries have a longer experience of peace than Myanmar, but it nevertheless seems as if the East Asian Peace has not – yet – become inclusive in the sense that it has led to acceptable levels of human security in all corners of the region or for all individuals.

Interpersonal violence Interpersonal violence constitutes one of the greatest sources of fear for personal integrity. Among all violent deaths globally, homicides are esti-

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mated to be more than eight times as common as battle deaths (Hoeffler & Fearon 2015: 4). However, reliable statistics of the prevalence of interpersonal violence are notoriously difficult to find, due to the very nature of such violence. In post-conflict settings it is sometimes difficult to distinguish conflict-related continuing violence from criminal violence. This poses less of a problem in those East Asian societies where conflict termination is not recent. The data problem tends to be accentuated in countries with high levels of interpersonal violence, as well as in countries where the state is a major perpetrator of violent acts and violations of personal integrity; in this volume, Eck demonstrates that the state itself can be a main contributor to the deepening of a culture of violence. In these countries, interpersonal violence often goes unreported, and even available data is not always systematically collected and presented. Despite the statistical challenges, trends can nonetheless be discerned. Lethal violence tends to be less widespread in East Asia than in other regions, and is also more steeply in decline in the East Asian region than in other parts of the world. Who are the victims of homicides in East Asia? The clearest pattern here is gendered, although far from all countries gender-disaggregate homicide data. It is estimated that globally, 84 per cent of all victims of intentional homicide are men, and the same pattern is visible in the few countries that present gender-disaggregated data in East Asia. Intentional homicide is therefore similar to armed conflict in the sense that its victims are predominantly young men. There is an important exception to this pattern, however. When it comes to homicide rates against children under 14, the gendered pattern is the reverse, particularly for newborn babies. Here, East Asia stands out: according to the World Health Organization, the region has the highest reported homicide rate in the world for newborn girls, 46 per 100,000, while the corresponding rate for newborn boys is 18 per 100,000 (WHO 2016, Hoeffler and Fearon 2015: 10–11). This pattern is magnified when it comes to sex specific abortions, which have severe implications for sex ratios of entire countries. In Hudson and den Boer’s global comparison of sex ratios for children aged 0 to 4, China stands out with a ratio of 120 boys per 100 girls. This development, along with long-standing discrimination in nutrition and health care, has led to estimates of millions of ‘missing’ women in China (Sen 1990). Ebenstein and Sharygin

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(2009: 400) estimate that cohorts born in China in two first decades of the East Asian Peace, between 1980 and 2000, included 22 million more boys than girls. There are similar tendencies in South Korea, with 111 boys per 100 girls. These patterns are much less pronounced and closer to the global average in Southeast Asia (Hudson & den Boer 2004). The young men who used to risk death in armed battles now seem to enjoy the benefits of peace across East Asia, including running a relatively low risk of being victims of homicide. The most vulnerable individuals, however, are also the most likely to live in constant fear of violence in East Asia. The surplus of men that this pattern creates can also have more long-reaching consequences for peace and security. Non-lethal violence is even more difficult to measure, but intimate partner violence or domestic violence are nonetheless important indicators of the extent to which people in a society are fearful of being hurt or killed. There are virtually no comparative data on these types of violence, but numerous case studies consistently confirm that while men account for the majority of homicide victims, women constitute the majority of victims of intimate partner violence – a type of violence that takes place in the private sphere, hidden from the public. Intimate partner violence is massively underreported due to stigma and fear: one study assesses that only one out of nine victims of intimate partner violence reports it to the police. Thus, while largely invisible in statistics, intimate partner violence affects many more individuals than homicides or armed conflicts. A recent report by Hoeffler and Fearon estimates that the cost of non-fatal domestic violence against women and children is much higher than the cost of homicides and civil war combined (9.5 per cent of world GDP vs. 1.63 per cent of world GDP) (Hoeffler & Fearon 2015). One of the few attempts to assess the prevalence of intimate partner violence globally was published in the journal Science in 2013. It pools data from different types of studies and its findings are in line with earlier estimates: about 30 per cent of women aged 15 and over have experienced physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence during their lifetime. The estimated proportion of women in East Asia is somewhat lower, at 22 per cent. This can be compared with the much higher 41 per cent in neighbouring South Asia. Estimates in Northeast Asia are particularly low. At a 16 per cent prevalence rate, the region constituted

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by China, Korea and Japan is, in fact, the one with the lowest prevalence of all (Devries et al. 2013). One UN study looking specifically at men’s violence against women in the context of East Asia has worked on methods for collecting more reliable data on these sensitive issues. It finds that the prevalence of intimate partner violence is much higher than previously expected across the region, but also that there are important differences between countries. When asked about their lifetime experiences, between 30 and 57 per cent of men in most countries surveyed reported that they had at some time perpetrated physical or sexual violence against an intimate partner. In Cambodia, 30 per cent of men reported that they had done so, in China 51.5 per cent and as many as 60 per cent in parts of Indonesia (Fulu, Jewkes, Roselli & Garcia-Moreno 2013; Fulu, Warner, et al. 2013). Given the large populations of China and Indonesia, this implies that millions of women live in fear of violence. Data from the World Values Survey on attitudes towards violence against women also point in the direction of mass-scale gender-based violence in the most populous nation of the world: only 45 per cent of the polled Chinese agree with the statement that it is never justifiable for a man to beat his wife (WVS 2014). Children are also victims of violence in the private sphere. This is possibly even more difficult to measure comparatively than intimate partner violence because of huge variations with regard to what constitutes acceptable behaviour. Corporal punishment is accepted in some countries, encouraged in others and prohibited in a few. In Japan and South Korea, over 80 per cent agree that it is never justified to beat a child. In the Philippines only 46 per cent agree and, in populous China, just 22 per cent think child-beating is never justified (WVS 2014). This type of violence is difficult to detect, because it affects the most vulnerable group in society: children who have little or no ability to report it. Further, violence against children is problematic for society as a whole, because victims may use their childhood experiences as measures of right and wrong through the whole of their life, reinforcing the norm that violence is an appropriate form of conflict resolution. A survey conducted in Thailand as part of Uppsala University’s East Asian Peace Programme has demonstrated the link between childhood experiences of violence and violent behaviour in adult lives. Individuals who have been beaten as children or who have seen their mother being beaten are far more likely

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to be willing to use violence as a means to solve conflicts that individuals who have been raised in a familial respect for physical integrity.

Attitudes to ‘others’ Let us move from experiences to attitudes and ask about the extent to which peace has been ingrained in people’s minds in contemporary East Asia. Has it become unthinkable to devalue or hurt other human beings? Is peace part and parcel of the primary mindset and logic of people, or are warlike attitudes still prevalent in spite of an absence of armed conflict? Are groups of people mistrusted and mistreated because they are perceived as different? Attitude surveys help us link macro-level conflict patterns to mechanisms at the individual level. It is important to understand the extent to which people regard others as enemies and the extent to which there is widespread tolerance of people who are perceived to be different. This is because the process of ‘othering’, which includes distancing oneself from other groups of people, speaking in ‘we’ and ‘they’ terms, and devaluing ‘them’, has been demonstrated by sociopsychological studies to be an early step in processes that lead to the commission of violent acts. Investigation of the attitudes that people have with regard to other groups therefore gives important information about the extent to which peace is ingrained in people’s minds. If ‘othering’ is pervasive, there is fertile soil for conflicts to turn violent, and for individuals to be ready to agree to violent acts toward other nations or individuals. The Pew Global Attitudes Project has conducted attitude surveys in China, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan. It presents data regarding people’s attitudes toward other nations, and thus prerequisites for international conflict, as well as people’s attitudes toward individuals of other religions, which points more in the direction of prerequisites for conflicts with religious connotations (see Svensson’s chapter in this volume). When it comes to fertile ground for international conflict, the Pew data show us that there are clear differences in the ways that Indonesians, South Koreans and Japanese citizens regard the big power in the region, China. The closer the country is to China, the more likely people are to regard China with hostility. When asked ‘Overall, do you think of China as more of a partner of [survey country], more of an enemy of [survey country], or neither?’ 20 per cent of the Japanese and a full 35 per cent of

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South Koreans say they primarily think of China as an enemy. However, only 10 per cent of Indonesians think of China as an enemy. The same question is not asked of the Chinese, so we have no possibility of measuring to what extent feelings of enmity are mutual (Pew 2015). Turning to religious groups, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has also asked the question, ‘Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinion of Jews/Christians/Muslims?’ Here, the tables are turned: Indonesians, who were most likely to have a favourable view of China as a nation, are the least tolerant of other religions. Almost half of the population of Indonesia has a very unfavourable view of at least one religious group. South Koreans, who were most likely to view China as an enemy, show more tolerance to religious groups than other countries in the region. Eighteen per cent of South Koreans claim to have a very unfavourable view of another group. For China and Japan the percent- ages are 34 and 22, respectively. There are very small gender differences in these surveys; the big differences in attitudes are between countries. This means that there are also fairly high levels of religious intolerance in large parts of East Asia, which cautions us to think that religious cleav- ages could be mobilized and cause violent conflict (Pew 2015). Attitude data are able to show us that even in countries such as Japan, which has reached a low level of interpersonal violence, about a fifth of the population still holds unfavourable views about entire nations or groups of people.

The human security challenges to the East Asian Peace Even if one accepts that the East Asian Peace exists as a relative absence of war and violent conflict, this does not lead directly to a conclusion that East Asians now generally lead a secure life. Many of the patterns presented in this chapter instead demonstrate highly uneven performances with regard to human security. True, when it comes to interpersonal violence, East Asia as a whole seems to be safer than other regions (except Europe), although underreporting may be higher there than in other regions. There are also huge differences within the East Asian region: being a girl child is far more dangerous in China and South Korea than in Southeast Asia. Members of some minority religious groups are more likely to be tolerated in South Korea and China than in Indonesia or Myanmar.

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In fact, we do not yet know if the long-term absence of armed conflict leads to a deepening of a culture of peace. We have reason to believe, however, that if fear, distrust and human insecurity persist among large parts of the East Asian population, the risk of new outbreaks of organized violence or war will increase. Distrust and enmity between countries and among ethnic and religious groups can be direct causes of armed conflict. The relationship between violence against women and children and the absence of armed conflict is perhaps not as direct, but it is empirically well documented. Many studies have shown that when women are maltreated in a society, the risk of organized violence and war increases. When a society persists in its view of ‘others’ as inferior human beings against whom physical, psychological or sexual violence is justifiable, a culture justifying or even glorifying violence is reproduced. As Melander’s chapter shows, the glorification of militarized masculinities and honour ideologies can explain why conflicts are allowed to escalate and why compromise is avoided. This chapter points to the complexity of the concept of the East Asian Peace from a human security perspective. A thorough investigation of possible links between decline in battle deaths and human security is badly needed in order to gauge the depth of peace in East Asia, but is difficult to carry out due to the scarcity of reliable data. One conclusion is already clear: despite the long-lasting negative peace in East Asia, there are still important human security problems that need to be tackled in order to strengthen the East Asian Peace and to protect individual integrity everywhere. At the very least, it is safe to say that huge human security challenges persist in the East Asian region and that there are good reasons to continue to work towards a deeper culture of peace – or whatever we decide to call it.

References Bjarnegård, E., & E. Melander (2011) ‘Disentangling gender, peace and democratization: the negative effects of militarized masculinity’, Journal of Gender Studies, 20(2): 139–54. ——— (2013) ‘Revisiting Representation: Communism, Women in Politics, and the Decline of Armed Conflict in East Asia’, International Interactions, 39(4): 558–74. Bjarnegård, E., et al. (2015) ‘Gender, peace and armed conflict’, SIPRI Yearbook

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2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Björkdahl, A. (2012) ‘A Gender-Just Peace? Exploring the Post-Dayton Peace Process in Bosnia’, Peace & Change, 37: 286–317. Boyd, R. (2005) ‘Gender and human security issues: building a programme of action research’, Development in Practice, 15(1): 115–21. Caprioli, M. (2000) ‘Gendered Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 37(1): 51–68. ——— (2005) ‘Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly, 49(2): 161– 78. Caprioli, M. & Boyer, M. A. (2001) ‘Gender, Violence, and International Crisis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(4): 503–518. Clark, J. N. (2009) From Negative to Positive Peace: The Case of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Journal of Human Rights, 8: 360–384. Cockburn, C. (1998) The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict. London: Zed Books. Cohen, D. K., R. Nordås, R. & E. J. Wood (2014) ‘Four Things Everyone Should Know about Wartime Sexual Violence’, (9 June). www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/09/four-things-everyone-should-know-about-wartime-sexual-violence/, accessed January 28, 2017. Copic, S. (2004) ‘Wife Abuse in the Countries of the Former Yugoslavia’, Feminist Review, 76: 46–64. Devries, K. M., et al. (2013) ‘The Global Prevalence of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women’, Science, 340(6140): 1527–8. Ebenstein, A. Y., & E. Jennings Sharygin. (2009) ‘The Consequences of the ‘Missing Girls‘ of China‘, The World Bank Economic Review, 23(3): 399- 425. Fulu, E., R. Jewkes, T. Roselli, & C. Garcia-Moreno (2013) ‘Prevalence of and factors associated with male perpetration of intimate partner violence: findings from the UN Multi-country Cross-sectional Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific’, The Lancet Global Health, 1(4): e187– e207. Fulu, E., X. Warner, S. Miedema, R. Jewkes, T. Roselli & J. Lang (2013) Why Do Some Men Use Violence Against Women and How Can We Prevent It? Quantitative Findings from the United Nations Multi-country Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific. Retrieved from Bangkok: UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women and UNV. Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, 6(3): 167–91.

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——— (1985) ‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses’, Journal of Peace Research, 22(2): 141–58. Gizelis, T.-I., & Olsson, L., eds (2015) Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Goldstein, J. S. (2001) War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hedström, J. (2013) Where are the women? Retrieved from Stockholm: The Swedish Burma Committee. Hedström, J. & T. Senarathna (2015) Women in Conflict and Peace. Retrieved from Stockholm: International IDEA. Hoeffler, A. & J. Fearon (2015) Conflict and Violence Assessment Paper. Benefits and Costs of the Conflict and Violence Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Retrieved from Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus center. Hudson, V. M., M. Caprioli, B. Ballif-Spanvill, R. McDermott & C. F. Emmett (2009) ‘The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States’, International Security, 33(3): 7–45. Hudson, V. M. & A. den Boer (2004) Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press. Jarstad, A. K. & T. D. Sisk, eds (2008) From War to Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaldor, M. (1999) New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. King, G. & C. J. L. Murray (2001) ‘Rethinking Human Security’, Political Science Quarterly, 116(4): 585–610. Kivimäki, T. (2014) The Long Peace of East Asia. London: Ashgate. Korac, M. (2006) ‘Gender, conflict and peace-building: Lessons from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 29, 510–20. Kovitz, M. (2003) ‘The Roots of Military Masculinity’, in P. R. Higate (ed.), Military Masculinities: Identity and the State. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Mani, R. (2002) Beyond retribution: seeking justice in the shadows of war. Cambridge: Polity Press. Mani, R. (2005) ‘Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict’, Development, 48(3): 25–34. Melander, E. (2005a) ‘Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly, 49(4): 695–714. ——— (2005b) ‘Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse’, Journal of Peace Research, 42(2): 149–66.

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Paris, R. (2001) ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ International Security, 26(2): 87–102. Pew Research Center. (2010) ‘Gender Equality Universally Embraced, but Inequalities Acknowledged’, 1 July, www.pewglobal.org/files/2010/07/ Pew-Global-Attitudes-2010-Gender-Report-July-1-12-01AM-EDT- NOT-EMBARGOED.pdf, accessed December 9, 2016. Sen, A. (1990) ‘More than 100 Million Women are Missing’, New York Review of Books 37(20): 61-66. Svensson, I. (2011) ‘East Asian Peacemaking: Exploring the patterns of conflict management and conflict settlement in East Asia’, Asian Perspective, 35(2): 163–85. Transnational Institute. (2016) No Women, No Peace: Gender Equality, Conflict and Peace in Myanmar. https://www.tni.org/en/publication/no-women- no-peace-gender-equality-conflict-and-peace-in-myanmar, accessed 16 November 2016. True, J. (2009) ‘The Unfulfilled Mandate: Gender Mainstreaming and UN Peace Operations’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 10(2): 41–51. Tønnesson, S. (2017) Explaining the East Asia Peace. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. UNDP. (1994) Human Development Report 1994. Retrieved from New York, Oxford: United Nations Development Programme. UNODC. (2013) The Global Study on Homicide 2013. Retrieved from Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Winslow, D. & J. Dunn (2002) ‘Women in the Canadian Forces: Between Legal and Social Integration’, Current Sociology, 50(5): 641–67. WLB. (2014) If they had hope, they would speak. http://womenofburma.org/ if-they-had-hope-they-would-speak/, accessed 16 November 2016. WVS. (2014) World Values Survey. www.worldvaluessurvey.org, accessed 16 November 2016. Yuval-Davis, N. (1997) Gender & Nation. London: Sage Publications.

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The Trustworthy Peace?

O. Fiona Yap

Studies of East Asia have generally focused on one of four concerns: economic achievements, given the region’s generally remarkable performances; interest in inter-nation conflict, since the countries in the region assert competing territorial claims; the potential for civil wars, where civil-military relations and ethnic differences have led to regime changes or clashes over governance; and democratic development, where the region has seen political progress in emergent democracies that outpaces counterparts in other regions (Chan 2013; Beeson 2008; Moon & Rhyu 2011). Curiously, one area that is the foundation of each of these fields – domestic peace – is largely sidestepped in these studies. This is despite the fact that domestic peace underpins the full slate of economic achievements, outward-looking policies and democratic development. Why is a concept so fundamental to the big picture and daily quality of life bypassed by scholars? In part, it is due to the convention of studying peace as the absence of war or violence: inadequate and unsatisfactory as these may be, ‘war’ and ‘violence’ are operationally clear and observable, while the converse holds for peace (Regan 2014; Diehl 2016; Gledisch et al. 2014; Pinker 2011). In part, it is also due to the ongoing struggle to define peace: it is no coincidence that Patrick Regan, as President of the International Studies Association (2015–16), and Paul Diehl, in his Presidential Address to the Peace Science Society (2013), both highlighted 50 years of troubled – and fruitless – efforts to define peace and peace research (Regan 2014; Diehl 2016). Renowned conflict experts Nils Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle and Håvard Strand (2014: 145) underline the same difficulty: in their review of 50 years of research in the two pre-eminent peace and conflict journals, the Journal

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of Peace Research and Journal of Conflict Resolution, they note that efforts to broaden peace studies beyond negative peace – the absence of war – have ‘largely evaporated’. Patrick Regan’s 2013 presidential address recounts how, in 1977, ten prominent peace researchers, including Haward Alker, Anatol Rappoport, Edward Azar, Paul Soker and Johan Galtung, responded to a call by the editors of the Hiroshima Peace Science Journal to define peace. Although nine of the ten offered varying conceptions of ‘positive peace’ and only Anatol Rappoport made the case for studying negative peace, the definition of peace that has held sway in the literature on peace studies is negative peace (Regan 2014: 347–8). Fortunately, the study of peace has pushed beyond the investigation of negative peace. One such overlooked area that has gained attention is political protests. Political protest refers to unconventional political participation or engagement, outside of institutionalized processes, intended to challenge policies or politics, that stop short of violence (Norris 2002; Quaranta 2013; Benson & Rochon 2004; Anderson & Mendes 2006; Dalton et al. 2010). Political protests span a spectrum that includes petitions, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, unofficial strikes and occupation, all clearly aimed at influencing government decisions or political outcomes, but stopping short of those that directly threaten the political system, such as coups or violent political conflict (Dalton et al. 2010; Anderson & Mendes 2006; Quaranta 2013). Why study political protest? Perhaps more accurately, why do we need to bring political protests into the fold of peace studies? One reason is that it furthers the study of peace beyond negative peace: political protest has been snubbed by peace researchers due its non-violent aspects, but the phenomenon is of crucial importance to agendas that move beyond negative peace in order to understand how the breadth and depth of domestic peace can be enhanced. In particular, even as protests stop short of direct threats to the political system, scholars recognize that they are expressions and indications of conflict, dissent or discontent, and represent efforts to influence political process or policies outside of state-sanctioned and institutionalized channels (Varshney 2001; Quaranta 2013; Chenoweth & Cunningham 2013; Anderson & Mendes 2005; Dalton et al. 2009). Perhaps ironically, then, one reason for not studying political protests, and therefore not probing into the sources of protests, is a normative

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unease: acknowledging that political protests embody a form of conflict may risk that the conflict be resolved in ways that directly contravene liberal democratic values that embrace and foster individual freedoms. This normative position is probably best captured by Eck (in this volume) as follows: ‘protests are public and communal expression of preferences in order to effect change’ and thus should not be repressed. Few would disagree that repression of freedoms, including the freedom to protest, is repugnant. However, that should say that even though protests embody conflict, they should not invite or even justify repression by the authorities. Here, Varshney’s (2001) point regarding ethnic conflict is particularly relevant: even when waged through institutionalized channels, conflict remains because ‘when there are different ethnic groups that are free to organize, there are likely to be conflicts over resources, identity, patronage and policies’ (2001: 366). Scholarship does no justice to the understanding of peace, then, by ignoring the whats and hows of protests that themselves harness conflict for political ends, particularly if such protests are met with violence. Eck may be right that a polity where protests occur is more politically and socially preferable to one where protests are repressed. Again, this serves to underline the continuum between full-scale violence and absolute peace, and the need to consider and study the various points in between. Without a deeper understanding of protests, scholarship offers little more than shaming of autocrats who choose to abuse authority through structural repression of protests and other challenges, or violent repression of protestors. And, shaming – particularly based on western or liberal democratic values – has been an ineffectual strategy against autocrats in East Asia. At a minimum, the study of protests adds clarity and nuance to outlines of the breadth and depth of domestic peace. Eck’s comment that repressive state policies hide but do not dissolve discontent, and Bjarnegård’s observation of ‘partial, or shallow, peace’ in this volume are well taken here. In particular, if protests are fuelled by considerations other than ones asserted by the governments – that the protests are over economic losses or the lack of economic growth – then the government’s economic prioritization over political developments may ignite more violent forms of political protests as citizens increasingly turn away from weak or weakened institutions and processes. Understanding the roots

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of political protests, then, might clarify how the smoulders ignite into larger-scale conflict. Also important, most of what we know of political protests is drawn from rich empirical studies of societies that are both industrialized and democratic, where the cost of such participation is generally low (Benson & Rochon 2004; Dalton et al. 2009; Anderson and Mendes 2005); we know infinitely less of political protests in less-democratic or emergent democracies, where the costs incurred by protesters may be considerably higher. In addition, the ‘lines of conflict’ – dissatisfaction with the economy, frustration with political or civil restrictions – underlying political protests have generally been assumed rather than systematically studied (Chenoweth & Cunningham 2013: 272; Schock 2013); given that such assumptions are often drawn from studies of violent conflict, this risks refounding – once again – an understanding of peace as ‘negative peace’, as described in the introduction, i.e., peace as the absence of violence or war. In this chapter, I answer the call to expand and contextualize the understanding of peace beyond negative peace, and do so by considering the composition of political protests in East Asian countries. This chapter departs from the chapters in this volume that look at conflict only from the standpoint of regime repression, that is, the supply side of securing domestic peace. Such treatments fail to take into account the need to examine the inchoate manifestations of that conflict through political protests, which I construct as the demand side to domestic peace, where such peace is defined as the reduction of structural violence. The treatment in this chapter has taken on urgency: in response to political protests in their countries, governments in the emergent democracies of East Asia have prioritized growth over democratic and other political and institutional reforms. Amnesty International’s 2015 report pointedly notes the regressive political trends in South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia, where freedom of expression, association and assembly have seen increased restrictions; concerns for Indonesia and the Philippines, where excessive use of force or unlawful killings continue to intimidate the public; and a lack of progress for Taiwan and Singapore, where the right to assembly remains circumscribed (Amnesty International 2015). If scholars, many of whom view protest as a normatively positive form of political activity, continue to overlook the wellsprings of political protest, we risk perpetuating a general igno-

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rance that enables political elites to frame and drive the priorities of their respective nations. Such elite-framing ignores the sources of political protests and potentially increases citizens’ disenchantment or disenfran- chisement. Specifically, I investigate the composition and progression of political protest across time for seven countries in the region: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. My investigation of the sources of political protest pays particular attention to the effects of the economy and political trust in these countries. Do political protests that impinge on domestic peace represent grievances due to weaker-than-expected economic achievements? Will sidestepping political progress – such as strengthening rule of law and powers of institutions (rather than personnel) – while focusing on redress of the economic weakness satisfy the protesters? My results are instructive: on the one hand, I find no evidence that the economy is related to political protest; on the other hand, I find that the level of political trust correlates nearly perfectly with the intensity of political protest. Indeed, it seems that the failure to build political trust jeopardizes stability as the willingness to protest increases. The two-front assessment of the influences of political protest through economic performance and political trust, then, provides a systematic evaluation of the conditions that compromise domestic peace in East Asia. In the following, I describe the literature on the sources of political protests, with particular attention to the effects of economic performance and political trust, before proceeding to discuss the evidence associated with political protests and trust. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings.

Political protests, political trust and domestic peace in East Asia Strife – whether political, social or economic – affects national development, as studies of democratic peace, domestic civil conflicts, and civil- military relations underline (Chan 2013; Rosato 2003; Beeson 2008). In East Asia, strife has been the subject of empirical and theoretical study in examinations of democratic peace (conflict with other nations), domestic civil conflicts (civil war, civil insurgency), and economic performance (economic unrest). In contrast, the study of political protests – actions that are short of coups or violent political conflict – has seen

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limited attention. In this section, I describe the wellsprings of protest from political and economic standpoints, before turning to political trust to consider its potential countervailing effect on political protest. What is political protest? To recap, political protest denotes forms of unconventional participation, outside of institutionalized processes, that capture participants’ attempts to influence political outcomes or government decisions (Norris 2002; Quaranta 2013; Anderson & Mendes 2006; Dalton et al. 2010). Importantly, such political disenchantment is captured through a hierarchy of political actions – namely, petitions, boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes and occupation – that mark a transition in intensity starting from unconventional low-key practices. Options higher in the hierarchy require more effort among participants, embody more conflict, and also exert more pressure on their political targets (Quaranta 2013; Benson & Rochon 2004; Anderson & Mendes 2006; Dalton et al. 2010), so a lack of understanding of the sources of such political protests risks misap- prehension of domestic peace as the inverse of negative peace. More problematically, continued misunderstanding may mean that political elites continue to frame and drive the priorities of their respective nations in East Asia. Thus, current governments and some opposition parties have tied political protests to weak economic performance and have responded with renewed focus on growth, to the detriment of political progress or even democratic development. Such responses are potentially counterproductive: neglecting political development threatens to further weaken political institutions and fuel public dissatisfaction or distrust of politics that may underlie the political protests. In particular, political protest has roots in a mix of participant demands and political contexts. Is the current course of action – focus on the economy, even if at the expense of political development – the right response to political protests? To address this question, I consider: how is weak economic performance related to protest? The vast literature on voting in democracies confirms that governments that preside during times of weak economic performance are often punished at the polls (Cordova & Seligson 2009; Jordahl 2006; Yap 2013). In less-democratic regimes, weak economic performance often leads to more democratization and political liber- alization, either as efforts to avert challenges to the political system or

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following the success of such challenges (Haggard & Kaufman 1997; Mason & Clements 2002; Howard & Roessler 2006; Yap 2005). Thus, there is considerable empirical support for the idea that weak economic performance leads to political challenges for regimes throughout the democracy-authoritarian political spectrum: on the democratic end, weak economic conditions lead to rejection of the government while on the authoritarian end, weak economic conditions lead to rejection of the political system. What about emergent democracies? How is economic performance tied to political protest in these countries? Studies show that emergent democracies or partly free nations see more incidents or protests than repressive regimes or democratic ones (Anderson & Mendes 2006; Mishler & Rose 1997; Yap 2013). Thus, protests occur most often in emergent democracies that have seen an opening of the political system but where weak institutions are perceived to have failed to deliver political goods. Some studies suggest that emergent democracies face significant risk of democratic reversal when their economic performance is weak (Shin & Lee 2006; Cordova & Seligson 2009; Grosjean et al. 2013). However, political goods are distinguished from policy goods, so it is inappropriate for studies to conflate protests against weak political institutions with protests against weak economic performance. Political goods refer to influence on political processes and outcomes, such as civil liberties, political liberties and freedom of association and expression; policy goods refer to specific policy outcomes and include metrics such as economic performance (Almond & Powell 1982; Bratton & Lewis 2007; Rotberg 2014). Protests over the failure to deliver political goods, then, denote disenchantment with the political capacity of institutions, rather than dissatisfaction with policy outcomes such as the economy. To the extent that political protests denote frustration with political institutions, then building political trust rather than the economy may provide the key to resolving the political protests. What is political trust? Political trust captures public confidence in regularized political patterns under the democratic or democratizing political system, specifically, the facility and capacity of political institutions – such as contestable political succession, regularized competition, civil and political liberties, and freedom of association and expression – to deliver regularly political goods that produce fair outcomes

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(Evans & Whitefield 1995; Mishler & Rose 1997; Hetherington 1998; Mattes & Bratton 2007; Duch 2001). Democracies provide political and social goods in addition to economic ones; in times of economic weakness, these political or social goods fill in for the lack of economic performance. Political trust, then, captures trust in the system’s ability to deliver political goods regularly and fairly. Higher levels of political trust underlie higher levels of acceptance of a government’s policy choices, even if these choices may not always pave the way to policy success; consequently, the erosion of political trust compromises government policymaking since citizens have less patience and are more likely to press the governments to scrap policies – even well-conceived ones – before they have a chance to show results (Daugbjerg & Halpin 2010; Polidano 2000; Wagle 2000; Schneider & Ingram 1997; Lee & Haque 2006). More importantly, political trust is directly tied to political protest: recent country, regional and large-N studies tie increased protests and willingness to protest to citizens’ distrust of the government, particularly the government’s failure to control corruption (Mishler & Rose 2001; Chang & Chu 2006; Seligson 2002; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Clausen et al. 2011; Marien & Hooghe 2011). What are the bases of political trust? Importantly, the building blocks of political trust are learning and confidence: affirmative experiences within the political system build political trust and negative experiences undermine trust. These characteristics of political trust distinguish it from political naivety. Impressions of passive compliance in the col- lectivist societies in East Asia may suggest a passive trust that is more accurately characterized as political naivety. Political trust is not passive but, rather, emerges with institution building and increasing levels of trust are highly correlated with the facility and capacity of the democratizing system to deliver political goods. With a build-up of political trust, then, citizens may differentiate the performance of the political system from the government’s policy performance, such as economic success (Hetherington 1998; Mattes & Bratton 2007; Duch 2001; Yap 2013). The data shows that political protests can be tied directly to the lack of political trust, while economic performance is tied to citizens’ rejection of the government in democracies and the rejection of the political system in less-democratic countries. Emergent democracies may see more incidents or protests than repressive regimes or democratic ones

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both because a newly opening political system makes these strategies possible and because new and weak institutions are more likely to fail to deliver political goods than are more established institutions. These findings underline the smaller than commonly expected extent to which weak economic performance underlies political protests in the emergent democracies in East Asia. Governments, perhaps unaware of this motivation, have responded to protests by prioritizing economic growth over institution building. If weak economic performance were the source of political protests, then this prioritization might be a useful and peace-deepening response; however, to the extent that the protests capture the loss of public confidence in institutions and institution building, then the inattention to political development may fuel further political dissatisfaction and, in turn, further protests.

Evidence Heeding the call to expand and deepen understandings of peace beyond the absence of violence, I am interested in uncovering the motivations for political protests. This examination of East Asia pays particular attention to two roots: economic weakness and political trust. Specifically, some studies suggest that economic weakness may precipitate political protests in East Asia, as a result of dissatisfaction from the failure to meet the economic achievements of previous eras; a different set of studies, arguing that that erosion of political trust has decreased support for the government and amplified the willingness to challenge the government through protests, shows that political trust buffers the political system against protest. To uncover the influence of these sources, I draw on the successive waves of public opinion survey data collected by the World Values Survey. Although not all the countries in this chapter are covered by each wave, the broadening embrace of cross-national surveys such as the World Values Survey enables an increasing number of countries to be evaluated. As a result, of the seven countries I examine, most are surveyed in at least two waves, 2005–08 and 2010–13. Survey data for some countries, notably South Korea, was collected in 1982. The successive waves show how citizens’ responses changed over time and are particularly relevant for tracking the progression of political protests and augment the robustness of the conclusions drawn from the data.

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The first task is to address the question: how is political protest measured? The literature measures political protest as an index combin- ing five actions: signing petitions, joining boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes and occupying buildings (Quaranta 2013; Benson and Rochon 2004; Anderson and Mendes 2006; Dalton et al. 2010). Further, Anderson and Mendes (2006) note that measurement of political protests only in terms of actual behaviour underestimates unconventional participation, because individuals may choose not to report actual engagement in protest activities. Anderson and Mendes recommend contrasting participants who ‘would never do’ against responses of ‘have done’ and ‘might do’ to more accurately capture the scale of political protests and potential in a nation. Accordingly, I follow these constructs to build a political protest index that uses an additive scale across the five actions. What is the extent of political protests in these countries, and how have these changed over time? Table 10.1 combines data from several World Value Survey years, together with the Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties and the summary status of free, partly free, or not free for the countries, to report the responses of those who would never pursue political protest by survey years, Three features are notable: First, in general, the proportion of people who would never pursue political protest has fallen over time. That is, political protests are more likely to occur today than in the past. Second, more recent surveys show an increasing willingness of the respondents to pursue political protests; indeed, in the final wave of survey, generally almost half or more of the respondents are willing to or have engaged in political protests in their countries. Third, and perhaps most important, the number who would never pursue political protests does not appear to be correlated to regime freedoms. The third observation demands scrutiny. In South Korea, about 23 per cent of the 1982 respondents would never pursue political protest; while this number has changed over time, it has steadied at about 18 per cent in the 2005 and 2010 surveys. Interestingly, the proportion of those who would never pursue protest was lowest (about 8.6 per cent) in 2001, more than 14 years after democratization in the country. Likewise in Taiwan, the number of respondents who would never pursue protest was higher in 2006, when the country was classified as ‘free’, than it was

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Table 10.1: Democratic peace over time for East Asia Dependent Political Would never pursue Per cent of variable rights, civil political protest2 respondents liberties1 South Korea 1982 5.5 (NF) 224 23.09 1990 2.3 (F) 161 12.87 1996 2.2 (F) 173 13.85 2001 2.2 (F) 103 8.58 2005 1.2 (F) 218 18.17 2010 1.2 (F) 220 18.33 Taiwan 1994 3.3 (PF) 321 41.15 2006 2.1 (F) 760 61.94 2012 1.2 (F) 607 49.03 Indonesia 2001 3.4 (PF) 548 54.80 2006 2.3 (F) 822 40.79 The Philippines 1996 2.3 (F) 688 57.33 2001 2.3 (F) 720 60.00 2012 3.3 (PF) 683 56.92 Malaysia 2006 4.4 (PF) 704 58.62 2012 4.4 (PF) 1063 81.77 Thailand 2007 6.4 (NF) 1135 73.99 2013 4.4 (PF) 681 56.75 Singapore 2002 5.4 (PF) 699 46.23

Notes: (1) Freedom House political rights and civil liberties are measured on a 7-point scale, with 1 capturing most free and 7 least free. The scales are averaged to determine the status of the countries – Free (F = 1.0–2.5), Partly Free (PF = 3.0–5.0), or Not Free (NF = 5.5–7.0). (2) Political protest: sign petition, join boycott, peaceful demonstration, unofficial strike, or occupy. Source: Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/).

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in 1994, when the country was still only party free. Malaysia shows a similar pattern: the country is classified as partly free across two surveys in 2006 and 2012, but the number of those who would never pursue protest increased from 58.6 per cent to almost 82 per cent. For the Philippines, the number who would never protest has hovered around 57 per cent, notwithstanding some variability in regime freedoms in the country from free to partly free. Of the countries in this study, only respondents in Indonesia may be said to exhibit changes in willingness to protest that parallel changes in freedoms in the country. Indeed, the lack of correlation is emphasized when the survey responses are compared across countries. Consider, for instance, that Taiwan – rated by Freedom House as free in 2006 and 2012 – saw about 62 per cent and 49 per cent respondents respectively who would never pursue political protest; by comparison, Indonesia – rated by Freedom House as only partly free in 2001 and 2006 – saw significantly fewer respondents who would never pursue political protest, at about 55 per cent and 41 per cent respectively. Indeed, Taiwan’s 2012 figure of 49 per cent who would never pursue political protest is higher than Singapore’s 2002 figure of 46 per cent. Likewise, respondents in the Philippines in 2001 – when the country was rated free by Freedom House – reported that 60 per cent would never pursue political protest, a number that is higher than respondents in the partly-free countries of Indonesia (2001 and 2006), Malaysia in 2006, Thailand in 2013, and Singapore in 2002. What does the apparent lack of correlation between respondents’ willingness to pursue political protest and regime freedoms mean? As Eck in this volume notes, with a few exceptions, the data on political and civil liberties has shown remarkable constancy for East Asia. While regime freedoms are largely unchanged, the willingness to protest has generally increased. Indeed, to tie to the second noteworthy observation, only three countries see a minority of the respondents willing to or have pursued political protests: Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. That the Philippines, where ‘people power’ ousted President Ferdinand Marcos from office in 1986 and helped push for the removal of President Joseph Estrada for alleged corruption and abuse of power in 2001, sees more than half of the respondents claim never to pursue political protest is instructive: it underscores the point by Anderson and Mendes (2006) about the likely underreporting of engagement in protest activities.

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Likewise, in Thailand, where martial law was imposed in 2006 and 2014, the proportion of respondents who stated that they would never pursue political protest fell from 74 to 56.8 per cent. This result underscores the idea that the willingness to pursue or engage in protest is generally trending upwards, both in free and in less-free nations. Given the lack of correlation between regime freedoms and political protests in East Asia for the survey periods examined, the other sources investigated in this chapter – economic performance and political trust – take on added significance. How is economic performance or political trust related to protest? To capture economic performance, I follow the convention of using annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. How is political trust measured? The World Values Surveys have a series of questions on confidence in political and social institutions; however, a composite index that comprises a mix of these questions lacks empirical rigour. For example, legislative brawls in Taiwan and longstanding battles against executive corruption in the Philippines may have distorted such a composite measure (Mattes & Bratton 2007; Hetherington 1998; Yap 2013). A frequently suggested alternative is generalized trust: generalized trust reflects the individual’s experience with effective political and social institutions, which accords with the scholarship that political trust is based on learning and experience of the political institutions (Letki and Evans 2005). Recent studies also report consistent and robust correlations between generalized trust and political trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Zmerli & Newton 2008; Letki & Evans 2005). Accordingly, we have confidence that indications of political trust can be gleaned from surveys that seek responses to the question, ‘Most people can be trusted’. What do the results show? Figures 10.1 through 10.6 depict the results for South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, in the order of most to least democratic. Each country figure shows growth rate, level of political trust, percentage who would never protest, and the combined but reversed Freedom House score for political and civil freedoms. The reversed score means that a higher figure represents more freedoms while lower figures capture lower freedoms. Of the six countries, South Korea is the most intensively surveyed, with six waves of surveys. Taiwan and the Philippines have three waves of surveys recorded, while Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have two waves

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each. Singapore is omitted because the country had only one survey where responses to the question of protest were captured; one point in time does not offer much ground upon which to draw conclusions. In general, the figures capture the trends reported in Table 10.1: respondents who would never pursue protests have declined since the first survey for the country, or the next-to-most recent survey taken about six years ago, across the countries examined. The only country that bucks the trend is Malaysia, where regime freedoms have stayed constant between the two surveys. And, this trend does not appear to be tied to political and civil freedoms in the country: even in Thailand, which saw martial law imposed in 2006 and 2014, the number of respondents who claim they would never pursue protest has declined over the two surveys. Further, across the countries, there is no consistent relationship between economic performance and never-protest levels. Instead, excepting Taiwan, there is remarkable symmetry between the level of trust and level of never-protest responses.

Figure 10.1: Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in South Korea 15 40

10 30

20 0 Per cent: Never protest; Trust protest; Never cent: Per Growth rate; Regime freedoms Regime rate; Growth

-5 10 1982 1992 2002 2012

Growth Political and civil freedoms Never protest Trust

Note: Regime Freedoms is calculated from Freedom House measures of political rights and civil liberties on a 7-point scale. It inverts and sums the two measures, so that 1 captures least free and 7 most free, and higher figures represent more freedoms while lower figures capture lower freedoms. Source: Freedom House, 1972–2014; World Values Survey, 1980–2014; Asian Development Bank, 1980–2014.

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Figure 10.1, which maps growth, trust and protest in South Korea, shows a strong correspondence between trust and the never-protest levels. Interestingly, the graph shows that in 2001, both never-protest and trust levels dipped, yet the economy was doing better than its nadir in 1998. Another useful piece of evidence: when the economy dipped in 2010, levels of never-protest plateaued and did not dip. Also, it is worth noting that those who would never protest was at a low around 2002, when civil and political freedoms also dipped to a low. Thus, in South Korea, there is no relationship between regime freedoms and never-protest; likewise, there is no relationship between economic performance and never-protest. Among the six countries, the one nation where the trust and never- protest levels do not mirror each other is Taiwan, depicted in Figure 10.2. Instead, trust and never-protest are the inverse of each other. Still, for Taiwan, the never-protest levels are not mapped to economic performance: for instance, never-protest levels in 2010 are falling, re- flecting that more respondents are willing to protest, and this follows a peak in the growth rate for the nation. Perhaps also ironically, the level

Figure 10.2: Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Taiwan

15 60

10 50

40 0 Per cent: Never protest; Trust protest; Never cent: Per Growth rate; Regime freedoms Regime rate; Growth 30 -5 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Growth Political and civil freedoms Never protest Trust

(Note/Source as per Figure 10.1.)

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of those who would never protest parallels the increase in political and civil freedoms in the nation in the mid-2000s, that is, as freedoms rise, those who would not pursue political protests also increased. Thus, for the nation, there is no relationship between relationship between economic performance and never-protest, and also no relationship between regime freedoms and never-protest. The relationship for trust, the economy, and political protests for Indonesia is depicted in Figure 10.3. The pattern for protest is remarkably similar to trust in Indonesia, while there is little relation between protest and economic performance in the country. It is particularly relevant to note that economic performance in the country has generally sustained at or above 5 per cent GDP annually since the turn of the millennium, while political trust in the country has fallen over the same period of time. Only in the case of Indonesia does the decline in the never-protest levels coincide with increases in civil and political freedoms in the country. Of all the results, falling political protests in the country correspond most closely with rising political trust over the same period.

Figure 10.3: Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Indonesia

10 55

50 0

-5 45

-10 Per cent: Never protest; Trust protest; Never cent: Per Growth rate; Regime freedoms Regime rate; Growth

-15 40 1982 1992 2002 2012

Growth Political and civil freedoms Never protest Trust

(Note/Source as per Figure 10.1.)

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The relationship between political protests, trust and economic performance for the Philippines is captured in Figure 10.4. As with Indonesia, the never-protest level is a virtual mirror of the country’s trust level. Indeed, the falling level of never-protest since 2010 coincides with some of the higher levels of economic performance, and this never-protest decline occurs in a period of reduced political and civil freedoms in the country. Of the six countries depicted graphically, the Philippines is one of two countries with levels of trust below 10 per cent, at least 30 per cent lower than the average of the other countries. For the Philippines, then, the direction of political protests most closely parallels the trends in political trust in the country. Figure 10.5 shows the relationship for Malaysia, the other country with trust below 10 per cent. Malaysia reports the region’s highest levels of never-protest. For Malaysia, never-protest levels were at about 59 per cent in 2006, which increased to about 82 per cent in 2012. The level of never-protest in this country appears to defy the general trend across the other countries in this study. Still, the trend does not reflect any relationship between the economy and never-protest levels, and certainly does not capture any relationship between never-protest and freedoms

Figure 10.4: Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in the Philippines

10 60

40 6

4 20 2 Growth rate; Regime freedoms Regime rate; Growth Per cent: Never protest; Trust protest; Never cent: Per 0 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Growth Political and civil freedoms Never protest Trust

(Note/Source as per Figure 10.1.)

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Figure 10.5: Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Malaysia

10 80

5 60

0 40

-5 20 Per cent: Never protest; Trust protest; Never cent: Per Growth rate; Regime freedoms Regime rate; Growth

-10 0 1982 1992 2002 2012

Growth Political and civil freedoms Never protest Trust

(Note/Source as per Figure 10.1.)

in the country. Instead, a relationship between political trust and protest is more probable. For Thailand, Figure 10.6 shows a virtual symmetry between levels of never-protest and trust, while economic high points and low points do not show any correspondence with the level of never-protest. The level of those who would not protest in 2007 – about 74 per cent – dropped to about 57 per cent in 2013; for the same periods, trust levels were at 41.5 per cent in 2007, falling to 32.6 per cent in 2013. The country remains partly free across time, although the actual level of political and civil freedoms in the country reported in Table 10.1 shows a slight improvement. It is useful to note that, although the regime remains partly free and political and civil freedoms have only improved slightly, those who would never protest dropped by almost 20 per cent from 2007 to 2013. To summarize the findings, the results show that economic performance does not bear much relation to peoples’ willingness to engage in political protests across the countries in this study. By contrast, increased political trust is resoundingly related to the choice to refrain from political protests: the graphical depictions show virtual symme-

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Figure 10.6: Growth, trust, protest and freedoms in Thailand

10 70

5 60

0 50

-5 40 Per cent: Never protest; Trust protest; Never cent: Per Growth rate; Regime freedoms Regime rate; Growth

-10 30 1982 1992 2002 2012

Growth Political and civil freedoms Never protest Trust

(Note/Source as per Figure 10.1.)

try for four of the six countries surveyed, with one country showing a more probable relationship between trust and protest than between economic performance and protest. Importantly, the trends regarding political protests occur despite largely invariant levels of freedoms in the countries. Given the constant levels of freedom, the higher levels of political protests documented may not be tied to changes – particularly increases – in freedoms that may fuel political expression. Instead, the increase in political protests reflects inchoate manifestations of conflict in the East Asian countries.

Conclusion The study of political protests is useful, since the actions of first movers in countries that may have previously or currently maintained domestic peace through repression, rather than address structural inequalities, reveal the sources of discontent or dissatisfaction that may kindle larger scale conflict. Such a possibility is high for East Asia, given that governments have responded to political protests by prioritizing growth at the expense of political development. Recent developments in the region

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include re-engineering of political and economic structures, such as the suspension of candidate-nomination reforms in South Korea, the re-institutionalization of the president as party strongman in Taiwan, possible reduction of Supreme Court powers in the Philippines, and the abolition of direct elections for regional leaders (subsequently overridden by Presidential decree) in Indonesia (Korea Herald 11 November 2013; Taipei Times 11 November 2013; Jakarta Globe 14 December 2013; The Philippine Star 18 August 2014; Financial Times 26 September 2014). More generally, strife affects a nation’s political, social and economic development, so that the study of strife clearly matters. Yet, while East Asia region has been the subject of scholarship in studies of democratic peace, domestic civil conflicts and civil-military relations, the study of political protests in relation to domestic peace has seen limited attention. This oversight leads policy analysts and government officials to underestimate the potential of political protests as well as the full range of strategies that can be employed to satisfy concerned citizens. Protest captures unconventional participation that requires effort by participants, embodies conflict and also exerts pressure on extant institutions in the system. Further, the general increase in episodes of and willingness to participate in political protests in a region accustomed to high growth performance in previous, less-democratic eras has put stress on institution building and political development. In particular, governments and opposition groups in these emergent democracies have responded to protests by harkening back to politics of the previous era, during which economic growth was prioritized over development of political freedoms. This chapter addresses the need to deepen understanding of peace in the East region with an examination of political protests, and does so by investigating the extent to which various ‘lines of conflict’ – dissatisfaction with the economy, frustration with political or civil restrictions – underlie political protests. Using longitudinal analyses of survey data from the World Values Survey, I assess two sources of political protest that undermine democratic peace in East Asia: the role of economic conditions and the relevance of political trust. My focus on these considerations is theoretically driven: I assess the real-world relevance of previous theories that tie economic performance to citizens’ rejection of the government in democracies and to citizens’ rejection of the entire

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political system in less-democratic countries. I also assess the relevance of theories that suggest that emergent democracies may see more incidents or protests than repressive regimes or democratic ones and that argue that the opening of a political system, in conjunction with weak institutions that fail to deliver political goods, may erode political trust and impel political protests. Such evaluations are particularly important and timely for emergent democracies of East Asia, to contravene general impressions that the governments – by limiting political access and framing the political-economic priorities for the nations – have led the public to prosperity while avoiding problems of rent seeking that undermine general interests. The results are informative in at least three ways. First, although political and civil freedoms have largely remained constant across the countries surveyed, there is a general trend towards higher levels of political protests. Second, this study shows that high political trust correlates almost perfectly with low levels of political protests. Third, economic performance shows no relation to protest levels. Hence, building political trust, rather than higher levels of economic achievement, may provide the countervailing effect to political protests. These results highlight the risks that politicians or political elites take by setting institution building to the side while focusing on growth for their respective countries. They are also instructive of the need for institution building to nurture democratic peace in these nations, if fuelling further public dissatisfaction is to be avoided. At a minimum, the results here show that an emphasis on high growth performance, which was so effective during less-democratic eras, is unlikely to quell political protest.

References Almond, G. A. & G. B. Powell (1982) ‘Evaluating political goods and productivity’, International Political Science Review 3(2): 173–81. Amnesty International (2015) Amnesty International Report 2014/15: The State of the World’s Human Rights. London, UK: Amnesy International. Anderson, C. J. & S. M. Mendes (2006) ‘Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential’, British Journal of Political Science 36(1): 91–111. Anderson, C. J. & Y. V. Tverdova (2003) ‘Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science 47(1): 91–109.

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Beeson, M. (2008) ‘Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines: Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious?’ Armed Forces & Society 34(3): 474–90. Benson, M. & T. R. Rochon (2004) ‘Interpersonal Trust and the Magnitude of Protest A Micro and Macro Level Approach’, Comparative Political Studies 37(4): 435–57. Bratton, M. & P. Lewis (2007) ‘The durability of political goods? Evidence from Nigeria’s new democracy’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 45(1): 1–33. Chan, S., R. Hu & I. Sohn (2013) ‘Politics of detente: comparing Korea and Taiwan’, Pacific Review, 26(2): 199–220. Chang, E. C. C. & Y.-h Chu (2006) ‘Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?’ The Journal of Politics 68(2): 259–71. Clausen, B., A. Kraay & Z. Nyiri (2011) ‘Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey’, World Bank Economic Review 25(2): 212–49. doi:10.1093/wber/lhr018. Cordova, A. & M. Seligson (2009) ‘Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America’, PS: Political Science and Politics 42(4): 673–8. Dalton, R., A. Van Sickle & S. Weldon (2010) ‘The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour’, British Journal of Political Science 40(01): 51–73. Diehl, P. (2016) ‘Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace’. International Studies Quarterly 60(1): 1–10. Duch, R. M. (2001) ‘A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies’, American Political Science Review 95(4): 895–910. ‘Editorial: Future of Indonesia’s Democracy at Stake’ (2014) Jakarta Globe, 25 September. Evans, G. & S. Whitefield (1995) ‘The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies’, British Journal of Political Science 25(4): 485–514. Grosjean, P., F. Ricka & C. Senik (2013) ‘Learning, political attitudes and crises: Lessons from transition countries’, Journal of Comparative Economics 41(2): 490–505. Haggard, S. & R. R. Kaufman (1997) ‘The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions’, Comparative Politics 29(3): 263–83. Hetherington, M. J. (1998) ‘The Political Relevance of Political Trust. American Political Science Review 92(4): 791–808. Howard, M. M. & P. G. Roessler (2006) ‘Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes’, American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 365–381.

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‘Indonesian lawmakers scrap direct local elections’ (2014) Financial Times 26 September. Jordahl, H. (2006) ‘An Economic Analysis of Voting in Sweden’, Public Choice 127(3/4): 251–73. Lee, E. W. Y. & M. S. Haque (2006) ‘The New Public Management Reform and Governance in Asian NICs: A Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore’, Governance 19(4): 605–26. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2006.00330.x. Letki, N. & G. Evans (2005) ‘Endogenizing social trust: democratization in East-Central Europe’, British Journal of Political Science 35(03): 515–29. ‘Main Opposition flip-flops on candidate nominations’ (2014) Korea Herald 11 April. Marien, S. & M. Hooghe (2011) ‘Does political trust matter? An empirical investigation into the relation between political trust and support for law compliance’, European Journal of Political Research 50(2): 267–91. Mason, T. D. & J. Clements (2002) ‘Tiananmen Square Thirteen Years after: The Prospects for Civil Unrest in China’, Asian Affairs 29(3): 159–88. Mattes, R. & M. Bratton (2007) ‘Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience’, American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 192–217. Mishler, W. & R. Rose (1997) ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’, Journal of Politics 59(2): 418–51. ——— (2001) ‘Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures’, International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique 22(4): 303–20. Moon, C.-i. & S.-y. Rhyu (2011) ‘Democratic Transition, Persistent Civilian Control over the Military, and the South Korean Anomaly’, Asian Journal of Political Science 19(3): 250–69. Mo, Yan-chih (2013) ‘KMT heavyweights call for party unity’, Taipei Times 11 November. Norris, P. (2002) Democratic Phoenix. Political Activism Worldwide. New Social Movements, Protest Politics and the Internet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Polidano, C. (2000) ‘Measuring public sector capacity’, World Development 28(5): 805–22. Quaranta, M. (2013) ‘Measuring political protest in Western Europe: assessing cross-national equivalence’, European Political Science Review 5(03): 457–82. Regan, P. (2014) ‘Bringing peace back in: Presidential address to the Peace Science Society, 2013’. Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(4): 345–56.

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Rosato, S. (2003) ‘The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory’, American Political Science Review 97(4): 585–602. Rotberg, R. I. (2014) ‘Good Governance Means Performance and Results’, Governance 27(3): 511–18. Rothstein, B. & J. Teorell (2008) ‘What is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions’, Governance 21(2): 165–90. Schneider, A. L. & H. M. Ingram (1997) Policy Design for Democracy. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Seligson, M. A. (2002) ‘The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries’, Journal of Politics 64(2): 408–33. Shin, D.-C. & J.-c. Lee (2006) The Korea Democracy Barometer Surveys 1997– 2004. Aberdeen, UK: Aberdeen University Press. Varshney, A. (2001) ‘Ethnic conflict and civil society: India and beyond’, World Politics 53: 362–98. Villanueva, Marichu A, 2014, ‘Trusting the High Court’, Philippine Star August 18 Wagle, U. (2000) ‘The Policy Science of Democracy: The Issues of Method ology and Citizen Participation’, Policy Sciences 33(2): 207–23. Yap, O. F. (2005) ‘Bargaining in the Less-Democratic NICs: Model and Evidence from South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17(3): 283–9. ——— (2013) ‘Economic Performance and Democratic Support in Asia’s Emergent Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies 46(4): 486–512 Zmerli, S. & K. Newton (2008) ‘Social Trust and Attitudes Toward Democracy’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 72(4): 706–24.

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The Masculine Peace

Erik Melander

This chapter argues that understanding masculine honour adds an essential dimension to the debate about the East Asian Peace. While elements of masculine honour are ubiquitous, the variation in the strength of masculine honour across societies and over time has important consequences for the prevalence of violence at all levels, ranging from within the family to wars between states. The character of the peace that holds after or in between wars also differs depending on masculine honour. The East Asian peace is diluted and undermined by the lingering strength of masculine honour ideology in the region, especially in comparison to Western Europe. Masculine honour has a direct bearing on the question of what could lead to the breakdown of the East Asian Peace. Theories about power transition and history problems are prominent in the literature about war and peace in East Asia, and it is often argued that war may occur in East Asia because of China threatening to overtake the United States as the most powerful nation in the world (power transition; see for example Ross in this volume), or because memories of the problematic history in the region make current territorial disputes difficult to manage peacefully (the history problem; see for example Ryu in this volume), especially in the absence of satisfactory apologies on behalf of perpetrators of atrocities (usually singling out Japan for not apologizing appropriately). Proponents of these ideas seem to assume that the belligerent logics of power transition and history problems always apply, as if timeless and unconditioned by other factors. I argue that power transitions and history problems are more likely to disrupt the peace if societies with a strong masculine honour ideology are involved. I suggest that the presence of strong masculine honour ide-

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ology is a scope condition for power transition and history problems in this sense. Honour ideology enables history problems and power transitions to generate excessive hostility and fear, which may lead to war under certain circumstances. In Europe today, history problems and power transitions are not destabilizing. Traditional masculine honour ideology has abated much more in Europe than in East Asia. This provides a key to understanding why the risk of armed conflict is much greater in East Asia than in (most of) Europe. Indeed, the risk of war in Western Europe has declined to such an extent that this region has become the paradigmatic case of a security community as defined by Karl Deutsch (1957), meaning that expectations of peaceful change are so strong that members of the community no longer even prepare for the eventuality of war against each other. By contrast, East Asia is clearly not a security community in this sense. This chapter seeks to explain the role of masculine honour ideology in undermining peace both within and between nations, and preventing the development of security communities. The implications for East Asia, not least for Japan’s relations with China and Korea and for US relations with China, are important. I do not fully spell out these implications, partly for lack of space and partly because so little empirical research has been undertaken about East Asian masculine honour ideologies. Masculine honour ideology is an aspect of gender relations, and studies have found that individuals who endorse masculine honour ideology tend to hold more misogynist views. When masculinity is redefined and delinked from the logic of honour, relationships between men and women progress toward equality. Improved gender equality in the medium- to long-term will be decisive for whether or not peace can take hold more deeply in East Asia. An ongoing cultural change may render history problems and problems of power transition much less consequential. My argument thus challenges those theories about causes of war which disregard norms and ascribe explanatory importance only to the distribution of power, economic interests and the like. In East Asia, and in particular in relations between China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, historical wrongs are often and acrimoni- ously invoked in politics, and territorial disputes serve as focal points for nationalist rhetoric laden with the language of honour (for a review

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of works dealing with historical memory in East Asia while referring to social science theory, see Johnston 2012: 67–69). For example, official Chinese statements commonly lament that an adversary ‘hurts the feelings of the Chinese people’ (Mair 2011), and incidents in ongoing disputes, particularly with Japan, sometimes leads to officially tolerated mass demonstrations that involve flag burnings and physical attacks against symbols of the foreign adversary. In Japan, on the other hand, official attempts at apologizing for historical wrongs committed by Japan are undermined by outbursts of protest by strong, conservative elements who deny that Japan has anything to apologize for (Buruma 1995). Sometimes the historical events themselves are proffered as explanations for why international relations in East Asia seem so difficult and conflictual, but equally difficult historical experiences elsewhere have been overcome and no longer play any role in fuelling conflict in main- stream politics. A better understanding of the East Asian Peace can hence be gained by comparison with other regions of the world. Dramatic examples include relations between Germany and France, Germany and Poland, and Sweden and Denmark. Historical territorial disputes in Western Europe are not the focus of active conflict today, and historical wrongs are not discussed in an accusatory manner. A case in point is the renewed territorial dispute between Sweden and Denmark about the island of Hesselö in 1983, which was dealt with without any nationalistic overtones, talk about hurt feelings, or flag-burning. Another example is how people and leaders in Germany reacted when, in 2015, demonstrators and media in Greece depicted present-day Germany as a Nazi state, and Chancellor Merkel as a Nazi officer. Merkel responded with great cool and stated that in discussions with Greece and other European countries, ‘We Germans do have a special responsibility to deal in an aware, sensitive and knowledgeable way with what we perpetrated under Nazism.’ No German government representatives complained that the feelings of the German people were hurt. Theories on the role of history problems and on power transition hinge on assumptions about how states assess whether other states have hostile intent (for an excellent review and critique with an application to US–China relations, see Chan 2008). The most straightforward version of power transition theory assumes that states act as if other states always have hostile intent; all that matters are considerations of relative power,

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and therefore assessing intent is irrelevant. This view of state behaviour is in line with a hard core version of the realist school of international relations: offensive realism. According to this school, states always strive to maximize power and will use opportunities to gain relative power advantages by taking the offensive. This implies that power transitions inevitably represent grave threats that force states to consider preventive war by the state descending in relative power, or preemptive war by the ascending power if it believes that the declining rival will launch a preventive war. The main difference with defensive realism is that it distinguishes between states satisfied with the status quo and revisionist states. In the context of an impending power transition, the ascending state is only likely to be dealt with as a threat if it is assessed to be revisionist. Power transition among status quo powers is less destabilizing. Hard core realists (e.g., Mearsheimer 2006) disregard ideology and culture. But honour matters. Honour has been defined as ‘the right to be treated as having a certain worth’ and ‘a right to respect’ (Stewart 1994: 21). Most societies and cultures have a concept of honour that means something along the lines of honesty, integrity and virtuous conduct. However, honour also has a more sinister meaning. The traits and behaviours that earn honour in this latter sense have to do with strength and domination, and the respect that is earned entails the right to privilege and precedence (Nisbett & Cohen 1996: 4). Accordingly, honour in anthropology and psychology refers to a reputation that entails the right to respect and precedence in social interactions. How honour is gained and lost typically differs for men and women. For men, honour follows a reputation for strength and toughness. To increase and preserve honour, men must be prepared to use violence in response to displays of disrespect. A man’s failure to react aggressively to an insult can be interpreted as indicating a lack of strength and hence as an inability to protect himself, his family and his assets (Nisbett & Cohen 1996). Evolutionary psychologist Todd Shackelford proposes that all men have the psychological mechanisms that produce the behaviours that build or defend honour, and that the circumstances determine whether the mechanisms serving to maintain reputation are activated or not. The ubiquity of these mechanisms among men leads Shackelford to theorize that they are evolved responses to the adaptive problem of mate retention (2005). Because the parental investment associated with pregnancy

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and delivery is different for men and women, and because of paternity insecurity, behaviour related to mate retention has evolved differently for men than for women. In particular, violent sexual jealousy and deterrence of sexual rivals are behaviours that would have been adaptive for men more than for women (Buss 1988; Buss & Shackelford 1997). From an evolutionary perspective, the reproductive capacity of women in particular is a valuable resource that can be stolen in the form of extra- pair copulation, kidnapping or rape. This form of theft has been a constant possibility in the ancestral human past, and honour mechanisms are an evolved adaptation to this problem (Shackelford 2005). Honour thus also entails controlling female sexuality. For example, a man loses honour if his wife is adulterous, and this honour can be at least partially restored with violence. For women, honour requires deference to her husband (or father and brothers) and ‘the avoidance of behaviours that might threaten the good name of the family (e.g., adultery or sexual im- modesty)’ (Vandello & Cohen 2003). Honour thus refers to a system in which individuals are assigned status and right to precedence based on how well one lives up to a code of honour that, for men, entails deterring or redressing affronts with violence and, for women, chastity and family fidelity. Traditional ideals of manhood everywhere ascribe, at least to some extent, a superior position for men relative to women. They also prescribe gender roles: men must be warlike and dominant. Real men are supposed to be tough, brave, resistant to pain, and able to steel themselves against potentially weakening influences of soft emotions. For men, violence is an appropriate response to affronts; men who back down when challenged lose status. Moreover, male privileges vis-à-vis women are linked to their role as potential warriors, and these privileges tend to be seen as natural. Moreover, a man of honour must guard the chastity of female family members. Also, women tend to espouse and perpetuate this understanding of what manhood means. Much of the literature on honour uses the term ‘honour culture’ as a shorthand that refers to societies in which honour norms prevail. For example, it is often stated that an honour culture exists among whites in the South of the United States, but not so much in the North (Nisbett & Cohen 1996). However, an evolutionary perspective suggests that elements of honour culture exist in all cultures, and that the prominence

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of honour in a society, and for a particular individual, will vary with the specific circumstances. Culture and circumstance shape how these psychological mechanisms play out. Societies can make major turnarounds, as exemplified by the shift in Scandinavia from the extreme honour ideologies of Viking ancestors to today’s relatively peaceful and gender- equal attitudes (Potts & Hayden 2008). In Njal’s Saga – the greatest of the early medieval Icelandic sagas about Viking-age family feuds – the perhaps most memorable character is the tragic hero Gunnar Hamundarson. Gunnar is described as the best skilled in arms, the most courteous of all men, and a loyal friend. Gunnar had a dispute with a man named Oktell, which the local governing assembly settled to Gunnar’s great advantage. In a subsequent riding accident, Otkell wounds Gunnar’s ear with his spur, resulting in a bleeding gash. In a decisive turn of events, Otkell’s friend spreads the rumour that Gunnar shed tears when Otkell rode over him. When hearing of this, Gunnar comments, ‘We must not be over-sensitive’, but immediately arms himself and sets off to ambush Otkell. With his famous atgeir – a type of polearm – in hand, he calls out to Otkell and his seven companions: ‘Get ready to defend yourselves. The atgeir is here now. Now you shall see if you can make me weep.’ In the ensuing fight, Gunnar kills all eight men (with the assistance of his brother, who arrives on the scene at the last minute). Viking society was an extreme honour culture, and a man of Gunnar’s stature could not bear the humiliation of being accused of crying, although he had already proven himself by killing several men in battle and gained a formidable reputation from his journeys abroad. The sagas are full of similar examples of how challenges to manliness are met with swift violence. Viking male honour is moreover tied to a need to differentiate men from women, and hence men can be goaded into violent action by insinuations that they behave like the weak womenfolk (Byock, 2001; Jakobsson 2007; Ystgaard 2007; Sandquist 2012). In contrast, Magnus Magnusson, a modern descendant of Gunnar’s people and translator of Icelandic sagas, finds it ‘a little pathetic, now, to read how vulnerable these men were to calls on their honour’ (Magnusson & Pálsson 1970). Indeed, compared to men in most other societies, men in contemporary Iceland, and in the Nordic countries in general, are probably among the most peaceful and the least concerned with traditional gender roles.

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Striking parallels to the Viking honour culture are replete in the history of East Asia, most famously perhaps in Japan, where the extreme warrior ethos bushido continues to have lingering consequences today. In feudal Japan, the ruling samurai warrior class adhered to an honour code that prescribed hypersensitivity to perceived slurs paired with constant preparedness to unleash violence in response. In her analysis of the role of samurai culture historically and today, Ikegami (1995: 199–200) retells a well-known incident that epitomizes this mentality: two samurai meet on a bridge on a stormy day, and their umbrellas collide. Since neither man offers an apology, a deadly fight ensues, followed by a protracted vendetta (the Mido no Mae Vendetta of 1687). Ikegami also shows how a male-dominated culture that condones honour killings of adulterous wives developed as an element of the honour code. In his incisive analysis of nationalism in modern Japan, Benesch (2014) examines how Japanese thinkers invented a modern version of bushido during Japan’s search for a new identity in the late nineteenth century. This modern version of bushido emphasized unquestioning loyalty to the emperor as well as bravery and self-sacrifice in battle, and served as an important ideological resource until Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. A similar kind of honour system is described by Hinsch in his 2013 analysis of the changes in masculinities throughout Chinese history. According to Hinsch, the roots can be found in antiquity, and the code of masculine honour grew in strength in Eastern Zhou society (771–256 bce), and in particular during the chaotic period known as the Warring States era. Hinsch describes a classical honour system, noting that contemporary Mandarin speakers tend to describe honour using the metaphor of face (p. 32), and hold that remnants of masculine honour endure today despite the rapid transformations in Chinese male identity by forces such as capitalism, imperialism, modernization and revolution. Research has indeed established that the ideas of masculinity and femininity, including notions of honour, vary enormously over space and time. A crucial insight from this research is that honour is often redefined, and actors in society can intentionally influence such redefinition. Also, it is most fruitful to view adherence to honour norms as varying among individuals rather than among societies, with societal change following from numerous changes at the individual level. Hence this chapter uses ‘honour ideology’, which is something that an individual can embrace

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to a greater or lesser extent, rather than ‘honour culture’, since the term ‘culture’ is often understood as immutable and homogenous for a given cultural group. Of course, the degree to which individuals adhere to honour ideology has aggregate effects on the societal level, for example, in terms of the frequency of intimate partner abuse in connection with sexual jealousy. A strong reason for treating endorsement of honour ideology as re- siding within the individual is methodological individualism. According to Jon Elster, a prominent proponent of this perspective, the elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. Only individuals can act. Corporate decision-makers such as firms and governments, and social institutions such as constitutions and taxes, are created, obeyed or defied by individuals. Talking about collective actors and institutions is often useful as a simplifying shorthand, but ultimately social science explanations must rely on individuals interacting with each other (Elster 1989). Moreover, collective concepts such as culture cannot explain any of the variation in behaviour among individuals within the same collective (Figueredo et al. 2001). For example, why are some individuals in an honour culture, such as that existing among whites in the South of the United States, willing to absolve rivals of an honour-related felony, while others are not (Nisbett & Cohen 1996)? Indeed, as Barnes et al. point out the research on the effects of honour culture observes that ‘individuals’ acceptance of this ideology does not perfectly follow geographical boundaries’, such as the South, and that such regional divisions ‘are always used to represent differences in masculine honour ideology endorsement among persons’ (2012: 1020, italics in original). This does not mean that culture is dismissed as inconsequential. For the purposes of social theorizing, culture has been defined as ‘the humanly invented realm of producing artefacts and meaningful interpretations of experience and their symbolic representation’ (Parker et al. 2003: 207). The authors of this definition note that the ‘complex symbolic manipulation embodied in natural language’ is central to culture, and that culture enables ‘humans to tap the experience of past generations’ (ibid.). Cultures are furthermore non-biologically transmitted, collective phenomena that are shaped over long periods of time, meaning that most of those who did the shaping may already be dead. Culture has the potential to influence our activities, but cultural resources have to

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be applied by human agents; they do not by themselves produce any activity. Culture prescribes socially preferred ways of doing things, but there is always a choice of acting against the norm (although the consequences may be dire) (ibid. 71–87). The tenets of honour ideology clearly constitute a cultural resource in the sense that they have to be learned, they are shared and shaped by many individuals, and they condition behaviour. It may thus in some contexts be fruitful to think of honour as an aspect of culture, but this does not undermine the arguments above. Honour ideology should be theorized and studied at the level of the individual. Competition for honour is essentiality zero-sum in character, as one person’s right to precedence can only come at the expense of the right to precedence of someone else (Frank 1985; Fukuyama 2011). It is nonetheless possible that honour and deference serve to limit the amount of intra-group violence, compared with a hypothetical condition of unbridled competition (cf. Elster 1989: 113f.). Hence I argue that individuals who endorse honour ideology tend to view relations with others as a zero-sum conflict rather than a positive sum competition. Consequently, states where honour ideology is strong can be expected to produce and be influenced by more offensive realists, and fewer defensive realists, and therefore power transitions that involve such states will indeed be particularly threatening. Importantly, a strong honour ideology in a society, and in particular among opinion leaders and decision-makers, will also influence how history problems play out. In her incisive analysis of the logic of apologies for past atrocities, Lind (2010) identifies three mechanisms through which state behaviour, with regard to apologizing (or not) for past atrocities, influences an opposing state’s assessment of its intentions. First, apologizing is a costly and hence credible signal of peaceful intent, because it makes it more difficult to mobilize support for future wars of aggression. Strong support for war typically requires that the enemy can be depicted as the aggressive party, so a state that openly ad- mits and actively remembers its own earlier aggression can less credibly rationalize aggression in the future. The relevant audience, whom the government wants to sway, will be more likely to question the necessity of war. Second, apologies are indications of a changed identity, so the apologizing state can be expected to behave differently than in the

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past. Third, failure to apologize properly communicates lack of respect, which in turn provokes anger and hostility among aggrieved parties. A crucial complication discussed by Lind is that the effect of apologizing is often undermined by a conservative domestic backlash in the apologizing country, since conservative elements tend to be more nationalistic and have an impenitent view of their country’s past. I argue that honour ideology plays a role in all three mechanisms. When honour ideology is strong, the side that might otherwise apologize will be more reluctant to do so, because the logic of honour implies that the apologizing party presents itself as weak and submissive. On the receiving side, the transformed identity that the apology indicates may be exploited, instead of received graciously, if honour ideology remains strong among the recipients. Attacks on someone else’s perceived failure to apologize, and the implied disrespect, are also perfectly in line with the logic of honour. When honour ideology is strong, disrespect must be met with displays of strength, or else honour will be lost. When honour ideology is weak, the disrespect implied by not apologizing will provoke much less hostile behaviour, because insults are considered to reflect more badly on the insulting party than on the party being insulted. Finally, the domestic conservative backlash that sometimes undermines the conciliatory effect of an apology is more likely to happen in an apologizing country where opinion leaders are imbued with a strong honour ideology. Scholars have begun to garner evidence of the effects of honour in international relations. For example, Barnes et al. (2012) find that honour endorsement among individuals predicts taking country-level threats personally and approving of militant responses to terrorism. Barnes et al. (2014) argue that one’s strength of identification with a nation mediates the relationship between honour endorsement and support for militant reactions to perceived provocations. Just as endorsers of honour values use interpersonal aggression to discourage affronts, they tend to believe that strong reactions to national threats signal national strength and intolerance of disrespect. Those who endorse honour ideology are thus particularly likely to take perceived affronts to their nation personally, and to react with demands for a strong response. They find support for this argument in the results of survey data on honour endorsement, nationalism, opposition to illegal immigration and approval of the US

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war on terror. American decision-makers and candidates for political office need to take such sentiments into account. An ingenious study by Dafoe and Caughey (2016) makes use of previous research findings that establish honour as generally more important to white males from the South of the United States than to white males from the North. The authors treat the haphazard variation in the cultural backgrounds of US presidents as a natural experiment and analyze the effect of a Southern background on US behaviour in international militarized disputes. Taking into account other characteristics, they find that disputes under Southern presidents are approximately twice as likely to involve US uses of force. This study shows that the degree to which the highest decision- makers themselves embrace honour ideology matters greatly for war and peace. Moreover, all regimes to a greater or lesser extent need to take into account the views of the selectorate, that is, those who have a say in choosing the leaders, whether this is a broad segment of society (as in democracies), or a much smaller elite (as in non-democracies such as China) (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Indeed, regimes that are not democratically elected, and hence lack this form of legitimization, typically have to worry more about the risk of anti-regime uprisings from dissatisfied groups. Furthermore, all regimes may be tempted to play on nationalism in the population to garner support. In this connection, Chan’s (2008) conclusion is noteworthy: despite the absence of democratic elections, the regime in China is becoming increasingly concerned about its level of popular support. The popularity or unpopularity of going to war is particularly important for regimes, because waging war with a limited support is much more difficult and risky for regimes than if a war is massively popular. Accordingly, regimes everywhere have invested enormous effort into fostering citizens into loyal supporters and patriotic soldiers (Sheehan 2007). It follows that sentiment in the broader society about the legitimacy of war and other policy options involving heightened risk of military confrontation should influence how leaders choose to act (although leaders of course sometimes choose to risk ignoring or overriding popular sentiments). Scholars have suggested ways of measuring adherence to masculine honour ideology using survey instruments that could be applied to a representative sample of a relevant group (such as the whole population

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of a country, or registered voters). However, these proposed indexes of masculine honour ideology have only been tested on very limited sub-groups (most often university students) and not across countries, and hence they cannot offer insights regarding how pervasive masculine honour ideology is in a region such as East Asia or Western Europe. It is therefore necessary to rely on more indirect measures. Given that belief in the inferiority of women is a component of masculine honour ideology, it follows that measures of gender equality, as well as measures of attitudes to gender equality, should be systematically (albeit imperfectly) related to the strength of masculine honour ideology in a society. This suggests that both measures of the level of equality between women and men as well as measures of attitudes to gender equality can be used to indirectly assess masculine honour ideology. The World Values Survey (WVS 2015) conducts nationally representative surveys of most countries in the world, and presents both an- onymized individual-level responses and aggregated numbers by country and year of survey. The Gender Equality Scale measures attitudes to gender equality and has been measured in many countries over a long period of time. According to the summary presentation in the codebook for the Quality of Government Data set, the WVS Gender Equality Scale: is a 0–100 scale composed of five items: On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do, (agree coded low). When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women, (agree coded low). A university education is more important for a boy than a girl, (agree coded low). Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary? (agree coded low). If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove? (disapprove coded low) (Teorell et al. 2015: 741). The mean of the scale is 50 and the standard deviation 15. It is striking that all countries in East Asia, for all surveyed years, have values below the global mean in the Gender Equality Scale – except Thailand in 2007 (the latest survey for Thailand) when Thailand was almost exactly on the mean (50.86). Despite continuing to lag behind the world, large improvements have occurred in several countries over recent decades. For example, South Korea has improved from 33 in 1982 to 46 in 2005, Japan from 32 in 1981 to 47 in 2005, and Taiwan

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from 39 in 1994 to 47 in 2006. These three improvers are now close to the global average. By contrast, China entered the data set in 1990 with 41, saw some improvements in the following two surveys, but then fell back to 40 in the latest survey in 2007. China thus clearly lags behind in attitudes embracing gender equality in East Asia. At the same time, the acceptance of gender equality is much lower in East Asia compared to Western Europe. In the latest available survey, all countries in Western Europe have a value on the Gender Equality Scale at least one standard deviation higher (that is, greater than or equal to 65), than the global mean; this holds for the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as well. If one accepts the premise that the Gender Equality Scale is an indirect measure of adherence to masculine honour ideology, then it is possible to draw several conclusions from these numbers. First, masculine honour ideology should be much stronger in East Asia than in Western Europe. Second, masculine honour ideology should have weakened considerably in East Asia, except in China and the Philippines, where no improvement is visible according to this scale. The countries with the weakest masculine honour ideology in East Asia should be Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam and Japan (but even in these countries, honour ideology should be considerably stronger than in Western Europe). It is important to recall that the countries in Western Europe have not always been so accepting of equality between women and men. The improvement in the status of women is a relatively recent phenomenon. For example, women were not given the right to vote until around the First World War in most countries in Western Europe (and considerably later in some, such as France and Italy). At the time when women gained suffrage, war was generally considered a noble and manly undertaking in Western Europe, and honour was frequently invoked when discussing both international and personal conflicts (Sheehan 2007). Masculinity, militarism and privilege were closely interlinked in Europe at the time: The army was exclusively and aggressively male. Military culture, both in the barracks and outside it, was dominated by a kind of masculinity that emphasized physical strength and courage as well as heavy drink- ing, sexual adventures, and random violence. If … the soldier was the ideal citizen and the army the school of nationhood, then it was obvious

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that only males could be fully qualified members of the national community. (Sheehan 2007: 19) Unsurprisingly, resistance to female suffrage was massive. When the First World War erupted, large crowds of people streamed into the streets to celebrate, a mood which surely seems incomprehensible and bizarre for most modern Europeans. A famous and ominous example can be found in a photograph from Munich’s Odeonplatz taken on 2 August 1914. In the picture, a young Adolf Hitler can be discerned in the crowd supporting war against the allies, the people around him smil- ing and waving hats (Sheehan 2007: 61). It was not only young men like Hitler who celebrated war in 1914. James Sheehan (2007: 62) quotes three of the most influential intellectuals of the time: In Vienna, Sigmund Freud applauded Austria’s decision to strike against Serbia as ‘a release of tension through a bold-spirited deed’ … ‘All my libido,’ he declared ‘is given to Austro-Hungary.’ Max Weber … wel- comed the war with equal gusto: ‘No matter what the outcome will be, this war is great and wonderful.’ In Paris, Émile Durkheim … believed that the war would contribute to ‘reviving the sense of community.’ However, the horrors of the First World War instead led to a decline in masculine honour ideology in Western Europe. The gradual decline in the importance of honour in the English-speaking parts of the world can be illustrated with the information tool Google Books Ngram Viewer, which produces graphs of the usage frequency of a particular word in more than 5 million digitized books by publication date. The figure below shows how the usage of the word honour (spelled honour or honor) in books published in English changes over time. The Ngram graph clearly shows that the English-speaking world, as reflected in published books, was much more concerned with honour before the First World War than today, and that honour was even more important in the 19th century. Today, arguments along the line that war is necessary to uphold the greatness of one’s nation, or even that war is an appropriate tool of foreign policy beyond self-defence, are rarely heard in Europe. Indeed, the largest demonstration in European history was an anti-war protest on 15 February 2003, when millions of demonstrators in London, Rome, Berlin and other cities protested against the impending US-led war against Iraq (Sheehan 2007: xiii). In Western Europe, valorization of both war and masculine honour

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Figure 11.1: Use of the word ‘honour’ or ‘honor’ over time

0.024%

0.020%

0.016%

0.012%

0.008% (honour + honor)

0.004%

0.000%

1800 1840 1880 1920 1960 2000 Source: Graph created using Google Books Ngram Viewer (http://books.google.com/ngrams). Software developed by Michel, Aiden, et al. (2010).

ideology have diminished as equality between men and women has progressed. Today, war is widely seen as permissible only as a last resort, and many Europeans would only accept war in self-defence. International affairs are typically conducted in a low-key, matter-of-fact, almost bu- reaucratic tone, and high-strung statements invoking honour or status are seldom heard from European leaders. The calm and perfectly peaceful resolution of the Hesselö dispute between Sweden and Denmark in 1983 is a good case in point, especially in light of the difficult history between the two nations. The formation of the modern centralist Swedish state began in violent opposition to Denmark and, for more than three centuries (ca. 1471–1814), Sweden and Denmark fought numerous wars. Indeed, Sweden and Denmark are among the pairs of nations that have fought each other the most frequently in recorded history (Världens Historia 2015). Particularly devastating wars were fought in the then- Danish province of Scania, which had been one of the most valuable parts of Denmark for centuries when it was conquered by Sweden in 1658. The province was subsequently subjected to harsh, forced assimilation into Sweden as local guerrilla resistance was brutally crushed. When a Danish company started test drillings for oil in disputed waters near the small island of Hesselö off the Scanian coast in 1983, the Swedish government delivered a Note of Protest to Denmark, but a settlement was soon reached via peaceful negotiations (Jacobsson 1997).

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Above it was noted that although attitudes to gender equality in East Asia are far less favourable to gender equality than in Western Europe, considerable progress has been made in several important countries. In-depth studies of the construction of masculinity in some of these countries provide additional evidence that the grip of masculine honour ideology has begun to weaken in parts of East Asia. Mikanagi (2011) shows that five different types of dominant masculinity have succeeded each other in Japan in the period from the Meiji restoration to the present, and these masculinities differ in terms of the relative emphasis placed on warrior ideals versus literati ideals in the construction of what it means to be a successful man. During the Second World War, a dominant men-as-soldiers masculinity emphasized loyalty to the Emperor, violence and physical toughness. After the defeat in 1945, this type of warrior masculinity was replaced by salaryman masculinity, lacking almost any association with soldiering and war, and instead valor- izing knowledge and technology more than physical strength. During the Allied Occupation, women gained formal equality under the law at the same time that Japan was demilitarized. The occupation authorities expected that a new type of masculinity in line with the American ideal of the nuclear family would take hold, with manhood being defined in terms of loving fathers and breadwinners. However, changes in the economy led to dominance of the salaryman masculinity, with its emphasis on fierce dedication to one’s employer and extreme work hours. This type of masculinity is largely delinked from pure warrior ideals, but maintains a strict division of roles between men and women: the ideal husband is employed outside the home and the ideal wife is a housewife. In recent years this salaryman masculinity has weakened somewhat, and Mikanagi concludes that it is unclear what will replace it. She does point, however, to survey data that show that the sex-based division of labour between salarymen and housewives is rapidly losing its appeal among both men and women in Japan. Naturally, there are in any society several masculinities, and one and the same individual can embrace different variants of masculinity in different periods of life or even during different times of the day, depending on the context. Here the primary concern is with the most prevalent and influential type of masculinity in a society at any given time. Yet it could also be relevant to consider variants of masculinity that are less broadly

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adhered to but may have a special importance for issues of war and peace. For example, Frühstück (2007) analyzes masculinity within modern Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF). She shows that the predominant masculinity in the Japanese military is at least in part defined in opposition to the salaryman masculinity referred to above (and not so much in contrast to civilian women). For many soldiers, the life of the salaryman appears as intolerably boring, and the ‘samurai spirit’ and ‘corporate warrior’ identity that supposedly imbue the white-collar salaryman is largely dismissed by the soldiers as ridiculous and lacking in true warrior qualities. However, a theme throughout Frühstück’s book is the uncertainty among modern Japanese soldiers about their own identity as warriors. The version of militarized masculinity prevalent in the SDF is at any rate defined also in contrast to the identity of the soldiers of the former Imperial Army. The SDF distances itself from the unquestioning loyalty, aggressiveness and disregard for the integrity and lives of the soldiers of the Imperial Army, and instead attempts to construct a soldierly identity around the mission to help and protect the civilian population with maximum possible safety for the service members. The impression given by Frühstück’s work is that, broadly speaking, members of the SDF are unlikely to support wars of aggression. In South Korea, a similar gendered division of labour developed during the decades following the Korean War. The great difference compared with Japan is that South Korea introduced universal conscription for men, and the status of having served in the armed forces became associated with formal privileges in the labour market (e.g., the extra-point system). Masculinity in South Korea became strongly militarized at the same time as male precedence over women was reinforced. This gender system began to weaken following democratization, when South Koreans were transformed from subjects who earned status through participation in the gender-based system of male warrior-providers and female housewives to citizens with democratic rights. In particular, possibilities opened up for men and women to claim and practice their citizenship rights through autonomous organizations that monitor and promote human rights (primarily educated middle-class men), or the labour movement (primarily working-class men), or the women’s movement (primarily women, generally of all class backgrounds) (Moon 2005). The Japanese and South Korean cases indicate how gender relations,

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and masculine honour ideology, may be changing in key East Asian countries. The trends in the data from the World Values Survey discussed above suggest that attitudes in favour of gender equality are progressing in most of the region, although unevenly. The case of Western Europe illustrates deep changes in masculine honour ideology over the last century and highlights implications for how warlike – or rather unwarlike – this region has become as a consequence. I have argued that the intensity of honour ideology in a country or group of countries has a decisive effect on whether or not history problems and power transitions may lead to war. I propose that the presence of relatively strong honour ideology is a scope condition for both of these theories. This suggests that part of the reason why history problems and power transition seem so threatening in East Asia, but are seen as far less dangerous in Europe, is that masculine honour ideology has lost so much of its grasp on Europeans. An analysis of the waxing and waning of masculine honour in East Asia adds to studies on the role of nationalism in the region, such as the chapter by Yongwook Ryu in this volume, by offering conditions under which nationalism may become more or less of a problem. Similarly, masculine honour provides a potential explanation for why former adversaries are unwilling to offer and accept apologies, and instead prefer amnesia or engagement in history struggles, something Holly Guthrey in this volume identifies as detrimental to reconciliation and the attainment of deep peace. This chapter has suggested several reasons for why masculine honour ideology matters for our understanding of war and peace. Presently, the peace in East Asia is diluted and undermined by the lingering strength of masculine honour ideologies. The still uneven and hesitant weakening of this belligerent and misogynist ideology which seems to be underway in the region represents a very hopeful development.

References Barnes, C. D., R. P. Brown, J. Lenes, J. Bosson & M. Carvallo (2014) ‘My Country, My Self: Honour, Identity, and Defensive Responses to National Threats’, Self and Identity 13(6): 638–62. doi:10.1080/15298868.2014.892529. Barnes, C. D., R. P. Brown & L. L. Osterman (2012) ‘Don’t Tread on Me: Masculine Honour Ideology in the U.S. and Militant Responses to Terrorism’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38(8): 1018–29. Benesch, O. (2014) Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Inter nationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Buruma, I. (1995) The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan. London: Vintage. Buss, D. M. (1988) ‘From Vigilance to Violence: Tactics of Mate Retention among American Undergraduates’, Ethology and Sociobiology 9: 191–317. Buss, D. M. & T. Shakelford (1997) ‘From Vigilance to Violence: Mate Retention Tactics in Married Couples’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72(2): 346–61. Byock, J. (2001) Viking Age Iceland. London: Penguin Books. Chan, S. (2008) China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique. London: Routledge. Dafoe, A. & D. Caughey (2016) ‘Honour and War’, World Politics 68(2): 341– 81. doi:10.1017/S0043887115000416 Deutsch, K. W., et al (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Elster, J. (1998) Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Figueredo, A.J., et al., (2001) ‘Blood, solidarity, status, and honor: The sexual balance of power and spousal abuse in Sonora, Mexico’, Evolution and Human Behavior 22: 295–328. Frank, R. H. (1985) Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behaviour and the Quest for Status. New York: Oxford University Press. Frühstück, S. (2007) Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army. Berkeley: University of California Press. Fukuyama, F. (2011) The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. London: Profile Books. Hinsch, B., (2013) Masculinities in Chinese History. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Ikegami, E. (1995) The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jacobsson, M. (1997) ‘Sweden and the Law of the Sea’, in T. Treves and L. Pineschi (eds), (pp. 495–520) The Law of the Sea: The European Union and Its Member States. The Hague: Martinus Nijohff Publishers. Jakobsson, Á. (2007) ‘Masculinity and Politics in Njáls saga’, Viator 38(1): 191–215. Johnston, A. I. (2012) ‘What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About Inter national Relations Theory?’, Annual Review of Political Science 15: 53–78. Lind, J. (2010) Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Itacha, New York: Cornell University Press. Magnusson, M. & H. Pálsson (1970) Njal’s Saga. London: Penguin Classics.

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Mair, V. (2011, September) ‘Hurt(s) the feelings of the Chinese people’, http:// languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3425, accessed 15 January 2017. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006) ‘China’s Unpeaceful Rise’, Current History 105(690): 160–2. Mesquita, B. Bueno de, A. Smith, R. M. Siverson, & J. D. Morrow (2003) The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: MIT Press. Michel, Jean-Baptiste, Erez Lieberman Aiden, et al. (2010) ‘Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books’, Science (published online ahead of print, 16 December). Mikanagi, Y. (2011) Masculinity and Japan’s Foreign Relations. Boulder and London: First Forum Press. Moon, S. (2005) Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Nisbett, R. E. & D. Cohen (1996) Culture of honour: The psychology of violence in the South. Westview Press. Parker, J., et al (2003) Social Theory: A Basic Tool Kit. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Potts, M. & T. Hayden (2008) Sex and War: How Biology Explains Warfare and Terrorism and Offers a Path to a Safer World. Dallas, TX: BenBella Books. Sandquist, S. (2012) Making of a Man. University of Glasgow. Shackelford, T. K. (2005) ‘An evolutionary psychological perspective on cultures of honour’, Evolutionary Psychology 3: 381–91. Sheehan, J. (2007) The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War. London: Faber and Faber. Stewart, F. H. (1994) Honour. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Teorell, J., S. Dahlberg, S. Holmberg, B. Rothstein, F. Hartmann & R. Svensson (2015) ‘The Quality of Government Standard Data set, version Jan. 15’, University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. http:// qog.pol.gu.se, accessed 15 January 2017. W. V. S. Association (2009) ‘World values survey 1981–2008 official aggregate v. 20090901’. Vandello, J. A., & D. Cohen (2003) ‘Male Honour and Female Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts That Pepetuate Domestic Violence’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84(5): 997–1010. Världens Historia (2015, July) ‘Vilka två nationer har krigat mot varandra flest gånger?’ http://varldenshistoria.se/krig/vilka-tva-nationer-har-krigat-mot- varandra-flest-ganger, accessed 15 January 2017. Ystgaard, I. (2007) ‘Globalization, identity, material culture and archaeology’, In P. Jensen, S. Sindbæk and H. Vandkilde (eds), (pp. 62–5) Århus: Aarhus universitet.

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The Unforgiving Peace

Holly L. Guthrey

The avoidance of reckoning with the past undermines the attainment of deep peace in East Asia. While the East Asian region has not seen the recurrence of large-scale conflict since 1979, I argue that it is only ‘negative’ peace (in the terminology of Johan Galtung 1985) that has been achieved. This chapter will illustrate that progress towards ‘positive’ peace, by which Galtung means settings free from structural violence and replete with ‘harmony, cooperation, and integration’, has been lacking thus far. The tendency in the region to avoid reconciling past conflicts and human rights abuses through justice processes, truth commissions or reparations programmes allows wounds to fester and does not contribute to the type of structural change via acknowledgement and recognition that would allow for positive peace to develop. In East Asia, the preference is to use amnesties, to try to forget the past or to engage in ‘history struggles’ with demands for apologies that never come into fruition. These preferences, in tandem with intense nationalism, limit the possibility of attaining a depth of peace that would make the absence of armed conflict more meaningful and ultimately sustainable. The predilection for avoiding engagement with past wrongdoings is unfortunate, because it is widely recognized that past human rights abuses need to be dealt with in order for societies to move toward deep and sustainable peace. In the words of Richard Solomon, president of the United States Institute for Peace, sustainable peace requires that long-time antagonists not merely lay down their arms but that they achieve profound reconciliation that will endure because it is sustained by a society-wide network of relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and address the root causes of enmity before they can regenerate destabilizing tensions (as quoted in Lederach 1997: ix).

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This definition of sustainable peace can also be seen to reflect what David Crocker refers to as ‘thick’ reconciliation, which ‘grounds the possibility of mutual trust in a reflective and deliberative engagement in history’ (Crocker 1999: 60–61; quoted in Kwak & Nobles 2013: 4). In this conception of sustainable peace, problems of the past that cloud the present are recognized and addressed in a way that leads to the possibility of a renewed trust between rival parties. Securing mutual trust – or at the least undoing mistrust and hatred, in order to coexist with little fear of aggression from one another and thus reducing insecurity – will be considered as an illustration of ‘deep’ peace for the purposes of this chapter. Reconciliation ‘in the sense of a repair and restoration of relationships’ through such contact can help settings recovering from armed violence to progress from negative to positive peace (Clark 2009: 362, 368). Several mechanisms of transitional justice, particularly truth commissions and reparations programmes, have been considered to be valuable for helping to acknowledge and address the root causes of violence and its consequences in the wake of mass atrocities (Govier 2003; Minow 1998; Quinn 2011). Acknowledgement of for example human rights violations is more than just knowing something occurred, because it implies that previous violations both are true and publicly ‘spelled out’, and is followed by actions taken to rectify the consequences of those events (Govier 2003). The opposite of acknowledgment is denial, which may be ‘compromised’ or ‘partial’ and suggests that action will not be taken to recognize appropriately the harm done in the past. When acknowledgement is lacking, perceived victimization can intensify, thus impeding recovery and potentially contributing to desires for extrajudicial revenge (Vollhardt, Mazur & Lemahieu 2014). Indirect as well as direct victims can experience these consequences, which compromises intergroup relationships and reconciliation. Given the widespread consequences that must be tended to in the aftermath of mass violence, not addressing the problem through acknowledging its existence means that attempts to foment lasting peace will stall. Acknowledgment of the past not only contributes to social capital, wherein ‘people may be more willing to contribute to communities that have recognized that they were victimized’ (Quinn 2011; Cilliers, Dube & Siddiqi 2016: 787), but is also important for reconciliation that builds the foundation for positive peace, which will deter the possibility of

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future violence. Dealing with ‘painful collective history’ and ‘overcoming conflicting narratives about who-did-what-to-whom among various community groups’ can ultimately help to contribute to ‘the feeling of safety and self-worth of individuals, and stability and a sense of com- monality for communities’ (Ajdukovic 2004: 126). In Ajdukovic’s research about the views of three ethnic groups in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina toward the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and war crimes, respondents expressed discontent that those perpetrators who abused them during the war ‘continued to live freely in their community and would never be tried in the Hague’ (Ajdukovic 2004: 128). His results illustrate that negative experiences associated with other ethnic groups and ‘feeling discriminated against and unsafe’ was a key factor that ‘predicted resistance to the reconciliation process’ (Ajdukovic 2004: 128). Hence, one can see a need to address the relationships among rival groups via acknowledgment processes in order to facilitate the sense of safety necessary for reconciliation. This may be done by undertaking initiatives to reconcile conflicting narratives and tend to the past so that positive peace can take root. Amnesty, a word that has roots in the Greek word, amnestia, to forget (Chigara 2002), is a transitional justice mechanism that can be considered to run contrary to acknowledgment. While amnesties following periods of mass violence can be beneficial in the short-term for securing peace or consolidating democracy, I argue that amnesties only temporarily cover up the wounds of conflict and hence do not positively transform relationships between rival groups or individuals in a way that can solidify positive peace. Over time, avoidance of addressing the past leaves grievances unresolved and contributes to continued enmity and insecurity that could ultimately cause conflict to reignite. Acknowledgment can help to deter the desire to exact extrajudicial revenge (David & Choi 2009; Govier 2006) and can help to promote faith in the rule of law or national institutions, both of which increase the trust and security that are necessary for positive peace. East Asia has clearly eschewed processes of acknowledgement in favour of disavowing the past via amnesties, outright denial, and engage ment with history struggles. The countries that have seen the greatest resurgence of violence since 1979 – Myanmar, Thailand and the Philip

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pines – have also issued the most amnesties over time.1 This is not to say that amnesties will necessarily lead to more violence, but instead may illustrate that these mechanisms are not reckoning with the effects of past abuse in a way that promotes positive peace, and thus a context in which the likelihood of further atrocities becomes reduced. Although several truth commissions have been created in the region, the examination below suggests that these generally appear not to have been of high quality. They largely lacked the intention to truly promote acknowledgment and address structural violence, which can impede reconciliation and coexistence. Indeed, most of the greatest atrocities committed in the region have not been addressed through any means; instead, the consequences of these crimes have been left to fester. Kwak and Nobles (2013: 3) suggest that despite the development of ‘impressive economic and cultural networks’ during the past several decades, the region has ‘failed to secure peaceful coexistence or [to] overcome lingering attitudes of distrust and misunderstanding.’ They argue that because of this, ‘some form of historical reconciliation is necessary to generate and sustain cross-national mutual trust and prevent nationalist sentiments from re-emerging’ or further intensifying.’ This is particularly relevant given what Ignatieff (1998: 45) refers to as the ‘fiction of nationalism’, where ‘nationalism creates communities of fear, groups held together by the conviction that their security depends on sticking together.’ Fear drives the tendency toward nationalism, which is increasingly problematic in a setting where ‘the only answer to the question “who will protect me now?” becomes “my own people”’ (ibid.). Such a mentality, which is rooted in insecurity and anxieties about the Other, will be self-perpetuating without some type of mechanism or process that breaks the cycle of fear and feelings of us versus them. Lacking intervention, security will continue to deteriorate, making cooperation and reconciliation nearly impossible.

Tragic history East Asia’s 20th century history does not just include some of the world’s worst wars (see Bjarnegård & Kreutz’s contribution in this volume), 1. South Korea has also issued a high number of amnesties without seeing conflict re-emerge, possible reasons for which will be examined below.

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Box 12.1: Selected human rights abuses in East Asia •• Nanjing massacre, 1937 •• Japanese use of ‘comfort women’ during World War II, 1937–1945 •• Chiang Kai-shek’s destruction of the dikes, 1938 ••Bombing of Tokyo and atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1945 •• French bombing of Haiphong, 1946 •• Taiwan massacre, 1947 ••Systematic killings perpetrated by the two Korean governments before and during the Korean War, 1948–1953 •• Chinese Great Leap Forward, 1958–1961 •• Anti-communist massacre in Indonesia, 1965 ••Widespread violence in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966– 1976 ••US carpet bombing of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War ••US use of ‘Agent Orange’ in areas controlled by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam ••Summary executions undertaken by communist troops in Hue, February 1968 ••Korean massacre at Phong Nhi and Phong Nhat in South Vietnam, February 1968 •• American massacre at My Lai, March 1968 •• Gwangju massacre in South Korea, 1980 •• Prison camps in North Korea (still existing) •• Cambodian genocide under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1978 •• Bangkok massacre, 1976 ••Chilling absence of prisoners-of-war after the Sino–Vietnamese war despite massive fatalities, 1979 ••Killings in Yangon, 1988 and 2007, and the widespread use of rape, torture and killings by the Myanmar Army against ethnic and political opposition movements over a long period ••Systematic violence orchestrated by the Indonesian military in Timor-Leste, 1975–1999, and in Aceh, 1976–2005 •• Tiananmen massacre in Beijing, 1989 •• North Korean famine, 1997–1998 •• Massacres in Lhasa, 2008 and Urumqi, 2009

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but also massacres, attempted genocide, man-made catastrophes and numerous crimes against humanity. Although not exhaustive, Box 12.1 illustrates some of the most striking examples: The scale and frequency of such tragic events have been remarkably lower in the more peaceful decades since 1979. Yet East Asia’s relative peace has not been used to open up processes for dealing with the region’s tragic history. Indeed, very few of these incidents have been followed up with officially sanctioned vehicles to acknowledge the extent of past wrongdoing. Instead, tragic incidents have largely been ‘forgotten’, dealt with through amnesties or used instrumentally within nationalist rhetoric. Because little effort has been made officially to acknowledge the past and transform relationships, I argue that peace in the region has not yet become a positive one, due to continued grievances and mistrust. It is because of this that the quality of the East Asian Peace is dubious. Contention over numerous issues of the past is ongoing in East Asia and exists both between states as well as domestically. Problems that continue to colour tense interstate relationships in the region span across the WWII ‘comfort women’, increasingly intense territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands between Japan and China and Dokdo/ Takeshima between Korea and Japan, and controversies over historical sites such as the Yasukuni Shrine and the Koguryo tombs (see Ryu in this volume). On the intrastate side, a host of conflicting narratives also remain and are manifested in such matters as a controversial textbook revision in Japan, ‘divisiveness in historical memory’ about the White Terror period in Taiwan (Wu 2005) and disagreements regarding not only the existence or extent of grave human rights violations perpetrated by Indonesian government (e.g. Timor-Leste, Aceh, West Papua and the 1965–66 anti-communist massacres), but also about whether victims from those periods continue to suffer from a government that acts with impunity. Progress toward reconciliation and a more genuine peace is difficult, because some social actors depend on a narrative of denial of past events for their political power or sense of political identity. A substantive change in approach is needed if this gap is to be bridged.

History struggles, nationalism and acknowledgement As can be surmised from Ryu’s contribution to this volume, these issues are likely tied to both the ‘history problem’ and high levels of nationalism

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in the region. The ‘history problem’, as he writes, sees national identity as a ‘non-negotiable issue’ in which ‘memories of an important past event are a critical constituent’ (see p. 244). Because of this, many groups and actors in the region have not created a collective identity which would enhance the ‘deep’ cooperation necessary for high-quality and sustained peace. Related to this, he writes that ‘continued nationalism hinders the deepening of the East Asian Peace through the formation of an encompassing regional community, and that nationalist tensions may provoke conflict’ (p. 257). Nationalism, at its root, emphasizes ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Brown & Ni Aolain 2015; Ryu in this volume) and hence inherently inhibits the ability of reconciliation to take place. To this end, Brown and Ni Aolain (2015: 139) highlight a similarity between transitional justice and nationalism: ‘both place victimhood at their moral center.’ While the focus placed upon victims within transitional justice processes arguably has the intention to assuage grievances and reduce consequences of past trauma (Guthrey 2015), nationalist tendencies may have an opposite effect. Nationalism is problematic for overcoming the consequences of the past because when all parties rely on a narrative of grievance and victimization, it is then difficult to foment a transformation from these identities into what has been referred to as a ‘we-feeling’, where trust and security abound between groups or individuals. Building shared narratives of the past, through truth revela- tion and official acknowledgment and documentation of wrongdoings, has the potential then to contribute to a deepening of peace.

Truth commissions, reparations, and amnesties Truth commissions have been touted for their ability to promote reconciliation, accountability and healing for victims and society following periods of mass violence (Guthrey 2015; Minow 1998; Hamber 2009; Hayner 2011). They are also seen to be adept at uncovering and addressing the root causes of violence. The achievement of these goals has been linked to the creation of environments capable of sustainable peace. However, one must also consider the quality of these mechanisms in relation to achieving these goals. In the context of this chapter, ‘high-quality’ truth commissions are considered to be those which seek to acknowledge and address the consequences of past human rights abuses, thereby aiming, at least in principle, to achieve the kind of

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‘thick’ reconciliation described above, which may positively affect the depth of peace. A piece of Hayner’s (2011:11–12) definition of a truth commission – that they engage ‘directly and broadly with the affected population’ – is useful in this regard, as it is essential that individuals and groups affected by wrongdoings in the past have the opportunity to participate directly or indirectly in the process as well as be able to have voice in the process which has been found to be beneficial for victim recovery in post-conflict settings (Guthrey 2015). Another way in which a truth commission may be considered to be of a high quality is that it produces a final report that documents past transgressions and outlines recommendations for how to reckon with harm caused by human rights violations. Implementing recommendations is not often part of the work assigned to the truth commission itself, as they are temporary bodies with limited funding; however, if the efficacy and value of a truth commission is to be elevated, political leadership should take effort to implement these recommendations, particularly in the cases where the recommendations focus on tending to the root causes of past violence as well as repairing past harms through symbolic or monetary reparations, including health/psychological care for victims. Not only is the recognition that reparations provide important, but the provision of these types of resources may help to overcome structural violence that can persist in post-atrocity settings. Indeed, although there are arguably relatively few commissions throughout the world that have lived up to these standards, these aspects are illustrative of the acknowledgement and recognition crucial to reconciliation, and hence restoring relationships and increasing mutual trust between rival parties. The degree to which the commissions in East Asia have fulfilled this type of acknowledgment will be further described below. In all, there remains much to learn about the true impact of these mechanisms; however, given the potential of truth commissions to promote acknowledgment, and hence, increase trust and security, it is possible that such strategies are important steps on the path to achieving deep peace. In a way similar to truth commissions, both symbolic and monetary reparations have the potential to provide acknowledgment for past wrongdoing by both individual perpetrators and the state (David & Choi 2005; De Greiff 2006). Through the recognition that is demon-

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Table 12.1: Amnesties and truth commissions in East Asia Number of Truth commissions/ Reparations amnesties commissions of inquiry programmes Cambodia 5 China 1 East Timor 3 2002–2005; 2005–2008 (with Indonesia) Indonesia 5 (Aceh) 2 Japan 1 Laos 2 Malaysia 1 Myanmar 19 North Korea 2 Philippines 33 1986–1987 South Korea 21 2000–2004; 2005–2010 1990–1998 Thailand 11 2005–2006; 2010–2012 Vietnam 5 Source: Based on findings from the Transitional Justice Database Project, Louise Mallinder’s Amnesty Law Database, Priscilla Hayner (2011), the Justice in Perspective project (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2012), and the Transitional Justice Research Collaborative.

strated by reparations, these programmes have been linked to victim healing, including the restoration of victim dignity (David & Choi 2005; Freeman & Hayner 2003; Lykes & Mersky 2006). Some have also suggested that the receipt of reparations can serve as a ‘proxy for justice’, as such programmes can help to acknowledge that the harm caused in the past is now understood to be wrong in the eyes of the state and can facilitate a sense of assurance that such abuses will not be repeated (David & Choi 2005, 424; Hamber and Wilson 2002; van Boven 1995; Lykes and Mersky 2006). This type of legitimation of the rule of law may in turn lead to an increased sense of safety (Ajdukovic 2004), which is important to the promotion of deep peace. On the other hand, amnesties, either in the form of official pardons for people who have been convicted of offences or a promise not to prosecute, are almost the polar opposite of acknowledgment. The most

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dubious kind of amnesty is the latter when future prosecution is explicitly removed from the table, since it means that no investigation is conducted at all. Amnesties have proven to be useful as a way to encourage parties engaged in mass violence to lay down their weapons, but this should be a means to an end, not the final stop in promoting lasting peace. This type of strategy does not come to terms with the harm done during conflict, but instead acts as a type of band-aid to stop conflict in the short-term, and hence likely has either no effect or a negative effect on promoting positive peace in the long-run. Table 12.1 shows where truth commissions and reparations have been initiated in East Asia, as well as the total number of amnesties issued since 1947. Amnesties clearly outnumber truth commissions and reparations – the highest number have been issued in the Philippines (33), South Korea (21), Myanmar (19) and Thailand (11). These countries, except for South Korea, have been the outliers of the East Asian Peace; they are the only places where violent conflict continues to surge (see Tønnesson’s chapter in this volume). Of these countries, Myanmar is the only one that issued amnesties without a truth commission or commission of inquiry, and has also had comparatively high levels of violence in the recent past. The Philippines created a commission of inquiry, the Presidential Commission on Human Rights, to investigate human rights violations that occurred under the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972–1986 (Hayner 2011). The mandate was, however, severely limited. It was only empowered to examine violations perpetrated by ‘government officers or their agents, or by persons acting in their stead or under their orders’, because it was believed that abuses committed by guerrilla forces could be handled by the court system as ‘common crimes’ (ibid. 244). From the onset, the commission was also hobbled by a lack of adequate staff and funding, and thus could not deal with the large number of complaints it received about past violence. It was, in essence, doomed from the start, because it did not have the capacity to develop a full picture of the past. Thailand has had two commissions of inquiry, but their contribution to addressing previous wrongdoings is dubious. The National Reconciliation Commission, created in Thailand in 2005 to heal the wounds left by the 2001 coup that ousted Thaksin Shinawatra, was set up to resemble a ‘royal’

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inquiry as opposed to a conventional truth commission. It did not engage ‘broadly and directly with the affected population’, and so excluded both the idea of voice and the concrete information that stakeholders at many levels might have provided (Hayner 2011). Thailand’s second commission of inquiry, the Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand that began its work in 2010, only investigated a limited episode of human rights violations during a two-month period the same year, when anti-government protests ended in bloodshed. This brief time frame also suggests a limited scope of acknowledgment, given the vast number of abuses that were perpetrated outside of this time period. The International Center for Transitional Justice also noted that this commission faced ‘obstacles to finding the truth, such as lack of cooperation from the military and police’ (Bangkok Post 2011).2 This implies that those who were most involved in past abuses had little intention truly to address past violence; hence, this commission was unlikely to develop any type of shared narrative of the past. South Korea, which also has issued many amnesties, has implemented two official truth commissions as well as a reparations programme. The first commission, the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (PTCSD), operated from 2000–04. It was tasked with resolving specific deaths that occurred during the authoritarian period from 1961 to the 1990s, but it was not mandated to review either widespread patterns or underlying causes of abuse. The commission opened a very tight window for victims and their families to submit claims, and it actually investigated relatively few submitted claims (85 out of several hundred) (Hayner 2011). The second, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRCK), undertook its work from 2005–10 and was mandated to ‘investigate human rights violations in Korea from 1910–87’ (Dong-Choon 2012). It was aimed at ‘reconciling the past for the sake of national unity’ and honouring victims of past abuse, including those incurred as a result of Japanese colonialism and during authoritarian rule in the country (ibid.). The comprehensiveness of this mandate, including the time period and range of abuses to be examined, illustrates a stronger intent to

2. The 14 May 2011 Bangkok Post article that included this quote has since been much abridged. What remains can be found at https://www.ictj.org/news/doors-still- closed-truth-about-may-19.

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achieve acknowledgment than the previous commission in South Korea and most others in the region. Notably, South Korea is the only country in East Asia to carry out a reparations programme aimed explicitly at compensating victims for wrongdoings committed in the past. When the law for compensating victims in relation to the 1980 Gwangju massacre was passed in 1990, these payments were merely referred to as compensation; however, in 1995 the language was altered to the term ‘reparations’. This change, according to Han (2005:1033), ‘explicitly implicat[es] the authoritarian government for abuse of power, and thus providing an additional measure of symbolic reparation to the victims.’ It should be mentioned that two foundations in Taiwan also developed compensation programmes. One, started in 1995, was directed toward victims of the 228 incident (an uprising on 28 February 1947). The other, started in 1998, focused on individuals who had been incarcerated as political prisoners during the White Terror period (1949–87). Both sought to provide restitution for ‘losses of freedom, life, and property’ (Wu 2005: 10). However, some victims of the White Terror period do not view this as a ‘reparations’ process as such because it has not been coupled with an official apology or acknowledgement of responsibility for past wrongdoing.3 The money for these payments came from the national treasury and not directly from the KMT, which was responsible for the abuses (Dr Wen Chen-wen Memorial Foundation 2006). Hence, the KMT avoided taking responsibility for the crimes, and to date has not apologized. Timor-Leste also issued several amnesties (although far fewer than the four countries discussed above), and two truth commissions were established to investigate the country’s occupation by the Indonesian military. The first was the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR, its Portuguese acronym), which undertook its work from 2002–05. The CAVR had a much more comprehensive mandate: to investigate crimes that were committed during the Indonesian occupation from 1975–99. Also, it operated the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) based on traditional conflict resolution practices that aimed to reintegrate East Timorese ex-combatants into their communities. Although not without pitfalls, the CRPs have been

3. Interviews by the author, November 2015.

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considered to have achieved some degrees of success at the local level in Timor-Leste (Stanley 2009; Senier 2008; Pigou 2004). Similarly, the CAVR has also come under criticism, but some victims recognized the benefit of being able to contribute to their country’s national narrative as a positive outcome of the programme (Guthrey 2015). It should also be mentioned that the CAVR did implement an ‘urgent reparations programme’ as part of its work for those victims who faced an imminent need for support. The reach of this programme was, however, quite limited in scope; it only provided benefits to roughly 200 of the estimated 100,000 to 180,000 victims affected by the occupation (CAVR 2006). The second commission involving Timor-Leste was the Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF), which was created jointly by Timor- Leste and Indonesia and operated from 2005–08. The CTF was tempo- rally limited to crimes committed in 1999 and substantively limited to crimes committed in connection with the referendum for Timor-Leste’s independence from Indonesia. These limitations call into question whether the commission was actually intended to achieve true acknowledgment of responsibility for the past, given that the truth about the previous 24 years of abuse would not be investigated. Examining one year of wrongdoings – which were largely perpetrated by East Timorese militias (although they were backed by the Indonesian military) – while ignoring another 23 years of violence undertaken largely by the occupation forces themselves can scarcely be regarded as acknowledgment.

Quality of peace In considering not only the absence of armed conflict, but also the quality of peace on the ground, looking at the Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) index developed by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, as well as the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Societal Violence Scale (SVS) both developed by researchers working in the Political Terror Scale Project is instructive. These measures go further than determining the presence or absence of armed conflict and illustrate patterns related to whether people are essentially safe from harm (which may not necessarily result in loss of life) perpetuated by their government or opposition groups. This can be conceptualized further as positive peace. Table 12.2 com- pares the most recently available scores from each of these scales for the

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Table 12.2: Amnesties, truth commission quality, and quality peace scores More Quality Wide- Political Societal Physical than 10 TC spread Terror Violence Integrity amnes- repara- Scale Scale Rights ties tions 2014 2013 2011 Myanmar Yes N/A No 4 5 1 Philippines Yes No No 3.66 5 1 Thailand Yes No No 3 4 1 South Korea Yes Yes Yes 2 2 4 Timor- No Yes No 2 3 7 Leste

Note: The PTS and SVS range from 1–5, with 5 as the worst score and the PIR ranges from 1-8, with 1 being the worst. Source: The Physical Integrity Rights (PIR), Political Terror Scale (PTS), and Societal Violence Scale (SVS) scores come from Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014) and Gibney, et al. (2016).

countries that have issued the greatest number of amnesties alongside those that have also created truth commissions and initiated reparations. South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Myanmar have issued the greatest number of amnesties in the region, and the latter three score the worst on the positive peace-related scales. Indeed, South Korea and Timor-Leste boast the highest scores in the table above. This trend may be an indication that amnesties are not effective at securing long-term, deep peace where the threat of renewed violence is reduced unless they are coupled with a high-quality mechanism for acknowledgment (which may come in the form of a truth commission or widespread reparations programme) that aims to address the root causes of violence through a thorough investigation of the past and engagement with conflict- affected parties at various levels.

Conclusions On the surface, a counterargument to the one put forth in this chapter could be that some regional cooperation – including international trade and shared legal frameworks – exists in spite of the engrained ‘forgetting’ in East Asia. Ben Goldsmith (in this volume) argues that regional con-

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flict in East Asia has largely been avoided because of increased economic interdependence via international trade. Shirley Scott (this volume) further suggests that the East Asian Peace may be a result of international treaties that have led to the peaceful rise of China, thus pacifying the region. While both Goldsmith and Scott provide convincing accounts of possible explanations for the existence of the East Asian Peace, a question still remains as to how deep the peace that has been facilitated by these factors (among others) might be. Indeed, widespread regional conflict has been largely avoided since the early 1980s, but tensions remain both between and within East Asian countries as described in the examples above. I argue these grievances persist because issues of the past have been unresolved. Ryu’s discussion of nationalism as a hindrance to deepening the peace in East Asia is useful; however his piece does not necessarily offer a way to transform the negative and potentially destructive us- them mentality into collective identity with a shared future. In addition to nationalism, the prevalence of honour ideology in the region that Erik Melander highlights in his contribution may be another factor that continues to cement resistance to reconciliation, particularly with regard to the refusal of rivals to offer and accept apologies. While truth commissions and reparations processes may not be the only mechanisms that can contribute to positive peace, they may indeed be a start. I support Ryu’s suggestion that political reconciliation should take place at both the domestic and the interstate levels; hence, it may be useful to think about developing acknowledgement processes at both levels in order to better enhance the possibility of attaining positive peace in the region. As mentioned, forgetting and/or denying the occurrence of previous human rights abuses has the potential to be detrimental to individuals and societies. This is not least because, in the absence of acknowledgment and building of shared narratives of the past, nationalist sentiments can threaten cooperation and inhibit the development of positive peace. Avoidance of reckoning with previous wrongdoings can contribute to strained relationships between countries that have yet to resolve their past through some form of acknowledgment for the suffering of victims and acceptance of responsibility. Aside from the Commission for Truth and Friendship (which, as mentioned, was largely ineffective at dealing with the past conflict) involving Indonesia and Timor-Leste, there have

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been no official attempts to pursue reconciliation between countries. Given the persistence of history problems and lingering mistrust, both domestically and across states in East Asia, it appears that just ignoring the past and avoiding responsibility for it is not leading to deep and lasting peace. Acknowledgment helps to build trust and security. Without trust, individuals or states will continue to feel vulnerable when tensions arise. This may happen because of social problems (including lack of access to economic opportunities) or even because of territorial disputes. When one is uncertain of the way in which another will act, an environment of insecurity is perpetuated (Staub 2000). Security concerns are often at the heart of the initiation and escalation of conflict. Although truth commissions are not the only way to facilitate acknowledgment, quality truth commissions in East Asia that have engaged broadly with those affected by past violence and demonstrated an intention to promote reconciliation and recovery appear to have had some positive impact. On the other hand, in those countries that have only issued amnesties for past crimes, or amnesties followed by low-quality truth commissions, deep peace appears to be lacking. Without acknowledging the wounds resulting from past wrongdoings, rivalries and grievances will probably persist, which limits the possibility for positive peace to be realized. This ultimately makes the East Asian Peace a shallow and tenuous one.

References Ajdukovic, D. (2004) ‘Social Contexts of Trauma and Healing’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival 20 (2): 120–35. Bangkok Post (2011) ‘Doors Still Closed on Truth about May 19’, 14 May, https://www.ictj.org/news/doors-still-closed-truth-about-may-19, accessed 14 December 2016. Brown, K & F. Ni Aolain (2015) ‘Through the Looking Glass: Transitional Justice Futures through the Lens of Nationalism, Feminism and Transformative Change’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 9: 127–49. CAVR (2006. ‘Chega’, Final Report for the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2012) ‘Justice in Perspective’. https://web.archive.org/web/20160320164622/http://jus- ticeinperspective.org.za/index.php, accessed 20 March 2016.)

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Chigara, B. (2002) Amnesty in International Law. London: Longman Group United Kingdom. Cilliers, J., O. Dube & B. Siddiqi (2016) ‘Reconciling after Civil Conflict Increases Social Capital but Decreases Individual Well-Being’, Science 352 (6287): 787–94. Cingranelli, D. L., D. L. Richards, and K. C. Clay (2014) ‘The CIRI Human Rights Dataset’. http://www.humanrightsdata.com, Version 2014.04.14, accessed 31 October 2015. Clark, J. N. (2009) ‘From Negative to Positive Peace: The Case of Bosnia and Hercegovina’, Journal of Human Rights 8(4): 360–84. Crocker, D. A. (1999) ‘Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework’, Ethics & International Affairs, no. 13: 43–64. David, R. & S. Y. P. Choi (2009) ‘Getting Even or Getting Equal? Retributive Desires and Transitional Justice’, Political Psychology 30(2): 161–92. ——— (2005) ‘Victims on Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic’, Human Rights Quarterly 27(2): 392–435. De Greiff, P. (2006) ‘Justice and Reparations’, in P. De Greiff (ed.) The Handbook of Reparations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dong-Choon, K. (2012) ‘Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: An Overview and Assessment’, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 19: 97–124. Dr. Chen Wen-Chin Memorial Foundation (2006) The Road to Freedom: Taiwan’s Postwar Human Rights Movement. Taipei: Dr. Chen Wen-Chin Memorial Foundation. Freeman, M. & P. B. Hayner (2003) ‘Truth-Telling’, in D. Bloomfield, T. Barnes and L. Huyse (eds) Reconciliation after Violent Conflict-A Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: 122–44. Galtung, J. (1985) ‘Twenty Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses’, Journal of Peace Research 22(2). Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, and Daniel Arnon (2016) ‘The Political Terror Scale 1976-2015’. http://www.politicalter- rorscale.org, accessed 31 October 2015. Govier, T. (2003) ‘What Is Acknowledgment? Why Is It Important?’ in C. Prager and T. Glovier (eds) Dilemmas of Reconciliation : Cases and Concepts. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press: 65–89 ——— (2006) Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable Peace. New York: Humanity Books. Guthrey, H. L. (2015) Victim Healing and Truth Commissions--Transforming Pain through Voice in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. New York: Springer.

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Hamber, B. (2009) Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation, and Mental Health. London: Springer. Hamber, B. & R. A. Wilson (2002) ‘Symbolic Closure through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Post-Conflict Societies’, Journal of Human Rights 1(1): 35–53. Han, I. S. (2005) ‘Kwangju and Beyond: Coping with Past State Atrocities in South Korea’, Human Rights Quarterly, no. 27: 998–1045. Hayner, P. B. (2011) Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Ignatieff, M. (1998) The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. New York: Henry Holt. Kwak, J-H & M. Nobles (2013) ‘‘Inherited’ Responsibility and Historical Reconciliation in East Asian Context’, in J-h Kwak and M. Nobles (eds) Inherited Responsibility and Historical Reconciliation in East Asia. Abingdon: Routledge: 3–20. Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. United States Institute of Peace. Lykes, M. B. & M. Mersky (2006) ‘Reparations and Mental Health: Psychosocial Interventions towards Healing, Human Agency, and Rethreading Social Realities’, in P. De Greiff (ed.) The Handbook of Reparations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Minow, M. (1998) Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston: Beacon Press. Pigou, P. (2004) ‘The Community Reconciliation Process of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation’, report for UNDP Timor-Leste. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.737.3841&r ep=rep1&type=pdf, accessed 12 December 2016. Quinn, J. R. (2011) Politics of Acknowledgement : Truth Commissions in Uganda and Haiti. Vancouver: UBC Press. Senier, A. (2008) ‘Traditional Justice as Transitional Justice: A Comparative Case Study of Rwanda and East Timor’, Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security 13: 67–88. Stanley, E. ( 2009) Torture, Truth and Justice: The Case of Timor-Leste. London: Routledge. Staub, E. (2000) ‘Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation’, Political Psychology 21(2): 367–82. Transitional Justice Database Project (2016) http://www.tjdbproject.com/, accessed 14 December 2016. Van Boven, T. (1995) ‘Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Com pensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, in N. J. Kritz (ed.) Transitional Justice:

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How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace: 505–50. Vollhardt, J. R., L. B. Mazur & M. Lemahieu (2014) ‘Acknowledgment after Mass Violence: Effects on Psychological Well-Being and Intergroup Relations’, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 17(3): 306–23. Wu, N. (2005) ‘Transition without Justice, or Justice without History: Transitional Justice in Taiwan’, Taiwan Journal of Democracy 1(1): 77–102.

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The Nationalist Threat to the East Asian Peace

Yongwook Ryu

East Asia has witnessed fewer interstate wars and battlefield deaths since 1980 and so, by definition, the region has certainly become more peaceful in this negative sense of the term. But does this mean that the East Asian Peace is also deep and durable? In this chapter, I argue that while East Asia has become more peaceful in the negative sense, the peace is not yet deep, nor is it necessarily durable. This is mainly because the national identities of key regional countries (China, Japan and South Korea) have become increasingly pitted against each other in the post-Cold War era, as the controversy relating to the interpretation of important historical events has increased in saliency. These historical issues form the core of the national identities of these three countries, which is considered as non-negotiable. As I show, these antithetical national identities have strengthened in all three countries and, even more troubling, the negative manifestation of each nationalism is being directed toward the other states. One consequence of the emergence of antithetical national identities is the intensification of territorial disputes, a quintessential symbol of nationalism in the modern era and perhaps a symptom of a rather fragile East Asian Peace. I further argue that other factors identified in this volume as causing the East Asian Peace in the negative sense, such as power balance (Ross) and deepening intra-regional trade relations (Goldsmith), have a limited ability to foster creation of a more positive regional peace. Instead, what is required to make the regional peace deep and durable is the creation and development of a common community based on a shared sense of a collective identity and ‘we-feeling’ (Kupchan 2011; Adler & Barnett

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1988; Deutsch 1957). The most critical step in this effort is political reconciliation between countries in the region through narrowing their perceptual gap of controversial historical issues. Achieving this would go a long way toward resolving or ameliorating the antithetical national identities of countries in the region, as well as to improving interstate cooperation and developing a regional community.

Nationalism and antithetical national identities in East Asia Nationalism is both a socio-psychological belief that a group of people who perceive themselves as a cohesive entity ought to constitute a nation, and a political ideology that such groups (nations) should possess their own territories with a sufficient degree autonomy and sovereignty (Smith 1979; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hass 1986). It is also a form of collective identity whose locus is at the national level. In the modern era of the Westphalian system, this form of collective identity has superseded others such as loyalty to tribe, kin, emperor, class and even god. It has been the main culprit for the outbreak of some of the deadliest wars and conflicts, especially when national boundaries do not map onto territorial boundaries, in the form of independence movements, ethnic conflict, ethnic ‘cleansing’ and territorial disputes (Kellas 1991). This distinctively modern and European phenomenon has swept the rest of the world, including East Asia, through military conquest and colonization. East Asia had existed as an autonomous and independent unit on its own, operating according to the rules of the tributary system, before the advent of Westphalian states. Under that system, regional countries acknowledged the supremacy of China in return for the legitimacy and autonomy to govern their own territories. The Westphalian form of nationalism – territoriality internal sovereignty and external equality – was foreign to East Asia and, while occasional conflict still occurred, the tributary system essentially preserved regional peace and stability, leading some scholars to argue that a hierarchical system could also make East Asia more peaceful in the contemporary era (Kang 2003). The advent of western powers brought an abrupt end to this Sino- centric tributary system. Of course, with the western powers came the western idea of nationalism, which proved to be a major force shaping re-

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gional interstate relations. Japan quickly learned the power of nationalism and embarked on its own modernization programme in the form of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which overhauled its feudal socioeconomic and political system. Within three decades, it successfully challenged the regional hegemon, Qing China, and defeated it in the first Sino-Japanese War, claiming Chosen (current Korean peninsula) and Taiwan as its spoils. Only a few years later, Japan launched another challenge, this time against a major European country, Russia, again winning decisively and thereby emerging as the regional hegemon. Thereafter, Japan’s imperialism quickly grew powerful, bringing one country after another under its control in the name of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere. In resistance to Japanese colonialism arose various independence movements that appealed to nationalist sentiments, and which resulted in violent and bloody struggles. This is particularly true for China and South Korea, where the anti-Japanese resistance war (kangri zhanzheng) and the March First movement (samil undong) sprang to life in direct resistance to Japanese colonial rule. Henceforth was born the nationalism of China and South Korea, and from the very beginning, nationalism was a major factor for regional conflict right, and the nationalisms of these key East Asian countries (Japan, China and South Korea) were set against each other. This is in sharp contrast to the development of nationalism in other parts of the world, where nationalism arose and grew mainly in opposition to external colonizers. Even in Southeast Asia, a region that had also been subject to colonial rule by Northeast Asian states, local nationalisms developed first and foremost in response to European colonial occupation. In Northeast Asia, by contrast, nationalism emerged in opposition to another country in the region. However, nationalism has not always produced regional conflict. In the postwar period, it was largely a force for interstate peace and stability. Except for the relatively short-lived struggles for national unification by the two Chinas and the two Koreas, newly independent nations oriented their domestic political agenda to national socioeconomic development. In Japan, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru navigated the difficult political waters between the left and the right as he formulated what is known as the Yoshida Doctrine, which allowed Japan to focus on economic development while relying on the United States to ensure its national security (Johnson 1982). In South Korea, General Park Chung-

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hee’s military government similarly led national development plans for economic growth (Kim & Vogel 2013), whose resounding success came to be known as the miracle of the Han River. In China, after the bloody and devastating experiences of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar 1997), Deng Xiaoping began the open-door and reform policies in the late 1970s, thereby shifting national priorities to socioeconomic development (Vogel 2013). While one may characterize this period as a capitalist peace based on deepening trade relations between regional countries, the root cause for international stability and closer economic relations during this period came from a domestic source, namely, the desire by reform-oriented national leaders to achieve national growth and socioeconomic development. Hence, as Tønnesson argues in this volume, this period is more accurately described as a developmental peace in which prominent national attention to socioeconomic development had a positive spillover effect into regional peace and stability. The urgency of developmental agenda slowly waned, however, as the countries attained a certain level of national wealth and social development. The catalyst for nationalism to once again reveal its ugly side was the rise of unresolved historical grievances around the mid- to late-1980s, when the Cold War was melting. As the developmental agenda decreased in importance and the security rationale weakened due to the end of the Cold War, issues such as the ‘comfort women,’ the Yasukuni Shrine controversy, history textbook revisions, Nanjing Massacre and competing historical interpretations of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo came to the fore of regional relations. Referred to collectively as the ‘history problem’ (lishi wenti or rekishi mondai), these issues transformed previously peaceful nationalisms into fervent nationalism directed against each other. The intensity reached such a level that some analysts describe the conflict as ‘history war’ (Yoon 2009; Shin & Sneider 2014; Wakasa 2015). The potency of these issues to cause diplomatic controversy and public anger is vividly illustrated by widespread anti-Japanese protests in both China and South Korea, where tens of thousands of people took to the streets in 2005. Ironically, the end of the Cold War opened a Pandora’s Box for regional conflict rather than yielding a peace dividend. At the heart of the ‘history problem’ issue are competing interpretations of important historical events and periods that these nations

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consider to be defining elements of their national identities. And controversy arises because there is a lack of shared understanding between the relevant parties about them. Take the issue of Japan’s past colonialism in Asia, for example. On the one hand, virtually everyone in China and South Korea as well as a majority of Japanese citizens believe that Japan waged a wrongful war that resulted in immense human casualties and suffering, as well as material loss to Asian nations. On the other, small but vociferous conservative groups in Japan propose a counter- narrative, according to which Japan’s past aggression was a holy war of self-defence and survival (jiei jison no seisen) that was forced upon Japan by prevailing circumstances such as expanding western imperialism and lack of natural resources.1 Several issues stem from this differing historical perspective on Japan’s past colonialism in Asia, and they include (but are not limited to) the content of Japanese history textbooks, politically motivated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (which worships Japan’s war dead, including thirteen Class A war criminals), the so-called ‘comfort women’ issue and competing interpretations of the Nanjing Massacre. The increased salience of these historical issues directly feeds into Chinese and Korean nationalisms, which have strong anti-Japanese sentiments based on their colonial experience under Japanese rule. In turn, Japanese nationalism is strengthened by ‘Japan bashing’ and pressure (gaiatsu), accommodation of which is taken as a sign of national weakness by Japanese nationalists. A different kind of history problem also exists between China and South Korea. In 2001, North Korea (with Chinese support) attempted to register the tombs of Koguryo (37 bce–668 ce) in the UNESCO as a world heritage site. This was followed in the next year by the Chinese policy initiative called the ‘Northeast Asia History Project’ (dongbei

1. Former Mayor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintaro said, ‘it was not aggression … Deprived of of resources, (Japan) had no choice but to expand into Southeast Asia … If one defines the war as aggression without such a historical perspective, it merely amounts to masochism or ignorance of history’ (The Asahi Shimbun 18 May2013) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201305180041. Last accessed on 1 September 2015. The chairman of the Dissemination of Historical Fact, Kase Hideaki, claims that ‘Japan was forced into war by the United States, because America was making unreasonable demands upon us, and that Japan was fighting a war of national self-defence.’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4145356. stm. Last accessed on 1 October 2015.

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gongcheng), which declared, among other things, that those Koguryo tombs located in China itself should be recognized as China’s own world heritage (Ramzy 2004). This seemingly innocuous incident began a controversy regarding which state owns the history of Koguryo. When China’s foreign ministry deleted Koguryo from the summary of ‘Korean’ history on its website and consistently referred to the area as ‘China’s Koguryo’ (Gries 2005), the South Korean National Assembly took a rare move and unanimously passed a resolution in the National Assembly criticizing the Chinese stance on the issue and reiterating that Koguryo is part of Korean history. While not as intense and controversial as those historical issues involving Japan, the Koguryo saga illustrates how unresolved historical issues easily can lead to the formation of antithetical national identities between China and South Korea. The importance of these historical issues lies in the fact that they go to the heart of defining their national identities, which each party treats as non-negotiable. The shared social memories of important past events are a core element of collective identity formation (Calhoun 1993; Anderson 1983); when actors’ historical memories do not converge they cannot form a genuine collective identity. The increased salience of unresolved historical issues suggests that the social memories of important past events are increasingly less shared and more contested by the three countries, which pits their national identities against one another in an antithetical manner. The rise of the ‘history problem’ resuscitated the antithetical national identities that have their roots in Japan’s imperial period but became dormant during the developmental peace. Social identity theory tells us that once a particular group identity is primed in relation to some out-group, then in-group favouritism and out-group derogation are very common behavioural traits (Turner 1982; Turner & Tajfel 1979). When national identities are primed and directed against a particular Other, in-group members will not only voluntarily conform to in-group norms and attitudes – both toward other in-group members and toward relevant out-group – but also they themselves might enforce those norms and attitudes on other in-group members and punish deviant behaviour either materially or socially (Shih, et al. 1999; Benjamin, Choi & Fisher 2010), the effect of which is to accentuate that very antithetical national identity vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. Hence the emergence of antithetical national identi-

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ties does not bode well regional peace and stability, as it causes regional affairs to become unnecessarily tense and conflictual by exacerbating mutual threat perceptions and boosting domestic support for hard-line foreign policy toward neighbouring countries. A vicious cycle is at work here. The lack of mutual trust and common identity increases the likelihood of historical controversies, as actors envision neither a common past nor a common future. Such historical controversies, in turn, further diminish mutual trust and hinder the formation and development of a common regional identity.

Domestic politics of nationalism There are two main ways nationalism affects foreign policy. The first is through socialization and internalization of prevailing historical memories and nationalistic sentiments and attitudes. The memories, sentiments and attitudes of policymakers are similar to those of ordinary citizens and may be reflected in foreign policymaking. The other mechanism is through domestic politics. Even when policymakers would like to pursue different policies (for example, cooperation with neighbouring countries), prevailing public sentiments and attitudes may limit their options and constrain their behaviour. This is particularly applicable in democratic countries where politicians and policymakers are subject to social pressure and punishment, but the same dynamic can also take place in non-democratic countries such as China (Weeks 2008; Weiss 2013). Policymakers are social beings and are subject to the same kind of domestic socialization process as ordinary citizens, which may make them more or less identical to ordinary citizens. Like ordinary citizens, policymakers also internalize prevailing historical memories and perspectives as well as ensuing nationalistic sentiments and attitudes. And they may reflect those sentiments and attitudes in their foreign policymaking and in their dealings with foreign counterparts. Chinese and South Korean policymakers firmly believe that they are on the side of historical justice and assume an attitude of moral superiority vis-à-vis their Japanese counterparts, mainly because they are certain that Japanese actions in the past were ‘wrong.’ This sort of belief and attitude arises as one internalizes particular historical memories and perspectives about Japanese colonialism. For instance, when

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South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun spoke of Dokdo/Takeshima in a nationally televised speech, his words reflected widely shared societal beliefs and attitudes about Japan’s past wrongdoings, which were his own beliefs too. He said:2 for Koreans, Dokdo is a symbol of the complete recovery of sovereignty. Along with homage by the Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese history textbooks, Dokdo is a touchstone of Japan’s recognition of its past history as well as its determination for Korea-Japan relations of future and peace in East Asia. When various Chinese policymakers insist that the Japanese side must ‘squarely face history and use history as a mirror’ (zhengshi lishi yishi weijing), they feel that they can chastise Japanese counterparts from the moral high ground. Chinese policymakers typically demand certain actions from the Japanese side based on their own understanding of the past historical event.3 In both cases, China and South Korea assume that they stand on the moral high ground vis-à-vis Japan. The other way that nationalism can affect foreign policy is through domestic politics. While policymakers have been subject to the same kind of domestic socialization, they typically work in a different environment with a greater constellation of interests and issues to balance than ordinary citizens and interest groups. Often the international situation and domestic political environment dictate the pursuit of conflicting interests/policies. In such cases, nationalism could tip the balance, making domestic politics more important to policymakers. For example, the North Korean nuclear weapons issue is a major security threat to both Japan and South Korea, and both would like to improve their security cooperation such as intelligence sharing, to counter more effectively the security danger posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. But due to the saliency of the ‘history problem’, such cooperation has been vehemently resisted by the public, especially in South Korea. During the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–13), the South Korean and Japanese governments sought to conclude and sign the

2. For the full text in English, see http://dokdo-or-takeshima.blogspot.kr/2008/04/ roh-moo-hyuns-angry-dokdo-speech.html. 3. A recent example of this is when Chinese premier Li Keqiang met with Japanese foreign minister Kishida Fumio. For more details, see http://news.iciba.com/ study/bilingual/1572263.shtml.

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General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), but when this news was leaked to the public, the Korean public opposed what it understood to be a military pact. In the end, the South Korean government decided not to go ahead with the agreement. Governments that are subject to domestic social and interest group pressure find it very difficult to pursue the policies that deviate from the preferences of their publics, especially if there are powerful domestic groups that can punish the government for doing so. Such groups exist in all three countries. In Japan, conservative nationalists’ desire to move away from what they perceive to be excessive historical baggage and transform Japan into a ‘normal state’ (futsu no kuni). This normalization has two dimensions: political-security and sociocultural (Ryu 2017). The political-security aspect of normalization is mainly about revising Article 9 in order to permit Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defence. Article 9 contains a clause that prohibits the use of force as a means to settle international disputes. Furthermore, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), which has the power to interpret the constitution, has stated that while Japan has the right of collective self-defence right under the UN Charter, this right cannot be exercised due to Article 9.4 In 2015, however, conservative nationalists led by Shinzo Abe passed the Security Acts (anpo hosei), which changed this long-standing CLB interpretation in a way that now allows for the exercise of collective self-defence right without revising the constitution.5 The sociocultural dimension relates to what conservative nationalists believe is a low level of patriotism (read: nationalism) in Japan, especially among the youth. They argue that this sorry state is caused by ‘masochistic historical education’ (jigyaku teki rekishikan) in the postwar era. Postwar education, they claim, led the Japanese to feel a sense of

4. For details see Miyoko Tsujimura, Kenpō [Constitution] 59 (2000): 108. Article 9 is followed by several anti-militaristic principles: Japan shall accept three non-nuclear principles (prohibition to produce, possess and introduce nuclear weapons), shall restrict the export of arms and military technology, shall affirm the principle of peaceful use of space, and agree to limit defence expenditure to one per cent of GNP. 5. Many constitutional lawyers in Japan believe that the Security Acts are uncon- stitutional. Since the court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the Acts, the Japanese government has the legal basis for exercising the collective self-defence right for the time being.

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shame and guilt about its own past and traditions, to lack a spirit of independence, and to engender a willingness to give in to foreign pressure (gaiatsu). A ‘normal’ country would be the opposite of all this: high on national pride, freely expressing patriotic sentiments, and standing up against foreign criticism. While Japan’s apology is a costly signal of peaceful intent and changed identity with regard to China and South Korea (Lind 2010), it is a hard pill to swallow for Japanese nationalists, who see it as a signal of national weakness and interpret it as an indication of the sorry state of Japanese nationalism. To promote nationalism, they therefore seek to revise history in a way that conforms with their nationalistic view of modern Japan, which portrays Japan in a more positive light. For instance, they argue the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken) operated for the betterment of East Asian nations rather than for Japan’s national interest, and that these were noble goals and not merely imperial propaganda used to justify Japan’s military expansion.6 In China, the declining relevance and legitimacy of socialism led the Communist Party to search for a new source of political legitimacy. At the same time, the Chinese regime has increasingly been concerned with popular support despite the lack of democratic elections (Chan 2008). With the communist ideology losing its appeal, the CCP re-discovered nationalism as a key means to boost its political legitimacy, along with economic performance (Zhao 2005/6). Amidst this, Japan became a useful and effective target against which Chinese public sentiments could be incited (Reilly 2014). The patriotic education campaign (aiguo jiaoyu yundong) initiated under Jiang Zemin specifically and deliberately invoked Japan’s past atrocities in China to generate nationalistic feelings – of both internal solidarity and external resentment – among the Chinese public (Wang 2012). As long as the political legitimacy of the CCP is in question or needs a boost, Japan will continue to be a handy card for the CCP to play, given that their bilateral historical issues remain unresolved. Moreover, the social pressure to adhere to an overwhelmingly ne gative view of Japan suppresses reasonable voices. The Ma Licheng

6. Toko Sekiguchi ‘Prime Minister Abe Doubts ‘Aggression’, The Wall Street Journal 26 April, http://jp.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873242894045784457706 54912536.html. Last accessed 16 November 2016.

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incident illustrates this very well. A liberal intellectual at Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), Ma Licheng in 2002 wrote an article entitled ‘New Thinking on Relations with Japan’ in which he advocated putting the ‘history problem’ aside in order to achieve rapprochement with Japan. He saw excessive anti-Japanese nationalism as harmful. Ma’s views were criticized by other academics who maintained that the problem is Japan’s excessive anti-Chinese nationalism based on Japanese historical revisionism (Gries 2005). Ma was described as a ‘traitor’ (maiguozei) by many Chinese, and even received death threats. While it is true that other viewpoints on Japan do exist in Chinese society (Gries 2005), the dominant voice is a nationalistic one that reinforces a negative image of Japan and treats Japan as the Other. Once difficult, today it is not hard to find Renmin Ribao articles, including personal reminiscences, that describe Japan’s wartime atrocities in detail. In South Korea, the ‘Japan problem’ is still a politically sensitive issue seven decades after the former’s independence from the latter. Both ‘North Korea worshipper’ and ‘pro-Japan collaborator’ labels have a long pedigree of being associated with ‘traitor’ or ‘harming national interests’, and the labels, once applied, can end a politician’s career. Polarized politics in South Korea between the conservatives and progressives have also accentuated the political importance of these labels, with the former accusing the latter of being pro-North Korea and the latter accusing the former of being pro-Japan. For our purpose, this is important because the domestic politics of South Korea cannot be separated from its foreign relations with Japan. As South Korea’s national identity gets increasingly defined vis-à-vis Japan in an antithetical manner, bilateral cooperation receives less public support. The GSOMIA incident vividly illustrates this point: the Korean public has become extremely sensitive and resistant to any policy that enhances security via military cooperation with Japan. While in 2014 the conservative government of Park Geun-hye signed a three-way memorandum of understanding with Japan and the United States on safeguarding and sharing classified information about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, this GSOMIA is yet to be concluded with Japan due to the public resistance. 7

7. Despite the deceptive headline, the Japan Times confirms that the General Security of Military Information Agreement has not been concluded. ‘Japan, S. Korea, U.S. now sharing intelligence on N. Korea’ The Japan Times 29 December 2014 http://

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The domestic politics of nationalism will continue to complicate interstate relations among countries in the region by sustaining and reinforcing the antithetical national identities of Japan, China and South Korea. Ironically, the domestic political influence of the nationalists in each country depends upon nationalists in the others, despite their mutual hatred and mistrust. Furthermore, if nationalistic sentiments strengthen or issues of national symbol intensify, then their domestic voices will only grow, thereby creating a perverse incentive for nationalists to pursue their nationalistic political agenda with ever-rising stri- dency. This convergence of nationalism and domestic political incentive consolidates antithetical national identities.

The East Asian Peace in perspective: territorial disputes and a fragile peace The discussion in the previous sections helps us put the phenomenon of East Asian Peace into perspective. While the region has certainly become more peaceful as measured by the frequency of wars and battle deaths, it lacks a sense of collective identity and does not yet constitute a security community. The actual outbreak of military conflict is rare, but military tensions still exist and, arguably, have increased since the mid- or late-1980s due to strengthening nationalisms. This is most clearly shown in the intensification of territorial disputes. Territory is a quintessential symbol of Westphalian sovereignty, upon which modern nationalism is founded. It serves as a nationalistic symbol as well as a focal point around which nationalist rhetoric and actions can congregate. Therefore, it is no surprise that, as nationalism rises, conflict over disputed territories also increases in both intensity and frequency. There are three disputes in question. The first is a dispute between Japan and China over a group of islands known as the Senkakus by the Japanese or Diaoyudao by the Chinese. The Japanese government claims the islands by the right of discovery, arguing that they were terra nullius when it occupied them in the late 19th century and, therefore, they are not part of the territory that was to be returned at the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Japan de facto administers the islands today and does not admit the existence of www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/29/national/japan-s-korea-u-s-now- sharing-intelligence-on-n-korea/#.VrFot_GDo44. Last accessed 20 January 2016.

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Figure 13.1: Number of Chinese government and other vessels that entered the maritime and air space of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 2008–2015 40

120 No. of vessels identi ed that month No. within territorial sea within the contiguous zone 30 No. of vessels identi ed that month within the territorial sea 80 20

40 10 No. within contiguous zone within contiguous No.

0 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Dec 2008

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ page23e_000021.html.

a dispute. For its part, China claims that Japan forcefully and illegally took over the islands when Japan expanded militarily in the late 19th century and, as such, the islands were included as part of the territory that was to be returned to China in 1945. China further argues that the Japanese government is illegally occupying the islands, which are sovereign Chinese territory. The recent tensions over the islands began when the Japanese government officially purchased the islands from a Japanese private owner in 2012. The Chinese government vehemently protested against the action, and started sending fishing ships and coastal guard vessels into the disputed waters near the islands, and flying aircrafts over the disputed area, in order to weaken Japan’s effective administration. Figure 13.1 below shows the frequency of Chinese entrance into the waters surrounding the disputed islands. The number of airspace incursions by Chinese aircraft was about 20 in 2006, but steadily increased to 150 in 2011, 300 in 2012 and more than 400 in 2015.8 On 13 December 2012, 8. The numbers are compiled from various newspaper sources. See (1) http://www. ainonline.com/aviation-news/defence/2014-03-19/japan-highlights-increased- airspace-incursion-china and (2) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-chi-

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China sent a State Oceanic Administration aircraft (Harbin Y-12) to fly over the territorial space of Uotsuri Island, one of the disputed islands, thereby creating a dangerous situation of contingency and escalation, especially after the Japanese government scrambled its fighter jets to drive it out. Another territorial dispute is between Japan and South Korea. Called Dokdo in Korean or Takeshima in Japanese, the dispute has also intensified as a consequence of increased nationalism. The South Korean government claims that the island has been a part of Korean territory since ancient times, that there is no dispute about Korea’s sovereignty over the island, and that it was forcefully and illegally taken away by Japan when Japan annexed Korea in the late 19th century. On the other hand, the Japanese government argues that the island was terra nullius and without any effective administration by Korea when it took over, and that since the 1950s Korea has illegally occupied the island over which Japan has sovereignty. South Korea has de facto control and administration of the island. While maritime and airspace incursions are not common between South Korea and Japan over the disputed area, both have intensified their sovereignty claims. In 2012, Lee Myung-bak became the first sitting president to visit Dokdo. South Korea has also started to offer domestic tours to the island that attract hundreds of thousands of visitors annually. On the other hand, the Abe administration in January 2014 has passed the new ‘textbook screening guidelines’ that require all relevant textbooks to explain that Takeshima has been and remains illegally occupied by South Korea. This policy deviates sharply from Japan’s past practice of avoiding an explicit mention of Japan’s territorial claim in its history textbooks out of its consideration for neighbouring countries (kinryn jyoko), even though it still officially maintains a legal claim to the island. It is reported that in 2015, 15 out of 18 middle school textbooks describe Takeshima as Japan’s territory from ancient times and 13 describe South Korea as illegally occupying the island, an increase from 9 and 4 textbooks in 2014, respectively.9

na-russia-idUSKBN0KT0KT20150121 and (3) http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/senkaku/position_paper2_en.html. All accessed on 16 November 2016. 9. ‘Japanese middle school students learns “revisionist history”’ Hangyore 6 April 2015 http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/japan/685694.html

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The final dispute is between China and South Korea over a small rock called Suyanjiao in Chinese or Eardo in Korean (Socotra Rock). While the intensity of this dispute is nowhere near that of the previous two disputes, in recent years there have been some signs that it might become a thorny issue in the bilateral relationship. Initially, the dispute was mainly about maritime boundaries and jurisdiction. The South Korean government argues that the equidistance principle (based on the surface land mass) should apply to the maritime boundaries, in which case the rock falls within the Korean maritime area. The Chinese government, on the other hand, argues that the principle of natural prolongation based on continental shelf lines should apply. In that case, China would get roughly two-thirds of the maritime area between the east of China and the west of the Korean peninsula, and could also claim the rock itself.10 Both sides agreed in 2006 that the Socotra is not an island but a reef, and hence the issue is not about territory but rather about maritime boundary delimitation. In 2007, the website of a Chinese oceanic bureaucracy stated that the rock was Chinese territory; the statement was quickly deleted when it threatened to become a diplomatic issue. In 2012, Liu Cigui, then the director of China’s State Oceanic Administration, said that the Socotra falls within the Chinese maritime boundary and hence is subject to Chinese administration, including sea and air patrols.11 History once again matters here, at least as far as China and South Korea are concerned. China and South Korea see the territorial disputes with Japan as part of the ‘history problem,’ and argue that those islands were forcefully taken away from them by Japan during the latter’s imperial expansion. As all three countries passionately believe that they have legitimate sovereignty over the disputed islands, it is unlikely that they could resolve the disputes in the foreseeable future. These territorial conflicts sustain the vicious cycle of antithetical national identities, and diminishes mutual trust. The territorial disputes will continue to be a potential threat to regional peace and security.

10. ‘Korea-China Dispute over Eardo Flames’ http://news.naver.com/main/read.nh n?mode=LS2D&mid=sec&sid1=100&sid2=267&oid=001&aid=0002657269 11. State Oceanic Administration, ‘Restoration of Optical Cable in the Pacific Under Our Administration’ [我管辖海域中断的太平洋直达光缆修复] http:// www.soa.gov.cn/xw/dfdwdt/jsdw_157/201211/t20121109_12821.html

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So what does the intensification of territorial disputes between these three countries imply for our understanding of the East Asian Peace? Beneath the general trend of fewer wars and battle deaths lies a worrisome trend of increasing nationalism in key regional countries. It is even more concerning because their nationalisms are directed against one another. Unresolved historical issues that these countries consider to be an integral part of their national identities, feed into their nationalism, increase military tensions and mutual distrust between them, and threaten to escalate their territorial disputes to the level of actual military clashes. I argue that so long as nationalism remains intense and is defined in an antithetical manner, the East Asian Peace will remain rather fragile and shallow. It should be noted that the emphasis on nationalism in this chapter is different from Melander’s discussion (in this volume) of honour ideology and masculine peace. Melander in this volume argues that the prevalence of honour ideology based on the patriarchal culture of masculinity enables history problems and power transition to generate excessive hostility. While I agree that national pride is at stake between Japan, South Korea and China, the root cause of this clash of national identities is the differing understanding of important historical events and a deep sense of injustice felt by China and South Korea. I argue that even in the absence of honour ideology and patriarchal culture in these countries, unresolved the historical issues would generate a similar kind of interstate dynamics. My argument also differs from Guthrey’s (in this volume) emphasis on domestic political reconciliation as a valuable precursor to interstate political reconciliation. Guthrey argues that the lack of domestic political reconciliation can threaten the East Asian Peace as it can have a negative spillover effect into interstate relations. I agree that political reconciliation is needed to further the East Asian Peace, but such reconciliation should take place not just at the domestic but also at the interstate level. This is particularly so for the better relations between Japan, China and South Korea, as the historical issues they dispute are international in nature. What, then, can be done to deepen the regional peace and make it more durable? Can the factors that cause the East Asian Peace in the negative sense – such as the balance of power (Ross in this volume) and

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deepening trade relations (Goldsmith in this volume) – help ameliorate these security tensions, mutual distrust, and intensifying territorial disputes? To some extent, the answer is yes. These factors raise the costs of military conflict and act as constraints on aggressive behaviour. The balance of power makes it harder for any state to change the system through violent means, while close trade relations impose economic costs on the state that initiates conflict. Given that a lack of conflict (negative peace) is a necessary step toward the resolution of conflict and establishment of community (positive peace), the deterrence power of these factors remains important until we attain a more positive peace in the region. However, the same factors are not sufficient to create a positive regional peace. What is required en route to a more positive East Asian peace is a shared sense of ‘we-feeling’ and a collective identity that is necessary and critical for constructing a security community. Without such, while we may not observe the outbreak of military conflict, tensions will persist and territorial disputes will threaten regional peace and stability. Thus, more proactive measures must be taken in order to make the East Asian peace more deep and durable. Three concrete suggestions follow from the above analysis. First and most importantly, the three countries must work toward bridging the perceptual gap relating to the history of Japanese colonialism. While the complete convergence of historical understanding is too idealistic a goal, it is possible to narrow the gap, once political will is formed. The effort to write a joint history textbook is encouraging and disappointing at once. It is encouraging because the regional countries have finally come to realize the importance of narrowing their diverging historical understanding. But it is disappointing, because they sidestep the most controversial and contested issues in their joint history textbook. What should be done is that they delineate the areas of disagreement, state why they disagree, and supply their best historical evidence to support their respective viewpoints. While disagreement would never disappear completely, the fact that all sides are willing to face squarely a painful past together would go a long way toward weakening their antithetical national identities. Secondly, rather than aiming big, the three countries can explore possibilities for cooperation in areas far removed from contentious and divisive issues. Such cooperation is already taking place. In 2009, for

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example, the three countries commissioned a tripartite joint research project on environmental management in East Asia. But more is needed, and regional interstate cooperation in non-contentious issues is in the interests of all countries and can contribute to more positive evaluations of one another. And lastly, an effort must be made to reduce biases toward one another and improve mutual trust and sentiments. Any such effort has to be sustained over a long period of time. While there are some regional sociocultural interactions already in place, such as various student fo- rums and visits by parliamentarians, they are irregular and short-term in nature, and therefore cannot generate much of a positive institutional legacy. While the talk of regional community may sound utopian to some realists, the historical record offers many cases where erstwhile enemies have achieved rapprochement and became friends (Kupchan 2012). One need not look too far to find an example. In Southeast Asia, the overwhelmingly negative sentiments and suspicions Southeast Asian nations held of one another in the 1960s and 1970s slowly improved for the better, as regular contacts under the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) led to a habit of consultation and cooperation in ‘low politics’. Regional cooperation expanded over time from initial cooperation in tourism, agriculture, and science and technology to trade, security, and national defence. Today there are more than 1,000 official ASEAN meetings per annum. They have agreed to construct a regional community based on three pillars (politics and security, economics, and sociocultural) and the ASEAN Charter now explicitly requires the member states to give priority to ASEAN in their foreign policies (ASEAN Charter Article 2(2)(m)). Further, ASEAN decided to establish an Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2012, the first regional human rights mechanism in Asia and, as Ryu and Ortuoste (2014) argue, the creation of AICHR is part of ASEAN’s community-building process, in which the member states increasingly seek to converge and share socio-political values regarding domestic governance, rule of law and democracy. Some Southeast Asian nations – Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore – have also resolved their bilateral territorial disputes through the International Court of Justice. The evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism offers a sanguine possibil-

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ity that Japan, China and South Korea can break away from the vicious cycle of antithetical national identities and develop a more peaceful path toward the goal of constructing a regional community.

Conclusions This chapter has examined the effect of nationalism on the East Asian Peace, arguing that the rise of controversial historical issues has resulted in antithetical national identities between Japan, China and South Korea and the consequential intensification of territorial disputes. The emergence of antithetical national identities hinders the development of a regional community and thus renders the East Asian Peace rather shallow. As a result, the possibility of conflict still lurks in the background, even though outright military conflict has become rare. The chapter has also discussed how Southeast Asian nations have been able to transform their once antithetical national identities into more cooperative ones under the regional framework of ASEAN. It has suggested practical actions for the East Asian countries to weaken their antithetical national identities and improve mutual confidence and trust. All those actions, however, require a political will on the part of national leaders in all three countries, much like what existed in Southeast Asia in the early 1960s that led to the creation of ASEAN. Unfortunately, given the lack of political determination and imagination by national leaders of East Asian countries, coupled with the prevailing domestic political climate centred on narrow nationalism, it is hard to be too optimistic about the possibility of East Asia following the path of Southeast Asia. Hence in the foreseeable future, East Asia will remain peaceful, but the peace will be a shallow one.

References Adler, E. & M. Barnett, eds (1988) Security Communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism New York: Verso. Benjamin, D., J. Choi & G. Fisher (2010) ‘Religious Identity and Economic Behaviour’ NBER Working Paper Series 15925 Calhoun, C. (1993) ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity’ in Annual Review of Sociology 19: 211–39

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Chan, S. (2008) China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory. London: Routledge. Deutsch, K.W. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gries, P.H. (2005) ‘The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino- Korean Relations Today’, East Asia 22(4): 3–17. ——— (2005) ‘China’s New Thinking on Japan’, China Quarterly 184(4): 831–50. Hass, E. (1986) ‘What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?’ International Organization 40(3): 707–44. Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kazutomo, W. (2015) The Nature of History War [rekishi senso no shoutai] Tokyo: Science of Happiness Publishers. Kellas, J. (1991) The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: MacMillan. Kim, B. & E. Vogel, eds (2013) The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea. Cambridge; MA: Harvard University Press. Kupchan, C. (2011) How Enemies Become Friends. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lind, J. (2010) Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. MacFarquhar, R. (1997) The Origins of the Cultural Revolution vol. 3. New York: Columbia University Press. Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Ramzy, A. (2004) ‘Rewriting History’ Time Magazine (August 16) Reilly, J. (2012) Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. New York: Columbia University Press Roh, Moo-hyun. (2006) ‘Roh Moo-hyun’s Angry Dokdo Speech’ full English text at http://dokdo-or-takeshima.blogspot.kr/2008/04/roh-moo- hyuns-angry-dokdo-speech.html. Ryu, Y. & M. Ortuoste. (2014) ‘Democratization, Regional Integration, and Human Rights: the Case of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights’, The Pacific Review 27(3): 357–82. Ryu, Y. (2017) ‘Departing from the Postwar Regime: The Revision of the ‘Peace Constitution’ and Japan’s National Identity’ in McCarthy(ed.) The Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy. London: Routledge. Shih, M., T. Pittinsky & N. Ambady. (1999) ‘Stereotype Susceptibility:

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Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance’ Psychological Science 10(1): 80–3 Shin, G. & D. Sneider (eds) (2011), History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories. London: Routledge. Smith, A. (1979) Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press. Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979) An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey:Brooks/Cole. Turner, J. C. (1982) ‘Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group’, in H. Tajfel (ed.), Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vogel, E. (2013) Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Yoon, D. (2009) History War between Korea, China, and Japan in the 21st Century. Seoul: Seohae Munjib. Wang, Z. (2012) Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press. Weeks, J. L. (2008) Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signalling resolve. International Organization 62(1), 65–101. Weiss, J. (2013) ‘Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China’, International Organization 67(1): 1–35.

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The Great Power Challenge to the East Asian Peace

Robert S. Ross

Since the end of the Cold War, East Asia has experienced fewer battlefield deaths than Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia. Along with the Western Hemisphere, it has been the most peaceful region in the world, free from war and free from even less violent forms of interstate conflict, including small-scale hostilities. Moreover, apart from US–North Korean tension over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the region has been free from crises, arms races and heightened fears of hostilities. Since 2010, however, as China has developed increasingly modern and capable maritime capabilities, East Asia has experienced a con- tinuous rise in great power tension and regional instability, and thus prompting region-wide concern that hostilities and war might now be more likely. In the East China Sea and the South China Sea, conflicts between China and other claimants over disputed maritime territories and US–China naval friction have threatened to disrupt regional stability. With the rise of Chinese maritime capabilities, an emerging power transition in maritime East Asia between rising China and status-quo United States has implications for regional security trends that are not encouraging for the long-term prospects of the East Asian Peace (e.g. Gilpin 1983; Levy 2008; Organski 1958). This chapter will discuss the sources of the East Asian wars during the Cold War and address the characteristics of the post-Cold War strategic order that gave rise to the East Asian Peace. It argues that China’s ultimate satisfaction with the post-Cold War strategic order on the East Asian mainland enabled the emergence of the post-Cold War East Asian

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Peace. This chapter then analyzes the rise of China as a maritime power and the emerging US–China power transition that has contributed to the recent rise of regional tension. The conclusion will briefly consider the prospects for sustaining the East Asian Peace.

China, the Cold War and the wars in East Asia During the Cold War, East Asia experienced more wars than any other region in the world, China was involved in more wars than nearly every country in the world (second only to the United States) and China was involved in every East Asian war.1 In 1949, following the Japanese occupation of China and the Chinese Civil War, China’s vulnerable borders led to challenges to its security around its entire periphery. The multiple East Asian wars over the ensuing 40 years, each of which occurred on China’s territorial periphery, reflected China’s determination to secure its borders. In June 1950, China refrained from diplomatic support for Kim Il- Sung’s invasion of South Korea and from direct Chinese involvement in the war as long as it remained a north–south civil war. But once US forces entered the war, China prepared for war, including moving units to the Sino–Korean border to deter the United States from unifying the Korean Peninsula. When US forces then crossed the 38th parallel and approached the Chinese border, Chinese troops entered the war en masse and engaged in three years of war with US forces (e.g. Chen 1994; Christensen 1992; Goncharov, Lewis & Xue 1993). China’s many wars in Indochina similarly represented Beijing’s efforts to coerce the great -powers and their allies to remove their strategic presence from Chinese borders. When de Gaulle’s France returned to Indochina following World War II, it became China’s primary border security concern. Within months after the defeat of the forces of the Republic of China and the declaration of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949, China intervened in the Vietnam War against France, sending aid and personnel to support the anti-French Vietnamese Workers’ Party insurgency (Zhai 2000).

1. China was not involved in the 1962–1966 conflict involving Indonesia, Britain and Malaysia over the establishment of Malaysia, but in any case the number of casualties in this conflict did not reach the 1,000 battle-deaths threshold traditionally used to classify an interstate war.

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Chinese logistics and military advisors played an essential role in defeat- ing the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. After the 1954 Geneva Accords, China offered minimal support for North Vietnam’s objective of Vietnamese unification. Through the early 1960s it counselled Hanoi against the use of force against the South Vietnamese government, despite Saigon’s repression of South Vietnamese communists. The Vietnamese communists defied the advice, however, and from 1959 organized a sustained insurgency in South Vietnam, with provisions being sent in through Laos and Cambodia. When the United States reacted by establishing a significant and increasing military presence in Indochina beginning in late 1962, China offered diplomatic encouragement to North Vietnamese military objectives and soon provided extensive military aid to Vietnam and sent troops to North Vietnam to participate in the war. The 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises similarly reflected Chinese concern for its territorial security. Chinese use of force against Taiwan- held islands in the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s not only reflected its political objective of unification but also its security objective of compelling the United States to reconsider its security commitment to Taiwan and to remove its military presence from the Chinese coastal waters. During the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises, there were extensive Taiwan casualties (Gong 2001; Niu & Shen 2004). China had fought the United States to a stalemate in North Korea, it cooperated with North Vietnam to compel France and then the United States to withdraw from Indochina, and it compelled US caution on the Taiwan issue in the 1960s (Goldstein 2015; Tucker 1994). But the Soviet Union then emerged as a new threat on China’s strategic perimeter. Following China’s 1958–60 Great Leap Forward and its subsequent development of an independent security policy that included resistance to Soviet leadership of the communist bloc, Moscow aimed to coerce China to return to its fold and to accept Soviet leadership over Chinese security policy. In the mid-1960s, Moscow began a major defence build-up on the Chinese border and, by the mid-1970s, it had deployed a full array of modern military equipment against China in the Soviet Far East, thus threatening China with war (Gelman 1982, 1986; Langer 1982). Moreover, the Soviet Union cooperated with India’s ef-

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forts to promote an Indian strategic presence on the Chinese border and it competed with China for influence in North Korea (Garver 2001). The 1969 Sino–Soviet border war reflected Chinese determination to resist Soviet coercion and compel the Soviet Union to end its threat to Chinese border security. Following the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and its subsequent declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine, China initiated use of force against the Soviet Union’s forces on Zhenbao Island on the Ussuri River to signal that China was resolute in its intention to resist Soviet use of force on Chinese territory (Kuisong 2000; Lewis & Xue 2006). The Soviet Union’s challenges to Chinese territorial security also spread to Indochina. In 1965, Moscow began to compete with Beijing for influence in Hanoi. Then, after the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam following the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, and after North Vietnam had defeated South Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge had defeated the pro-US Lon Nol government in Cambodia in 1975, Vietnam increasingly tilted toward the Soviet Union in the Sino–Soviet conflict. In November 1978, the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a defence treaty and, one month later, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia and ousted China’s strategic partner, the Khmer Rouge, establishing Soviet influence in all three Indochinese countries: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The Soviet Union thus followed France and the United States in establishing a strategic presence on China’s southern borders. China responded in 1979 by initiating a three-week Sino–Vietnamese border war. Through 1989 China deployed multiple divisions on the Sino-Vietnamese border and both the Chinese and Vietnamese armies incurred significant casualties. China aimed to deter expanded Soviet– Vietnamese cooperation on China’s southern borders in mainland Southeast Asia (Ross 1988; Zhang 2015). China’s 1962 war with India similarly reflected Chinese concern for its border security. Despite clear and frequent Chinese warnings, India did not withdraw its military forces from the Chinese side of the established line of control along the disputed border between China and northeast India. China responded with a decisive attack on Indian forces, thus re-establishing the status-quo ante and stabilizing Chinese border security.

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Sources of the East Asian Peace The Cold War militarization of East Asia reflected Chinese readiness to use force to establish border security. The subsequent East Asian Peace reflected Chinese success at ousting great power presence from its borders and at establishing border security. Chinese intervention in the Vietnam wars contributed to the defeat of France in 1954, of the United States in 1975, and of the Soviet– Vietnamese alliance and Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in 1989. The US defeat in Vietnam also contributed to Bangkok’s 1975 decision to oust US bases from Thailand and to develop cooperative security ties with China. Thus, by 1989, with the end of the Soviet Union’s commitment to support Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia and with reduced Soviet military and economic assistance to Vietnam, China emerged as the only great power with influence in Indochina, thus establishing for the first time since the colonial era in East Asia a sphere of influence and border security on its southern periphery. China’s successful intervention against the United States in the Vietnam War also contributed to improved Chinese security in the Taiwan Strait. The US defeat in Vietnam contributed to America’s global retrenchment in the 1970s and to the necessity for the United States to compromise gradually on Taiwan and end its strategic presence on the island, so as to reduce both the US–China conflict and the US defence burden in East Asia. The US compromises on Taiwan embodied in the Shanghai and normalization communiques, including the US commitment to withdraw its military from Taiwan, were the prerequisites for US–China rapprochement and the normalization of US–China relations (e.g. Gong 1994; Ross 1995). China’s Cold War with the Soviet Union contributed to the collapse of Soviet power in East Asia. NATO forces created a military front against the Soviet Union in Europe; the Sino–Soviet conflict created the Soviet Union’s ‘second front’ in East Asia, requiring Moscow to deploy 45 divisions along the Sino–Soviet border and advanced aircraft and missiles in the Soviet Far East in the 1970s and 1980s (Naughton 1988; Gelman 1982, 1986; Langer 1982). The corresponding expense of maintaining the Soviet Union’s Eurasian empire contributed to the collapse of Soviet power in 1989 and the establishment of a secure Chinese northeast border with Russia. Since 1989, China has consoli-

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dated its border security on the Sino–Russian border, as Chinese economic development has been accompanied by enduring Russian failure to carry out economic reforms and Chinese military modernization has been accompanied by Russian military decline in the Russian Far East and Northeast Asia. Russian security in its Far East now depends on Chinese cooperation. The collapse of the Soviet Union also contributed to Chinese security along its northern and western borders. Russia can no longer resist Chinese influence in North Korea; China now dominates its border with North Korea. The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to unchallenged Chinese strategic pre-eminence along the Sino–Mongolian border and on China’s Central Asian borders with Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan. Since 1989, increasing China’s military and economic advantages vis-à-vis Russia have strengthened Chinese dominance along the entire length of the Sino–Russian border. China also enjoys unchallenged security along the Sino–Indian border. Since the end of the Cold War, the economic gap between China and India has significantly expanded. The ‘rise of India’ has failed to meet expectations (Economist 2015).2 Similarly, in contrast to the significant modernization of the Chinese military, there has been minimal indigenous modernization of the Indian armed forces, including its naval capabilities; trends in Chinese and Indian military modernization have favoured China. These developments in the Indian and Chinese economic and military trajectories have contributed to declining relative Indian capabilities vis-à-vis China. Moreover, the Himalaya Mountains present an imposing geopolitical impediment to major Sino–Indian hostilities, thus mitigating against a significant Indian military threat to Chinese territorial security. By 1989, forty years after the establishment of the PRC, Beijing had established a new East Asian security order. Soviet power had retreated to its European interior, the United States had retrenched to maritime East Asia, and no other power had the ability to challenge Chinese power along its mainland borders. Thus, China emerged as the unrivalled domi-

2. Note that recent trends suggest that the Indian economic growth rate is approaching the Chinese, after China’s growth has slowed down. But one per cent growth in China is tenfold more than one per cent growth in India in absolute terms, given the enormous difference in the total national income.

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nant power in the geopolitics of continental East Asia. China was more secure than at any time since the beginning of the Opium War in 1839. China’s Cold War victories established the underlying strategic foundation for the post-Cold War East Asian Peace. Mao Zedong contributed his distinct revolutionary ideology to China’s post-1949 diplomacy, but the great power challenges along China’s borders created the strategic conditions for East Asia’s Cold War violence. Once China had secured its borders, it no longer faced the strategic imperative to use force to establish border security. China’s leaders could thus devote scarce Chinese resources to economic development, rather than to great power competition and war fighting. Whereas Chinese insistence on obtaining border security contributed to East Asia’s wars from 1945 to 1989 (see also Kreutz in this volume), China’s ultimate satisfaction with the post-Cold War strategic order on the East Asian mainland enabled the emergence of the post-Cold War East Asian Peace. But the East Asian Peace has entailed more than just Chinese border security. It has also reflected the distinct characteristics of the East Asian theatre. Once the United States lost the war in Vietnam, it retrenched to maritime East Asia, satisfied that it could secure its interest in the regional balance of power with cooperation from the maritime states. Thus, the great powers’ spheres of influence emerged in distinct theatres – China’s sphere on mainland East Asia and the US sphere in maritime East Asia. The presence of water between these two theatres has provided a natural strategic buffer, a large ‘moat’, that has enhanced the security of each great power. Because until recently China has not possessed power-projection naval capabilities, it could not challenge the US Navy or the security of US strategic partners in maritime East Asia. Similarly, because the United States has not possessed a land army that can wage war on mainland East Asia, it has not challenged Chinese border security or its mainland spheres of influence. This geopolitical order has contributed to regional stability and explains the absence of great power tension. Moreover, each side’s confidence in its respective security has allowed both sides to maximize bilateral cooperative relations (Ross 1999a).

The Rise of China and the challenge to the East Asian Peace Since the end of the Cold War, the East Asian Peace has reflected China’s satisfaction with its continental territorial security and the characteris-

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tics of the regional strategic order. But East Asian stability also reflected the full extent of Chinese military capabilities. China’s ground force capability had won the wars in East Asia and established secure Chinese continental borders. But the Chinese military continued to lack the ability to reach across the seas to further advance Chinese security. During the two decades following the end of the Cold War, despite unchallenged territorial security along its entire interior, China was not necessarily satisfied with the East Asian strategic order. Its military could not secure its coastal waters and it faced an East Asian maritime environment dominated by the US Navy, which enjoyed unchallenged access to its naval facilities along China’s entire maritime perimeter in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. Moreover, Chinese strategic maritime vulnerability has assumed greater importance since the late 1990s, as China emerged as a global trading power and as the United States deployed its most advanced naval and air force platforms to China’s maritime perimeter (Kan 2014). In this strategic context, since the early 1990s China has devoted an increasing share of its expanding defence budget to the modernization of its navy. By 2010, after thirty years of economic and technological development and twenty years of naval modernization, the Chinese Navy had begun to deploy new capabilities that allowed China to assert with determination its maritime security interests. For the first time, China was able to reach across the East Asian Seas, across the East Asian moat, to enhance its security, but in so doing it challenged US maritime security and the security of US allies, and thereby contributed to heightened great power tension, similar to the great power tension of previous power transitions in Europe and Asia. China continues to expand rapidly its modern naval fleet. It is replacing its older naval platforms, including submarines, destroyers, attack ships and amphibious ships, with numerous contemporary platforms that possess greater firepower and sea-worthiness than their predeces- sors. Equally important, China is developing an indigenous ability to manufacture advanced submarines, aircraft and surface ships (Erickson 2014; Erickson, Lu, Bryan & Septembre 2014). These efforts extend to aircraft carriers that, when fully developed with support ships and advanced aircraft, will contribute to a global PLA Navy power projection and expeditionary capability (Ross 2009, 2017). The PLA Navy is also

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developing reconnaissance and targeting capabilities that will enhance the firepower of its more modern platforms (Gormley, Erickson & Yuan 2014). Together, these next-generation platforms and weapon systems have demonstrated that all modern navies, including the US Navy operating in the West Pacific and East China Sea and in the South China Sea, must revisit their balance of power calculations. Chinese military advances have been most significant for the US– China balance of forces in the Taiwan theatre. In 1995 the United States could send an aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait with no concern for its safety; China could not even detect the presence of a carrier (Ross 1999b). But by 2015, the advances in Chinese coastal weaponry and surveillance capabilities had made such an exercise highly risky. Whereas Taiwan was once considered an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’, by the 2000s Taiwan’s proximity to Chinese coastal warfare capabilities had made it useless as a US base for power projection capabilities. Moreover, China’s coastal capabilities have significantly raised the cost to the United States of war with China over Taiwan. For Taiwan, China’s medium-range ballistic missiles and advanced aircraft have undermined US ability to defend Taiwan from the cost of war, regardless of the outcome of such a war, thus weakening Taiwan’s resolve to challenge Chinese determination to oppose Taiwan independence (Heginbotham 2015; Ross 2006). Beyond the Taiwan Strait, the modernization of the Chinese Navy and improved education and training of its officers have enabled China to conduct increasingly sophisticated exercises and to spend more time navigating its ‘near seas’ (Kamphausen, Scobell & Tanner 2008). The greater presence of Chinese fishing fleets, maritime surveillance vessels and war ships in the coastal waters of US allies has heightened regional security concerns. And the Chinese Navy’s greater ability to defend its sovereignty interests has created new sources of friction between China and US allies and between the US and Chinese navies. The Chinese Navy is far from developing parity with the US Navy. United States aircraft, aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and anti-submarine warfare capabilities are all superior to advanced Chinese capabilities in both quantity and quality in the East Asian seas (Chase et al. 2015; Murray 2014). The United States is also developing next-generation military technologies, including ship-based anti-ship missiles, directed energy weapons, rail guns and ship-based drones. US Navy

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and Air Force communication and electronic warfare capabilities are also superior to their Chinese counterparts and contribute to both the offensive capabilities of US forces in East Asia and the US Navy’s ability to defend against Chinese offensive systems (Greenert 2014). Equally important, the Chinese Navy has yet to carry out the advanced training and develop the leadership necessary for advanced war-time naval operations. The experience of China’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden reveals that, despite important improvements in its operational sophistication, the PLA Navy suffers from protracted logistical weaknesses and significant constraints on its ship commanders’ operational autonomy (Erickson & Strange 2013). Nevertheless, the rise of the Chinese navy is gradually restoring ‘normalcy’ to great power relations. US post-Cold War global naval supremacy was destined to erode, and the rise of China has been the critical force in this emerging equilibrium in the great power balance. The United States has retained absolute naval superiority over much of the world, but in East Asia, the central great power theatre in twenty- first century international politics, the rise of China has contributed to the determined erosion of US global maritime presence (Ross 2017). The emerging US–China naval balance increasingly resembles the nineteenth century balance among European naval powers. Throughout the nineteenth century, the British Empire enjoyed undisputed global maritime superiority. All of its potential adversaries understood that they would lose a naval war with Britain. The Royal Navy’s ‘two-power standard’ assured Britain of victory against even a coalition of naval powers. Nonetheless, British leaders did not believe that a war with France, for example, would be easy or cost free. Similarly, the United States will retain its superiority over the Chinese Navy for perhaps the next two decades. But great power war has always been costly and dangerous, and China’s emerging naval capabilities and its challenge to US naval hegemony are restoring the historical norm of competitive relations among maritime powers.

The rise of China and the US response: great power transition in East Asia The US–China power transition is far from the power nexus when international relations theorists predict great power war (e.g., Gilpin 1983;

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Mearsheimer 2006; Organski 1958). But incremental change in the balance of power among the great powers has consequences for international politics. China has not closed the gap in the US–China balance, but it has narrowed the gap (Heginbotham 2015). This is an important source of heightened regional instability, which has contributed to expanding Chinese efforts to enhance its security and defend its sovereignty claims, which in turn has prompted US efforts to maintain the strategic status quo and, thus, resist China’s increased regional activism. The rise of China and Chinese strategic activism For thirty years after the Maoist era, China pursued ‘peaceful rise’ and Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui (hide one’s capacity and bide one’s time) diplomacy. Its foremost priority was economic development. It thus sought maximum regional stability so that it could avoid costly international conflicts and could allocate its resources to civilian and defence modernization. China thus tolerated challenges to its sovereignty claims from maritime neighbours, as well as US naval presence in its coastal waters. But, as expected from the dynamics of power transitions, China’s improved maritime capabilities relative to both its neighbours and the United States has contributed to Chinese re-evaluation of its security interests and to a less restrained foreign policy. In the East China Sea, China reacted strongly to the 2010 Japanese arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain who rammed his boat into a Japanese Coast Guard ship within disputed waters near the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands. China’s reaction signalled to Japanese leaders the sensitivity of this issue for China and for Sino–Japanese relations. Thus, Japan’s 2012 ‘nationalization’ of the islands elicited a strong Chinese challenge to Japanese sovereignty claims. Beginning in late 2012, China began regular coast guard patrols within the islands’ territorial sea and naval patrols in the islands’ contiguous zone (Ryu in this volume; Fravel & Johnston 2014). In 2012, after the Philippines sent a naval vessel to detain Chinese fishermen operating within the lagoon of the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, China retaliated by sending its coast guard to the shoal, preventing the Philippines’ ship from leaving the lagoon. Since the end of the standoff in late 2012, China has cordoned off the entrance to the lagoon, blocking all fishing within the shoal, and its coast guard vessels have patrolled the waters around the shoal.

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China’s maritime forces have also retaliated against Vietnamese challenges to Chinese maritime claims. In 2008 Vietnam, along with the Philippines, refused to extend a 2005 agreement for China–Vietnam– Philippines oil exploration in disputed waters. In 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea by submit- ting their own claims to waters in the central part of the South China Sea, more than 200 nautical miles from their territorial borders, based on an extended continental shelf. Vietnam also passed a new maritime law in June 2012, strengthening its claims to waters also claimed by China. In 2011 and 2012 China retaliated against Vietnamese challenges to Chinese maritime claims. Its ships cut the cables of Vietnamese seismic survey ships operating in disputed waters and China increased its naval presence around the contested Paracel Islands (Fravel 2011; Perlez 2012; Wong 2012). In early 2013, two Chinese patrol boats fired flares at a Vietnamese boat fishing in disputed waters, causing a fire that destroyed the boat’s cabin (Vietnam 2013; Wu 2013). In May 2014, after Sino–Vietnamese negotiations on joint oil exploration in disputed waters ended without success, China deployed the Haiyang deep sea oil rig to disputed waters (China Daily 2014; Xinhua News Agency 2014). This was the first time China had explored for oil on a disputed part of the seabed since 1994, despite the exploration activities of other claimants. Chinese deployment of the Haiyang oil rig contributed to region-wide concern about Chinese intentions, to large-scale anti-China demonstrations in Vietnam, and to a tense confrontation between Chinese civilian and naval ships and Vietnamese government ships in disputed waters. China’s expanded maritime abilities have also contributed to US– China maritime tension. The US Navy had long conducted unimpeded surveillance and intelligence operations close to the Chinese coast. China tolerated US activities because it lacked the air and maritime capabilities ability to challenge US operations. But with the modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, China has increasingly challenged US military operations in sensitive waters near China’s coastal defence installations. In early 2009, Chinese ships sailed close to the USS Impeccable, which was carrying out surveillance activities 125 nautical miles from the Chinese coast. Since then, China has increased the frequency of its surveillance of US air and naval surveillance operations in the South China Sea.

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For many years, China’s neighbours in Northeast Asia, including Russia, South Korea and Japan, had enforced air defence identification zones (ADIZ) in Northeast Asian waters. Until recently, however, China lacked the capability to establish and enforce an ADIZ anywhere around its maritime perimeter. China’s November 2013 declaration of its own East China Sea ADIZ reflected both Chinese interest in securing the airspace over its coastal waters and the recent advances of its air force. Throughout East Asia and in the United States there was considerable concern that China’s ADIZ declaration reflected growing Chinese strategic ambitions that would destabilize East Asia security. China’s controversial reclamation activities in the South China Sea similarly reflected China’s improved maritime capabilities and a cor- respondingly greater effort to enhance Chinese maritime security and defend its sovereignty claims. Reclamation of Chinese-occupied reefs and islands in the South China Sea supports expanded China’s air and naval presence in the southern reaches of the South China Sea and a greater ability to carry out surveillance of US naval activities, similar to the contribution of US naval facilities in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines to the presence of the US Navy in the South China Sea. China’s land reclamation also enables more effective Chinese Coast Guard patrols of other countries’ activities in Chinese-claimed waters. US resistance to China’s strategic activism The United States understands recent Chinese activism as a challenge to both US naval security in East Asia and to the stability of US regional alliances. But as much as China’s effort to improve its security has contributed to regional instability, the U.S. response has similarly contributed to regional instability. Regarding the region’s sovereignty disputes, the United States has made strong statements in support of its allies’ resistance to Chinese defence of their sovereignty claims. In 2010 the United States changed its policy toward the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Prior administrations had merely asserted a US interest in freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of the disputes. But in July 2010 in Hanoi, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for ‘collaborative’ and ‘multilateral’ negotiations among the claimants, thus supporting the ASEAN position that there should be multilateral negotiations to resolve the maritime disputes, in contrast to China’s preference for bilat-

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eral negotiations (Clinton 2010; Landler 2010). Clinton repeated this call four months later in Manila and again in November 2011, where she spoke from the deck of an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer in Manila Bay. She also said that, ‘in the spirit’ of the famous Philippine boxer Manny Pacquiao, ‘let me say, the United States will always be in the corner of the Philippines and we will stand and fight with you’ (US Department of State 2011). In 2012 she stated that Chinese territorial claims exceeded the limits allowed by the law of the sea (Associated Press 2012). During President Barack Obama’s visit to Manila in April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, which allows US forces to have regular access to the Philippines’ military facilities (Garamone 2014). Regarding the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute, the United States has been even clearer in its promise to stand by a security ally. Following the Japanese government’s purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in September 2012 and after Chinese Coast Guard ships increased the frequency of their patrols within the territorial sea of the islands (see also Ryu’s chapter in this volume), the US Air Force began flights of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft over the disputed islands to provide support to the Japanese Air Force. In January 2013, US AWACS aircraft approached the Sino–Japanese maritime median line, leading the Chinese Air Force to scramble two aircraft, which then approached and tailed the US AWACS aircraft. Secretary Clinton then reassured Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida that the US–Japan Mutual Defence Treaty extends to the islands and that the United States opposes Chinese actions that ‘undermine Japanese administration’ of the islands (Asahi Shimbun 2013; US Department of State 2013). In April 2014, as part of his visit to Japan, President Obama reaffirmed three times that the US–Japan alliance covers defence of Japanese-administered territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Glaser and Vitello 2014). After China declared its Northeast Asian ADIZ, Washington singled out China for creating regional instability and making extreme territorial claims. A senior administration official warned China that declaration of an ADIZ in the South China Sea could lead to changes in the US ‘presence and military posture’ throughout East Asia (Dyer 2014; Russel 2014). As Chinese reclamation projects expanded and accelerated through 2015, the United States frequently criticized China’s ‘coercive’ policies

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in disputed waters (Russel 2014; US Department of Defence 2015). In April 2015 the United States more than doubled the number of troops participating in the US–Philippine annual naval exercise (Robson 2015). In January 2106 Adm. Harry Harris, head of the US Pacific Command, declared that the islands do not belong to China” and that China’s “provocative land reclamation activities were increasing the tensions in the region.” (Cavas 2016). Multiple US naval operations in close proximity to the reclaimed islands, as well to natural islands claimed by China, have challenged the security of Chinese installations and Chinese sovereignty claims.

Conclusion: the rise of China and the prospects for the East Asian Peace The fundamental underlying challenge to the East Asian Peace is the rise of China and the consequences for US–China relations. After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, because the regional security order on the East Asian mainland did not reflect Chinese ground force capabilities, instability and war characterized the East Asian order. Such was the case from 1949 to 1989, when China’s powerful army resisted great power presence on China’s borders. For the following twenty years, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the East Asian order accurately reflected the great power distribution of capabilities. China had achieved mainland border security but it lacked the maritime capabilities to resist the US–dominated maritime order and the challenges to Chinese maritime security. The recent instability in East Asia reflects the determined emergence of advanced Chinese maritime capabilities and China’s corresponding effort to reshape the regional maritime order better to serve Chinese security. With its improved coast guard and naval capabilities, China has challenged the US Navy’s ability to dominate the East Asian seas and it has sought greater respect for its maritime claims. In so doing, it has inevitably heightened the security concerns of the smaller regional states and challenged US maritime security, contributing to regional tension. But the recent East Asian instability also reflects the response of the United States, the region’s maritime status-quo power, to China’s demand for a revised regional order. To bolster its alliance relationships

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and restrain Chinese coercion, the United States has resisted strategic accommodation of enhanced Chinese maritime capabilities and Chinese maritime security concerns. It has expressly challenged China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea and provided unambiguous alliance support for Japanese defence of its sovereignty claims in the East China Sea. The United States has also resisted China’s expansion of its naval presence in East Asia and the challenge to US maritime hegemony. The emergence of East Asian instability is the expected result of the ongoing US–China power transition. China has not closed the gap in the US–China balance of power, but its improved relative capabilities have enabled it to pursue greater maritime security and to defend its sovereignty claims and maritime claims against US allies, thereby challenging the regional security order and US security. The combination of China’s quest for maritime security and US resistance to a corresponding decline in its own security has caused heightened great power conflict and regional instability. China is determined to enhance its naval capabilities and maritime security (People’s Republic of China 2015) and, should recent trends in the US–China balance of power continue, the competitive aspects of US–China security relations will increase and managing the relationship will become more difficult. As China’s relative maritime capabilities grow, its willingness to accommodate the post-Cold War regional security order will diminish and its challenge to US security will thus increase. The United States will probably respond with greater resistance to China’s challenge to the status quo in the regional security order and US–China conflict and broader regional instability will increase. Nonetheless, the East Asian power transition and heightened great power conflict and regional instability will not inevitably lead to war. Deterministic monocausal theories of international politics fail to capture the complexity of decision making and the causes of great power war. Diplomacy, leadership and domestic politics all contribute to conflict escalation and decisions to use force. The evolving US–China relationship is not destined for war. Chinese strategic patience and restraint would allow for political change to promote a revised strategic order and constrain the pressures for war. For its part, a US strategic adjustment to China’s rise can contribute to peaceful change that also reflects US maritime security interests. In the context of an ongoing regional power

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transition, sustaining the East Asian Peace will not be easy, but it is not an insurmountable challenge.

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Erickson, A. S. & A. M. Strange (2013) No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden. Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College. Erickson, A., H. Lu, K. Bryan & S. Septembre (2014) ‘Research, Development, and Acquisition in China’s Aviation Industry: The J-10 Fighter and Pterodactyl UAV’, Policy Brief (8 January). University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Fravel, M. T. (2011) ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33(3): 292–319. Fravel, M. T. & A. I. Johnston (2014) ‘Chinese Signaling in the East China Sea?’ Washington Post (12 April). https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/12/chinese-signaling-in-the-east- china-sea/?utm_term=.da86e1c835f0, accessed 29 January 2017. Garamone, J. (2014) ‘US-Philippine Pact Expands Defence Cooperation’, American Forces Press Service, US Department of Defence (28 April). http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122136, accessed 29 January, 2017. Garver, J. (2001) Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 20th Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Gelman, H (1982) The Soviet Far East Military Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. ——— (1986) ‘The Soviet Far East Military Build-Up: Motives and Prospects’, in R. H. Solomon and M. Kosaka (eds) The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security. Dover, MA: Auburn. Gilpin, R. (1983) War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Glaser, B. & J. Vitello (2014) ‘US–China Relations: China’s Maritime Disputes Top the Agenda’, Comparative Connections. http://csis.org/files/ publication/1401qus_china.pdf, accessed 21 November 2016. Goldstein, S. M. (2015) China and Taiwan. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Goncharov, S. N., J. W. Lewis & L. Xue (1993) Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gong, L. (1994) Kuayue Honggou: 1969–1979 Nian Zhong-Mei Guanxi de Yanbian [Across the chasm: The evolution of Sino–US relations, 1969– 1979]. Henan: Henan Renmin ChubanShe. ——— (2001) ‘Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics’, in R. S. Ross and C. B. Jiang (eds) Re-examining the Cold War: US–China Diplomacy, 1954–1973. Cambridge, MA: Asia Center, Harvard University: 141–72. Gormley, D. M., A. S. Erickson & J. Yuan (2014) A Low-visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions. Washington, D.C.:

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Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University. Greenert, J. (2012) ‘Sea Change: The Navy Pivots to Asia’, Foreign Policy 14. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/14/sea-change/, accessed 21 November 2016. Heginbotham, E. (2015) The US–China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Kamphausen, R., A. Scobell & T. Tanner (2008) The ‘People’ in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute. Kan, S. A. (2014) Guam: US Defence Deployments. CRS Report RS22570. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Kuisong, Y. (2000) ‘The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement’, Cold War History 1(1): 21–52. Landler, M. (2010) ‘Offering to Aid Talks, US Challenges China on Disputed Islands’, New York Times (23 July). www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/ world/asia/24diplo.html/, accessed 21 November 2016. Langer. P. H. (1982) ‘Soviet Military Power in Asia’, in D. Zagoria (ed.) Soviet Policy in Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Levy, J. (2008) ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, in R. S. Ross and F. Zhu (eds) China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 11–33. Lewis, J. & L. Xue (2006) Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006) ‘China’s Unpeaceful Rise’, Current History 105(690): 160–2. Murray, W. S. (2014) ‘Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare: Evolving Strength and Calculated Weakness’, in P. Dutton, A. S. Erickson and R. Martinson (eds) China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities. Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College. Naughton, B. (1988) ‘The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior’, The China Quarterly 115: 351–86. Niu, D. Y. & Z. H. Shen (2004) Lengzhan yu Zhongguo de Zhoubian Guanxi [The Cold War and China’s relations with its neighbours]. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe. Organski, A. F. (1958) World Politics. New York: Knopf. Patch, J. (2014) ‘Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft: Beyond Sea Denial’, in P. Dutton, A. S. Erickson and R. Martinson (eds) China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities. Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College: 4–9.

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People’s Republic of China (2015) ‘China’s Military Strategy’, Xinhua (May). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001. htm, accessed 29 January 2017. Perlez, J. (2012) ‘Dispute Flares over Energy in South China Sea’, New York Times (December 4). http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/world/ asia/china-vietnam-and-india-fight-over-energy-exploration-in-south- china-sea.html/, accessed 21 November 2016. Robson, S. (2015) ‘US More Than Doubles Troops for Philippine Balikatan Exercise’, Stars and Stripes (8 April). http://www.stripes.com/news/ pacific/us-more-than-doubles-troops-for-philippine-balikatan-exercise-1.338953, accessed 29 January 2017. Ross, R. S. (1988) The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam policy, 1975–1979. New York: Columbia University Press. ——— (1995) Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969– 1989. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. ——— (1999a) ‘The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century’, International Security 23(4): 81–118. ——— (1999b) Interviews. ——— (2006) ‘Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement’, Foreign Affairs 85(2). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-03-01/tai- wans-fading-independence-movement, accessed 21 November 2016. ——— (2009) ‘China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the US response’, International Security 34(2): 46–81. ——— (2017) ‘The Rise of the Chinese Navy: From Regional Naval Power to Global Naval Power?’ in A. Goldstein and J. DeLisle (eds) A Changing China in a Changing World. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Russel, Danny (2014) ‘Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Danny Russel before the US House of Representatives’, (5 February) Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, Maritime Disputes in East Asia. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm, accessed 21 November 2016. Tucker, N. B. (1994) Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945–1992: Uncertain Friendships. New York: Twayne. US Department of Defence (2015) ‘Remarks by Secretary Carter and Nakatani at a Joint Press Conference’, (8 April) Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defence. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript- View/Article/607035/remarks-by-secretary-carter-and-nakatani-at-a- joint-press-conference, accessed 29 January 2017. US Department of State (2011) ‘Clinton, Philippine Foreign Secretary Joint Press Availability’, (16 November). http://iipdigital.usembassy. gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/11/20111116142331su0.4998852. html#axzz4XBfBhsti, accessed 29 January 2017.

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The East Asian Peace – Will It Last?

Elin Bjarnegård, Kristine Eck, Holly Guthrey, Joakim Kreutz, Erik Melander, Isak Svensson and Stein Tønnesson

The empirical pattern underpinning this volume is that East Asia went from being one of the world’s regions worst affected by armed conflict in 1946–79 to one of the regions with the least armed conflicts since 1980. The editors asked each contributor to explore possible explanations for this pattern, as well as characterize the type of ‘peace’ that has formed in contemporary East Asia. While the ambition never has been to reach a consensus view on either of these issues, this concluding chapter returns to the questions that were raised in the introduction to sum up and identify paths forward: What is peace and how can it be studied? How can we characterize the East Asian Peace? What limits and conditions are associated with this peace? Can insights from East Asia explain overall regional trends of political violence? Does the way in which peace comes about affect the quality of that peace? Is the East Asian Peace under threat? If so, then why is this and where is the threat coming from?

What is peace and how can it be studied? Peace means different things to different people, including peace researchers. While the relative absence of armed conflict and battle deaths constitutes a necessary condition for peace by most definitions, not everyone considers these conditions sufficient. Repression and physical violence can take place in many forms, causing a society at peace to

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be understood as anything but peaceful by many of its citizens. Some people are more vulnerable than others to indirect forms of violence, sometimes called structural violence. We do not aim to close the discussion about the appropriate definition of peace, as definitions should vary according to the questions asked, but we can point to where the main agreements and disagreements lie. First, considering that a relative absence of armed conflict and battle deaths is a necessary condition for peace, we can point to a strong agreement in the assessment that East Asia prior to 1979 was not peaceful. Likewise, there is consensus around the fact that the reduction of battle deaths after 1979 is an incredible achievement worthy of appraisal and investigation. A relevant question for debate, however, is whether East Asia in the subsequent period merits being referred to as peaceful and, by extension, whether what we are explaining is really peace … or something else. Scholars of peace often delineate their research areas by attaching one or another adjective to the concept of peace: negative peace, shallow peace, cold peace or unstable peace. Below, we will briefly revisit some of the terms for peace used by the authors of this volume and how these distinctions enhance our common understanding of peace. While our debates have not led us to agree on a definition of peace, they have contributed to a realization that, while there is ample reason to study why and how armed conflict ends, there is also much reason to pay attention to questions that go beyond a reduction of battle deaths. The reduction of battle deaths in East Asia is remarkable, but this achievement alone does not necessarily bring about a peaceful society, much less a durable, high-quality peace. The concept of positive peace is widely used despite competing views as to whether this is an accurate and fruitful conceptualization. Some argue that negative peace is the minimum requirement for any condition that can meaningfully be described as peaceful, whereas the concept of positive peace could be replaced by the consolidation, strengthening and deepening of this peace. The labels ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ signal qualitative differences, whereas ‘a deep peace’ rather signifies the deepening and development of a process that is already under way. So how can such a disputed concept as peace be studied empirically? As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, peace can be studied in

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many ways, at many levels and with different methods. As always, it is however necessary that key concepts are clearly defined beforehand in order to facilitate mutual understanding and precision. Our focus on one region – East Asia – and on certain necessary conditions for peace – the decline of battle deaths – has facilitated fruitful exchanges of ideas and coherent debates. By also studying peace from wider perspectives, taking into consideration forms of violence other than just armed conflict, the contributions to this volume have added insights about the quality or durability of the relative peace prevailing in East Asia.

How can we characterize the East Asian Peace? The debate within this book demonstrates that the East Asian Peace is a multifaceted phenomenon. Despite all the talk about an East Asian Peace, the region has not even fully achieved a so-called ‘negative peace’ as international disputes, civil conflicts and political and interpersonal violence still are present. Perhaps defining peace as the absence of all kinds of violence is too high a standard to become empirically meaningful, since no region of the world has achieved a total absence of violence. At the same time, the region has also partially moved towards a so- called ‘positive peace’, that is, a) more viable and higher quality peace. Following Tønnesson’s (2017) suggestion to discuss the quality of peace, we can see positive trends beyond the reduction of battle deaths. Data on various dimensions of democracy indicate improvements over time. Polity IV (2016) shows that the regional average, in terms of various procedural and institutional elements of democracy, has improved since the end of WWII. Boix, Miller & Rosato (2012) present similar findings for contestation and participation.1 Physical integrity rights have, on average, improved across the region, meaning that fewer East Asian states are torturing or killing their citizens. And there are more cross-border contacts and better opportunities for young people to fulfil their potential than was the case for previous generations. However, huge challenges remain to be overcome before the East Asian nations can be said to have developed legitimate forms of governance.

1. The Polity average for 1948 was -2, while in 2015 it had risen to +2.3. Boix, Miller & Rosato (2012) develop a dichotomous measure where countries are coded as either non-democratic (0) or democratic (1); the regional average was 0.29 in 1948 and 0.4 in 2010.

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The East Asian Peace should not be seen as complete, representing a stage that has been ‘reached’ and from which the only potential movement is a ‘backslide’. There is tremendous room for improving the peace and making it more sustainable. However, we should also acknowledge that even if we were to see increased armed conflict in East Asia, this would not necessarily constitute a ‘return’ to wars like those in the past. New security threats in the region may be influenced by the historical background sketched out in this book, but our understanding of that history as well as of contemporary dynamics combine to shape the possibility of new-conflict prevention. To extend the East Asian Peace, it is not sufficient to look at factors that were successful for peacemaking in the past; one must actively seek out preventive measures against future security challenges. On a similar note, the legacy of war in East Asia should neither create too much concern nor too much confidence with regard to future threats. On the one hand, we should be aware that even conflagrations considered very violent by today’s global standards would still be much smaller than the peak levels of violence previously seen in the region. At the same time, there is still the risk that a dispute beginning in East Asia could escalate into a third world war, or even a nuclear war, and although the risk may be small, this scenario remains a plausible prospect. Clearly, East Asia has not become a ‘security community’ as defined by Karl Deutsch (1957), whose members do not prepare for war against each other since they no longer consider violence a relevant method for dealing with conflict among themselves. A variety of explanations for why, in the 1980s, the region entered a long period with no wars and few conflicts are presented in the first part of this book. These explanations are embedded in differing characterizations of the East Asian Peace. Scott and Tønnesson each suggest that the peace resulted from political or normative change on the level of national political elites, while Urdal, Goldsmith, and Kreutz, each in his own way, argue that peace came about as a somewhat unexpected consequence of changing circumstances: in demography, through new and intensified trading patterns, or as a result of withdrawal of external support to belligerents. An alternative explanation is offered by Svensson, who claims that East Asian would, in fact, be in line with the global trend if it were not for the religious conflicts in other regions but much less so in East Asia. Thus, what is unique about East Asia (or at least Southeast

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Asia, in which most intrastate conflicts have occurred since the 1950s) is that the region has been able to contain religiously defined conflicts at a relatively low level of intensity. The causes may well affect the quality of the resulting peace, and in this volume the East Asian Peace has been characterized as a repressive peace, an unequal peace, a peace where trust is lacking, a masculine peace and a peace where nationalism flourishes and past injustices have not been forgiven. These characterizations share a fundamental concern about inequality. The peace these stories describe is built on the promotion of some groups at the expense of others, and on the preservation of illiberal values which do not respect the integrity of all citizens. In other words, each chapter in Part II suggests that the East Asian Peace has either come about at a certain cost, or that the factors that successfully triggered a decline of battle deaths are not of the kind that will spur movement toward a sustainable and more positive peace. When trying to apply a regional perspective to the analysis of patterns of war and peace, it is inevitable that some nuance is lost in the search for clear explanations. At the same time, it should be remembered that the character of the East Asian Peace differs across the region. For example, several countries are stable democracies with a high degree of respect for human rights, whereas some other states are repressive dictatorships.

What limits and conditions are associated with the East Asian Peace? The East Asian Peace is limited in the sense that its most direct ben- eficiaries are the young men who no longer have to risk their lives on battlefields and the civilians who are less at risk of perishing in bombing campaigns or massacres. Yet many members of all demographic groups – and particularly minorities, women and children – continue to live under a constant threat of violence. In many countries, the cost of the East Asian Peace is efficient state repression. While a fully sustainable or perfect peace for everyone might be an unattainable ideal, it is nevertheless worrying that state repression of civil and political liberties remains entrenched (Eck in this volume) and that interpersonal violence is still so widespread in most countries of the region (Bjarnegård in this volume). In the Philippines, violations of physical integrity rights increased radically under the Duterte administration, including thousands of extrajudicial killings which, by contrast to what had happened earlier, are now

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overtly encouraged by the political authorities. China under Xi Jinping has experienced an increase in various forms of censorship, surveillance and repression of the freedom of speech and opinion, including the arrest of many independent lawyers. Thailand reverted to military rule in 2014, and the junta imposed regulations preventing any form of political cam- paigning when a referendum was held in 2016 to adopt a new, illiberal, constitution that institutionalizes many prerogatives for the military and an appointed, unelected Senate. The military has put a temporary end to the sometimes violent internal conflict over government, between so- called redshirts and yellowshirts, that had been going on since the early 2000s. However, that internal conflict has been replaced by a military rule that allows no possibility for an active and outspoken opposition and severely limits basic human rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. New elections are planned for 2017–18, but will now probably be delayed by the year of mourning following the death of King Rama IX in October 2016. Human rights are also poorly protected in many other countries in the region, including Vietnam and Cambodia. As Eck and Svensson show, efficient repression may well have helped prevent insurgency and religious conflict, but repression can also provoke protest that creates political instability under certain circumstances. The vast literature ana- lyzing the relationship between dissent, protest and repression cannot yet help us predict the effect of harsher policies. What we do know is that when the economy fails to improve, leaders know they are faced with the risk of being criticized, but state responses to this risk, before or after it manifests itself, can vary markedly. While Thailand reverted to military rule because of demonstrations in the streets, Indonesia instead abandoned its dictatorship following a revolt in 1997 and has since developed a decentralized political system, with open and competitive elections at many levels. While some religious minorities are being mistreated and discriminated against, as of now, Indonesia may be considered a relatively open and functioning democracy. China, on the other hand, makes no claims to be a democracy and threats to the well- being of its citizens are troubling. The Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 and the much more recent turn to more repressive policies under Xi Jinping are particularly worrisome since they have occurred in the world’s most populous country, which will soon also have the world’s

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largest economy. A regime that continues to oppress its own people cannot claim to be embracing peace. Conflicts that were underway before 1979 have not been settled in the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar, even though ceasefire agreements and ongoing peace processes show that the governments have been trying to put an end to internal armed conflict. The Philippines took promising steps toward a negotiated solution with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) during the Aquino III administration, but talks with the communists stalled. When the Duterte administration took over in 2016, it engaged in active talks with the communists, leading to the release of many prisoners and an indefinite ceasefire, while it sought to integrate the Moro peace process into a general programme of federal reform. This strategy may extend the time frame for negotiations and risks stalling the process with MILF. Thailand signed an agreement with communist rebels on its Malaysian border in 1989 and democra- tized in 1992, but rebellion broke out anew in the Malay Muslim areas of Thailand’s deep south (‘Patani’) in the beginning of the 2000s, leading to an escalation of violence from 2004 onward. While political reform in Myanmar in 2010 led to the initiation of the first political negotiations with insurgents for decades, process has been slow and fighting has not ended, but rather shifted from some parts of the country to others. In 2016, the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi organized a national Union Peace Conference in an attempt to further the peace process but many of the country’s armed groups were not included or represented. Violent government repression of protests often leads to resistance and escalation while disciplined, well-organized policing in combination with talks and negotiations tend to de-escalate the conflicts. There are many examples of this in East Asia from countries such as Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia and Myanmar. Occasional but very destructive and high-profile acts of violence have continued to occur even in these countries, always with harmful long-term effects. The 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo, the Bali bombings in 2002, the Erawan Shrine bombing in Bangkok in 2015 and several attacks in Chinese cities indicate that terrorist tactics are being used in many places, even though this is less frequent in East Asia than in the contemporary greater Middle East or Europe. While concerns that large-scale religious terrorism would spread across East Asia have not been realized (Svensson in this volume), there have been instances

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where inter-religious violence has caught public attention. The most visible has been the communal violence between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar in 2012 and 2016, but the phenomenon has also been observed in Indonesia 1997–99, as well as in the Philippines. While similar clashes have been reported occasionally in East Asia, religion has not dominated politics here in the way it has in regions such as South Asia or Africa. Yet ethnic tensions have often had an indirect political impact in the form of a reorganization of ruling elite coalitions and often increased state repression. Regardless of whether or not similar patterns will play out in the future, there is a risk that the East Asian domestic peace will be challenged by political instability caused by violent street protests that are mobilized on the basis of ethno-religious or other group identities. The claim that many injustices are hidden if we focus solely on the public sphere is well illustrated by the cases of post-1979 violence in East Asia. Although human security has increased as a consequence of the decrease of armed conflict and because of limited crime rates, intimate partner violence remains common and homicide rates for young girls are persistent and high throughout the region; governments generally have not intervened strongly to stop either of these threats to positive peace (Bjarnegård in this volume). It is impossible to know whether such interpersonal violence has increased, precisely because it takes place outside what is seen as the public realm and data is scarce and, when it exists, unreliable. To complicate matters, an increase in the number of reported cases is often a sign of increased government attention to these issues and more effective reporting, rather than of actual increases in crime rates. The fact that civil society organizations are becoming more active, and in some places are starting to expose perpetrators and victims that have previously been hidden from the public eye, should be seen as a positive development, even though it highlights continued violence. Governments need to be able to tackle repression based on gender, ethnicity and class if they are to sustain the peace. Dealing with issues of inequality and injustice is a major challenge to securing a deep and high-quality peace in East Asia. The lack of attention placed upon conflict resolution and reconciliation is evidenced not only in the blind eye turned towards violence in the private sphere, but also in the tendency to forget the past, rather than deal with it (Guthrey in this volume). This kind of avoidance does nothing to transform broken

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relationships and build trust and security, which are necessary for high- quality peace to develop. Instead, in the absence of reckoning with past violence and transgressions, grievances have the potential to escalate into further tensions and violence – not least in the form of revenge at the interpersonal level. Indeed, an important limitation of the current East Asian Peace is that it has not expanded beyond politics and into the private sphere; nor has it transformed individual attitudes toward war and peace. A peace based on calculations of political and economic gain will be much shal- lower and more fragile than a peace that is also grounded in normative aversion to hypernationalism and war. For many East Asian regimes, external and internal peace and stability have been understood as prerequisites for economic growth, that is, the pursuit of growth motivated peaceful choices (Tønnesson in this volume). Yet, governments that have harnessed this instrumental approach to peace and stability have also voiced a rhetorical dedication to peace or ‘peaceful development’, vaguely defined. Such dedication has not prevented hypernationalism, sabre-rattling or highly contentious international disputes, hence the regional peace continues to be under serious threat. It may perhaps seem naïve to think that peaceful values and aversion to war can come to play a more prominent role in deciding between war and peace, particularly in a region marred by history struggles and unresolved territorial conflicts. Yet, some regions in the world have developed a popular abhorrence for war that underpins a security community in which no country prepares for war against another member of that community. This shows that aversion to war can become a force to reckon with, and that chauvinistic quarrels with historical enemies over territorial disputes may lose their appeal and, eventually, cease to function as tools for boosting regime legitimacy. A key part of such a shift is the weakening of honour ideologies (Melander in this volume), so that public opinion rewards leaders who show moderation or a creative approach to peace making. When honour ideology is strong, showing restraint in the face of insults signals weakness and loss of face, but when honour ideology has abated, insults reflect badly on the perpetrator. There are signs that this kind of shift has begun in parts of East Asia, for example in Japan, where the warlike and honour-fixated ideology (often referred to as bushido) of the period leading up to the

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defeat in the Second World War has largely been replaced with more peaceful attitudes, at least among the young. Yet, hypernationalism and the valorization of war continue to threaten the peace in East Asia.

Can insights from East Asia explain overall regional trends of political violence? Since the 1990s, the decline in the prevalence and intensity of armed conflict in East Asia has contributed to and formed part of a global trend. There are, though, some factors that are unique to the East Asian region. Most notably, East Asia has seen less religious war than the rest of the world (Svensson in this volume), but the region’s experience of overcoming the Cold War rivalry between military powers has also been unique (Scott, Kreutz, and Ross’s chapters in this volume). Beyond these specifics, most of the arguments discussed in the book should be able to travel to any region and explain similar developments. This book shows that regional policies and developments influence the probability of countries becoming embroiled in conflict and their opportunities to make a transition to peace. While individual theories focus on the role of country-to-country trade (Goldsmith in this volume), within-state norms and nationalist sentiments (Melander, and Ryu’s contributions in this volume) have effects that are nested within a regional prism. For example, several states in East Asia have combined highly repressive internal policies with growth-promoting reforms, but a similar turn towards repression in Latin America in the 1980s did not yield comparable economic returns (Geddes 1990). This shows that the use of repression (Eck in this volume) in combination with state promotion of economic growth (Tønnesson in this volume) is not guaranteed to be successful. While these policies dovetailed in many East Asian countries, it is difficult and dangerous to imagine that the East Asian experience can offer specific prescriptive recommendations that could make a difference in more unstable regions such as the contemporary Middle East.

Does the way in which peace comes about affect the quality of that peace? Although many of the explanations here offered for the East Asian Peace point to the influence of strategic elites – whether by increased emphasis

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on trade (Goldsmith in this volume) or on promoting economic development more broadly (Tønnesson in this volume), the forging of international law to resolve conflicts (Scott in this volume), or the deliberate withdrawal of external powers (Kreutz in this volume) – none points to large-scale changes in the attitudes of the general population. Several contributions to this volume demonstrate that the East Asian Peace is largely a peace from above. This opens the question of the extent to which peace has left an imprint on how states interact with their citizens and how citizens interact with each other. One of the most hotly debated topics in international politics in recent decades has been whether China’s growing economic and political power will result in conflict with the world’s incumbent superpower, the United States. According to the classical realist view of international relations, a power shift is likely to lead to conflict, but many scholars argue that this is neither inevitable nor very likely in the case of China–US relations (Ross in this volume). As noted in Scott’s chapter, China’s rise has largely occurred within the existing legal and economic international framework, which suggests that the so-called Thucydides trap (‘It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable’), pointing to the likelihood of conflict between a rising power and a currently dominant one, may be averted. In addition to the ability of the existing international system to incorporate Chinese ambition, many scholars also point to the interdependence between states and the development of a more globalized society than at any earlier point in history as constraints on both Chinese and US use of force in pursuit of their security objectives. This is particularly true as citizens exercise greater influence even on non-democratic governments. Although citizens can and do demand policies that are more aggressive than those preferred by their leaders (Ryu in this volume), the more dominant trend seems to be that citizen interest in continuing their upward economic progress and access to travel is likely to contain otherwise-hawkish leaders. While economic interdependence is important, the effect of societal interdependence should not be discounted. What needs to be considered, though, are the many international disputes that remain unresolved and may at any time escalate into highly destructive violence. Arguably the two most pressing unresolved disputes have stabilized in the form of de facto two-state solutions:

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between North and South Korea, and between China and Taiwan. On the Korean peninsula, the parties remain formally at war although actual fighting is contained by the Demilitarized Zone created by the 1953 armistice agreement. While the current situation regarding Taiwan is a vast improvement on open warfare, one of the biggest disappointments of East Asia’s peaceful transition is the inability to resolve the conflict over the island’s status, which has persisted over the more than 60 years that have passed since the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Peace treaty between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Japan in 1952. Taiwanese companies have made huge investments in the mainland, and cross-Strait communication skyrocketed under President Ma Ying-jeou. Under Taiwan’s current president, Tsai Ing-wen, this tendency has been somewhat reversed, and Taiwanese capital now seeks out ways to move elsewhere under a new ‘southbound policy’. Tsai Ing-wen also scored a diplomatic point in December 2016, when US president-elect Donald Trump accepted her congratulatory telephone call.

Is the East Asian Peace under threat? If so, then why is this and where is the threat coming from? An advantage of studying a region is the ability to identify broad trends despite the occasional local development in a different direction. Some such developments, as for example boundary tensions between Cambodia and Thailand, receive undue attention precisely because they are so rare. The vast majority of the region’s border disputes have been resolved, through either bilateral negotiation or multilateral arbitration. Even so, it remains possible that events in any one of the region’s 17 political entities might trigger a chain reaction that threatens peace throughout the region. With this caveat in mind, we discuss some tensions and developments that may shape the future of the East Asian Peace phenomenon, based on the debates that have taken place in this book. As East Asia and the people in this region will change, the ‘peace’ will also change. But how? In recent years, one threat to peace in the region that has received much attention, and which has led to the mobilization of strong nationalist sentiments in several countries, relates to the management of disputed maritime boundaries in the seas east and south of China. In July 2016, an international arbitral tribunal created under the United

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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea decided that none of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea can generate any continental shelf or Exclusive Economic Zone for any country; these islands can serve as a basis for a claim to only 12 nautical miles of territorial sea surrounding each island. It also invalidated China’s claim to have special historical rights to the waters within a U-shaped line, which can be found on virtually every Chinese map of the region. While tensions have been visible for many years with regard to competing claims for sovereignty to islands and for rights to the resources in the sea and under the seabed, and the freedom of (military) navigation, the view that these will lead to violence is based on debatable assumptions. One such assumption is that the area contains massive amounts of oil, another that it is impossible to find workable negotiated solutions – or preliminary arrangements – on the basis of international law, and a third that navies are unable to prevent their rivalries from turning violent. Another international dispute with nationalist undertones is the dispute over the land border between Cambodia and Thailand. It concerns an 11th century temple, the Preah Vihear, which lies near the border between the two countries. While the International Court of Justice determined long ago that the temple belongs to Cambodia, the easiest access to the temple is via an area that Thailand claims. Cambodians celebrate their identity as the nation that built Angkor, and Prime Minister Hun Sen has promoted nationalist sentiments. In 2008, Preah Vihear was given status as a world heritage site by UNESCO, but instead of welcoming this change to spur tourism, nationalist forces in Thailand raised strong protests. When Cambodia started building a road to the temple, artillery exchanges followed. While the conflict has remained low-scale and manageable, the fact that it flares up as soon as there is a provocation underscores how honour ideology may play a part and how closely this case is related to the potential threat of nationalist discourses more generally (Melander, and Ryu, in this volume). If geostrategic claims involving China have been sharpened, one of the reasons is the US 2011 so-called ‘pivot’ to Asia, with redeployment of military forces, strengthening of bilateral alliances and increased diplomatic attention to the region. China has seen this as an attempt to contain its rising power as it has allocated great resources to modernize its military. Despite this, few predict that the tension between the US

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and China will lead to outright warfare between the two Great Powers even if there is a risk of an arms race and threatening moves. A more common concern is that increasing great power rivalry may encourage and contribute to an increase in internal armed conflicts. As Kreutz and Svensson both mention in their chapters, the opportunity of external support for violence may tilt local actors’ decisions in favour of insurrec- tion rather than non-violent protests against the state. What separates the present situation from the Cold War superpower rivalries is that the United States and China share an ambition to support governments and not insurgencies. Thus, the quest for stability, and the avoidance of provoking interstate discord, may result in a situation where governments are given leeway to increase repression of their citizens. We can, for example, see that little international criticism has been levelled against the Philippines for the extrajudicial killings during President Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’. Most chapters in this book underscore the possibility that threats to the East Asian Peace can come from within nations. If international disputes constitute one set of potential conflict risks, then domestic inequalities and violence constitute another. Here prediction is more difficult; we lack the models necessary to predict where and which patterns of discrimination are more likely to provoke organized violence. If peace processes between Muslim minorities and their respective governments in Thailand and the Philippines break down, there is a potential risk for escalation and that these locally defined disputes connect with the global jihadi movements. The 2016 attacks against Myanmar border guards at the border to Bangladesh, and the extreme harshness of the military reaction afterwards, could also escalate into a new armed conflict between the Myanmar army and underground Islamist networks being supported from abroad and recruiting fighters among the repressed Muslim Rohingya population. Also, the returnees from Syria and Iraq may seek to escalate the religiously defined confrontations in the region. The management of these risks depends largely on how each of the states in East Asia integrates minorities and their interests. Viewed broadly, all of the states in East Asia that do not respect human rights are at risk for rebellion; regimes that build the foundations of their power on the marginalization of others face a constant, though often unspoken, threat of rebellion.

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Conclusions This book has sought out rival explanations of the surprising peace that has reigned in East Asia since the 1980s, while pointing to the many shortcomings of that ‘peace’, which may not be so peaceful after all. These shortcomings tend to make the peace fragile and perhaps unsustainable. The causes of peace may affect the quality of peace, and the quality of peace may affect its sustainability. Peace can become a virtuous circle, where different aspects reinforce one another, but it can also be a stalled process, where advances are limited to the reduction of battle deaths in a context of continued domestic repression and violence. To understand peace as a process, it is necessary to debate its nature, its origins and its consequences. This book has presented highly divergent views on the most relevant explanations for the emergence of the East Asian Peace as well as on which aspects should be in focus in order to assess its quality and depth. A real academic debate requires not only putting forward one’s own arguments in a convincing way, but also to listen, consider and address the arguments put forward by others. It is only when this interactive aspect of academic theorizing is taken seriously that it will really drive research forward. A certain starting point can sometimes lead in a path-dependent direction if it follows a tradition where questions are asked in a certain way, about a certain aspect of peace, and analyzed with certain methods. Engaging in real debate with someone who has a different starting point can lead to a critical assessment of one’s own assumptions and a more nuanced understanding, and can potentially open up for ideas about interactions. For instance, it is possible that the East Asian Peace came about because external powers withdrew, leaving room for different priorities from leaders, legal solutions and increased trade. What is important in this book, though, is that the scholarly debate where the theoretical logic and empirical evidence for these different views are contested has pushed the authors towards even more developed contributions. We find it noteworthy that despite the internal diversity in this volume, and without any expectation or instruction from the editors, most chapters reach a similar conclusion about the fragility of the East Asian Peace. The East Asian Peace seems to be rather shallow, regardless of the definitions, measurements or methods used. Currently, there are few armed conflicts going on, but the risk of new outbreaks seems

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relatively high. Contentious politics in the region can easily lead to public protests, as concerns over lack of democracy and human rights remain. The use of violence by rebels has largely been suppressed, but participants in past conflicts have not had a chance to see their roles being meaningfully acknowledged, much less been offered reparations for their suffering; reconciliation as a path to peace remains a road not much travelled. Societal and inter-gender inequality is still widespread in East Asia, and this limits the ability to use the full potential of its citizens, as well as address non-military political challenges including an ageing population structure. These common findings, coming from a diverse set of studies and approaches, strengthens the assessment that the factors that brought about the reduction of battle deaths that started the East Asian Peace have not been conducive to deepening this process. It is therefore necessary that peace researchers from different backgrounds, and with different conceptualizations of peace, continue to interact and discuss the complex and highly desirable phenomenon of the East Asian Peace – in the region itself and beyond.

References Boix, C., M. Miller & S. Rosato (2012) ‘A Complete Set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007’, Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1523–54. Deutsch, K. W. et al. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research 6(3): 167–91. Geddes, B. (1990) ‘How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics’, Political Analysis 2(1), 131–50. Polity IV (2016) ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015 Data set’, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr- data.html, accessed 12 October 2016. Tønnesson, S. (2017) Explaining the East Asian Peace. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

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b=box; f=figure; t=table; bold=extended discussion or a word emphasised in the text

1984 (Orwell, 1949) 151–2, 158 Ajdukovic, D. 222, 228, 235 911 attacks (11 Sep. 2001) 100, 105 Akamatsu Kaname 56, 76 al-Qaeda 104–5, 113 Abdullah Sungkar 105 Alker, H. 177 Abdurajak Janjalani 104 Alliance for Gender Inclusion in Peace Abe Shinzo 247, 248n, 252 Process (AGIPP) 165 abortion 116, 117, 124, 137, 167 alliances 17, 27, 73, 75, 80, 132 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 105 amnesties 220, 222–3, 225, 226–32, 235–6 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 101, 104, 106, 114 Amnesty International 109, 112, 179, 196 accountability 68, 95, 157, 165, 226 Anderson, C. J. 177, 179, 181–3, 185, 187, 196 Aceh 88–9, 90, 95, 97, 104, 224b, 228t anpo hosei (Security Acts, Japan) 247 Acharya, A. 11, 24, 33, 78, 92, 94, 105, 112 Anti-Fascist Organisation (Burma) 82 acknowledgement (of wrongdoing) 222, apologies for atrocities 208–9, 217, 220, 225–6, 227, 230, 232–8, 296 234, 248, 258 versus amnesties 228 Aquino, B. III 63, 287 Afghanistan 69, 104, 105 Arbitral Tribunal (2016) 50–1, 53, Africa 21f, 22f, 83, 110, 260, 288 292–3 age structure 118–19, 124n armed conflict 55n absence of 6, 7, 13, 16, 36, 55, 78, 94, age structure transitions 122, 125–31 116, 159, 160–1, 170–2, 179, 184, and political violence 119–21 232, 250, 281–2 ageing population 9, 116, 117, 122, 130, consequences beyond battle deaths 296 161, 162–6 agency 27–30 termination (how and why) 282 Agreement Establishing WTO armed forces 63, 65, 87n, 88, 103, 132, (1994) 39, 47–9 148–9, 155, 230, 265 Ahtisaari, M. 89 civilian control 63–4, 87n, 195 aiguo jiaoyu yundong (patriotic education ASEAN (1967–) 61, 62, 70, 80, 85, campaign) 248 91, 92–3, 256–7, 258, 272. See also Southeast Asia air defence identification zones (ADIZ) 272, 273 ASEAN Charter 256

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ASEAN Community 256 Birdsall, N. 118, 119, 121, 138 ASEAN Declaration (1967) 92 Bjarnegård, E. ix, xi, 6, 12, 14, 33, 36, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 78, 94, 116–17, 124, 156, 159–75, on Human Rights (AICHR, 2012–) 178, 281–96 256 Blainey, G. 5, 11 ASEAN Regional Forum 66 Blitt, J. 123 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Bloom, D. E. 118 Cooperation (1976) 92 Boer, A. M. den 117, 124, 137, 138, 139, ASEAN Way 24, 34, 95 167, 168, 174 ASEAN+3 66 Boix, C. 283, 296 Asian financial crisis (1998) 88 Boserup, E. 117, 138 Asia-Pacific 25, 52, 73 Bosnia-Herzegovina 222 ‘assured retaliation’ 46 boycotts 181, 185, 186n atrocities 221, 222–3, 248 Boyd, R. 159, 160, 173 Aung San Suu Kyi 63, 287 Brazil 39, 47 Australia 83–4, 212 Brecher, M. 18n, 19f, 33, 35 authoritarianism 65, 124, 143, 182, 230, Brezhnev Doctrine 263 231 Britain. See United Kingdom auto parts case (2006) 49 Brown, K. 226, 235 autocracies 57–8, 84, 178 Brunei 63, 65, 125, 127–9f, 136f, 137, AWACS aircraft 273 145, 146f, 147t, 148 Azar, E. 177 Buddhism 101, 103, 111, 288 Burmese Communist Party. See Com balance of power/power balancing 6, munist Party of Burma 10, 17, 25–7, 38, 42, 78–9, 90, 239, bushido 206, 289–90 254–5, 266, 269, 275 Buzan, B. 4, 11 Bali bombings (2002) 92, 100, 105, 106, 108, 287 Bangkok bombing (2015) 287 Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB, Japan) 247 Bangkok Post 230n, 235 Cambodia 20, 26–7, 57, 63, 66, 70, 72, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 82–3, 84–5, 86–7, 89, 125–6, 127–8f, Movement (BIFM) 101 130f, 131, 135–6f, 146f, 147t, 169, Barakat, B. 122, 131, 138 224b, 228t, 262, 286–7 bargaining model of war 20, 34 border conflict with Thailand 64, 93, Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate 93n, 292, 293 (BSN-C) 110 genocide 1, 86 Vietnamese occupation (1978– Barnes, C. D. 207, 209–10, 217 89) 19, 62, 86, 90–1, 93, 263–4 battle deaths 1, 2f, 6, 7, 18n, 78, 80, 95, violent and non-violent repres- 98, 100, 131, 148, 156, 159–61, 167, sion 149 172, 239, 250, 260, 261n, 281–3, 296 Canada 38, 83–4, 175, 212 definition 55n capitalist peace theory 8, 66–72, 74, Beeson, M. 2, 11 77, 242 Belo, Bishop C. 88 Caughey, D. 210, 218 Benesch, O. 206 ceasefires 87, 165 bipolarity 25, 27

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censorship 149, 153, 157, 286 China, rise of 8, 10, 27, 30–1, 32–3, 36, Central Asia 100, 105, 260, 265 37, 39–51, 52, 66, 73, 219, 234, 291 air power 267, 268, 269, 271–3, 277 Chan, S. 202, 210, 218 challenge to East Asian Peace 266–9 Chen Hsui-bian 71 maritime power 10, 260–1, 266–76, Chiang Ching-kuo 61 277–80 Chiang Kai-shek 61, 224b strategic activism 270–2; US resistance to 272–4 children 119, 161, 167–8, 169–70, 171–2, 211, 285 Chinese civil war 80, 261 China (pre–1949) 41–2, 45, 60 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 61– Eastern Zhou society 206 2, 80–1, 83, 248 Qing dynasty 241 Chinese Revolution (1949) 81 Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) 1 Chosen (Korean peninsula) 241 tributary system 240 Christians 101, 103, 104, 111, 171 Warring States era 206 Cincotta, R. P. 123, 138 China, PRC (1949–) 18n, 20, 25–6, 29, 56–7, 65, 70, 75, 84–5, 87n, 91–2, Cingranelli, D. L. 233n, 236 115, 117, 124–38, 146f, 147t, 161, CIRI [Cingranelli-Richards] Human 169, 170–1, 200–2, 210, 212, 218, Rights Data Project 158, 232, 236 225, 228t, 254, 257–9, 286–7, 292 civil liberties 57, 142, 143, 146–55, 182, border security concerns 10, 261–6, 185, 186t, 187, 189–96, 285 274 Cold War victories in East Asia 261– civil society 57, 68, 149, 288 6, 267 civil wars 1, 8, 14, 63–4, 70, 80, 94–5, conflict risk predictions 134 99, 97, 112, 119–21, 144, 152, 154, crises with Vietnam (1984, 1987, 176, 180, 195 1988) 19 motives 120 economic growth 47–8, 51 opportunities 120–1 economy 31–2 see also religious civil wars entry into WTO (2001) 45 civilians 55n, 73, 162–3, 165, 216, 270–1, establishment (1949) 261 285. See also armed forces foreign policy 50 class 216–17, 288 geriatric peace 132–3 international law 38 Clay, K. C. 233n international system (cornerstone Clinton, H. 272–3, 279, 276 treaties) 8, 38–51 Cockburn, C. 164, 173 maritime security interests 267 ‘missing’ women 167–8, 173 ‘Cold Peace’ (Europe, 1945–89) 6, 74 nationalism 239, 241–5; ~ in domes- Cold War 44, 52, 60, 73–4, 76, 81–2, tic politics 245–50 83, 86, 260, 290, 294 nuclear strategy 46, 52 PRC victories in East Asia 261–6, 267 one-child policy 116, 132 collective identities 164–5, 226, 234, permanent member of UN Security 239–40, 244, 250, 255 Council (1971–) 42–3, 46, 50, colonialism 40, 42–3, 93, 150, 230, 241, 51, 53, 54, 66 243, 264 rapprochement with USA (1971) 25, 42, 72, 74, 84, 278 ‘comfort women’ 224b, 225, 242, 243 stock market crisis (2015) 68 Commission for Reception, Truth and territorial disputes 250–3 Reconciliation (CAVR, 2002–5) transition to market economy 48 231–2, 235, 237 urban population growth 123 Commission on Truth and Friendship war with India (1962) 263 (CTF, 2005–8) 232, 234–5

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communist insurgencies 63, 72–3, part two 9–10, 142–280, 285 83–4, 85–6, 88, 105, 287. See also purpose of debate 5 insurgencies title 2 communist parties 65, 73 decision-making 26, 40, 42, 58, 68–70, Communist Party of Burma 83, 85, 96 93, 163–4, 207–8, 210, 275 Communist Party of Malaya 82, 85 defence 68, 256 Communist Party of Thailand 85 ‘degrees of freedom’ problem 16 Community Reconciliation Process democracies 37, 142, 145, 154, 164, (CRP, Timor-Leste) 231–2, 237 179, 181, 210, 245, 285 emergent 182, 183–4, 196 Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB, 2014) 109–10 democracy 23, 178, 256, 296 conflict escalation 18–23, 30–2, 71, 79, democratic peace 5, 17, 32–3, 64–6, 75, 80, 172, 235, 275, 294 180, 195–6, 198 conflict resolution 78, 79, 80, 85–92, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 93–4, 142–3, 165, 169, 288 Taiwan) 71 Confrontation/Konfrontasi 61, 93, 261 democratisation 85, 88, 154–5, 176, 181, 183, 185, 216, 283 Confucianism 14, 103 demographic constructivism 21, 24, 25 change 9, 115–41, 161 continental shelf 271, 293 data 124–5 Copeland, D. C. 68, 72, 74, 75–6 developments 125–38 Correlates of War trade data 21f, 21, 22f dividend 116, 121, 126, 136 transition 118–19, 121, 136 corruption 183, 187–8, 196–7, 199 demography 74–5 crimes against humanity 102, 149 demonstrations 149, 154, 181, 185, Crocker, D. 221 186n, 202, 213, 271, 286 Crown Property Bureau (Thailand) 58 Deng Xiaoping 46, 77, 270, 280 Cuba 47, 83 reforms (1978–) 13, 21–2, 48, 58, Cultural Revolution (1966–76) 1, 61, 62, 72, 242, 259 83, 90, 224b, 242 Denmark 38, 202, 214 culture 103, 203 dependency ratios 126, 128–9, 131–2 definition 207–8 determinism 31, 59, 120, 275 Czechoslovakia (1968) 263 deterrence 26, 46, 71, 73 Deutsch, K. W. 4, 11, 201, 240, 258, Dafoe, A. 210, 218 284, 296 Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken (Greater East Asia Co- development 117–24, 266, 270 Prosperity Sphere) 248 development and political violence Darul Islam 82, 107–8 117–24 data deficiencies 117, 124n, 134, 143, implications for conflict 134–8 144n, 147n, 153, 167, 168–9, 171–2, ‘developmental peace’ theory 8, 29–30, 179, 189, 201, 211–12, 288 32, 93, 55–77, 116, 151, 242, 244, death rates 118–19, 122, 125 289, 290 comparison with other theories 64–75 Debating East Asian Peace ‘does not provide complete explana- book aims/purpose 3, 281, 295 tion’ 74 book structure and content 7–10 core questions 2–3, 30, 281 developmental state 14, 16, 20, 31, 34, part one 8–9, 13–141, 284–5 56–7, 69, 71, 73

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definition (partial) 70 and demographic change 9, 115–41, failures 62–4 284 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 67–8, 225, depth/shallowness of 3, 6, 9, 10, 14, 250–2, 270, 273 32, 56, 142, 155, 161, 172, 184, 217, 220–1, 227–8, 234, 235, 239, dictators 73, 88n 250–7, 282, 288–9, 295, 296 dictatorships 65, 94, 285, 286 and development 8, 36, 55–77, 116 Diehl, P. 6, 11, 52, 176 durability/sustainability 3, 9, 10, 14, Dien Bien Phu (1954) 262 31–2, 36, 56, 94, 156–7, 220–1, 226, 229, 239, 254–6, 281–96 Diet (Japan) 60 explanations (general versus particu- discrimination 7, 45, 47, 102, 109, 112, lar) 15–16 148, 167, 222, 286, 294 and external withdrawal 8, 78–97, dissent 102, 124, 142–3, 149–50, 284, 291, 294, 295 153–5, 157–8, 177, 286 focus of analysis 14–16 great power challenge 260–80 Doi Moi 30, 58, 62 history 59–64 Dokdo/Takeshima islets 225, 246, 252, human security challenges 171–2 258 insights (applicability elsewhere) 31, domestic system 68 290 domino theory 81, 81n interactive theorizing 295–6 and international law 8, 36–54 dongbei gongcheng (Northeast Asia liberal theory (IR) 16–23 History Project) 243–4 limits and conditions 31, 285–90 drone warfare 106, 110, 258 masculine peace 10, 200–19 Dumbarton Oaks (1944) 42, 52 nationalist threat 239–59 nature 1–2, 295 Dunn, J. 164, 175 origins 3, 60, 295 Durkheim, É. 213 qualitative versus quantitative ap- Duterte, R. 63, 285–6, 287, 294 proach 16 dyads 17–18, 19f, 21f, 21, 23–4, 26, quality 7, 10, 31, 225–6, 232–3, 282, 31–2, 66, 99n 283–4, 288–9, 295; ~ effects of causes of peace 290–2, 295 readjustment period (1970–85) 83–5 East Asia beyond reduction of battle decline of military confrontation 6 deaths 162–6 definition 1n, 13n repressive 9, 107, 142–58, 285 map viii repressive (sustainability) 153–7 regional identity lacking 163 sources 264–6 religious peace (durability) 110–12 and trade 8, 13–35, 115, 284, 290–1 tragic history 223–5 threats 10, 292–6 ‘world’s deadliest battlefield’ 1 trust, protests, economic performance East Asian Peace (EAP) 9–10, 176–99 and avoidance of religious civil wars 9, unequal 9, 159–75 98–114, 284, 286, 290 unforgiving 10, 220–38 background 1–12 viability 75 challenged (rise of PRC) 266–9 see also peace characterisation 30–1, 283–5 East Asian Peace, explanations (comple- conflict resolution 85–9 mentary and competing) 23–30 consensus lacking 3 elite coalitions and agency 27–30, 32 contingent (where you are, who you heterogeneous regional dynamics are) 9, 161 23–5 definition 7, 29 regional power configurations 25–7

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East Asian Peace research programme ethnicity 5, 61, 63, 84, 87n, 94, 149, (Uppsala University) ix–x, 3, 14, 33, 176, 178, 257–8, 288 55, 169–70 Europe 83, 86, 92, 118, 132, 136f, 154, annual conference ix, x 171, 200–1, 211, 217, 260, 287 East Asian Summits 66 masculinity, militarism, privilege in East China Sea 31, 33, 260, 268, 270, 212–15 275, 277 European Union 48, 49, 65, 66–7, 72, East China Sea ADIZ 272, 273 88, 95 East Turkestan Islamic Movement excess males 116, 117, 123–5, 136f, (ETIM) 105 138, 167–8 Ebenstein, A. Y. 167–8, 173 exclusive economic zones 50–1, 293 Eck, K. ix, xi, 9, 57, 78, 94, 107, 142–58, expectations 27, 72, 74–5, 77, 201 167, 178, 187, 281–96 Explaining East Asia Peace (Tønnesson, economic factors 9, 89, 91–2 2017) 56 economic growth 8, 28, 47–8, 51, 56, exports and exporting 31–2, 57, 62, 67, 59, 68, 74–5, 115, 118–19, 129, 132– 115 3, 137, 151, 178–9, 184, 189–94f, external intervention 7 194–6, 289 definition 79–80 as pacifying factor 121 external withdrawal 78–97, 160 economic integration 65–7, 70, 73–5. further research 94 See also interdependence economic performance 180, 181–4, 188, 189–94, 196, 248 ‘face’ 206 education 67, 68, 116, 121–2, 126 Fariss, C. J. 144, 144n, 145–6f, 152, relationship with income 122 157, 158 educational attainment 115, 130f, 131, fear 60, 65, 68, 73–4, 75, 102–3, 152–3, 134, 211 159, 161, 166, 168–9, 223, 260, 291 and gender parity 135f Fearon, J. 168, 174 Eisenhower, D. D. 81n feminism 159, 235 elections 86, 89, 102, 142, 154, 195–6, Ferguson, N. 69, 76 210, 248, 286 fertility/birth rates 118, 119, 121, 122, demographic shifts and 134 126–7, 129 elites 27–30, 32, 57, 87, 180–1, 196, 210, replacement level 125 284, 288, 290–1 ‘fiction of nationalism’ (Ignatieff) 223 Elliott, D. W. P. 58, 76 fishing 251, 268, 270, 280 Elster, J. 207, 208, 218 ‘flying geese of peace’ theory 56–9 empiricism 5, 6, 7, 14, 17, 23–4, 78, 90, food 20, 162 103, 118–19, 151, 153, 172, 179–80, 182, 188, 198, 201, 281, 282–3, 295 foreign aid 57, 61, 62 employment 68, 120, 122 foreign investment 57, 61, 63–6, 68, 71, 73, 91, 292 energy 20, 50 foreign policy 25, 28, 70 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agree ment (Philippines–USA, 2014) 273 forgetting 10, 220, 222, 233, 234–5, 259, 288 environment (natural) 118, 256 ‘Four Policemen’ 42 equidistance principle 253 Estrada, J. 187 Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro 109 ethnic groups 117, 165, 172, 222

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France 38, 41, 42, 78, 82, 202, 212, 233–4, 239, 255, 284, 290–1 261–2, 263, 269 publications 34 Franklin, U. 159 trade interdependence 91 Fravel, M. T. 46, 52 Goldstein, J. S. 5, 11 free speech 149, 155 Goldstone, J. A. 115, 117, 120, 123, 137, 138, 139 freedom, of assembly 149, 179, 286 Gorbachev, M. 62, 73, 90 association 179, 182 governance 67, 122, 176, 198, 256, 283 expression 179, 182 governments 9–10, 134, 181, 182, the press 155 183–4, 194–6, 207, 288, 294 religion 143n, 149 and religious civil wars (relative absence speech 153, 286 of internationalisation) 106–7 thought/opinion 143n, 286 Great Leap Forward (1958–60) 1, 242, Freedom House 102, 113, 146–9, 185, 262 186t, 187, 188, 189f great powers 10, 14, 27, 31, 32, 34, 90 Freud, S. 213 revisionist vs status quo ~ 27, 203, Frühstück, S. 216, 218 260, 267, 274–5, 291, 293–4 futsu no kuni (‘normal state’) 247 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 56, 241, 248 Gaddafi regime 44, 110 green growth policies 75 gaiatsu (foreign pressure) 243, 248 Gulf of Aden 269, 277 Galtung, J. 6–7, 11, 177, 220, 236 Guthrey, H. L. ix, xi, 10, 88, 94, 163, 217, 220–38, 254, 281–96 ‘Gang of Four’ (PRC) 62 Gwangju democracy movement GDP 23, 26, 64, 151, 168, 188, 189–94f (1980) 85, 224b, 231, 237 gender 131, 135f, 137–8, 288, 296 gender equality, vs violent conflict 124 Haas, M. L. 132–3, 139 Gender Equality Scale 211–12 Haiyang oil rig 271 General Agreement on Tariffs and Hamundarson, G. (Njal’s Saga) 205 Trade 48 Han, I. S. 231, 237 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 246–7, 249 Han Chinese 102, 103 Geneva Conference (1954) 82, 262 Harris, Admiral H. 274 genocide 1, 11, 95, 149, 224b, 225, 237 Hayner, P. B. 226–30, 236, 237 ‘geriatric peace’ (Haas) 9, 116, 132–4, health 67–8, 121, 126, 162, 166–7, 173, 139 227, 237 Germany 28, 44, 60, 65, 66, 202, 218 Hedström, J. 165, 174 Gibney, M. 152, 158 hegemony 27, 42, 43, 50, 90, 102, 200, 269, 275 Gizewski, P. 123 regional 25–7, 32, 51, 115, 134, 241 Gleditsch, K. S. 23–4, 34, 79, 95 Hegre, H. 22, 34, 134 Gleditsch, N. P. 1, 2n, 11, 80, 95, 139, Helsinki Agreement (2005) 89, 96 158, 176–7 Hesselö dispute (1983) 202, 214–15 global market 68–72, 73, 74 hierarchy 25, 26, 27 152, 181, 240 globalisation 57, 76, 291 Hildebrand, R. C. 42, 52 Goldsmith, B. E. ix, xi, 2, 8, 11, 13–35, 36, 57n, 66, 70–1, 76, 78, 115, 160, Hinsch, B. 206, 218

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Hiroshima and Nagasaki 46, 224b IIASA [International Institute for Hiroshima Peace Science Journal 177 Applied Systems Analysis] data 131 historical memory 245, 259, 285 Ikegami, E. 206 history 14–15, 16, 17, 24, 62, 70, 103, Ikenberry, G. J. 37, 52, 76 134, 284 imports 57, 67 problems 10, 200–2, 208–9, 217–18, India 31, 39, 47, 124, 137, 138, 262–3, 235, 239–57 265 struggles 220–6, 289 Indochina 81, 82 textbooks 242, 243, 246, 252, 255, 259 ‘war’ 242, 258, 259 Indochina Wars 261 First (1946–54) 224b, 261, 264 Hitler, A. 213 Second (Vietnam War, 1959–75) 25– Hoeffler, A. 168, 174 6, 60–1, 69, 83, 90, 91n, 224b, Homer-Dixon, T. F. 123 262–4, 266 Hong Kong 38, 56, 89, 198 Indonesia 1, 33, 56–7, 66, 70–2, 77, honour 60, 203–4, 219 81–2, 86–7, 87n, 88–9, 90, 92, 103, Google Books Ngram Viewer 213, 214f 125, 127–8f, 130f, 131, 135–6f, 146f, 147t, 154, 169, 170–1, 179–80, 186t, honour culture 204–6 187–8, 191, 191f, 192, 195, 197, 224b, versus ‘honour ideology’ 207 228t, 234–5, 256, 286–8 ‘honour ideology’ 206–9, 217–18, 234, anti-communist massacres (1965–6) 254, 289–90, 293 224b, 225 ‘Hot Peace’ (East Asia today) 74 Christian–Muslim violence 101 conflict risk predictions 134–5 housewives 215, 216 jihadism 104–9 Howe, N. 133 as ‘key country’ 111 Huawei 67 Indonesian Communist Party 85, 107 Hudson, V. M. 117, 124, 137, 138, 139, inequalities 7, 9, 124, 141, 158, 160, 164, 167, 168, 174 165, 173, 175, 194, 285, 294, 296 Hukbalahap rebellion 82, 82n infrastructure 67, 71, 109, 162 hukou system (household registra- institution-building 195, 196 tion) 123 institutions 8, 17, 56, 142, 144, 156, 178, Hula Drainage crisis (1951) 18n 180, 182–4, 188, 197, 199, 222, 256, 283 human capital 116, 122 insurgencies 1, 64, 77, 89, 100–1, 103–4, human rights (abuses) 5, 7, 9, 43, 106, 113, 131, 180, 294. See also com- 57–8, 63, 82, 82n, 84, 89, 94, 102, munist insurgencies 142, 145–6, 150–7, 216, 220–1, 224b, intent 22, 202–3 225–7, 229–30, 234, 237, 256, 286, interdependence 20, 45, 48–9, 70–3, 294, 296 75–7, 234 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 149, 158 basis of peace (McDonald) 66–7 human security xi, 9, 12, 114, 117, 161, economic versus societal 291 166, 171–2, 173–5, 237, 288 see also trade interdependence human trafficking 138, 166 interest groups 155, 246, 247 Hun Sen 57, 293 Internal Security Act (Singapore) 150 International Atomic Energy Agency 46 Iceland 205, 218 International Centre for Transitional Justice 230 ideology 55, 57, 82, 84, 202 International Court of Justice 46, 256, Ignatieff, M. 223, 237 293

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International Covenant on Civil and Israel 18n Political Rights (1966) 143 International Criminal Tribunal for Jackson, R. 133 Yugoslavia (ICTY) 222 Jakarta 100, 108, 111 International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) data 18–19, 19f, 33, 35 Japan 20, 30–1, 33, 38, 42, 56–7, 66, 70, potential weakness 18n 73, 75, 80–1, 89, 92, 103, 115, 125, 127–30f, 135f, 142, 147t, 148, 169, international economic linkages 28–9 170–1, 200–2, 211–12, 225, 228t, international institutions 17, 36–7, 64, 254, 257–9, 267, 272 65, 77 colonialism 252, 253, 255; ~ in Asia international law 8, 36–54, 66, 144–5, 243–6. See also history: problems 160–1, 236, 291, 293 constitution 59, 258; ~ (Article 9) 45, global versus regional 38–9 60–1, 247 human rights 143 dominant masculinities 215–17, 218, and power 37–8 219 geriatric peace 132, 133, 134 International Relations (IR) 4, 62, 78, honour culture 206 89–93, 218, 269–70 Meiji reforms (1868–1912) 60, 215, honour ideology 209–10 241 ‘levels of analysis’ problem 15 Ministry of Finance 60 power-based theories 25 MITI 60, 258 see also liberal theory nationalism 239, 241–5 International Studies Association 176 nationalism (domestic politics) 245– internationalist coalitions 50 (Solingen) 28–9 ‘normal state’ aspiration 247–8 interstate conflict 14, 26, 27–8, 239 peace pioneer 55, 58, 59–64, 74 causes (liberal theories) 16 peace treaty with Taiwan (1952) 45, intentions 22 292 thousand battle-deaths criterion 261n physical integrity rights 145, 146f territorial disputes 250–3 interstate disputes 13, 20, 29 US military bases 45 failure to escalate (1979–) 30 US occupation (1945–51) 44, 72, 215 initiation 18–19, 19f likelihood of escalation 18–23, 31, Japan Times 249n 32, 71 Jarstad, A. K. 160, 178 onset 22 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, 1993–) 100, outbreak avoidance 23 104–6, 108, 112–13 intimate partner violence 163, 168–9, Jiang Zemin 248 173, 207, 288 jiei jison no seisen (self-defence and Iran 54, 62 survival) 243 Iran-Contra affair 86 jigyaku teki rekishikan (‘masochistic Iraq 40, 69, 105, 213, 294 historical education’) 247–8 Isaacs, M. 99n jihadism 9, 100, 104–11, 294 Islam Nusantara/Islam of Archipelago local grievances 105 (Indonesia) 108–9 Johnston, A. I. 202, 218 Islamic State 109, 111, 112 Journal of Conflict Resolution 176–7 Islamic State of Indonesia/Negara Islam Journal of Peace Research xii, 176–7 Indonesia (West Java, 1949) 107 judicial independence 149, 154 Islamism 61, 63, 98, 100, 107–8, 109, Justice in Perspective 228n 111. See also jihadism

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Kachin Independence Organisation Korean armistice (1953) 82, 292 (KIO) 100 Korean War 26, 31, 44, 46, 60, 81, 216, Kachins 103 224b, 261, 276, 277 Kahl, C. H. 123 KPNLF [Khmer People’s National kangri zhanzheng (anti-Japanese resist- Liberation Front] 86 ance war) 241 Kreutz, J. ix, xi, 8, 14, 33, 36, 72, 78–97, Kant, I. 17, 64–5, 76 106, 116, 160, 266, 281–96 Karens 103 Kuomintang/Guomindang 45, 80–1, 83, 231 Kastner, S. L. 71n, 76 Kwak, J-H. 221, 223, 237 Kelley, A. C. 118, 119, 121, 138 Khin Ma Ma Myo 166 labour 56, 67, 116, 119, 122, 216 Khmer Rouge 84–6, 95, 224b, 263 Lao Issara 82 killings 143, 153, 179, 206, 224b, 283, Laos/Lao PDR 19, 58, 63, 65, 83–4, 285–6, 294 87n, 125–6, 127–8f, 130f, 131, 136f, Kim Il-Sung 261 137, 146f, 147t, 148, 224b, 228t, Kim Jong Un 64 262–3 Kishida Fumio 246n, 273, 280 Laskar Jihad 101, 104, 113 Kivimäki, T. x, 2, 6, 11, 24, 34, 70, 76, Latin America 14, 18, 19f, 21f, 22f, 290 78, 92, 95, 163, 174 Le Duan 62 Koguryo tombs 225, 242, 243–4, 258 leaders 8, 24, 26, 29, 30, 32, 59, 64, 72, Korea 1, 103, 252, 258 75, 84, 91, 92, 210–11, 242, 257, 286, Demilitarised Zone (1953–) 292 291, 295 Korea, North (DPRK) 19, 58, 61, 64, developmentalist (unsuccessful) 70 70, 84, 125, 127–8f, 135f, 146f, 147t, leadership 56, 58, 69, 227, 269, 275 148, 224b, 228t, 243, 262–3, 265, 292 learning 58–9, 62, 188 ‘military first’ policy 64, 73–4 least developed countries 126, 128f nuclear aspirations 64, 246–7, 249, 260 Lederach, J. P. 220, 237 Korea, South (Republic of Korea) 19, Lee Kuan Yew 61 33, 56–7, 61, 66, 70, 72–3, 75, 77, 92, Lee Myung-bak 246–7, 252 115, 117, 125, 127–8f, 128, 135–6f, Leftwich, A. 57n, 76 137, 142, 147t, 148, 169, 170–1, 179–80, 184–5, 186t, 188, 189f, 190, legitimacy 8, 9–10, 46–7, 49–50, 57, 61, 195, 197–9, 201, 211, 225, 228t, 229, 76, 105–6, 108, 199, 210, 228, 240, 254, 257–9, 267, 272, 292 248, 283, 289 division of labour (gendered) 216–17 Legro, J. W. 58, 76 excess males 168 Lemke, D. 4, 11, 26, 34 geriatric peace 132, 134 ‘levels of analysis’ problem 15 nationalism 239, 241–5 nationalism (domestic politics) 245–50 Li Keqiang 246n physical integrity rights 145, 146f liberal states 57, 68–9, 70–1 quality of peace 233t, 233 liberal theory (IR) 16–23, 30, 32–3, territorial disputes 252–3 64–9. See also realism truth and reconciliation 230–1, 236–7 Libya 44, 110 youth bulges and support ratio Lind, J. 208–9 (1950–2015) 129f lines of conflict 179, 195 see also Gwangju, Park Chung Hee lishi wenti (history problem) 242

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Liu Cigui 253 masculine peace 10, 200–19, 254, 285 Lon Nol 263 masculinity (militarised) 164–5, 172, low-intensity conflicts 87, 117 174, 216 Luttwak, E. N. 133 mate retention 203–4, 218 McCamant, J. F. 153, 158 Ma Licheng incident (2002) 248–9 McDonald, P. J. 66, 68, 71n, 77 Ma Ying-jeou 292 Mearsheimer, J. J. 25, 34, 49, 51, 53, 203, 219, 270 MacArthur, General D. 59, 60 Medeiros, E. S. 46, 52 Mack, A. 2, 11–12 media 111, 149, 202 Madurese 101 Melander, E. ix, xi, 6, 10, 12, 60, 94, 124, Magnusson, M. 205, 218 164, 172, 200–19, 234, 254, 281–96 Magsaysay, R. 70 Mendes, S. M. 177, 179, 181–2, 185, Mahathir Mohamad 61 187, 196 maiguozei (‘traitor’) 249 Merkel, A. 202 Malaya 81 methodological individualism 207–8 Malayan Communist Party. See methodology 3, 5, 38, 40, 146n Communist Party of Malaya Middle East 14, 27, 28, 62, 83, 86, 99, Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese 106, 110–11, 260, 287 Army 82 and North Africa 18, 19f, 21f, 22, Malays 64, 103, 287 100, 122 Malaysia 57, 66, 70, 72, 92, 105, 107–8, Mido no Mae Vendetta (1687) 206 110–11, 127f, 128f, 130f, 131, 135–6f, Mikanagi, Y. 215, 219 146f, 147t, 148, 179–80, 186t, 187–9, Militarised Interstate Dispute (MID) 192–3, 193f, 199, 228t, 256, 267, data 18, 18n 271–2, 287 ‘Look East’ policy 61 military bases 40, 45, 60, 90, 92, 264 state repression 149, 154–5 military capability 132 Malaysian Chinese 103 military coups 85, 180, 197, 229 Malaysian Indians 103 military expenditures 10, 28, 73, 116, Mallinder, L. 228n 122, 133, 247n, 267 Malmberg, B. 119, 121, 126, 140 military technology 122, 132 Malthus, T. R. 118, 140 militias 81, 88 Mao Zedong/Maoism 46, 60–1, 84 Miller, B. 6, 12 Marcos, F. 88n, 187, 229 Miller, M. 283, 296 maritime boundaries 31, 32, 33, 50–1, Mindanao 63, 88, 100–1, 102–3, 104 52, 252–3, 292–3 autonomous Bangsamoro entity 109 maritime East Asia (US sphere) 260, Mindanao peace agreement (1976) 88n 265–9 Moluccan islands 101 market access 59, 72, 74 Mongolia 66, 125, 127–8f, 130f, market mechanism 56–7 135–6f, 146f, 147t, 148, 265 marriage 120, 124 monocausal theories 31, 275 martial law 188, 189 Monroe Doctrine (1823) 51, 53 masculine honour ideologies 10, 120, Moro Islamic Liberation Front 124, 172, 200–19 (MILF) 63, 88, 100, 105, 109, 287

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Moro National Liberation Front NATO 44, 264 (MNLF) 88 natural prolongation principle 253 Morphett, S. 42–3, 53 naval power 10, 260–1, 266–76, 277–80 multilateral treaties 8, 37, 38–51, 234 Ne Win 82 murder 143, 148, 166, 167, 168, 288 Negara Brunei Darussalam. See Brunei Muslims 64, 100–3, 104, 171, 287–8, 294 negative peace (Galtung) 6–7, 9, 177, Myanmar/Burma 1, 33, 58, 63, 64–5, 179, 181, 220–1, 236, 239, 254–5, 70, 72, 81, 81n, 82, 84, 87, 87n, 94, 97, 282, 283 100, 103, 111, 113, 127f, 128f, 130f, New Economic Policy (Malaysia, 131, 146f, 147t, 148–9, 154–5, 171, 1971) 61 222–3, 224b, 228t, 229, 288, 294 all-around repressor 149 New Order (Indonesia) 71 census (2014) 124n ‘New Thinking on Relations with Japan’ conflict risk predictions 134 (Ma Licheng, 2002) 249 failure to settle long-running con- New Zealand 83–4, 212 flicts 287 Ngo Dinh Diem 82 Institute for Peace and Security Studies 166 Ni Aolain, F. 226, 235 peace negotiations 165–6, 175 Njal’s Saga 205, 218 population data (deficient) 124n Nobles, M. 221, 223, 237 quality of peace 233t, 233 Nonaligned Movement 43 Nahdlatul Ulama 108–9, 111 non-developmental states 62–4, 70 Nanjing Massacre 224b, 242, 243 non-great powers 27, 32 narcotics 81n, 109, 294 non-interference in internal affairs 39, nation-building 55, 164 43, 92, 93 National Assembly (South Korea) 244 non-involvement 78, 83–5, 89, 93 National Bureau of Statistics of China non-use of force 39–40 (NBSC) 123 non-violence 79, 80, 88, 94, 108, 177, national 294 identity 48, 208–9, 226, 239–45, 249, Nordkvelle, J. 176–7 250, 253–5, 257–8 normative unease 177–8 interests 107, 248 priorities 8, 55, 58–64, 69, 72, 74, norms 37, 38, 92, 93, 201, 208, 244, 290 75, 160 Northeast Asia 4–5, 24, 45, 89, 92, 103, security 26, 58, 60, 75, 84, 92, 116, 168–9 161, 256 nuclear energy 46, 47 sovereignty 20, 28, 38, 39, 43, 246 nuclear weaponry 64, 73, 247n, 284 ‘national purpose shifts’ (Legro) 58 National Social Security Fund (PRC, Obama, B. 273 2000–) 133 occupying buildings 181, 185, 186n nationalism 28–9, 32, 72, 75, 92, 111, 133–4, 163–5, 201–2, 206, 210, 217, OECD 126 220, 223, 225–6, 234–5, 279, 285, oil (and gas) 74, 271, 293 289–90, 292–3 old-age dependency ratio 119, 122, domestic politics 245–50 125, 132–4 rejection of ‘apologies’ to former One-China policy 71–2 adversaries 209 territorial disputes 250–3, 255 Oneal, J. R. 22, 34, 65, 74, 75, 77 threat to East Asian Peace 10, 239–59 opportunity costs 20, 28, 79–80, 120, 121

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Organisation of Islamic Conference 88 peacemaking 85–9, 93, 175, 284, 289 Organski, A. F. K. 26–7, 32, 34, 90, 96, ‘peer competitor’ (Mearsheimer) 49 260, 270 pensions 133 Ortuoste, M. 256, 258 people power 187 Orwell, G. 151–2, 158 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 132 othering 165, 170–1, 172, 223, 226, per capita income 118, 119 234, 244, 249 perception 26, 39, 69 Otkell (Njal’s Saga) 205 perestroika 62 pacifism 59 Permesta 82 Pacquiao, M. 273 perpetual peace (Kant) 17, 76 Pakistan 47, 105 petitions 181, 185, 186n Paracel Islands 271 Pew Global Attitudes Project 170–1, 175 Paris agreements Philippines 63, 109–10, 192, 192f, 270–1 (1973) 263 conflict risk predictions 134 (1991) 86–7, 88 defence cooperation with USA 273– 4, 277, 279 Park Chung Hee 61, 82, 241–2, 258 democratisation (1986) 85 Park Geun-hye 249 failure to settle long-running con- Parker, J. 207–8 flicts 287 miscellaneous 1, 20, 33, 58, 64–5, 70, Patani 101, 103–6, 110, 131, 287 81, 84, 88, 92, 94, 103, 111, 125–6, path-dependency 24, 295 127–8f, 130f, 131, 135–6f, 146f, Pathet Lao 84 147t, 154, 169, 179–80, 186t, peace 5–7 187–8, 197, 212, 222–3, 228t, 267, agreements 6, 79, 87–8, 163 272, 285–6, 288, 294 definition (Galtung) 6 quality of peace 233t, 233 definition problems 176–7 truth and reconciliation 229 definitions (validity) 159–60 US support against ASG 106 domestic 8, 57, 176–9, 180–4, physical integrity rights 143, 144–6, 148, 194–5, 288 151–2, 283, 285 ‘flying geese’ theory 56–9 PIR index 232, 233t forms 6–7 Pinker, S. 5, 12 methods of study 281–3 piracy 269, 277 narrow conception (absence of violent conflict) 13, 161 Pol Pot 82 nature 281–3 police 68, 149, 168, 230 as process 295 policy-makers 146, 245–6 processes 162–3, 165–6, 287 in ‘region’ 4–5 policy-making 142, 183 types 7–8, 155 political coalitions (domestic) 28–9, 35 ‘writ large’ 3 political development 9, 115, 151, 178, see also regional peace 181, 184, 194, 195 ‘peace with adjectives’ 160, 282 political goods 182–3, 184, 196–7 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) xii political liberties 182, 285. See also civil Peace Science Society 176 liberties peace through trade (Kant) 65 political rights 146–51, 155, 185, 186t, peacebuilding 7–8, 9, 94, 160, 162–3, 187, 189–96 237 political science 14, 143

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political system 182, 183, 196 under-reporting 187 Political Terror Scale (PTS) 158, 232, willingness to pursue 185–9, 233t, 236 189–94f political violence 115–16, 117–24, 138, psychology 123, 153, 160, 162, 203–5, 153, 290 219, 227 age structure transitions 119–21 public opinion 58, 66, 84, 86, 91n, 184, political will 255, 257 209, 210, 245–9, 258, 289, 291 politics 94, 154, 275, 289 Putin, V. 73 Polity IV 283, 296 Quality of Government Data 211 population decline 125 population neutralists 118 Rakhine State 104 population optimists 117–18 Rama IX 63, 286 population pessimists 118 Ramos, F. 63 Portugal 38 Ramos-Horta, J. 88 positive peace (Galtung) 6–7, 156, 177, rape 148, 165, 204, 224b 220, 221–3, 225, 232–4, 236, 239, 255, 282, 283, 288 Rappoport, A. 177 post-Cold War era 42–3, 239, 242, Ray, J. L. 15 260–1, 265–7, 269, 274–5 realism (IR) 17, 25, 27, 53, 71, 71n, post-conflict settings 167, 200, 227 72–4, 256, 291 offensive versus defensive 203, 208 post-war era (1945–) 27, 39, 42, 52, 65, see also International Relations 78, 81–2, 144, 156, 215, 241, 247–8 reconciliation xi, 10, 160, 217, 220–3, power 37–8, 57, 82, 187 226–7, 235–7, 240, 254, 288, 296 relations 89, 90–1 relative 202–3 referendums 88, 142, 232, 286 transitions 10, 26–7, 32, 200–3, 208, Regan, P. D. 6, 11, 79, 96, 176–7 217–18, 258, 260–1, 267, 269–75, regime in/stability 121, 134 278, 291 regime security 58, 72, 75 pragmatism 58, 159 regime type 23, 32, 155 Prayut Chan-o-cha 110 region, as explanatory factor (or not) for Preah Vihear (temple) 20, 293 ‘peace’ 4 pregnancy 203–4 regional Presidential Commission on Human community 10, 257 Rights (Philippines) 229 dynamics (heterogeneous) 23–5 Presidential Truth Commission on Sus hierarchies 26, 27 picious Deaths (PTCSD, 2000–4) 230 instability 260, 270, 272–3, 275 power configurations 25–7 Printing Presses and Publication Act (Malaysia) 149 regional peace study of ‘peace’ in ‘region’ 4–5 production chains 67, 68, 77 see also East Asian Peace protectionism 32, 48 rekishi mondai (history problem) 242 protest 9–10, 151, 154, 157, 176–99, religion 5, 170, 171, 172, 286, 287–8 286, 288, 294, 296 definition 181 religious civil wars (avoidance) 8–9, evidence 184–94 98–114 extent 185 further research 99n, 103, 106 measurement 185 incidence 98–9

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internationalisation (relative absence salaryman masculinity 215–16 of) 104–7, 110, 111, 112 samil undong (March First move- intractability 99 ment) 241 lessons learned 110–12 relative absence (explanations) 104– samurai 206, 216 10 San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT, state capacity 9, 107–10, 148 1951–2) 44–5, 53, 250, 292 religious freedom 103 San Francisco System 44, 51 religious intolerance 171 Santiago, C. 102n Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) 249 savings 119, 133 reparations 220–1, 226–32, 234, 236, 296 Scania province 214–15 reputation 203 Scarborough Shoal 270 ‘resource scarcity’ 123 Schaftenaar, S. 6, 12 respect 46, 203, 209 Science (journal) 168, 173 Responsibility to Protect 43–4, 52 Sciubba, J. D. 122, 132, 133, 140 Richards, D. L. 233n Scott, S. V. ix, xii, 8, 36–54, 66, 145, right to life 143 161, 234, 284, 290–1 Riksbankens Jubileumsfond x secessionism 109, 111 riots 100–1, 102 Second United Front (1937–46) 80 rising powers 36–7, 39, 42, 90, 203, security community (Deutsch) 4, 24, 260, 267, 274–5, 291, 293–4. See also 92, 201, 250, 255, 257, 284, 289 China: rise security dilemma 17 risk 18, 23, 27, 32, 60, 68–70, 72, 75, Security Offences Act (Malaysia) 155 116, 121, 134–5, 137–8, 151, 164, 210 Security Treaty (Japan-USA, 1951) 44– Roh Moo-hyun 246, 258 5, 60 Rohingyas 101, 102, 149, 294 Sedition Act (Malaysia) 149 Roosevelt, F. D. 41–2, 53 self-defence 41, 46, 213, 214, 243, 247 root causes 9, 220–1, 226–7, 233, 242, Self-Defence Force (Japan) 60, 216 254 self-policing 151–2 Rosato, S. 283, 296 sexual violence 162–3, 165, 166, 172–3 Ross, R. S. ix, xii, 2, 10, 12, 14, 17, 26, Shackelford, T. K. 203–4, 218, 219 31, 67, 71–3, 76, 78–9, 90, 200, 239, Sharygin, E. J. 167–8, 173 254, 260–80, 290–1 publications 279 Sheehan, J. 212–13, 219 Royal Navy 269 signalling 20, 30–2, 66, 208 rule of law 149, 180, 222, 228, 256 Sinding, S. W. 118, 119, 121, 138 rural-urban migration 123 Singapore 56, 57, 62, 66, 70–2, 75–6, 107, 125, 127–30f, 135f, 146f, 146, Russett, B. M. 22, 34, 65, 74, 75, 77 147t, 158, 179–80, 186t, 187, 189, Russia (Tsarist) 241 198–9, 256, 267, 272 Russian Federation (1991–) 25, 29, 44, state repression in 150, 153–5 66, 74–5, 77, 157, 265, 272 Sino-Soviet split 42, 72, 83–5, 90, Ryu Yongwook ix, xii, 10, 67, 75, 79, 262–3, 264, 278 92, 94, 163–4, 200, 217, 225–6, 234, Sino-US rapprochement (1971) 25, 42, 239–59, 290–1 72, 74, 84, 90 Ryukyu Islands 44 Sisk, T. D. 160, 174

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Snyder, J. 74, 77 state-owned enterprises 57, 133 social capital 221, 236 statist coalitions (Solingen) 28–9 social change 118 statistics 4, 16, 25, 71–2, 137, 167–8 social control 134, 151 status 124, 204, 214, 216 social identity theory 244 Strand, H. 176–7 social justice 6, 159 strikes 181, 185, 186n social mood 132–4 structural change 132–4 social sciences 14, 202, 207, 218 structural inequalities 160, 194 socialisation 245, 246 structural theories 25–7, 32, 69 Societal Violence Scale (SVS) 232, 233t structural violence 6, 7, 156, 179, 220, socioculture 247, 256 223, 227, 282 sociopsychology 170 Suara Rakyat Malaysia 149 Socotra Rock (Eardo/Suyanjiao) 253 Sub-Saharan Africa 18, 19f, 118, 137 Soker, P. 177 Suharto 71, 82 Solingen, E. 2, 6, 12, 27–9, 34–5 Sukarno 71 Solomon, R. 220 Sulu Sultanate 104 Songun policy 64 superpowers 25, 50, 51, 83 South Asia 100, 110, 168, 260, 288 support ratios 121, 125 South China Sea 20, 31, 33, 40–1, supporting armed force 78, 79–83, 89, 50–1, 52, 260, 268, 270–1, 275–7, 91, 92, 93 279, 293 Supreme Court (Philippines) 195 PRC reclamation activities 272–4 Svensson, I. ix, xii, 6, 8–9, 12, 61, Southeast Asia 4–5, 89, 92, 103, 168, 98–114, 148, 170, 281–96 171, 241, 284–5 Sweden 38, 202, 214–15, 218 jihadist ‘second front’ 100, 113 Swedish Burma Committee 165 see also ASEAN Syria 18n, 44, 105, 111, 294 Spratly Islands 62, 293 stability 8, 57, 59, 67, 71–2, 90, 92, 94, Taiwan 18n, 33, 42, 56–7, 65–6, 70, 73– 180, 240–2, 245, 260, 266–7, 270, 4, 83, 89, 92, 115, 125, 127–9f, 135–6f, 289, 294 137, 142, 147n, 179–80, 185–91, 195, post-conflict 79 197, 199, 201, 211–12, 236, 238, 241, state 4, 29 279, 292 state capacity 58, 62 228 incident (1947) 224b, 231 repression of religious civil wars 9, bilateral treaty with Japan (1952) 45, 107–10, 148 292 physical integrity rights 145, 146f State Oceanic Administration signatory to NPT (1968) 46 (PRC) 253 truth and reconciliation 231 state repression 7, 8, 57, 59, 61, 67, 70, White Terror 225 78, 81–2, 107, 109, 121, 133, 142–58, Taiwan Relations Act (USA, 1979) 61 167, 178–9, 194, 281–2, 285, 286–7, 288, 290, 294 Taiwan Strait 71–2, 76, 262, 264, 268, 277 non-violent 144, 146–51, 155; ef- crisis (1954–5) 18n, 19 fectiveness of ~ 151–3 taoguang yanghui (hide capacity and bide repertoires 144–51 time) diplomacy 270 typology 156 Tatmadaw 165, 224b violent 143, 144–51, 153, 156 taxation 67, 87, 207

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terra nullius 250, 252 tourism 252, 256, 293 territorial disputes 50, 176, 200–2, 225, trade 8, 13–35, 50, 64–9, 70, 71, 72, 73, 235, 239–40, 250–3, 257, 260, 289 160, 233–4, 256, 295 territorial integrity 3, 47 consequence rather than precursor of peace 91 Thai language 101, 103 intra-regional (dyadic volumes) 21f Thailand 1, 19, 20, 26, 27, 33, 63–4, 65, trade interdependence (Goldsmith) 17, 70, 76, 83–7, 109, 110, 125–6, 127– 22–3, 91, 92–3, 239, 242 30f, 135f, 146f, 147t, 154, 169, 179–80, 186t, 187–9, 193, 194f, 197, 211–12, trade volumes 31, 32, 255 222–3, 224b, 228t, 264, 286, 294 diffusion pattern increase 13 border conflict with Cambodia 64, intra-regional 17–21, 29–30 93, 93n, 292, 293 transitional justice 223, 235–8 border conflict with Myanmar 93, Transitional Justice Database 228n 93n conflict risk predictions 134 Transitional Justice Research constitution (2016) 286 Collaborative 228n failure to settle long-running con- transnational companies 67–8 flicts 287 Transnational Institute 166, 175 Islamic insurgency 64, 77, 100–1, transnational institutions 89, 92–3 103–4, 106, 113, 131, 287 National Reconciliation Commission Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and (2005) 229–30 Security (Japan-USA, 1960) 44, 45n, quality of peace 233t, 233 273 truth and reconciliation 229–30 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Thaksin Shinawatra 63, 96, 229 Weapons (NPT, 1968) 39, 46–7, 52 PRC accession (1992) 47 Thein Sein 63 Triangulating Peace (Russett and Oneal, ‘thick’ reconciliation (Crocker) 221, 2001) 65, 74, 75, 77 227 Truman doctrine (1946) 81n Third World 47, 50 Trump, D. 69, 71–2, 75, 292 third-party actions 79, 80 Truong Chinh 62 Thucydides trap 291 trust (distrust/mistrust) 4, 9–10, 75, 80, Tiananmen Square massacre (1989) 86, 89, 151, 163, 170, 172, 176–99, 221, 198, 224b, 286 223, 225–7, 235, 245, 250, 254–7, timing 17–18, 21, 23, 25, 30 285, 289 Timor-Leste/East Timor 65, 88, 89–90, bases 183 96, 125–6, 127–8f, 130f, 131–2, 136f, definition 182–3 137, 146f, 147t, 224b, 225, 228t, 234–7 measurement 188, 189–94f Indonesian occupation (1975–99) truth commissions (TCs) 220–1, 223, 231–2 226–32, 233t, 234–5, 237 quality of peace 233t, 233 definition (Hayner) 227 truth and reconciliation 231–2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Tokyo: sarin gas attack (1995) 287 (TRCK, S. Korea, 2005–10) 230–1 Tønnesson, S. ix, xii, 2, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16, Truth for Reconciliation Commission 27, 33, 36, 45, 54, 78, 159–60, 281–96 (Thailand, 2010) 230 ‘developmental peace’ theory 8, 29–30, Tsai Ing-wen 71, 292 32, 93, 55–77, 116, 151, 242, 244, 289, 290 Tsujimura Miyoko 247n torture 143, 148–9, 153, 157–8, 224b, 283 U Nu 103

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Uighurs 102, 109 international relations (effects of hon- Ullfelder, J. 146n our) 209–10 invasion of Iraq (2003) 40 ‘unbalanced multipolarity’ Navy 10, 266–76 (Mearsheimer) 25 North versus South 204, 207, 210 UNDP 237 ‘pivot to Asia’ (2011) 293 Philippine Human Development PRC challenge 27, 32 Report (2012–13) 102–3, 114 UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in UNESCO 243, 293 Cambodia, 1992–3) 86 Union Peace Conference (Myanmar, UNTAET (UN Transitional Administra 2016) 165–6, 287 tion in East Timor, 1999–2002) 88 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Uotsuri Island 252 (USSR) 27, 41, 46, 52, 62, 65, 78, 81, Uppsala Conflict Data Programme 86, 104–5, 277 (UCDP) 55n defence treaty with SRV (1978) 263 fall (1991) 25, 26, 73, 90, 264–5 Uppsala definition (‘25 battle see also Sino-Soviet split deaths’) 55n, 131 unit of analysis, dyadic 23–4 Uppsala University x, 2 United Kingdom 38, 41–2, 68–9, 78, Uppsala University: Department of 81, 87n, 269 Peace and Conflict Research ix, xi, xii United Nations 66, 80, 169, 173 Uppsala University: EAP research pro- Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS, gramme ix–x, 3, 14, 33, 55, 169–70 1982) 39, 49–51, 54, 292–3 urbanisation 116, 117, 119, 123, 125, Convention on Torture (1984/1987) 135–6f, 137–8, 140 144 Urdal, H. ix, xii, 9, 115–41, 161, 284 General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) 42, 46 US Institute for Peace 220, 237 peacekeeping 43 USS Impeccable 271 Population Division 123, 140 sanctions 64 variables 23, 24, 31, 37, 89, 118 World Population Prospects (data- dependent 16, 28, 55, 159, 186t base) 124, 127–30f, 135–6f, 140 independent 16, 38, 55 see also UNDP; UNESCO; UNTAC; UNTAET Varshney, A. 177, 178 United Nations Charter (1945) 39–44, victimhood 221, 226 53, 247 Vietnam 34, 56–8, 65, 70, 72, 76, 77, Article 2(4) 39–40, 43, 47, 52 84–5, 87n, 91, 115, 117, 126, 127f, Article 23(1) 41 128f, 130f, 131, 135f, 136f, 137, 146f, Article 103 41 147t, 212, 228t, 279–80, 286 foundational principles 39–41 challenges to Chinese maritime United Nations Security Council 41–4 claims 271 ‘chapter VII decisions’ 41 Chinese invasion (1979) 16, 19, 22, permanent members (veto power) 41 27, 62, 224b resolutions: 1820 (2008) 163; ~ 1325 developmental state categorisation (2000) 163; ~ 1973 (2011) 44 (1986–) ‘problematic’ 30 United States 25–6, 30–3, 36–43, 46, Vietnam, North (DRV) 224b, 262 48–9, 51, 59, 61–2, 67–8, 71–2, 78, Vietnam, South 82, 84, 146f, 224b, 262, 81–5, 87n, 88, 90, 105, 107, 132, 200, 263 202, 212, 218, 249, 260, 263, 265, 291 Vietnamese Workers’ Party 261 expectations 75 ‘hands tied’ 40–1 Vikings 205–6

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violence 138, 164, 281–2, 283, 285, 294 World Values Survey 169, 175, 184–5, inter-personal 117, 166–70, 171 188, 189f, 195, 211–12, 217, 219 inter-religious 288 World War I 212–13 non-lethal 168 ‘personal’ versus ‘structural’ 6–7 World War II 1, 42, 44, 45, 60, 80–1, 93, 94, 206, 215, 224b, 225, 248, 261, 290 ‘vital security’ 24 WTO 39, 45, 47–9, 52 voice 227 accession agreement with PRC (2001) 48 Waever, O. 4, 11 dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 49 Waltz, K. N. 17, 25, 78, 90 97 ‘warm peace’ 6 Xi Jinping 68, 286 Weber, M. 213 Xinjiang 100, 102, 104–5, 109, 113 Wen Chen-wen Memorial Foundation 231, 236 West Kalimantan 101 Yap, O. F. ix, xii, 9–10, 79, 94, 151, 176–99 West Papua 225 Yasukuni Shrine 225, 242, 243, 246 Westphalian system 240, 250 Yoshida Doctrine 59–61, 241 White Terror (Taiwan, 1949–87) 231 Yoshida Shigeru 76, 77 Wilkenfeld, J. 18n, 19f, 33, 35 young men 119–20, 285, 160–2, 167–8 Winslow, D. 164, 175 youth 115, 118, 247, 283 women 161, 203–4, 205, 206, 211–12, 215–17, 285 youth bulges 116, 120–1, 125–31, 134 experiences and vulnerabilities 162 definition 120n ‘intimate partner violence’ 168–9, early-transition countries 125–6, 172, 173 127f, 129, 131, 135f, 137 seldom participate in peace process- late-transition countries 125–6, 127f, es 162–3 130–1, 136f, 137 unequal peace 159–75 risk of armed conflict 121–2, 126–7 vulnerability to sexual violence 163, youth dependency ratio 118–19, 121, 165, 166 125–6, 136 Women’s League of Burma 165 Yudhoyono, S. B. 89 women’s suffrage 212–13 Yuval-Davis, N. 164, 175 Wood, R. M. 152, 158 working age population 118–19, 121–2, Zhenbao Island (Ussuri River) 263 125, 128 zhengshi lishi yishi weijing (‘squarely face World Health Organisation 167 history’) 246 World Heritage Sites 243, 293 Zhu Mingquan 47, 54

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After about 40 years of significantly reduced armed conflicts and battle deaths, is the East Asian Peace thesis on the verge of collapse? This collection of recent studies provides data and analysis that enable us to hold on to the faith, even as vulnerabilities, especially from the broader perspective of a durable peace, are highlighted. – Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman and Chair of the Filipino Government Negotiating Panel for Peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 2012–2016 The volume is a collection of new, interesting, and cutting-edge research works on peace and conflicts in East Asia. Diverse in themes, analytically innovative, empirically rigorous, and rich in policy implications, this is a must read for students of international relations in general and East Asian peace and conflict in particular. – Chung-in Moon, Distinguished University Professor, Yonsei University ‘The East Asian Peace’ has become a new term in the study of peace and war. This volume demonstrates why. The project with the same name has identified the dramatic change in East Asia from violent devastation to tremendous economic growth without war. Appropriately, Debating The East Asian Peace brings together a set of possible explanations for this historical shift skillfully presented by leading proponents. It makes it possible for any reader to make his/her own evaluation. Furthermore, it ends with general reflections beyond East Asia and its current settings. It is an indispensible book for understanding conflict patterns in a key region as well as the general conditions for lasting, quality peace. – Peter Wallensteen, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and University of Notre Dame In this excellent volume debating the East Asian peace, three chapters really caught my eye. Bjarnegård questions how we can claim there is a peace when there are such high rates of violence against women and sex-selective abortion is much more prevalent than in any other continent. Melander argues that masculine honor ideology may well undermine any future peace in the region, and Urdal asks whether the bare branches of East Asia will aggravate that trend. A thought-provoking treatment unusual for books on East Asian security, the reader is led to the conclusion that improved gender equality will be decisive for peace in East Asia. I’ll be assigning my students readings from this volume, to be sure! – Valerie M. Hudson, Professor and George H.W. Bush Chair, Director, Program on Women, Peace, and Security, Texas A&M University

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