Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

Home , Battalion, Brigade, Electronic warfare, Tabor (Morocco)

FIELD MANUAL *FM34-80 NO. 34-80 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 15 April 1986

i ii PREFACE Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support is critical to the success of the divisional brigades and battalions conduct of close operations. Commanders at these tactical echelons require accurate intelligence to plan the battle and timely combat information to win it. Counterintelligence (CI) support to battlefield deception and operations security (OPSEC) ensures the critical element of surprise and helps sustain the effective combat power of tactical forces. Electronic warfare (EW) provides combat information and targeting data for both maneuver and fire support units, protects friendly command, control, and communications (C3) systems, and augments maneuver and fires to suppress, neutralize, and destroy enemy C3 facilities. FM 34-80 is intended primarily for use by the intelligence staff officer (S2) and his section at the maneuver battalion and brigade levels. It describes the IEW tasks for which the S2 has responsibility and how the S2 operations are integrated into the command and staff process at the battalion and brigade levels. This manual may also be used by commanders, other staff officers, and military intelligence personnel within the division to gain a better understanding of the IEW system and IEW tasks applicable to brigade and battalion operations. For a more thorough understanding of tactical IEW doctrine, the reader should review FMs 34-1 and 34-10. FMs 71-3 and 71-2J should be reviewed for general doctrinal guidance for maneuver operations at the brigade and task force levels. Information contained within FM 34-80 is applicable to division- and corps-based units organized according to (Army 86) tables of organization and equipment (TOE). Appendix D, Army of Excellence (AOE) points out those organizational and operational areas that have been changed in one way or another by the current restructuring of IEW resources under the AOE force design. FM 34-80 describes how various elements of the IEW system extending from battalion to corps are best used in support of brigade and battalion combat operations. Essential IEW functions, performed in peacetime, are also described in sufficient detail to ensure the combat readiness of IEW resources and the maneuver units they support. Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes or submit comments for its improvement. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to assure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forwarded to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000. Provisions of this manual are subject to international standardization agreements (STANAGs) 1059,2003,2008,2014, 2033,2044,2082,2084, 2097,2113,2844,2868, 2936,3277, and 6004. Provisions of this manual are in compliance with quadripartite agreements 101-3, 170, 295, 311, 321, 492, 502, 506, 511, 523, 528, and 593. When amendment, revision, or cancel- lation of this publication is proposed that will affect or violate the agreement concerned, the preparing activity will take proper action through international standardization channels. When used in this publication, “he”, “him”, “his”, and “men” represent both masculine and feminine genders unless otherwise stated.

iii CHAPTER 1 THE MISSION

Brigade and battalion commanders plan tle. Their success, the result of avoiding and direct the close operations on the air- enemy strengths while exploiting weak- land battlefield against enemy battalions nesses and the element of surprise, and companies of first-echelon regiments. depended on their knowledge of the area in They must also be prepared to engage which they fought. follow-on forces and first-echelon sustainers located within or entering their assigned Today, brigade and battalion command- areas of operations (AO). ers consider the battlefield in terms of the time and space necessary to defeat or bypass an enemy force before it can reactor Successful close operations depend be reinforced. They are concerned about an on the ability of the combined arms team to area of operations in which they need to see find, fix, fight, and finish enemy forces and fight by means of maneuver and fire through a combination of offensive and support; and an area of interest about defensive operations. IEW resources, to which they seek and receive information include the S2, the S3, and all reconnais- regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain. sance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) assets are members of the combined arms team. Their mission is to provide bri- AREA OF OPERATIONS gade and battalion commanders the accu- An area of operations is defined as that rate, timely, and effective intelligence, portion of an area of conflict necessary for counterintelligence, and electronic warfare military operations (JCS Pub 1). Areas of support necessary to plan, direct, and con- operations are geographical areas assigned duct successful combat operations. to commanders for which they have responsibility and in which they have authority to conduct military operations. The assigned area of operations is based on the factors of INTELLIGENCE METT-T and must be of sufficient size to Intelligence impacts directly on the allow completion of the assigned mission. effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, Commanders at each level are normally and leadership—the components of combat assigned areas of operations which extend power. Accurate intelligence is critical to beyond the FLOT or attack objectives a dis- the brigade and battalion commander’s tance commensurate with the planning decisions regarding when, where, and how horizons shown on page 1-1. They rely on to employ maneuver and firepower. It pro- the next higher echelon and adjacent units vides the information necessary to select for information pertaining to enemy forces appropriate protective measures essential to located beyond the limits of their respective the security of the command. It also pro- AO and within their areas of interest. vides the knowledge which enables leaders to lead and win. Historically, commanders AREA OF INTEREST who have possessed superior knowledge of the enemy, weather, and terrain— An area of interest is not assigned by a intelligence—have proven victorious in bat- higher headquarters and is not delineated l-0 by any boundaries. It is determined by bri- off" operations as enemy forces enter or exit gade and battalion commanders and usu- the division, brigade, and battalions’ ally includes their assigned area of opera- assigned AO and specified areas of interest, tions and adjacent areas in which enemy respectively, as shown below. forces are or maybe located. The area of interest extends into enemy-held territory to Rear, close, and deep operational respon- the objectives of current and planned opera- sibilities for the division are summarized tions. Such areas frequently contain named below. Brigade and battalion responsibili- areas of interest (NAI), routes or avenues of ties for rear and close operations are also approach, and specific enemy units which shown. Divisional brigades and smaller may jeopardize the accomplishment of the tactical units do not normally conduct unit’s mission. A phase line is normally separate deep operations but their planning used to distinguish the forward limits of the and operations must anticipate actions of assigned AO. Phase lines support “hand- enemy uncommitted units.

1-1 1-2 Commanders’ Information Needs There are two categories of information Areas of operations and interest are sig- which are critical to brigade and battalion nificant because they generate, in general commanders. They are intelligence and terms, the commanders’ information needs. combat information.

1-3 Intelligence is the result of processing all attached, and supporting units and requests available information known about enemy information from the next higher echelon. forces—their composition, disposition, and He receives and evaluates information from intentions, as well as their locations, their all sources, develops and nominates high direction and speed, and their combat readi- payoff targets (HPT), and reports intelli- ness. Expeditious processing, timely pro- gence results to higher, lower, and adjacent duction, and rapid dissemination of intelli- units. gence is necessary to plan, direct and sup- Battalion commanders plan, direct, coor- port the brigade and battalions’ close dinate, and support the brigade’s close operations. operations against enemy first-echelon battalions. Their mission is to locate, close Combat information, on the other hand, with and destroy enemy forces using fire- is unevaluated data gathered by, or pro- power, maneuver, shock effect and surprise vided directly to, the tactical commander. in coordination with other combat arms. Due to its highly perishable nature or the They must also be prepared to attack enemy criticality of the situation, it cannot be pro- second-echelon battalion maneuver forces cessed into tactical intelligence in time to and first-echelon sustainers, as well. satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence Detailed preplanning and rigorous RSTA requirements. activities prior to the initiation of hostilities Intelligence and combat information are or before actual contact with enemy forces equally important. Both provide targeting is made are absolutely critical to the battal- data for IEW, maneuver, and fire support ions’ success. systems at each echelon. The inverse relationship regarding their relative worth at Battalion commanders need specific higher and lower echelons is directly keyed information and accurate intelligence from to the time available for respective com- the brigade and higher headquarters to manders to make decisions and take the plan their operations. They need timely action necessary to accomplish their combat information and targeting data mission. from subordinate, adjacent, and supporting Company and battalion commanders units to refine their plan and to win their fight what they can see and shoot. They offensive and defensive battles. Their spe- need information about enemy activity cific information requirements for attacking within their AO as it becomes available. and defending are consolidated, due to the Brigade commanders need such informa- speed with which they must react on the tion within 15-30 minutes. Information extremely dynamic and volatile air-land about enemy activity within brigade and battlefield. They must know— battalion areas of interest must be provided in time to plan future operations. The spe- Location, direction, and speed of pla- cific time required to plan future operations toon and company-size elements at brigade and battalion is METT-T within the enemy’s first-echelon dependent. battalions. Location, direction, and speed of Specific Information enemy second-echelon battalions Requirements which indicate the first-echelon regi- Tactical intelligence operations at the ment’s main effort. brigade and battalion begin with the com- Locations and activities of follow-on mander. He conveys his information needs battalions in enemy second-echelon to the S2 who converts them into priority regiments. intelligence requirements (PIR) and other information requirements (IR) for the com- Disposition and strength of enemy de- mander’s approval or modification. The fensive positions and fortifications. intelligence officer translates PIR and IR Location of antitank positions, crew- into specific intelligence, reconnaissance, served weapons, individual vehicle and surveillance missions for subordinate, positions, and dismounted infantry.

1-4 Locations of barriers, obstacles, mine- Enemy use of NBC. field, and bypass routes. Effects of weather and terrain on cur- Effects of terrain and prevailing rent and projected operations. weather conditions throughout the Anticipated timetable or event sched- course of combat operations. ule associated with the enemy’s most Capability of enemy force to employ likely course(s) of action. air assets. Should the enemy succeed in establishing Availability and probability of use of his defensive positions, then brigade com- enemy radioelectronic combat (REC) manders’ specific information requirements assets to disrupt friendly C3. increase. They must then know the specific types, locations, and organization of enemy Possibility of special weapons. first- and second-echelon defensive posi- Probability of enemy use of nuclear, tions and fortifications. These include— biological, and chemical (NBC) Barriers, obstacles, fire sacks, and weapons. antitank (AT) strong points. Brigade commanders need and use spe- Locations of antiaircraft and missile cific information to plan, direct, coordinate, artillery (AAMA) units. and support the close operations of the division against enemy first-echelon regiments, Locations of surface-to-air missile their battalions, companies, and combat (SAM) units. support units—the sustainers. They also Location of REC units. need accurate intelligence about enemy second-echelon regiments within first- Location of reserve maneuver forces. echelon divisions and any follow-on forces Enemy ability to conduct deep attack which can close on their AO before the cur- into friendly rear area. rent engagement can be decisively concluded. Brigade commanders given defensive missions, or forced to defend in given sec- Brigades strive to attack enemy first- tors, require specific information about echelon forces while they are on the move assaulting enemy companies, battalions, and before they can deploy into combat regiments, and divisions—generally, their formations. The brigade commander needs strength, composition, and direction of specific information about— attack. The same information is required about enemy follow-on units that can affect Composition, equipment, strengths, brigade combat operations. Of specific con- and weaknesses of advancing enemy cern are the locations, size, activities, direc- forces. tion, and speed of enemy air-assault, heliborne, and tactical air (TACAIR) units Location, direction, and speed of capable of dealing lethal and decisive blows enemy first-echelon battalions and to brigade units and which could poten- their subordinate companies. tially be used to thwart any counterattack. Locations and activities of enemy Specific information about enemy first- second- and follow-on echelons capable 3 of reinforcing their first-echelon forces and second-echelon regimental C facilities in the close operations area. is of paramount concern to the brigade commander, whether on the offense or Location of enemy indirect fire weapon defense. He must know the specific loca- systems and units. tions of enemy— Location of gaps, assailable flanks, Division forward, and main command and other tactical weaknesses in the posts (CPs). enemy’s order of battle (OB) and OPSEC posture. Regimental and battalion CPs. Air threat. Fire direction control (FDC) centers.

1-5 Command observation posts (COPS). identifying the hostile intelligence collection threat. They, together with operations Radio and radar reconnaissance sites. personnel, develop friendly force profiles, Radioelectronic combat sites. identify vulnerabilities, and make recom- Target acquisition sites. mendations to reduce those vulnerabilities. Counterintelligence operations support The suppression, neutralization, and de- the division’s overall OPSEC program. struction of enemy C3 systems and facilities They are designed to protect the brigade are critical to the success of the close opera- and battalion by countering enemy tions. Brigade commanders, in concert with attempts to identify and locate friendly supporting division and corps IEW, combat and combat support forces. Division maneuver, and fire support (FS) units, use CI operations are conducted to support all available means to identify, locate, dis- OPSEC, deception, and rear operations. rupt, and destroy these extremely high payoff targets. Their objective is to neutral- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ize the enemy commanders’ capability to SUPPORT TO OPSEC command troops and control weapon and combat support systems. Degrading or CI support to OPSEC is the principal role denying the ability of the enemy com- of CI at echelons below division. It mander to conduct his attack as planned is includes— done by systematically attacking key The identification and analysis of “nodes” and “information links” in the enemy reconnaissance, enemy commander’s command and control surveillance, and target acquisition (C2) system, which supports their decision (RSTA) capabilities, personnel, units, making process. This form of command and and activities. control warfare is founded upon the basic The identification and analysis of tenets of command, control, and communi- 3 enemy REC units, locations, and cations countermeasures (C CM) strategy, activities. defined below. Assisting in the development of The integrated use of operations security friendly force profiles. (OPSEC), military deception, jamming, and Determining friendly vulnerabilities to physical destruction, supported by INTEL- enemy RSTA and REC activities. LIGENCE, to deny information, to influence, degrade, or destroy enemy command, Recommending and evaluating control, and communications (C3) capabili- appropriate OPSEC and deception 3 measures. ties; and to protect friendly C .

The protection of friendly command,3 con- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE trol, and communications—protect C —is SUPPORT TO DECEPTION the number one priority under C3CM strategy. Intelligence supports the protection of Military deception operations are friendly C3 primarily through counterintel- planned, controlled, directed, and conducted ligence support to OPSEC and deception. by commanders at echelons above division (EAD). They are designed to mislead enemy senior military and political leaders regard- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ing our true military objectives, our combat The mission of CI is to detect, evaluate, capabilities and limitations, and the com- counteract, or prevent hostile intelligence position and disposition of our combat collection, subversion, sabotage, and inter- forces. national terrorism conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, Battlefield deception operations are con- or person operating to the detriment of the trolled, directed, coordinated, and executed US Army. CI personnel are responsible for by corps and division commanders in

1-6 accordance with the overall military decep- neutralize enemy agents, saboteurs, terror- tion plan. Battlefield deception is deliberate ists, sympathizers, and special purpose action to achieve surprise on the air-land forces. Brigade and battalion commanders, battlefield. Its purpose, ultimately, is to mis- their staffs, and all subordinate personnel lead enemy ground force commanders as to must be trained and prepared to identify our true combat objectives, our tactical and report enemy units or activities which order of battle, our major axis of advance, may pose a threat to brigade trains, and the disposition of our reserve and com- DISCOM, and COSCOM operations. The bat support units, defensive positions, forti- potential impact on close operations from fications, and C3 facilities. the rear cannot be overlooked. Corps, division, brigade, and battalion commanders also plan, direct, coordinate, ELECTRONIC WARFARE support, and conduct battlefield deception EW is an essential element of combat operations to achieve surprise and create power. It can provide brigade and battalion opportunities for decisive tactical maneuver commanders both a passive and an active in order to break contact with and bypass means to protect their C3 systems and a enemy forces, seize their true objectives, passive and an active means to attack the and accomplish their missions. Such battle- enemy commanders’ C3 system as well. Pro- field deception operations support the tecting C3 is the number one priority for EW attack and defense; however, they are in accordance with C3CM strategy. Action offensive rather than defensive in nature. taken to deny, influence, and degrade or They are directly keyed to deceptive forms destroy enemy C3 capabilities, counter-C3, is of maneuver, such as demonstrations and equally important. Electronic warfare, like feints. Such deceptive maneuvers may be other elements of combat power on the air- used to seize secondary tactical objectives. land battlefield, is waged by employing a They may also represent or turn out to be combination of both offensive and defen- the preparatory phase of a combat opera- sive operations, tactics, and procedures. Air- tion designed to achieve surprise in seizing land battle doctrine and the spirit of the primary tactical objectives. offense are the overriding considerations in Brigades and battalions participate in the planning and conducting EW opera- deception effort regardless of its nature, tions. (See Chapter 5, FM 34-l.) military or tactical, and whether they know it or not. Their participation may be limited PROTECT COMMAND, CONTROL, to practicing sound OPSEC measures on a AND COMMUNICATIONS regular and standard basis in accordance Electronic counter-countermeasures with established unit standing operating (ECCM), or defensive EW, are the responsi- procedures (SOP). They may also partici- bility of all soldiers who use or who super- pate in or employ active deceptive measures vise the use of communications-electronics such as outlined above. In either case, coun- (C-E) equipment. ECCM are passive in terintelligence does support their deception nature and are used to protect friendly C3 operations. The principal CI functions con- systems against enemy REC activities. ducted in support of brigade and battalion Passive ECCM include both anti-intercept deception operations are similar to those and locate (for example, emission control, performed in support of OPSEC. terrain masking, and avoidance) procedures and antijam or kill (for example, C-E equip- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ment design) features. ECCM also includes SUPPORT TO REAR OPERATIONS the immediate identification and reporting of meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and Counterintelligence support to rear opera- interference (MIJI) on a friendly C3 facility. tions includes identifying and analyzing the enemy threat to brigade trains and both Electronic warfare support measures division support command (DISCOM) and (ESM) can provide commanders the capa- corps support command (COSCOM) opera- bility to intercept, identify, and locate tions. CI personnel recommend steps to enemy emitters. It represents a source of

1-7 information required for jamming, decep- CRITICAL TASKS tion, ECCM, targeting, and other tactical Command and control warfare in air-land employment of combat forces. ESM sup- combat operations is complex when viewed ports the 3 destruction and jamming of as a maze of intangible electronic signals enemy C systems through acquisition and criss-crossing above and over the battle- reporting of targeting data. ESM also sup- field. Command and control warfare, how- ports the commander’s efforts to counter ever, can be reduced to the most simple enemy OPSEC and deception. terms of reference and understanding. It is

Electronic countermeasures (ECM), in composed of both tangibles3 and intangibles. general, and communications jamming The tangibles are the C “nodes” which (COMJAM systems, in particular, can pro- present visual signatures for commanders vide brigade and battalion commanders two to see and shoot. The intangibles are the active capabilities to protect their C3 sys- “information links” between the nodes tems. The first is screen jamming, or which can be intercepted, identified, and COMJAM screening. COMJAM screening jammed. There are also the nodes them- is the jamming of enemy communications selves which can be intercepted, identified, intercept and direction finding (DF) receiv- and jammed. Depending on the tactical ers to preclude this information gathering situation and the desired effects of friendly or locating efforts against friendly high- operations, there may also be nodes and value communications. links which must be seen and monitored, but neither shot nor jammed. As a general Communications jamming systems can rule, we normally jam and kill the fighters provide brigade and battalion commanders and sustainers, and collect information with a means to communicate with one from the planners and coordinators. When another, as well as with senior and adjacent attacking the planners and coordinators unit commanders in worst-case situations will result in the desired alteration of the when enemy jamming is experienced and 3 enemy commander’s battle plans, this gen- no other means of C is possible. The high- eral rule would obviously by reversed. power amplifier provided with COMJAM systems is used to “burn through” enemy Electronic warfare resources available to, jamming. Calls for fire, situation reporting, or in support of, the brigade and battalions, and orders to subordinate units can still be close operations, though limited, are specifi- communicated. cally trained to cope with the intangibles of command and control warfare. However, COUNTER COMMAND, CONTROL, the critical tasks they must perform in sup- AND COMMUNICATIONS port of the battalion and brigade to win, begin and end with the commander. His The offensive components of EW, passive operational needs for EW support are just ESM and active ECM, provide to brigade as important as his information needs dis- and battalion commanders— cussed earlier in this chapter. The following list summarizes the brigade commander’s Intelligence to plan, direct, coordinate, critical tasks for EW. support, and conduct combat operations. Each of the IEW tasks derived from the IEW mission (situation development, target development, EW, and CI) is essential to the Combat information and targeting success of the brigade’s and battalion’s data to maneuver their forces and operations. The composition of the IEW target their weapon systems. system and how it fulfills the commander’s ECM nonlethal attack capability to requirements of each IEW task, the employ- systematically disrupt the C3 systems ment for specific operations, and the critical of enemy first- and second-echelon functions of sustaining combat operations units located within the brigade’s and are explained in specific terms in the chap- the division’s assigned AO. ters which follow. The doctrine is based on,

1-8 and requires an understanding of, the air- land battle doctrine of FM 100-5 and IEW doctrine espoused in FM 34-1.

1-9 CHAPTER 2 Intelligence And Electronic Warfare Resources

The ability of the brigade and battalion to tion and produce intelligence, the focus is successfully accomplish their combat mis- on the timely collection and use of combat sions with minimum casualties is depen- information in the conduct of close opera- dent upon the knowledge and tactical skill tions. Division normally provides intelli- of the brigade and battalion commanders gence needed to execute deep operational and their staffs. Commanders and staff missions assigned to brigades and battal- officers who understand the capability of ions. The following discussion of RSTA sys- organic, attached, and supporting IEW tems is intended to familiarize brigade and resources can integrate these capabilities battalion commanders and their S2s with with their combat maneuver forces. They the numerous collection systems that sup- get the full potential from their IEW, port the development of combat information maneuver, and fire support systems. and intelligence through reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) and formal collec- Battalion and brigade IEW resources are tion management efforts. The allocation components of a large IEW system that and apportionment of these systems to the begins at the national level and extends brigade and battalion levels is dependent down to the individual soldier. The IEW upon METT-T planning and doctrinal system includes virtually every individual norms. Detailed information about IEW soldier and operational element at every operations at echelons above brigade is level of command capable of collecting and provided in FM 34-10, FM 34-25, and FM processing information, disseminating 34-37. intelligence, providing CI support, and The IEW systems at battalion and bri- managing or executing EW operations. The gade consist of the commanders, their IEW resources at each level are interlocked staffs, supporting IEW resources from MI with other resources at higher, lower, and units at division and corps, and other adjacent commands to provide a single, organic, attached, and supporting combat integrated, and interdependent IEW struc- and fire support units. The IEW mission is ture. The Army’s IEW system is shown on accomplished through the integrated efforts the next page. It is fully described in FM of all of its components. 34-1. While the total IEW system is interlocked and interdependent, the focus of This chapter describes the basic organi- intelligence operations varies at each zation and composition of the brigade and echelon. Brigade and battalion intelligence battalion IEW systems. It provides infor- operations focus on the development of a mation about the functions, capabilities, responsive combat information system and and limitations of IEW resources which are the infusion of intelligence provided by divi- organic or attached to the brigade and bat- sion. Therefore, brigades and battalions talion or which support their combat opera- base their intelligence operations on the tions. The IEW responsibilities of the bri- reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, gade and battalion staff are also discussed, and surveillance capabilities of organic, where pertinent; they are detailed in attached, and supporting combat units. Chapter 3. Intelligence requirements that can not be satisfied by these elements are passed to the BATTALION IEW RESOURCES division G2 for satisfaction. Although, bri- The maneuver battalion is the basic com- gades and battalions do analyze informa- bat unit in the US Army. It is the lowest echelon where combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities are brought together, integrated, and directed

2-0 against enemy forces. Accurate intelligence assigned. The availability and capability of and effective CI support provided by the the battalion’s IEW resources to provide brigade and higher echelons is critical for timely and accurate combat information planning and directing the battalion’s may well determine the success of the employment. The battalion, however, relies battle. primarily on the combat information pro- The principal IEW resources available to vided by its organic, attached, and support- the battalion include its organic scout pla- ing IEW resources to execute all missions toon and subordinate maneuver companies.

2-1 Patrols, observation posts, and individual Observation posts may be augmented by soldiers are used and relied upon to collect ground surveillance radars, remote sensors, and report information about the enemy, or night observation devices. Night obser- terrain, and weather. vation devices are either active or passive equipment designed to permit observation INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS during the hours of darkness. Active Individual soldiers provide company and equipment transmits infrared or white light battalion commanders with a large quan- to illuminate an object or an area. Passive tity of timely combat information. They devices use either ambient light—resulting perform patrols, man observation posts, from the stars, moon, or other low-intensity and observe enemy forces with which they illumination in the battle area—or operate are in contact. They observe and report by detecting the differences in heat (infrared first-hand information concerning enemy energy) radiated by different objects. These troops and equipment, patrols, reconnais- devices may be adversely affected by heavy sance units, and the activities of each. rain, snow, fog, and smoke. The size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) formula is the Night observation devices, organic to basis for both the training of individual maneuver companies and the scout platoon, soldiers and the reporting of combat are used extensively for night patrols, information. observation posts, and night defensive positions. They may also be used to augment OBSERVATION POSTS radar surveillance. This equipment includes Observation posts (OPs) are established night vision sights for crew-served weapons to observe and listen to enemy activity such as the tube launched, optically within particular sectors and from which tracked, wire guided (TOW) missile system. warning of the enemy approach is provided. The thermal sights on the improved TOW They are placed where they can be sup- vehicle penetrate fog, smoke, dust, light ported by fire and where withdrawal routes foliage, as well as darkness. This improved are covered and concealed. capability enhances the TOW gunner’s Communications between the parent unit ability to observe the battlefield under and each observation post are essential. adverse conditions.

NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES

2-2 PATROLS company and battalion commanders’ IEW requirements. The functions, capabilities, Patrols are conducted both prior to and and limitations of these supporting re- during combat operations for reconnais- sources are discussed later in this chapter. sance, counterreconnaissance, and security Their general capabilities, however, purposes. They are also used to conduct together with those of the company’s small-scale combat operations. There are organic resources described above, are two categories of patrols, reconnaissance shown on the following page. and combat. Company commanders direct the place- Reconnaissance patrols are used to collect ment of organic and attached RSTA assets information and confirm or disprove the in accordance with the guidance provided accuracy of other information gained pre- by the battalion commander or his S2. The viously. The three main types of reconnais- battalion S2 plans for and recommends the sance patrols are— deployment of all organic, attached, and Route reconnaissance to obtain infor- supporting RSTA assets, to include the bat- mation about the enemy and any domi- talion’s reconnaissance or scout platoon. nating terrain features along the route. Subordinate company commanders deploy patrols, establish OPs, and task subordinate Zone reconnaissance to collect the platoons to collect the information needed information about enemy forces and or to provide security for their combat the terrain between specific operations. CI and EW support is limited boundaries. and that which may be required is satisfied Area reconnaissance to gather infor- by higher echelons. mation about the enemy or the terrain within a defined area, such as a town, SCOUT PLATOON ridgeline, woods, or other features As the primary intelligence-gathering critical to current or planned asset, the mission of the scout platoon is to operations. provide reconnaissance and security for its Combat patrols are used to provide securi- parent battalion and to assist in the control ty and to harass, destroy, or capture enemy and movement of the battalion and its sub- personnel, equipment, and installations. ordinate elements. The scout platoon is There are three types of combat patrols— used— raid, ambush, and security. The collection To conduct route, zone, and area and reporting of combat information is reconnaissance missions. usually a secondary mission for combat patrols. Captured enemy soldiers, equip- To establish observation posts. ment, and documents are evacuated to the To conduct chemical detection and rear for exploitation at higher echelons. The radiological survey and monitoring results of such actions may prove to be of operations. significant value as either tactical or stra- To screen one flank, the front, or rear tegic intelligence. of the battalion. MANEUVER COMPANIES To act as part of an advance, flank, or Individual soldiers (or troops), observa- rear guard. tion posts, listening posts (LPs), and patrols are the principal means available to To establish a roadblock. maneuver company commanders to gather To provide traffic control and road information about the enemy, terrain, and guides. weather in their immediate areas and to To participate in area damage control acquire targets for immediate attack. A fire operations. support team (FIST) from divisional artillery and ground surveillance radar To provide contact teams, conduct liai- teams and remote sensor teams (if avail- son missions, and perform quartering able) from the division’s MI battalion are functions. It also conducts limited pio- also available to help satisfy the maneuver neer and demolition work. 2-3 The scout platoon, or elements thereof, various combat service support units all may be attached to a maneuver companv provide the maneuver battalion commander for a specific operation. Reconnaissance additional means and resources to satisfy operations are conducted under the staff his IEW requirements. supervision of the battalion S2, who coordinates these requirements with the battalion Field Artillery S3. Security operations are conducted to provide early warning of enemy maneuvers Field artillery battalions, in direct sup- and to deny information to the enemy con- port of the brigade, provide each maneuver cerning the battalion’s disposition or battalion headquarters with a fire support movements. Security operations are section (FSS) to help plan, direct, and coor- planned and conducted under the supervi- dinate fire support operations. The FSS sion of the battalion S3, who coordinates establishes and maintains the fire support with the S2 for information on enemy activ- element (FSE) at the maneuver battalion’s ity. The organization and operations of the command post. The FSS also provides the scout platoon are detailed in FMs 71-2J and FIST, mentioned earlier, to each of the bat- 7-20. talion’s maneuver companies. The fire support officer (FSO), who is in charge of the SUPPORTING RESOURCES maneuver battalion’s FSE, also supervises Field artillery, military intelligence, the operations of the company FIST. Army aviation, tactical air forces, air Forward observers (FOs) from each FIST defense artillery, combat engineers, and are deployed at both company and platoon

2-4 levels and may accompany reconnaissance tasks. Digital message devices (DMDs) are patrols or help to man observation posts. used to send and receive messages digitally They are the “grass roots” of the field using existing FM radios. It is a hand-held, artillery’s target acquisition effort. They battery-powered unit used to call for fire, to observe the battlefield to detect, identify, pass targeting data, and provide the loca- locate, and laser-designate targets for sup- tion of the FO, or to send plain text mes- pression, neutralization, or destruction. sages with combat information. They also monitor friendly fires on specific The battery-powered AN/GVS-5 laser targets to assess damage effectiveness, range finder is held and sighted like a large adjust fires, and ensure that the desired pair of binoculars. The FO looks through a effects are achieved. They report both tar- single 7 x 50mm eyepiece to locate and geting data and combat information to the range targets. Distance is displayed in maneuver battalion FSO and S2, respec- meters. By ranging the initial adjusting tively, using either organic or supporting round, an FO gives instant feedback to fire communications means. direction control centers through the DMD, Fire support teams and forward observers “closing the loop” and facilitating rapid are specially equipped to accomplish their massed fire for effect.

2-5 The ground or vehicular laser locator level. The improved accuracy of this system designator and its ancillary equipment are and the speed of its operations greatly configured to provide distance, direction, enhance the fire support provided the com- and vertical angle as well as laser illumina- pany and battalion. tion termed “designation” for Army, Navy, The capability of the FIST to provide real- and Air Force laser guided munitions. time combat information and intelligence to While the designator can be transported by the battalion cannot be overlooked. The members of a FIST, it is normally mounted battalion FSO receives information from, in a vehicle. It is battery powered and oper- and passes information to, the FIST. He ates with an AN\TAS-4 night sight. It also exchanges targeting data and combat inputs target location direction into the information with the brigade FSO and ele- DMD, which sends the data to the tactical ments from the direct support field artillery fire direction system (TACFIRE). battalion. He coordinates with the battalion The FIST vehicle (FISTV) integrator, S2 and S3 to identify and verify targeting ground laser designator-range finder, the data and combat information derived from DMD, and night observation devices with the battalion’s overall collection effort. the improved TOW vehicle enhances the Thus, the FSO is both a producer and con- FIST chiefs role as an FO and fire support sumer of combat information and intelli- coordinator (FSCOORD) at the company gence at the maneuver battalion. He is also the battalion’s FSCOORD.

2-6 Military Intelligence Leaders from other combat support ele- all-weather, 24-hour capability for battle- ments such as MI, air defense, and engi- field surveillance. They may be employed neer, perform functions similar to those of on patrols and at observation posts and are the FSO. This is especially true for support- used with remote sensors and night obser- ing MI resources, in general, and the vation devices. They may be employed near ground surveillance radar (GSR) squad or the FLOT, forward of the FLOT, on the team leader, in particular, when attached to flanks, or in the rear area. The supported or placed in direct support of battalion, battalion S2, company commander, or scout company, or scout platoon operations. platoon leader selects general locations 3 from which the radar may operate. The Extensive coordination and effective C are GSR team leaders select the actual site required. within these general locations. GSR site GSR Resources. GSRs provide the requirements and selection criteria are maneuver battalion a highly mobile, near shown in the following illustration.

2-7 Surveillance platoons organic to the divi- used to detect and provide early warning of sion’s MI battalion are currently equipped enemy movements at ranges greater than with two types of radar—the AN/PPS-5 and the AN/PPS-15 radar. The AN/PPS-5 is the AN/PPS-15. These systems provide the also used to search beyond engaged forces supported commander with timely and for indications of reinforcement or with- accurate combat information and target drawal activities and enemy movements to acquisition data. They are designed to out-flank or bypass friendly forces in the detect and locate moving objects under con- engagement area. The AN/PPS-15 radars ditions unfavorable to other RSTA assets. provide the commander with highlv mobile They are best used to search small areas on GSR support in operations where the heav- a continuing basis for random or specific ier, less portable AN/PPS-5 radar is targets. Their capabilities are best exploited impractical. The range and accuracy of when used to cover specific areas on a both these radars are shown below. scheduled basis. The AN/PPS-5 radar is

2-8 The AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-15 radars The AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-15 GSR are can detect targets and provide more accu- capable of performing a variety of surveil- rate distance and directional data than is lance missions to support the battalion’s possible by visual estimate. However, they combat operations. They can be used— add to, rather than replace, other surveil- To search for enemy activity on lance means. They can detect and locate avenues of approach, possible enemy targets over a considerable distance under attack positions, and assembly areas. conditions of darkness and poor visibility. However, they can be used just as effec- To observe point targets, such as tively during periods of good visibility. bridges, road junctions, or defiles, to Their use should not be limited to a certain detect movement. type of terrain, a rigid set of conditions, or To scan final protective fire areas for to a few particular operations. Their com- enemy movement to ensure timely mon capabilities and limitations, other firing. than those unique to each system and reflected in the preceding illustration, are To confirm targets developed by other the determining factors in how they are collectors, such as remotely employed best employed. The capabilities of the sensors (REMS), OP, and other surveil- AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-15 include— lance means. To extend surveillance capabilities of They can penetrate smoke, haze, fog, patrols by surveying surrounding light rain and snow, and light foliage. areas and distant points for enemy They are equally effective day or night. movement. They can detect moving personnel and To help in the control of units, espe- equipment. cially during night operations, by locating friendly units, vectoring They can distinguish between wheeled patrols, and warning them of enemy vehicles, tracked vehicles, and activity near their positions or along personnel. their routes. They are transportable and man-portable. To assist the visual observation of units during daylight by detecting They have quick set-up and tear-down targets partially hidden by haze, times. smoke, or bright sun. They are capable of real-time To increase the effectiveness of fire reporting. support by accurately locating targets. The limitations of the AN/PPS-5 and To cue the FIST by reporting enemy AN/PPS-15 are— activity. They require line of sight (LOS) to the To determine the rate of movement of a targeted area. target by plotting its location and measuring the time it takes to move Their performance is degraded by from one point to another. heavy rain and snow, dense foliage, and high winds. To survey target areas immediately They are active emitters and are sub- after friendly-fires are lifted to detect ject to enemy REC activities and sub- enemy activity and determine effec- sequent enemy fires. tiveness of fire. Remote Sensors. REMS, like GSRs, are a They cannot distinguish between near all-weather, day/night surveillance enemy and friendly movers. system. They provide an additional source One unique limitation—the AN/PPS-5 of information for the battalion com- is a heavy system and its effectiveness mander. These sensors can be used either is reduced in fast-mewing operations. alone or to complement or supplement other

2-9 RSTA assets, such as ground surveillance Sensors may be hand-emplaced by radars. They provide information for the maneuver unit patrols, long-range recon- production of intelligence and timely, accu- naissance patrols, long-range surveillance rate target acquisition data. They are em- operations, or by sensor teams. The major placed in areas of expected enemy activity advantages of hand emplacement include and monitored by teams located in friendly accurate determination of sensor location, forward areas. Movement of enemy forces better camouflage, and confirmed detection within the sensor radius is detected and radius of each sensor. Disadvantages in- indications are transmitted to the moni- clude threat to the implant team, the time toring team. These indications are then factor required to install several strings, analyzed by the team and the resulting and the limited number of sensors that can information is reported to the battalion S2. be carried by the implanting team. Aerial emplacement is primarily by helicopter. The major advantages of remote sensors This method provides an accurate and are— quick response to the ground commander’s Timeliness. Information is near-real request for support. Air delivery provides time and can effect an immediate access to areas inaccessible to g-round ele- response or target acquisition role by ments, speeds emplacement, and increases the supported. . command. the number of sensors that can be emplaced All-weather. Adverse weather condi- during a single mission. Army air asset tions will not affect the operational capabilities are limited by enemy air de- cycle of remote sensors. fense measures, the inability to accurately determine the detection radius. and adverse Full-time or constant operation with- weather conditions. Although not currently out regard to visibility or fatigue. used in this role, high performance aircraft Suitable for employment in high-risk and Army fixed-wing aircraft may also per- environments due to expendability and form sensor implant missions. a high probability of recovery in certain situations.

2-10 Remote sensor personnel from the divi- OPSEC evaluations conducted by CI, sion’s MI battalion may be attached to, or SIGSEC, and other specially trained IEW placed in direct support of the maneuver personnel is one form of support which battalion as members of the surveillance would require direct contact with the platoon or squad mentioned earlier. They maneuver battalion commander and his may be further attached to the maneuver staff. battalion’s subordinate companies or the scout platoon. These sensors are used— These forms of IEW support provided by To monitor roads, trails, and avenues MI organizations are described in greater of approach. detail later in this chapter and in follow-on chapters, as well. To monitor road junctions and bridges. To monitor possible assembly areas. To monitor drop and landing zones. Army Aviation To provide target data for immediate Division- and corm-based Army aviation use. units provide the maneuver brigade and To extend OP capabilities. battalion commanders a responsive, mobile, and extremely flexible means to find, fix, To monitor obstacles and barriers. disrupt, and destroy3 enemy forces and their To perform similar tasks designed to supporting C facilities. These combat avia- detect the movement of personnel or tion assets include— vehicles. Cavalry or reconnaissance squad- Other MI Support. Counterintelligence, rons to perform reconnaissance, sur- signals security (SIGSEC), enemy prisoner veillance, and security or screening of war (EPW) interrogators, and EW re- missions. sources from brigade and higher echelons Attack helicopter battalions to pro- are capable of providing IEW support to the vide aerial escort and suppressive fires maneuver battalion. However, this support to support air assault operations, to is limited and is normally indirect in na- destroy enemy C3 and logistics assets, ture. The maneuver battalion’s require- to attack enemy formations penetrat- ments for such support are usually submit- ing the close operations area, and to ted to, and satisfied by, echelons above conduct deep attack and joint air battalion level. attack team (JAAT) operations.

2-11 Combat aviation companies and chronized with the brigade and battalions’ battalions to provide airlift support ground maneuver schemes and supporting for combat troops and assault forces; tire plans. to evacuate damaged equipment, casu- The suppression of enemy air defense alties, and EPW; and to implant aerial- (SEAD) weapons systems and their sup- delivered scatterable mines and porting C3 system as well, is an integral REMS. part of any combat aviation operation. It is Aerial Scouts only through the fully synchronized and coordinated effort of the entire air-ground MI combat electronic warfare and combat team that the success of close intelligence (CEWI) aviation assets maneuver forces can be achieved. Air- at division and corps perform offen- ground combat and combat support opera- sive EW and aerial reconnaissance tions require the full participation and both and surveillance missions. intra- and interaction of all staff sections at echelons of command. The maneuver bat- The majority of combat aviation assets talion’s participation is limited, however, to discussed above normally remain under the operations conducted within its immediate operational control of their parent organi- or adjacent AO after proper coordination zation or respective branch command and has been conducted. The maneuver battal- control authorities. They usually provide ion commander plans for and requests general support (GS) to echelons above bri- Army combat aviation and tactical Air gade. This is especially true for the MI Force support, as well. Their plans and CEWI assets. For example, the aerial EW requests for Army or joint air support and surveillance companies subordinate to include all of the forms of IEW support de- the MI brigade (CEWI) (corps) always scribed above. remain as integral elements of all MI brigades and usually are GS to the corps, as a Tactical Air Force whole. The QUICKFIX flight platoon subordinate to each division’s combat aviation JAAT, a combination of Army attack and brigade (CAB) also remains OPCON to the scout helicopter and Air Force close air MI battalion (CEWI); it is usually held in support (CAS) aircraft, normally operate GS to the division. with ground maneuver forces of brigade or battalion size. They combine with field The combat missions capable of being artillery, mortars, and air defense weapon performed by Army aviation assets are of systems to attack high payoff targets. Both extreme importance to maneuver brigade Air Force electronic combat and Army and battalion commanders, regardless of aerial and ground-based jammers support the command and support relationships their attack to suppress enemy air defenses. involved. Army ECM systems may also support

EPW evacuation plans should address or participate in the3 attack of primary aviation asset availability to expedite cap- and secondary C targets. tured personnel, documents, and equipment Preplanned JAAT missions, even those to the rear as fast as possible. planned on a contingency basis, are abso- Remote sensor operations must be coordi- lutely essential if the full potential of the nated, especially if MI supporting REMS entire air-ground combat team is to be real- monitoring teams are required in the for- ized. The forecasting of operational ward maneuver battalions’ AO. requirements and generation of operational concepts stimulates the detailed planning Combat information, target acquisition necessary at higher echelons and support- data, and intelligence must also be ing headquarters. Again, all staff officers exchanged. participate, especially the S2, the S3, Both lethal attack and nonlethal ECM S3-air, fire support officer, and Air Force attack efforts against close or penetrating liaison officer (ALO) from the tactical air enemy forces must be integrated and syn- control party (TACP).

2-12 The TACP at the maneuver battalion is Forward area alerting radar and target the bottom link in the tactical air control alert data display set (FAAR/TADDS) sys- system (TACS). The TACS, together with tems provide air alert warning information the Army air-ground system (AAGS), com- to Chaparral and Vulcan squads and prise the air-ground operations system Stinger/Redeye teams. Alert warning infor- (AGOS). The AGOS provides an interface mation includes the tentative identification for the joint air-ground fire support system. and approximate range and azimuth of ap- It links Army fire support coordination proaching low-altitude aircraft out to a agencies—the fire support elements—with range of 20 kilometers. Other characteris- TACP from battalion through corps level tics and capabilities on shown on the fol- and on up to the tactical Air Force head- lowing page. quarters or tactical air control center (TACC). The FAAR/TADDS systems provide low- altitude air defense weapons early warning The AGOS also provides the means for to assist the engagement process. Final the maneuver battalion S2 to forward identification, however, for all low-altitude immediate tactical air reconnaissance ADA weapons is always visual. Nonethe- requests up the chain in the most expedi- less the information provided by the tious manner. Air reconnaissance (air recce) FAAR/TADDS systems, together with reports, in-flight combat information information available from the area-wide reports, and air situation reports are all ADA command and control system, pro- available via the AGOS and TACP. vides the battalion commander important 3 combat information regarding the enemy Joint protect and counter C actions—all air situation. The possibility of enemy air actions, to include coordination of Air Force assault and air-ground attack operations to electronic combat (EC) and Army offensive exploit close-in tactical objectives or to EW–are communicated via the AGOS. It thwart counterattacks carried out by the provides the most expeditious means for battalions should never be forgotten. The forwarding EC\EW support requests. dissemination of early warning information Immediate recognition of probable3 EC to forward-deployed subunits allows for ear- interference on friendly C systems is com- lier final identification. Small arms air municated via the AGOS. An immediate defense systems such as 25mm cannons means to recognize such interference is and 7.62mm or ,50 caliber machine guns available and will be discussed later within can then be used to engage the aircraft in this manual. accordance with active air defense procedures and objectives. Air Defense Artillery Combat Engineers Short-range air defense (SHORAD) ele- The maneuver battalion receives engineer ments normally support the maneuver bat- support from the engineer company nor- talion. These may include both Stinger/ mally placed in direct support of the bri- Redeye teams or sections and Chaparral/ gade—a combat engineer platoon. Its mis- Vulcan squads. The air defense artillery sion is to provide mobility, countermobility, (ADA) platoon or section leader functions survivability, and general engineering sup- as the battalion air defense officer. He port to the battalion and its organic, at- works closely with the battalion S3-air, the tached, or supporting units. fire support officer, and the ALO. He helps plan, direct, and coordinate both offensive The mobility mission is to negate and defensive counter-air and air defense the effects of natural or man-made operations. He also interfaces and ex- obstacles and to enhance the mobility changes information with the battalion S2 of maneuver and combat support regarding enemy ground and air activities. forces. The battalion air defense officer’s resources The countermobility mission is to are specially equipped to support this construct obstacles, barriers, and function. denial positions. The purpose is to

2-13 impede the mobility of enemy forces, to counter enemy surveillance capabili- increase the time for target acquisition, ties and to reduce the effectiveness of and to maximize the effects of friendly enemy weapon systems. maneuver of firepower in designated engagement areas. General engineering missions are performed to support any other The survivability mission is to requirements deemed essential for develop protective positions in order to maneuver and combat support units.

2-14 Intelligence and electronic warfare sup- must also be considered, developed, and port, per se, is not endemic to the mission of maintained. This is the job of the battalion combat engineers. It is limited to the com- staff, the support platoon leader, and sub- bat information provided by individual ordinate company commanders. Battalion soldiers and engineer reconnaissance or ter- resources are illustrated on the next page. rain data obtained to support their assigned missions. The support which combat engi- The maneuver battalion’s organic, at- neers provide to other IEW resources how- tached, and supporting IEW resources are ever, is absolutely essential. capable of providing the commander with a vast amount of information about close-in Electronic warfare resources from the di- enemy forces. The ADA FAAR/TADDS vision and corps require line-of-sight to systems and MI GSR resources provide the their target areas and, for the most part, commander early warning and indications operate within the maneuver battalion’s of enemy air and ground activity out to and AO. Many of these systems have limited beyond the limits of the battalion’s AO. mobility. Others require flat terrain for the They can acquire, track, and monitor HPT employment of given antenna systems. The as they enter the battalion’s close opera- degree of slope in given geographical areas tions area. Field artillery FIST at the may render these vital collection and jam- maneuver companies acquire, track, and ming systems virtually inoperative. Acces- report close HPT for immediate destruc- sibility to key terrain is imperative. Combat tion by indirect fire means. Patrols, night engineer support is critical and must be observation devices, and observation posts provided prior to combat, when required. conducted, used, and established by the This is another situation in which direct maneuver company commanders and the contact and extensive coordination among scout platoon leader also acquire, confirm, the S2, S3, and engineer support officer, and report, track, and monitor HPT in the close the EW platoon or team leader is required. operations area. Ultimately, it is the indi- Such coordination at brigade and division vidual soldier, who is in the right place at level early in the planning process sets the the right time, who knows, sees, and kills stage for effective follow-through actions at his enemy and wins the fight. the maneuver battalion itself. Combat Service Support BRIGADE IEW RESOURCES Combat service support (CSS) resources Brigade, division, and corps commanders organic or available to the maneuver battal- ensure the success of the maneuver battalion, like combat engineers, do not have an ions’ close and rear operations. They plan, IEW mission beyond that of the individual direct, and coordinate attacks against soldier. Their support to other IEW re- enemy follow-on echelons. They attack sources, however, is just as essential as that enemy first-echelon sustainers and follow- of the combat engineers, when required. on echelons, as well. Their purpose is to attrite the fighting capacity of advancing One requirement which must be consi- enemy forces before they close on the dered and planned for is the evacuation of maneuver battalions’ AO. Intelligence and captured enemy documents (CEDs), equip- electronic warfare resources support their ment, and EPW from the forward combat synchronized battle plans. areas. The maneuver battalion S2 must anticipate the accrual rate. The availability The maneuver brigade commander’s IEW of transportation and security assets resources include his coordinating and spe- required to ensure the most rapid evacua- cial staff, cross-reinforced maneuver tion of captured EPW and material must battalions—battalion task forces—and at- then be determined. Requirements that tached or supporting combat and combat exceed the battalion’s capability are for- service support units. The manner in which warded to the brigade and higher head- the brigade is organized for combat is quarters for incorporation into the area- derived from the division commander’s con- wide evacuation plan. Contingency plans cept of operations and his evaluation of the

2-15 2-16 brigade commander’s information and radar techniques and computer-controlled operational needs—the METT-T planning signal processing methods to detect, verify, factors. and track projectiles in flight. The tracking The maneuver brigade commander has data are used to determine the projectile’s direct influence on how his brigade is trajectory. These data are used to determine organized for combat. He and his staff con- the location of enemy weapon systems and tinuously plan and forecast their require firing batteries via the back azimuth of the ments to higher headquarters. They con- projectiles. The data are transmitted digi- sider the functions, capabilities, and tally to a fire direction center (FDC) or the limitations of all IEW resources available DIVARTY tactical operations center (TOC). within division- and corps-based units. This system can detect and locate weapons They integrate IEW into their operations firing simultaneously from multiple posi- plan. They realize the maximum potential tions. It can also be used to register and from their IEW, maneuver, and fire support adjust friendly indirect fire. The maximum systems. They succeed in combat. range of the AN/TPQ-36 is 15 kilometers for mortars and artillery and 24 kilometers However, requirements not considered are for rockets. requirements not specified. Requirements not specified are, potentially, requirements not fulfilled. And requirements not fulfilled AN/TPQ-37. The AN/TPQ-37 detects and in combat lead to defeat. All requirements locates enemy artillery and rocket weapons must be considered, specified, and fulfilled for immediate counterfire. It uses tech- if the division’s close operations are to be niques similar to those of the AN/TPQ-36 successful. radar system and has similar capabilities. Its automatic search and simultaneous FIELD ARTILLERY tracking capabilities allow it to detect and Field artillery target acquisition resources locate enemy weapon systems firing simul- detect, identify, and locate HPT for imme- taneously from multiple positions. Its maxi- diate attack. They also provide accurate mum range is 30 kilometers for artillery and and timely combat information to orient 50 kilometers for rockets. and cue other RSTA assets. Sound-ranging and weapons-locating radars are the prin- AN/MPQ-4A. The AN/MPQ-4A radar can cipal means within division artillery for detect and locate enemy mortars, cannons, locating active enemy indirect-fire weapon and rockets using techniques similar to systems. Moving-target-locating radars and those of the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 sound observation posts normally posi- radars. However, it has only a one-round tioned along the forward edge of the battle detection capability. It is vulnerable to satu- area (FEBA) are also capable of acquiring ration from multiple rounds being fired. targets and collecting combat information. Its range is limited to 15 kilometers. The Division artillery also provides survey sup- AN/MPQ-4A is currently being replaced by port to divisional and non-divisional RSTA the new AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 ra- assets using conventional survey tech- dars. It may still be used in some DIVARTY niques or the position and azimuth deter- TABs. mination system (PADS). Weapons-Locating Radars The target acquisition battery (TAB) of division artillery (DIVARTY) is equipped with three AN/TPQ-36 mortar-locating radars and two AN/TPQ-37 artillery- locating radars. AN/TPQ-36. The AN/TPQ-36 radar detects and locates enemy mortars and artillery for immediate engagement by indirect fire means. It uses a combination of

2-17 All of the weapons-locating radars dis- Moving-Target-Locating Radars cussed above are active emitters and are, therefore, subject to enemy radio direction The DIVARTY TAB is equipped with finding activities and subsequent jamming either one AN/TPS-25A or one AN/TPS- 58B moving-target-locating radar (MTLR). or destruction. These battlefield surveillance radars are Sound Ranging Equipment similar to the GSR described earlier, in that The DIVARTY TAB is currently equipped they can detect, locate, and distinguish with four sound ranging sets—the wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles, and AN/TNS-10. Two AN/TNS-10 are used dismounted personnel. They are used as the with an OL-274 computer, two radio data GSR to augment other radar surveillance links, AN/GRA-114, and two sound plotting systems to cover critical areas, such as sets, M-53. Two AN/TNS-10 systems can major avenues of approach. cover an area 10 kilometers in width and The AN/TPS-25A radar can locate mov- approximately 20 kilometers in depth. ing targets to within 100 meters. Its maxi- Under favorable conditions, accuracies of mum range is 18.28 kilometers for vehicles 0-150 meters can be obtained. Sound rang- and 12 kilometers for personnel. ing does not require line-of-sight and can be used, therefore, to locate enemy artillery in The AN/TPS-58B radar’s maximum defilade. It is particularly effective in fog. It range is 10 kilometers for personnel and 20 is a passive collection system. It is not kilometers for vehicles. It can locate targets vulnerable to enemy detection and subse- to within 50 meters. quent jamming or destruction. Gusty winds, More detailed information about the mountainous terrain, and heavy bombard- capabilities and employment of MTLR, ment are factors which limit its weapons locating radars, and sound rang- performance. ing systems is shown below.

2-18 Air Observers are required to maximize the effectiveness The DIVARTY support platoon of the of the radar. Such information is routed heavy division’s CAB provides rotary wing through the DS field artillery battalion’s aircraft for DIVARTY air observers. Field TOC to the radar. Again, EW resources artillery air observers (FAAOs) are allo- operating in the brigade or battalion’s AO cated by the DIVARTY S3 to augment other can provide information to cue the target acquisition assets in the forward AN/TPQ-36 before the enemy fires. They areas, as required. Their mission is to call strive to locate mortar and artillery firing batteries, FDC, and COP. They can also for and adjust fires from any fire support 3 means available. FAAO are used to cover disrupt enemy mortar and artillery C . areas masked from ground observers, to These capabilities and the staff interaction cover thinly resourced areas, to provide necessary to see that it gets done are dis- coverage while ground-based RSTA assets cussed later in this chapter. displace, and to reinforce surveillance of Battalion Observation Posts. Field vulnerable areas. They accompany highly artillery battalion observation posts (BOPs) mobile forces and normally operate as close are established to increase area coverage. to the line of contact as possible. Targeting These BOPs are manned by personnel from data and combat information are reported the field artillery battalion’s survey parties to the FSO at the maneuver brigade or bat- or other available trained personnel. These talion, the DIVARTY TOC, or the FDC of personnel survey designated target areas. the direct support (DS) field artillery battal- They perform field artillery observation ion responsible for that brigade zone or duties to include high burst (HB) and mean sector. point of impact (MPI) registrations. Target- Direct Support Field ing data and combat information collected Artillery Battalion by personnel are transmitted to the field artillery battalion FDC or the FSO at the A field artillery battalion from DIVARTY maneuver battalion or brigade. is usually placed in direct support of the The employment of BOPs is dependent maneuver brigade. One mortar-locating upon the availability of survey personnel radar, the AN/TPQ-36, is normally at- who provide survey support to all field tached to the DS field artillery battalion. artillery and other combat support units Other target acquisition assets which may operating within the brigade’s AO. Survey be employed are battalion observation posts requirements have priority over BOP prior and MTLR. to combat. Most EW intercept and direction- Weapons-Locating Radar Section. An finding systems require survey support, AN/TPQ-36 radar section, when attached especially at night. Other IEW resources to the DS field artillery battalion, maybe may require similar support. The IEW sup- further attached to a subordinate firing bat- port element (IEWSE) should coordinate all tery. However, it remains under the opera- survey requirements with the DS battalion tional control of the DS battalion. The S3. radar section also remains responsive to Moving-Target-Locating Radar Sec- DIVARTY guidance on positioning, cover- tion. The DS field artillery battalion may age zones, cuing, frequencies, and trans- have one MTLR section equipped with mission duration. either the AN/TPS-25A or the AN/TPS- The DS field artillery battalion S2 has 58B. The MTLR section is normally kept staff supervision responsibility for the under DIVARTY control. However, it may radar. He coordinates with the DIVARTY be attached to the DS field artillery battal- counterfire office, the DS field artillery bat- ion to provide DS to the maneuver brigade talion S3, and the FSO at the maneuver in certain situations. The MTLR is a source brigade to integrate his target acquision of both targeting data and combat informa- effort and to ensure that both fire support tion for the maneuver brigade commander, and maneuver coverage requirements are regardless of the command and support met. Cuing instruction and target criteria relationship which may exist. The FSO at

2-19 the maneuver brigade TOC receives infor- brigade. He provides the brigade headquar- mation collected by the MTLR from the DS ters with the FSS which was described ear- field artillery battalion or the DIVARTY lier in this chapter. The FSS establishes TOC itself. He exchanges this information and maintains an FSE at the brigade TOC. with the maneuver brigade S2 and S3. The The brigade FSE is similar to the maneuver opposite is also true. The maneuver brigade battalion FSE described earlier. It is run by S2 and S3 provide the FSO targeting data, an FSO. The FSO is the brigade’s assistant combat information, and intelligence col- FSCOORD. He is the DS field artillery bat- lected or produced by all other resources talion commander’s senior representative at available to them to help cue the MTLR. the brigade TOC. The FSO interfaces with members of the brigade’s coordinating and special staff to help integrate, plan, direct, and coordinate IEW, maneuver, and fire Fire Support Coordination support operations. The FSE is responsible The DS field artillery battalion com- for coordinating both lethal and nonlethal mander is the FSCOORD for the maneuver attack means for the brigade S3.

2-20 The FSEs at brigade and maneuver battalion is equipped with a TACFIRE receive- ions are equipped with a variable format only battery computer system (BCS). The message entry device (VFMED) to send and BCS can receive TACFIRE information receive information to and from TACFIRE from either the company FIST using the computers at the DS field artillery battalion DMD or the DS field artillery battalion’s TOC and DIVARTY TOG. An FSE at the TACFIRE computer. Command and fire division TOC is also equipped with a nets using secure FM voice communications VFMED. Thus, the fire support command provide a secondary means to interface and control system in TACFIRE-equipped components of the fire support C2 system. organizations is extremely responsive to Secure FM voice communications are the tactical commanders at all echelons from primary means of C2 in non-TACFIRE company through division-level. The com- units. Intelligence and operations nets also pany FIST DMD, discussed earlier in this extend from company- through division- chapter, interfaces with the VFMED- level to provide maneuver and field artillery equipped FSE at the maneuver battalion commanders a continuous flow of targeting and also the TACFIRE computer at the DS data, combat information, and intelligence. field artillery battalion. Each firing battery The fire support C2 system is illustrated subordinate to the DS field artillery battal- below.

2-21 The maneuver brigade and battalion S2 provides GS and DS IEW capabilities to the have direct access to the fire support C2 sys- division and elements of the division based tem via the FSO. Targeting data, combat on METT-T planning. The MI brigade information, and intelligence collected by (CEWI) (corps) may provide the division MI other IEW resources such as GSR and EW battalion additional IEW resources depend- are passed to the FSO. Such information ing on the factors of METT-T, aggregate flows both ways. Thus, the maneuver bri- requirements, and mission priorities. The gade and battalion S2, S3 and FSO provide IEW resources organic or OPCON to the MI the conduit for exchanging all forms of brigade and MI battalion include: information. Well planned and effectively executed RSTA activities and lethal and EPW interrogator—both. nonlethal attack missions depend on their CI support personnel–both. knowledge and ability to skillfully maxi- Aerial surveillance assets—side- mize the combat potential of all fire sup- looking airborne radar (SLAR), port, maneuver, and IEW resources. infrared, and photography-corps only. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE Aerial EW assets—ESM only at corps, ESM and ECM at division. Military intelligence resources are dedicated to the IEW missions. Multidisciplined Ground-based EW assets–both. intelligence, CI, and EW resources are GSR and REMS assets—division only. available at both division and corps levels to support the maneuver brigade and bat- The distribution of these IEW resources talion. The MI battalion (CEWI) (division) and their normal allocation of support to the division and its subordinate maneuver brigades and battalions are shown below.

2-22 The corps MI brigade commander nor- IEW requirements—and the division com- mally retains his organic aerial surveil- mander’s concept of operation are the major lance and aerial ESM resources in GS of the considerations which ultimately determine corps and under his operational control. He how MI resources are task organized. The retains and allocates EPW interrogator and capabilities, limitations, and availability of CI resources, as required, to satisfy corps, MI resources to satisfy aggregate maneuver division, and brigade requirement. Most of and fire support requirements are the prime his ground-based E W resources, however, factors considered by all commanders and require LOS to their target areas and must staff personnel, battalion through corps. operate within the foward areas close to the The process begins at the maneuver FLOT. They are normally allocated, there- battalion. fore, to divisional and nondivisional MI units to support their respective IEW Ground Surveillance Radars operations. and Remote Sensors The division commander, like the corps The capabilities and limitations of GSR commander, normally retains his aerial EW and REMS were discussed earlier in this resources in GS of the division and under chapter. Most of these resources operate in his operational control. His organic and DS of the maneuver battalions. However, supporting EPW interrogator and CI some of them may be held in DS of or at- resources are task organized to provide GS tached to the brigade or placed in DS of to the division and DS to the maneuver bri- other division elements. For example, the gades when required. His organic and sup- brigade elements and DISCOM’S forward porting ground-based EW resources, how- support battalion (FSB) in the brigade sup- ever, normally remain under the port area (BSA) may require GSR support operational control of the MI battalion for security purposes. Rear operations can- commander. The ground-based EW re- not be forgotten. Aggregate requirements sources respond to brigade requirements in are considered by the brigade S2, the divi- accordance with the priorities and coordi- sion tactical surveillance officer (TSO), the nating instructions established by the divi- division G2, and the MI battalion com- sion commander and the G2 and G3, respec- mander and his staff. Reconnaissance and tively. The MI battalion commander task security requirements, mission priorities, organizes his GSR and REMS assets to and the availability of GSR and REMS provide support to divisional brigades. resources are the determining factors. These resources are normally attached to The number of GSRs authorized the MI the brigade. They can be further attached to battalions organic to armored and mecha- the brigades’ maneuver battalions, scout nized ‘divisions (heavy), infantry divisions platoon, and company teams. (light), and air assault and airborne divi- Brigade and battalion commanders’ sions, respectively, are shown in the illus- information and operational needs—their tration below.

2-23 The number of GSR systems equates to has one AN/PPS-5 team and one AN/PPS- the number of GSR teams available. There 15 team. An additional 12, 15, and 18 are three personnel per AN/PPS-5 team and AN/PPS-15 teams are also authorized the two people per AN/PPS-15 team. Team MI battalion organic to infantry, air mobility is tailored by TOE to match that of assault, and airborne divisions, respec- supported units. The types of vehicles used tively. These additional AN/PPS-15 teams range from armored personnel carriers, are task organized to round up the number Ml 13, to the new highly mobile and multi- of GSR teams available to each GSR squad wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) 5/4-ton 4x4 and surveillance platoon placed in DS of or truck, M1028. Each team is equipped with a attached to maneuver brigades and their standard VHF FM radio—an AN/VRC-46, subordinate battalions. They may also be an AN/PRC-77, or an AN/GRC-160. held in DS of the brigade or placed in DS of There are three surveillance platoons other brigade and division elements. Thus, organic to each MI battalion. The surveil- a maneuver brigade subordinate to the lance platoons in the heavy division MI heavy, light, air assault, or airborne divi- battalions have two GSR squads. Each sion may expect at least one surveillance squad has one AN/PPS-5 team and three platoon with from 8 to 12 or more GSR AN/PPS-15 teams. The three surveillance teams in support of their combat opera- platoons subordinate to the MI battalions tions. A nominal brigade slice of GSR organic to other types of divisions have assets for each type of brigade is shown in three GSR squads. Each of these squads the following illustration.

2-24 The MI battalions organic to heavy, light, The strength of given enemy units, to and air assault divisions are authorized five include personnel, weapons, ammuni- REMS teams each. The MI battalion tion, equipment, and fortifications. organic to the airborne division is autho- The tactics, procedures, and techniques rized three REMS teams. Each REMS team used by enemy units to satisfy their consists of three personnel, one vehicle, and mission requirements. one radio, together with REMS monitoring equipment. Their employment is dependent The logistical support provided enemy on mission requirements and the actual units to include the location of rearm- availability of sensors themselves. The ing and refueling points, supply points, REMS teams are task organized to augment and maintenance repair facilities. the surveillance platoons in DS of the The combat effectiveness of enemy maneuver brigade and its subordinate bat- units, to include their training status, talions. Additional REMS teams are autho- combat readiness, morale, losses, and rized on augmentation TOE for employ- replacements. ment of the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS), when fielded. Electronic technical data with major emphasis on the enemy’s C-E operating instructions—frequency usage, call The GSR squads and their subordinate signs, and operating schedules. teams are usually attached to the maneuver brigade’s subordinate battalions. They may Other miscellaneous information such operate with the maneuver battalion’s scout as the names, background, experience, platoon, its subordinate company teams, and competence of enemy unit com- rifle platoons; FIST or other supporting manders and staff officers. combat units. Staff responsibilities are discussed later in this chapter. Command, con- The capability of interrogators to provide trol, and communications are discussed in such information is limited by— Chapter 3. The time provided at different locations to screen and interrogate EPW, detainees, and refugees. EPW Interrogations The willingness of EPW, detainees, Interrogators are specially trained lin- and refugees to cooperate with the guists and intelligence analysts. Their job interrogator. is to screen and interrogate EPW, detainees, The content and subject matter of and refugees and to translate CED. Their CED. mission is to collect and report all informa- The number of EPW, detainees, refu- tion possible to satisfy the supported com- gees, and CED to screen, interrogate, mander’s priority intelligence and informa- and translate, respectively. tion requirements. Interrogators are capable of providing information about— The availability of interrogators to do the job. The past, present, and future missions of given enemy units. The number of interrogators authorized within the MI battalions organic to The composition of given enemy units armored, mechanized, infantry, air assault, to include their type (for example, and airborne divisions follows. artillery, tank, motorized rifle), organizational structure, and chain of Interrogation resources are task command. organized to satisfy aggregate mission requirements. The interrogation section is The disposition of enemy units at normally deployed at the division collecting given locations, security measures point in GS of the division. Interrogation employed, and anticipated times of teams are normally placed in DS of departure. forward-deployed brigades. Interrogation

2-25 teams extend the division’s human intelli- may be attached to a company team or gence (HUMINT) collection effort into the combat patrol. Such missions are unique forward areas, when required. Forward- and usually require detailed planning and deployed teams usually operate from the approval by higher headquarters, brigade maneuver brigade’s EPW collection point in and above. Command and control in such the BSA. Each team includes two interroga- situations is normally retained by the bri- tors, one vehicle, and one VHF FM radio. gade or battalion commander. The interrogation section has two vehicles Counterintelligence Support and two or three VHF FM radios. Addi- tional resources from the corps MI brigade Counterintelligence activities are con- may augment the interrogation section or ducted on a continuous basis throughout all interrogation teams. The teams may also be phases of military operations at all levels of cross-attached, based on mission priorities command from battalion through EAC. The and the workload itself, in one or another commander, his staff, and all assigned, at- brigade AO. tached, and supporting personnel take the actions necessary at each echelon to defeat Interrogation operations conducted below or degrade the enemy’s multidiscipline division level emphasize rapid screening RSTA effort. Counterintelligence operations and brief tactical interrogations of EPW, include all staff functions regarding the detainees, and refugees. Enemy documents identification of enemy RSTA capabilities found on EPW are used to support the and activities; they support the develop- screening and interrogation efforts and ment, execution, and maintenance of may themselves provide substantive com- OPSEC, deception, and rear operations bat information or intelligence for the plans. Counterintelligence operations also commander. All other CED are evacuated to include specific operational activities such the rear areas as swiftly as possible for as— exploitation purposes. Liaison. Forward-deployed interrogation teams Security investigations. may be placed in DS of the maneuver brigade. The brigade may further allocate Defensive source operations. these DS interrogation teams to its subor- Technical OPSEC and deception eval- dinate maneuver battalions to accomplish uations and assistance. specific missions for a specific period of time. Direct support interrogation teams are Security training. tasked by, and respond to the brigade or CI screening and line-crosser battalion S2. On occasion, DS interrogators operations.

2-26 The specific operational activities out- acquisition resources shown in the forego- lined above are conducted primarily by spe- ing illustration. cially trained CI personnel assigned to MI The majority of enemy HUMINT collec- organizations at echelons above brigade. tion resources were discussed above in Such operations are oriented to identifying regard to Level I, II, and III threats to and defeating or degrading sabotage and friendly rear operations areas. Enemy IMINT, espionage activities, such as those con- SIGINT, and to a lesser degree, enemy sur- ducted by terrorist groups, enemy sympa- veillance and target acquisition resources thizers, and enemy-controlled agents—the also pose a significant threat to brigade, Level I threat to rear operations areas. division, corps, and EAC rear operations. The staff and operational CI functions The RSTA threat to the maneuver brigade described above are also designed to iden- and battalions’ close operations is also tify and counter Level II and Level III readily apparent—it is intense. threats to rear operations areas. Level II The maneuver brigade and its subordi- threats include sabotage, reconnaissance, nate, attached, and supporting units require and diversionary operations conducted by extensive CI support during peacetime and special purpose forces (that is, sabotage and prior to actual combat. The division and reconnaissance groups) and raids, corps provide the brigade and battalion ambushes, and reconnaissance missions with intelligence pertaining to enemy conducted by regular combat reconnais- RSTA capabilities and existing or antici- sance units of smaller than battalion size. pated threats to the brigade rear area. The Level III threats include heliborne, air division G2, G3, and MI battalion com- assault, airborne, and amphibious opera- mander may allocate organic or attached tions conducted by regular and special pur- resources to maneuver brigade commanders pose forces, and deliberate ground force to satisfy their aggregate CI requirements combat operations conducted by an opera- for OPSEC, deception, and rear operations. tional maneuver group (OMG) or conven- These resources come from OPSEC support tional ground forces to exploit a specific teams, which include CI and other specially breakthrough in the close operations area. trained personnel from the division staff Tactical Air Force, attack helicopter, long- and the MI battalion. range artillery, rocket, missile, and REC units will also conduct and support deep CI members of the support teams are attack missions against key elements in capable of identifying and countering the friendly rear operation areas. These threats specific enemy HUMINT, IMINT7 SIGINT, may be present at all rear area threat levels, and surveillance and target acquisition such as I, II, or III. Enemy collection means means which pose a significant threat to are illustrated on the following page. brigade operations. They help develop or refine friendly forces profiles and monitor Enemy commanders, as friendly com- and evaluate the most sensitive aspects of manders, need accurate and timely intelli- the division and brigades’ OPSEC program gence, combat information, and targeting and deception operations. More specifically, data in order to conduct deep attack mis- they assist the brigade’s coordinating and sions, while conducting their close and rear special staff in— operations at the same time. Accurate and timely intelligence, combat information, and targeting data are dependent on the Identifying the hostile collection and availability and capabilities of multidisci- rear operations threat to the brigade pline collection means and a responsive C3 and its subordinate maneuver system. The enemy has a vast array of mul- battalions. tidiscipline collection means to satisfy his intelligence, combat information, and tar- Determining the essential elements of geting requirements. These collection friendly information (EEFI) that means include HUMINT, imagery intelli- require protection. gence (IMINT), signals intelligence Identifying brigade and battalion vul- (SIGINT), and surveillance and target nerabilities to enemy RSTA, REC, and

2-27 2-28 destruction activities—vulnerability true signature and patterns. False signa- assessments. tures and patterns which the enemy is most likely to believe and verify are also imple- Performing risk analyses and selecting mented for deception purposes. EEFI that must be protected. Counterintelligence personnel perform a Maintaining intelligence, OPSEC, and number of functions to counter enemy deception data bases. HUMINT capabilities. These include— Nominating enemy RSTA and REC Personnel, physical, and document assets or units for suppression, neutral- security investigations, to include inci- ization, destruction, or exploitation. dents of sabotage and espionage Recommending OPSEC and deception directed against the US Army measures to be employed. (SAEDA). Monitoring the effectiveness of OPSEC Counterinterrogation training, to and deception measures employed or include threat awareness briefings counteractions taken—OPSEC regarding enemy collection capabilities evaluations. and information pertaining to hostile interrogator techniques and Recommending adjustments to the procedures. brigade’s OPSEC program, deception operations, or battle plans. Liaison activities with local military, paramilitary, and civilian authorities Training brigade and battalion per- and indigenous CI elements to identify sonnel in counterintelligence and CI targets and to impair the effective- security matters. ness of enemy HUMINT operations. Most of the CI functions listed above sup- Screening and line-crosser operations port the development and refinement of bat- to identify enemy sympathizers, talion, brigade, and division operation agents, or saboteurs; the knowledge plans and orders (OPLANs and OPORDs) they or the enemy commander may and the training necessary to ensure com- have of friendly units and their activi- bat readiness at each respective echelon. ties; and collaborators for potential Counter-HUMINT. The maneuver bri- return as low-level US agents to the gade, its subordinate battalions, and at- enemy-held area from which they tached or supporting combat and combat came. service support units face a HUMINT CI screening and interrogation of refu- threat posed principally by close enemy gees, detainees, and EPW to determine maneuver forces. The HUMINT threat also the effectiveness of friendly OPSEC includes enemy sympathizers, agents, sabo- and deception measures and the enemy teurs, and interrogators. The enemy’s RSTA collection effort itself. CI per- HUMINT collection effort is focused on sonnel and EPW interrogators provide determining the types of units in given one another mutual support to accom- areas, their disposition, strengths, weak- plish common intelligence and CI nesses, capabilities, and current or pro- objectives, missions, and tasks. jected activities. Signatures and patterns developed by the enemy maybe used for immediate targeting and maneuver or for Counter-IMINT. Counterintelligence per- the development of friendly unit profiles. sonnel may assist the brigade and battalion The brigade and its subordinate, attached, S2 in determining enemy imagery collection or supporting units uses basic countersur- capabilities and activities to include side- veillance techniques such as light, litter, looking airborne radars and photographic, and noise discipline, camouflage, and other thermal, and infrared systems. They may selected OPSEC and deception measures to also perform friendly pattern and move- counter enemy HUMINT activities. All ment analyses to assist the S2 in determin- efforts are made to conceal the brigade’s ing the enemy’s knowledge of friendly

2-29 activities based on exposed signatures, include: radiotelephone, radioteletype, mul- patterns, and recognized vulnerabilities. tichannel communications emitters, and Army aviation and Air Force reconnais- noncommunications or radar emitters such sance assets may provide SLAR, infrared as GSR, weapons-locating radars, MTLR, and photographic reconnaissance support and air defense radars. These enemy RSTA to CI OPSEC, and deception operations assets are organic to close-in maneuver and directed and coordinated at division and fire support units. They provide direct tar- higher echelons. The brigade and battalion geting data to lethal attack systems. Close- S2 requests such support through opera- in army and FRONT-level REC assets are tions and intelligence channels or the similarly equipped with organic radio direc- AGOS C2 systems as described earlier in tion finding (RDF) systems which provide this chapter. Results of such missions pro- direct targeting data to nonlethal ECM vide the S2 and supporting CI analysts attack systems. additional information to confirm or negate Army and FRONT-level SIGINT assets their previous conclusions. Enemy actions are also targeted against battalion, brigade, are determined and friendly counteractions and division C3 emitters and facilities. are recommended, selected, and Their purpose is to monitor current close implemented. operations to support on-going operations Counter-SIGINT. Both enemy and and near-term maneuver, logistics, and fire friendly commanders use camouflage, support planning functions. These SIGINT cover and concealment, radio silence, emis- resources are also targeted against corps sion control, and disinformation to protect and EAC C3 systems to support long-term their respective C3 activities and combat planning efforts for future battles. REC operations. However, C-E emitters are assets are also targeted against higher level employed by each force to command and C3 systems, extending from brigade control their forces and gather and transmit through corps, to disrupt our senior tactical combat information and intelligence both commanders’ decision making process. prior to and during combat operations. Lethal attack against deep targets such as SIGINT resources, therefore, area lucrative division and corps main CPs, brigade source of information to both enemy and trains, and DISCOM or COSCOM support friendly commanders prior to the initiation facilities is anticipated. of hostilities. Such information is used for Brigade commanders, their staffs, and all planning purposes. It is also used to cue assigned, attached, or supporting personnel close RSTA assets to look for, find, and take the steps necessary to counter enemy report the locations of HPT to maneuver SIGINT/REC capabilities and to protect and fire support systems—direct targeting their own C3 systems. These measures data. include— Enemy SIGINT or radio and radio-radar Data bases maintained on enemy reconnaissance assets are a significant2 SIGINT/REC capabilities. threat to both brigade and battalion C sys- The predicted location and disposition tems. These assets are distributed among— of enemy SIGINT/REC assets, units, Enemy regimental, division, and army and support facilities. reconnaissance units. Friendly electronic signatures, C-E Enemy division, army, and FRONT- profiles, operating patterns, and level artillery target acquisition units. vulnerability assessments developed Both army and FRONT-level intelli- and maintained on a continuous basis. gence and REC units. Development of OPSEC and deception Enemy SIGINT resources at division and measures, appropriate lethal and non- lower echelons are RSTA assets. They have lethal counteractions, coordinating one prime objective—to detect, identify, and instructions, and attack schedules. locate battalion, brigade, and division C3 Employment of deception, SIGSEC, emitters and facilities. Their targets and defensive EW measures.

2-30 The conducting of OPSEC evaluations. improved SIGSEC practices and procedures. Particular attention is focused on the Confirmation of the location and dis- means of communications and the opera- position of close-in enemy SIGINT/ tional use of noncommunications or radar REC assets, using specific operational systems. The SIGSEC survey emphasizes— techniques and procedures and by capitalizing on the aggregate capabili- Personal interviews. ties of all IEW resources. On-site observations. Suppression, neutralization, and de- COMSEC monitoring and analysis of struction of critical HPT in the ene- unencrypted communications. my’s SIGINT/REC forces on a systematic basis in the earliest stages of ELSEC assistance. combat Cryptofacility inspections. CI personnel may assist the brigade staff Cryptonet evaluations. in performing many of the counter-SIGINT functions described above. The primary Identification of C-E profiles asso- emphasis of CI services are communica- ciated with the combat operations and tions security (COMSEC) and electronic staff functions. security (ELSEC) vulnerability assessments which are usually conducted as integral tasks of an OPSEC evaluation in general, Personal interviews are critical to the and a SIGSEC survey in particular. success of the SIGSEC survey. When coupled with on-site observations, they pro- The need for a SIGSEC survey is directly vide valuable insight into how the unit related to the hostile SIGINT/REC threat. actually performs. Participation in the Intelligence about enemy SIGINT/REC actual operation of the unit is an invaluable capabilities and their potential threat to part of the survey as it allows “the teams to brigade and battalion operations, as pre- observe and listen to what actually occurs viously mentioned, is usually provided by rather than to rely solely on information division and higher echelons. Preliminary obtained through personal interviews and SIGSEC vulnerability assessments are the review of documents. C-E operations are conducted by division, brigade, and battal- observed as they are normally conducted to ion staff personnel. They are used to deter- make realistic judgements and recommend mine the need for the SIGSEC survey itself, practical solutions for enhancing SIGSEC and aid in the selection and prioritization of practices. Participation in the actual opera- subjects to be examined and tasks to be tions also permits brigade and battalion performed. personnel to do their job without interfer- Signal security specialists conduct the ence, but with positive assistance. SIGSEC survey as a C-E review and not as a security investigation or inquiry with dis- COMSEC monitoring is an extremely ciplinary overtones. The objective of the important SIGSEC function. COMSEC SIGSEC survey is to conduct on-the-spot monitoring operations are3 well planned. examinations of all C-E required for plan- They focus on specific C facilities which ning and executing brigade and battalion are critical to the success of division, bri- combat operations. It assists commanders gade, and battalion combat operations. in eliminating SIGSEC weaknesses that They are conducted to enhance the brigade serve as sources for enemy intelligence. The and battalions’ OPSEC posture. They are survey begins with the planning stage of an designed to augment rather than replace operation and continues through the execu- the application of effective ECCM and tion, evaluation, and adjustment phases. SIGSEC practices. They also ensure 3the continued use of the commanders’ C The purpose of a SIGSEC survey is to system. identify areas for improvement in the overall operating effectiveness of the brigade SIGSEC personnel are capable of con- and its subordinate battalions through ducting both passive and active COMSEC

2-31 operations. Passive operations include evaluating the ELSEC posture of any unit COMSEC monitoring and analysis func- supporting the brigade is by targeting tions. Operations listen to, copy, and record friendly noncommunications or ELINT the content of friendly radiotelephone intercept and DF equipment against communications. Analysts evaluate such friendly radar emitters during field training material to determine the degree of security exercises (FTX). ELSEC targeting, like provided to these communications. COMSEC monitoring, in peacetime is an COMSEC monitoring is one of the best extremely effective means for evaluating methods for gathering the data necessary the adequacy of applied ECCM and ELSEC for traffic studies and vulnerability assess- measures. ELSEC targeting also plays an ments. It also provides the commander with important role in developing the data base a means to evaluate the adequacy of his needed for OPSEC and deception plans and SIGSEC training program and the effec- operations. Personal observations con- tiveness of applied ECCM. COMSEC moni- ducted at RSTA radar sites while ELSEC toring also plays an important role in targeting is under way, with the necessary developing the data base needed to plan C3 between ELSEC observers and ELINT and successfully execute an electronic cover operators, is an extremely effective method and deception operation. for training radar operators and developing The COMSEC monitoring functions de- sound operational techniques and proce- scribed above support the planning and dures. The dialogue and interaction preparatory phase of combat operations, to between ELINT personnel from the divi- include peacetime garrison activities. They sion’s MI battalion and RSTA radar opera- also support active COMSEC operations in tors from other division-based units (such combat. SIGSEC personnel are capable of as field artillery and ADA) greatly en- performing the following active COMSEC hances the interoperability among mutually support functions— supporting IEW, fire support, and ADA systems on the battlefield. A greater apprecia- Operators transmit MIJI tip-off reports tion for each other’s missions and opera- to friendly ESM resources to identify tional environments is obtained. Cuing and locate enemy jammers, as procedures, coordinating instructions, and required. mutually supporting techniques and proce- Operators relay messages to appro- dures are developed, tested, evaluated, and priate recipients when enemy jamming refined. The commander realizes the full of critical transmissions is experienced potential from all of his noncommunica- and primary routing is impossible. tions collection means. His troops survive. They win the battle. Operators coordinate. evaluate. and support COMJAM screening operations to ensure their effectiveness and Cryptofacility inspection, cryptonet to preclude their inadvertent disrup- evaluations, and the identification of tion of critical friendly C3. friendly C-E profiles are also important SIGSEC support functions. They, like passive COMSEC monitoring and ELSEC Counterintelligence personnel may pro- assistance, are performed in garrison. They vide ELSEC assistance to the brigade and have little or no value later in actual com- its subordinate, attached, or supporting bat. However, actions taken as a result of units regarding the operational employ- such efforts may well determine the success ment of given noncommunications emitters or failure of brigade and battalion combat or radars. ELSEC assistance includes the operations. These SIGSEC support func- usual CI support activities, such as the tions are fully explained in FM 34-60. The identification of enemy collection capabili- latter—C-E profiles—are also discussed in ties, friendly profiles, pattern analyses, risk greater detail within this manual. assessments, and training. Personal interviews and on-site observations may also be used for conducting ELSEC vulnerability The enemy’s surveillance and target assessments. However. the best means of acquisition effort against the brigade

2-32 and its subordinate, attached, and support- Sonic listening devices. ing units is extremely intense. The means for surveillance and target acquisition Battlefield surveillance radars. available to the enemy include— Remote sensors. Air defense radars. Range finders and laser designators. Counter-mortar and counter-battery Night observation devices. radars. Enemy collection capabilities are illus- Sound and flash ranging systems. trated below.

2-33 These resources are organic to enemy include both protect and counter C3 ADA, rocket, missile, artillery, reconnais- programs. sance, and maneuver units. All of these resources, less air defense radars, are inte- The effective use of smoke-generating grated organizationally with HUMINT and systems. SIGINT resources in given combat, recon- Soldiers who are well trained in the use naissance, and target acquisition units. All of camouflage, cover, and concealment, of these resources, to include air defense as well as light, litter, and noise radars, are fully integrated with the discipline. maneuver forces or weapon systems they Ultimately, it is the well-trained individ- support. ual soldier who ensures the elements of sur- The enemy also has an extremely robust prise up to the moment of actual contact C3 system to support the interaction among with enemy force. all the RSTA, maneuver, and fire support CI personnel may assist brigade and bat- systems or units previously mentioned. talion staffs in performing all CI functions Long range RSTA assets provide the intel- previously described. In regard to other CI ligence needed to focus short range systems. activities— Lower echelon close-in RSTA assets detect, identify, tip off, locate, and confirm or They help to identify the close-in negate HPT in the close operations area. enemy surveillance and target acquisi- They provide direct targeting data to tion capabilities. maneuver and fire support systems. They help to identify friendly force vulnerabilities, perform risk analyses, Counterintelligence operations, deception operations, and corps, division, and brigade and recommend appropriate OPSEC, OPSEC programs are conducted and imple- deception, and countersurveillance mented to counter both long-range and measures. short-range enemy RSTA capabilities and They recommend HPT for destruction C3 activities. Their emphasis at echelons and disruption. above brigade is weighted on the former— They conduct OPSEC evaluations in countering the enemy’s long-range peacetime and countersurveillance HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT collection investigations in combat, as required. capabilities, since poor intelligence results in an ill-informed, misguided, and ineffec- They help train brigade and battalion tive RSTA effort close-in. personnel in the proper use of the basic countersurveillance techniques pre- The enemy’s close-in RSTA effort is viously described. further complicated by RTO and radar operators who use sound operating procedures and proven ECCM and SIGSEC CI Resources techniques. Enemy attempts to detect, iden- Resource availability and mission priori- tify, and locate friendly C3 facilities and key ties are the prime factors which determine maneuver units and weapon systems early the degree of CI support to brigade and bat- on are thwarted. The enemy’s short-range talion operations. Sufficient resources RSTA effort directed against the maneuver should be available from division, corps, brigade is also countered by— and EAC to satisfy peacetime requirements—planning, training, and The effective application of engineer evaluation. However, in combat, mission survivability and counter-surveillance priorities change. Mission requirements for support measures. CI resources, per se, increase, especially The effective planning and timely exe- with regard to Level I, II, and III threats to cution of field artillery countertop and friendly rear operations areas. Level I counter-CP programs. threat activity will most likely have been accelerated during the 24- 48-hour period Well-planned, fully coordinated, effec- prior to actual combat. Level II threats, tively executed EW operations to such as small sabotage-reconnaissance

2-34 groups, may also become active within rear monitoring sets—the AN/TTR-lA or operations areas during the last few hours AN/TRR-33, respectively. Two of the five before combat. Naturally, units stationed COMSEC teams authorized in the MI bat- within contingency areas will have talion (CEWI), airborne division, have five deployed to their general deployment plan SIGSEC specialists each and employ either (GDP) area many hours and, hopefully, the AN/TTR-lA or AN/TRR-33. The other several days before the initiation of actual three COMSEC teams have three SIGSEC hostilities. Counterintelligence resources, specialists each and employ a standard just like all other IEW assets, will also have VCR-12 series radio for COMSEC monitor- deployed with their parent or supported ing purposes. These CI resource authoriza- units. They will have been performing their tions are shown on the following page. primary combat support functions for some time. The CI resources, assigned or attached to The primary combat support functions of the MI battalion, are task organized to pro- CI resources organic or attached to the divi- vide CI support on an area-wide basis sion MI battalion include a number of staff throughout the division AO. The actual and operational support activities pre- number and makeup of CI support teams viously described. Among the many staff and their individual zones of responsibility support functions necessary to be performed are based on aggregate mission require- in combat, emphasis is placed on the func- ments and other METT-T planning factors. tion of monitoring the effectiveness of ap- The availability of CI resources from corps plied OPSEC and deception measures. and EAC, cross-attachments between Many other staff functions stem from, or organic CI and COMSEC teams, and the depend on, the results of this task. mission requirements of all of the division’s major subordinate commands (MSCs) are Operational support functions also considered. An example of CI support teams emphasize the monitoring of the effective- employed on an area-wide basis is shown ness of applied OPSEC and deception mea- on the following page. sures. They include those specific field activities designed to counter enemy The majority of CI resources, like other HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities, namely HUMINT assets in the MI battalion (that liaison activities, CI screening, line-crosser is, EPW interrogators), are usually held in or interrogation operations, and COMSEC GS of the division. Teams deployed within monitoring. Countersurveillance investiga- the division’s rear area are normally collo- tions, as previously mentioned, are also per- cated with the rear area operations center formed in combat, as required. (RAOC) in the division support area (DSA). The CI resources authorized in the MI Personnel from these CI support teams battalions, organic to armored and mecha- assist the rear operations officer (ROO) and nized divisions (heavy), infantry divisions staff in identifying the threat to rear opera- (light), and air assault and airborne divi- tions areas and in monitoring the effective- sions respectively, are shown on the following ness of applied OPSEC measures and page. These resources are distributed deception operations. Individuals from one among five CI teams and five COMSEC or more of these teams may operate with teams on the TOE of each MI battalion. An EPW interrogators at the division EPW col- ELSEC assistance team of three specially lection point to perform CI screening and trained ELINT personnel is also authorized line-crosser operations. Other individuals in the MI battalion (CEWI), infantry divi- may be dispatched to locations within their sion (light). Each of the CI teams has two or CI support team’s assigned zone of respon- three CI agents per team, depending on the sibility to perform liaison activities and type of division to which the MI battalion countersurveillance investigations. itself is subordinate. The five COMSEC Forward-deployed CI support teams are teams authorized in the MI battalions usually collocated with the brigade rear CP organic to heavy, light, and air assault divi- of committed divisional brigades. They per- sions have three SIGSEC specialists each; form CI functions similar to those just de- they employ either a telephone or radio scribed for CI support teams deployed in the

2-35 2-36 division’s rear area. Their assigned zones of They can deceive enemy commanders responsibility may transcend division and by jamming specific enemy C3 facili- brigade AO boundaries. It is for this reason ties in support of friendly battlefield that the forward-deployed CI support teams deception operations, such as demon- are normally held in GS of division combat strations and feints—demonstrative operations and deployed under an area COMJAM operations. support concept. However, personnel and They can create a series of time delays resources from these forward-deployed in the enemy commanders’ decision teams may be placed in DS of the maneuver cycle by disrupting specific enemy brigade or its subordinate, attached, or sup- command, control, communications, porting units on a temporary basis to per- and intelligence (C3I) facilities in con- form specific CI missions. For example, cert with maneuver and fires— COMSEC resources may be assigned tasks offensive COMJAM operations. to monitor and actively support brigade and battalion C3 facilities. Counterintelligence They can identify, locate, track, and resources may also be assigned tasks to per- monitor the activities of enemy first- form countersurveillance investigations or and second-echelon battalions and missions in the brigade’s close operations regiments and supporting fire. combat area. engineer, and combat service support units—combat information and direct Contingency missions for light, air assault, and airborne divisions, and the targeting data. manner in which their subordinate The capability of EW resources to perform maneuver brigades are deployed may also any one of the tasks described above is dictate one or more CI support teams (rein- dependent upon a number of METT-T fac- forced) to be placed in DS of brigade combat tors. The primary factor is intelligence and operations. CI teams may be placed in DS the availability of specific electronic order to the brigade when such requirements of battle (EOB) information about the ene- exist. The CI support teams revert to MI my’s disposition, frequency utilization, and battalion control for GS to the entire divi- C-E operating instructions (CEOI). sion once the division is deployed and National agencies and SIGINT resources at operational. EAC may provide corps and division MI units with this essential EOB information. Electronic Warfare Support However, this information may not be The EW resources organic to, or attached available in given contingency areas. It to, the division’s MI battalion are capable may also prove to be of little or no value in of performing a number of tasks in support the initial hours and days of actual combat of brigade combat operations. in given theaters of operations. These statements are predicated upon the follow- They can identify, locate, track, and ing assumptions: monitor the activities of enemy RSTA, REC, and fire support units which pose The enemy will conduct extensive 3 OPSEC and deceptions to cover the a threat to brigade C facilities—com- movement of combat forces to wartime bat information and targeting data. assembly areas and firing positions. They can disrupt enemy SIGINT and REC collection activities by screening Wartime frequency utilization may friendly communications deemed criti- differ significantly from the estab- cal to the success of brigade combat lished norm in peacetime. operations—COMJAM screening. The enemy may introduce and use They can communicate essential more highly sophisticated C-E equip- orders and requests of brigade and bat- ment than originally anticipated. talion commanders when enemy jam- The CEOI used by the enemy, once the ming is experienced or long-range skip- attack begins, will be drastically dif- echelon communications are re- ferent than the CEOI used prior to quired—high power communications combat. support. 2-37 The conclusion drawn from the above and the correlation of targeting and techni- discussion is that “cold start” EOB or cal data is reported to the division G2 for SIGINT data bases may have to be devel- further analysis or immediate dissemina- oped by corps and division EW resources, tion to the appropriate MSC. once deployed. Thus, the EW resources available to support brigade combat opera- The SIGINT process and reporting flow tions have another mission to perform, a described above provides essential informa- mission which is actually endemic to all of tion needed by each division MSC to further the EW tasks previously described. This refine and adjust their respective collection mission is SIGINT. plans, battle plans, attack schedules, and HPT lists—both prior to and during combat The SIGINT mission is an operational operations. The entire process begins and imperative for all division EW resources, ends with SIGINT technical data. SIGINT especially in the prehostility and post- technical data, such as frequencies, call deployment phases of combat operations. signs, and C-E operating schedules, when The primary objective is to provide the combined with SIGINT RDF results and division, brigade, and battalion command- combat information, is the basic means ers with the intelligence they need to plan, used by SIGINT/EW analysts to “sort” and direct, coordinate, support, and conduct isolate HPT emitters and to “template” the their combat operations. All of the EW electronic battlefield. resources available to the division are “netted” via the IEW C2 system. The com- The SIGINT/EW analysts at the TCAE bat information, targeting data, and and intermediate processing, analysis, and SIGINT technical data collected by each control elements use intelligence prepara- EW collection or jamming team is reported tion of the battlefield (IPB) procedures to to intermediate processing, analysis, and template the electronic battlefield and to control elements located within the forward develop and maintain EOB maps. They use brigade AO. target value analysis (TVA) procedures to identify high value target (HVT) emitters. An intermediate processing, analysis, In addition, they use SIGINT technical and control element may be an EW platoon data, SIGINT RDF results, combat infor- operations center, a SIGINT processing pla- mation, and special SIGINT analytical toon operations center, or an IEW company methodologies to identify, locate, track, and team TOC. Either one of the former may be monitor HPT emitters, enemy C3I facilities, collocated with the latter. and the units or weapon systems they EW and SIGINT analysts at these loca- support. tions relay all information received to the Electronic templating and EW targeting technical control and analysis element are endemic to specific IEW responsibilities (TCAE) located at the MI battalion tactical of the brigade S2 and S3. The S2 is respon- operations center. Combat information and sible for collection management, situation targeting data essential to brigade plan- development, and target development. Elec- ning and targeting efforts are provided tronic templating—general in nature and immediately to the brigade S2 by the done without SIGINT technical data— IEWSE, which gleans the information by supports both situation and target devel- monitoring the MI battalion TCAE to the opment functions and helps determine the EW platoon tasking and reporting net (FM). brigade’s E W collection requirements. The EW and SIGINT analysts at the MI battal- S2’s ability to identify high value C3I ion tactical operations center process and targets, to include the predicted locations of analyze all information received. Combat enemy SIGINT, REC, and other electronic information and targeting data essential to surveillance and target acquisition systems, the division’s overall planning and target- is critical to the S3. The S3 is responsible ing effort is reported immediately to the for EW, overall, and ECM in particular. He division G2, upon recognition. ensures that ECM is integrated with bri- Intelligence resulting from the compari- gade maneuver schemes and supporting fire son and analysis of combat information plans. High value C3I targets, developed by

2-38 the S2, are considered by the S3, FSO, and tion and incorporation into the division and EW officer from the IEWSE in their overall MI battalion’s OPLAN/OPORD. targeting effort. High payoff target emit- 3 The mission, functions, and tasks capable ters, C I facilities, and both active and pas- of being performed by EW resources in sup- sive SIGINT, surveillance, and target port of brigade combat operations are acquisitions systems are identified and summarized in the following illustration. scheduled for attack. The availability of They relate directly to the brigade com- munitions and delivery means and the desired effects on the commander ulti- mander’s critical EW tasks discussed in mately determine the brigade’s ECM Chapter 1. requirements. Aggregate EW requirements are forwarded to the division for considera-

2-39 Electronic templating, IPB, TVA, collec- master control stations (MCSs) and three tion management, situation development, remote slave stations (RSSs). Each MCS target development, EW targeting, and all and RSS is configured in a protective shel- other IEW functions performed to prepare ter, mounted on a modified M548 ammuni- the brigade for combat operations are dis- tion carrier, the M-1015 tracked vehicle. The cussed in Chapter 4. Similar functions per- MCS is capable of intercepting and provid- formed in combat are discussed in Chapter ing LOB data on enemy AM, FM, continu- 5. Division tactical SIGINT operations and ous wave (CW), single side band (SSB), sin- detailed information about EW and SIGINT gle channel voice (SCV) and manual Morse processing, analysis, and reporting func- communications. The RSS can operate in a tions performed in the TCAE are further remote or local mode. In the remote mode, described in FMs 34-10 and 34-40(S). the RSS is remotely turned by, and tasked Detailed information about the specific to provide LOB data to, the MCS. No opera- capabilities and limitations of all division tor control is required in this mode, once EW systems is also contained in FM 34-10. deployed and initialized. In the local mode, Information deemed essential to brigade the RSS functions as an independent plat- commanders and staff officers is provided form providing intercept and LOB data. in the following discussion of this chapter. Intercept and LOB data, generated by either the MCS or RSS, is correlated at the EW Collection Resources MCS to provide DF locations on enemy All ground-based EW collection systems communications emitters. Each station has available within the corps MI brigade and identical 30 kw power units transported by the division MI battalion may operate a 6-ton flatbed trailer. Backup power is pro- within the AO of forward maneuver bri- vided by an on-board 60 kw generator. A gades. The division’s airborne EW system, self-supporting telescopic DF antenna is QUICKFIX, also having a significant col- mounted on top of each MCS and RSS lection capability, operates within the for- shelter. (Note: All future doctrinal publica- ward area. All these systems are capable of tions will refer to a remote slave station supporting brigade combat operations. (RSS) as an out station (OS) instead.) They include– A ground-based HF and VHF com- The MCS equipment is contained in a bal- munications intercept and VHF DF listically protected S-280 shelter. The S-280 system—TRAILBLAZER—heavy divi- shelter can be mounted on a tracked cargo sions only. carrier or a 5/4 ton truck. Each MCS and Ground-based noncommunications RSS is equipped with a quick-erecting intercept and line of bearing (LOB) antenna. The antenna system is mounted systems—TEAMPACK—all divisions on the S-280 shelter. The quick-erecting (less the light divisions) and corps. antenna assembly consists of a self- supporting telescoping mast and a folding Ground-based HF, VHF, and UHF antenna array. The mast is erected to the communications intercept and LOB vertical position by a hydraulic ram system systems—such as TEAMMATE—all and raised to the desired height by a pneu- divisions and corps. matic system. The antenna can be opera- Airborne VHF communications inter- tional within 6 minutes. One station of the cept and LOB systems—QUICKFIX— TRAILBLAZER system is shown in the fol- all divisions. lowing illustration.

TRAILBLAZER. The special purpose Each MCS has two identical intercept detecting set, AN/TSQ-l14A, or positions. These two intercept positions, TRAILBLAZER, is a ground-based HF and shown in the illustration on page 2-42, are VHF communications intercept system also used for DF target acquisition. Each with a VHF DF capability. The A-model position enables the operator— TRAILBLAZER system consists of two

2-40 To tune on-board receivers. To record and gist HPT communica- To remotely tune RSS DF receivers. tions traffic. To initiate DF commands to the To edit DF results. computer. To initiate or generate reports. To intercept HPT communications emitters.

2-41 Each MCS intercept and DF team con- are also reported to the TCAE via VHF FM sists of five voice intercept operators and communications. Such information is also one manual Morse operator—six operators transmitted to other intermediate process- total. The MCS team leader and a senior ing, analysis, and control elements, such as voice operator are usually designated as the EW platoon, which may be operating in work shift supervisors. They man one posi- the same brigade AO. SIGINT technical tion within the MCS and continually search data may also be included. Information per- the band for HPT emitters. They tip off the tinent to brigade combat operations is second operator regarding HPT emitters. passed to the brigade S2 via the IEWSE. The second operator initiates DF requests Each of the three RSSs has one DF posi- into the system. The DF requests are auto- tion. Each RSS team consists of one vehicle matically processed within the on-board and generator mechanic and two DF opera- computer and transmitter via UHF data tors. No recording or gisting of enemy HPT link to the other MCSs and RSSs for LOB communications traffic can be performed at data. The LOB data, received from the other the RSS. The DF operators merely set up MCSs and RSSs, are automatically pro- the RSS for remote or automatic DF opera- cessed; the DF results are displayed to the tions. As mentioned previously, they can DF operator in the MCS. provide basic intercept and LOB data in One MCS is always designated as the net. local mode operations. Local mode opera- control station (NCS) for automatic DF tions are conducted by netting all MCS and operations. A second MCS functions essen- RSS via VHF FM secure voice communica- tially as an RSS when the system is in tions. The VHF FM secure voice communi- automatic mode. The two operators in the cations provide a backup to automatic UHF second MCS receive HPT emitter tip-offs data link operations. Thus, local mode from the NCS primary officer/team chief. operations equate to degraded mode opera- They record and gist HPT communications tions. No one station, by itself, can produce traffic. All DF results and SIGINT techni- DF fix results. Three of the stations, the cal data are transmitted via HF radiotele- RSSs, cannot provide combat information, type (RATT) communications to the TCAE targeting data, or anything more than basic for further analysis and reporting. Combat technical data. The RSS DF operators are information, targeting data, and DF results not language qualified.

2-42 The M-1015 is a 6-ton tracked vehicle be used. At any rate, all of the stations must designed to provide improved mobility and be positioned to provide as much coverage a higher degree of survivability for of the enemy’s AO as possible. They must TRAILBLAZER and other EW systems, as be deployed to concentrate their “fix” area well. Its physical characteristics are the where it is most probable the HPT emitters same as the M-548 with the following will be located. Plans are made to combine modifications: the LOB and “cuts” obtained from other LOB systems in the area in order to obtain A trailer-towing capability. a fix and to provide the necessary combat An intercommunication system which information and targeting data. A defilade allows operators in the S-280 shelter to area may require redeployment of the sys- speak with personnel in the cab of the tem itself. vehicle. Examples of various deployment configu- An electronically-operated ground rod rations of the TRAILBLAZER stations and driver which reduces system set-up and their respective areas of coverage are shown tear-down times. in the illustration on the following page. A 60 kw generator backup power sub- These examples are based on LOS ranges system, previously mentioned. for flat terrain and assume the FLOT will be a relatively straight line. Local terrain The tactical mobility of the M-1015, the conditions and radio wave propagation quick-erect pneumatic mast antenna, and conditions are taken into consideration the electronically-operated automatic when planning TRAILBLAZER operations. ground rod driver significantly enhance the ability of TRAILBLAZER stations to oper- Deployment 1, as shown in the following ate well forward in the brigade AO. illustration, indicates that if the stations

All five stations of the TRAILBLAZER operate at the maximum3 radio line-of-sight system require radio LOS to their predicted range for effective C , the system will not or assigned HPT communications emitters. produce any DF fixes-only LOB and They also require radio LOS for UHF data “cuts”. The other two deployments illus- link communications between stations for trate how the fix, cut, and LOB areas are effective C3 and automatic DF operations. modified by the relative positioning of the The stations must also be protected from stations. Deployment 2 permits a relatively enemy detection and possible direct fire large fix area and provides for deployment attacks. Thus, the TRAILBLAZER system of the MCS at a closer distance to the normally occupies an area 40 kilometers FLOT. The distance to the TCAE for radio wide and 10 kilometers deep with forward communications, however, is increased. RSS kept at least 3-5 kilometers behind the Deployment 3 represents the optimum base- FLOT. line for effective TRAILBLAZER operations; the target area of DF coverage is Optimum DF accuracy and target area maximized and deeper targets can be coverage with the five stations of the located.3 All METT-T factors and especially TRAILBLAZER system is relatively simple C must be considered. if the target area is small and the stations can be positioned anywhere desired to TRAILBLAZER stations must also be establish the required baseline. However, in redeployed frequently even when required many combat situations the target area is to maintain coverage of one target area for very large; it may be much wider than an extended period. Failure to do so is a TRAILBLAZER is capable of covering. Ter- sure way to have all of the stations in the rain may also preclude the intercept and DF TRAILBLAZER system located by the of critical HPT emitters in given sectors. enemy. Caution must be exercised to avoid Target priorities and the division and bri- detection during the redeployment by select- gade commanders’ information needs are ing march routes that cannot be observed the primary factors which determine how and by eradicating any telltale signs, such and where the TRAILBLAZER system will as vehicle tracks leading into the new site.

2-43 The TRAILBLAZER system is the heavy TRAILBLAZER system is the fact that it division G2’s .primary. organic means for can only cover a one- or two-brigade front. identifying, locating, tracking, and moni- This limitation is directly related to, and toring the movement of enemy first- and actually is the reason for, the system’s second-echelon regiments. division and greatest vulnerability. The UHF data link Army C2 facilities: fire support units, and communications system, which is the pri- CSS facilities. The DF accuracy of the mary means for C3 and automatic DF TRAILBLAZER system is not sufficient, operations, presents a unique signature on itself, for targeting. . most lethal attack fire the battlefield. Data link signals are emit- support systems. However, the DF results ted 360 degrees from omni-directional whip obtained and produced by TRAILBLAZER antennas. Thus, the system itself is not - are more than adequate for the cuing of only vulnerable to enemy SIGINT, DF, and other available RSTA systems as the enemy indirect fire systems, its employment forces move closer to or into the forward against high priority target areas or on brigade AO. The DF results are also ade- major avenues of approach used by friendly quate for division and brigade commanders forces may provide the enemy commander a to make decisions regarding the employ- significant indicator of brigade and divi- ment of maneuver forces. High payoff sion main objectives. The TRAILBLAZER targets may also be developed for deep MCS and RSS teams use special operating attack as a result of performing terrain procedures and techniques and battlefield analysis and by comparing the DF results tactics to reduce their vulnerability, to pre- with information provided by other RSTA clude compromise of the division and bri- assets. gades’ objectives, and to enhance their The greatest limitation of the target coverage area capability at the same

2-44 time. These special operating procedures, The platoon leader and platoon sergeant techniques, and tactics are discussed in form the SPP headquarters. They are Chapter 5. They are detailed in FM 34-10. equipped with one VCR-12 series VHF FM Degraded mode operations, using backup radio and one 5/4-ton cargo truck. The pla- VHF FM voice communications means, toon headquarters is usually collocated with may be favorable in high density SIGINT the TRAILBLAZER MCS designated NCS. threat environments. The UHF data communications signature could also be used to The EW and SIGINT analysis team is friendly advantage for deception purposes. normally deployed as part of the SPP headquarters. The team consists of three DF analysts and three ELINT analysts. This Other factors which limit team is equipped with one S250 and one TRAILBLAZER’s effectiveness are— S280 shelter-mounted M1028 5/4-ton truck MCS and RSS cannot fully deploy and one AN/VRC-47 radio. The DF ana- their antennas in high winds (50 mph lysts maintain an EOB map and perform or more). preliminary analysis of the DF results produced by the TRAILBLAZER system. The MCS and RSS cannot fully deploy ELINT analysts compute the LOB data their antenna in high winds (50 mph reported by the MI battalion’s three or more). TEAMPACK systems, which will be dis- Heavy rains and snow, dense foliage, cussed shortly. The ELINT and DF analysts work together to correlate RDF fixes metallic objects, tall buildings, close on HPT communications and noncommuni- proximity to railroad tracks, power cations or radar emitters. They report both lines, buried cables and pipelines, wire initial and follow-on SIGINT technical data fences, and bodies of water all degrade and RDF results to the TCAE over the HF system performance. RATT net. The principal means used to counter the The SPP analysis team’s COMINT and threat and to maximize the effectiveness of ELINT RDF correlation effort is the initial TRAILBLAZER operations is effective C3 step in templating the electronic battlefield, and system flexibility. which was previously explained. Their major effort, however, is to ensure that The TRAILBLAZER MCS and RSS TRAILBLAZER stations and TEAMPACK teams are assigned to the SIGINT process- systems are targeted on the HPT emitters in ing platoon (SPP) subordinate to the EW a synchronized manner and to ensure that company in the heavy division’s MI battal- the desired RDF results are passed to the ion. The SPP is normally held in GS of the TCAE on a timely basis. The analysis team division. However, the platoon normally may also pass or relay combat information deploys its MCS and RSS teams within the and HPT location data to the brigade S2 via AO of forward brigades. An EW and the IEWSE. Reporting criteria are deter- SIGINT analysis team, also assigned to the mined by the division G2 and G3 and the SPP, is usually deployed with the MCS MI battalion S3. When the NCS-designated designated as the TRAILBLAZER NCS. An MCS reaches its storage capacity, it AN/GRC-122 RATT system from the MI transfers TRAILBLAZER NCS responsibil- battalion’s service support company also ity to the other MCS. This permits continu- deploys with the SPP to provide HF com- ous operations. The second MCS is usually munication record traffic between the SPP collocated with an EW platoon operations and TCAE. The MI battalion S3, TCAE center or the IEW company team TOC in an operations officer, IEW company team adjacent brigade’s AO for C3 purposes and commanders, and EW support officers effect analysis support. the necessary coordination with the brigade S2 and S3. The MCS and RSS team leaders In actuality, NCS responsibility may interface with battalion S2 and S3 for coor- change dynamically between the two MCS dination purposes, when required. on a time-shared basis in order to satisfy

2-45 aggregate mission requirements and HPT Target surveillance, target tracking, priorities for the division and its subordi- and fire control radars associated with nate maneuver brigades. Time-shared NCS enemy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and responsibility lends greater flexibility to the SAM units. TRAILBLAZER system. It is a basic technique employed for maintaining continuity The AN/MSQ-103A, shown in the follow- of operations as given RSS and other MCS ing illustration, is configured in an S-623 displace to new positions. shelter mounted on the M-1015 EW system carrier, previously described. Like the Time-shared requirements are determined TRAILBLAZER stations, it utilizes a quick- as HPT emitters located in each brigade erect antenna and has an on-board power AO. Deeper targets are developed by the generator to facilitate rapid set-up and relo- TCAE and become the responsibility of the cation operations in heavy divisions. A MCS in the AO of the brigade most likely to lightweight version of TEAMPACK is cur- be affected by the HPT emitter and the rently being developed for use by airborne enemy unit or weapon system it supports. and air assault divisions. The lightweight HPT revisit requirements to provide target version will be a similarly shelter-mounted location update information (tracking data) system on the 5/4-ton M-1028 commercial ultimately determine the HPT sets for utility cargo vehicle (CUCV) or M990 which each MCS is responsible. Combat HMMWV. information and HPT location data pertaining to target units within or approaching the brigade AO are passed via the IEW C2 Each TEAMPACK system is capable of system to the brigade S2 in accordance with detecting, intercepting, and providing LOB established unit SOP, coordinating instruc- information on HPT noncommunications tions, and the reporting criteria mentioned emitters, such as those described above. The earlier. The brigade S2 uses all other RSTA on-board computer can be programed to assets organic, attached, or supporting bri- rapidly search specified frequency bands. gade and battalion combat operations to SIGINT technical data and LOB informa- acquire, track, and monitor HPT units tion is stored in the computer’s memory and associated with the target emitters. These can be displayed to the operator or printed RSTA assets may include other EW re- out on hard copy upon command. The sources from the division’s MI battalion. approximate location of an HPT radar emitter can be determined by triangulation TEAMPACK. There are three noncom- of several TEAMPACK intercepts. The munications collection teams assigned to approximate locations of HPT radars, like each MI battalion. Each team is equipped the communications intelligence (COMINT) with a TEAMPACK system, the AN/MSQ- DF results produced by TRAILBLAZER, 103A. The teams consist of four electronic are adequate for cuing other RSTA assets in intelligence (ELINT) operators each. These the close operations area. In fact, it is teams are targeted against HPT radars and standard practice to cue COMINT systems other noncommunications emitters, the with ELINT tip-offs, and vice versa, within majority of which may be found within the EW units. Information provided by aggre- brigade’s close-in and deep operations areas gate TEAMPACK systems, once processed of responsibility. Priority targets usually at the SPP or TCAE, is also sufficient to include— provide front-line traces and AO parameter Meteorological radars supporting information about close-in enemy forces. enemy fire support units, to include Terrain analysis, target correlation with surface-to-surface missile (SSM) units. COMINT DF results, and comparison with enemy communications operating schedules Countermortar and counterbattery generate, in many cases, HPT nominations radars associated with enemy rocket suitable for targeting lethal fire support and artillery units. systems. TEAMPACK DF accuracy is also Battlefield surveillance radars support- greatly enhanced when intercept sites are ing enemy reconnaissance and fire surveyed by field artillery survey teams support units. using the PADS system mentioned earlier.

2-46 The circular error probable (CEP) is reduced level terrain notwithstanding. Dense and greater RDF accuracy is achieved. foliage, ground clutter, the enemy’s use of There are two major factors which limit terrain masking, electromagnetic propaga- the effectiveness of TEAMPACK operation losses, and the multipath effects of tions. The first limitation factor is that the given radar systems can also have adverse VHF FM voice communications means used impact on TEAMPACK’s RDF capability for DF flash tip-offs, technical data, and LOB and detection range. The intercept and DF information reports are slow. The second capability of each TEAMPACK, however, is limitation factor is the fact that three not hampered by smoke, haze, fog, light TEAMPACK systems, like the five stations rain or snow, or light foliage. of the TRAILBLAZER system, cannot cover the entire division front. The fields of The two major limitation factors men- view and forward deployment of each tioned above are well recognized. Major TEAMPACK to achieve triangulation, efforts are under way to provide maximum range, and LOS to the HPT emit- TEAMPACK a UHF data link communica- ters, restricts the target coverage area, tions capability similar to that which is front-wise, to that of one and possibly two employed on the TRAILBLAZER system. brigades in best case situations, flat and Corps augmentation (three TEAMPACK

2-47 systems authorized) and the cross- battalion S3 and TCAE operations officer. attachment of other TEAMPACK systems The three TEAMPACK systems, and any in adjacent divisions and the corps separate additional systems from corps, are task brigade or armored cavalry regiment (ACR) organized in accordance with the division may also be used to increase TEAMPACK’s commander’s operational guidance, infor- target coverage area. Corps, division, mation requirements, and concept of opera- separate brigade, and ACR intelligence tions. They may be placed in DS of one bri- officers and TSOs work together to ensure gade or held in GS of the division to provide adequate ELINT DF coverage of critical priority of support to two forward- areas. National, EAC, and corps-based air- committed brigades. In either case, the borne ELINT systems such as QUICKLOOK TCAE and SPP exercise technical control of are also considered. The intelligence, com- TEAMPACK operations; OPCON is bat information, and targeting data capable retained by the IEW company team com- of being collected and produced by ELINT mander or the MI battalion commander and systems at echelons above division is of S3, depending upon the situation. paramount concern to both division and The three or more TEAMPACK systems brigade commanders. The challenge is get- are targeted against HPT noncommunica- ting it down to the division and brigade tions emitters supporting enemy first- commanders who can put it to best use. echelon reconnaissance and fire support Such information may not only provide units found beyond the limits of friendly direct targeting data for lethal deep attack observation and within the brigade and systems, but cuing data for TEAMPACK divisions’ indirect fire range. The LOB and other close-in RSTA assets, as well. information, emitter identification, and The manner in which the three combat information regarding the specific TEAMPACK systems are deployed and activities indicated are reported to the employed ultimately determines their indi- TCAE via the TEAMPACK-designated vidual and collective contributions to bat- NCS and intermediate processing, analysis, talion, brigade, and division combat and reporting elements, previously speci- operations. fied. The TEAMPACK systems may be collocated with TRAILBLAZER MCS or RSS One of the three TEAMPACK systems or with other EW communications intercept and noncommunications collection teams and LOB systems operating in the forward assigned to each MI battalion is subordi- areas. Their collocation enhances the cu- nate to one of three EW platoons (heavy ing effort between communications and division), collection and jamming (C&J) noncommunications collection systems and platoons (light and air assault divisions), or provides an enhanced communications and C&J companies (airborne division), depend- reporting capability. CSS and security ing upon the type of division to which the requirements are also reduced. Additional MI battalion itself is organic. It has been information about the deployment and common practice, doctrinally and histori- employment of TEAMPACK systems and cally speaking, to place each of the three the support they are capable of providing platoons or companies mentioned above in the maneuver brigade is contained in Chap- DS of the division’s three maneuver bri- ter 5. More detailed information is provided gades. The field of view, maximum range, in FM 34-10. LOS, and RDF tip-off and reporting requirements, however, dictate a more flexible The MI battalions subordinate to heavy, operational concept for TEAMPACK light, air assault, and airborne divisions are systems. authorized an equivalent number of voice Centralized control at the TCAE and collection teams to satisfy division and bri- intermediate control at the SPP or MCS is gade requirements. They have three teams required. Trade-offs between maximum each, with six operators per team to man range (depth) and frontal coverage (width) three intercept positions. The air assault capabilities are determined by the division and airborne division MI battalions are G2 and TSO in coordination with the MI authorized an additional six and nine

2-48 low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams, The voice collection teams in each MI respectively. These LLVI teams employ the battalion consist of six operators each. AN/TRQ-30 manpack radio intercept They are equipped with one AN/TRQ-32 per receiving set. The-AN/TRQ-30 is actually a team. Each AN/TRQ-32 has two intercept component of the AN/TRQ-32 voice collec- positions. The AN\TRQ-30, as a component tion and LOB system used by the voice col- of the AN/TRQ-32 system, provides the lection teams mentioned above. The LLVI team one additional position and a capabil- teams augment the voice collection teams— ity to reach intercept sites otherwise inac- two and three LLVI teams per voice collec- cessible to the voice collection team. The tion team in air assault and airborne divi- AN/TRQ-30 provides a backup and surge sions, respectively. The LLVI teams in the augmentation capability to the team’s air assault division are authorized two primary system. It also provides the team a operators per team. The airborne division means to maintain continuity of operations LLVI teams, however, have three operators in fast-paced combat situations. The above per team—a greater capability to satisfy information is summarized in the following aggregate combat requirements. illustration.

2-49 The AN/TRQ-32 system is configured which will be discussed shortly, is mounted within an S-250 shelter. The shelter is usu- on an M-1028 5/4-ton truck. The AN/TRQ- ally mounted on a 5/4-ton M-880 cargo 30 is usually carried and maybe mounted truck. It can also be mounted on the M-561 in an M151A l/4-ton jeep or the new M1009 Gamma Goat. The replacement for the 3\4-ton 4x4 truck. These systems are illus- AN/TRQ-32, the TEAMMATE system, trated below.

2-50 These systems have similar capabilities information on HPT as they enter and pro- and limitations. They are capable of inter- ceed to close on brigade battle positions. cepting both HF and VHF single channel They also monitor the lethal and nonlethal voice and manual Morse communications attack against critical HPT located beyond facilities supporting enemy first-echelon the limits of observed fire. They provide units. battle damage assessment reports to the 2 Both of these systems also have a VHF brigade S2 and division G2 via the IEW C line of bearing capability. Their primary system. They also evaluate the effectiveness HPTs usually include the C3 facilities of COMJAM operations against enemy HPT emitters; they coordinate directly with supporting— ECM operators located nearby to ensure Enemy first- and second-echelon bat- proper COMJAM adjustments to counter talion CP. enemy ECCM activities. Enemy first- and second-echelon regimental CP. TEAMMATE–AN/TRQ-32(V1). TEAMMATE, the AN/TRQ-32(V1), is a Enemy first-echelon division forward product improvement of the AN/TRQ-32 and main CP. system described above. It provides HF, Fire direction control centers and VHF and UHF communications intercept, command observation posts associated and VHF LOB data. The system is mounted with rocket and artillery units support- on the M-1028 5/4-ton 4x4 CUCV. The ing enemy first-echelon divisions. quick-erect antenna, antenna mast, and hydraulic 5 kw generator and air condi- Meteorological stations supporting tioner are attached to the exterior of the enemy first-echelon fire support units. S-457 shelter, making the system self- Rocket, artillery, AA, and SAM firing contained. batteries. The TEAMMATE system, shown in the following illustration, will eventually The AN/TRQ-32 and AN/TRQ-30 sys- replace all AN/TRQ-32 systems on a one- tems are the primary means available to for-one basis; some are available in given the heavy division G2 for extending the MI battalions today. RDF baseline of the TRAILBLAZER system described earlier. Secure VHF FM voice The AN/PRD-10, MRDFS. The communications provide the basic means AN/PRD-10 Man-transportable Radio for netting TRAILBLAZER MCS with the Direction Finding System (MRDFS)– AN/TRQ-32 and AN/TRQ-30 via the IEW vehicle or pack-frame mounted—is a light- C2 system. RDF flash tip-offs are communi- weight modular radio intercept and direc- cated both ways over these VHF FM cir- tion finding system. It is capable of cuits. Rapid identification and location of operating in two modes—autonomous or HPT emitters is given primary emphasis in netted. In the autonomous mode, an indi- the TRAILBLAZER system, especially in vidual station can provide intercept and the pre-hostility phase of combat opera- LOB data. In the netted mode, up to four tions. However, combat information and stations can be interfaced to provide inter- targeting data, and the tracking and moni- cept and RDF fix location data on HPT. toring of HPT, is the primary effort for The MRDFS will eventually replace all AN\TRQ-32 and AN/TRQ-30 operators. AN/TRQ-30 systems on a one-for-one basis, They track and monitor the communica- Armywide. Some are in the hands of troops tions activity on the HPT C3 facilities men- today. tioned above. They provide indications and Voice Collection and LLVI. The voice warning data to the brigade S2 via the IEW collection and LLVI teams previously de- C2 system as targets approach the brigade scribed are distributed evenly among the AO or as enemy fire support units target three EW platoons, C&J platoons, and C&J friendly close-in forces. They flash RDF tip- companies in the MI battalions subordinate offs and help provide target location update to heavy, light, air assault, and airborne

2-51 2-52 divisions, respectively. These E W platoons, AN/TRQ-32; the AN/TRQ-30, even when C&J platoons, and C&J companies, as men- used, is collocated with the AN/TRQ-32 tioned in the discussion about TEAMPACK, most of the time. These two systems cannot have been traditionally placed in DS of the be deployed to provide a sufficient baseline respective division’s subordinate maneuver for DF purposes. In any case, only a “cut”- brigades. two LOBs—would be produced. Thus, the single voice collection team within any one The number of SCV collection and LOB brigade AO cannot produce anything other systems authorized in air assault and air- than a general direction to HPT emitters. A borne divisions, and their equal distribution general direction to an HPT emitter is ade- among three C&J platoons or companies, quate for nonlethal COMJAM attacks. permits effective DS to each maneuver bri- However, a general direction to an HPT is gade. These DS assets can still operate inadequate for targeting by lethal attack under the technical control of the TCAE to systems. All three of the voice collection satisfy SIGINT and the division G2’s intel- teams, therefore, must be netted under one ligence requirements. The individual voice centralized control authority. collection and LLVI teams are netted under the control authority of the C&J platoon or The TCAE is the centralized control company in each brigade’s area; the voice authority in most situations when the entire collection teams, using the AN/TRQ-32, division is deployed and operational. Task- serve as the RDF NCS. The C&J platoon ing and reporting, however, between the and company processing, analysis, and voice collection teams and TCAE, are still control elements are similarly netted under performed using intermediate control the centralized control authority of the divi- elements—the C&J platoon operations cen- sion MI battalion’s S3 and TCAE. A con- ters, TRAILBLAZER MCS/SSP, or EW pla- tinuous flow of combat information, LOB toon headquarters. In heavy divisions and RDF fix location targeting data, and equipped with TRAILBLAZER, the voice SIGINT technical data provides all collection teams may be cross-attached to elements—to include the division G2 and provide an extended RDF baseline against brigade S2—the information needed to suc- key target coverage areas. Thus, one bri- cessfully conduct the division’s close, deep, gade may have up to two or three voice and rear operations. The brigade S2 has collection teams and one RSS from direct access to the communications inter- TRAILBLAZER operating within its AO. cept and LOB systems via the IEWSE and The actual mix of communications intercept C&J platoon leader or company command- and LOB or RDF stations within any bri- er. A C&J platoon or company may be gade’s AO is METT-T and situation reinforced with other voice collection and dependent. LLVI teams, cross-attached from other C&J The infantry division (light) is authorized platoons or companies. A prime example is three voice collection teams. These teams when a divisional brigade is deployed for- are sufficient for providing DS to only one ward by itself, as the initial division maneuver brigade at a time in most situa- maneuver MCS, into a given contingency tions. These three voice collection teams, area. In such situations, the TCAE, or per- however, cannot possibly cover a division sonnel therefrom, may augment the IEWSE front in excess of 40 kilometers unless spe- at the brigade TOC. A tighter interface and cial preparations and modifications are more responsive support is then provided made in regard to personnel availability, the brigade commander. The MI battalion enhanced CSS, and high-powered communi- commander and S3 may accompany the cations. These changes could include— forward MI elements with the brigade mak- Moving a number of personnel forward ing the initial assault or deployment. to augment the C&J platoon’s analysis The number of voice collection teams in effort and reinforcing the voice collec- the divisional MI battalions does not nor- tion team with two voice intercept mally permit DS to maneuver brigades of operators from the C&J platoon’s DF assets. Each team has only one transcription and analysis element.

2-53 Identifying personnel from the IEW plus two operator positions. QUICKFIX IIB company team or a local CSS unit to in the Blackhawk is not yet fielded. transport fuel and rations to forward- The LOB and RDF capability of displaced AN/TRQ-32 and AN/TRQ- QUICKFIX IIB was originally designed to 30 teams on a scheduled basis. provide general direction LOB information Using the high-powered communica- in support of QUICKFIX COMJAM operations”capability-of COMJAM systems tions. However, QUICKFIX, as with all operating on the flanks of the division other COMJAM systems, has an inherent or designated brigade AO to support mission to collect combat information and the extended baseline requirement. A both targeting and SIGINT technical data third COMJAM system would be to satisfy the aggregate information needed at the centrally-located requirements of the division. Its collection AN/TRQ-32 which, in most cases, may mission during the prehostility phase of be designated the RDF NCS. combat operations is extremely important to both division and brigade commanders. The type of DF and COMJAM support operations described above may be well QUICKFIX is usually considered a deep suited to light division operations con- attack jamming system. Its enhanced radio ducted against an adversary which lacks LOS provides the division G2 and G3 with sophisticated DF capabilities. The use of and extended VHF intercept and jamming COMJAM systems to support DF opera- capability which reaches beyond brigade tions in high density enemy SIGINT envi- AO into the division’s deep attack zone. Its ronments, however, is not recommended. HF intercept range is unlimited. The division G2 and MI battalion S3 use the The infantry division (light), because of QUICKFIX aircraft to extend the DF base- its limited number of authorized voice col- line of ground-based communications, lection teams and LOB systems, will have intercept, LOB, and RDF systems. They, in to optimize the communications intercept coordination with the division G3 and bri- and LOB capabilities of other EW systems it gade S2 and S3, also use QUICKFIX to has available to satisfy aggregate mission target key NAI and target areas of interest requirements. QUICKFIX is one of these (TAI) in defilade to ground-based collection systems. and jamming assets. The QUICKFIX air- QUICKFIX. Each MI battalion exercises craft are used extensively to support the operational control over the three division’s overall SIGINT collection and QUICKFIX aircraft which are organic to electronic battlefield templating effort prior the division CAB. Two versions of to combat. QUICKFIX are currently fielded. The first The QUICKFIX aircraft operate well for- version is the QUICKFIX IB, AN/ARQ-33- ward in brigade AO prior to combat opera- A, which is mounted on the EH-lH modified tions. QUICKFIX missions are preplanned helicopter. This version is capable of inter- and on call. One aircraft is on station at all cepting and jamming HPT communications times during the specified mission time. emitters in the VHF band. It also has an frame, while another aircraft is enroute to HF intercept capability. It does not have an or from a forward arming and refueling LOB or RDF capability. point (FARP). A series of flight tracks may The second version is the QUICKFIX IIA, be established across brigade fronts to sup- AN/ALQ-151, which is mounted on the EH- port area-wide communications DF opera- 1X modified Huey helicopter. It has all of tions for key time periods against key target the capabilities of the AN/ARQ-33, plus an areas. LOB or RDF capability. It has only one QUICKFIX operations are controlled by operator position, however, whereas its the MI battalion S3 and TCAE. The IEW predecessor has two. A new model of of company team TOC, E W platoon operations QUICKFIX, the QUICKFIX IIB, mounted centers, SSP, C&J platoon operations cen- in an EH-60A Blackhawk helicopter, has all ters, or C&J company TOC serve as inter- of the capabilities of the QUICKFIX IIA, mediate control authorities when required.

2-54 They also provide a communications relay, intelligence and overall targeting effort of- alternate communications routing, or back- the division, readiness is the ultimate goal up communications capability to support of EW operations in the prehostility phase QUICKFIX operations. Combat informa- of combat. However, this goal is extremely tion and LOB or DF fix location targeting difficult to achieve. The enemy’s use of data pertinent to specific maneuver bri- radio silence, OPSEC, deception, and new gades is transmitted by TCAE analysts to CEOI in combat are elementary factors to the brigade S2 via the IEW C2 system in deal with when compared to another factor accordance with the reporting criteria and not yet mentioned. That factor is the ene- coordination instructions previously de- my’s extensive use of secure communica- scribed. At times, such information may be tions means to command and control troops routed directly from the QUICKFIX aircraft and weapon systems. This last factor rein- to the brigade S2 via one of the interme- forces the need for an aggressive SIGINT diate control authorities previously men- collection, processing, and analysis effort tioned and the IEWSE at the brigade TOC. within the division as a whole. “Aggres- The latter communications routing is most sive” does not mean “extensive”. EW opera- prevalent in those unique situations when tors and analysts concentrate on five QUICKFIX aircraft are placed in DS of a information elements deemed essential to specific maneuver brigade. Independent all tactical commanders. These essential brigade operations, such as described for air elements of information are— assault and airborne operations previously, Branch. are good examples of when such procedures are used. Echelon. The Ultimate Challenge. The EW and Activity. SIGINT collection, DF, and electronic bat- Location. tlefield templating efforts are predominant in the prehostility, postdeployment phase of Time of intercept. combat operations. Virtually all EW collec- EW operators and analysts are specially tion and jamming resources remain in GS trained to provide such information. ELINT of the division during this time period. operators and analysts are not constrained Their aggregate collection capabilities are in their efforts to identify and locate HPT exploited to support the templating done at noncommunications emitters. The founda- the MI battalion TCAE. The results, refined tion they provide to the electronic battle- EW target lists and jamming schedules field templating effort is tremendous. (EWTL/JS), are used to program forward- COMINT technical data and signal para- deployed E W collection and jamming sys- metric data, together with LOB and RDF tems. HPT sets are keyed to specific forms information and IPB products from the of maneuver schemes. They are time- and division G2 staff, when compared with location-phased in accordance with support- ELINT EOB information, provide an over- ing fire plans. Direct support to maneuver view of the enemy situation and order of brigades is now feasible. Individual voice battle on the battlefield. HPT communica- collection and COMJAM teams are focused tions and noncommunications emitters can on specific HPT emitters, units, and weapon be determined, and both lethal and nonle- systems. They are prepared to collect and thal attack schedules can be refined. The report pertinent combat information and electronic battlefield templating can only be targeting data critical to the brigade and done by EW and SIGINT analysts at the division commanders. COMJAM operators TCAE. are prepared to attack HPT communications links critical to brigade and division The information derived from the elec- combat operations. E W operators are ready tronic templating process, described above, when the attack begins. provides the voice intercept and COMJAM operators the initial identification and gen- In connection with the scenario described eral location data of HPT emitters within above, when expanded to the all-source their respective zones of responsibility.

2-55 COMJAM operations in the initial hours COMJAM Resources of combat are conducted to drive HPT communications facilities into the clear. All of the ground-based and airborne Once the enemy is forced into clear-text COMJAM resources available to the divi- voice communications— sion can be used to augment the division’s overall EW and SIGINT collection HPT identifications can be confirmed. effort prior to combat, when deemed neces- Enemy event schedules and intentions sary. QUICKFIX IIA, however, is the only can be determined or confirmed. COMJAM system in the inventory that has an on-board LOB or RDF capability. All of Indications and warning data can be the ground-based COMJAM systems, there- provided. fore, cannot be used to extend the division’s HPT can be provided to target lethal RDF baseline. They can and are used, how- attack fire-support systems. ever, as search and monitoring positions. The enemy’s event schedule will have Ground-based COMJAM operators are been significantly altered to provide capable of identifying and tipping off HPT the necessary time windows for deci- emitters to other EW collection, LOB, and sive tactical maneuver by friendly RDF resources in their immediate areas of forces on and over the air-land employment. Such interaction is normally battlefield. coordinated by the intermediate processing, analysis, and control authority in the This scenario and its ultimate goal, a se- assigned AO. Ground-based COMJAM ries of battlefield successes which will win operators are also tasked to monitor HPT the air-land battle, is the ultimate challenge communications and to report all essential facing all EW personnel. combat information, targeting data, and The above scenario is focused on SIGINT technical data heard.

COMJAM operations and3 the necessity of The TCAE ensures adquate EW and driving critical enemy C facilities into3 the SIGINT collection coverage throughout the clear. The disruption of HPT enemy C division AO. All efforts are made to ensure facilities must begin at the exact moment of that forward EW collection and jamming the attack. It must be a concerted effort of resources are focused on HPT emitters criti- all available maneuver and fire support cal to the brigade in whose AO the re- assets. The combined effects of maneuver, sources are operating. Such focusing fires, and communications jamming 3 greatly enhances the ability of the entire against critical enemy C I facilities will EW system to respond to specific brigade result in a geometrical degradation of the requirements. The development of SIGINT/ enemy commanders’ ability to effectively EW technical data is a major effort with command and control their maneuver both the TCAE and intermediate process- forces and fire support units.3 The elimina- ing, analysis, and control elements having tion or degradation of key C facilities such ECM control authority over COMJAM as regimental and division CP, force ill- operations. This information, such as pri- informed decisions to be made at ever mary, alternate, reserve, and skip-echelon higher and lower echelons in a disjointed frequencies; call signs; powerout; LOB; and manner. The skip-echelon communications vertical or horizontal antenna polarization, required to command and control far dis- is absolutely essential to optimize the tant forces lend themselves, at the same COMJAM capabilities of given systems. time, to ever more effective COMJAM operations. The COMJAM resources, their The Huey-mounted (EH-lX) QUICKFIX capabilities and limitations, and their IIA, AN\ALQ-151, EW system was de- availability to support division and brigade scribed earlier. This airborne EW system combat operations in a unified and single employs the VHF AN/TLQ-17A jammer. coherent manner may determine who suc- This jamming system can be programmed ceeds and who does not succeed on the elec- for up to 256 frequencies for enhanced tronic battlefield of today. search and monitoring functions. Sixteen

2-56 frequencies can be prioritized for automatic tem. This ground-based version is capable time-shared sequential spot jamming opera- of jamming both HF and VHF HPT com- tions. A number of the sixteen frequencies munications emitters. It has the same pro- can also be used to “lock out” and protect gramming and automatic jamming capa- friendly frequencies from being inadver- bilities as mentioned above for QUICKFIX. tently jammed. The QUICKFIX system It also employs omni-directional whip uses an ommi-directional whip antenna and antennas for communications intercept and radiates jamming signals 360 degrees. The jamming operations. An illustration of this brigade S3, S3 air, and C-E officer must all system follows. consider the QUICKFIX when developing their respective portions of the brigade The TRAFFIC JAM system, is usually OPLAN. COMJAM targets, such as 3 mounted on the M-151A 1/4-ton jeep. It may regiment-to-battalion C links, airspace also be mounted in the M-113 armored per- management and fire support coordination sonnel carrier or on the M-1028 5/4-ton 4x4 means, CEOI, and protected frequencies CUCV. The HF band-1 antenna has seven must all be considered. The brigade S2 mast elements which, when fully erected, should also consider QUICKFIX collection reach a height of 28 feet. Five and seven capabilities in his collection, reconnais- elements are used for COMJAM operations sance, and surveillance plans. against HPT emitters in the higher and TRAFFIC JAM. TRAFFIC JAM also lower bands of the HF spectrum, employs the AN/TLQ-l7A jammings sys- respectively.

2-57 The HF band-1 antenna can be mounted There are three HF and VHF COMJAM in the M-416 trailer, as shown above, or teams which employ either TRAFFIC JAM dismounted and set upon more favorable or the older AN/TLQ-17 in the MI battalion terrain. The VHF band-2 whip antenna can subordinate to heavy and light divisions. also be trailer-mounted, as shown above. The air assault and airborne division MI However, it is usually mounted on the rear battalions are authorized six such teams. of the M-151A to facilitate rapid set-up and These HF and VHF COMJAM teams nor- tear-down time. mally operate within the main battle area The TRAFFIC JAM HF and VHF (MBA). They are usually located on the COMJAM teams also have an additional flanks of their supported unit relatively vehicle for support purposes. It is an addi- close to the FEBA when conducting VHF tional M-151A l/4-ton jeep which pulls a COMJAM operations. They deploy further second M-416 trailer. The support vehicle, to the rear and are more centrally located an M-1028 CUCV, in the future will be used when conducting HF COMJAM operations. to carry the TRAFFIC JAM teams’ VHF The TRAFFIC JAM and AN/TLQ-17 sys- FM radios used for C3 purposes. tems, the latter also M-151A-mounted, are The brigade and battalion S2, S3, and effective against VHF HPT communication C-E officers consider the use of TRAFFIC facilities within the brigade’s close opera- JAM systems when planning combat operations area beyond the limits of observed tions. They take special care to ensure that fire. They are not effective against short these systems are not employed closer than communications link-distanced targets one kilometer to friendly battle positions. within the close operations area 1-5 kilome- Friendly CEOI and COMJAM schedules ters beyond the FLOT. TRAFFIC JAM, due are also coordinated to ensure minimum to its omni-directional whip antennas, is 3 not suitable for performing COMJAM interference with friendly C . Rules of screening operations or providing high engagement, ECM control mechanisms, power communications support. The poten- and coordinating instruction are developed tial interference to critical friendly C3 and and employed. Major coordination is the broadcasting of critical information in required among the brigade S3, C-E officer, 360 degrees must be precluded in most com- and the EW support officer from the bat situations. Calls for fire using the IEWSE. TRAFFIC JAM system, however, may over- ride all other considerations at given times Some MI battalions may still be equipped in battle. The enemy commander knows with the older AN/TLQ-17 HF and VHF where a maneuver battalion is when he has jamming system, rather than TRAFFIC it cut off, pinned down, and encircled. JAM. The AN/TLQ-17 does not have a 256 Direct accessibility to TRAFFIC JAM’s frequency programmable capability. It high power communications capability and does have a 15-frequency COMJAM priori- its use by the maneuver battalion or bri- tization or friendly lockout capability, how- gade commander is recommended in such ever. The normal ratio of enemy HPT emit- situations. ter frequencies to be jammed and friendly frequencies to be protected is 10:5. The TACJAM–AN/MLQ-34. The TACJAM, AN\TLQ-17, unlike TRAFFIC JAM, has a AN/MLQ-34, is the most powerful and directional VHF log periodic antenna mobile ground-based COMJAM system in (LPA). This VHF LPA allows for greater the inventory today. It is a semi-automatic, effective radiated power (ERP) and also computer-assisted VHF COMJAM system, reduces the likelihood of COMJAM interfer- capable of jamming up to three enemy HPT ence with friendly communications in the communications facilities at one time. area. This LPA, however, takes considera- TACJAM, shown in the following illustra- ble time to setup and tear down. It is a tion, is enclosed in an S-595 shelter, manual operation. Thus, the AN/TLQ-17 mounted on the M-1015 EW System Cargo may not be employed as closely to the Carrier. It utilizes a quick-erect pneumatic FLOT as the TRAFFIC JAM system. antenna mast, folding LPA, and on-board

2-58 2-59 power generator. It is a completely self- deceive the enemy SIGINT or REC intercept contained system. and DF operators, to ensure that the brigade and division’s OPLAN and intentions TACJAM has the most rapid set-up and are not inadvertently compromised, and to tear-down times of any ground-based ensure the survivability of the TACJAM COMJAM system. The power take-off team itself. COMJAM screening operations (PTO) unit allows the system to become require detailed planning and extensive operational by simply putting the transmis- interaction among many members of the sion into neutral. The automatic ground-rod IEW team. Two COMJAM systems are driver and pneumatic mast antenna allow required for each frequency to be screened. the system to become operational within COMSEC operators may assist the up and approximately two minutes. Pre-loaded down cuing effort. Such operations are “mission data” are stored in the on-board executed on a preplanned basis. They are computer. The 40-foot pneumatic mast, conducted for cover and deception purposes. VHF directional LPA, and the system’s They should not be attempted unless all high ERP make TACJAM extremely effec- personnel involved are adequately trained. tive against HPT communications facilities supporting enemy first-echelon units in COMJAM screening operations are also both the brigade and division’s deep opera- conducted for pure OPSEC purposes in the tions areas. TACJAM is also effective heat of battle. The full capability of against close-in HPT. However, these HPT TACJAM—three-frequency automatic jam- are numerous. TACJAM, therefore, is nor- ming, simultaneously performed—can be really targeted against HPT C3 facilities used when such operations are required. beyond the limit of observed fire–both HPT This type of COMJAM screening operation within and beyond the range of TRAFFIC does not require the use of sophisticated JAM systems. procedures and techniques. They are conducted on an on-call basis and do not require extensive preplanning and coordi- There are three VHF COMJAM teams nation. They do require, however, a more which employ the TACJAM system in the precise knowledge of where the enemy MI battalions of armored and mechanized SIGINT and REC assets are located. This divisions. There are also three TACJAM requirement is reduced though, when two teams in the corps MI brigade. These TACJAM systems are used in tandem; their TACJAM teams are usually employed well overlapping field of cover toward suspect forward in the division AO. They can oper- target areas is adequate to do the job for a ate in the MBA or in the covering force area short period of time. Their field of cover can (CFA). They are usually deployed with also be increased when augmented by the TRAFFIC JAM systems when operating in PIRANHA systems, soon to be discussed. the MBA and conducting VHF COMJAM More information pertaining to COMJAM operations. screening operations, procedures, and tech- TACJAM, due to its high ERP and direc- niques is provided in FM 34-10. tional LPA, is an extremely valuable COMJAM asset. It can be used to screen TACJAM systems are also extremely friendly C3 without unintentionally jam- valuable as skip-echelon high power com- ming friendly communications. This capa- munications systems. Directional bility, however, is limited to just one fre- COMJAM systems, using emission control quency at a time, due to the manual nature (EMCON) procedures and being strate- of the jamming operation and the rather gically placed on the battlefield from battal- sophisticated techniques and procedures ion through corps rear areas, allow for the used. These techniques and procedures, continued use of friendly C3 in, all situa- explained in FM 34-10, are designed to tions. This C3 capability provides commanders at all echelons with an important means to synchronize close, deep, and rear operations throughout the corps AO in worst-case situations when no other means of C3 are available.

2-60 AN/GLQ-3B. The AN/GLQ-3B is the fore- operations. The system is illustrated on the runner to the TACJAM system. It is following page. employed in both the heavy division’s MI The directional LPA, mounted on the battalion and corps MI brigade. The front bumper of the M-151A l/4-ton jeep, is AN/GLQ-3B is mounted on the 5/4-ton a significant improvement over the LPA M-880 series wheeled vehicle. It is a manual used on the AN/TLQ-17. It is a telescopic system capable of jamming just one HPT hand-cranked antenna which allows the frequency at a time. It has no programma- system to be set up in just a few minutes. It ble capability. It is an extremely effective can be taken down in seconds. It folds back COMJAM system even in light of its stated over the vehicle when the team moves. The limitations. It has the highest VHF fre- omni-directional whip antenna on the quency range of any COMJAM system. It rear bumper can also be used for VHF employs a directional LPA and has the COMJAM operations. This dual antenna equivalent ERP of TACJAM, when feature allows for greater flexibility and TACJAM is used in the three-channel mode continuity of operations. The whip antenna of operation. The AN/GLQ-3B is more can be used when HPT emitters dip down effective against longer range HPT than out of radio LOS of the primary LPA—an the TRAFFIC JAM system. It is also capa- important feature in hilly or mountainous ble of providing both high power communi- terrain. The whip antenna also permits cations and COMJAM screening support to jamming operations while on the move—a the brigade and division or corps. design feature and capability which is of extreme importance in fast-paced retro- There are three AN/GLQ-3B assigned to grade and pursuit operations. The ERP the MI battalion in each heavy division. is limited, however, when jam-on-move These COMJAM systems normally operate COMJAM operations are performed. in the MBA. They are not usually located as The team can now also provide high- close to the FEBA as the lighter and more power communications support using the mobile TRAFFIC JAM or AN/TLQ-17 sys- PIRANHA system. COMJAM screening tems. They may be employed with the operations are possible. The potential in- TRAFFIC JAM or AN/TLQ-17 systems terference to friendly C3 is reduced. In when the latter two systems are held back addition, the C3 capability of all VHF to conduct HF COMJAM operations. The COMJAM teams is greatly increased. The AN/GLQ-3B systems may also operate in PIRANHA’s high-powered communications conduction with other forward-deployed HF capability, directional in nature, can be COMJAM systems, such as the AN/TLQ- used for long-range C3 and coordination 15, from the corps MI brigade. The purposes even while the primary COMJAM AN/TLQ-15 HF jammer will be discussed systems are operational. shortly. AN/TLQ-15. The AN/TLQ-15, mentioned previously, is an HF COMJAM system. All of the VHF COMJAM systems de- There are three AN/TLQ-15 HF COMJAM scribed above are authorized a backup VHF teams assigned to each MI brigade at corps. COMJAM system for surge augmentation These HF COMJAM systems usually oper- purposes and to provide an enhanced capa- ate well forward in the division and brigade bility to maintain continuity of operations AO for radio LOS requirements to HF in a swift-paced combat situation. This ground-wave HPT and communications back-up system is the PIRANHA. facilities. They are usually attached to the division’s MI battalion and are normally

PIRANHA OG-181. Each divisional MI held in GS of the division. They must3 collo- battalion is authorized three PIRANHA cate with other E W resources for C pur- OG-181 amplifier groups. The PIRANHA poses; the3 HF COMJAM teams have no system is composed of an SG-886 signal organic C means. The normal deployment generator, a power amplifier, spectrum ana- for AN/TLQ-15 teams is to collocate with lyzer, frequency scanner, and directional AN/GLQ-3B VHF COMJAM teams in the LPA. It can be used to augment COMJAM MBA. Collocation with TRAFFIC JAM

2-61 teams conducting HF COMJAM operations HF COMJAM range capability. The is also very practical in given situations. AN/TLQ-15. however. uses an omni- The AN/TLQ-15, like the AN/GLQ-3B directional whip antenna; HF COMJAM and PIRANHA, is a manual COMJAM sys- schedules and friendly CEOI must be fully tern. However, it provides the corps coordinated at all echelons of command and division commander an extended from brigade through corps.

2-62 COMJAM Resource Availability. The The three QUICKFIX aircraft assigned to number of given COMJAM resources autho- each combat aviation brigade are subordi- rized in division and corps MI battalions nate to the GS aviation company, as pre- and brigades are summarized in the illus- viously mentioned. One HF and VHF tration below. TRAFFIC JAM team and one VHF The number of jamming systems shown TACJAM or AN/GLQ-3B team are as- below equates to the number of COMJAM signed to each of the three EW platoons, teams authorized in each type of division C&J platoons, and C&J companies in the and corps MI unit. Each ground-based MI battalions subordinate to heavy, light, COMJAM team has three operators—two air assault, and airborne divisions, respec- voice operators and one manual Morse tively. The ground-based COMJAM teams operator. A fourth operator has been autho- at corps are assigned to the EW company in rized each COMJAM team under new TOE the tactical exploitation battalion (TEB) of force structures. the corp’s MI brigade.

2-63 Electronic Attack Options corps and divison G2, G3, and EWO. The and Task Organization— capability of individual and collective EW resources to identify and locate HPT emitters The EW collection and jamming teams, and the enemy units and weapon systems described on the preceding pages, are task they support is a major consideration; it organized to satisfy aggregate mission provides a fourth attack option—destruc- requirements. The corps and division G2, tion. The destruction of enemy CSI facilities G3, and electronic warfare officers (EWOs) at critical times in battle is the preferred work closely with the MI brigade and bat- attack option. talion commanders and S3 to determine task organization requirements for each The electronic attack options3 are consid- operation. They consider both the informa- ered for each high payoff C target set tional and operational EW requirements of associated with given enemy combat, com- all subcommanders. bat support, and CSS units found in specific attack zones beyond the FLOT. Nominal “Identify, locate, and jam” are the major attack zones and HPT sets are shown in the electronic attack options available to the following illustration.

2-64 Corps and division ground-based EW INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC resources and the division QUICKFIX air- WARFARE COMPANY TEAM craft are focused primarily on the HPT C3I facilities within the division AO. The divi- The MI battalion’s IEW resources which sion AO, as shown in the illustration, support the brigade or operate in the bri- may represent the corps’ close operations gade AO are normally organized into an area. The enemy’s C3I system within this IEW company team. The IEW company AO, as mentioned earlier in the discussion team provides for centralized control and about CI support, is extremely robust. coordination of MI resources. It provides Alternate means of communication are the brigade commander and staff with a available at almost every echelon of com- single point of contact for tasking support- mand in the enemy’s force structure, from ing MI units and for requesting additional battalion through Front levels. The MI support which maybe necessary to compatibility among given HF, VHF, and satisfy the brigade commander’s aggregate UHF C3 facilities, and the skip-echelon IEW mission requirements. A nominal IEW capability of the enemy, offer a significant company team is illustrated on the follow- challenge to friendly EW systems. The flexi- ing page. bility and capability of friendly EW sys- The composition of each IEW company tems to work in such a dynamic signal team is based on the division and brigade environment can only be ensured by apply- commanders’ overall IEW requirements and ing a centralized control and decentralized the METT-T planning factors. An IEW execution concept of operations on the bat- company team, as portrayed in the follow- tlefield. EW communications-intercept, DF, ing illustration, may include— and jamming targets-the NCS or specific subscribers or outstations on critical C2 The IEWSE which is normally located facilities—may be located in different bat- at the brigade TOC. talion, brigade, and division AOs. In other An EW platoon with one transcription words, the communications links of given and analysis (T&A) team and a enemy C2 nets may cross friendly battalion, number of voice collection, noncom- brigade, and division commanders’ AO munications intercept (ELINT), and boundaries and their respective battle areas COMJAM teams. of responsibility. In fact, a major goal of combined maneuver, fires, and jamming is An intelligence/surveillance platoon to force this to happen—force the enemy to with a number of GSR and REMS use skip-echelon communications to slow teams, as well as one or more EPW down his C2 process and to make his critical interrogator, CI, and COMSEC teams communications facilities more susceptible which normally deploy in the area of to COMJAM attack at the same time. This the brigade rear CP. is the geometrical degradation of the ene- A service support section to provide my’s C3I system mentioned earlier. logistical and maintenance support to the company team. In heavy division operations, an SSP element with at least one RSS and possibly The centralized control and decentralized an MCS as well, may be attached to the concept of operations for division EW and company team for service support purposes SIGINT operations dictates the need for all only. EW resources to be held in GS of the division as a whole. It is only through GS that The IEW company team maybe “heavy”, effective EW support can be provided any such as shown in the preceding illustration, brigade commander. The IEW C2 system, or “light”, with few resources other than the reinforced by IEW company teams in each GSR assets portrayed. brigade AO, is the means by which aggre- The majority of MI resources in each IEW gate EW requirements are satisfied on a company team are usually held in GS of the division-wide basis through all phases of division, as previously stipulated. They can, combat. however, be placed in DS of the maneuver

2-65 2-66 brigade when METT-T factors and existing Army Aviation battlefield situations so dictate. The GSR All combat aviation resources have an and REMS assets are normally attached to implied mission to observe the battlefield the maneuver brigade and further allocated and report enemy activity to include enemy to the brigade’s subordinate battalions. locations, equipment, and movement. They also report weather observation and terrain The division OPLAN/OPORD prescribes information. Aviation units support OPSEC the designation of the IEW company team by observing and reporting poor camou- supporting each brigade and the control flage and light discipline. Aviation units and support relationships, as well. The MI normally report through aviation channels battalion OPLAN/OPORD prescribes the to the division unless OPCON to the bri- composition and task organization of each gade. When OPCON to the brigade, they of these company teams. report highly perishable information IEW Support Coordination directly to brigade, S2, S3, and FSO in accordance with defined brigade The IEW company team commander is procedures. the MI battalion’s IEW support coordinator for the brigade. He is responsible for— Air Defense Exercising control over MI assets placed under his command. Division air defense units are deployed throughout the division area to protect criti- Coordinating with the brigade S2 and cal facilities and other potential targets of S3 concerning the deployment, move- enemy aircraft. The ADA units supporting ment, and security of MI units operat- the brigade or operating in the brigade ing in the brigade AO. AO employ the FAAR/TADDS system de- Coordinating combat service support scribed earlier in this chapter. They report for MI assets in the brigade AO. combat information directly to the brigade The IEW company team commander also via the ADA support officer. They can pro- provides the IEWSE at the brigade TOC. vide information about enemy air activity, The IEWSE is supervised by a trained elec- aircraft losses, and air avenues of approach tronic warfare officer in charge (OIC) into and within the brigade area of influ- assigned by the MI battalion. The OIC, ence. A type of deployment of division ADA IEWSE serves as the IEW company team units and the FAAR/TADDS systems is commander’s senior representative at the provided in the following illustration. brigade TOC. He functions as a special Armored Cavalry staff officer. He interfaces with other The armored cavalry squadron is the members of the brigade’s coordinating and primary reconnaissance and security force special staff to help integrate, plan, direct, for the heavy division. As such, it may and coordinate MI operations conducted operate on the flanks, forward, or to the within the brigade AO. rear of the maneuver brigades. It collects The brigade commander and his staff and reports combat information about have direct access to the MI battalion’s enemy identification, disposition, and IEW C2 system via the IEWSE. The MI bat- movement. It also provides information talion’s IEW C2 system is further described about the terrain and the effects of weather in Chapter 3; and is described in detail in on the terrain. FM 34-10. Combat Engineers A combat engineer company is routinely OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS placed in DS of the brigade. This company The Army aviation, tactical Air Force, is critical to the brigade IEW effort in sev- ADA, and combat engineer units, described eral respects. First, through engineer earlier in this chapter, all support bri- reconnaissance, it provides critical informat- gade combat operations. ion concerning where brigade and enemy

2-67 forces can and cannot move. Second, ter- opportunities that the terrain presents. The rain data is vital to the intelligence DS engineer company also helps the bri- process—engineer reconnaissance data, gade reinforce the terrain; it conducts both along with terrain data, helps the brigade mobility and countermobility operations as S2 determine the limitations and tactical described earlier in this chapter.

2-68 tion of combat power on the battlefield is a Military Police basic tenet of air-land battle doctrine. Syn- A military police (MP) platoon is usually chronization begins with the integration of provided DS to each maneuver brigade. It combat power in the OPLAN/OPORD it- performs both battlefield circulation control self. Synchronization, however, is ulti- and area security operations within the bri- mately dependent on an effective C2 system. gade AO. It secures the division’s forward Command and control of brigade IEW EPW collection point in the BSA. In this operations is discussed in Chapter 3. It pro- capacity it plays a vital role in supporting vides the foundation for follow-on subject interrogation operations. The MP platoon matter regarding IEW preparation for com- supports OPSEC by observing and report- bat and actual combat operations as well. ing activity in the vicinity of facilities with These subjects are covered in Chapters 4 which it is charged, and by securing LOCs and 5, respectively. during battlefield circulation control operations. MP personnel can also provide vital information to CI teams supporting the brigade and division. Supply and Transportation The supply and transportation (S&T) battalion from DISCOM provides essential support to the brigade. It provides basic transportation means for evacuating EPW, detainees, and refugees, as well as CED and material from the forward BSA. Thus, S&T resources, as well as Army aviation assets, must be considered by the brigade staff when developing its evacuation plans. Bri- gade requirements feed the division and corps area-wide EPW evacuation plans. Command and Control The maneuver companies, maneuver battalion, and attached or supporting IEW resources from field artillery, MI, combat aviation, tactical Air Force, ADA, combat engineer, and CSS units in the division and corps provide the brigade commander a significant wartime IEW capability. The capability, shown in the following illustration, permits the brigade commander to secure his force and provide intelligence support, allowing the commander to synchronize his total combat operations. The capabilities and limitations of each IEW resource available to support brigade combat operations were described in considerable detail within this chapter. The ability of the brigade commander and his staff to realize the full potential of each IEW resource is dependent on how well they plan, support, and coordinate individual and collective IEW missions. Synchroniza-

2-69 2-70 CHAPTER 3 Command and Control Tactical skill and effective leadership are The application of C2D and C3CM strate- the foremost elements of combat power on gies on the air-land battlefield results essen- the air-land battlefields of today. Modern tially in command and control warfare. C2 technology has compressed both the time warfare is an integral component of all and space required for effective combat combat operations today. It is a battle for operations. The high mobility of air-land time, speed, and efficiency-time to plan combat forces, and the speed, range, precise and make decisions; speed to communicate accuracy, and lethality of modern weapon combat orders; and the efficiency of combat systems place stringent demands on all power applied at the critical time and place commanders and staff officers. Highly in battle. sophisticated, multidiscipline RSTA sys- The implications for C2 of brigade and tems are all-seeing, and computers react battalion combat operations are clear. The faster and more accurately than man. nature of the battlefield requires a respon- These capabilities further compound the sive and efficient C2 system. A fundamental factors that contribute to victory or defeat. element of this C2 system is streamlined They render every area of the battlefield command posts to plan, conduct, and sus- virtually insecure. tain the battle. In turn, command and staff C2 facilities are HPT for both friendly and relationships and staff procedures must enemy commanders. Both friendly and reflect the efficiency and proficiency required to operate the various elements of enemy commanders use a vast array of 2 RSTA assets to rapidly identify and locate each CP. Moreover, the C system must be their adversary’s critical C facilities. reliable, secure, fast, and durable. It must 2 be capable of communicating intelligence Enemy commanders conduct extensive and combat orders, coordinating support, RSTA operations and detailed planning and providing direction to the entire force prior to beginning an offensive operation. under all battlefield conditions. Above all, Targeting priorities are directly aligned to the C2 system must function faster and support preparatory air and artillery fires more effectively than that of the enemy. It against the defender’s main defensive must allow brigade and battalion com- forces, reserves, and key CPs. The enemy manders to receive information, process commanders continue2 their efforts to locate that information, and consistently make and destroy C facilities once the attack and execute decisions faster than the begins. Their intent is to systematically dis- enemy. rupt their opponent’s ability to command and control his available troops and sup- Brigade and battalion commanders need porting weapon systems. Their ultimate IEW support. They must be able to see, hear, and assimilate the multitude of data goal is to maximize the degradation of 2 friendly C3I systems. essential to effective C . IEW support must be timely, accurate, and totally dedicated to Enemy doctrine is founded on the Soviet extending the commander’s perception of military strategy known as Command and the battle. Control Disruption (C2D)–NARUSHENIE UPRAVLENIYA. This strategy, unlike the This chapter provides the principles, joint US strategy of C3CM, is purely offen- procedures, and techniques of IEW doctrine sive in nature. However, C2D is executed in as it applies to C2 at the brigade and battal- conjunction with extensive cover and decep- ion level. It outlines an IEW C2 system tion (MASKIROVKA) plans and opera- which allows brigade and battalion com- tions. Thus, C2D, when combined with manders to practice the basic tenets and cover and deception, is the equivalent of operational concepts of air-land battle C3CM strategy, which was defined in doctrine-initiative, agility, depth, and Chapter 1. synchronization.

3-1 COMMAND AND CONTROL The thorough planning of IEW operations allows command and staff functions to be PROCESS performed on a proactive rather than a The success of brigade and battalion reactive basis. IEW resources are “focused” combat operations depends on accurate on HPT associated with each enemy course intelligence, sound tactical plans, “focused” of action perceived. They provide the infor- elements of combat power, and quick mation essential for rapid processing at the exploitation of tactical advantages and brigade and battalion TOC in support of the opportunities. The C2 process supports these decision-making process. The disposition requirements. It consists of the procedures and intentions of the enemy are determined and techniques used to make and execute by the HPT array depicted on the S2’s tactical decisions. situation map as information flows into the TOC. Friendly courses of action and the PLANNING REQUIREMENTS information thresholds for their execution, determined in the detailed planning phase, Brigade and battalion commanders, their allow rapid decisions to be made and exe- staffs, and all attached or supporting unit cuted before the enemy commander can commanders use the basic military initiate or complete any given action. Effec- decision-making process to develop their tive OPSEC, deception, and countersurveil- battle plans. This process permits the full lance measures impede the ability of the coordination among all commanders and enemy commander to see the battlefield staff officers, the development of staff esti- clearly enough to adjust his plan to friendly mates, and the preparation of detailed initiatives. The combined effects of plans and orders. Planning, however, can maneuver, fire support, and COMJAM only be as thorough as time will permit. operations conducted at critical times in Plans and SOPS must include criteria for battle against the enemy commander’s key actions to be taken when mission-type CSI facilities further compound his seem- orders are used on the fluid battlefield. The ingly proactive decision-making process. military decision-making process and the Tactical advantages and opportunities for specific procedures and techniques used by decisive maneuver, anticipated in the given staff personnel to plan IEW opera- detailed planning phase, are developed and tions in support of the brigade and battal- exploited in combat to achieve success. ion are fully described in Chapter 4 of this manual. The entire IEW system, illustrated The division’s close operations cannot be at the beginning of Chapter 2, provides the won by the brigade without C2. And the intelligence necessary to support the battle for C2 cannot be won without coher- detailed planning effort. The brigade and ent plans. These plans must develop and battalion staffs must use all of the time ensure a firm understanding of the next available prior to combat to plan the opera- higher commander’s intent and concept of tion. Their commanders’ information and operations, encourage and develop the con- operational requirements for IEW support, fidence in subordinate commanders and as mentioned previously, must be forecast small unit leaders to seize the initiative and to the next higher headquarters early in the exploit the tactical opportunities which planning process. arise in war, and provide an indestructible C2 system in combat. In short, critical actions in response to mission-type orders are the prerequisite for successful operation on the air-land battlefield.

Combat Requirements Brigade and battalion commanders, their staffs, and all attached and supporting unit commanders or leaders use the related processes of troop-leading procedures and

3-2 command and staff actions common to the staff actions included as time and the situa- military decision-making process. Tactical tion permit. This combined set of proce- field SOPS, which detail the responsibilities dures is the most frequently used C2 process of personnel and staff sections and routine at the brigade and battalion levels. It per- operations, facilitate the rapid planning mits staff participation when possible, and and execution processes in combat. allows for rapid decision making and execu- The C2 process used in combat consists of tion. This combined set of procedures is the eight troop-leading procedures. These shown in the illustration which follows. procedures are particularly applicable to Command and staff actions, which may be fast-paced combat situations in which accomplished as time permits, are shown in limited staff input is possible. Brigade and parentheses under each troop-leading battalion commanders use these procedures procedure or step. with some elements of the command and

3-3 The troop-leading procedures used at the are taken, because the resulting decision battalion and brigade levels are fully de- might be faulty or erroneous. scribed in FMs 71-2J, 71-3, and FM 7-30, The illustration shows the relationship of respectively. The commanders and staff the troop-leading procedure and each phase officers within the MI battalion and all of of the decision cycle. Time, speed, and effi- its subordinate units which support the bri- ciency are of paramount concern to brigade gade also use these same troop-leading and battalion commanders. They reduce the procedures. Information pertaining to spe- decision-making time by establishing an cial troop-leading considerations unique to organized, systematic C2 process, making the internal operations of the MI battalion the process a matter of SOP, and by practic- are provided in FM 34-10. ing command and staff drills at every The combined set of procedures, shown in opportunity. the preceding illustration, provides the Time, as shown in the following illustra- framework for planning, preparing for, and tion, is the critical ingredient. Brigade and executing assigned and implied missions. battalion commanders establish a “time- The C2 process is initiated, formally or critical” factor for the completion of each informally, each time information requiring step and phase in the decision cycle. The some action is received. The commander “time-critical” factor is keyed to the specific collects and analyzes information, decides time in which the commander must make what to do, orders someone to do it, and his decision in order to effect the action supervises the execution of this decision. necessary to accomplish the task or mission The types of information which initiate the at hand. Adherence to “time-critical” fac- C2 process may be as complicated as an tors ensures greater speed and efficiency in OPORD or as simple as something which the application of combat power. causes the decision and action to be These “time-critical” factors are devel- accomplished as a matter of SOP. The cycle oped as a result of war-gaming and FTX begins each time a decision has to be made experiences. They are specifically designed and continues until the mission is complete, to ensure the brigade and battalion com- a new mission is received, or the combat manders’ ability to function inside the situation indicates the need for a new or enemy commander’s decision cycle. IEW alternate course of action. resources, deployed well forward in the bri- The commander’s decision cycle, as gade AO prior to and during hostilities, shown in the following illustration is de- provide the basic information from which signed to turn inside the decision cycle of the enemy’s course of action and associated the enemy commander. The commander event schedule is derived or confirmed. must make better and quicker decisions Knowing the enemy’s event schedule is the than his adversary if he is to succeed in key to effective C2. combat. The goal, proactive in nature, is to The enemy’s event schedule is initially never give the enemy commander time to predicted as a result of the detailed situa- complete one tactical response before tion and target development activities con- another is required. This forces the enemy ducted at division, brigade, and battalion commander to deal with more than one tac- levels prior to combat or prior to the next tical decision at a time and to react to anticipated engagement. Time measure- friendly plans rather than carry out his ments are estimated between each event own. anticipated. The aggregate result is a time- Each phase of the decision cycle requires sequenced series of events clearly depicting certain activities to take place and a certain the “time-critical” factors of the enemy amount of time for completion. If there is commander. Friendly courses of action and enough time, the commander completes corresponding time-sequenced event sched- each step of the troop-leading procedures in ules are juxtaposed against each enemy detail. The commander covers each step, event schedule. Friendly and enemy “time- however, even when time is limited. The critical” factors are compared and mea- time spent on each step may be only a few sured. The result is a series of friendly bat- seconds. This does not mean that shortcuts tle options designed to get ahead and stay

3-4 ahead of the enemy commander. Informa- options, or alternative courses of action, tion provided by IEW resources in combat predetermined, can then be selected and reflect exactly where the enemy commander executed by the commander in a very short is in his event schedule. Appropriate battle of time.

3-5 Principles of IEW Support essential to formal planning initiated from The IEW missions described in Chapter 1, the top down. The top-down planning effort and the IEW functions, capabilities, and is supported by the lower-echelon com- limitations described in Chapter 2, provide mands that generate their information and the basis for the principles of IEW support operational requirements from the bottom to both offensive and defensive combat up. operations. These IEW principles are Three of the four decision-cycle functions directly2 keyed to the brigade and battalion portrayed in the preceding illustration— C requirements described above. The prin- collect, process, and assess battle damage ciples of IEW support are— —are IEW functions. They are three major components of the intelligence cycle which Knowing the battlefield-multi- is described in FM 34-1. The intelligence discipline RSTA assets to provide cycle is driven by the commander, his mis- essential information about the enemy, sion, and his concept of operations. Con- terrain, and weather. stant supervision and direction by the Denying the enemy intelligence—EW3 G2/S2 ensures a continuous flow of infor- and COMSEC resources to protect C mation to the commander and other staff and CI support to OPSEC deception, members in both peace and war; that is, the and rear operations dissemination of intelligence. Disrupting and destroying enemy C3I facilities—COMJAM resources to dis- Attack, the fourth function depicted in the rupt HPT C3I facilities and ESM preceding illustration, is also supported by, resources to target fire-support and endemic, to IEW. The intelligence provided by the IEW system supports the systems. commander, G3/S3, and FSCOORD’ Maintaining the integrity of IEW efforts to select HPT, based on decisions on operations—task organization to what, when, where, and how to attack. The satisfy aggregate mission require- attack plan may include IEW missions for ments and the full integration of IEW COMJAM systems. to maintain the integrity of the force as a whole. The combined intelligence and attack cycle, superimposed upon, and intertwined IEW COMBAT POWER with, the decision cycle reflects the commander’s targeting process, described in The principles of IEW support provide Chapter 4. The targeting and decision pro- commanders and staff officers a significant cesses are inseparable in both peace and insight regarding the application of IEW war. Substitute “plan” or “train” for combat power. The application of IEW “attack” and the cycle and processes con- combat power begins in the planning phase tinue to turn. Planning, training, and refin- of combat operations and continues ing SOPS, followed by continued planning, throughout the course of battle. IEW com- training, and evaluation, ensures the combat power, applied today in peacetime, adds bat readiness of the force.2 It also ensures a new dimension to brigade and battalion 2 that the commander’s C system and pro- combat operations and the commanders’ C cess can do the job in war. The command- process, as well. This new dimension is por- er’s C2 system must be well-exercised and trayed in the following illustration. stressed during peacetime. The combat power IEW brings to the The combat power of IEW is maximized commanders’ C2 process is intelligence. In when it is applied in accordance with C3CM peacetime, intelligence supports contin- strategy in war. C3CM strategy supports gency and battle plan development activi- the top-down formal planning process men- ties at all levels of command from the bat- tioned above. It provides the corps, division, talion through EAC and the national and brigade commanders with four options command authority. The intelligence avail- to protect and counter friendly and enemy able in peacetime provides the information C3I systems, respectively. The four C3CM 3-6 options are defend (OPSEC), deceive (tacti- support measures, such as demonstrations, cal deception), disrupt (jamming), and de- feints, COMJAM screening, high-power stroy (physical destruction), Intelligence communications support, and COMSEC supports all four C3CM options. Protect C3 monitoring also help to protect friendly C3 is a “constant” on the battlefield; it is systems. OPSEC and deception measures to assured through the application of effective protect brigade and battalion C2 systems OPSEC and deception measures. Active are described in FMs 71-3 and 71-2J.

3-7 3 The offense is at the very heart of air-land targets. Some of these HPT are key C I battle doctrine. Thus, the disruption and facilities of the enemy force commander. destruction of enemy C3I facilities is the first and foremost consideration to protect COMMAND AND CONTROL friendly C3I facilities. Depth is extended, ORGANIZATION AND tactical opportunities arise, agility is exer- FACILITIES cised, initiatives are taken, and battles are The brigade and battalion CP consists of won. the facilities and locations from which the The combined effects of maneuver, fire respective commanders, assisted by their support, and EW attacks against key C3I staffs, plan and direct the battle and sus- facilities in battle interdict and impede the tain the force. Exercise of C2 is focused in enemy commanders’ C2 process and deci- three major facilities at both commands— sion cycle. The cumulative degradation, the tactical CP, the main CP, the rear CP at shown in the last illustration, creates inde- brigade, and the command group, TOC, and cisiveness on the part of enemy command- administration and logistics center (ALC) ers. The time needed to make decisions is at battalion. This section outlines the IEW lengthened, for key CPs and alternate C2 responsibilities of the staff personnel and facilities need to be reconstituted. The describes the facilities through which the incessant attack against key C3I facilities commander accomplishes his C2 functions. renders the enemy commanders’ C2 system COMMANDERS AND STAFF virtually ineffective. It can never be recon-2 stituted long enough to regain effective C . Brigade and battalion commanders de- As mentioned previously, C3CM strategy fine the IEW mission and explain how is applied in a top-down planning process it supports their concept of operations. starting at EAC. Brigade and battalion They coordinate with supporting IEW unit commanders fully realize the intent of commanders, such as the MI IEW company senior commanders who apply C3CM strat- team commander, to organize IEW re- egy to their battle plans. They must do so, sources for combat. They state their infor- since their C2 systems extend to, and are a mational and operational needs, specify part of, the next higher commander’s C2 their desired effects, and assign missions to system. The entire system needs to be pro- subordinate unit commanders. They ensure tected in a coherent, well-orchestrated that all organic, attached, or supporting manner. The maneuver brigades, their subunit commanders understand their inten- ordinate maneuver battalions, and support- tions for IEW support to combat operations. ing fire support and MI units are also the They provide subordinate commanders the major action arms for attacking key C3I necessary latitude to make decisions that facilities supporting enemy close-in forces. can allow rapid reaction to fleeting tactical Friendly C2, in combat, cannot totally rely opportunities. on the availability of all communications The commanders position themselves to facilities at all times. Protecting and coun- effectively control their combat forces. They tering C3 actions must be considered on a 2 accurately determine where the IEW effort regular basis in performing all C functions. must provide support priorities to ensure They must be executed using the same de- success. The relative need for information gree of initiative applied to other battle from the depth and width of the AO and the tasks. In fact, the application of C3CM synchronization of various IEW resources, strategy and commensurate IEW combat arms, and services are the two tactical con- power is much more imperative when siderations which determine where to place friendly forces are outnumbered and out- CPs, and the commanders themselves. gunned on the air-land battlefields. A deaf, dumb, and blind enemy force is not too Brigade and battalion commanders leave worthy an opponent. Available maneuver, their CPs and position themselves at van- fire support, and IEW systems must be tage points well forward in the AO, when employed against the highest payoff circumstances so dictate. Regardless of

3-8 location, the commanders monitor and fol- factors, takes appropriate actions as the low enemy actions based on real-time com- conditions of battle change. bat information obtained by IEW resources The above is also applicable to all at- positioned throughout their respective AOs. tached or supporting IEW units in the bri- They track the actions of subordinate bat- gade and battalion AO—especially the MI talions and companies respectively, battalion’s IEW company team and its sub- through close coordination with their subordinate unit commanders. They also ordinate or attached platoons, squads, and remain cognizant of how units are being teams. supported throughout their AO. The Brigade Staff Succession of command and delegation of The brigade staff consists of the officers authority are established within all unit and enlisted personnel required to plan and SOPS. At the brigade and battalion levels, supervise brigade operations. The brigade the executive officers (XOs) know the com- staff monitors combat service support mander’s location and communicate with operations to ensure that adequate support him by several alternate means—face to is provided to all attached or supporting face, AM or FM radio, or messengers. Spe- maneuver, fire support, and MI resources cial staff officers at both brigade and bat- within its AO. The overall duties and talion main CPs, such as the IEW support responsibilities of the members of the bri- officers from the MI battalion, maintain gade staff are detailed in FMs 71-3 and 7-30. similar contact with their unit commanders Many of the specific IEW responsibilities of who are in support of brigade and battalion members of the brigade’s coordinating and combat operations. Unit SOPS establish special staff were described in Chapter 2, who is in charge. Succession of command in where it was deemed essential to under- all units is planned to permit continued standing mission requirements based on combat operations in the event of the com- the capabilities and limitations of given manders’ incapacitation. IEW systems and organizations. Brigade and battalion staffs are composed of people specifically ordered or The Intelligence Officer—S2. The S2 is detailed to assist the commander in the the principal advisor to the brigade com- exercise of command. The staff reduces the mander concerning the enemy, terrain, and demands on the commander’s time and weather. He manages intelligence opera- assists the commander and subordinate tions to satisfy the commander’s require- units by issuing warning orders, providing ments. He assists the commander in identi- information, making estimates and recom- fying the specific information requirements mendations, preparing plans and orders, such as are described in Chapter 1. He and supervising the execution of estab- plans, supervises, and coordinates the col- lished orders. The staff permits the com- lection and analysis efforts to ensure that mander to accomplish his duties without combat information and intelligence are becoming continually involved in many of disseminated promptly to staff elements or the specific details incident to command, subordinate units. thus allowing him to obtain first-hand An S2’s first and most important respon- knowledge by visiting subordinate units. sibility is to provide the intelligence his The relationship between the commander commander needs to make sound tactical and staff must be close and effective. The decisions. He uses every means available to commander clearly articulates his concept develop timely, complete, and accurate and intent for all operations. The staff then intelligence to satisfy these needs. takes appropriate actions before and during the battle to attain the commander’s objec- The S2 recommends IR to the comman- tives. This must be done without constant der. First, he identifies requirements to sup communication with the commander. The port planning. Planning requirements are staff, understanding the commander’s based on the assigned and implied missions intent, and fully aware of time and distance given the battalion or brigade, and the

3-9 commander’s planning guidance. They The brigade S2 also manages the person- become the basis for the intelligence esti- nel and information security programs. He mate, which supports other command and assists the S3 in planning and evaluating staff estimates. After the commander the effectiveness of the unit’s OPSEC pro- decides on the friendly course of action, the gram by providing information on enemy S2 develops intelligence requirements to intelligence collection capabilities, and support his concept of the operation. assisting in evaluating friendly Based on the concept of the operation, the vulnerabilities. S2 develops intelligence requirements to The brigade BICC provides the brigade support every battlefield function that con- S2 with an organic collection management, tributes to the accomplishment of the analysis, production, and reporting capabil- mission. ity that enables him to supply the com- Requirements to support maneuver and mander with the intelligence required for fire support are always high priority. Other making decisions. Acting under the supervi- important functions that require intelli- sion of the brigade S2, the brigade BICC gence support include— controls and coordinates the combat intelligence collection effort for the brigade. It OPSEC expedites the dissemination of information Deception and intelligence among the BICC, the brigade’s subordinate maneuver battalions, EW the DS field artillery battalion, the air ADA support defense artillery battery, elements of the IEW company team from the division’s MI Combat aviation/tactical Air Force battalion, adjacent brigades, and higher support headquarters. Engineer support The brigade BICC assists the S2 in devel- CSS oping intelligence requirements. After the brigade commander approves the require- The S2 coordinates closely with the bri- ments, the BICC develops the R&S plan. It gade commander, the brigade XO, the S3, forwards collection requirements to the and other staff officers. He also coordinates division G2 section that cannot be satisfied with subordinate and supporting command- by resources assigned to, or supporting, the ers and staffs to determine what intelli- brigade. gence they need in order to plan and con- The brigade R&S plan integrates intelli- duct operations within their functional gence requirements of units assigned to, or areas of responsibility. supporting, the brigade, adjacent brigades, The S2 expresses intelligence require- and the division. The BICC receives divi- ments as PIR. The commander approves sion requirements in the intelligence annex the PIR. The S2, with the assistance of the of the division OPORD. Requirements may battlefield information control center be stated as PIR, IR, or as assigned collec- (BICC), identifies other IR to satisfy the tion missions. commander’s information needs. The PIR, The BICC develops and manages the exe- with associated IR, are the basis for the cution of the brigade R&S plan. It reviews R&S plan. the maneuver battalions’ R&S plans and The S2 develops and implements the R&S incorporates them into the brigade plan. It plan as the formal collection management consolidates requests for aerial R&S sup- tool. An informal collection plan may also port from the maneuver battalions with be developed, but is not required at the bri- brigade requirements and submits the con- gade and battalion levels. He provides staff solidated requirements to the division col- supervision over organic and allocated R&S lection management and dissemination assets. He coordinates with the S3 to ensure (CM&D) section. that the intelligence and resulting R&S The BICC maintains the current status of plan supports the commander’s concept of organic, attached, or supporting RSTA the operation. assets. The S2 coordinates tasking with the

3-10 S3 to ensure compatibility with the brigade within the assigned AO. The staff relies on commander’s scheme of maneuver and the the IEWSE from the divisional MI battalion tasked unit’s primary mission. It tasks the to assist in planning and executing EW DS IEW company team operating within operations and to request additional EW the brigade AO through the IEWSE. It support, when required. normally transmits tasking as fragmentary orders. The S3 has primary staff responsibility The brigade BICC processes incoming for planning and coordinating EW opera- intelligence reports to develop the situation tions conducted in the brigade AO. He inte- and targets in response to brigade require- grates EW with maneuver and fires to ments. It screens reports to isolate signifi- ensure that supporting EW resources are cant information, evaluates them for accu- used effectively to support brigade and bat- racy and reliability, correlates them with talion combat operations. He establishes currently held information, and analyzes priorities and recommends deployment and them to determine enemy intentions and to missions for EW systems. The S3 forwards develop targets. It also develops intelligence EW requirements to the division G3 for con- to support brigade EW, OPSEC, and decep- sideration and incorporation into the divi- tion operations. It identifies gaps in the sion and MI battalion’s OPLAN/OPORD. data base, which become new collection The MI battalion’s IEW support element requirements. The BICC maintains the assists the brigade S3 in planning EW enemy part of the brigade situation map operations. The assistant brigade S3 is a (SITMAP). specially trained EW staff officer and The BICC disseminates information and should have the additional 5M skill identi- intelligence to all subordinate units of the fier. He assists the S3 in planning brigade brigade and to units supporting the brigade, EW operations and in integrating EW with to the division, and to adjacent brigades. It the scheme of maneuver and supporting fire disseminates combat information immedi- plan. ately to those elements that need it. The S3, S2, and C-E officer coordinate The Operations and Training Officer— closely in planning and executing EW S3. The S3 is responsible to the brigade operations. commander for plans, operations, and The C-E officer ensures that friendly elec- training. He plans and directs OPSEC, tronic systems are protected from enemy deception, and EW operations. REC operations. Coordination between the The S3 has a vital interest in the produc- S3 and the C-E officer ensures that ECM tion of intelligence. He uses intelligence as will not significantly degrade brigade the basis for all operations planning. He communications. ensures that friendly courses of action are The S3 manages the OPSEC program. He evaluated in light of the enemy situation, analyzes the commander’s concept of the the battlefield terrain, and the weather con- operation to determine sensitive aspects ditions under which the battle will be that must be protected from enemy intelli- fought. Through the application of intelligence. He recommends EEFI to the com- gence to planning, the S3 ensures the most mander. He relies on the S2 to assess enemy effective use of the combat resources at the intelligence collection capabilities and right time and place to achieve the results friendly indicators that might compromise the commander desires. the EEFI. EW operations are planned in detail at The S3, in coordination with the S2, per- the division; they usually support the bri- forms a risk analysis and develops appro- gade battles. The division G3 allocates EW priate OPSEC and deception measures, as support to the brigades based on the aggre- well as other lethal and nonlethal counter- gate requirements of the brigades and the actions. He monitors the effectiveness of the division commander’s overall concept of brigade’s OPSEC program and deception operations. The brigade staff plans and operations, making adjustments as coordinates EW operations conducted required.

3-11 The IEW Support Element. The MI bat- single CP, degraded, suppressed, or de- talion provides an IEWSE to support each stroyed, can greatly impede the command- maneuver brigade staff and coordinates all er’s decision cycle—as shown in the last MI operations in support of the brigade. illustration. Thus, there are numerous The IEWSE is the essential link between imperatives each CP must meet if success is the brigade TOC, the IEW company team to be achieved. These CP imperatives are as commander, and the MI battalion tactical shown on the following page. operations center. It provides assistance in planning the use of MI assets and in identi- A simple comparison of the considera- fying and requesting additional support tions and functions listed under the three from the MI battalion. CP imperatives, shown above, and the The IEWSE normally is collocated at the decision-cycle functions and troop-leading brigade TOC. Personnel assigned or at- steps shown earlier, reflects the importance tached to the IEWSE perform the following of CP survival on the air-land battlefield. functions: Failure to survive is failure to operate, and failure to operate is defeat. Advise the brigade S2 and S3 on the capabilities, limitations, and employ- The brigade commander knows the im- ment of supporting MI assets. portance of survival. He takes all the steps Assist the brigade S1 and S3 in plan- necessary to ensure maximum redundancy, ning the use of supporting MI assets austerity, dispersion,2 and mobility when and in preparing taskings for EPW organizing his C system for combat. Mini- interrogators, CI, GSR, and E W mum signatures for each CP and strict resources. adherence to established OPSEC, SIGSEC, and ECCM procedures are demanded. Coordinate with supporting MI elements or the IEW company team The brigade commander organizes his commander to ensure a rapid response headquarters for combat by grouping staff to all requirements. sections or elements of sections within the Ensure rapid dissemination of combat headquarters by function for efficient staff information from EW elements directly coordination. Under ideal conditions, the to the brigade S2, S3, and FSO. organization of the brigade C2 elements Ensure that deployed EW elements are includes a main CP, a tactical CP, and a advised of friendly force maneuvers BSA. that directly affect their security. The Main Command Post. Brigade C2 is accomplished primarily through a main CP. Coordinate with the MI battalion tac- For security, only essential elements are tical operations center on all matters located in this CP. It consists of those coor- concerning MI support within the dinating and special staff personnel. and brigade. representatives from the division or other Coordinate with the brigade staff to units necessary to carry out combat opera- ensure the availability of necessary tions. It is concerned with the activities support for MI elements. required to sustain current operations and plan for the future. This includes intelli- Advise the brigade S2 and S3 of the gence production and receiving and pro- organic capabilities of the MI assets at cessing combat information, as well as corps, and assist in the preparation of submitting required reports to higher requests for that support via the divi- headquarters. sion staff. The main CP of the brigade is usually Brigade Command Posts. The single located to the rear of battalion task forces, purpose of CPs at any echelon is to support out of range of enemy direct fire and mortar the commander by providing the framework fire where possible. It is close enough to and system necessary to facilitate his rapid maintain FM communications with the CPs decision-making process. No CP can of subordinate elements. Since its location achieve its purpose if it does not survive. A is often within range of enemy artillery, its

3-12 electronic and visual signature, too, must be lished by elements from the division signal no larger than that of a battalion CP. battalion. Most of the brigade staff operates from The armored vehicles shown in the fol- the brigade main CP. The S3; S2; fire sup- lowing illustration are located in the main port; chemical, biological, and radiological CP complex and are an example of how a sections; TACP; IEWSE; FSE; engineer ele- heavy division brigade CP (armor or ments, and ADA elements are all present. mechanized) may be composed. Communications with division are estab-

3-13 These include one each from the S2 and VHF FM communications. The FSO and FSE sections and two from the S3 (one S3 DS field artillery battalion communications vehicle used to establish the TAC CP when interface was described in Chapter 2 in dis- necessary). These four vehicles make up the cussion of the overall fire support C2 tactical operations center. The remaining system. two armored vehicles are the communica- Communications are maintained with the tions platoon’s vehicle that carries the division using multichannel, radioteletype, RATT, normally remoted from the CP and a division command net (FM), and division vehicle (normally Ml13) for the TACP. operations and intelligence net (FM). Single Elements from supporting air defense side-band (AM) communications are also artillery elements and engineer elements used in communicating with the division are also found in the CP. The TACCP vehi- TOC. Multichannel communications are cle is only located here when it is not provided to the brigade MAIN by the divi- employed elsewhere on the battlefield. sion signal battalion. Multichannel and These six armored vehicles and accompany- voice communications are augmented by ing vehicles required to support the main RATT nets which include the division CP are dispersed over an area of approxi- operations/intelligence net and the division mately 500 square meters. command net. The brigade main CP is primarily a coordination, information, communications, The Tactical Command Post. When and planning center. It includes a TOC for required, a brigade commander may employ operations and intelligence functions. The a TAC CP. This provides command and main CP is arranged to facilitate work and control of the immediate battle and contains only those personnel required for security, take advantage of cover, and per- immediate control of the battle. The pres- mit quick displacement. Its physical ar- 2 rangement is prescribed by unit SOP. The ence of a C element well forward places the brigade main CP communicates with the brigade commander near his subordinate brigade commander and subordinate battal- commanders. ion task forces over the brigade command The TAC CP is used when a key phase of net (FM). The brigade MAIN also communi- an operation is taking place that requires cates with subordinate elements over the additional control: when the main CP is brigade operations and intelligence net displacing, during river crossings, passage (FM) and the administrative logistics net of lines, or when the disposition of brigade (FM). Land line communications are used units requires that communications be whenever possible as an alternate means of relayed. A TAC CP is ideal for fast-moving communication. The IEWSE, as mentioned mounted operations since it allows the previously, maintains communications with commander to directly influence that battle the IEW company team commander and MI while the remainder of his staff, supervised battalion tactical operations center via by the executive officer, operates from the main CP. Brigade Support Area. The BSA of the brigade is located well to the rear and provides the CSS function required to support the brigade. The brigade S4 is responsible for the operation and displacement of this element. The S1 and the S4 maintain continuous contact with the brigade executive officer located at the main CP to ensure the adequacy of CSS operations. The forward area support team, or the forward support battalion CP from the division support command, is also located in this support area and provides support to the brigade

3-14 units. This support team or battalion CP Supervising the command’s personnel locates and displaces according to the direc- security and information security tions of the brigade S4. Another unit programs. located in this area is the brigade headquarters company minus those company Disseminating combat information. elements located at the main. EPW collect- Assisting the S3 in targeting battalion ing point, military police, and civil affairs weapon systems, and planning, execut- personnel may be located with or in proxi- ing, and assessing battle damage mity to the BSA. results. The Alternate Command and Control Facility. The brigade commander estab- The battalion S2 is primarily concerned lishes an alternate C2 facility in case his with directing and coordinating the collec- primary C2 elements are destroyed. It may tion, reporting, and dissemination of com- be the CP of a subordinate unit or support- bat information and targeting data. He ing unit. Succession of brigade command is plans and supervises R&S operations, using usually to the senior task force or battalion organic, attached, and supporting re- commander. These subordinate units are sources. He amplifies IPB products received designated to implement this procedure from the brigade S2 based on the battalion when required. commander’s PIR. Requirements exceeding the capability of battalion resources are The Battalion Staff forwarded to the brigade. The Intelligence Officer—S2. The S2 has the staff responsibility for intelligence and The tactical intelligence officer works security training. The S2 organizes for con- under the supervision of the S2 and is part tinuous operations during combat in coor- of the two-man BICC. The BICC’s primary dination with the S3. The S2 and S3, responsibility is to effectively manage the through close coordination and cooperation, unit intelligence collection, processing, and are prepared to perform each other’s duties. disseminating effort for the S2. The BICC The S2 is responsible for preparing and normally operates in the TOC. executing R&S plans. The S2 is normally The battalion BICC is a vital link in the located in the TOC during operations, IEW system. It is the first element to begin although he may also be placed in the the analysis and processing of front-line command group displaced forward. The combat information. The BICC provides battalion S2 is responsible for— combat information, performs limited anal- Recommending PIR and IR. ysis of information, and acts as the intelligence resource management element for the Directing and managing the com- battalion. It forwards requests for informa- mand’s reconnaissance, surveillance, tion outside the capability of the battalion’s and target acquisition assets. IEW resources to higher headquarters. The Processing information into BICC also provides the S3 with intelligence intelligence. support to OPSEC. Additionally, the Performing rapid target and situation BICC— development activities before and during combat and providing pertinent Develops and maintains an intelli- information to subordinate, higher, gence data base. and adjacent units. Plans and manages the battalion col- Coordinating’ and consolidating com- lection effort and prepares the battal- mand requirements for weather and ion’s R&S plan. terrain analysis support. Integrates information and intelli- Planning and supervising the imple- gence from all sources. mentation of countersurveillance mea- Processes and disseminates intelli- sures to support all operations. gence and information.

3-15 Prepares intelligence summaries and situation, reporting to higher headquarters, reports. and planning future operations. Factors which have immediate operational impact Assists the S3 in evaluating the com- and must be monitored by the TOC and mand’s OPSEC posture. communicated to the commander are speci- Assists the S3 in identifying friendly fied in priority (friendly or enemy) as vulnerabilities to enemy intelligence follows: collection systems. Assists the S3 in identifying the type FRIENDLY and amount of OPSEC support Changes in mission or status of the required. task force or higher adjacent units. The Operations and Training Officer— Changes in status of supporting fires S3. The S3 has staff responsibility for mat- or CAS priority. ters pertaining to the organization, train- Loss of unit combat effectiveness of a ing, and operations of the battalion and platoon-size or larger equivalent force attached units. He maintains necessary (including loss of DS or attached units liaison with the brigade S3 and adjacent both maneuver and support). units’ S3. The S3 supervises TOC operations. He is responsible for coordinating the Strength, location, and activity of actions of the FSO, engineer support officer, operational forces down to platoon and other planners in preparing the battal- level (including DS and attached units, ion’s OPLAN\OPORD. The S3 is normally both maneuver and IEW support). in the TAC CP during operations. The S3 is Changes in status of major organic also responsible for— systems having a significant impact Identifying EW support requirements. on combat power. Class III and V status. Coordinating with C-E officer to establish ECCM to protect battalion C31 Priority of fires and CAS. facilities. Status of friendly or enemy obstacles Identifying and recommending EEFI. and contaminated areas. Battalion Command Posts. The battal- 3 ENEMY ion TOC is the C center for combat and Major contact with, or withdrawal of, IEW operations. The TOC is composed of platoon-size or large enemy units. the S2 and S3 sections, elements of the communications platoon, the FSE, and Changes in location or sighting of representatives from other attached ele- enemy platoon-size or larger units. ments, such as the GSR squad leader and Employment of NBC weapons. ADA support officer. The organization of the TOC in terms of vehicles and personnel Appearance of nuclear fire support must be as small as possible to allow for weapons. rapid displacement 3 but sufficiently manned Location, strength, identification and to accomplish its C functions in support of activity of units in contact and capa- the commander. The personnel in the TOC bility of enemy units to reinforce and monitor operations on a 24-hour-a-day support. basis. The functions of the TOC when the com- Significant changes in enemy logistics mand group is deployed forward in a TAC capabilities. CP are to monitor and assist in the C2 of The TOC must be capable of continuous current operations by integrating CS and operations for extended periods of time. CSS into ongoing operations, maintaining Because of the limited number of personnel coordination with higher and adjacent available, continuous operations are usu- units, continuously updating the enemy ally conducted in two duty shifts. Although

3-16 all personnel must be available during criti- The command group fights the battle. cal periods, off-duty personnel are usually The commander will position himself so performing maintenance on vehicles and that he can “see the battle” and issue equipment, providing security for the CP, appropriate orders at the critical times. and resting. “Seeing the battle” consists of more than The battalion SOP describes specific positioning this command group in a loca- responsibilities for each individual in the tion to observe decision points and critical TOC. The responsibility for maintenance of actions. It also implies that the command group is in a position to receive reports on friendly and enemy situation maps, enter- those key indicators that he has discussed ing and monitoring radio nets, maintaining with his subordinates and, upon receipt of daily journals, controlling access to the these reports, that he is in a position to TOC, obtaining and maintaining current order decisive action. The FSO must be in a logistics status (ammunition, fuel, equip- position to coordinate indirect fires and ment availability rate, unit strengths, and respond to changes in the situation or mis- so forth), and rendering required reports sion with recommended changes to the fire should be included. support plan. The ALO must also be in a The headquarters and headquarters composition to see the battlefield in order to pany (HHC) XO is normally responsible for coordinate CAS, shift preplanned CAS CP security. He coordinates with the S2 and targets, and advise the commander on CAS S3 to determine— issues. Sector designations. The command group normally operates in two or three armored vehicles modified for Mine and anti-intrusion device C2. The crews of the tracked vehicles in the emplacement locations. command group assist in operating radios, Chemical alarms. posting maps, moving the vehicles, and providing security, thus freeing the com- Dismount points. mander and S3 to concentrate on the battle. Parking areas. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS Security arrangements are specified in CENTER the individual battalion SOP. The ALC is the coordination center for CSS for the battalion. The battalion S4 is responsible for operations, movement, and COMMAND GROUP security of the ALC. He is assisted by the The command group is that element S1. The ALC locates within, and is the con- which the commander takes forward with trol element of, the combat trains. It is him to help C2 the battle. The composition located in a position on the battlefield to of this command group depends on the provide forward CSS to all elements of the situation and the desires of the commander. battalion task force. The position also must The command group will generally consist allow the ALC to function as the alternate of the commander, S3, FSO, ALO, and the TOC if necessary, normally within 2 to 4 crews from the assigned tracked vehicles. kilometers of the TOC. Although the ALC is The command group is not a permanent normally designated as the alternate TOC, organization and is normally prescribed by it must be understood that, if required to SOP and modified as necessary. The com- function as the TOC, its logistical functions mand group is highly mobile, enabling the will be degraded. commander to move about the battlefield as necessary. It is normally activated and COMMAND, CONTROL, AND employed for the actual conduct of the bat- COMMUNICATIONS tle only, with the battalion TOC controlling subordinate battalion or battalion task The air-land battlefield is dynamic and forces during other periods. lethal, and places demands on tactical

3-17 communications systems not experienced in elements located in the brigade or battalion the past. Communications systems must be AO may have RATT capability. However, capable of delivering to the commander the this capability is used for communications information he requires for decision making with the MI battalion tactical operations quickly and in a form that facilitates the center and TCAE. There are no direct decision-making process. It is imperative RATT links to either the brigade or that brigade and battalion commanders be maneuver battalion from IEW elements able to turn their decision cycle inside that operating within the brigade or battalion AO. of the enemy. Rapid, reliable, and secure communications are the means by which Radio (FM) this can be accomplished. 3 Secure VHF, FM, and HF AM communi- Rapid, reliable, and secure C provide a cations means are used to interface most of means for tasking and coordinating IEW the IEW elements located in brigade and resources and for receiving intelligence, battalion AO. These communications— combat information, and targeting data especially the data systems—are fast, and from these assets. They also provide a can handle large amounts of traffic. They means for brigades and battalions to report need a minimum number of personnel and information to the division, to disseminate space for equipment and can be remoted or intelligence, combat information, and tar- operated while on the move. They can also geting data to their subordinate maneuver be integrated into compatible wire systems. units, and to support fire support systems. Retransmission of these secure communica-2 This section describes the communications increases their range for enhanced C . tions systems that support brigade and bat- Limitations include a high susceptibility to talion IEW operations. It describes brigade jamming or interception and interference and battalion IEW communications require- from atmosphere, terrain, or man-made ments, and the complementary intelligence sources. If security equipment is not used, FM radio is the least secure means of com- and EW nets of the battalion and brigade. 3 munications. Critical C I facilities can be The communications system supporting immediately identified by enemy SIGINT/ brigade and battalion IEW operations is REC units and targeted by both lethal and primarily composed of the VHF FM and HF nonlethal attack systems. RATT intelligence nets, described earlier in Chapter 3. Intelligence nets are established Wire at each level of command throughout the division. Wire communications (telephone) is a backup system for FM radio. It is one of the COMMUNICATIONS MEANS most dependable means of communications and is more secure than radio. It is not Brigades and battalions rely on multiple vulnerable to enemy disruption or DF, means of communications, Radio, wire, and although wire can be tapped (with or with- other systems are integreted to complement out a physical connection) if the wire is not each other. This provides maximum flexi- covered or guarded. Wire is generally used bility, reliability, and responsiveness to bri- to interconnect closely located activities, to gade and battalion commanders’ IEW integrate radio with wire, or to tap into needs. existing commercial lines. Radio Teletypewriter One of the major disadvantages of wire is HF RATT facilities are the primary that it cannot be used under mobile condi- backup means of communications in the tions. It also requires more time, men, and division. They provide a rapid method of equipment to install and maintain than transmitting lengthy or technical informa- radio. Even when it is laid properly, signal tion. HF RATT requires greater power, integrity diminishes over long distances. more maintenance, and higher quality cir- When it is not laid properly, it may be dam- cuits than simpler means of communica- aged by tracked and wheeled vehicles or be tions, such as wire or FM radio. Some EW susceptible to wiretaps.

3-18 Brigades and battalions normally use gade. Specific instances when this may be wire for internal communications within required is the evacuation of captured their CP area and assembly areas. MI and enemy documents for immediate exploita- other units located in the brigade or battal- tion at higher headquarters. Messenger ion AO use wire to remote active COMJAM operations are described in FM 21-1. sysems and other C3 emitters from their actual locations for survival purposes, when TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS the situation permits. SYSTEM Messengers There are two major means of radio Messengers provide a secure means of communications available to support IEW delivery for bulky items or large quantities operations within the brigade AO—HF of message traffic. The use of messengers is RATT and VHF FM. When these individual limited only by the availability of trained systems are supplemented with wire and personnel and transportation, and by the net radio interface (NRI), they become part tactical situation. Using messengers re- of the division’s comprehensive tactical duces the electromagnetic signature and pro- communications system. This system provides a means of communicating if electri- vides the brigade with the ability to coordi- cal means are destroyed or their use is nate, task, report, and disseminate intelli- inadvisable. Although messenger service is gence and combat information with higher, very flexible, it is slower than electrical lower, and adjacent units within the transmission. Weather, terrain, and opera- division. tional considerations also impact on the The Multichannel System type and frequency of messenger service. The maneuver battalions, field artillery, At the brigade and battalions, messen- MI, and other supporting units in the bri- gers are used regularly between CPs, trains, gade or battalion AO do not have a multi- higher headquarters, and subordinate ele- channel capability. They rely on the for- ments. MI and other units do not have the ward area signal center (FASC) in the BSA assets to establish a regular messenger ser- for multichannel communications when vice. However, depending upon the nature required. CI and EPW interrogators from of the material and the combat situation, the MI battalion may require access to special messenger service may be performed these multichannel facilities for intelligence by IEW company team personnel or estab- reporting purposes. The normal deployment lished by the supported battalion or bri- of FASC is shown in the following illustration.

3-19 3-20 HF RATT Communications System RATT nets that link the EW platoons and the SIGINT processing platoon with the The brigade communications platoon TCAE and S3 at the MI battalion tactical establishes an HF RATT net between the operations center. This provides a means to brigade and its subordinate battalion head- send and receive record copy traffic and quarters. This net provides a means to dis- large volumes of technical data to and from seminate and report intelligence and com- the platoons and the TCAE. The EW pla- bat information between the brigade and its toon has no direct RATT or FM link with subordinate battalions. the brigade or the brigade’s subordinate battalions. The illustration below depicts The MI battalion’s service support com- the RATT communications system in the pany installs, operates, and maintains brigade AO.

3-21 VHF FM Communications System Maneuver Battalion Nets. Maneuver battalions rely primarily on FM radio communications to transmit highly per- Division Nets. Brigade VHF FM commu- ishable information. Intelligence and com- nications links to the division are estab- bat information is passed to the battalion lished through two division FM nets: the TOC from the brigade through the brigade command net and the operations/intelli-2 intelligence net (FM). A secure command gence (0/1) net. The brigade receives C net is used for C2 of the battalion, itself. All information and operational tasking from organic and attached units normally oper- the division G3 via the FM command net. ate in this net to include the FSO, ALO, and The FM division 0/1 net provides the bri- leaders of supporting elements, such as gade with a means for receiving intelligence GSR squads or team leaders. The command and information from the division G2 and net is controlled by the S3 or S2 in the bat- other commands within the division. The talion TOC. brigade S2 uses this net to report informa- Maneuver battalions may use a surveil- tion and intelligence developed by the bri- lance net or establish a separate 0/1 net, if gade and to pass requirements and requests required. The battalion may establish an for additional IEW support to the division 0/1 net by unit SOP if required. The pur- G2. The MI battalion S2 and S3 are sub pose of the 0/1 net is to transmit routine, scribers on the division 0/1 net; they report lengthy reports, thus freeing the command information to, and receive intelligence net of this type of traffic. Reports such as products and IEW mission tasks from, the routine unit situation reports, bridge/route division G2 and G3 sections. reports, obstacle reports, NBC reports, and Brigade Nets. The brigade 0/1 net links so forth, would be transmitted on this net. the battalion S2 and other units, as re- This net may also be used by the S3 or quired, to the brigade S2 section (BICC). commander to relay instructions to the TOC This net provides a means for coordinating, regarding upcoming operations. One radio tasking, and disseminating combat infor- at the TOC will monitor the 0/1 frequency. mation and intelligence. The scout platoon net may function as a Supporting GSR/REMS teams, CI sup- surveillance net when required. The S2 and port teams, and EPW interrogator teams elements assigned surveillance missions located in the brigade or battalion AO, may operate on these nets. also be assigned to this net for tasking and reporting purposes when operating in direct OTHER COMMUNICATIONS support of the brigade. This net gives the SYSTEMS AND NETS brigade S2 the capability to task and receive reports and information from these Information about the specific network MI resources. Such tasking is coordinated structures and other communications sys- with the IEWSE at the brigade TOC. The tems, some of which were mentioned in IEW company team commander is always Chapter 2, is beyond the scope “of this man- informed of any major requirements. ual. Such information is provided in FMs 71-3, 71-2J, 34-10,7-20, and 7-30. Military Intelligence Nets. The IEW support officer who heads the IEWSE is a subscriber on the MI battalion operations center\TCAE SIGINT/EW tasking and reporting net (FM) to the EW platoon operating in the respective brigade’s AO. The EW platoon headquarters located in each brigade AO is also a subscriber on its respective EW tasking and reporting net.

3-22 CHAPTER 4 Preparation For Combat

Combat support operations are organized Examples are— as integral parts of combined arms opera- Intelligence estimates of higher tions. Maneuver, fire and IEW makeup the headquarters. significant components of combat power. OB books. This chapter describes how combat operations are preplanned to support brigade and Register of Intelligence Publications battalion combined arms operations. It de- (RIP). scribes IEW system interface to accomplish Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) the IEW mission and how IEW is integrated handbook on (specific country) armed with other combat functions in combined forces. arms operations. This chapter focuses on those activities conducted prior to combat Scientific Technological Intelligence with support from division IEW assets. Reports (STIR). In preparation for combat, each staff sec- DIA and Central Intelligence Agency tion reviews the commander’s mission and (CIA) periodical technical intelligence determines the specific task to be per- reports. formed. The commander’s guidance and concepts of the operation, along with indi- Area studies handbook (specific vidual staff estimates, provide the basis for country). determining brigade and battalion IEW Foreign materiel catalog (FOMCAT). requirements to organize the unit’s contin- Division, corps, and theater intelli- gency mission. gence products, which include intelli- The brigade or battalion S2 focuses on gence estimates and OB listings. critical intelligence and information needs Theater topographic products. dealing with enemy, weather, and terrain. He supplies the information on potential Engineer soils analysis. enemy forces, thereby assisting other staff Climatic weather studies. elements and subordinate elements in These data are consulted for additional satisfying their requirements. information or to answer questions when The brigade or battalion S3 depends on developing initial estimates. The results of the S2 for information needed to support the initial work are provided to the EW and OPSEC. This data assists in the commander. deployment of EW systems, the selection of The planning guidance phase consists of OPSEC measures and the selection of pos- mission analysis, restated mission, and sible jamming targets to support brigade commanders’ planning guidance. and battalion OPLANs. MISSION ANALYSIS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS Mission analysis ensures that the commander identifies all of the tasks required When this mission is received, the S2 be- to accomplish the mission. Some tasks are gins a preliminary analysis of the AO and specified in the OPLAN/OPORD as re- enemy situation. Obtaining a copy of ceived from higher headquarters. Other higher headquarters analysis is vital to tasks may be implied by the situation, mis- support this function (see OPLAN/OPORD sion, and purpose of the operation, and on specific requirements). Data is derived must be deduced by the commander during from a variety of sources available to divi- the analysis. The commander relates tasks, sion and higher echelons. if possible, to the terrain or enemy.

4-1 RESTATED MISSION If planning guidance is necessary, the commander must take care not to unduly The restated mission results from the bias staff estimates. commander’s mission analysis. It is a clear, concise statement of the task (or tasks) to be Estimate accomplished by the command and the The staff assists the commander in reach- purpose to be achieved. Multiple tasks are ing a decision by making estimates in their normally described in the sequence to be assigned areas of responsibility. These accomplished. Many tasks may be identi- estimates analyze the influence of factors fied during the mission analysis; however, within the staff officer’s particular field of the commander’s restated mission includes interest on the accomplishment of the only those tasks which are essential to the command’s mission. It also identifies fac- overall success of the operation. Tasks tors that affect formulation, analysis, and which are routine or inherent responsibili- comparison of feasible courses of action. ties of a commander are not included in the The staff estimate concludes and recom- restated mission. For example, routine mends feasible courses of action. In making tasks, such as establishing liaison, or an estimate, the staff officer consults with refueling of vehicles are a matter of SOP other staff officers and agencies. The S2 is and, while important, should not be key to the estimative process at all eche- included in the restated mission. The re- lons. IPB formulations concluding with a stated mission becomes the basis of all decision support template (DST), the intelli- command and staff estimates and is para- gence estimate in graphic form, serve as the graph 1 of those estimates, whether oral or basis for other staff planning. written. The restated mission is also paragraph 2 (Mission) of the command’s Staff. The staff estimates may be prepared OPLAN/OPORD. mentally, orally, or in writing. Often, only the staff officer’s conclusions or recommendations are presented to the commander. COMMANDER’S PLANNING The intelligence estimate format is found in GUIDANCE Appendix A. At battalion and brigade, Commander’s planning guidance is pro- enemy capabilities are normally drawn vided by the commander to the staff as from the higher headquarters’ estimates required. The frequency, amount, and con- and restated in terms specific to the bri- tent of planning guidance will vary with gade’s and battalion’s assigned area of the mission, time available, situation, operations. information available, and experience of the commander and staff. The commander Commander. The commander’s estimate is may choose to issue initial planning gui- based on personal knowledge of the situa- dance to the staff when the restated mission tion and estimates provided by the staff. It is announced. This guidance is used to also contains modifications to compared direct or guide the attention of the staff in courses of action and judgment on facts not the preparation or revision of staff esti- known, recognized, or available. The estimates and serves to expedite the decision- mate should ensure a course of action that making process.. Initial planning guidance is feasible when supported with available might include: resources. The commander’s estimate is constantly reviewed as new information is Courses of action that should be obtained. addressed or disregarded. Concept Unusual restrictions placed on the The commander announces his decision command. and concept to key members of the staff. Considerations for the employment of Subordinate commanders may also be pre- nuclear or chemical weapons. sent. The concept is the commander’s de- Directions regarding deception. scription of the present operation. The commander normally announces his deci- Other factors considered important. sion and concept orally to staff officers and

4-2 subordinate commanders so they can exe- Intelligence Estimate. cute the operation in the absence of further instructions. Intelligence Annex. Plans and Orders R&S plan to the OPORD. Plans and orders are procedures for the Detailed discussions of these documents commander’s decision and concept. This are found in FM 101-5, Appendix G. Once procedure requires some compromise approved by the commander, the OPORD/ between speed and responsiveness and OPLAN is published and issued to the orderly procedure and detailed planning. At command. The next step is to supervise the this point, the S2 prepares the intelligence operation. plans and intelligence portions of The military decision-making process is OPLAN/OPORD. illustrated below. Specific documents include but are not limited to—

4-3 requirement, and identifies the timeliness COLLECTION MANAGEMENT and reporting procedures to be followed. Collection management is defined as the Any collection requirement(s) that cannot timely, efficient process of assigning be accomplished by organic, subordinate, or approved intelligence requirements (includ- adjacent units’ collection agencies are ing the commander’s PIR and IR) to collec- passed to higher headquarters for tors in support of military operations. Prin- consideration. ciples governing collection management The collection effort involves continuous include— planning, updating, and revising to satisfy There is only one top priority—the the commander’s PIR/IR. As PIR/IR and commanders. All other IR are priori- available collection agencies change, so tized by the collection manager. does the collection plan. The collection management cycle is depicted in the follow- The OB data base must be checked to ing illustration. ascertain if requirements can be answered immediately. RECEIVE AND ANALYZE Specific questions must be asked of REQUIREMENTS collectors—they must know where to look, when to look, and what to look Collection requirements and priorities are for. expressed in terms of PIR/IR. The most A higher headquarters should not be important collection requirements given to told what collector to use; the collection the BICC are the commander’s PIR. To manager at that level is better able to accomplish this support it is necessary to— determine that. Receive requirements. In the battalion task force and brigade, Determine indicators. collection management is defined as limited Determine SIR. by the principles above, and is the job of the S2 and BICC. The BICC, under the direc- Determine reporting requirements. tion of the S2, prepares a complete R&S Received requirements are processed by plan which is most often accompanied by the brigade or battalion BICC in the follow- an overlay. The R&S plan is disseminated ing manner: as an appendix to the Intelligence Annex of the unit OPORD and updated via fragmen- They are logged into the journal. The tary orders (FRAGO). system used is flexible or dependent The collection plan (Appendix A) assists upon SOP; a control numbering sys- the S2 in managing requirements, collection tem, however, will ensure uniformity agencies, and time constraints. As such, the and an audit trail. collection plan is dynamic and is updated The new requirements are compared to continually. The collection plan format active collection requirements to ascer- should include the following entry head- tain if current collection missions can ings, as a minimum: answer those new requirements, thereby reducing the number of collection PIR/IR. missions assigned to already limited Indicators. numbers of collectors. Specific information requirements The validity of the requirement must (SIR). be determined. (The commander’s PIR are always valid.) Requirements gen- A list of collection agencies. erated outside the headquarters are A place and time to report. usually accepted as valid. However, The plan identifies the basic information requirements levied by organizations required to answer the commander’s which have the organic means of col- PIR/IR, indicates the collection agencies lecting that requirement will be consi- available to best satisfy the collection dered invalid. 4-4 The new requirements are then com- intentions. Indicators provide the” what to pared to the OB data base to ascertain look for” information required by collectors. if the required information is already A list of enemy indicators is found in available. If so, collection agencies will Appendix F of FM 34-3. not be tasked, leaving them free to exe- Indicators can be specified by location cute other collection missions. New col- through the use of NAI. An NAI is any lection missions should never be point or area on the ground, usually along tasked without researching the data an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, base. where activity (or lack of activity) will con- The requirement must then be evalu- firm or deny a particular enemy course of ated to-determine its priority of collec- action. The S2 depicts NAI on the event tion. For example, a battalion task template, thus using it as a collection tool. force in a movement to contact has In fact, the event template is the vital link varying levels of requirements. The between the collection effort and IPB, GSR platoon leader requires the because NAI specify the “whereto look” friendly avenue of approach (or mobil- information required by collectors. NAI can ity corridor) more than the air defense be numbered, named, or lettered. officer needs an obstacle overlay. The Determining SIR is a function of the most critical requirements should be BICC. SIR are the basic questions that need satisfied first. to be answered to confirm or deny the exis- An indicator is any positive or negative tence of an indicator. Essentially, SIRS are evidence of enemy activity or any charac- indicators in question form in sufficient teristic of the area of operations that points detail to be the basis for tasking collection toward enemy capability, vulnerabilities, or agencies. For example, as an indicator of

4-5 possible enemy intentions, the locations of The capability and requirement correla- air defense units are needed. An SIR would tion matches the collector to an SIR. For be a question, asking whether or not there example, to locate a ZSU-23-4 air defense- are any ZSU-23-4s at location X. Medium related radar, the tasking would be submit- air defense guns are displaced forward prior ted to a unit capable of collecting radar sig- to the attack to protect assault forces and to nals (ELINT) or a unit or agency capable of facilitate forward displacement during the seeing or imaging a ZSU-23-4 (aerial scouts attack. ZSU-23-4s protecting the regimental or IMINT). This understanding of capabili- artillery group (RAG) are approximately ty eliminates tasking an incapable collec- 1.25 KM to the rear of the FLOT. After SIR tor. For example, a SLAR mission would be have been prepared, the S2 incorporates inappropriate to locate the whereabouts of them into the collection effort. the enemy commander. The collection manager specifies the most capable collector. Like PIR, SIR should be assigned There may be several collectors capable of priorities. Remember that the commander’s PIR are always the highest priority collec- answering an SIR; the collection manager tion requirements. The primary basis for must choose those collectors most capable determining the priority of any requirement of collecting the SIR. The specific elements is its criticality to the friendly mission of the capability and requirement correla- accomplishment and the time and information are— tion is needed (or will no longer be of value). Range-to-target location. (Consider the Reporting requirements specificy when, tactical employment of collectors and where, and in what detail information is the range of the collectors, usually reported. Reporting requirements are devel- from the FLOT.) oped in terms that are understandable by collection units or agencies. The collection Time available should be compared to manager must speak the language of the the historical or estimated response HUMINT, IMINT, or SIGINT collector. The time of the collector. The period begins purpose is to provide the collection agency when an information request (PIR or with specific collection and reporting IR) is received and concludes when the requirements which ensure that the right information is received by the request- data is collected and reported promptly to er. Times required to complete each the appropriate user. (Where to look, when event should be calculated or estimated to look, and what to look for.) from each available collector based on the tactical situation and local SOPS. Unit SOP should outline the reporting The S2/BICC must ensure that com- requirements, to include report format, fre- munication media times and priorities quency of reports, and methods of trans- are considered. Often, timeliness can mission. Requirements are based on the only be derived from experience. needs of the requester. The technical characteristics of each DETERMINE RESOURCE collector must be examined in detail to AVAILABILITY AND CAPABILITY ensure that the collector has the tech- The selection and tasking of organic and nical capability to perform the mis- supporting collection units and the formula- sion. The S2 should not hesitate to tion of requirements for higher echelon refer to the DOD Sensor Capabilities support require a basic knowledge of the Handbook which provides information units, agencies, and sources that can pro- on the technical characteristics of col- vide information by the S2/BICC. The fol- lectors. Location by IMINT/HUMINT lowing chart defines sources and agencies sensors is very accurate; however, the and lists what units and activities fit into ESM/SIGINT sensors may not be as each category. Usually, only capable agen- accurate as IMINT/HUMINT. The cies will be tasked; rarely will a collection local weather conditions can affect col- manager task a source directly. Sources and lection capability and exploitation of agencies are explained on the following data collected. Weather support can be page. obtained from the USAF staff weather

4-6 officer (SWO) at division or from the higher priority. The next most capable col- artillery meteorological sections. lection agency would then be tasked to exe- Another source at brigade and battal- cute the collection mission. ion level is the forward area limited The brigade or battalion S2, in conjunc- observing program (FALOP) or “belt tion with the S3, determines selection of col- weather kit”. lection resources based on their unit’s primary mission, outstanding collection - Collector vulnerability to the antici- requirements, and that collection resource’s pated threat depends on the collector. ability to collect SIR. Combat and combat Penetrating collectors, such as patrols, support units constitute the primary collec- are the most vulnerable. tion capability of the maneuver brigade and The local terrain with its potential battalion task force (BTF). The brigade may LOS limitations will affect the LOS have multidisciplined MI collection support capabilities of given types of collection available; however, the BTF relies pri- systems (such as SIGINT and GSR). marily on maneuver and fire support elements, which are controlled by the S3. The above factors must be matched or correlated to determine the proper or capa- The collection manager should use one ble collector. Although a collector may be collection agency to cue another when pos- evaluated as capable, the collector may not sible. For example, a communications inter- be physically available for the mission. For cept may detect and determine the approxi- example, if it’s determined that an aircraft mate location of an enemy battalion’s CP. photo mission is the most capable collector, The collection manager can then effectively the collection agency to which the collector use other collection systems to pinpoint the is organic could respond that no aircraft are location. He must plan and coordinate the available because of maintenance, adverse use of cuing and confirming systems weather, or existing requirements of a against priority targets. The unit SOP,

4-7 however, should specify standard cuing and justified against high priority targets when confirming relationships and procedures for the probability of intercept by any one sys- coordination of these collection agencies. tem is less than 100 percent. Examples are The collection manager also uses a air defense (AD) units and CPs. selected redundancy and resource mix against high-priority targets. Redundancy TASK COLLECTION RESOURCES is the use of multiple agencies with known Following selection of collection agencies, capabilities to provide information concern- intelligence requirements tasking is pre- ing a single target or SIR. Similarly, the pared. The tasking of organic agencies is collection manager may employ a mix of accomplished according to command SOPS collection agencies with different capabili- but is normally accomplished through the ties to exploit the different signatures of a use of the R&S plan at the brigade and bat- target. talion levels. Tasking of agencies controlled Various procedures may be used to select by higher headquarters must be submitted the collection agencies capable of SIR. One through proper channels and requires justi- format is the asset evaluation worksheet fication. Issuing specific orders and (AEW). The purpose of the AEW is to requests (SOR) depends entirely upon com- determine the capability of a collector to mand relationships. For example, a battal- satisfy SIR. When the AEW is completed ion S2 can initiate patrolling missions by and the collectors identified as fully or the authority of the battalion S3. The line marginally capable, those assets are ap- companies must provide the patrols to exe- plied to the collection plan beside the SIR cute the orders from battalion. On the other they could possibly supply. hand collection missions stated to higher Devising a collection strategy includes headquarters are requested, not tasked. resource integration, cuing, collector mix, The key to successful tasking of collection and redundancy. Resource integration missions is in remembering which echelon enhances the efficiency of the overall collec- is involved. Lower echelons “ask” or re- tion effort. The collection manager must quest from higher, and higher echelons attempt to integrate new collection require- “tell” or task the lower ones. The standard ments into current missions, which offers collection asset request format (SCARF) is three benefits: used for intelligence requirements tasking Employs the fewest number of and for requesting information from higher collectors. or adjacent headquarters. The SCARF can be used for all intelligence disciplines. It Decreases cost and risk. specifies the following: the information Increases the utilization of overall col- needed (what to look for); where and when lection capacity available. to look for the movers, shooters, sitters, and The result is increased productivity. emitters; and when the information is Before requesting additional missions, needed. In some cases, a collection means however, the collection manager must con- may be recommended. For additonal infor- sider three factors: present operating mis- mation on the SCARF, refer to Appendix A sions, scheduled future missions, and new and Chapter 3 of FM 34-1. tasking requests. The S2/BICC should, as a The S2 coordinates all taskings with the rule, task those agencies under his control S3 for those collection agencies organic to first before requesting collection missions the battalion or brigade. This coordination from higher or adjacent units. ensures that the collection taskings are compatible with, and support, the current Cuing is the use of one collector to provide scheme of maneuver and future operations. necessary targeting information to direct Units assigned, attached, or supporting the collection by a more accurate point-target brigade or battalion, except for MI units, system. are tasked through the operations (S3) Collection against a target requires using channels. Intelligence tasking channels for a combination of collectors. This may be potential IEW resources supporting brigade

4-8 and battalion collection missions were out- Once engaged in combat, this collection lined in Chapter 2. plan is updated as required. Another method of tasking is through the use of the brigade and battalion OPLAN or IEW TASKS OPORD. If an intelligence annex is not published with the OPLAN or OPORD, IEW operations, in both peace and war, tasking instructions may be included in support the winning of campaigns and bat- paragraph 3 of the OPLAN or OPORD. ties. The mission of IEW operations is to Tasking instructions are as follows: provide the combined arms commander A further explanation of OPLAN and with three forms of support: intelligence, OPORD is given later in this chapter. counterintelligence, and EW.

EVALUATE REPORTING The combined application of these forms of support, the IEW mission, translates into Collection management is a dynamic pro- four major tasks: situation development, cess that does not end with tasking. The target development, CI support, and EW. BICC must monitor collection and reporting to ensure that collection agencies respond to SITUATION DEVELOPMENT assigned collection missions and report The situation development process pro- their results to designated users in a timely vides to commanders the intelligence data manner. they need to plan and conduct combat UPDATE COLLECTION PLAN operations. This process incorporates the intelligence cycle and IPB functions. The BICC continuously updates the collection or R&S plan in response to changing Situation development enables command- requirements. It purges the plan to elimi- ers to see and understand the battlefield in nate requirements that have been satisfied sufficient time and detail to employ their or are no longer needed, due to changes in forces and weapons systems effectively. In the situation. situation development, the S2 uses IPB to produce a description of enemy force dispo- The S2 integrates new requirements sitions on the battlefield in terms of loca- according to priorities, changing the priori- tion, size, type, direction, rate of movement, ty, or eliminating old requirements when and activity. This portrayal is based on an necessary. analysis of intelligence data which is con- A formal R&S plan is normally prepared tinuously updated through the collection as part of the S2’s intelligence planning and processing of information. process at battalion and brigade levels prior Intelligence Cycle to combat. A collection plan may also be prepared informally at the brigade level to The intelligence cycle consists of four help define the numerous tasks and collec- phases: directing, collecting, processing, tion agencies applicable to brigade collec- and disseminating. It is a continuous pro- tion operations. This collection plan serves cess, and each phase is conducted in as the basis for the development of the R&S sequence. However, all phases are being plan which is an appendix to the Intelli- conducted concurrently. While new infor- gence Annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. mation is being collected, the intelligence

4-9 staff plans and redirects efforts to meet new Dissemination. The dissemination and demands, while previously collected infor- use of intelligence is the last and most vital mation is processed and disseminated. All step of the intelligence cycle. Usable infor- phases of the cycle focus on the command- mation and intelligence is distributed to er’s mission. The intelligence cycle is illus- those who need it. trated below.

Directing. The commander, through the Most information is used in the develop- S2, directs the intelligence effort. The S2 ment of intelligence, and can often be used translates the commander’s guidance and immediately for fire, maneuver, or ECM. concept of the operation into intelligence When raw data can be used as received for requirements and established priorities. fire, maneuver, or ECM, with no interpreta- Intelligence requirements and priorities are tion or integration with other data, it is expressed in terms of PIR and IR. These combat information. terms are defined as shown on the following page. Combat information is further defined as unevaluated data gathered by, or provided Collecting. This is the process of gather- directly to, the tactical commander. Due to ing information from all available sources. its highly perishable nature or the critical- Collection operations are guided by the ity of the situation, combat information commander’s requirements and are facili- cannot be processed into tactical intelli- tated by use of the collection plan and IPB. gence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical Processing. This is the phase of the intel- intelligence requirements. ligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. Information from all sources is Once raw data (including combat infor- evaluated, correlated, and analyzed to pro- mation and ESM) is validated, integrated, duce a current all-source assessment stating compared, and analyzed, it becomes intelli- the enemy’s current dispositions, capabili- gence. In other words, the difference be- ties, and most probable course of action. tween intelligence and combat information

4-10 is in the method of handling the data. If the IPB is a vital function of situation devel- information must be processed and ana- opment. Actually, it is the key to preparing lyzed, it is intelligence and not combat for combat. Today’s intelligence must en- information. Information may be both able the commander to “see” the battlefield combat information and intelligence. in all its aspects: graphically, red depicts Intelligence Preparation of the the enemy, white shows the terrain and Battlefield weather, and blue portrays friendly forces. IPB provides a mode that ensures uni- IPB is an important function in situation formity in how intelligence personnel development. It is an excellent tool for pre- within each echelon of command are to paring for combat. It provides a guide to the analyze weather and terrain and evaluate commander and his staff in determining the effects of each on enemy and friendly where and when to use available resources courses of action. Commanders must make to achieve decisive results based upon more complicated decisions than ever expected dispositions. before. Therefore, each commander needs The brigade S2 initiates intelligence timely and accurate intelligence that will operations by developing an intelligence aid his decision-making process. data base, which is applicable for each IPB is the continuous and systematic potential area in which a unit may be process of evaluating the enemy, weather, required to operate. The BICC acquires the and terrain for a specific battlefield area. required data, and using IPB methodology, IPB provides the basis for a dynamic R&S converts it into graphics that can be readily plan and a guide for the effective employ- used by the brigade and battalion comment of collection, reconnaissance, and manders and staffs. Brigade and battalion surveillance assets. Through the systematic BICCs are not sufficiently resourced to per- process, all the battlefield’s elements can be form formal IPB without assistance from incorporated into easily understood graphic higher echelons. They request IPB products products. IPB graphics are communicated from the division all-source production sec- through the use of templates and multi- tion (ASPS), which they refine to satisfy layered overlays. These graphic data bases their commander’s needs based on their specific assigned area of operations, mis- provide a basis for situation and target sion, and PIR or IR. They do, however, use development. IPB methods to record and analyze infor- The IPB process and the associated pro- mation about the enemy, weather, and ter- ducts have applications across a broad con- rain that the commander and staff needs tinuum of operations. Terrain analysis, for planning, decision making, and the integrated with knowledge of how a specific conduct of combat operations. foe would like to fight, can provide likely In preparation for combat, IPB is con- areas on the battlefield where intelligence ducted based on assigned mis- operations can be focused to determine sions. It supports the planning and execu- enemy courses of action. Likewise, terrain tion of most other battlefield functions, as and weather analysis can be used to sup- well. port friendly OPSEC operations, allowing

4-11 for optimum siting of units to deny the IPB, as illustrated, is a continuous and enemy vital intelligence. systematic process performed for a specific geographic area. It consists of five func- IPB is the link between intelligence operations or steps. Step 1 is the battlefield area tions and air-land battle doctrine. By inte- evaluation. Steps 2 and 3 are the analysis of grating the air-land battle with the IPB the terrain and weather. Step 4 is an evalu- process and carrying it over to intelligence ation of the Threat forces expected to be operations, the air-land battle can be won. found operating in the battlefield area. Step Intelligence is vital to the successful con- 5 is the nucleus of IPB where Threat forces duct of the air-land battle. The commander (red) are integrated with the weather and must know where the enemy is and know terrain (white) and friendly operations the best point to engage him in order to win (blue). This combination of red, white, and the next battle. blue into final graphic products aids the commander’s decision-making process in IPB is “homework” that each echelon the areas of— must accomplish before the battle begins. Battlefield area evaluation. Through IPB, gaps in the intelligence data base become readily apparent. Thus, Terrain analysis. through collection management, require- Weather analysis. ments can be fulfilled before the first shot is fired. Threat evaluation. Threat integration. IPB analysis provides a basis for planning and executing the battalion and bri- NOTE: Chapter 3, FM 34-1 and Chapter 4, gade battles. It helps the commanders to FM 34-3 provide additional discussion on visualize the battlefield—where friendly the IPB process illustrated here. and enemy forces can move, shoot, and communicate; where the critical areas of the The battlefield area evaluation function battlefield are; and where enemy systems of IPB must be performed first. Terrain and become most vulnerable to attack. It helps weather analysis and threat evaluation the S3s to determine where the battalion may be performed concurrently or in and company teams can be employed to sequence, since all three are equally impor- take maximum advantage of the terrain, tant. For example, a unit assigned a mis- and where and how the terrain can best be sion might first need the evaluation of the reinforced. It guides the S2 concerning areas of operation and interest. The key is when and where to employ collection sys- to use the IPB process to satisfy the mis- tems for maximum effectiveness. It also sion. But keep in mind that the first four provides a basis for analyzing collected functions or steps must be completed before information to determine enemy intentions. Threat integration can be accomplished. The products developed through IPB are However performed, one of the significant used to support many battlefield functions. benefits of IPB is that the framework is IPB is most valuable to commanders and complete before the battle begins. Since it is operations officers, allowing the command- paramount that the first battle be won, IPB er to better track and predict enemy move- must be conducted and constantly updated ment, and interdict and target enemy units. before the conflict begins. IPB, also referred to as the intelligence The first function of the IPB process deals estimate in graphic form, enables the com- with an evaluation of the battlefield area; mander to make better decisions regarding for example, the areas of operation and operations and planning. interest. It is within these areas that the battles will be fought. The AO is defined by higher headquarters. Commanders select their own areas of influence and interest. The following illustrations depicts the areas of operations and interest.

4-12 4-13 This function involves filling in the time S2s must have information on observation and space framework of the Threat model and fields of fire, concealment and cover, and can be referred to as thinking “white”. obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of This creates an organizational structure for approach and mobility corridors (OCOKA), the Threat model and identifies the impact to be successful in their missions. of the environment on the enemy (red) and Basic topographic maps serve as the friendly (blue) units. We need to be able to foundation for terrain analysis. Depending think about the environment in two basic upon the map editions and the actual ter- modes: time and geography. rain, the information contained on each may may not be totally accurate. They do, Commanders must be able to “see” the however, depict elevations, road systems, battlefield in terms of the dimensions of towns, waterways, depressions, and other depth, width, height (airspace), and time. vital terrain information. Topographic These dimensions are examined in light of maps provide a wealth of good information. the defined areas of operations and interest. Layer tinting, or presenting elevations in As a result, PIR are developed by the com- different colors, is a technique that can be mander (that is, his highest priorities). used for LOS. In terrain analysis, the military signifi- The S2 should not rely solely on map cance of terrain is analyzed in detail to reconnaissance. Visually observing the ter- determine how it affects friendly and enemy rain will add another dimension to terrain capabilities, vulnerabilities, and courses of analysis. If this is not possible, discussion action. To be successful, a combat force with scouts, OP and listening post (LP) per- must be able to move, shoot, and communi- sonnel, reconnaissance patrols, and GSR cate. Thinking “white” is used when con- teams will establish more credibility with sidering environmental effects on battle the commander and staff. outcome, regardless of whether it is the The S2 does not have the organic capabil- enemy or friendly force. In other words, ity to produce the detailed products neces- rarely does the terrain change. sary to support the terrain analysis process. Terrain includes natural features, such as The S2 can request terrain support or pro- mountains, forests, rivers, and manmade ducts from the division’s terrain team. features, including cities, highways, and These teams have personnel trained and cultivated areas. Terrain usually dictates equipped to create the detailed terrain pro- how the battle will be fought. ducts called terrain subfactor overlays. These overlays—not templates—present Terrain analysis is one of the most criti- detailed information for specific areas. cal and important steps of IPB, since commanders must use terrain to site weapon Should the terrain team (or its products) systems, minimize vulnerability to enemy not be available, the S2 should develop a fires, canalize enemy movement, and pro- system or technique for terrain analysis. tect vital lines of communication (LOC). This should include— Establishment of a terrain data base Regardless of who does the work, there and identification of intelligence gaps. are certain aspects of terrain analysis that apply in all areas. Commanders and their Development of terrain subfactor overlays based upon different times of the year. Development of combined obstacles overlays. Identification and analysis of avenues of approach and mobility corridors. Consideration is to analyze the terrain from both offensive and defensive standpoints.

4-14 Although the terrain doesn’t change, de- ment, and every person on the battlefield is fending a battle position is different than a affected by the weather. Commanders plan movement to make contact with an armor to take advantage of weather conditions unit. The same terrain may be viewed dif- favorable to the mission. Similarly, they ferently. The numbers of overlays will plan operations to minimize the adverse depend upon factors of METT-T. effects of the weather. Terrain cannot be analyzed without tak- Threat evaluation focuses on the specific ing the effects of weather into considera- enemy force expected to be found operating tion. During Step 3, climatic data and in the battlefield area. To adequately evalu- weather for the AO are analyzed to deter- ate the Threat, the analyst must think like mine their effects on friendly and enemy the enemy. That is, he must see the battle operations. Historic weather data and through the enemy’s eyes. The analyst be- weather subfactor overlays are integral gins to create a baseline threat model by parts of the intelligence data base. The building an OB data base. Although a data close relationship between terrain and base usually exists, none is totally com- weather in a tactical environment make plete. The data base should be established Steps 3 and 4 inseparable. around the nine OB factors: composition, disposition, strength, tactics, training, The five military aspects of the weather logistics, combat effectiveness, electronic that concern intelligence support to opera- technical data, and miscellaneous information planning are: temperature and humid- tion. Chapter 3, FM 34-3 contains a detailed ity, precipitation, winds, clouds, and visi- discussion of OB factors. bility. The tactical significance of these aspects, and the risk or opportunities they As much of the written data as possible is present, depend upon knowledge of weather then portrayed graphically in the form of data acquired and the significance of the doctrinal templates. Steps 1 and 5 of the effects of weather elements on Army user IPB process are accomplished through the operations. analytical technique known as templating, or converting written data into graphics. The S2 can obtain weather support from Templating itself can be thought of as a the division’s SWO, the division’s artillery visual OB data base, and thus is another meteorological section, or from their own technique of “cataloging” information on assets. The FALOP or “belt weather kits” the enemy and the environment. OB fac- provide the S2 with the organic capability tors, to include formations, frontages, to gather existing weather data. depths, equipment numbers, and HVT are There are numerous weather subfactor types of information that can be displayed overlays that can be developed. For exam- on doctrinal templates. Doctrinal templates ple, for the brigade commander on the depict enemy doctrinal deployment for vari- demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Korea, an ice ous types of operations without the con- thickness overlay would be extremely im- straints imposed by the terrain and weath- portant. Weather overlays are used to aug- er. In other words, if the world were flat, ment the more traditional weather products with no terrain or weather, the enemy could such as light data tables and climatic deploy units exactly as desired; however, summaries. such is not the case. Practically any situa- Weather is critical to Army tactical operation, unit, formation, or rate of movement, tions. Reliance on mobility requirements for or such features as petroleum, oils and lu- thoroughly integrated air and ground oper- bricants (POL) points and ADA systems, ations, and the need to see and attack deep can be doctrinally templated. into the battlefield, may be affected signifi- Examples are, an MRR in a hasty river cantly by prevailing weather conditions. crossing, ZSU-23-4 deployment, MRB in the Complex weapon and support systems fre- defense, MRD in the attack of a defending quently depend on favorable weather condi- enemy, an MRB in pursuit, and so on. This tions for accuracy and effectiveness. Virtu- is only a sampling of the doctrinal tem- ally every operation, every piece of equip- plates the S2 can produce. Depicted below

4-15 is a type of doctrinal template. sible. As an enemy force moves along a par- The last function of the IPB process is the ticular area of the battlefield, it will be integration of the Threat with the weather, required to do certain things at certain terrain, and friendly operations. Threat places which are dictated by weather, ter- doctrine is examined in relation to the exist- rain, and tactical doctrine. ing situation and to the constraints im- The situation template shows how Threat posed by the weather and terrain. By doing forces might deviate from doctrinal disposi- this, the analyst is able to determine how tions, frontages, depths, and echelon spac- the Threat forces will probably fight. ing to account for the effects of the terrain Friendly courses of action are also inte- and weather. grated with the effects of the terrain and The following illustrations are examples weather and anticipated enemy courses of of situation templates. Note how unit dispo- action. This assists the commander in se- sitions have been adjusted and frontages lecting a friendly course of action. compressed. Through the use of situation templating, A doctrinal template of an MRR is over- the enemy’s doctrine is integrated into the laid on subject terrain. “Obviously, doctrinal constraints created by the weather and ter- frontages and unit configurations do not fit rain for a specific battlefield area. the confines of the subject terrain. The situation template is basically a doc- As enemy forces move along mobility cor- trinal template with terrain and weather ridors, their actions continue to be influ- constraints applied. It is produced by plac- enced by terrain and the tactical situation. ing a doctrinal template over a selected Since this movement is sequential, situation mobility corridor or specific terrain configu- templates are sequential snapshots of how ration and noting how the enemy force the enemy might look as the force must modify its doctrinal configuration to progresses. account for environmental constraints. Unit distances and frontages are ad- The analyst uses military logic to fit the justed, but kept as close to doctrine as pos- enemy force to the terrain as closely as possible with relation to the subject terrain.

4-16 4-17 In order to generate hypotheses concern- Information thresholds can be ing the enemy and environmental effects on assigned to each NAI, which alert the the friendly mission, it is important that the analyst that the expected action is con- S2 know the commander’s mission so that firmed or not confirmed within the the information needs can be anticipated, time limit set. identified, and understood. This involves Events within NAIs can be analyzed more than “knowing” the mission. To for indicators against which intelli- “understand” the mission, the S2 must gence and target acquisition resources think like the commander. That is, he must can be directed or redirected as re- know how the friendly unit is organized quired. NAIs are a basis for collection and equipped, as well as friendly tactics and R&S planning. and battlefield functional systems. Once this. is known, a hypothesis as to the impacts of the enemy and environment can The third of four templates produced dur- be assessed. ing the IPB process can be created at this point. The event template is nothing more Situation templating is a basis for event than a collection of NAIs which are time- templating. Event templating is the identi- related, logically sequenced indications or fication and analysis of significant battle- events based on a series of situational tem- field events and enemy activities which plates. The NAIs will determine what you provide indicators of the enemy course of are looking for, and generally when and action. As the enemy force moves along a where to look. mobility corridor, critical areas become apparent. These areas are significant Thus, event templating is the vital link because, within them, significant events between intelligence collection requirements and activities will occur. It is within these and the commander’s intelligence needs. areas that targets will appear. These areas The following illustration is an example are identified as NAI, An NAI is a point or of an event template. NAIs numbers 1 area along a mobility corridor where enemy through 9 are areas where particular types activity or lack of activity will confirm or of activity would provide indications of deny a particular enemy course of action. intent. NAIs facilitate intelligence collection, The event analysis matrix (EAM) is reconnaissance and surveillance, and anal- another IPB tool used in conjunction with ysis because— collection and R&S management. An event analysis matrix is developed for each mobil- Attention is focused cm areas where ity corridor. Based on terrain constraints the enemy force must appear if it has and enemy doctrinal rates of movement, selected a particular mobility corridor. estimated times between NAIs can be computed. For example, using the previous Significant military events can be illustration, the distance between NAI 1 framed by time and location within and NAI 3 is 7 kilometers. Time phase lines NAIs. (TPLs) graphically depict estimated enemy Events in one NAI can be compared to movement rates. Using a covering force events occurring in NAIs of other mo- rate of movement of 6 kilometers per hour, bility corridors as the basis for deter- the estimated time between these NAI is 70 mining enemy intentions. minutes (1 hour 10 minutes).

4-18 4-19 The EAM assists in the collection by analyst has the basis for predicting what specifying the “when to look” information the enemy intends to do next. Such infor- required by a collector. mation provides the basis for constructing Through the use of both the event tem- decision support templates. plate and the event analysis matrix, the S2 Intelligence products are the “output” of can direct assets to the NAI at the right the IPB activities. To produce usable pro- time to observe enemy acts and events. ducts, it is necessary to know what the vari- Both of these tools will confirm or deny ous users require, the detail required, and in enemy intentions by location and time. what format. Up to this point in the IPB Depicted below is an example of an EAM. process, a number of products have been Note the NET (not earlier than) time and created. For instance, the doctrinal tem- NLT (not later than) time. The observed plates created during threat evaluation time column allows for adjusting enemy were essentially for intelligence use. The rates of movement and estimated times in event template can be used by all collection subsequent NAIs. managers, and by the collection agencies themselves.

The matrix enables the analyst to more The basic product used by the tactical precisely correlate what event or activity is commander is the decision support template expected within the geographical location (DST). As a matter of fact, the DST is tradi- and at what time the event is expected to tionally considered the only real product of take place. This capability, along with doc- the IPB process, with all the other tem- trinal and situation templates, provides the plates and overlays serving as the basis for basis for critical node of HVT analysis. The its creation. estimated times between NAI within a mobility corridor are derived from determining the effects of terrain and normal seasonal The DST is essentially the intelligence conditions on doctrinal rates of advance. estimate in graphic form. It relates the The event template and EAM allow for the details of event templates to decision points initiation of precise collection requirements, (DP) that are of significance to the com- maximizing the use of limited collection mander. It does not dictate decisions to the assets against the vast array of potential commander, but rather identifies critical targets on the future battlefield. By know- events and threat activities relative to time ing in advance what the enemy can do and and location, which may require tactical by comparing it with what he is doing, the decisions.

4-20 Central features of the DST are target TAIs. The actual selection of TAIs is a areas of interest. These TAIs are areas command responsibility. along each avenue of approach or mobility corridor where the commander can influ- Following the selection of TAIs, DPs are ence the enemy through fire and maneuver. identified. Usually identified previously as NAIs, these areas afford the commander the DPs link battlefield events to friendly option of delaying, disrupting, destroying, options for action. They represent the last or manipulating the enemy force. Key point in time for a decision to be made that bridges, tunnels, major road junctions, will allow effective action with a specific choke points, and known drop and landing system or weapon. Decisions must be made zones are examples of TAIs. early enough to ensure that they can be implemented in time to achieve the desired TAIs which are essential to the uninter- effect. However, decisions cannot be made rupted advance of the enemy (for example, until there are indications that particular a tunnel) may become HVTs. Other areas battlefield events will occur and their loca- may be designated as TAIs because they tions are determined with a high degree of are good interdiction points through which confidence. HVTs are expected to move. DPs equate time to specific points on the Part of determining TAIs involves TVA. battlefield. They are determined by compar- TVA is a joint activity among intelligence, ing times required to implement decisions, operations, and fire support personnel. enemy movement rates, and distances. For Through analysis of enemy doctrine, TVA example, if it requires 2 hours to implement names and provides the basis for locating a decision, the decision must be made while enemy elements which are key to the ene- the enemy is at least 2 hours from the NAI my’s success. These enemy elements are where the event will occur. Enemy doctrinal known as HVTs. A second category of movement rates, adjusted to compensate for targets is known as HPTs. Destruction of the effects of the terrain, weather, and HPTs is advantageous to friendly opera- friendly action on mobility, provide the tions. HPTs are designated by the com- basis for computation. mander. For example, suppose the enemy must cross a wide, deep river in a friendly For example, the enemy has been tem- sector as part of a probable attack. Enemy plated within an avenue of approach that engineer assets will be very important to requires crossing a bridge. S2s should think the enemy commander’s success. The engi- like the commander by anticipating his neer units and equipment are HVTs, with- needs. In other words, will the commander out which the river crossing would be im- want to interdict the enemy in terms of EW, possible. The friendly commander, who is artillery, air interdiction, or maneuver of briefed on this HVT, may designate the forces? Thus, each TAI should have a series enemy engineers as an HPT, since their of DPs, or a decision point cluster (DPC). destruction would be of great value to the For example, though not doctrinal, the friendly defense plan. If so, then this par- following items could apply to a DPC: ticular HPT is prioritized among other EW (depends on the enemy electronic HPTs for location by intelligence personnel order of battle (EEOB) developed): 5 and subsequent attack by fire support or minutes to 12 hours EW personnel. Artillery: 15 minutes An analyst who has an in-depth knowledge of doctrine can indicate potential Air Force: 1 hour HVTs (CPs, missile units, logistics points) Maneuver forces: 5 to 6 hours on situation and event templates. This helps cue collection assets to possible HVT Based upon this information, the S2 could locations, and helps designate TAIs for the accurately depict areas where the com- decision support template. The S2 recom- mander must decide which course of action mends areas (usually NAIs) as potential to employ. He may not take any action, but

4-21 the S2 has to anticipate the commander’s concentrating critical assets at the right needs. There should be as many DP (within time and place. The DST allows the com- each DPC) as there are tactical options. mander to act, not react. By referring to the EAM, the S2 can depict enemy time-phase lines. The production of one DST does not con- TPLs are based upon enemy doctrinal clude the IPB process. The threat model is rates of advance modified by terrain con- never complete. IPB is a continuous process straints. They are drawn across the avenue with one or all five steps occurring at the of approach or mobility corridor and listed same time. New contingencies arise and missions change; IPB developed for both as H+l, H+2, and so forth. the offense and defense—before the battle— Through the use of well-prepared DSTs, ensures success on the modern battlefield. A the commander can influence the battle by sample of a DST is shown below.

4-22 TARGET DEVELOPMENT the commander can quickly select and The target development role of the bri- attack specific targets to manipulate the gade and battalion S2 in support of combat enemy force. When faced with a numeri- operations is very important. Principally cally superior enemy force, commanders concerned with situation development, the will not have enough resources to attack S2 staff and supporting IEW elements pro- every target that can be acquired. There- cess a great deal of target information. This fore, TVA must be keyed to determining section discusses target development (pri- which targets, out of the entire enemy marily the tactical situations when targets array, should be attacked (and when) to are encountered and the method for deter- achieve the greatest tactical benefit for the mining the value of the targets) and the role resources expended. TVA determines— of the S2 and his staff in formulating target The critical targets. data during preparation for combat. Target When these targets should be attacked. acquisition and the actual development of the target, once it is acquired, will be dis- Where these targets should be cussed in Chapter 5. attacked. Upon receipt of a mission (whether con- TVA begins in IPB by a detailed analysis tingency or actual), the BICC will conduct of enemy doctrine, tactics, equipment, or- an analysis of the AO and implement the ganizations, and expected behavior. Infor- IPB process based upon this information. mation derived is then used to project how, The intelligence staff determines enemy in each tactical formation, the enemy will capabilities and determines the most prob- respond when confronted with different tac- able course of action. tical situations. TVA identifies activities, Contingent on enemy courses of action behavior, equipment, and elements of the and the commander’s tactical requirements, selected enemy force which are critical to the TVA tools are used by the S2 (who coor- successful operations in each situation. An dinates with the S3/FSO) to determine example of this is the engineer company in which elements of the enemy’s force are an MRR during a march to contact. When most important to his success. the MRR is faced with making a river crossing, the engineer company’s location within Tactical requirements vary among the the march formation changes. Other pre- following areas or conditions of the paratory activities must also take place in battlefield: order for the river crossing to succeed. Close operations. Through TVA, a listing of actions and ele- Deep operations (as battalion\brigade ments is developed that would prevent the MRR from conducting a river crossing. Pre- operations support the division’s deep venting the river crossing may accomplish operations effort). the desired effect by disrupting, delaying, or Rear operations. blocking the MRR based on the command- Protect/counter-C 3. er’s tactical plan. In-depth TVA provides a means of determining which targets should Battle damage assessment. be attacked for the greatest tactical benefit The location and composition of the in a given situation. These targets are iden- enemy force compared against the mission tified as HVT. and targeting assets of the friendly forces When conducting TVA, the situational drives the TVA process. value of a target is a significant factor. As TVA involves— the distance from the FLOT increases, the Determination of HVT. value of combat forces decreases with respect to CSS forces and facilities. For Preparation of target spread sheets. example, at the FLOT, an attack battalion Preparation of target sheets. is a significant threat and is a very important target to the maneuver battalion com- Establishment of target list. mander. However, 100 kilometers forward Using IPB templating, TVA is done of the FLOT, that tank battalion is not as before the battle so that, during the battle, 4-23 important to the success of the enemy’s completed, a spread sheet is prepared for immediate mission as an ammunition each specific tactical situation and level of supply point (ASP) or a fuel dump. Recogni- command. tion of this situational value element is The results of TVA are used to prepare important in TVA. target spread sheets and target sheets. Each echelon of command should have Spread sheets are a means of describing and use target spread sheets that apply to and identifying targets in specific situa- the enemy forces that commanders can be tions and various echelons of Soviet-type expected to face. These sheets are main- forces. The S2 and S3 use spread sheets as tained within the brigade TOC by the S2 indicated below. and S3. Currently, spread sheets have been pre- During TVA and preparation of target pared for use in Europe against Soviet- or spread sheets, potential targets are grouped Warsaw Pact-type forces in any mid-to into 12 sets. These sets are shown in the fol- high-intensity environment. Spread sheets lowing illustration. normally used are shown in the following— Once an analysis of enemy doctrine is matrix.

4-24 4-25 A sample spread sheet is illustrated below.

4-26 The spread sheet is divided into five Organizational, radio, radar, and columns. The first three columns describe operational data. the effect desired from attacking the target. Radio, radar, and photo profiles. The Xs in the columns identify which effects can be achieved in a particular Both of these products are classified situation against the size of formation for because of the nature of the information which the sheet is being prepared. depicted. Once completed, these sheets are used by the S2 and S3 to identify and prior- The TARGET SET column lists the 12 itize enemy potential HPTs. target sets identified previously. The RELATIVE WORTH column depicts the A list of HPTs is provided to the com- worth of attacking one target set with mander. Upon approval, the HPTs subse- respect to the other target sets on the sheet. quently drive the friendly collection effort The subdivisions in the column are not and attack planning. The S2 will designate scaled and should not be interpreted as certain targets on the HPT list as protected absolute values. This column allows a rapid targets (those elements that might be ex- identification of the priority which different ploited using COMINT assets). See target sets should have when resources for FMs 34-1 and 6-20 for a more detailed attack are scarce. explanation of the above procedures. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE The spread sheet also contains informa- SUPPORT TO OPSEC tion on enemy doctrine. This includes likely formations and distances (event template), CI support to OPSEC is a critical element objectives of the force, and likely enemy in preparation for combat operations and courses of action if the attacks on this force determines what actions the CI personnel are successful. will take. CI support orients on defeating or degrading an enemy’s multidisciplined The spread sheet presents the attack RSTA capabilities. objective for a particular target set and re- The support requires continuous plan- fers to specific targets within that set which ning, data collection, analysis, reporting, should be attacked. Individual spread and execution of orders and instructions. It sheets identify which specific targets within is a 10-step process that is cyclic in nature, a set should be attacked. For example, in which continually considers the changing the blank left column, ZSU-23-4S within the nature of the enemy threat and friendly ADA set would be indicated. vulnerabilities. The following chart depicts A target sheet is prepared for each poten- the OPSEC cycle. tial HVT and supports the spread sheets discussed earlier. Target sheets are designed to indicate the critical elements of various target groups which, when attacked, will restrict options or capabilities of the enemy. The target sheet identifies the target and provides information target category, nomenclature and command relationship, function and capability, physical description, signature (visual and electronic), graphic representation of critical target elements, and the effects of a successful attack against the target. The target sheets are further enhanced by electronic target sheet addenda provided by the MI battalion TCAE. These target sheet addenda are organized into two major sets of information for each target:

4-27 4-28 Step 1. Identify the Hostile Intelligence Profiles result from actions, including the Collection Threat timing of those actions, taken by military This step is an intelligence function per- units and individual soldiers. Analysis of a formed by the CI analysts. The enemy intel- unit’s profiles reveals signatures and pat- ligence collection threat is all-source, multi- terns about unit procedures and may be disciplined, and extremely effective. used to determine intentions. Collectively, profiles can be used by the enemy to predict Information on the enemy intelligence probable friendly courses of action. The CI collection systems is developed and stored analysis section develops profiles on all in the OPSEC data base at division level. division units to determine weaknesses and to recommend corrections. Profiles which must be maintained include— Step 2. Develop Friendly Force Administration. Profiles and Recommend EEFI Intelligence. Friendly force profiles, signatures, patterns, and indicators show how a unit Logistics. might appear through the eyes of the Operations. enemy. The friendly force data base is crucial to planning operations because it aids Communications. in developing EEFI, countermeasures, The following illustration depicts a type accurate appraisals, and effective deception of brigade CP showing physical and elec- plans. tronic signatures.

4-29 4-30 Unit profiles should be developed by OPSEC support teams which will subsequently be compiled to develop major unit profiles. For example, the profile of a brigade will include all profiles of units within that brigade area plus patterns that will occur to support the operations. (See the following example.)

4-31 This profile will be an in-depth analysis and patterns are immediately entered into of the signatures and patterns of the bri- the data base. Reports from the OPSEC gade and must show the interrelationships survey teams may disclose indicators not of command, support, and maneuver units. previously considered in assessing a com- Signatures result from the presence of a mand’s subordinate unit’s profile. unit or activity on a battlefield. Signatures Determining EEFI is based solely on the peculiar to specific units are detected and analysis done in Step 2 of developing the units identified based on unique charac- friendly force profiles. Once identified, this teristics of equipment, size, electronic signal EEFI will be recommended to the com- emission (communications, noncommunica- mander to protect the combat force. tions, thermal, acoustic, and seismic ema- nations). Detection of individual signatures can be grouped by analysts to show instal- Step 3. Identify Friendly Force lations, units, and activities. Vulnerabilities Patterns are the result of the way operations are conducted. Military forces have Vulnerabilities are specific weaknesses SOPS for virtually everything they do. Pre- in a command’s OPSEC posture that are dictable patterns may be developed by susceptible to the enemy’s intelligence col- commanders, planners, and operators. lection threat. Vulnerabilities may include Types of patterns are as numerous as poor COMSEC, inadequate use of camou- procedures in military operations. For flage, poor physical or document security, example, before every offensive operation or any predictable patterns or activities the volume of communications increases offering indications of specific intentions. dramatically and then drops off equally This step is primarily an intelligence func- dramatically just before the attack. Enemy tion. Vulnerabilities are determined analysts would note this pattern and be through comparison of friendly profiles (or able to predict our intentions for future indicators) to hostile collection capabilities. offensives. A vulnerability exists whenever the enemy Indicators are activities that can contri- has the capability to collect information on bute to the determination of a friendly our forces which would cue him as to our course of action. In preparing for a tactical intentions (or courses of action). Time, date, operation, it is virtually impossible for mili- locations, and type of collector are the first tary forces to avoid or hide all indicators. In important considerations during this step. many cases, these activities can be detected Threat evaluation is accomplished by the enemy and used to predict probable through comparison of friendly indicators courses of action. Indicators that cannot be and hostile collection capabilities to iden- eliminated or hidden may be considered as tify friendly force vulnerabilities. As an aid a basis for a deception plan. to analysis, IPB techniques are applied to friendly force patterns and signatures so we Identification and interpretation of spe- can see ourselves as viewed by enemy col- cific indicators are critical tasks in intelli- lection systems. For example, the range and gence operations whether the indicator is focus of hostile collection means can be friendly or enemy. CI analysts look for plotted on a map and, with intervisibility indicators, analyze them, and make esti- overlays, a determination made regarding mates of capabilities, vulnerabilities, and what friendly activities are vulnerable to intentions. These analyses lead to requests enemy observation. Further, IPB can be for information and planning and eventu- applied to develop countermeasures recom- ally provide the basis for decisions and mendations. For example, a map overlay orders. could be constructed to indicate which Data bases on friendly forces are contin- routes minimize detection during move- ually updated as the situation changes. ment, or which areas would afford con- Changes in operations, tactics, equipment, cealment and cover for signature-unique or personnel that may alter any signatures equipment.

4-32 Step 4. Perform Risk Analysis and Selected countermeasures are directed by Select EEFI the OPSEC annex to the OPORD. Risk analysis is the process by which pro- The OPSEC annex to the OPORD is, in jected friendly vulnerabilities are compared reality, the OPSEC plan. There are five to the enemy’s capabilities to defeat the paragraphs: Situation, Mission, Execution friendly force. Nonelection of a counter- (Countermeasures), Service Support, and measure may incur certain risks to the force Command and Signal. (See FM 34-60, or its operations and activities. This cost of Appendix B.) The EEFI (which should be countermeasure versus benefit expected to listed in paragraph 3 of the OPSEC annex) be derived requires the coordinated efforts are set up in priority order. Generally, these of the S2 and S3 staff elements. The coordi- priorities will coincide with enemy doctrinal nated risk analysis is presented by the S3 to priorities for reconnaissance and the em- the commander for decision. The results of ployment of their fire support and jamming risk analysis include the selection by the S3 resources. of the EEFI which are critical enough to The plan may be disseminated by any of warrant the application of countermeasures the following means: to conceal them from the enemy. Annex to the OPORD. EEFI provide the basis for applying appropriate OPSEC countermeasures. The Fragmentary order (FRAGO). EEFI are derived from the commander’s Verbal or written instructions. guidance and from after-action reports, In selecting and planning countermea- staff evaluations, and vulnerability sures, the OPSEC countermeasures work- analysis. sheet is completed. The worksheet describes Once the threat has been identified, to countermeasures for the force as a whole include methods of operation, timeliness of and specific countermeasures to be em- reaction, and known capabilities, it is com- ployed by the subordinate maneuver and pared with the OPSEC profiles and the support units. The worksheet becomes part friendly mission. The S3 outlines the plan of the OPSEC annex to the OPORD (see for the aspects of the assigned mission. FM 34-60, Appendix C). These aspects include many terms of information that could, if compromised, lead to failure, or could limit the success of a given Steps 6, 7, 8, and 9 operation. Step 6, Select OPSEC Measures; Step 7, Step 5. Recommend OPSEC Measures Apply OPSEC Measures; Step 8, Direct Efforts to Monitor the Effectiveness of Ap- Based on the risk analysis process of Step plied OPSEC Measures; and Step 9, Moni- 4, countermeasures are selected to minimize tor OPSEC Measures Effectiveness, are vulnerabilities. Because this selection is a closely related to the previous step. It is in resource management and risk decision these steps that an OPSEC survey is done function, it falls to the operations staff ele- and countermeasures are evaluated. Teams ment to make the decisions. Resolving the are formed with personnel from the opera- competition-for-resources problem is an S3 tions staff (the team leader), and represen- function. Generally, there are five options tatives from the functional areas of intelli- for the decision maker: gence, communications, logistics, and Apply countermeasures. administration. Other specialists may be required. For example, if engineer opera- Accept risk of detection. tions are to be evaluated, then an engineer Use deception. expert should be designated as a team member. Combine any of the above. CI personnel assigned to the teams assist Prohibit the activity (cancel the in evaluating units for identifiable patterns mission). and signatures exploitable by the enemy.

4-33 Their knowledge of enemy intelligence col- low-level US agents to the enemy-held lection capabilities and effective counter- territory from which they came. Indi- measures is critical to the effectiveness of viduals are also screened for their the team. Additionally, the CI personnel identification on the black, gray, and interrogate EPW and refugees to determine white lists (see below). enemy intelligence requirements and to Investigations. CI personnel investi- gage the effectiveness of OPSEC measures. gate incidents to try to detect and nul- During the course of OPSEC surveys, the lify espionage, sabotage and subver- OPSEC teams advise their commanders sion activities. In overseas areas, they and staffs about security practices that may also investigate personnel to ensure compromise EEFI or provide indicators of they are suitable for a position of trust any planned or ongoing operations. If any and responsibility with the US actions indicate possible compromise of Government. essential information, the data is reported CI defensive operations. CI personnel to the CI element for analysis of the proba- develop defensive source operations to ble information disclosed and the risks to which the command may be subjected. obtain information on potential Examples of data to be reported are— threats to the rear area. Liaison. Liaison is conducted at all Suspected disclosure of designated levels of the Army. It is essential to the EEFI. success of the CI exploitation of infor- Serious violations of established secur- mation in overseas areas of operation. ity procedures. Liaison is conducted with both mili- Friendly losses attributable to proba- tary and civilian agencies in the area. ble compromise. Black, gray, and white lists. These lists Indications that the enemy had prior identify persons selected as US targets. Black lists contain those hostile to the knowledge of a friendly operation. US, gray lists identify those whose Enemy activity directed against oth- inclinations and attitudes toward the erwise well-concealed friendly US are obscure, and white lists contain vulnerabilities. those friendly to the US. They are used during screening operations to locate Step 10. Recommend Adjustments to personnel of Cl interest. OPSEC Measures Training. CI personnel conduct security training in various areas, such as Intelligence and operations staffs jointly SAEDA and counterinterrogation. make adjustments to the OPSEC program. This includes classes, briefings, and When necessary, new EEFI are recom- other training to meet the require- mended and changes to countermeasures ments of the command’s mission. are devised and recommended. After-action reports about OPSEC condi- ELECTRONIC WARFARE tions and the effectiveness of countermea- The ground-based EW resources available sures previously implemented are presented to the MI battalion and MI brigade at divi- to commanders and operations officers. The sion and corps, respectively, and the three detail of these reports will vary with the QUICKFIX aircraft of the division CAB, extent of an operation, size of a unit, time are all capable of providing EW support to available, and current situation. divisional brigades and their subordinate Additional Functions maneuver battalions. These resources, however, as discussed in Chapter 2, are ex- CI personnel perform various additional tremely limited, and the missions they may functions. These functions include— be called upon to perform are extremely CI screening or line-crosser operations. diversified. Their individual and collective During initial screening, individuals capability to effectively support any battal- are approached for possible return as ion or brigade, or the division as a whole,

4-34 for that matter, ultimately depends upon operations by integrating ECM with the how well EW operations are planned, prior targeting of lethal fires and the scheme of to combat. The following describes the for- maneuver. ESM, although a critical element mal top-down, bottom-up EW planning pro- of EW, are the responsibility of the S2. ESM cess in which the battalions and brigades operations are conducted the same as other participate. collection operations and require the same The brigade S3 has the primary responsi- type of S2/S3 coordination. The S3 identi- bility for the planning, targeting, execution, fied his combat information requirements to and evaluation of EW operations in support the S2, who incorporates them with other of the brigade. Maneuver battalion EW ESM/SIGINT needs. The six principles of needs are identified to the brigade for EW support, shown in the following illus- incorporation in brigade priorities. The bri- tration, provide corps, division, and brigade gade S3 is specifically concerned with ECM staff officers alike with a common point of and ensuring that EW operations support reference to ensure maximum effectiveness the commander’s overall concept of the of EW operations to support all operations.

4-35 Types of Targets are generally identified to degrade enemy operations if and when these targets are The types of targets for EW missions are located. Finally, as the operation pro- the same as for other fire missions. They gresses, on-call targets are identified and are: preplanned targets, on-call targets, and missions attacking or exploiting them are targets of opportunity. requested. Preplanned EW targets are communica- The development of targets of all types is tion or noncommunication entities which through the standard target development are identified during the planning of an process described in FM 34-1 and FC 34-118. operation. These targets can be identified Initial analysis of the enemy’s deployment before the operation as key elements to be and intentions leads to the development of jammed or collected on during the opera- HVTs. Comparison of these HVTs to the tion. Through IPB and existing data bases, friendly commander’s intent and concept of target locations are predicted. Through the operation leads to the selection of HPTs. analysis of the concept of the operation, Identification of the priority for each target their importance and priority for EW action relative to other targets of all types is criti- is determined. cal to ensure effective control. For example, On-call EW targets are elements identi- if an on-call mission is requested, the fied during the conduct of an operation for requester must identify the priority of that immediate jamming or collection. These are mission as compared to existing priorities targets which could not be predicted before for preplanned and other targets. If he does the start of the operation, and whose impor- not, that on-call mission may preempt a tance is identified as the operation more important preplanned mission or progresses. other on-call missions. EW targets of opportunity are communication or noncommunication entities which Planning Process were not identified as specific preplanned targets and which the EW operator acquires The planning process for EW operations and recognizes during the conduct of ESM closely parallels the targeting process. The or ECM operations. Once these targets are S3, S2, and IEWSE cooperate closely to recognized, they become candidates for plan EW missions. The initial planning jamming or intercept operations. Normally, process is performed prior to an operation categories of targets of opportunity are pre- for development of preplanned targets and planned to allow action by operators upon identification of categories of targets of recognition. They are usually given a lower opportunity. The process continues during priority than specific preplanned targets or the actual conduct of an operation to iden- on-call missions. tify on-call targets. As well as the identification of targets, the EW planning process All three types of targets will be identified drives the task organization of EW assets in an operations. Preplanned ESM targets and initiates requests for EW missions to be are selected so as to detect the movement of performed by higher echelons. enemy second-echelon forces at key times. Preplanned ECM targets are identified to The EW planning process begins with the degrade critical communications. Addition- analysis of the battlefield situation based ally, categories for targets of opportunity on IPB and current intelligence data. EW system capabilities and limitations are then compared to the emitters associated with the targets identified through IPB. The result of this first step is the identification of significant targets which we can affect with available EW assets. This is the selection of HVTs in the targeting process. This step is performed by G2 or S2 staffs in close coordination with the electronic warfare section (EWS) or IEWSE.

4-36 The second step in the EW planning pro- are beyond the capability of the assets cess entails development of a strategy for available at a given echelon. Giving these use of EW in the operation. The corps G3, worksheets to the next higher level allows assisted by his EWS, will identify the gen- for review to avoid conflicts, such as simul- eral focus of EW operations. This includes taneously tasking for both jamming and establishing priorities for EW operations collecting on the same target. These work- throughout the area of influence. Priorities sheets also are exchanged with adjacent are identified for each phase of an opera- units to avoid similar conflicts. tion. For example, a strategy in a particular To complete the planning process, the operation might be to prioritize SEAD EWS at division uses the completed EW operations, and to counter the enemy’s target list to examine the distribution of intelligence and reconnaissance systems missions and recommend allocation of EW during movement-to-contact. As the main assets. At division, this involves recom- attack begins, this priority might shift to mendations for placing assets in DS of bri- countering enemy artillery. Finally, in the gades or in GS of the division. exploitation of success, priority would be to disrupt the enemy command and control to prevent his regaining control of the situa- EW Target Lists tion. In turn, the division G3 and brigade S3 will apply this strategy to their opera- The worksheets described above list tion, assisted by their EWS or IEWSE. They desired preplanned EW targets with details compare the focus and phases of higher on unit identifications and locations. Tech- echelon EW strategy to their operations nical data is added only when the tasked plan, and identify a focus or priority for EW mission reaches the appropriate TCAE. missions that will support their operation A proposed format for a brigade-level EW and comply with the overall strategy. This target list is provided on the following page. ensures that EW operations at all echelons complement each other and apply limited The EW target lists developed at the bri- EW assets with maximum effectiveness. gade level are consolidated at the division EWS on a similar worksheet. Missions After targets which we can jam or collect planned at the division level are added to against have been identified and the gen- this worksheet. A proposed format for a eral strategy has been established the next division composite EW target list is also step is to decide which specific targets to provided on the following page: preplan. At brigade the S3 makes this determination based on recommendations from the IEWSE. Key enemy elements whose movement or action is considered important are prioritized for ESM missions. If appropriate, their control links are prioritized for jamming to delay receipt of orders to move. Other key communications links are also prioritized for jamming and emitters associated with unique missions or enemy actions are prioritized for intercept. After the G3 or S3 has selected the preplanned targets which he desires to influence or exploit, the IEWSE at the brigade documents these missions on worksheets called EW target lists. These worksheets serve as planning documents for coordination between elements in the EW system. The worksheets at brigade are provided to the division’s EWS to coordinate missions and to request support for missions which

4-37 4-38 Planning On-call EW Targets the EW planning process with specific attention to the C3 means available for Unlike preplanned EW targets, informa- implementation. They are specified in the tion regarding on-call EW targets cannot be “control mechanism” and “coordinating predicted in detail. Their locations and the instructions” columns of the refined EWTL, key times to interdictor collect on these previously described. Each type of targets are not clear until the operation is underway. Therefore, these missions could COMJAM attack and ECM control proce- not be included on the EW target lists dure requires extensive preplanning in which were prepared before the operation, critical situations. and will need to be forwarded separately for Negative ECM control procedures against execution. categories of targets of opportunity are used by COMJAM operators extensively during While the specific data to jam or collect the initial hours of combat when little or no on these targets cannot be predicted, poten- technical data base is available to support tial targets can be identified and tracked their operations. Such procedures are used until they are selected for EW action. To do predominantly against enemy secure com- this, the IEWSE monitors the situation map munications facilities to support the divi- in order to identify enemy units of potential sion and corps’ overall SIGINT collection, significance. He maintains his own overlay processing, analysis, and reporting effort. depicting the location of EW assets in his They provide COMJAM operators a posi- area with their range based on LOS. Com- tive means to “get into” the enemy’s parison of this overlay to the situation map decision-cycle or “event schedule.” HPTs for then determines which of the potential jamming are developed by the EWS at targets may be engaged. division and corps. Extensive coordination Based on his overlay and the current with the G2, MI unit S3, and each TCAE, is situation map, the IEWSE will recommend required. Target of opportunity jamming on-call EW targets to the S3 as the opera- missions are reflected on the EWTL, pre- tion progresses. The S3 will also select on- viously described. They are based on the call targets based on his analysis of the commander’s specified rules of attack ongoing friendly operation. priorities, and critical task lists. The IEWSE will normally maintain a separate list of potential targets. Using the same format as the EW target list, this list will be a working document which is not provided to higher and adjacent units. As the detailed data on these potential targets is not all available, there will be many blanks or incomplete entries on the worksheet. The IEWSE will fill in this worksheet as the situation map provides answers. By maintaining and constantly updating this worksheet, on-call EW targeting data is ready for rapid identification and for request of EW missions. When these targets are to be jammed or exploited, the IEWSE at brigade calls these missions directly to their servicing TCAE for execution. FM 34-40(S) provides more detail on planning and tasking of both on-call and preplanned EW missions. Electronic Warfare Operations COMJAM attack and ECM control procedures are initially determined during

4-39 Targets of opportunity jamming missions Preplanned jamming requires the great- are usually conducted on an area-wide basis est amount of detail, identifying the unit, against generic sets of HPTs such as all location, and time. It must be totally syn- enemy secure communications facilities chronized with fire support and maneuver operating in a specified frequency band; all to achieve maximum results. Preplanned fire support facilities operating within a jamming missions may engage a target specified attack zone; or all SAM/AAA C3 simultaneously with fire, or singularly facilities passing operational information engage lower priority targets, while simul- within a given time period. Generic HPT taneous fire is brought to bear on higher sets are prioritized by the G3/S3 based on priority targets. Preplanned targets, like recommendations from the G2/S2, EWS, targets of opportunity, are reflected on the FSE, and the MI unit S3 and TCAE. EWTL for each EW team or platoon. Tech- SIGINT analysts and ECM managers nical data (such as frequencies and call within the TCAE determine the specific signs, or indications that technical data is elements of information or types of trans- available to support attacks against specific missions to be jammed, the respective HPT facilities) are the primary means for employment area for each EW team or pla- differentiating preplanned HPTs from toon, and the frequency bands for which target of opportunity sets on the EWTL. each EW team or platoon is responsible. Preplanned COMJAM operations are con- COMJAM operators execute missions ducted on a scheduled or on-call basis. against high pay-off targets of opportunity Preplanned missions, depicted on the “upon recognition” only when the specific EWTL, as previously mentioned, are both attack criteria, specified on the EWTL have time- and location-phased according to the been met. Voice collection and DF operators scheme of maneuver and the supporting fire monitor the mission. All combat informa- plans. The enemy unit’s C3 facility, its location, technical EOB data, frequencies, and tion, and the time at which the COMJAM COMJAM results are transmitted to the 2 attack is to begin are all reflected on the TCAE via the IEW C system. EWTL. This type of COMJAM attack is Positive ECM control procedures for usually synchronized with the lethal attack offensive COMJAM attack against pre- fire missions to provide the greatest support planned EW targets begin at the to the supported maneuver unit and to earliest possible point in battle. They com- ensure maximum degradation to the mence as specific HPTs are identified and enemy’s C3 system. SOP COMJAM attack located. Again, the reporting of combat priorities allow for the immediate attack of information regarding enemy activities or unforeseen or nonscheduled HPTs as the “events” provides the key for synchronizing battle develops. Such targets are normally the overall fire support effort. Knowing attacked on an on-call basis, having been where the enemy is and what the enemy is anticipated early in the planning process. doing, and slowing the enemy down by dis- Extensive coordination is required among rupting his critical communications means, the S3, S2, and the FSE of the supported provide the time necessary to “adjust” all maneuver unit, their counterparts at higher lethal and non-lethal attack schedules. echelons, and, most importantly, the IEW resources operating within their AO. This will ensure that preplanned and on-call targets are attacked at the time and place they require COMJAM support. Such coordination in combat is virtually impossible unless detailed targeting, COMJAM attack and ECM control procedures, alternate communications means, and coordinating instructions are determined prior to combat. On-call COMJAM attack and ECM support missions are the most difficult tasks to perform.

4-40 On-call jamming missions, like other pre- fire support operations. Proper authentica- planned missions, are reflected on the tion procedures must be used and CEOI EWTL for given EW teams or platoons must be known by all members of the com- operating in each AO, as HPT C3 facilities bined arms team involved in these types of are identified, located, and scheduled for operations. attack. Positive control procedures and spe- On-call high-power communications sup- cific coordinating instructions are always port should be considered when determin- stipulated. However, the basic technical ing the manner in which ECM resources are data and the exact time of the COMJAM task organized to support the synchroniza- attack may not be available or immediately tion of all operations. These operations are known. There are three types of on-call performed only in extreme circumstances, missions: COMJAM screening operations are also COMJAM attacks against immediate used only in extreme situations. FM HPTs as they become active or cross 34-40(S) will provide more detail on these into pre-established attack zones. operations. High-power communications support Effective on-call COMJAM support may to specific commanders in critical ultimately determine the outcome of close situations. operations. The MI battalion and its TCAE COMJAM screening missions. dis- and EW resources must render that support cussed in Chapter 2. to the brigades and battalions conducting close operations. This includes COMJAM COMJAM attacks, performed on an on- attacks against immediate HPTs, high- call basis against immediate HPTs are very power communications to call in air or similar to preplanned jamming, previously artillery strikes, or screen jamming protec- described. On-call jamming missions, how- tion for friendly C3 activities. These sub- ever, differ from preplanned missions, in jects are discussed in greater detail in that they are developed as the battle pro- Chapter 5. Additional information regard- gresses to attack specific HPT C3 facilities ing the procedures, tactics, and techniques supporting specific enemy units in specific used to plan, conduct, coordinate, and eval- attack zones during specific time periods. uate such operations are provided in FMs On-call COMJAM attacks are conducted 34-10, 34-25(S), and 34-40(S). primarily in support of “hand-off’ operations as enemy units transcend attack zone RECONNAISSANCE AND boundaries or when the COMJAM effec- SURVEILLANCE tiveness of one ECM system is degraded and another ECM system can acquire the R&S provides a systematic watch over HPT and conduct operations more effec- the battlefield. It provides early warning of tively. On-call targets are anticipated in the planning process prior to deployment. The IEWSE and TCAE personnel develop and refine on-call attack missions as the battle unfolds. ECM managers in the TCAE schedule on-call targets for given EW teams or platoons as HPTs are identified and located. COMJAM operators report the time of acquisition and their readiness condition to the TCAE and supported command following SOP and predetermined coordinating instructions. On-call COMJAM control authority in such situations may reside with the supported commander or his S3 to ensure that the COMJAM attack is synchronized with his specific maneuver and

4-41 enemy activity, targets for fire and maneu- Cover large areas rapidly and ver, and, most important, information to repetitively. help satisfy the commander’s PIR in preparing for combat operations. R&S there- Minimize risk to the collector. fore provides the commander with Observe or detect changes on the information-collection capabilities through- enemy side of the FLOT. out the battle area. In addition, other services’ capabilities may augment those of Cue other collectors for more detailed the Army. For example, Army capabilities coverage. are extended well forward by Air Force tactical air reconnaissance. This extension provides critical intelligence of enemy ROLES OF RECONNAISSANCE AND second-echelon forces before they are within SURVEILLANCE the range of Army collection capabilities. R&S is a vital part of the battalion and R&S yields much of the information neces- brigade intelligence collection effort. The sary for decisions and targeting. BICC does the detailed R&S planning and Most information needed in combat integrates it into the overall collection comes from assets within the combat force. effort. For a more detailed discussion of the These assets perform R&S operations in the S2/BICC responsibility and procedures in area of immediate interest. R&S planning see Appendix E.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS The main reconnaissance effort supports the main maneuver effort: main attack Reconnaissance is undertaken to collect along with main defensive effort. The pri- information by visual or other detection mary reconnaissance effort is designated by means. It is characterized by its direction redundancy; for example, using two patrols toward coverage of one or more specific along the main axis of advance or attack. target areas. The reconnaissance mission Detailed instructions given to R&S assets may be developed from cues indicating that include: mission, start-completion time, an area possesses intelligence value or objective-passage points, action on enemy because current or planned operations contact at barriers, control measures (that require detailed coverage of a specific area. is, phase lines and checkpoints), PIR, SOR, Surveillance is the systematic observa- and actions on completion of mission. The tion of aerospace, surface or subsurface higher headquarters’ (brigade and division) areas, places, persons, or things by visual, intelligence and combat information on the aural, electronic, photographic, or other TF area of operations must be confirmed. means. Surveillance is characterized by The commander should receive timely wide coverage of a target area and by repe- information in order to adjust his scheme of tition. It is normally used to gain informa- maneuver as new combat information is tion in those aforementioned areas over a acquired. long period of time to note any changes that may take place. In preparing for R&Sin the offensive, the TF commander must focus the collection Because of the interrelationship of recon- effort, based on SOR derived from a situa- naissance and surveillance, the same assets tion or event template on platoon locations, used to execute reconnaissance missions vehicle locations, crew-served weapon loca- may also be used for surveillance tasks. tions, individual fighting positions, barriers As noted above, surveillance missions are and obstacles, and locations of the reserve characterized by a systematic, constant and counterattack elements. For planning watch of persons, places, or things by purposes, the collection effort focuses on the HUMINT, IMINT, or SIGINT resources. threat echelon two levels below the R&S Surveillance missions are usually preplanning level. Reconnaissance patrols will planned. Surveillance missions are particu- watch the objective during changes to the larly suited to— threat posture.

4-42 For R&S in the defensive, the commander mount importance to the immediate must focus collection effort on the battle situation or objective. following Priority 2: The results of these require- Identifying the enemy reconnaissance ments are in support of the general effort for counter-reconnaissance battle situation and will be accom- purposes. plished as soon as possible after Prior- Identifying the enemy main effort as ity 1 requirements. These missions are indicated by enemy unit locations, par- to gain current battle information. ticularly the second echelon. Priority 3: The results of these mis- For counter-reconnaissance purposes the sions update the intelligence data base, but do not affect the immediate battle collection effort must— situation. Define EEFI: barriers or obstacles, pla- Priority 4: The results of these mis- toon locations, reserve and counterat- sions are of a routine nature. These tack elements. requirements will be fulfilled when the Assess enemy collection capabilities reconnaissance effort permits. and methods. Priority 3 and 4 taskings are not Assess friendly vulnerabilities. assigned to subordinate units. Infor- mation required which falls in these Coordinate countermeasures with the categories is included in PIR and IR S3. transmitted to subordinate units. Countermeasures accomplish two things: The BICC will also use planning factors Orientation of TF collection capabili- to develop R&S information. Planning fac- ties (scouts, patrols, GSRs, and OPs) tors are those elements or conditions which on protecting EEFI to identify enemy may have a serious impact on the com- reconnaissance. mand’s R&S effort. Orientation of combat elements on the The friendly and enemy situation in- identified reconnaissance to neutralize cludes the composition and disposition of or destroy them by combat. friendly and enemy forces, enemy tactical doctrine, and the type and extent of PLANNING PRIORITIES planned operations. Resources include brigade and battalion In planning R&S, it should be understood collection assets (discussed previously) and that long-range planning of R&S operations supporting assets. Capabilities, limitations, and events is conducted by division echelon and availability of collection assets are and higher, using the formal collection considered when allocating resources for management process, whereas brigade and reconnaissance and surveillance require- battalion planning usually involves events ments. The objective is to assign each that will occur within a few days. The requirement to the best available collection results of planning at the brigade and bat- asset or assets to most economically sup- talion levels includes a written or graphic port the requirement. R&S plan. The R&S plan prepared at brigade and battalion levels may include all Terrain and weather are studied to deter- R&S data. mine their effects on available resources and are also considered during the determi- The BICC will assign priorities to all R&S nation of R&S requirements. That is, likely requirements based on the urgency and avenues of approach would normally be importance of the information needed. allocated greater resources. Priority 1: Takes precedence over all EW is considered in all R&S plans. Plan- other requirements except previously ning should include consideration of assigned Priority 1 missions. The friendly and enemy SIGINT, DF, and jam- results of these missions are of para- ming capabilities.

4-43 SIGINT, DF, and jamming capabilities. landing zone (LZ) some distance beyond the OPSEC includes all measures that can be FLOT. taken to deny intelligence of friendly force Valid justification is particularly impor- composition, disposition, and activities to tant for immediate surveillance or recon- the enemy. naissance requests. This is critical if corps R&S plans must be scrutinized to ensure and EAC systems may be required to collect that they do not inadvertently disclose such the information. information to the enemy. The BICC manages all R&S assets avail- See FMs 30-20 and 100-5 for further able which provide a complete picture of the explanation of R&S planning. area of operations to the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and higher head- REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION quarters. Effective management requires Generally, requests for information can the determination of R&S requirements, be identified as either reconnaissance or tasking, controlling and coordinating surveillance. Classifying requests by this assigned assets, and requesting R&S sup- method assists the brigade or battalion S2 port from higher headquarters to satisfy in determining the basic elements of the those requirements beyond the capabilities request. of assigned assets. Planning for surveillance operations is To effectively manage the R&S effort, the conducted after determining the general BICC must consider the following: mission of the tactical force. Surveillance missions are often developed as a joint Unit mission and the commander’s effort involving all of the intelligence concept of the operation. organizations having an interest in the R&S assets available from assigned same AO. This is due to the limited availa- units. bility of surveillance systems and the large number of overlapping requests that could Resources available from higher head- be generated in a joint or combined quarters and other services. operation. Capabilities situation, including location, composition, and disposition of A reconnaissance mission seeks to obtain both friendly and enemy forces. information by visual or other detection means and is characterized by limitations The S2’s estimate of the situation and of coverage to one or more specific target possible enemy course of action. areas at a particular time without the Weather, vegetation, and terrain as requirement for systematic coverage. they may affect employment of R&S Reconnaissance missions are conducted resources. by HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT re- The BICC analyzes all available R&S data sources and are designed to— and uses organic R&S resources to best Collect specific, detailed information at cover the battlefield and satisfy PIR and a particular location and time. targeting requirements. It requests addi- Support current or planned operations. tional resources or support needed to ac- Most reconnaissance requests are pre- complish R&S requirements from higher planned before the operation; however, once headquarters. See Chapter 2 and Appendix operations begin, many reconnaissance E for the R&S resources assigned to and requests will be immediate. The time con- supporting the brigade and battalion. straints of the typical reconnaissance The BICC examines the capabilities and request will not allow for elaborate plan- limitations of each R&S resource and ning or coordination. A request that would matches resources to specific information be classified as a requirement for a recon- and R&S requirements. Careful planning naissance mission might be for urgent pho- ensures the most effective use of R&S tographic coverage of a proposed helicopter resources.

4-44 The BICC uses various aids to help man- Identify and task R&S resources and age R&S operations, including the unit ensure that R&S missions are compat- intelligence SOP. The SOP specifies stan- ible with other assigned missions. dard R&S procedures. It standardizes When time permits, the BICC coordinates procedures that are done repeatedly in order the R&S plan through informal and formal to reduce the number of orders that must be means, including briefings, personal con- transmitted during combat. The R&S SOP tacts, and liaison visits. The BICC uses should include the following: several methods to disseminate orders and Procedures and formats for requesting requests for R&S support. These include, R&S support. but are not limited to— Reporting procedures, channels, and OPORDs. formats. R&S plans as part of or separate from Standard R&S activities, such as con- the OPORD. ducting patrols and operating OPs. SCARFs. Another aid used by the BICC is the Battalion plans are generally informal, SITMAP. The SITMAP portrays the while the brigade plan is more formalized. friendly and enemy situation and conveys As the plans move vertically, the BICC plans and orders in a condensed form. The reviews them to ensure there is no gap in BICC posts pertinent parts of the R&S plan the R&S scheme. It satisfies any gaps with to the SITMAP to ensure that R&S opera- assigned resources. If this is not possible, it tions are integrated with maneuver, fire, requests assistance from higher headquar- and other intelligence operations. (See ters. A formal R&S plan follows the format Appendix E.) of a five-paragraph OPLAN/OPORD with The R&S plan includes the R&S require- appropriate overlays. (See Appendix E.) ments of subordinate units. Each echelon requests R&S support from higher head- Aerial surveillance is vital to the R&S quarters to satisfy those requirements that program, particularly at brigade level and are beyond its own capabilities. The BICC above. The OV1-D Mohawk, with SLAR, evaluates these requirements, assigns prior- infrared, and aerial photography capabili- ities, and satisfies them in one or more of ties, represents the primary Army surveillance system available to the tactical com- the following ways: mander. The supporting Air Force tactical air reconnaissance squadron satisfies aerial Includes them in the R&S plan. R&S requirements that exceed the capabilities of Army aircraft. There are two types of Allocates R&S resources to the request- aerial surveillance and reconnaissance ing unit. requests: Preplanned and immediate. Forwards the request to higher head- The brigade or battalion S2 submits pre- quarters, indicating approval. planned requests for aerial surveillance through intelligence channels to division. The BICC coordinates the R&S plan They are submitted for anticipated require- within the brigade or battalion staff with ments for reconnaissance support. The subordinate and supporting units, and approval or disapproval of each request is higher headquarters. Coordination objec- contingent upon the following questions: tives are as follows: Is the request valid? Ensure that the plan identifies and Can the requesting unit satisfy the meets all R&S requirements. requirement with organic or support- Avoid duplication of effort and to con- ing resources? solidate missions, when practical. Can the request be satisfied in time? Avoid conflicts with other combat Is the requested information or intelli- activities. gence already available?

4-45 Can it be included in missions which and notify their Army counterparts. Appro- are in progress? val at each echelon is signified by remaining silent on the air request net. If a higher Can it be satisfied by missions pre- echelon decides to disapprove the request or viously requested and planned at the to accomplish the mission with organic reviewer’s level? assets, then that echelon enters the air Are air assets available at the review- request net and notifies the originating er’s echelon which can accomplish the TACP of its decision. If all echelons ap- mission? prove the request by maintaining silence, Actions taken upon completion of this the corps ASOC forwards it to the TACC. review include— Each echelon of command has a time Disapprove the request and return it to limit (established by SOP) within which to the requestor with the reason for disapprove a request. disapproval. In addition to the preplanned and imme- Approve the request and task assets at diate requests, the brigade or battalion S2 the local echelon. may request intelligence imagery reports (IIRs) on missions already flown that may Approve the request and pass it on to have information they can use. the next higher headquarters. The following illustration shows the Immediate requests, by virtue of their procedures for requesting tactical air recon- urgency, are sent by a different communica- naissance support. As shown, the S2 and tions channel. The USAF maintains a sys- tactical surveillance officer at each level are tem from battalion to corps to provide liai- responsible for the request, and must son, rapid communications, and control for assume responsiblity for satisfying valid both close air support and air reconnais- requests they disapprove. See TC 34-50 for sance. A TACP, equipped and staffed by the further explanation of R&S. Air Force, is assigned to each Army echelon from battalion to corps and has direct radio OPERATION ORDER/OPERATION contact with all echelons. (It should be PLAN noted here that TACP radios are not usually compatible with those of the supported The preparation of an OPORD/OPLAN unit.) The immediate request is delivered to is an essential element in preparing for the TACP, which transmits it directly to the IEW operations. Upon determination of air support operations center (ASOC) at intelligence tasking requirements, the bri- corps. The TACPs at intermediate com- gade or battalion staff will prepare an intel- mand echelons monitor immediate requests, ligence estimate and annex to support the OPORD or OPLAN which is used for initial tasking. An operation order gives subordinate commanders the essential information needed to carry out an operation. This includes the situation, mission, assignment of tasks, and support and assistance to be provided. When an operation is to be conducted immediately, the complete order is prepared, based on the commander’s announced decision and concept. When an operation is to be conducted at some future time, the OPORD may be an OPLAN that will be implemented by appropriate instructions. A new order is prepared whenever a significant change in the mission occurs or a new mission is received.

4-46 An OPORD should include only the headquarters intelligence estimate and details that are necessary to enable com- annex before writing his own. Essentially, manders of subordinate units to issue their the battalion or brigade S2 is scaling down own orders, and to ensure coordination. the higher headquarters annex or estimate to fit the needs of his echelon. The gener- The brigade or battalion S3 has the pri- ated annexes and estimates should provide mary responsibility of preparing the more specific information about the enemy OPORD in accordance with the command- and AO as it affects the battalion or bri- er’s guidance. gade. Formats for the intelligence annex When preparing the OPORD/OPLAN, and estimate, and the analysis of the AO the S2 must read and review the higher can be found in Appendix A.

4-47 CHAPTER 5 Combat Operations

IEW resources contribute to, and are or disprove estimates and enemy intentions essential to, the combat power of the bri- hypothesized during predeployment analy- gade and battalion in offensive and defen- sis and planning phases. The majority of sive operations, and during retrograde and MI battalion IEW assets will deploy into other tactical situations. Leaders at all the various brigade and battalion AOs, but levels of command must know how to in- remain tasked in GS of the division. This crease the effectiveness of IEW systems and GS role is necessary for centralized C2 resources in support of the maneuver com- needed to accomplish the mission. (See, mander’s combat operations and, at the Chapter 3.) GSR and REMS teams, how- same time, reduce the vulnerability of their ever, may at this time be attached to the units to enemy intelligence and combat forward brigades or the covering force, if activities. the latter is organized. GSRs and REMS may be further attached to battalions for The low density of IEW resources and the individual surveillance missions or for at- independent and decentralized nature of MI tachment to scout platoons. The missions of operations require that leaders exercise a the MI battalion’s IEW assets are continu- high degree of competence, initiative, and ously changed and updated by various task- innovative thought to accomplish the com- ing messages and fragmentary orders. It is mander’s mission requirements in the bri- during these times, and especially upon the gade and battalion areas of operations and outbreak of hostilities, that certain IEW interest. assets may become DS to the brigade in Divisional MI assets should be task whose area they are operating. organized according to the situation, type of combat operation, and METT-T factors. This will result in the formation of IEW company teams which may be in GS to divi- DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS sions or placed in DS to brigades depending Once the mission has been received, the on METT-T criteria. All IEW elements, next task is to deploy the assets in areas including corps augmentation assets sup- where they can accomplish the mission. porting the brigade and battalion opera- The deployment of, and site selection for, tions, are normally attached to the com- IEW assets demands close and continuous pany team when such teams are formed. coordination between MI units and the bri- (See Chapter 4). gade or battalion in whose AO they may be This chapter will discuss how to employ located. The deployment of IEW assets and IEW resources during combat operations to site selection are critical tasks for leaders of best achieve the commander’s requirements MI units operating in the brigade and bat- and intent. talion AOs. Normally, the staff of the headquarters that exercises operational control Although there is a difference between of an MI element selects the general the light and heavy division’s IEW redeployment areas for SIGINT and EW sys- sources, they respond to the commander’s tems based on the recommendations of the requirements similarly. Where there is a supporting EW unit commander. For exam- significant difference, it will be noted. ple, if the covering force commander exer- PREHOSTILITY PHASE cises OPCON of an EW platoon that is employed in the covering force area, it will IEW support to the combat force in the designate general deployment areas for field during the prehostility phase begins SIGINT and EW systems based on the with the OPORD tasking division RSTA recommendations of the platoon leader. The assets and the MI battalion (CEWI) with brigade or battalion commander or S2 the mission of collecting information on selects general employment areas for GSR enemy force profiles. This action will prove elements that are attached. The controlling

5-0 commander may, however, delegate ing the initial coordination, the following employment area selection to a subordinate factors are coordinated: commander. For example, the battalion Designation, type, and mission of the may delegate this authority to a maneuver deploying MI unit. company commander, particularly if the GSR team(s) will support the company. Time of deployment and route the unit Normally, MI platoon leaders select the will use to deploy. general operational site locations for their General operational area and opera- systems after coordination with the sup- tional site requirements. ported maneuver unit. CSS requirements. The MI squad or team leader normally Arrangements for direct coordination selects the specific operational site. between the MI unit and the appro- Operational site selection requires coordi- priate subordinate MI unit. nation with the supported unit commander Exchange of radio frequencies and call or staff and with the commander and staff signs. of the maneuver unit in whose AO the system is to be deployed. The MI battalion C-E officer coordinates with the division signal officer for call signs MI unit leaders and maneuver unit com- and frequencies that MI units need to coor- manders and staff must establish and dinate with the brigade and its subordinate maintain close and continuous coordination units. to ensure effective MI support. Direct coordination begins between the MI battalion Upon initial deployment of the IEW com- and brigade, and is continued at every pany team to the brigade AO, the company echelon where MI units support or operate team facilitates the coordination. If time in the AO of maneuver units. It may go as permits, the company team commander and low as MI teams and maneuver platoons. the MI platoon leaders conduct a ground Although MI unit commanders and leaders reconnaissance and personal coordination coordinate with maneuver unit command- with the brigade staff and subordinate unit ers, staffs, and leaders on a variety of mu- commanders and staff prior to deploying tual concerns, the following are common the company team. items for coordination: After the IEW company team deploys, the MI support missions and how they are team commander facilitates coordination to be integrated with and support the between MI and brigade units. The MI bat- maneuver commanders’ schemes of talion notifies the team commander when it fire and maneuver. plans to deploy an MI unit in the brigade AO. The commander ensures that the bri- Times and routes for deploying MI gade IEW support element coordinates this units within the brigade AO. deployment with the brigade staff. The bri- Operational areas and sites. gade S3 notifies the battalion in whose area the MI unit will deploy over the brigade Security. operations net. The battalion, in turn, noti- Coordinating and communicating fies the maneuver company through the procedures. battalion command operations net. Final coordination of prearranged CSS The commander or leader of the deploy- requirements. ing MI unit contacts the IEW company team commander when he gets within The MI battalion tactical operations cen- communications range. The team com- ter initiates coordination with the brigade mander gives the MI leader instructions for prior to the deployment of MI assets in the establishing radio and physical contact brigade AO. If an IEW company team is with the maneuver commander or staff. operating in the brigade AO, it coordinates through the team commander and his at- MI elements such as GSR and CI teams tached brigade IEW support element. Dur- who are attached or DS to the brigade,

5-1 operate in the brigade intelligence net. If pressure. On the other hand, the MI unit they are further attached or placed in DS of must pass directly to the unit any perisha- a battalion or maneuver company team, the ble combat information that the maneuver MI element operates the battalion surveil- unit needs. lance or company operations net of the unit The MI unit leader must coordinate the it supports. mission with the supported unit. He coordi- Detailed and continuous coordination nates with the maneuver unit commander with maneuver units is especially critical who controls the AO to ensure that there for GS MI units. Maneuver units tend to will be no undue interference between MI forget GS units that are operating in the and other units that may need the site or AO—often forgetting to notify them when are operating nearby. they displace to new locations. The IEW team commander makes arrangements for Most MI systems need LOS to operate ef- the MI unit and the appropriate maneuver fectively. The need for high ground for commander to initiate coordination. The MI operational sites usually exceeds its availa- unit leader and maneuver unit commander bility. The maneuver unit commander or or staff officer coordinate the following leader operating in the AO resolves conflict- issues: ing requirements for the high ground. The MI unit commander must coordinate with Security. the maneuver unit commander for his Operational sites. operational sites. He must inform the maneuver unit commander of how MI ele- Deployment and displacement routes. ments can support him from various sites CSS. and the relative impact of the terrain on the Coordination and communications effectiveness of MI systems in various procedures. potential sites. While the maneuver unit may or may not There are three basic types of operational be assigned a mission to specifically secure sites. The primary site is the principal posi- an MI operational site, the MI unit does tion from which the MI team will accom- enjoy some degree of security by locating plish the assigned mission. An alternate near a maneuver unit. The MI unit leader position is another position where the same and maneuver unit commander should target area can be covered. The supplemen- establish definitive procedures that ensure tary position is used to cover a different the security of the MI unit. target area. The following schematic below Reliable communications should be estab- illustrates these positions. lished between the two units. Most MI pla- All operational sites should— toons and teams do not have sufficient radios to remain in the maneuver unit’s Permit coverage of the assigned area. communications net; however, both units Provide cover and concealment for the should exchange radio frequencies, call team, vehicles, and operational signs, and other appropriate CEOI to equipment. ensure immediate access to each other’s Facilitate communications and permit communications net. The MI unit should hook into the maneuver unit’s wire system coordination with other MI and sup- if they are within a reasonable distance of ported elements. their CP. Provide good ingress and egress. Both parties to this coordination must Take advantage of security provided carry out the procedures that they agree on. by maneuver elements. For example, if the maneuver unit commander agrees to notify the MI unit when it Provide LOS to the tanget area. Be rel- displaces, he must do it in sufficient time atively free of ground clutter. for the MI unit to displace—especially if the MI leaders should perform ground recon- maneuver unit withdraws because of enemy naissance to select operational sites when

5-2 time permits. During the reconnaissance Primary, alternate, and supplementary operation they— positions. Exact positions of equipment and Select routes to the AO. antennas at each site. Identify and coordinate with friendly Entry and withdrawal routes, and units in the area. routes between positions. Determine status of security. Directions and distances to threat forces. MI squad and team leaders plan the organization and occupation of an operation- Location of friendly forces. al site in detail. They should make detailed Friendly minefield and planned sketches to include— barriers.

5-3 A typical organization of an operational between the MI battalion TOC and the bri- site is illustrated below. gade TOC. The primary purpose of the IEWSE is to coordinate operations in sup- The EW platoon establishes a platoon port of the brigade. Working with the bri- headquarters in the brigade area from gade S2 and S3, the IEWSE helps plan EW which the platoon leader directs and con- operations in support of the brigade. It also trols operations of subordinate elements. coordinates MI unit and team occupation The T&A team is also located here. This and movement with the brigade AO on enables the T&A team to disseminate com- behalf of the company team commander, bat information rapidly to the brigade S2. reviews possible combat information from The MI battalion provides an IEWSE to MI units in the sector, and rapidly intro- each brigade. The IEWSE operates from duces it into the brigade intelligence within the brigade TOC. It is the link system.

5-4 Interrogation Assets met if the equipment is to do its job. These When EPW interrogation assets are requirements include— desired, the brigade’s S2 identifies brigade Must be located within range of tar- requirements during collection planning. geted receivers and transmitters. He requests interrogation assets through Must ensure that the receiving intelligence channels. He coordinates the antenna is positioned to intercept the deployment of the team through the arriving signal. IEWSE. Must be located near its supporting The team deploys to, and operates at, the elements. EPW collection point, which is normally located near the brigade trains. The actual Positioning the intercept antenna is the point on the ground where the interrogation most important factor to take into consider- team deploys is determined by the brigade ation when selecting EW sites. Without S2 in coordination with the brigade S4 and acquiring the target signal, intercept and brigade trains commander. The interroga- jamming missions cannot be accomplished. tion team, upon deployment to the brigade, Wide variations in the signal strength may coordinates with the brigade S2, through exist within relatively small areas. When the IEW support element. The S2 briefs the hearability problems occur, try the antenna team concerning— at several heights, orientations, and loca- Brigade mission and the commander’s tions in the vicinity of the site. Trial and error is the accepted technique to obtain concept of the operation. maximum reception. A detailed study of the PIR/IR. surrounding terrain should be used to check Communications and reporting a site location with respect to the location of procedures. the target area. Hills and mountains between the intercept antenna and the Contacts with the S4 to coordinate enemy emitter will limit the quality of logistic support. intercept. An illustration of an EW site is on Coordination with the S1 and MP pla- the following page. toon leader regarding procedures for In mountainous terrain, selected antenna securing and moving EPW. positions should be relatively high on the slopes or, when possible, remoted to the Although many of the IEW assets have forward slopes. Locations at the base of a common requirements for coordination and cliff or in a deep ravine or valley must be site selection, the EW, GSR, REMS, and avoided. For operations above the HF other elements have peculiar needs that range, a location that will give LOS recep- must be met. tion should be selected. In mountainous terrain, the objective is to get the antenna as Electronic Warfare Assets high as possible. As noted in Chapter 2, most ground-based Trees near the antenna system offer ad- EW assets at ECB must be deployed in the vantages and disadvantages. Foliage can brigade and battalion AO to be most effec- be used to camouflage the antenna system. tive. ESM equipment must be deployed in a It also can be used to mask the antenna sys- manner to allow overlapping areas of inter- tem from unwanted signals. However, trees cept coverage. This not only ensures cover- with heavy foliage absorb radio waves. age of the area forward of the FLOT but Leafy trees have more of an adverse effect also allows targets in the overlapping areas than evergreens. Foliage should not be posi- to be handed from one asset to the other. tioned between the antenna elements and ECM sites selected along the FLOT should the target signals, and it should never touch be located in such a way as to facilitate the elements of the antenna. Intercept electronic massing of several jammers antennas should extend above the surface against single targets. ESM and ECM sites of the vegetation level when “looking” at have common requirements that must be the target transmitter. The antenna can be

5-5 “masked” from unwanted signals if the should be avoided. In addition to the noise foliage behind and to each side of it extends and confusion caused by vehicles, their higher than the antenna. This is illustrated ignition systems may cause electrical inter- on the following page. ference. Copying weak signals requires a great deal of concentration by the intercept Man-made objects near an intercept site operator. His attention should not be can reduce the quality of the target signal. diverted by extraneous noises. Heavy traffic Buildings located between radio intercept areas also are prime targets for air and stations and their targets, especially if they artillery attacks. are of steel or reinforced concrete, will hinder reception. Every attempt should be Friendly transmitters can also interfere made to position the intercept antenna as with intercept. Communications nets and far from man-made objects as possible. But, DF flash and report nets are examples. in a tactical situation, it is not always pos- Terrain-masking techniques can be used sible to follow the recommended standards. to isolate receiving antennas from trans- The rule to follow in this case is “as far as mitting antennas as shown on page 5-7. possible.” If practical, communications antennas Wire lines, such as telephone, telegraph, should be postioned so a hill mass screens and high-tension power lines should be them from intercept antennas and from the avoided when selecting a site for intercept. enemy. This will cause a minimum of inter- These wire lines absorb an incoming signal ference to intercept antennas and will like a receiving antenna, and introduce dis- decrease the enemy’s ability to locate the tortion, hum, and noise into the receiving site with direction finding. Coordination antenna. Some distortion of the arriving between intercept and communications waveform may be acceptable if the site is equipment should be accomplished by field for intercept operations only. But other sys- phones or runner, not by radio. Generators tems, such as direction finding, must be free should be placed away from intercept from outside influences. Positions adjacent equipment to reduce noise and electronic to heavily traveled roads and highways interference.

5-6 5-7 Ground Surveillance Radar Assets OPSEC procedures, to include the sign The surveillance platoon leader moves the and countersign, noise and light disci- platoon to the brigade AO, either indepen- pline, and other OPSEC procedures. dently or as part of the IEW company team. Following the S2’s briefing, the team Upon arrival at the brigade CP, he coordi- leaders move their teams to the general site nates with the brigade IEWSE or company location. They perform the following tasks team commander, giving him a status re- to prepare to accomplish the surveillance port on the platoon. If the platoon is at- mission: tached to the brigade, control passes to the brigade commander, who normally dele- Reconnoiter the general site. gates operational control to the S2. Select specific sites, to include primary, alternate, and supplementary The brigade or battalion S2, or a maneu- positions. ver team commander, initially briefs the Coordinate position selection with GSR teams. The briefing, as a minimum, includes— adjacent companies and platoons. Prepare positions, to include fortifica- tion, cover, and concealment for pri- Surveillance mission. mary and alternate sites. General site location, area of surveil- Enter designated radio nets and the lance, type of surveillance to be con- wire communications system, when so ducted, specific targets, the frequency directed. of coverage, and how, when, and to whom information is to be reported. Forward specific locations of radar and area of radar coverage (left and Friendly situation, including the unit right) limits to the supported element mission, the tactical plan, location of by the fastest, most secure means. unit elements in relation to each other, the activities and operations of adja- Prepare radar surveillance overlays cent units and patrols, and when and and submit copies for each position to where friendly units are expected to the supported commander or S2. A move through the surveillance area. supported company commander forwards one copy to the battalion S2. Terrain characteristics and terrain The surveillance platoon leader, even analyses, which highlight mobility though losing some degree of OPCON of corridors, intervisibility, terrain mask- platoon assets through attachment, super- ing, and trafficability conditions. This vises the initial deployment of platoon information is used by the supported assets to the operational area. He monitors unit’s S2 and the GSR teams in select- the operations of his units to ensure that ing primary, alternate, and future they effectively accomplish their assigned operating sites. mission. He coordinates with the brigade Enemy situation, including the types and battalion commanders and their staffs, of targets expected, and the location and with company team commanders and and direction of expected enemy platoon leaders to advise them on how movement. GSRs can be effectively used to support their operation and to ensure that his units Prevailing or forecast weather that are provided the support and security they might affect the interpretation of need in order to operate. He also takes care signals. of administrative and leadership problems Procedures for coordinating with the and keeps the IEW team commander ap- friendly units, to include radio fre- prised of the status of platoon assets. quencies, call signs, and other CEOI. When the GSR teams are attached to a Covered and concealed routes into the maneuver company team or platoon, the site, and routes between sites. company commander or platoon leader

5-8 deploys and tasks the team. Even if the ported unit commander or S2 will decide the GSR team is only operating within a general site location for the attached maneuver unit’s AO, it coordinates with the AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-15 radars. This unit commander or leader. The GSR team general site location depends on the mis- leader and maneuver unit commander sion. The GSR squad or team leader selects should coordinate— the specific site location. Local friendly and enemy situations. To take advantage of the maximum range of the GSR, it should be sited as far forward Procedures for reporting combat as necessary to support the mission. It is information. Even if the GSR team is normally positioned on the forward slopes instructed to report information it col- of dominating terrain. Frequently, GSRs lects to someone other than the local are located with or near OPs. However, per- combat maneuver unit, it should report sonnel of the GSR team should not be used combat information, particularly early to man the OP. The GSR and OP observers warning of enemy movement and tar- must mutually support each other. Since the gets to the local unit commander. enemy can detect radar signals, GSRs Communications frequencies, call should not be located near troops or key signs, and procedures. The GSR team installations. should tie into the company or platoon wire line, if there is one in the area. Once the radar squad or team leader has Arrangements should be made for selected a site and the GSR is emplaced, the mutual support in relaying messages supported commander should check the site. under poor communications The site should provide the same common conditions. features as described earlier. Security. The GSR team should select a The most important feature of an opera- site near a maneuver unit for greater tional site is the capability to support the security. The team that must be overly accomplishment of the surveillance concerned about its own security will mission. be less effective. Procedures for notify- The site selected should use the terrain to ing the team, in case the maneuver increase ELSEC and ECCM protection. unit displaces, must also be Hills, embankments, trees, and other ter- coordinated. rain features are used to absorb side lobes. CSS requirements. The team leader The following illustration shows the advan- and unit commander coordinate these tageous use of terrain for a GSR site. requirements, particularly how the maneuver unit will provide food ser- Terrain, such as hilltops, is used to avoid vice, fuel, and ammunition. transmitting to enemy intercept sites. Al- though LOS to the target is required, ter- The GSR team should be totally inte- rain features, such as hilltops, are not used grated with the supported unit, Integration as GSR sites. means that the team responds to the requirements and orders of the supported unit If the terrain cannot be used effectively to commander. In turn, the supported unit block the radar signal, a low power signal provides security and other support that the can be used to limit its range. team needs. A habitual relationship be- A soft target background, such as heavily tween a GSR team and a supported unit wooded terrain, will help absorb the radar enhances the effectiveness of this signal. A hard background, such as rock integration. terrain or buildings, scatters and reduces The general GSR site is normally selected the signal, thus limiting the enemy’s capa- through the use of map reconnais- bility to detect the signal and locate the sance; however, the GSR team leader con- radar. ducts a detailed ground reconnaissance to In addition to the primary site, the team select the specific operational site. The sup- leader selects alternate and supplementary

5-9 5-10 positions. He must use the same care in In a hasty position, the initial emphasis selecting these positions as he did in select- is on concealment from enemy observation. ing the primary position. The illustration The radar must be sited in a camouflaged on the following page shows primary and position which will allow you to cover your alternate positions which cover a road junc- assigned area. tion and a supplementary position which A position with the GSR remoted is covers a bridge. shown in the illustration on the following The operational site must provide cover page. and concealment for the GSR team and Soon after occupying a new operational LOS to the target. Therefore, the team must site, the GSR team develops a surveillance effectively use the available terrain and card. The team chief or senior operator pre- improve the site. pares a card for the primary, alternate, and Cover and concealment are best obtained supplementary radar positions. The card is through the construction of field fortifica- maintained at the GSR site and transferred tions. The type and extent of fortifications to a new GSR unit when the team is re- depend on the mission and the time availa- lieved in place. Copies of the card are for- ble. A hasty position is prepared when time warded to the commander of the supported is limited. It uses the natural terrain more unit and to the BTF or brigade S2. Appen- for protection of the team. A deliberate posi- dix C describes how to prepare a surveil- tion is well fortified and camouflaged. It lance card. may be completed in 3 to 4 hours. Most Remotely Employed Sensor Assets deliberate positions begin as hasty posi- REMS provide an additional source of tions which have been improved in time. information for the ground commander. The team prepares its position in the fol- Sensors can be used either alone or to com- lowing stages: plement or supplement other information gathering sources, such as ground surveil- Site radar and clear surveillance area. lance radars. REMS provide information Initiate camouflage and concealment. for the production of intelligence and Prepare operator protective and fight- timely, accurate target-acquisition data. ing positions. Deployment of remote sensors is similar Improve position. to that of the GSR, with one major exception: Remote sensors are not as flexible as Initially, the team emplaces the radar GSRs. Once employed, they may not be and clears the surveillance area. It em- accessible for recovery. Because of recovery places the radar where it can best cover the problems, additional sensors must be issued target area, yet provides an acceptable before new missions can be assigned. Sen- degree of concealment and cover from sors may be recovered during offensive enemy fire. It clears a surveillance area in operations as friendly forces advance. How- front of each GSR. Clearing operations fol- ever, additional sensors usually are re- low these principles: quired for employment ahead of attacking Clearing should not be excessive or it forces. will disclose the radar position. Remote sensors may be effectively em- Clearing should start at the GSR posi- ployed for many operational tasks—alone tion and work forward as far as or with other surveillance assets. For opti- required. mum potential to be achieved, sensors must A thin natural screen of vegetation be fully integrated into the overall surveil- should be left to hide the GSR position. lance plan in the early planning stages. Sensor employment is planned by the type, Clearing a surveillance area is very simi- number, location, and layout of sensors on lar to clearing a field of fire in front of the ground. Sensors are emplaced by hand, weapons systems. FM 5-15 describes the aircraft, or artillery, depending on the tacti- procedure for clearing fields of fire. cal situation.

5-11 5-12 The major advantages of remote sensors visualize the battlefield-where friendly are— and enemy forces can move, shoot, and communicate, given the terrain available; Timeliness. The information is near the location of critical areas of the battle- real time and therefore may provide field; and the enemy systems that would be enough to effect an immediate re- most vulnerable to attack. This informa- sponse or target acquisition capability tion, along with weather and terrain data, by the supported command. aids commanders and their staffs in the All-weather use. This is possible, pro- planning and decision-making process. vided that the sensor data is inter- Data is obtained through tasking, report- preted so as to account for changes in ing, processing, and dissemination of the environment. information obtained from all IEW assets Full-time operation without regard to deployed in support of the mission. visibility or fatigue. Tasking Battlefield expendability will result in Following deployment of the MI battalion sensors being able to be employed in high- element, the asset tasking function is risk environments. Implant areas may be altered to facilitate effective control. This attacked by supporting arms with a high modification is required because of com- probability of the sensors being undamaged. munications constraints and support rela- Sensors may be hand-emplaced by ma- tionships dictated by the tactical situation. neuver unit patrols, long-range reconnais- The EW assets of the MI battalion are sance patrols, long-range surveillance oper- tasked by the MI battalion S3 or his staff ations, or by sensor teams. The major on behalf of the MI battalion commander. advantages of hand-emplacement include The S3 receives mission tasking from the accurate determination of sensor location, G2, CM&D section. Primary considerations better camouflage, and confirmed detection of asset tasking are: radius of each sensor. Disadvantages include threat to the implant team, the time Mission requirements. factor required to install several strings, Tactical situation. and the limited number of sensors that can be carried by the implant team. Asset capabilities. Air delivery provides an accurate and Status of available assets. quick response to the ground commander’s Current and planned missions. request for support. Air delivery provides Current deployment of assets under access to areas inaccessible to ground ele- control. ments, speeds emplacement, and increases the number of sensors that can be emplaced Flexibility. during a single mission. Army air assets Economy of effort. are limited by enemy air defense measures, the inability to accurately determine sensor Terrain. detection radius, and adverse weather Weather. conditions. The S3 selects a specified element capable TEMPLATING THE BATTLEFIELD of accomplishing the mission. Mission tasks and pertinent supporting data are Successful accomplishment of the mission then forwarded to the selected element. during the prehostility phase of operations requires that all deployed IEW assets be The surveillance platoon consists of GSRs used to template the battlefield. This is done and, when augmented, REMS. A surveil- to produce a description of enemy force dis- lance platoon is habitually task organized position on the battlefield in terms of loca- to support a brigade. The brigade and bat- tion, size, types, direction, rate of move- talion S2 normally tasks and coordinates ment, and activity. It helps commanders to the operations of GSR and REMS teams

5-18 that are attached to the brigade and BTF. battalion commanders’ PIR and targeting They prescribe the general employment of needs. Processing is the systematic analysis platoon assets based on the brigade or bat- used to produce intelligence from informa- talion R&S plan. Teams attached to lower tion. Combat information is recorded, eval- echelons are controlled by maneuver com- uated (together with data from other manders and leaders. sources), and interpreted during processing. Interrogation assets are assigned to These three steps are continuous, but are either a GS or DS role. Operating in a GS not necessarily accomplished in any partic- role, they will receive tasking from the S3 of ular order. Recording is necessary for future the MI battalion in response to require- reference. Depending on the combat situa- ments mission tasking from the CM&D section and the complexity of the information, tion. The CM&D section consolidates evaluation and interpretation by BICC per- requirements from subordinate brigades sonnel may consist of only a rapid mental and ensures that they are tasked. DS inter- process. Information received from IEW rogation assets at the brigade EPW collec- sources during the prehostility phase is tion point receive tasking directly from the posted on the SITMAP and evaluated and brigade S2. interpreted against doctrinal templates CI and OPSEC support teams remain in produced before deployment. However, dur- GS to the division. They are tasked by the ing combat, time and the requirement for G2 or G3 through the MI battalion tactical the collection and rapid dissemination of operations center to aid maneuver brigades, combat information limit the amount of to help develop or refine friendly forces pro- processing possible during combat at the files, and to monitor and evaluate division brigade and battalion levels. and brigades’ OPSEC program and decep- At the brigade and battalion levels, much tion operations. of the incoming information is combat information which fire and maneuver ele- Reporting ments need immediately. Successful target- Combat information, to include targeting ing relies on the ability to process informa- data resulting from collection resources, is tion and pass it to a maneuver unit or FSE. reported immediately to the organization The interface between intelligence and FS requesting the information or as directed in must be a viable and functioning system. SOP. Normally the SOP will specify the Target Acquisition way targeting data will be passed to the FSE at the supported headquarters. In some Target acquisition, or obtaining targets cases, targeting data may be transmitted for attack by FS weapons, has traditionally directly to a field artillery battalion or bat- been the responsibility of combat units. tery fire direction center. The types of However, with the introduction of new information to be reported directly to such technology, such as sophisticated detection units should be specified by the commander equipment, it has become necessary to cen- or S3 of the supported unit. Other combat tralize the target acquisition effort at the information will be reported to a battalion major unit level, such as with the G2 and S2 or brigade S2 through the EW platoon head- at the division and brigade TOC, respec- quarters and the IEWSE. All combat infor- tively. Because of the lethality and large mation and data requiring analysis is number of weapons on the modern battle- transmitted by the EW platoon headquar- field, intelligence from all sources must be ters to the MI battalion’s TCAE, and is used to obtain targets for attack by FS simultaneously monitored by the IEWSE at weapons. Intelligence collection assets must the brigade TOC for use as combat informa- look deeper, and “over the hill” for a con- tion supporting combat operations. cealed enemy well before he detects and attacks us. Processing The S2, with the help of the brigade The success of division and brigade com- BICC, processes combat information re- bat operations on the air-land battlefield ceived from the deployed IEW assets to will greatly depend on this timely detection, develop intelligence to satisfy brigade and classification, and location of ground

5-14 targets in sufficient detail to permit the Traditionally, direct target acquisition has most effective employment of maneuver been thought to be accomplished by only forces, fire support, and EW weaponry to those collectors designed specifically for the attack these targets. purpose of direct —only target acquisition. The future battlefields foreseen by today’s Some of these collectors include— combat commanders entail extreme vio- Forward observers. lence and lethality, combined with rapid, Observation posts. continuous combat maneuvers. For the brigade to win such battles, the commander Aerial observers. must be extremely flexible and have fore- Radars (weapons-locating radar (WLR) knowledge of enemy intent. The brigade and MTLR). commander must be able to concentrate combat power at critical times and places, However, direct target acquisition can be and his ability to do so depends on how well accomplished by other means. These other he “sees” these enemy targets on the battle- means may include combat units, GSR, field. His ability to “see” these targets will night vision devices, searchlights, aerial depend greatly on the effective employment surveillance assets, SIGINT elements, and of available target acquisition assets. remote sensors. Their primary mission is not direct target acquisition, but they play The S2 has staff responsibility for the an extremely important part in direct target target acquisition program. He will receive acquisition in support of current tactical continuous reports from his IEW collection operations. assets on which targets, or potential targets, are located on the battlefield. The S2 is Direct target acquisition may also be used required to identify HPT from these reports to assess target damage after engagement and pass them to the S3 and FSO for by FS weapons. engagement. This assessment, furnished to intelligence channels, updates the intelligence data Target acquisition is that part of combat base, influences collection and operational intelligence which pertains to detection, planning activities, and appropriately mod- identification, classification, and location of ifies the target acquisition process. a target (any enemy activity) in sufficient Indirect target acquisition is that target detail to permit the effective employment of data which is developed from the evalua- weapons. Target acquisition elements of the tion of intelligence information supplied by field artillery are specifically organized, two or more means. trained, and equipped to accomplish the target acquisition mission. Target acquisi- Indirect target acquisition can best be tion elements of the field artillery, as dis- defined by the term target development. cussed in Chapter 2, have specialized Target development is the detection, loca- equipment and trained aerial and ground tion, and identification of suspect, probable, observers to target enemy units—especially or confirmed targets as a result of the pro- enemy artillery units and front line forma- cess of analyzing and correlating informa- tions. As targets are acquired, they are tion from more than one information collec- reported either to the FS coordinator at the tion means. It is the development of targets maneuver unit TOC or to the artillery FDC obtained through use of the intelligence for immediate use. The two methods of cycle. Seemingly unrelated items of infor- target acquisition are direct and indirect. mation (which by themselves are not substantial enough to be defined as a target or Direct target acquisition is accomplished potential target) are collected, processed, by one intelligence collection means. For and developed into substantial targets, and example, an artillery FO observes enemy then disseminated to the proper FS activity (a target) and calls for a fire mis- agencies. sion. The fire direction center immediatey The success of target development brings artillery fire onto that target and depends on the active management of all neutralizes it. available information-gathering resources

5-15 in order to refine intelligence about the these collection agencies obtain informa- enemy which will continuously portray the tion, they send preliminary reports back to enemy situation. This will give the com- the S2, who determines whether potential or mander a basis for rendering timely suspected targets may be derived from this decisions. information. When analyzing data to determine whether there is sufficient targeting Target Development information, four areas of concern must be The most common source of target infor- studied: mation is target development. Target development involves the use of— The brigade’s mission. Map tracking. AO characteristics. SITMAP. Enemy tactics. Pattern analysis. Enemy patterns of activity. Map Tracking. Map tracking is the ability to “track” enemy activity on a map from As the S2 and BICC personnel review the first detection to its present position. By incoming information and perform their determining where the enemy has been, analysis, a list of suspected and potential how long he spent in each location, and targets will be developed. Since this list is what he did there, it may be possible to based on early information, it will often be determine enemy unit size, capabilities, and necessary to go back to the collection agen- limitations. Most important of all, we may cies and request additional information on learn enemy intentions. these possible targets. This subsequent information could— Map tracking should be accomplished for each separate and distinct enemy activity. Verify that the target actually exists. Map tracking can be effective only as long as locations are plotted accurately and Accurately identify the target by de- reports on enemy activity are conscien- scription, category, and posture tiously received, logged, and filed in the sequence. proper manner. Accurately locate the target. Situation Map. The brigade’s SITMAP Disprove the presence of the target. represents the most accurate portrayal of the enemy situation. Enemy capabilities Once a potential target has been devel- and intentions which may result in target- oped to the point where it is suitable for ing data can be revealed through a careful employment of a weapons delivery system, study of who the enemy is, how and where it must be included among those targets he is deployed, what he is doing, and what selected for attack. However, before a target he intends to do. can be selected for attack, the type of target Pattern Analysis. The culmination of the must be determined, to allow for the selec- use of the SITMAP, map tracking, and tion of an appropriate weapon system to be other techniques, such as receiving intelli- employed. The following must be gence reports and comparing data with determined: each other, is called pattern analysis. It is the detection of definite and predictable What is the target composed of? (For patterns of enemy activity through the use example, troops, tanks, trucks, emit- of careful mapping and the chronological ters, and so forth.) recording of minute details of enemy activi- What is the target’s strength? (For ty. By analyzing this data, information on example, number of personnel, equip- enemy targets may evolve. ment, and so forth.) Threat Development. Target develop- What are the vulnerabilities of the ment is conducted by the S2, who tasks col- target? (For example, overhead cover lection agencies with specific orders and available, lack of adequate terrain requests to collect target information. As concealment, and so forth.)

5-16 How permanent is the target? (For safeguard information on the battlefield. example, truck park, permanent-type The only time security measures are not fol- structures, tents, convoy, and so forth.) lowed is when they severely impede the rapid flow of critical, perishable data. The After processing has been completed and S2 must carefully weigh the possible ad- the target has been forwarded to the S3 or verse consequences if the recipient fails to FSO for target attack, the intelligence and get the report in time to act against an targeting data is used to update the IPB OPSEC risk. and targeting data base. It is also used to guide the issuance of future brigade collec- The brigade and battalion normally use tion plans. the reports listed below to report and disseminate information and intelligence. Dissemination Appendix A describes the format for the following reports: It is vital that combat information and intelligence be disseminated to brigade and battalion elements in time for effective tac- MIJIFEEDER—meaconing, intrusion, tical decisions and actions. The BICCs jamming, and interference feeder. ensure the timely distribution of informa- INTREP—intelligence report. tion and intelligence to those who need it. It ensures that dissemination is limited to INTSUM—intelligence summary. those elements with an operational need. NBC-l—nuclear, biological, and Most reports generated by the brigade chemical-1 report. and battalion are driven by events. Periodic RII—request for intelligence reports should be limited to those that are information. essential to pass intelligence to those units or elements that need it. The intelligence RRII–response to request for intelli- SOP and the intelligence annex of a higher gence information. unit headquarters should prescribe the NBC-6—nuclear, biological, and types, formats, means, frequencies, times, chemical-6 report. addresses, and information required for TACELINT—tactical ELINT report. each report. TACREP—tactical report. For event-generated reports, such as spot reports, the standard addressees are nor- SIR—serious incident report. mally the next higher, lower, supporting, MAER—multiple assets effectiveness and adjacent headquarters. However, the report. BICC should evaluate each report individu- ally to determine who needs it. Vertical dis- MASTR—multiple assets status report. semination and reporting is normally lim- MATM—multiple assets tasking ited to the next higher or lower echelons. message. For example, the maneuver battalion normally does not disseminate data directly to SALUTE—size, activity, location, unit, the division. An exception maybe dictated time, and equipment message. by a battlefield situation. In the event that FREETEXT—free text message. communications are lost with brigade headquarters, the battalion S2 may disseminate Order report. directly to the division G2, and indicate Patrol report that communications with the brigade are out. SITREP—situation report. Dissemination means are selected based Interrogation report. on timeliness and security requirements. Intelligence estimate. High-priority communication channels are Intelligence annex. only used to transmit highly perishable, critical information. Every effort is taken to R&S plan.

5-17 The S2 and BICC disseminate informa- ing relationship between the S2 and S3 section and intelligence to the commander, tions. When information, combat informa- staff, and other personnel within the head- tion, and intelligence become available, quarters through briefings and personal they are passed to the appropriate staff sec- contact. tion. In turn, they keep the S2 section in- Briefings are designed to present infor- formed of their intelligence requirements mation and intelligence to the commander, and of any situations which impact on S2 staff, and other designated personnel. Brief- operations. ings are given to obtain a decision, influence a mission, or inform the commander Frequent liaison with other unit person- and remaining members of the staff. S2 nel and agencies to exchange information briefings are normally informal. The formal and intelligence is mutually beneficial and briefing guide found in Appendix B is modi- contributes to the achievement of intelli- fied to fit the S2’s briefing situation and gence objectives. requirements. The information briefing enables the au- In combat, the S2 ensures that informa- dience to gain an understanding of a prob- tion is not disseminated to addressees who lem, a situation, or a military operation. do not have an operational need for that information. The single exception is to The decision briefing is presented to addressees listed in the SOP for required obtain a decision. Usually based on staff reports. Limiting dissemination reduces the study results, the briefing identifies a prob- communications system workload by elimi- lem, discusses the available options, and nating unnecessary reports. It also recommends the adoption of a particular enhances the security of the data by limit- solution. ing access on a need-to-know basis. The mission briefing imparts mission- related information and intelligence, gives Divisions and corps need information to specific instructions, and instills an under- support the development of the intelligence standing of the mission during operational picture along the front line. Battalions and situations. At the battalion and brigade brigades are primary sources for this infor- levels, the mission briefing is used by the mation. Lower echelons do not have the commander to state the mission and pro- time, manpower, or storage capability to vide guidance and direction. conduct an extensive analysis of disseminated data. Subordinate commands depend The staff briefing is used to secure a coor- on the next higher command for intelli- dinated or unified staff effort. This briefing gence to plan and conduct combat opera- is usually presided over by either the com- tions. They use extensive amounts of commander or the executive officer. Staff brief- bat information, especially targeting ings may combine portions of the informs- information, upon which they act promptly. tion, decision, or mission briefing. This Adjacent units extract, correlate, and inte- briefing provides principal staff members grate data into their respective intelligence an opportunity to update the commander assessments. They also need combat infor- and other staff members about the opera- mation that may affect their operations. tions and activities of the various staff Effective dissemination of intelligence is sections. important to the successful accomplishment One of the best ways to disseminate of the intelligence mission at all echelons. information is through personal contact. Communication of significant amounts of Through frequent staff contact, the S2 can data can place a severe workload on com- fully appreciate the purpose and intent of munication systems. Overloading communi- the commander’s guidance and directions, cations systems must be avoided. Use of how he operates, and what is expected of correct message priorities and limiting the the staff. The importance of this personal number of addressees contributes to rapid contact is surpassed only by the coordinat- and effective communications.

5-18 COMBAT PHASE Knowing the battlefield requires detailed intelligence on the enemy, weather, and ter- OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS rain. Detailed, accurate, and comprehensive Brigades conduct offensive operations as IPB begins before initial deployment, is part of division and corps offensives, during refined during the prehostility phase, and division and corps defensive operations, as continues, once the battle is joined. contingency forces, or internally within MI battalion assets serve to support econ- the context of their own defensive opera- omy of force operations by providing early tions. Offensive operations are character- warning and support to deception opera- ized by aggressive initiative on the part of tions within risk levels acceptable to the the subordinate (brigade and battalion) commander. MI battalion assets supporting commanders, the ability to make rapid the main attack and economy of force shifts in the main effort to take advantage operations must be task-organized accord- of opportunities, and momentum to effect ing to the tactical situation and METT-T deep, rapid destruction of enemy forces. requirements. These operations are conducted throughout the brigade and battalion areas of opera- Survivability of IEW assets is essential tions and interest. for successful battle outcome. Consistent with security and communications require- Brigades and battalions conduct offen- ments and mission responsiveness, MI bat- sive operations to carry the fight to the talion assets should disperse to the maxi- enemy and to destroy his capability to re- mum extent possible. They also apply the sist. Depending upon the commander’s full range of OPSEC measures. intent for a particular operation, one or C2 of IEW resources and their effective- more of the following may be the specified ness are directly related. If IEW is to be purpose for attacking: continuous and responsive, the level, type, Destroy an enemy force. and means of C2 of these assets must be determined early, as defined in Chapter 3. Secure or seize key terrain. The primary types of offensive operations Destroy a key element of enemy com- include— bat power. Movement to contact. Fix or contain enemy forces to deprive them of resources or to prevent them Hasty attack. from reinforcing elsewhere. Deliberate attack. Deceive the enemy. Exploitation. Conduct reconnaissance to gain Pursuit. information about the enemy and terrain. These operations are described in detail The destruction of the enemy fighting in FM 100-5 and FC 71-100. force and its will to resist is the only way of winning in combat. This purpose is well Movement to Contact served by effective and efficient IEW A movement to contact is conducted to support. gain or regain contact with the enemy and In the offense, certain IEW principles are to develop the situation so that either a essential to battlefield success: hasty or deliberate attack can be made. It is characterized by a lack of information Knowing the battlefield. about the enemy; therefore, it is necessary Denying intelligence to the enemy. for the brigade or battalion to move using techniques that provide maximum security Disrupting and destroying enemy CI and afford flexibility. It moves aggressively and reconnaissance capabilities. toward the enemy. Maximum use of intelli- Maintaining the integrity of IEW gence resources is made to find the enemy operations. before the enemy can detect the brigade or

5-19 battalion presence. OPSEC measures deny EW support to the movement to contact is intelligence to the enemy about the friendly aggressive, both in planning and execution. forces during movement to contact. When Every effort is made to provide continuous contact is made, combat information and coverage of the battlefield. Alternate posi- intelligence are used by the commander to tions, with LOS along the axis of advance, determine where to attack, bypass, or are selected to enable the EW assets to defend, and with what force to overcome “leapfrog” forward to support the operation. enemy resistance. High terrain to the rear and along the During the movement to contact, IEW re- flanks of the maneuver force is identified. sources are employed primarily to provide Assets requiring long set-up and tear-down early detection and location of enemy times may be best employed in these areas. forces. This effort begins in the planning stage. The BICC, with supporting data from EW support is initially provided from division intelligence sources, expands the positions as close as is tactically possible to division IPB data, relative to the brigade the line of departure. As the maneuver ele- battlefield area, to address the command- ments move forward, their rate of march is er’s PIR concerning the brigade areas of computed. This information, along with the operations and interest. Through this pro- estimated set-up, tear-down, and displace- cess, information about the enemy, terrain, ment times of supporting EW equipment, and weather are tied together to give the allows the ESM and ECM assets to “leap- brigade or battalion commander a clear pic- frog” forward and maintain continuous ture of expected battlefield conditions in the support for the operations. areas of interest and operations. The BICC, with guidance from the S2, ESM collection assets, primarily voice defines collection tasks based on the collection teams, intercept and record PIR/IR. The BICC prepares mission task- enemy HF and VHF voice transmissions. ing and transmits it to organic and support- Emphasis is placed on detecting forward ing IEW assets according to C2 procedures enemy elements as early as possible. Dur- outlined in Chapter 3. Collection missions ing the movement to contact, intercept are also levied through the S3 on combat, priorities include— combat support, and CSS units within the brigade or battalion. These functions are an Reconnaissance C2 nets. inherent part of each operation and are per- Tank communications. formed prior to, and during, all brigade and 2 battalion operations. IEW resources sup- C nets of maneuver units. porting the movement to contact will nor- Artillery FS nets. mally include interrogators, EW assets, and GSR teams from the surveillance platoon of Engineer nets. the MI battalion. REC nets. Interrogators move with and support the advance elements. Until contact is made HF/VHF and VHF ECM teams deploy with the enemy and EPW are available, and move with the ESM assets during this primary sources of information are limited phase of combat. Although they have no to refugees, line crossers, and other non- active ECM missions during this time frame, jammers maybe used as passive combatants. Interrogators determine— voice intercept positions to augment exist- Locations, size, composition, and direc- ing ESM collection assets. tion of movement of enemy forces. Enemy unit objectives. Surveillance squads and teams move forward with the units to which attached. Location of minefield, obstacles, and They support troops or companies or oper- antitank weapons. ate with platoons or teams. GSR teams Terrain conditions along the route of move with the supported unit using “leap- advance. frog” movement, monitoring the terrain

5-20 forward and to the flanks of the force to Hasty Attack detect enemy activity. They— The hasty attack is an offensive operation conducted to defeat the enemy. It also Acquire targets for immediate may be conducted to seize key terrain, gain engagement. information, or support a deception plan. It Provide early warning. is usually conducted following a movement to contact, for which a unit has not made Search and monitor ambush areas. extensive preparations. A hasty attack uses Search areas of conventional fires for the resources immediately available in signs of enemy activity immediately order to maintain momentum. From the after firing. early moments, every available element of combat and combat support is committed to Cue direct-fire weapon systems. the attack. A type of organization for brigade movement to contact with supporting MI battal- Deliberate Attack ion resources deployed is illustrated below. The deliberate attack is also an offensive The movement to contact terminates operation conducted to defeat the enemy. when enemy resistance requires deployment This type of attack, as with the hasty and a coordinated effort by the main body. attack, may be used to seize key terrain, All available collection resources are gain information, or support a deception employed to determine the size, capabilities, plan. intentions, and deployment of the enemy A deliberate attack is planned in detail force. Tasking of EW assets is redirected to and is often expensive in terms of man- support whatever action the brigade or bat- power, equipment, and supplies. A deliber- talion undertakes. ate attack involves overcoming strong

5-21 enemy forces in established positions and is fecting the situation. The following illus- undertaken after thorough reconnaissance, trates an enemy MRR defense config- acquisition, and development of targets. It uration. follows an analysis of all other factors af-

5-22 It is critical for the S2 to collect detailed too late for the enemy to react effectively. combat information and intelligence about Therefore, OPSEC support teams— the enemy from higher, lower, and adjacent units. Sources of information include Monitor and observe unit activity to patrols, reconnaissance by fire, aerial pho- ensure proper employment and coordi- tography, prisoners, deserters, electronic nation of OPSEC and deception plans. warfare assets, radar, and remote sensors. Monitor deception and countermea- Information about terrain can be collected sures to detect deficiencies or from many of the same resources. compromises. When attacking, the brigade or battalion Perform COMSEC monitoring. commander is particularly concerned about Voice collection teams intercept, record, the location and commitment of enemy and provide LOB on enemy voice communi- reserves; timing, strength, and location of cations. Combat information is reported counterattacks; and time, location, and immediately for use by FS and ECM ele- strength of forces attempting to envelop the ments in accordance with existing SOP. It attacking forces. is also sent via the T&A team to the MI bat- MI resources are initially employed well talion TCAE for processing into intelli- forward, as far as terrain and the tactical gence. During the attack phase, high- situation permit. As the tempo of the attack priority targets include— increases, certain collection assets become less effective. GSR assets maybe limited to Reconnaissance nets in the security flank screening and rear area security. zone. Ground-based EW assets maybe outrun C2 nets between reconnaissance units quickly. When possible, MI commanders in the security zone and regiments in “leapfrog” their resources in order to pro- the main defensive belt. vide continuous coverage. Maximum use of Rocket and artillery FS nets. assets must be made to support the attack. Air defense nets. Interrogators locate forward in DS of the BTF. They briefly interrogate EPW, line Enemy reserve forces. crossers, and refugees to determine— Locations of enemy communications Location and disposition of enemy emitters in the VHF range are obtained by forces. the TRAILBLAZER DF system. They are then reported immediately to the MI battal- Location of forward line of main ion TCAE and the IEWSE of the affected defense belt, including location, type, brigade in accordance with procedures out- and strength of defensive positions. lined in Chapters 2 and 3. TRAILBLAZER is targeted against the same type of targets Extent of obstacles and mines. as the voice collection teams. Planned operations such as counterat- Noncommunications collection teams are tacks, envelopments, and NBC important to the offense because they operations. detect, identify, and give LOB on enemy Enemy unit objectives. radars, noncommunications jammers, and telemetry systems which indicate enemy Weaknesses in the enemy defense force disposition and weapon systems to be which can be exploited through encountered. Examples of priority non- maneuver, fire, or deception. communications include— OPSEC support teams may support the Surveillance, countermortar, counter- effort and monitor the posture of the com- battery, and air defense radars in the mand to detect compromises or conditions security zone and main defensive belt. that may affect the commander’s EEFI. OPSEC is most important before the attack Nuclear and chemical meteorological begins. The brigade or battalion must radars and telemetry. retain the advantage of surprise until it is Noncommunications jammers.

5-23 ECM teams concentrate their efforts on lack of activity is not a sure sign of a gap in disrupting or degrading enemy C2 and FS the enemy defenses. It is an indicator, how- communications. The teams are tasked to ever, and can cue other collection systems jam— to locate enemy weak spots. GSRs maybe 2 employed with the enveloping force to pro- C nets linking battalions, regiments, vide early warning of enemy activity. and divisions in the main defensive belt with reconnaissance units in the security zone. Upon contact with the enemy, GSRs 2 cover areas that the enemy might use for Critical C links associated with FS maneuvering forces. They can also vector and air defense units in the security friendly units that are maneuvering against zone and main defensive belt. the enemy. They are especially valuable in C2 nets of reserve forces. providing early warning of enemy maneuver against friendly flanks and attempts at GSRs move with attacking elements, fo- envelopment. They also detect movement of cusing initially on enemy security and for- enemy reinforcing or counterattack forces. ward defenses. They may vector friendly maneuver elements through these gaps. They also monitor the flanks and the gaps By detecting enemy activity, both before between attacking elements. and during the attack, GSRs locate targets to determine whether there is any rein- GSRs support the consolidation of objec- forcement, shifting, or withdrawal of enemy tives by monitoring possible enemy with- units. drawals and counterattack routes. In an envelopment, GSRs detect gaps or MI resources supporting the attack may exposed flanks in the enemy defenses. A be deployed as illustrated below.

5-24 Exploitation ECM teams are employed to degrade the enemy C2, and FS communications, adding Exploitation is the following up of gains to the confusion and disorientation caused to take full advantage of success in battle. by the successful attack by friendly fires It is a phase of the offensive that destroys and maneuver forces. ECM are also em- the enemy’s ability to reconstitute an ployed against the C2 communication of organized defense or to conduct an orderly reserve or reinforcing units to disrupt the withdrawal in the face of threatened de- enemy reinforcement attempts. This inhib- struction or capture. It may follow either a its successful enemy reaction at critical hasty or deliberate attack. The brigade can phases during the exploitation. exploit its own success, act as the exploiting force for a higher echelon, or follow and GSRs continue to support the attack, support another exploiting force. extending the observation capabilities of forward attacking elements by enabling The exploitation is initiated when an them to survey distant points or areas of enemy force is having recognizable diffi- special interest. GSRs also assist the visual culty in maintaining its position. Although observation of attacking units during day- local exploitations may appear insignifi- light by making initial detection of par- cant, their cumulative effects can be deci- tially obscured targets at long ranges. sive. Exploiting forces can have the mission of securing objectives deep in the enemy Pursuit rear, cutting lines of communication, sur- As enemy forces begin to disintegrate rounding and destroying enemy forces, under pressure, exploitation may develop denying escape routes to an encircled force, into pursuit. The primary function of pur- and destroying enemy reserves. They suit is to complete the destruction of the require mobility and balanced firepower. enemy force which is in the process of dis- Tanks, mechanized infantry, and cavalry, engagement. While a terrain objective may supported by engineers, artillery, and be designated, the enemy force itself is the attack helicopters make up the forward primary objective. elements. The brigade conducts local pursuit or is Once the exploitation has begun, it is car- used as the direct pressure or enveloping ried out without interruption to the final force of a higher echelon in the pursuit. objective. The enemy is given no relief from Exploiting forces must be alert for indica- offensive pressure. The exploiting force tions of enemy collapse which enables pur- secures terrain only as necessary to accom- suit. Commanders prepare for pursuit by plish its mission. Deep attack is used to cut issuing warning orders, regrouping forces, off enemy forces from escape or reinforce- and providing logistic support. Ground- ment and to inhibit the enemy’s re- based IEW elements must be aware of the establishment. supported commander’s intentions in order MI resources support exploitation opera- to ensure that they are prepared to operate tions by identifying and locating enemy C2, as self-sustaining entities during this period FS, air defense, and logistical communica- of fast-paced operation. tions and activities. Information gathered The speed of advance, the enemy’s inabil- from voice collection teams, DF, and EPW ity to react effectively, and the dispersion of interrogators, helps the S2 determine— forces contribute to the security of the pursuing forces. The pursuit is conducted on as Identification and location of defensive broad a front as possible. Forces engaged in positions. direct pressure and eveloping maneuvers Identification and disposition of are given deep objectives, mission-type enemy reserves. orders, and minimum controls. If the attempt to cut the enemy’s escape routes fails, Enemy unit morale, strength, and a new enveloping force is immediately dis- logistical status. patched. Subordinate and CSS means are Enemy plans and intentions. decentralized.

5-25 The pursuing force employs all available Nature of obstacles, barriers, and

means of ECM to confuse2 the enemy, to bypasses. deny him use of his C communications, Unoccupied sectors, gaps between sec- and to hinder his attempts to consolidate tors, or sectors held by weak forces. and reorganize. Overwatch positions for TOWs and During the exploitation and pursuit, IEW tanks. assets supporting the attacking force continue their missions as originally tasked or GSRs maybe oriented along the direction as modified by the S2 in accordance with of attack to report and correct deviations for updated PIR/IR to support the commander the attacking force. GSRs are more effective and the decision-making process. Both when employed with thermal sights to over- operations require that enemy communica- watch movement of the attacking forces. tions, FS, and surveillance systems be The illustration on the following page located and suppressed or destroyed. This is depicts night attack orientation. accomplished with effective coordination ECM operations employed against C2 and integration of EW and fire and communications of enemy forces in the maneuver. security zone and the main defense zone are intensified. Night and Limited Visibility Combat ECM, with supporting fires and illumina- All the previously mentioned offensive tion of the objectives during the critical operations are affected by night and limited moment of attack, contribute to enemy con- visibility operations. fusion and lack of control, and to their Units attack at night and during periods eventual defeat. of limited visibility to continue an attack started in daylight, to achieve surprise and DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS psychological superiority, to gain important The purpose of the defense is to defeat the terrain for further operations, to use con- enemy and regain the initiative. Defense is cealment afforded by darkness or limited a temporary measure conducted to identify visibility to avoid heavy losses, or to com- or create enemy weakness which can be pensate for friendly air and armor exploited at the earliest opportunity by of- inferiority. fensive action. The defender uses fire and Terrain and weather information must be maneuver to seek an advantageous position available to the S2 to aid in planning for from which to blunt the attack, and concen- night and limited visibility combat. Analy- trates combat power to counterattack. De- sis of the terrain and weather factors affect- fending forces are required to hold their ing trafficability is vitally important to the positions and terrain and destroy the ene- selection of routes of march for the attack. my or cause him to stop or retreat. Defend- Terrain features that offer concealment and ing forces may move to subsequent posi- can be used for heading reference are also tions on order or as planned, but their important. intent—TO DESTROY THE ENEMY AND SEIZE THE INITIATIVE—does not IEW collection assets (communications or change. noncommunications intercept teams, DF, The brigade or battalion will normally and EPW interrogators) will be tasked to defend as part of a larger force. Depending supply information pertaining to enemy on the commander’s intent for a particular defenses such as— operation, one or more of the following may be the specific purpose for defending: Location of enemy positions (personnel, weapon systems, routes, and fields Concentrate forces elsewhere on the of fire). battlefield. Presence and number of searchlights Gain time without sacrificing the and night vision devices. defended area.

5-26 Preserve forces, facilities, or terms of participating in the division’s deep installations. operational effort. The organization of the Control key terrain. defensive battlefield is depicted on the following page. Brigades conduct close and rear operations.-They conduct deep operations-only in

5-27 The battalion can be employed in each of warning of enemy intentions and targets the operational areas listed below: for fire and maneuver forces. IEW assets must also be alert to enemy deception Deep operations. attempts and report them in sufficient time Covering force operations. for the commander to act effectively. It is Main effort in the MBA. essential, therefore, that the IEW assets be task organized and deployed early to pro- Rear area. vide intelligence, combat information, and The tactical situation and METT-T targeting data to support the division’s deep determine how the commander plans his operation, the covering force, the MBA, and defensive efforts. The MI resources to sup- the rear area. port the overall operation are task organ- The first task, once the battle begins, is ized and allocated based on the need. These for IEW assets to identify and collect resources may either be GS to the division against the enemy’s main effort as early as or DS to the brigade in whose area they are possible. Enemy methods of movement and operating. attack must be understood. to identify the The IEW principles discussed in offensive enemy’s main effort. operations apply to the defense as well. The following figure depicts a motorized Knowing the battlefield. rifle division (MRD) in its movement to con- Denying intelligence to the enemy. tact. The tank division (TD) is similar. 3 Once contact is made, the enemy com- Destroying and disrupting enemy C I. mander will deploy his maneuver elements Maintaining integrity of operations. for a deliberate attack. IEW support enables the commander to In the offense, enemy forces concentrate see the battlefield clearly. Collected infor- numerically superior forces for a combina- mation from IEW assets is analyzed at the tion of frontal attacks, envelopments, hold- BICC to provide the commander with early ing attacks, and deep thrusts. Normally, a

5-28 5-29 division will select one main and one defended or unoccupied areas to carry the secondary axis of attack. The entire divi- battle to the rear. Momentum of the attack sion may move along a single axis if that is is sustained through echelonment of forces necessary to achieve force superiority. and extensive artillery fires. The following Rather than attempting to seize key terrain, figure depicts an enemy’s configuration for it concentrates on breaking through weakly deliberate attack.

5-30 Deep Operations the situation and target development data being produced by division, corps, and EAC The deep operation is used by the division assets. Aerial COMINT and ELINT sys- and higher echelons to affect the closure tems collect information on, and locate, times of follow-on elements and create win- enemy C2 communications and noncom- dows of opportunity for decisive action munications systems. Long-range patrols, against leading enemy echelons. Brigades when available, provide detailed HUMINT and battalions participate in deep opera- on activities and locations deemed critical tions as part of the overall division force. to the deep operation. This data is passed Areas of interest and operations extend through corps and division intelligence forward of the FLOT far enough to give the channels to the brigade S2 as needed. commander time to identify approaching enemy forces, assess his options, and exe- During the defense, the brigade is con- cute operations accordingly. The deep com- cerned with the approaching enemy force ponent of the operation begins before the composition, disposition, strength, rate of enemy closes with the close-in maneuver movement, and intentions in its area of forces, goes on throughout the covering interest. As enemy formations approach the force and MBA battles, and usually con- brigade’s AO, the commander monitors tinues after direct contact between forces their movement through collection, analy- has ended. sis, and reporting from division; seeks HPT; and initiates deep attack options against In conducting the deep operation, the follow-on battalions and first-echelon sus- commander’s intelligence collection effort is tainers. EW and REMS resources provide focused by making specific demands on the the S2 with data on approaching forces intelligence system. As enemy formations which, when coordinated with the FSO and approach the FLOT, the commander moni- S3 and integrated into the fire and tors their movement, seeks high-value maneuver plans of the brigade, allows for targets, disrupts and delays them, and destruction, disruption or delay of these modifies his defensive plan as necessary. forces. The means available for deep attack may ESM resources support the deep operation be limited in number and effect. Special by– care is taken to use deep fires and maneuver 2 efficiently to obtain effects which contribute Locating and monitoring C nets directly to the success of the overall defense. between first- and second-echelon bat- Air-delivered weapons, tactical nuclear talions, regiments, and divisions. weapons, air maneuver units, and special Locating and monitoring C2 nets asso- operation warfare forces are the chief weap- ciated with artillery and rocket units, ons of the deep operation, though other especially those with NBC capability. maneuver forces may be used. Generally, more sensors and weapons become availa- Locating and monitoring enemy air ble as the enemy nears the FLOT. defense nets. Jamming C2 communications of Effective employment of these means reserves of second-echelon battalions depends on careful planning and IPB at the and regiments. division level before the operations begin and on a responsive surveillance operation Jamming communications nets used to once operations are under way. coordinate passage of lines, maneuver, and traffic control. The brigade S2 receives intelligence prod- Noncommunications collection teams ucts from higher, adjacent, and supporting detect, identify, and give LOB for enemy IEW resources to satisfy the brigade com- noncommunications emitters in the deep mander’s deep operation information operations area. This emitter information requirements. assists in the situation and target develop- IPB in the brigade’s area of interest for ment process within the BICC. Priorities the deep operation was initiated prior to include: deployment. This process continued during Surveillance radars of second-echelon the prehostility phase with the majority of battalions. 5-31 Air defense radars of second-echelon sensor teams. For monitoring movement in units. the enemy’s rear area, especially at specific NAIs, the REMS can be employed at speci- Meteorological radars in the deep fic road junctions or as sensor fields over a operations area. wider area. Counterbattery radars. The road or trail junction string includes REMS provide an additional source of two seismic sensors placed at each end of information for the ground commander that the three approaches of a Y-type road or can be used for the production of intelli- trail junction. A rule of thumb is to place gence and timely, accurate target acquisi- two seismic sensors on every approach and tion data. To support the deep operation, confirming sensors at all road junctions or REMS maybe emplanted deep in the ene- intersections. This is illustrated by the my’s rear area to provide indications of following. reinforcement. Sensors may be hand- A sensor field is two or more sensor emplaced by maneuver-unit patrols, long- strings employed to monitor two or more range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs), specific locations within an area of interest, long-range surveillance operations, or by as shown here.

5-32 There are two situations in which sensor the sensor’s transmit channel. Because the relays must be employed. The first is when relay transmits the sensor signal on a dif- the sensor implant location is not within ferent channel, the RF monitor at the moni- radio LOS of the monitoring site. The sector site must be set on the same channel as ond is when the distance between the sen- the relay’s transmit channel. Because the sor implant location and the monitoring relays can only receive and retransmit one site is greater than 50 miles or 80 kilome- channel, each sensor string will require two ters. The current relay, used with remote relays to retransmit all sensor information. sensors, is the expendable relay AN/GRQ- In most situations, each sensor string is 21. It will receive digital sensor signals on employed with a two-channel mix which one channel and retransmit this signal to will require two relays, as down by the the monitor site on a different channel. The example below. relay receiver channel must be the same as

5-33 The timeliness and accuracy of sensor- A typical target acquisition sensor em- derived data make REMS an excellent ployment is shown below. target acquisition resource. The REMS team emplaces sensors near predesignated It is the fusion of all the IEW collected target areas and reports activations to the data and its integrated use in target and FIST. Properly employed, REMS can indi- situation development that allows the cate the type, size, number, direction of commander to see deeply and conduct the movement, and speed of the target. deep operation.

5-34 Covering Force Operations Target confirmation, validation, and development is conducted in accordance The covering force is formed by the for- with the division and brigade collection ward security echelons. It defends or delays plan. The EW resources will respond to the and withdraws in a “staggered” sequence, brigade’s collection plan through the when appropriate. IEWSE and EW platoon headquarters, The fundamental purpose of the covering rather than directly from the S2 as GSR, force in defense is to serve as the forward REMS, CI, and interrogation assets would. security echelon. It occupies a sector far The covering force area, where IEW enough forward of the FEBA to protect resources will be initially deployed, begins MBA units from surprise, to allow MBA at the FLOT and extends rearward to the forces to move to meet the enemy attack, to FEBA, This is where the covering force per- prevent the delivery of enemy medium- forms its four basic tasks of— range artillery fire against MBA units, and to deceive the enemy on the location of the Deceiving the enemy as to situation. main defensive positions. The mission of the covering force is to gain and maintain Forcing the enemy to deploy from his contact with attacking enemy forces and to march formation. develop the situation. Stripping away enemy air defenses. In many instances, corps and division Delaying the enemy. commanders establish a strong covering force to form the first echelon of a defense MI resources in the defense will be based in depth. The covering force conducts a on the MI battalion in support of the heavy major operation to destroy leading enemy division, because of the preponderance of formations, causes the commitment of this type of unit in the US Army. Light divi- follow-on battalions or regiments, causes sions, air assault and airborne divisional repositioning of enemy artillery and air MI assets, although different in numbers, defenses, and thus forces the enemy to dis- will be employed similarly to the heavy di- close his main effort. While the covering vision in defensive operations. Differences forces are fighting the enemy’s leading will be discussed later in this chapter. echelons, the next higher level of command conducts the deep operation against enemy In the defense, most combat and intelli- follow-on forces and prepares for the main gence elements are relatively static until operation based on covering force and deep contact is actually made with the enemy. operation developments. GSR and EW elements, on the other hand, The size and composition of the covering because of their unique electronic signa- force area depends on the mission, enemy, tures, must continuously reposition them- terrain, and available forces. These factors selves to avoid enemy REC activities and take on added significance and complexity, subsequent destructive fires. depending on the attack mode chosen by the enemy, the depth and width of the area MI assets are deployed to support the available for covering force operations, and covering force operations. RSTA assets the time required for MBA defenders to get extend the capabilities of the covering force set for action. The covering force is nor- in the collection of vital combat information mally tank-heavy. A defensive covering and intelligence, based on the commander’s force operating in front of a division could PIR and IR. well consist of four or five tank-heavy battalion task forces, attack helicopters, field Covering force area operations are en- artillery, air defense, and engineer units. hanced when the two types of GSR teams IEW resources that are used to identify are deployed together tactically. The the enemy’s main effort will be deployed in AN/PPS-5 teams can be positioned to the covering force area as dictated by their exploit their long-range capabilities, while capabilities and limitations outlined in the mobility and quickness of the AN-PPS- Chapter 2, and by task organization. 15 can cover areas immediately beyond the

5-35 FLOT. Both types of GSR teams are used AN/PPS-15 team is equipped ideally to for— accompany motorized security patrols Search missions. Search for enemy and provide early warning of suspi- activity on likely avenues of approach cious activities along the patrol’s or withdrawal, attack positions, and intended route of march. assembly areas. GSRs with EW assets often can help lo- Point surveillance. Monitor point cate the enemy’s main effort by comparing targets such as bridges, defiles, or road activities noted in other parts of the CFA. junctions to detect movement in and They can be used to anticipate enemy ma- around the point. Similarly, this type neuvers, establish the depth of the enemy of surveillance can be conducted to offensive, or uncover an enemy feint or cover gaps between friendly units and demonstration. They cover gaps between key terrain where observation posts friendly units and monitor exposed flanks might be established. and other critical areas, such as the rear. Route surveillance. Scan roadways or During the covering force operation, portions thereof to detect and obtain REMS can be used with GSRs to provide information on traffic density, rate, flank security. When employed on lightly direction, and type of movement. defended flanks of maneuver elements, sensors provide early warning of enemy at- Control and coordination. Assist in the tempts to conduct envelopments. When em- control of units, especially during the ployed in this manner, REMS will permit night operations, by monitoring and economy of force by reducing the number of vectoring the movement of friendly troops needed to protect a unit’s flank in the RSTA and warning them of enemy CFA. and other friendly activities along EW support to the CFA is task organized their routes. to accomplish four primary tasks: Fire control support. Acquire targets Provide early warning. for fire missions and track the advancing or retreating enemy to permit the Assist in targeting. timely shifting of fire. When coordi- Augment combat power with ECM. nated with final protective fires and illumination plans, GSR teams are Support the commander’s deception used to locate the enemy and alert the plan (when such plans exist). supported unit so that fires, illumina- EW provides early warning and targeting tions, and pre-positioned munitions assistance through ESM. ESM consists of can be employed at the appropriate communications and noncommunications time and survey target areas imme- intercept and direction finding and is de- diately following the lifting of fires to scribed along with ESM systems in Chapter detect any remaining activity. 2. Early warning may also be provided the Observation. Vector friendly maneuver brigade and battalion by corps and EAC while concurrently searching for aerial ESM assets. enemy activity during periods when These assets can provide early warning of visibility is limited or obscured. enemy troop disposition, movements, and Riverine defense. Detect and monitor intentions at a much greater range than the movement of both friendly and those ground assets organic to the division. enemy watercraft. Requests for tasking of these elements origi- Perimeter security. Enhance security nate at the division G2 or G3. Brigades and and provide early warning of intru- battalions receive intelligence from these sions, movements in likely routes of missions through normal intelligence approach toward the perimeter, and channels. unusual or suspicious activities near As enemy units close on the CFA, the bri- long stretches of pipeline or LOCs. The gade and battalion resources assume the

5-36 task of early warning, identification of the CPs. enemy’s main attack, and target devel- 2 opment. Fire support C elements. Voice collection teams are deployed 2 to 5 REC systems. kilometers behind the FLOT, coordinating The voice collection elements determine with maneuver elements for deployment branch, echelon, location (LOB), direction sites. The voice collection teams require of movement, and capabilities of enemy radio LOS along probable enemy avenues combat, and combat support, targets. of approach for best utilization. At the direction of the TCAE, voice collec- DF elements of TRAILBLAZER require tion elements in GS to division can be used the same considerations in siting as the to augment the SPP by acting as additional voice collection assets. The voice collection RSS with separate intercept capabilities. elements are found solely in the brigade This increases the DF baseline and offers area and are tasked to support only avenues more LOB data for a more accurate emitter of approach within that brigade. location. Drawbacks to this augmentation TRAILBLAZER, on the other hand, will be are a conflict of tasking to the voice collec- located not only in a brigade area but also tion site, and communications equipment straddling brigade lines. incompatibility. The voice collection team By its nature, TRAILBLAZER requires a must use FM VHF transceivers and cannot large area for deployment and, because of talk directly to the MCS computer. LOB its unique electronic signature, must con- data must be manually collated at the SPP tinuously redeploy throughout the MBA to or TCAE to be incorporated with the avoid enemy REC and subsequent fires. To TRAILBLAZER product. retain continuity of intercept and direction This product, target emitter locations, is finding, TRAILBLAZER must use the used by the S2 with target information from “leapfrog” method for redeployment. To other sources; GSRs, imagery interpreta- accomplish this, for example, one MCS and tion, voice intercept and noncommunica- one RSS will deploy to new positions while tions intercept, to provide a target list to the the remaining MCS and two RSS hold their brigade and battalion FSEs for fire positions and continue with tasking. The missions. SPP headquarters element will deploy with the same MCS throughout deployment to The light, air assault, and airborne divi- maintain continuity. When the redeploying sions will not have an SPP and will rely on elements are in position and in communica- the voice collection team equipment for the tions on line with TCAE and SPP HQ ele- DF missions. ment, the remaining MCS and RSS will redeploy. The SPP headquarters element will Noncommunications intercept elements at that time pass control of the mission to require the same siting considerations as the MCS that has communications with the the voice collection and SPP elements. The TCAE. When the SPP headquarters element LOB, cut, and fix data produced by is in its new location, it will reassume con- TEAMPACK are correlated with GSR, trol of the mission. This leapfrog concept is countermortar/counterbattery radar, com- shown on the following page. munications intercept, and DF, compared to the brigade and battalion target list, and Priority of effort for the SPP is to the fed to the FSE and TACP for suppression, interdiction battle in the CFA. As the cover- fire, and air strike. ing force operation is handed off, priority of support shifts to forces in the MBA. During The ECM elements in the CFA and MBA operation in the MBA, targets include— will be deployed in the battalion area and

NBC delivery systems. must coordinate3 closely with the battalion for sites. The C facilities supporting enemy HVT and HPT as directed by the RSTA, REC, and both division and regi- commander. mental artillery groups are HPT for all Enemy jamming operations. ECM resources as enemy forces enter and

5-37 advance through the CFA. COMJAM oper- HPT, block transmission at regiment to ators selectively jam critical communica- battalion levels. Nuisance intrusion by tions links. They use both conventional and ECM operators may be conducted to con- special operating techniques and proce- fuse the enemy and disrupt his advance, dures which are specifically designed to provide false data to be acted upon by delay and confuse enemy commanders and enemy ADA and FSE, and require the ene- fire control operators. Enemy maneuver C3 my to waste valuable time confirming radio facilities are also attacked on a selective communications. jamming basis. Frequently, two or more jammers alternately engage the same tar- Enemy barrage jamming of friendly com- get. This not only increases the effective- munications will be present and heavy dur- ness of the ECM attack but decreases the ing their offense. ECM assets can and danger from enemy REC and subsequent should be used to provide high-power “burn- fire. Frequent redeployment is also required through” VHF communications for the bri- to reduce the danger of enemy fire. gade and battalion upon tasking from the TCAE and the brigade and battalion During the defense, the ECM assets are commanders. most effective3 because of the enemy’s heavy reliance on C for control of the attacking Deployment of ECM assets is designed to forces. provide not only ECM capability but ESM ECM has many methods at its disposal augmentation. for the disruption and denial of enemy communications. The ECM equipment The high-powered and more mobile TAC- available to the friendly commander can, JAM resources may be developed forward after detection and identification of enemy in the CFA to attack close-in and distant

5-38 HPT in the enemy’s force and to augment the division’s or brigades’ overall collection effort. The lower-powered and less mobile TRAFFIC JAM resources may be deployed near the FEBA and will be used for close-in jamming missions. Also, because of its frequency spectrum scanning capability, TRAFFIC JAM is used to assist voice collection tasking efforts. A typical deployment plan in a brigade area of the CFA is shown below.

5-39 The light, airborne, and air assault divi- for battle. From the defensive perspective, sions will not see the concentration of the terrain offers open maneuver spaces equipment seen by the heavy division, and and chokepoints or restrictive maneuver may not be able to saturate their AO. The areas. The S2, assisted by the BICC, con- types and numbers of equipment will be tinually updates the SITMAP. Using used in the same way and will provide the weather and terrain data and the IPB pro- same intelligence and information as the cess, BICC personnel analyze the battlefield heavy division’s assets. to estimate the course of action the enemy When dictated by the tactical situation, force will take during the attack in the the voice collection, ECM, and noncommu- MBA. This analysis is aided by IEW input nications intercept teams will deploy to the from MI battalion resources deployed in the MBA and take up sites along the FEBA to brigade AO. provide the same EW support as is done in Generally, MI support to the brigade bat- the CFA. tle requires a high degree of centralized con- ECM, voice collection, DF, and noncom- trol and decentralized execution. Use of the munications coverage of the battlefield IEW company team concept is especially must remain constant. To remain constant, appropriate in the close operation since it the leapfrog method of redeployment used maximizes both control and execution of by TRAILBLAZER will be used by the IEW support. Corps assets may augment other elements to reach the MBA. the assets in the company team: To preclude being left behind during with- Interrogation teams are deployed at the brigade collection point. When necessary, drawals, the EW platoon leaders ensure they may be deployed at battalion level. that coordination is maintained with the Screening operations and interrogations are maneuver element in whose area the EW conducted at the brigade collection point to assets are deployed. gain information of immediate tactical The decentralized, fluid nature of the cov- value about— ering force operation requires interrogation Locations, types, and disposition of support at the lowest echelons, often at enemy forces, including reserves. troop and company level. This requires DS interrogation teams from supporting MI Enemy unit objectives. companies, battalions, and the corps MI Location of the enemy’s main attack. brigade. Questioning of civilians and EPW is brief and conducted to gain information Enemy weaknesses. of immediate tactical value. Interrogators Enemy tactics and intentions, to gather information about the identification, include use of NBC weapons. composition, location, direction of move- When requirements exceed the capabili- ment, strength, and capabilities of enemy ties of organic interrogator assets, aug- forces involved in the immediate covering menting interrogation teams may be pro- force operation. vided by the MI brigade (corps). Close Operations OPSEC in the close operation is essential In his close operations, the brigade com- to maximize the natural advantages of the mander concentrates on the interrelation- defense. OPSEC support teams may operate ships of the terrain, the estimated enemy, throughout the brigade or battalion area. the capability of the battalion’s direct fire When so deployed they advise and assist weapons, and supporting fires. The brigade the brigade S3 on matters concerning commander’s organization for combat con- OPSEC and deception. OPSEC teams— siders the capabilities of his unit and their Monitor the execution of OPSEC and employment to stop, delay, or attack the deception measures approved by the enemy. commander or S3. The analysis of the terrain influences the Recommend countermeasures to reduce concept of the brigade commander’s plan the potential of compromise of EEFI.

5-40 Perform COMSEC monitoring. Surveillance radars with first-echelon Recommend and assist in planning battalions. deception operations. Air defense radars with first-echelon GSRs continue to be used as they had regiments. been during covering force operations. Tar- Countermortar and counterbattery geting enemy assault forces, overcoming radars. obscurations caused by weather or battlefield smoke, and covering gaps and exposed Meteorological radars. flanks are a few of the tasks performed by GSR teams. When deployed in gaps or on Rear Operations flanks, the GSR teams increase the combat power of the defending elements by provid- A major tenet of Soviet military doctrine ing early warning of enemy activity and by is to disrupt an adversary’s rear area targeting the enemy force at maximum through the use of agents, saboteurs, terror- range. GSRs can often help locate the ene- ists, special action, and diversionary forces; my’s main attack by comparing activities attacks by maneuver units; and aerial and in various parts of the sector. They can artillery fires. Soviet heliborne or air as- anticipate enemy maneuvers, establish the sault operations are the primary means of depth of an enemy offensive, or uncover an attacking or infiltrating the rear area. enemy feint or demonstration. Enemy doctrine stresses the use of REMS maybe effectively used in defen- battalion-size units conducting heliborne sive operations as an early warning system operations to depths of 50 kilometers. Air- to provide indications of enemy movement borne assault operations, up to division and location. The amount of activity de- size, may be introduced up to depths of 300 tected by the sensors may provide indica- kilometers in support of strategic objectives. tions of main or supporting attacks, feints, Attacks against rear area targets are care- or diversions. Since activity will be at its fully coordinated as an extension of combat peak on the battlefield, sensors may be sat- in either the CFA or MBA. The goal of heli- urated with activation and may not be able borne operations in the brigade area is to to provide anything other than warnings of degrade friendly support and sustainment imminent attack. Other than this disadvan- of CFA and MBA battle and to divert forces tage, defensive uses may include any or all from these areas. These attacks also con- of the following: tribute to the demoralization of friendly forces. Targeting. Detection of enemy patrol activity. The brigade S3 will ensure that all units operating in and around the brigade sup- Detection of enemy infiltration. port area have taken adequate security Communications and noncommunica- measures. These include— tions intercept collection, and direction finding resources concentrate their efforts Ensuring that all units supporting the against enemy first-echelon forces and the brigade establish a base defense (vil- potential introduction of the second-echelon lages and towns will assist their ESM resources (both communications and defense capability). noncommunications), target manuever, FS, Positioning bases near reserve air defense, and other critical elements of locations. the enemy force. Intercept and DF resources in the conduct of close operations concen- Coordinating with military police to trate on— ensure aggressive patrolling and early Enemy maneuver nets. warning. Positioning base clusters to permit Enemy REC elements, especially observation near critical points, such communications jammers. as bridges or points along main supply Regimental and division FS systems. routes (MSRs) to observe critical areas.

5-41 Establishing an alert system and they will remain under combat conditions communications net for defense of the at all times. The illustration on the follow- brigade support area. ing page is an example of a BSA. The enemy’s reliance on communications The battalion combat trains are posi- is extensive for the command and control of tioned so close to combat forces that their attacking maneuver forces and fire support defense mutually aligns with the security of assets, once they are committed to the the battalion they support. Their defense major battle in the MBA. HPT for ECM re- will be addressed in this manual. sources during this phase in battle include Rear operations will be characterized by both division-to-regiment and regiment-to- intense enemy activity whose intent is to battalion command nets, command obser- create panic and disruption. vation post (COP)-to-fire direction center (FDC) C3 facilities, and FDC-to-firing bat- Enemy forces have several objectives in tery communications links. the rear area. These include— COMJAM efforts are concentrated Destroy nuclear delivery systems, against enemy forces conducting or sup- headquarters, logistics, and nuclear porting the main attack. ECM operators, storage sites. targeted against close-in and supporting Disrupt C3, airfield operations, and air HPT, maximize the semiautomated capa- defense systems. bilities of their COMJAM systems. Other ECM operators are targeted against deeper- Assassinate high-ranking political and and higher-echelon HPTs, such as army-to- military figures. division command nets, division-to- 3 Destroy or seize important LOCs such battalion skip-echelon nets, and the C as highways, bridges, tunnels, and so facilities supporting the commanders of forth. missile troops and artillery (CMTAs) or army- and front-subordinate artillery and Harass supply lines and troop SSM units. They use the full range of capa- movements. bilities, procedures, and techniques to ac- The intelligence preparation of the rear complish their assigned tasks. They selec- operations area is absolutely critical to the tively jam some HPT using both conven- success of the air-land battlefield. Besides tional and special operating techniques. At looking deep and close-in, the intelligence other times, they may automatically jam system must also look at the rear operation. these same or other HPT, depending on the To conduct the rear operation successfully, HPTs’ operational status and the criticality echelon commanders must know enemy of the information being passed over the capabilities and intentions. They must given communications links. Unit field SOP anticipate enemy actions and receive early and EWTL/JS developed and refined prior warning of incoming incursions in the rear to combat and maintained on a dynamic area. This knowledge is obtained through basis as the battle is under way, and special coordination and staff planning by all ele- operating instructions and technical data ments of the brigade staff, especially the S2 from the TCAE on EW platoons, provide and S3. the COMJAM operators the information they need to effectively execute their as- The BICC, in accordance with S2 guid- signed missions. Direct coordination be- ance, performs the IPB process on the bri- tween the EW team or platoon and the sup- gade rear operations area in its IPB of the ported maneuver battalion or brigade brigade total area of operations. This con- ensures the synchronization of COMJAM, tinuous process develops a comprehensive maneuver, and fire support operations. and accurate data base of weather, enemy, and terrain information from all available Though the maneuver units alternate sources during hostilities. This information, from offensive to defensive actions, the when integrated and analyzed with other support units of the brigade must also intelligence during hostilities, is the key to maintain a constant awareness because determining Level III threat targets, land-

5-42 ing sites, and air avenues of approach local agencies serve as sources of informs affecting rear operations. This effort is tion in support of CI operations. aided by the various intelligence assets Tactical HUMINT operations are em- available to respond to brigade tasking. ployed to exploit those captured personnel Besides being familiar with the hostile who can quickly identify other hostile threat capabilities in the rear area, CI per- agents an-d saboteurs and pinpoint unit and sonnel are aware of the scheme of maneu- team locations, future plans, or weaknesses. ver for friendly deployed units. They know Time constraints generally prevent exten- and understand the commander’s rear sive tactical HUMINT operations against operation plan. level III threats, but enemy agents, sympa- Upgrading intelligence holdings from re- thizers, and terrorists can often be neutral- ports submitted by all sources plays an ized at levels I and II. important part in providing an accurate CI teams located near, or collocated with, picture of enemy intentions for the rear the brigade EPW cage will have EPW, refu- operation. Because the rear operation threat gees, defectors, and line crossers identified is dynamic, CI personnel must continually by interrogators as being of CI interest. CI assess the level of threat and develop and personnel conduct interviews or interroga- recommend appropriate countermeasures to tions of these individuals, and are primarily frustrate or eliminate the Threat. concerned with CI information of current Incidents of suspected espionage or sub- tactical value. Frequently, these interviews version are investigated by CI personnel as or interrogations require a joint effort by CI directed. These investigations can lead to and interrogation personnel. identification and elimination of perpetra- OPSEC support provides the commander tors of hostile actions in the rear area. Pat- with the ability to see his rear operations tern analysis of multiple incidents can area through the eyes of the enemy com- reveal enemy plans and intentions. mander. The OPSEC data base is used to Identification and neutralization of hos- evaluate enemy intelligence capabilities tile teams and cells are important priorities and friendly unit high-value targets, pat- in rear operations. Information provided by terns, and profiles. OPSEC surveys con- CI personnel is passed to local police, MP, ducted by OPSEC support teams identify or allied forces. In a similar manner, these

5-43 the vulnerabilities of friendly forces and cept efforts targeted against rear area recommend countermeasures. communications. COMSEC support teams deploy into the When emplaced in likely landing and brigade rear area and monitor friendly com- drop zones, REMS permit rapid identifica- munications, reporting security violations tion of enemy heliborne or airborne assault and unsafe practices to the S2. Enforcement locations as shown below. This applies to of proper COMSEC procedures denies the small and large insertions of troops behind enemy critical information through inter- friendly lines.

5-44 Sensors may also be extensively used to The three types of retrograde operations provide early warning to CSS elements. are— The S2, through the IEWSE, may also Delay—trading space for time. request ESM support for the rear operation. Withdrawal—disengaging from an ESM resources are not generally located in enemy in contact. the rear area but may, because of METT-T requirements and the situation, be placed in Retirement—moving to the rear with- support of the rear operation. Depending on out enemy contact or pressure. their availability, resources such as Because there is no enemy pressure TRAILBLAZER, AN/TRQ-32, or the involved during a retirement, no extraordi- AN/PRD-10, maybe tasked to intercept and nary IEW operations are required. Normal locate enemy radio transmitters in the rear OPSEC and SIGSEC precautions will be operations area. When there is no SOP for observed. deployment of ESM assets within the rear area, the S3 of the MI battalion will advise The IEW principles discussed in the the supported element as to the positioning offense and defense both apply to retro- of that resource. grade operations. Commanders require The brigade S3 may request countermea- accurate, timely information on which to sures to block espionage and saboteur con- base their decisions and to execute, at the trol nets and to jam psychological warfare precise moment, those actions associated transmissions and other enemy radio with the combat operation. broadcasts. ECM resources in the rear area are also used to isolate enemy special units The commander requires a clear, precise from their control element’s communica- picture of the enemy’s disposition, and tions. The MI battalion normally retains accurate indications of his intent to conduct operational control over all EW assets used operations over the terrain. in support of rear operations and is respon- IEW resources focus their attention on— sible for furnishing them with technical data to accomplish their assigned missions. Locating and tracking enemy forces. Retrograde Operations Determining when and where enemy Retrograde operations are organized forces will mass for offensive movements away from the enemy with the operations. intent of avoiding enemy contact. They are Identifying natural obstacles and key conducted to gain time for the commander terrain on which the commander plans to prepare for offensive operations. The and conducts his delay in withdrawal primary purpose of retrograde operations is operations. to preserve the force so that, under more favorable conditions, the offense may be Priority of effort is given to detecting resumed. Retrograde operations are also enemy attempts to outflank and isolate conducted to— friendly forces. IPB will identify routes to Harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and enhance friendly force security and mask otherwise inflict damage on the enemy. activities from enemy observation. Draw the enemy into an unfavorable IEW support to C3CM is oriented on de- position. stroying or disrupting key enemy C2 and Allow forces to be used elsewhere. intelligence links during critical periods of the operation. Especially critical is the Avoid combat when conditions are period when enemy forces have been unfavorable. stopped and forced to deploy. When this Gain time. occurs, the delaying force must break contact and withdraw to avoid becoming deci- Reposition forces. sively engaged. Destruction or disruption of Shorten LOCs. key enemy communication links during this

5-45 period delays enemy response to the disen- sensors for flank and rear security. Once gagement and withdrawal. This gains addi- the forward echelon of attacking enemy tional time for the friendly force to prepare forces has progressed beyond the stay- and occupy the next delay position. Simula- behind sensors, the sensors will prove valu- tive electronic deception (SED) is also used able by providing indications of resupply or to deceive the enemy as to when disengage- reinforcement activities of enemy rear eche- ment has occurred. lon units. Retrograde operations must be OPSEC and deception are essential to the carefully planned in order to locate and successful conduct of retrograde operations. install sensor relay equipment. These relays CI supports OPSEC by assisting the S3 in will require camouflage and remote em- identifying those critical friendly activities placement to avoid detection by enemy that must be protected to keep the enemy forces. uncertain of their time and place of actual Sensors should also be emplaced in front disengagement. IEW systems are used both of the new position to be occupied by our physically and electronically to deceive the friendly forces. These sensors are employed enemy about the disposition of the friendly for several reasons. One reason is to inform force. IEW support concentrates those mea- the commanders when the friendly units sures that obscure the size and intent of the are approaching their new positions. An- delaying force and preserve the element of other application is to offer these units the surprise. Each time enemy commanders are early warning necessary to continue to engaged by the delaying force they must be avoid decisive engagement. An example of convinced through the application of com- sensor emplacement in retrograde opera- bat power, OPSEC, and deception that they tions is shown in the illustration on the fol- have engaged the main force. This causes lowing page. them to deploy their forces, reinforce, and prepare to sustain an attack. The delay incurred is the purpose of the delay opera- Delay Operations tion. In addition, the operation creates a In delay operations, a force conducts com- situation in which the enemy commanders bat operations designed to retain initiative may expose weaknesses and vulnerabilities while relinquishing as little space as possi- that the friendly force can exploit to regain ble for as much time as possible. Attack, the initiative. defend, ambush, screen, raid, and feint make up the delay. There are two basic In retrograde operations, centralized con- types of delay techniques under which these trol of IEW resources at division level is operations will fall. These are delay from required. This enables the IEW coordinators successive positions and delay from alter- to draw upon the full spectrum of the divi- nate positions. There may be situations in sion’s IEW assets to achieve the support which the commander may want or need to required for operations. combine the two techniques. The factors of GSR and ESM assets must be deployed METT-T and the situation will determine well forward to provide maximum coverage the techniques used. for the flanks, any gaps, and for thinly held areas. Support to the brigades must be provided, as well as support to the entire force. To accomplish this, IEW assets must remain flexible and also capable of supporting any follow-on operations. During retrograde operations, remote sensors may provide an element of security to units conducting the delaying action. Sensors can be emplaced and left in a stay- behind role to provide warnings of when and where enemy forces are moving. Units conducting retrograde may be able to use

5-46 Delay from Successive Positions mission support to units conducting an This technique is used when the sector is economy of force screen along the flanks. so wide that available forces cannot occupy This frees the maximum number of maneu- more than a single tier of positions simul- ver units for the major avenue of approach, taneously. It requires units to continuously since selection of this tactic presumes a delay in or between positions and is charac- thinly spread force over a wide front. terized by simplicity of control, minimum preparation of positions, and less depth of As discussed in Chapter 4, IPB efforts forces. It is more easily penetrated than the will identify a series of delay positions that delay from alternate positions technique. A use the natural value of the terrain. graphic representation of the delay from The MI battalion resources are tasked to successive positions techniques is shown in support brigade and BTF commanders in the illustration on the following page. maintaining contact with the enemy, iden- This tactic requires that the majority of tifying the enemy’s weaknesses, disposi- available forces deploy forward along the tion, and intentions. These resources will be most critical sector as determined by IEW located behind the initial delay positions resources and, due to the inherent vulnera- (IDPs) and will focus on first- and second- bility to flank penetration, provides major echelon forces.

5-47 CI personnel enhance the force OPSEC approach and to continue the radar emis- posture by ensuring that the IDP, second- sions to deceive the enemy. ary delay-positions (SDPs), and time and GSR teams in position simulate normal routes of withdrawal are concealed from activity, maintain surveillance over the enemy intelligence efforts. enemy, and move to the SDP prior to the Interrogation assets will not find much withdrawal of the last maneuver elements activity during this phase of operations, left in contact. and will assist other IEW functions at the EW resources will intercept and locate direction of the MI battalion commander. enemy first-echelon regiment and division communications and noncommunications GSR will be used to survey gaps, critical emitters and perform ECM against enemy areas, and avenues of approach, and to high-payoff communications emitters. obtain target information for long-range fires. They are used primarily for early Voice collection teams’ resources deploy warning and can furnish significant infor- with or behind the maneuver elements’ mation about the enemy. The AN/PPS-15, IDPs. Close coordination with the along with other surveillance devices, is maneuver elements must be established and used forward of, or on, the IDPs to detect maintained throughout the operation. Voice areas of greatest enemy pressure. The collection teams intercept enemy HPTs as information provided will help the com- determined and tasked by the TCAE. The mander decide the best time to withdraw to brigade S2, using PIR and IR of brigade his SDPs. GSRs and other surveillance sys- and battalion commanders, requests mis- tems are kept in position as long as possi- sion tasking through the IEWSE. The voice ble, both to monitor enemy avenues of collection product will be reported to the

5-48 TCAE and concurrently monitored by the 5-10km behind the SDP and be directed IEWSE for information requiring imme- against the main enemy effort. diate action on the part of the supported The noncommunications data produced commanders. In this instance, combat by TEAMPACK is combined with GSRs, information will be passed by TACREP to TRAILBLAZER voice collection, and other the affected commander through the RSTA assets to assist in targeting for IEWSE to the S2 or BICC. The technical friendly fire support. TEAMPACK is valua- intelligence is forwarded to the TCAE. ble in suppressing and defeating enemy air Redeployment of the voice collection teams defense systems, surveillance radars, and is by order of the next higher commander. countermortar or counterbattery radars by Those collection assets located in the SDP locating them. Identifying the system and will assume coverage of the mission to per- plotting its movement provides the commit the forward elements’ displacement to mander with the location of the enemy’s the SDP. Elements along the flanks main effort. Unnetted TEAMPACK reports between the IDP and SDP will retain their its data through the EW platoon headquar- positions until physically relieved and ters to the TCAE, where it is analyzed and picked up by IDP forces. Upon the comple- reported to the brigade S2. Netted tion of occupation of the SDP by IDP ele- TEAMPACK reports directly to the TCAE ments, those elements originally in the SDP and then follows the same route as the will withdraw to the next delay position. unnetted system. Throughout the delay operation, EAC aerial assets will provide voice collection Redeployment of TEAMPACK as the op- targeted against enemy emitters located eration progresses is conducted in the same within the division’s deep operations area. manner as with voice collection resources. ECM systems are carefully controlled in The SPP (TRAILBLAZER) deploys its retrograde operations. Friendly ECM assets elements as in the defense. Redeployment are high-priority REC and FS targets and uses the same internal leapfrog methods therefore come under the centralized control used during both the offense and defense. of the TCAE and division G3. Brigade and TRAILBLAZER seeks locations of HPT as battalion commanders will see the ECM tasked by TCAE. Its DF information, to- systems in their AO but may be unable to gether with data from GSR, TEAMPACK, task them with the jamming of enemy com- voice collection teams, and other RSTA as- munications. However, if it becomes neces- sets, enable HPTs to be engaged by friendly sary to use high-powered communications, fire support. Because TRAILBLAZER con- because of enemy ECM, the brigade and tinuously moves throughout the division battalion commanders can task the ECM area, DF support is less direct than the elements, through the brigade IEWSE, to voice collection support. TRAILBLAZER provide “burn-through” communications deploys between the IDP and SDP across capability. Friendly SIGSEC elements can the division front, focusing on the expected task the ECM elements to conduct enemy main effort as determined by COMJAM screening of friendly communi- METT-T and analysis of the voice collection cations to prevent inadvertent disclosure of product. SPP HQ, collocated with one of the sensitive information to the enemy. The MI MCSs, reports DF results and intercept data battalion commander authorizes this ability to the TCAE which provides information to on orders from the division commander. the brigade S2 via the IEWSE. When the ECM perform the same function against the information received by TRAILBLAZER is same targets as in offense and defense extremely perishable, the SPP, by operations. TACJAM will be located in the TACREP, reports directly to the IEWSE at vicinity of the IDP and TRAFFIC JAM will the affected brigade. TRAILBLAZER rede- be located near the SDP. Redeployment of ploys on orders from the MI battalion com- ECM assets is accomplished as is the voice mander through the TCAE. The leapfrog collection team, with the SDP elements method is used to retain continuity of the assuming the mission for the IDP during mission. It will be relocated approximately relocation. The original SDP elements will

5-49 move to other deployment positions toward more forces, and provides greater security. the rear, once the IDP elements are estab- It is also more difficult to maintain contact lished in the SDP. with the enemy. A graphic representation of Typical EW element deployment is illus- this technique is shown in the illustration trated in the following figure. on the following page. The delay from alternate positions is Delay from Alternate Positions characterized by a higher density of forces The principal difference between alter- operating on a narrow front. nate and successive delay operations is that, in the alternate system, two units are GSR elements are employed in the same used in a single sector. Each delays alter- manner as during the delay from successive nately. While the first is fighting, the positions, with the exception that those second unit occupies the next delay position elements organic to Task Force A will in depth and prepares to assume delay re- remain with Task Force A, while those ele- sponsibility. As the first disengages and ments organic to Task Force B stay with passes through or around the second unit, their own. the second unit takes up the fight. The first EW elements operate in the same fashion unit then occupies a deeper position and as is accomplished in operations from suc- prepares to subsequently resume the delay. cessive positions. Delay from alternate positions is characterized by continuous, more complicated coor- In all cases, coordination with the ma- dination of fire and maneuver, requires neuver elements is essential.

5-50 5-51 Withdrawal Withdrawal not under enemy pressure Brigades and battalions assigned a with- affords the commander enhanced freedom drawal mission maintain contact with the to maneuver with minimum casualties. This enemy to provide security and deception, type of withdrawal is characterized by cen- and to prevent a rapid enemy advance. tralized control and contingency planning, There are two basic types of withdrawals— to include alternative routes, priorities, and effective traffic control. Withdrawal not under enemy pressure. The following diagrams graphically dis- Withdrawal under enemy pressure. play this technique.

5-52 A withdrawal not under enemy pressure enemy intelligence collection capabilities. operation is begun by the brigade com- CI personnel assist MP and civil affairs mander designating detachments to be left units in maintaining control of the civilian in contact (DLICS) to protect the initial populace in the zone. movement of the main body of the force. DLICs also perform a vital deception role GSR elements are deployed as in delay by simulating normal brigade activity, thus operations and are tasked to observe proba- masking from enemy intelligence the main ble avenues of approach, open areas, and body’s movement. IEW resources, especially key terrain features, both natural and man- CI teams, play a vital role in this operation. made. In short, they make the enemy be- The simulation of normal unit activity is lieve that the brigade is on line while pro- closely monitored by OPSEC evaluation viding vital information to the DLIC teams, based on the unit’s signatures, pat- elements. terns, and profiles. In addition to other EW elements will be used in the brigade’s countermeasures, fire and maneuver are CFA, ready to support the operation. All employed to reduce the effectiveness of elements not vital to the DLIC withdraw to

5-53 final new positions. The TCAE and the MI Withdrawal under pressure differs signifi- battalion support elements are in the first cantly from withdrawal without pressure. withdrawal. Voice collection, SPP, noncom- Units use delaying tactics to fight their way munications, and some ECM assets will be to the rear. All units initiate action simulta- deployed with the DLIC. Tasking for all EW neously in a given sector. A covering force elements is from the TCAE with a jammer is highly desirable to assist the disengage- system used to provide high-power VHF ment of committed units. It may also be “burn-through” communications, if needed. used to initiate a counterattack. Key to the All combat information and perishable successful conduct of a withdrawal under intelligence will be reported to the brigade enemy pressure is superior mobility, effec- S2 through the IEWSE and all technical tive covering force employment, sound C2, intelligence will be routed to the TCAE and local air superiority. A graphic example through the SPP when communications of a withdrawal under pressure is shown allow. below. All MI assets with the DLIC will deploy IEW support and actions are similar to a to new positions through the covering force delay from alternate positions. when the DLIC withdraws. GSR assets assist to vector the DLIC during periods of poor visibility and darkness.

5-54 OTHER TACTICAL SITUATIONS attempt can be made, the, commander continues the defense and plans for a linkup Defense and Breakout of Encircled and to assist a relieving force. The com- Forces mander must reorganize and consolidate the units within the encirclement to include The nonlinear nature of the modern bat- the IEW assets and MI units. tlefield presents units with a high probabili- IEW support to the encircled forces is ty that enemy forces will encircle them. vital. The force commander must receive This is especially true at the brigade and intelligence immediately concerning the BTF and of the MI elements supporting following: them. Encirclement of friendly forces may happen by a rapidly changing situation or Composition and disposition of encir- may be by design. cling enemy force. Enemy reinforcement units. Defense Exploitable weaknesses in the enemy When encirclement is unforeseen, the first disposition through which breakout or action to be accomplished is that the senior linkup can be effected. commander present must organize a de- Enemy intent to use NBC weapons. fense and establish a unity of command. The most immediate problem facing the ECM support is crucial to the breakout commander is the preservation of the force. and deception operations. Breakout from the encirclement is the next The following chart depicts the tasks that priority. If a breakout is to be made, the the commander must accomplish and what attempt must occur before the enemy can the S2 and senior MI commander must do consolidate their positions. If no breakout to support those tasks.

5-55 While part of an encircled force, MI ele- will other voice collection assets. Target ments respond directly to that force com- locations are unlikely, so the SPP elements mader’s requirements. The senior S2 of the that are available will provide communica- force will establish the HVT and HPT for tions intelligence and LOB data. The SPP the MI units based on the previous chart headquarters element, if in the encircled and METT-T. The efforts of the MI ele- force area, becomes the primary element in ments of the encircled force must be coordi- technical control and analysis for the en- nated with efforts of those MI elements at circled EW elements if there is no other the main force outside the encirclement. TCAE present. The MCS, if present, will be Use of high powered jammers could be used as the primary intercept and LOB sta- required to provide “burn-through” com- tion, due to its accuracy and sensitivity munications for this coordination because above the AN/TRQ-32 and MRDFS ele- of heavy enemy COMJAM operations. ments. The RSS elements are used as LOB The senior MI commander assumes tem- data stations. All ESM elements are porary C2 over the MI elements within the employed within 2 to 5 kilometers of the encircled force. That officer is responsible FLOT as directed by the MI commander for the quick reorganization of the MI ele- based on the force commander’s priorities. ments available to the force commander. Noncommunications intercept elements That reorganized MI unit will then respond (TEAMPACK) will be used primarily to to the commander as the divisional MI bat- locate the enemy fire support radar sys- talion does. tems, GSR systems, and air defense radar systems. This enables the S2 to determine EPWs are interrogated by available EPW the enemy’s main effort and troop concen- interrogation teams to ascertain the size of tration. Intelligence from TEAMPACK is the enemy force and its strengths and weak- reported to the S2 through the IEWSE. All nesses, to include personnel and equipment technical intelligence is transmitted to the makeup. Information as to the size, loca- designated TCAE as time and situation per- tion, and availability of enemy reserve mit. As with TRAILBLAZER, TEAMPACK forces is also obtained. will most likely be separated so that only GSR teams are deployed around the en- one or two units will be available to the MI circled force to provide the S2 and force unit commander for tasking. Precise loca- commander with information on locations tions of the enemy radar systems will be im- and size of enemy front-line forces, and to possible using the separated TEAMPACK provide early warning about enemy move- element, but LOB data will be available. ment to attack. GSRs are also used to vector Using this, along with other ESM data, patrols through enemy front lines during GSR results, OP observations, and friendly probing actions. countermortar and counterbattery radar EW elements deploy, are employed, and results, an accurate location can be redeploy similarly to the delay from succes- determined. sive positions in retrograde operations. ECM assets have, as stated previously, All tasking for the ESM elements is from the number one priority of providing the a reorganized TCAE or analysis section force commander with a high-powered based on the force commander’s priority communication capability that allows for and target list as outlined in Chapter 4. continuous coordination with the main force. Primary targets will include enemy forces’ If the commander requires a deception opera- disposition and any reinforcing elements. tion, C—E and CI assets provide a vital ele- Reported combat information goes directly ment for SED operations. COMJAM equip- to the force commander through the IEWSE ment can be used for demonstration and and S2. Any technical data will be reported feints. Deployment of COMJAM systems is to the analysis section of the reorganized dependent upon specific mission require- TCAE as time and the situation permit. ments. Because of heavy enemy REC activ- SPP (TRAILBLAZER) elements in the en- ity, the TACJAM and TRAFFIC JAM sys- circled force area will respond to tasking as tems must redeploy, often away from

5-56 any friendly C2 elements. All ECM assets in Main body. the encircled force are tasked by the MI unit commander to attack HPT, based on the Rear guard. force commander’s priority. Tasking is The force commander, as with defense of accomplished through the EWO and the the encircled force, has certain tasks he supported staff element. must perform to accomplish the breakout. All IEW elements are prepared to support The chart on the following page shows the breakout and linkup operations. The attack commander’s tasks and the applicable IEW to break out of an encirclement is conducted support measures for those tasks. on a narrow front, while a simultaneous The following figure portrays the break- defense is conducted in the remaining sec- out force and possible IEW resource disposi- tors of the perimeter. The encircled force is tion within that force. organized into four elements for the breakout: The rupture force opens the gap that the rest of the breakout force will pass through. Rupture force. It holds the shoulders until the main body Reserve force. passes through and is joined by the rear

5-57 5-58 guard. As shown on page 5-57, the armor- rupt the enemy’s C2 and slow down any heavy rupture force will use GSR, usually reinforcement. the high-powered AN/PPS-5 to vector away from enemy force concentrations or during Once the breakout is accomplished, the periods of low visibility or darkness. The force commander re-forms the force into EPW element screens any prisoners or docu- movement to contact configuration, as de- ments acquired during the rupture force scribed earlier in this chapter. Every effort breakout. The information gathered is sent is made to bypass enemy forces along the to the encircled force commander through route. If bypass is not possible, the force the S2 at the main body. EW elements con- will move to the hasty attack from the sist solely of jammers. The jammers disrupt movement to contact mode. enemy C2 to both maneuver and fire sup- If a breakout is not possible, relief by port elements near the breakout area. The another friendly force is probable. The relief MI command element, with the main body, force attacks the encircling enemy force’s will task and control the rupture force rear area and defeats him. The encircled jammers based on ESM and GSR collection force commander and IEW assets perform efforts. the tasks outlined in the chart on the following page. The reserve force does not possess any IEW resources until it assumes the role of Heavy enemy REC is expected in this lead element to the breakout. The rupture phase of operations. ECM assets will pro- force holds the flanks to allow the remain- vide high-powered communications among ing forces to break out. When the reserve the encircled force commander, relief force force passes through the rupture force, it commander, encircled MI element com- assumes the rupture force IEW assets. The mander, and MI commander attached to the GSR, EPW, and ECM elements continue to relief unit. ESM elements will operate as in perform the same functions and are tasked defense operations. and respond the same way as when at- GSRs provide the relief force commander tached to the rupture force. with probable avenues of approach, and assist in vectoring the relief force during The main body consists of the encircled periods of darkness and low visibility. force commander, his headquarters, and remaining combat support and CSS elements. The MI units’ headquarters analysis element and all ESM elements move with the main body. From this area, the ESM assets can cover the rupture and reserve force, flanks, and rear guard area. The MI headquarters assists the force S2 and commander in controlling all the MI assets. The rear guard provides the deception effort to confuse the enemy as to where the main effort is to occur, and provides protection to the rear of the force as it progresses through the rupture. The rear guard is usually placed under the control of the force XO, and contains a representative force structure to simulate the main body. The rear guard acts as a covering force. CI elements provide for OPSEC and prevent dis- abled equipment, supplies, and CPs from falling into enemy hands. GSR elements provide flank and rear security and targeting data for FSE. The ECM assets will dis-

5-59 SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND The environments that have a strong ENVIRONMENTS effect on special operations are— Mountains. The geographic range of US interests in Jungles. the world today requires that the Army be prepared to fight and win in all types of ter- Deserts. rain and climate. Winter. Army tactical units may be committed to Urbanized terrain. battle in those areas where severe weather, climate, and terrain impact on military While the fundamental principles dis- operations and the intelligence mission. In cussed in previous chapters apply to special addition to the physical effects on the indi- environments, brigade and battalion S2 vidual soldier, environmental extremes personnel must understand the limitations limit intelligence collection capabilities. imposed on collection resources by harsh Regardless of environmental conditions, the environments. Specialized training and commander needs information about the acclimatization periods are required before enemy, weather, and terrain. personnel can be effective in certain parts of the world. Special operations are those in which the The effects of extreme climatic and ter- natural and man-made characteristics of rain factors generally cause military opera- the area, the nature of the operations, and tions to proceed at a slower rate than in the unique conditions under which the more favorable environments. Set-up and operations are conducted, may require spe- break-down times may be longer, and rates cially trained personnel and special tech- of march slower. Routine functions, such as niques, tactics, or equipment. communications, can become a major

5-60 undertaking. S2s ensure that intelligence beyond the scope of his usual role. S2s may planning for combat operations takes into find themselves unable to communicate consideration the influence of a special with higher and adjacent units, forcing environment on intelligence functions, per- them to rely on their own resources to de- sonnel, and friendly and enemy operations. velop intelligence and determine an ene- While the means to collect data in special my’s probable course of action. environments are identical to those em- Mountain weather is difficult to predict. ployed in a normal environment, the In many areas, the weather can change methods of employment and equipment dramatically in short periods of time. As used may differ. storms develop, the effects of the tempera- The enemy’s methods of employment and ture and windchill factor may become as deployment will also differ, but only to the important an item of intelligence as the extent permitted by their doctrine, or dic- location and activity of major enemy units. tated by the environment. Exposed flesh can freeze in a matter of seconds. The higher elevations are frequently shrouded by rain, snow, sleet, and MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS fog. Electronic surveillance and visual Mountainous terrain exists in the jungle, observation are severely limited under these temperate, and arctic regions of the world. conditions. Operations conducted in mountainous areas When weather permits, mountain heights are characterized by heavy use of indirect offer outstanding conditions for long-range fires, canalized movements along valley visual observation and electronic floors, decentralized combat, increased col- surveillance. lection operations from aerial IEW operations, and reduced C2 capabilities. Moun- Weather data and forecasts are increas- tain operations conducted by MI units have ingly more important in selecting areas and restricted operational and sustainment times to conduct operations. capabilities. Cross-country movement and trafficabili- Mountainous terrain degrades target ty become more important in determining acquisition and early warning capability of enemy capabilities and intentions. Poten- GSRs, and collection capabilities of EW tial enemy use of nuclear weapons in moun- systems. Such degradation places an in- tainous terrain is a prime intelligence con- creased importance on emplacement and sideration. In some mountainous terrain, utilization of GSR and EW systems. Both the effects of nuclear detonation can be elements may have to use their manpack effectively contained within a specified equipment to best support the commander. area. Because of the low density of manpack IEW equipment in the division, brigade Wooded mountainous terrain has the areas will be unsupported or severely re- same general effect on intelligence opera- duced in GSR and EW support. Although tions as does dense jungle. Enemy forces operations may be severely hampered, the are difficult to locate and collect against. As mission for all MI assets remains the same in jungle terrain, the S2 will find his best as in any other type of operation. The opti- sources of information to be EPW, defectors, mum operation of these IEW systems in and friendly reconnaissance patrols. mountainous terrain is affected by inter- Mountainous terrain favors those opera- rupted LOS, extreme temperature variations which use stealth and the cover of tions, heavy precipitation, and a lack of darkness. Forces will likely be deployed to readily available support and supply parts. control passes, road junctions, built-up In mountain operations, the terrain isola- areas, and the high ground adjacent to tion of friendly units may require brigades these areas. Enemy tactics include bypass- and battalions to operate more indepen- ing defensive positions and attacking from dently than in other environments. In this the flanks and rear. Enemy forces will case, the S2 is required to make judgments decentralize the employment of artillery

5-61 and use multiple rocket launchers as indi- and retransmission to thwart both RDF vidual fire units. and ECM activities. S2s rely on front-line soldiers, aircraft The irregular terrain, multitude of dead crews, vehicle operators, and maps for ter- spaces, and degraded C2 will render EW less rain analysis. effective in the mountains than in other types of terrain. Mountain tactics favor the use of helicopters to drop enemy forces behind friendly ESM systems, such as TRAILBLAZER emplacements, and for reconnaissance, C2, and TEAMPACK, are best employed on resupply, and evacuation. high ground, concentrating on enemy approaches. Enemy forces can be expected to use ECM systems will find the most effective infantry troops in the higher elevations. use in the same area as the ESM assets. Motorized rifle units and tanks may be Their employment is directed against the encountered in the lower elevations, broad population centers, enemy broadcast block- valleys, depressions, and on the slopes of ing, and avenues of approach. ECM equip- small hills. ment (TRAFFIC JAM) is also used to re- In defensive positions, enemy tanks will transmit friendly C2 messages. be found in tiers on both forward and reverse slopes, usually within platoon-sized Aerial systems, SLAR and QUICKFIX, strongpoints. Enemy defensive frontages are used in other operations, although the can be expected to increase in mountain mountainous altitude may require the warfare. The enemy force will select the ter- QUICKFIX crew to use oxygen and operate rain most suitable for defense and the most for a shorter duration. inaccessible to the friendly force. Mountain Ground-based RDF is accomplished by operations are usually directed at the con- the MRDFS often employed in DS to the trol of passes. The force that controls the brigades. The amount of support provided mountain passes controls a significant will depend on equipment density. LOB amount of terrain. data may be questionable, due to the terrain, but will normally be used in conjunc- Rugged, irregular mountain terrain de- tion with QUICKFIX. grades AM and FM communications effec- 2 Sustainment considerations in special tiveness and associated C . Heavy reliance operational environments can be numerous. on retransmission and relay is required. Equipment used in a mountainous environ- Heavy (TACJAM) and medium (TRAFFIC ment must be rugged and man-portable. JAM) ECM equipment can be used to relay Cold weather in the higher elevations, or communications when necessary. during seasonal variations, will affect HUMINT provides the commander with equipment in the same manner as in winter his best source of combat information and operations. intelligence. Mountain heights offer excep- Transportation limitations will require tional OP sites which may be supplemented greater use of field expedients than in other by foot patrols. Population centers in valley types of operations. Because of the rugged areas provide a HUMINT collection and nature of the terrain, greater consumption interrogation potential, especially for ter- of Class IX repair parts will occur, and will rain intelligence information. demand a 20 percent overage in PLL and ASL for such items as tires, transmissions, OPSEC, as in all operations, will be of clutch plates, filters, brake shoes, tracks, prime importance for attacking forces. De- track pads, and fuel pumps. fending forces will have a distinct advan- The key to sustaining soldiers in the tage to deceive and contain any attack. mountains, as in other special environments, is training. Mountain combat can EW operations suffer a definite disadvan- affect a soldier’s mental alertness, accentu- tage in mountainous terrain. Enemy com- ate fears of heights and closeness, and munication sites use terrain masking, relay, cause dehydration and sickness.

5-62 Additional information on mountain Heavy rain showers limit the detection of operations is contained in FM 90-6. enemy electronic signatures to short ranges. GSRs in heavy jungle foliage will be of little JUNGLE OPERATIONS or no value. Signal reflections from vehicles and troops passing through or behind dense The jungle regions of Asia, Africa, and foliage tend to be inaccurate and unreada- Central and South America are potential ble. Although GSR operations in jungle areas of conflict where US forces could be environments normally are limited, they involved. Jungles vary from tropical rain are still a valuable asset to the supported forests and secondary growth to swamps commander when properly employed. GSR and tropical savannas. Heavy rainfall, high is particularly useful in preventing surprise and constant temperature, high humidity, when used with other battlefield surveil- and thick vegetation are the dominant fea- lance devices. REMS located along roads tures of jungle areas. These factors—cli- and trails indicate activity on those routes, mate and vegetation—contribute to the re- but cannot distinguish between enemy and striction of operational and sustainment other activity. capabilities of MI units. Lightly equipped LRRPs and long-range Because of the nature of the jungle, IEW surveillance units (LRSUs) play a major operations will be decentralized. Ground role in jungle intelligence collection opera- mobility restrictions of the jungle require tions. The terrain improves chances for that all IEW systems be light, man-portable accomplishing their mission unobserved and rugged, and fielded in greater densities and undetected. In patrol planning, consid- than in other, more open environments. eration is given to the possibility that an The climate, dense vegetation, and subse- aerial resupply, often required in jungle quent reduced radio LOS, significantly re- operations, will provide the enemy with duces communications in both AM and FM. indications of patrol activity and possibly Electromagnetic radiation is absorbed by a reveal the location of the patrol. Communi- factor of 10 to 25 percent and communica- cations are also a problem. The intelligence tion ranges will decrease by a factor of 20 value of the reconnaissance is reduced if percent. To facilitate effective C2, hilltops or intelligence and targeting data is not aerial relays may often be used. Although rapidly communicated. wire appears a logical method, security and The limitations discussed in Chapter 2 for maintenance considerations may preclude the EW systems are heightened by the jun- its use. gle environment. ESM ground systems are Jungle vegetation limits identification of located in various base camps throughout sounds, smells, deployments, movements, the division’s AO, concentrated in the bri- locations, and other activities which might gade where the expected enemy main effort otherwise be detected. It severely limits the will occur. use of enemy force signatures to identify types of units and activities. Intense tropi- ESM systems, to include TRAILBLAZER cal storms can temporarily preclude the use and TEAMPACK, may be used more as in- of electronic collection equipment. Thick dividual collection stations than as inte- jungle terrain restricts mobility largely to grated systems, due to the environment. roads and footpaths. The S2 may find that the best sources of information are EPWs, The lightweight, highly mobile systems, defectors, patrols, and the local populace— such as the MRDFS, will find extensive use. in other words, HUMINT. Deployment will be with patrols—foot or mounted. The MRDFS provides intercept The local populace can provide a wealth and LOB data to the patrol leader and of information about enemy forces opera- TCAE. ting in the local area. In insurgency situations, efforts are made to identify indivi- The divisional aerial assets provide the duals that support the enemy by providing best means of intelligence operations for supplies, food, and information about IEW elements. The supporting corps SLAR friendly forces in the area. aircraft, in conduction with GSR and

5-63 REMS, present the commanders with the The desert battle is highly mobile. An best picture of the battlefield. The attack may be carried out from the line of QUICKFIX provides excellent radio LOS to march. Enemy battalions deploy to com- all targets for LOB, intercept, and pany columns 12 to 15 kilometers, and pla- COMJAM operations. The TCAE, based on toon columns at 3 to 5 kilometers from the IPB and the brigade’s needs, tasks and con- assault position. Enemy doctrine dictates trols the aerial assets. High incidence of that tank formations will generally be used rust, corrosion, and fungus, caused by jun- in the first echelon, and that the attack may gle moisture and humidity, highlights the be conducted using a single echelon. The necessity for daily maintenance on equip- enemy may employ airborne and helicopter ment—especially at the operator level. This assaults to seize objectives in the rear. is especially true for electronic systems and COMSEC gear, which are subject to very Frequent and extreme changes in desert high failure rates in jungle environments. weather have a significant influence on Continuous operation of such systems gen- intelligence collection capabilities. Long erates heat, which combats moisture, corro- periods of unlimited visibility are abruptly sion, rust, and fungus, decreasing the mean interrupted by violent winds and sand- time between failures, but hastening system storms. These storms reduce visibility and wearout. drive sand into mechanical and electronic Mountainous regions may also be found equipment, causing frequent breakdowns. in jungle areas. These areas are particular The wear and tear, particularly on mechan- difficult for patrols to traverse, especially ical equipment, requires frequent replace- during the rainy season. In these regions ment of moving parts. Increased require- the extremes of weather can run from very ments for spare parts place an additional hot and humid at the lower elevations; to burden on the supply system, increasing the cold and wet at the highest elevations. vulnerability of friendly logistic operations. Wide variations in day and night tempera- DESERT OPERATIONS tures also have detrimental effects on peo- The use of IEW assets in desert opera- ple and machines. Precautions must be tions demands special preparation in order taken to prevent casualties resulting from to conduct combat operations. direct exposure to the sun and high temperatures. Deserts are semiarid regions containing a wide variety of soils in varying relief. There The high desert temperatures may cause are three types of desert: mountain, rocky equipment to overheat. Heat causes batter- plateau, and sandy or dune. Optimum op- ies to lose power more quickly. High tem- eration of EW equipment in desert terrain is peratures cause overheating in communica- affected by dust, sand, temperature variations equipment resulting in equipment tions, static electricity, and wind. failure. Lenses on DODs can become discol- ored when directly expose to sun. Communi- Desert operations are characterized by cations equipment must be protected from the use of forces that are capable of con- heat and from the direct ray of the sun. ducting highly mobile operations. These operations significantly increase the size of Degradation of AM and FM radio com- the area of interest at virtually all echelons. munications occurs due to extreme heat. Collection assets are focused on targets at Communications during hours of darkness significantly greater distances than nor- are excellent. During daylight, a 20- to 30- mal. Brigades and battalions may become percent loss of radio communications is even more dependent upon the division and experienced, due to heat. Frequency drift corps for intelligence, because collection will also limit radio capabilities. requirements may exceed the range of their collection capability. This requires more DS EW systems and radioteletype equipment and GS reinforcing missions. The mobility will also suffer frequent down time from factor of the desert requires more tracked sand and dust, if not protected. IMINT sys- and fewer wheeled vehicles for EW systems. tems are subject to heat wave distortion and

5-64 dust storms. HUMINT operations are re- and cover considerable distances across the duced, due to smaller population areas. front. OPSEC responsibilities increase signifi- The optimum operation of radar in desert cantly due to the long range of enemy terrain is degraded by— IMINT and SIGINT systems in the desert. Like OPSEC, the value of EW has increased Dust and sand. in importance. The expansiveness of the Temperature variations. desert precludes using terrain masking to avoid jamming. ECM can freeze the battle Static electricity. for destruction by fire and maneuver, and Wind. plays a significant role in air defense and CAS suppression. To obtain the best performance in target detection, place the radar set as high as Vehicle maintenance requirements in- possible above the area under surveillance, crease in extreme heat. The heat dries out so that the radar antenna overlooks the seals and gaskets and causes tires to crack. area. On smooth, sandy surfaces, the detec- The effects of sand on equipment creates tion range for moving targets may be the need to constantly replace bearings and reduced, because sand presents a surface other moving parts. Since reconnaissance that does not reflect an appreciable amount in desert operations is generally accom- of clutter. Increasing the operating angle plished using mobile patrols, maintenance helps to reduce this deficiency. A second requirements will directly impact on recon- disadvantage caused by the terrain is that naissance capabilities. little natural cover and concealment are Humidity and temperature variations available for radar positions. cause condensation and rust. Condensation It is extremely difficult to conceal combat degrades the effectiveness of the optical forces and operations in flat, open terrain. devices by causing mold to form on lenses, Airborne collection platforms are very effec- requiring extra precautions to be taken. tive in locating concentrated enemy forces. Equipment must be cleaned on a daily basis. The problems associated with desert Foot patrols are generally limited to static observations and reconnaissance include— defensive operations, while mobile patrols are effective in desert operations. Air recon- Long ranges and the refraction of vis- naissance is used to the maximum extent ible light impairing visual perception. possible. When a unit is on a march, ground Heat waves, blurring detail. elements will normally be located at least 2,000 to 4,000 meters to the front and flank The actual location of observed objects of the lead elements, depending on the ter- becoming difficult to determine. rain. OPs in static situations are sited in Mirages, which can distort objects to pairs as far apart as possible to permit ac- the point of being unrecognizable. curate intersection. The intensity of these effects often de- The desert terrain favors wide envelop- pends on the angle of the sun in relation- ments and turning movements. The intelli- ship to the observer. Observation in the gence collection effort must cover all direc- desert is enhanced by placing observers as tions and use all available collection sys- high above the desert floor as possible. In tems, especially those with long-range capa- rolling desert terrain, tanks and other vehi- bilities. Since large unit consolidations and cles are spread over a wide area, permitting preparations for attack are virtually impos- observation in areas which cannot be seen sible to hide, commanders on both sides by adjacent vehicle crews. may decide to conceal the time and place of attack through the use of deception opera- GSR and REMS are used to overcome vi- tions. The S2 must be prepared to provide sual distortion caused by the magnification intelligence support to the S3 for deception by heat waves. planning. The S2 incorporates all of the col- In a desert environment, GSRs can be lection means available in his collection used to acquire targets at extended ranges plan to achieve as much redundancy as

5-65 possible. All efforts are made to confirm or formance of the GSR, and must be consid- deny significant indications of enemy ered by the operators. The successful intentions. operation of the radar on the winter battle- WINTER OPERATIONS field is affected by— Signal scattering by ice, fog, and air- Because over 50 percent of the world can borne snow. become a winter battlefield, the Army must be prepared to conduct IEW operations in a Variation of radar images caused by winter environment. This environment is snow cover and frozen ground. characterized by low temperatures, fog, Reduced ability of the equipment oper- freezing rain, snow, ice, frozen conditions, ators to function in the cold. and a series of freeze-thaw cycles. The effects of the winter environment on person- Reduced battery life and performance. nel and equipment are numerous. Because Cold- and condensation-induced main- of the effort and extra equipment necessary tenance problems. to keep warm, common tasks take longer and are more difficult to perform. Mobility Winter battlefield operations require long- over frozen ground can be better than over er periods of time to perform even simple unfrozen ground. Snow or spring mud, on tasks. Experience shows that five times the the other hand, can hinder or halt move- normal time may be needed. Therefore, ment on roads or cross country. Fog and increased time must be allowed in planning blowing snow can reduce visibility to zero. for set-up and relocation of the GSR. Performance of most electro-optical systems A major impact of winter operations on is degraded or changed. Assessing enemy equipment is caused by cold and snow. capability to live and fight in extreme cold Extremely low temperatures cause metal is an essential intelligence requirement. parts of weapons to become brittle, result- Historically, Warsaw Pact forces conduct ing in a high breakage factor for internal numerous exercises during the winter, giv- parts. Vehicle engines and generators ing them experience in conducting combat require frequent starting, and the frequent operations in cold climates. Snow and cold starts cause condensation in the internal weather have detrimental effects on the parts of the engine, which later freezes. The operations of both mechanical and elec- intake filters of carburetors and C-E equip- tronic equipment. The following factors can ment are particularly susceptible to icing. cause degradation of IEW operations: Condensation covers on microphones and telephone handsets ice frequently if not protected. Blowing snow will also jam air- Reduced mobility of vehicle-mounted intake valves. Pneumatic antenna masts systems. and ADP equipment freeze because of con- Poor or inaccurate performance of ra- densation. Power supplies have greatly dars, sensors, radios, and other electro- reduced life spans. RATT equipment is very optical systems. susceptible to malfunction in these circumstances. Units preparing for winter opera- Antenna icing, which can reduce tions require a larger than normal PLL and range, increase noise, alter frequency, ASL. Each unit will need larger Class III or simply collapse antennas. allocations because of frequent engine start- Thickened oil and lubricants, which ing. Higher PLL usage factors will be expe- can cause mechanical problems in rienced for filters, batteries, spark plugs, generators and vehicles. hydraulic hoses, and all types of seals. Decrease in battery life and Thinner lubricants are required. performance. In winter operations, the human element Certain environmental phenomena, such is all-important and demands concerned as snow and fog, can significantly degrade leadership and thorough training. Particu- visibility, making the GSR a valuable asset. lar attention must be given to minimizing These same phenomena can affect the per- the effects of vision whiteouts, with the

5-66 attendant loss of perception, which affects areas, especially during periods of limited driving and flying. High windchill factors visibility. FM 90-10 describes MOUT. and the potential problems of frostbite and HUMINT, as with jungle and mountain immersion foot are additional considera- operations, provides the commander with tions. the best means of gathering intelligence. Only with the proper training, planning Troop observations, reported rapidly and and preparation, can IEW operations be accurately, can contribute extensively to the successfully conducted on the winter collection effort. Troops supply first-hand battlefield. knowledge about the location and type of URBAN AREAS enemy equipment and activity, most of which is submitted to the S3 for targeting. Urban centers have always been recog- Interrogations of EPW, civilians, line nized as important strategic objectives. crossers, and defectors will probably be the Commanders must not commit their forces best source of information on enemy con- to attack or defend an urban center unless a centrations within the city. Civilians distinct advantage can be recognized. recently routed from their homes may pro- Military operations on urbanized terrain vide the location of enemy forces and (MOUT) are characterized by short engage- information on structures, such as fortifica- ment ranges, structured obstructions to tions, major facilities, and vehicle or foot observation and communications, extreme bridges. HUMINT collection activity prior canalization, excellent cover and conceal- to the battle focuses on collection and anal- ment, and a new vertical dimension added ysis of city plans for IPB. to the battlefield. Frequently, there are The urban environment restricts or limits problems which include obstructions, such the use of AM and FM C2 communications. as rubble, control of civilian population, Enemy forces will make heavy use of wire and reduced R&S effectiveness. These ele- and established civilian telephone systems. ments constrain IEW operational and sus- There will be considerable crowding on the tainment capabilities. FM band with emitters located on tall struc- Intelligence collection requires intensified tures to afford radio LOS. management to be effective. The collection Communications and noncommunica- effort is severely hampered by the enemy’s tions intercepts become less valuable as an use of cover and concealment, which sup- intelligence collection source. Manpack press enemy unit signatures. An urban en- intercept and DF equipment are well suited vironment, particularly one that is exten- to operations in MOUT due to their ability sive, will eliminate many of the indicators to be used in high-tower buildings. Vehicle- used to determine enemy activities and dismounted ground collection systems are best position. The flash, sound, smoke, and dust used to provide early warning and indica- signatures of weapons are suppressed or distorted. tions of enemy intentions on the approaches to the urban area. Urban areas are characterized by abun- dant cover and concealment and limited ECM also has little use in MOUT due to visibility. Because of LOS considerations, the perturbation of the radio LOS required the target acquisition capability of GSR for effective operations. As with the collec- within built-up areas is reduced. Inaccurate tion assets, ECM systems are best employed range and azimuth readings may result to provide COMJAM support in the outly- when the radar beam is ricocheted off ing areas along suspected avenues of ap- buildings. proach. Additionally, ECM systems are tasked with collection and early warning GSR will normally be used against enemy missions to support other ESM assets. forces beyond the built-up area. Radar teams are positioned to monitor routes into Because there are fewer LOS restrictions, and out of the built-up area. Inside the built- QUICKFIX is tasked with ESM/ECM mis- up area, radars are positioned to detect sions against the urban area. Airborne movement along streets, alleys, and open ECM systems will be useful in disrupting

5-67 the hearability of enemy C2 links from urban environment limits the use of EW; higher echelons. however, airborne EW systems maybe useful in disrupting the hearability of enemy Defender advantages of cover and con- C2 links from higher echelons. cealment; protected, elevated platforms for IMINT and SIGINT systems covering ap- There are no unique sustainment consid- proaches to the urban areas; and the ability erations for MI equipment, supplies or sol- to hide key installations without risk or diers in the urban environment. detection, all place a premium on good Additional information on operations on OPSEC by the approaching force. The urbanized terrain is contained in FM 90-10.

5-68 CHAPTER 6 Combat Service Support CSS feeds, fuels, arms, maintains, and between these IEW elements and the ma- moves the brigade, maneuver battalions, neuver unit(s) in their proximity. This is supporting MI elements, and other combat, due to the operating characteristics of tacti- combat support and CSS elements. It pro- cal SIGINT and EW systems which require vides this support as far forward as possible their deployment to be well forward in order and throughout the AO. to be effective. For integrity of intelligence This chapter describes the CSS necessary operations through the analysis of techni- to maintain MI assets operating in the bri- cal information, they are designated as GS gade or battalion AO. It outlines the bri- resources of the division. No other Army gade’s responsibilities to these elements, tactical organization operates throughout identifies the key players who coordinate the width and depth of the division sector, this support, and lists the services provided yet requires centralized direction and man- by the MI battalions’ CSS elements. While agement for coherent operations, like the the description centers heavily on the MI battalion’s technical collection assets. responsibilities of logistical planners and As a result, support to these elements is maintenance personnel within the MI more often misunderstood than not. To the organization, it is incumbent upon the bri- maximum extent possible, the MI battalion gade and battalion S2 to understand these commander ensures that his organic CSS roles and their relationship to the maneuver capabilities are pushed as far forward as commanders and the logistical systems possible to meet the sustainment require- supporting these commanders. ments of forward-operating IEW teams. This effort is mandated in those MI-unique Sustaining those elements that conduct areas such as fault diagnosis and repair of combat operations is no less important than SIGINT collection systems, jammers, and the operations of the fighters themselves. radars. For Army common support such as Understanding CSS principles common to classes I, II, III, IV, V, and IX, IEW teams the Army, and the sometimes unique sup- deployed well forward will draw their support required of tactical MI organizations, port from CSS elements of the brigade in is fundamental to understanding how the whose sector they are deployed. To ensure total Army fights. that this happens, CSS planning within the IEW elements deployed and operating in MI battalion is accomplished early and in the forward maneuver battalion and bri- great detail to account for all classes of gade zones will be provided CSS based upon supply and all levels of maintenance their task organization, designated com- required. Most important, this planning is mand relationship to the forward maneuver done along with the expected deployment force, and, in certain areas, maintenance scheme for IEW assets developed by the requirements unique to tactical MI organizations. IEW elements such as GSR, CI, and EPW teams, when attached to, or in DS of, the brigade or subordinate units of the brigade, will be supported logistically with all classes of supply by CSS elements of the brigade, less those unique areas such as GSR repair parts or maintenance which only the MI battalion can provide. Unlike many other organizations, however, tactical MI elements deployed well forward in the brigade sector and dispersed geographically across the brigade and division frontage, require CSS from forward maneuver units regardless of the command relationship

6-1 commander and S3, responding to stated The MI battalion S1 and S4 are the prin- and implied IEW missions. The concept for cipal workers who, with their respective CSS to IEW elements, then, centers on the staff sections, accomplish the individual principles of— administrative and CSS tasks under the Fix forward. supervision of the executive officer. The battalion S1 sustains the force by Draw CSS from forward-deployed providing support to personnel within the units for Army common supply and battalion. Personnel support operations service items. maintain unit strength to ensure crew Sustain the IEW teams in all areas to manning and see to the morale and welfare the maximum extent possible, but of the individual soldier. coordinate CSS for those beyond the The MI battalion S4 is the principal staff MI battalion’s range of support. officer responsible for developing the battal Identify CSS areas requiring division, ion’s logistical plans, policies, and pro- brigade, and maneuver battalion sup- grams. Like personnel support operations, port, and coordinate to ensure that logistical support operations are based on support. detailed estimates resulting from the S4’s analysis of the MI battalion’s concept of the The MI battalion alone repairs, or evacu- operation and deployment plan and ates for repair, MI-unique systems. planned to include all classes of supply and services and all levels of maintenance. The S4 coordinates logistical and maintenance RESPONSIBILITIES requirements with the division G4 and As in other organizations, the battalion those brigade S4s who will have IEW teams executive officer serves as the commander’s operating within their area of operations. principal architect of unit CSS operations. Again, the unique capabilities provided by The executive officer— the MI battalion require thorough coordination to ensure the evacuation, repair, or Supervises S1 (administrative) and S4 replacement of uncommon mission- (logistic) staff activities. essential systems such as radars, intercept Directs administrative and CSS plan- systems, and jammers. These systems are ning accomplished by the MI battal- not replaced by spares stored within the ion’s S1 and S4. DISCOM, since no such spares exist at that Ensures that the administrative and location for most of these low density items CSS systems work by coordinating of equipment. required activities to maintain contin- The final key coordinator for CSS opera- uous support for all MI battalion tions is the IEW company team command- elements. er. Once deployed to operational sites, IEW teams rely on the company team commander for responsive CSS beyond that provided by forward maneuver units. This is assured through detailed prior coordination. The company team commander accomplishes

6-2 that final required coordination with are confirmed and expanded at this time. maneuver unit commanders or their S4s to The IEW company team commander may guarantee the sustainment of forward- deal directly with the brigade S4 or through deployed teams under his command. He the IEWSE at the brigade TOC. He coordi- also receives daily strength accounting nates the support required from the reports, reports of maintenance status, and maneuver battalion with the brigade S4. requests for maintenance support from his IEW teams or platoons. He then coordinates SERVICES the responsive support from the MI battal- CLASSES OF SUPPLY ion’s trains or supporting CSS units in the sector. The company team commander is Supplies are grouped into 10 categories or the final key link in the uninterrupted chain classes, so that items may be easily identi- of coordinated CSS to sustain the IEW fied. This establishes a common supply force. Maintenance support teams or con- terminology and eases logistical planning tact teams formed from assets of the MI and operations. MI elements use only 9 out battalion’s service support company will of the 10 classes of supply. These nine normally be organized within the IEW classes are illustrated below. company team to provide responsive sup- SUPPLY SOURCES FOR MI port to the company team elements. The tai- ELEMENTS IN loring of this organic CSS, when done well, BRIGADE AREA OF OPERATIONS minimizes the problems normally encountered by IEW elements operating well for- Class I ward of the limited CSS capabilities of the Class I supplies include subsistence and MI battalion. gratuitous issue health and welfare items. Class I requirements are determined from COORDINATION daily strength reports. The MI company team commander receives strength reports Preliminary coordination for CSS is from each of the MI elements deployed initiated by the MI battalion S4 as soon as throughout the brigade AO. He consolidates the battalion is notified that MI assets are these reports and presents a copy to the bri- being deployed to the brigade AO. The MI gade S1 and S4. The brigade S1 integrates battalion S4 coordinates with the G4 and MI requirements into the brigade daily the brigade S4. The G4 includes in the divi- strength determined from this report and sion OPORD the anticipated support re- delivered to the Class I supply distribution quirements. The brigade S4 arranges for all point in the BSA. classes of supply which MI elements cannot The brigade S4 and the IEW company obtain through the parent MI organization, team commander coordinate the best means when deployed. The brigade S4 coordinates of Class I distribution. Generally, an IEW with the maneuver battalion S4 for CSS company team representative collects Class required at that level. The IEW company I from the brigade Class I supply distribu- team commander or the brigade IEW sup- tion point and distributes them to MI units port element, when there is no IEW com- located in or near the BSA. Class I is pre- pany team, coordinates with the brigade S4 pared at multiple food service sections with- for additional maintenance support. Addi- in the brigade AO and is released to MI tional requirements may be satisfied by units based on a distribution scheme devel- organic brigade or maneuver battalion oped by the IEW company team maintenance assets. commander. When an IEW company team is formed, The IEW company team commander the IEW company team commander as- coordinates Class I support for MI units sumes the CSS coordination responsibilities located near maneuver battalions with each for all MI elements in the brigade AO. The battalion S4. Class I for MI units is distrib- initial requirements of the IEW company uted from the maneuver battalion field team, previously coordinated among the MI trains. Organic MI units’ vehicles are used battalion S4, division G4, and brigade S4, to pickup and deliver these supplies to IEW

6-3 6-4 site locations. When hot meals are availa- Empty fuel vehicles and containers pre- ble, the IEW company team commander sented at the distribution point are suffi- coordinates with the maneuver battalion S4 cient to obtain POL; a formal request is not to ensure that MI personnel receive these necessary. Bulk oil and lubricants are also rations in the battalion field trains, or that distributed at Class III distribution points. the appropriate number of meals is released Class III requirements for high POL con- to IEW team representatives for distribu- sumption systems such as the MI battal- tion at IEW site locations. When individual ion’s M1015 and 30-kilowatt generators MI units are deployed to the brigade or bat- must be supported by the MI battalion talion AO, the MI unit leader must coordi- refueling assets. POL for all other equip- nate Class I support with the nearest comment can be supported by the maneuver bat unit. Potable water, although not a battalion trains or BSA. Class I item, can normally be obtained from the food service element. When the IEW company team is formed and deployed in the brigade AO, the team Class II and IV commander coordinates with brigade and battalion S4s to confirm and expand pre- MI units in the battalion AO request vious POL support arrangements and to Class II and IV items through the IEW ensure that MI elements receive adequate company team commander. The IEW com- POL supply support. POL support to MI pany team commander coordinates with the elements in the brigade AO is obtained maneuver battalion S4. If the requisition through brigade and battalion supply cannot be filled, it is passed to the brigade channels. Daily consumption reports are S4. submitted by MI elements to the battalion If individual MI units are deployed in the or brigade S4 (depending on the element’s brigade AO, they must rely on previous deployed position). Deployed MI elements coordination between the MI battalion and provide POL consumption information to the brigade and battalion S4s for Class II the IEW company team commander, who and IV supplies. After deployment, they consolidates the reports and forwards them must confirm previous coordination and to the MI battalion S4. The MI battalion S4 establish supply request procedures to uses these reports to plan for future ensure that they receive adequate supply operations. support while deployed in the brigade AO. Class III Class V MI elements located in the brigade AO Deployed MI elements’ personnel and require a full load of POL to meet mission vehicles carry a basic load of Class V requirements. The initial additional alloca- ammunition. The MI battalion S4 coordi- tion of POL to the brigade for MI units is nates Class V ammunition supply require- usually based on consumption experience ments with the brigade and battalion S4s records which are consolidated and main- before MI elements are deployed into the tained by the MI battalion S4. Other factors brigade AO. Replenishment supplies of which must be considered when preparing a Class V ammunition and pyrotechnics are POL estimate are the duration of deploy- drawn from Class V distribution points in ment and terrain trafficability. the battalion combat trains and BSA. The MI battalion S4 uses this information Coordination is essential to provide for to prepare an estimate of POL requirements ammunition resupply for MI elements in for MI elements about to be deployed to bri- the brigade AO. Coordination enables MI gade AO. He coordinates with the brigade elements to draw Class V supplies directly S4 and maneuver battalion S4. This ensures from these nearby resources. that adequate POL is available for The IEW company team commander con- MI elements once they are deployed in the firms ammunition resupply arrangements maneuver brigade or subordinate battalion with the brigade and battalion S4s. He is sectors. responsible for ensuring that problems in

6-5 method, procedure, or location of ammuni- IEW element. Through coordination with tion resupply for MI elements are resolved the S1, the S4 also ensures that personnel to as quickly and efficiently as possible. operate the equipment are available at the Class VI receiving unit prior to delivery of the item. MI elements in the brigade AO may Class VIII obtain personal items from mobile PX sta- When MI units deploy, their vehicles are tions, when this service is available. For equipped with first aid kits. Individual first convenience, these stations are usually set aid kits are also issued to personnel. Addi- up near food service sites. When PX service tional supplies or replacements for exis not available, requests for Class VI items pended Class VIII items from either the are routed through the IEW company team personal or vehicular kits are provided by commander to the S1 of the MI battalion, the medical unit nearest to the deployed MI the maneuver battalion, or the brigade. The element. At the BSA, the medical clearing requisition channel depends upon prior station provides this service. In the coordination between the S4s of the MI bat- maneuver battalion AO, MI elements re- talion and the brigade and battalion. ceive replacement Class VIII items from Sundries packs are basic personal items either the medical aid station in the battal- allocated to personnel in the brigade AO ion trains or from a maneuver company and should not be confused with Class X team aid station. items. Sundries packs are usually distrib- Class IX uted along with Class I rations. Deployed MI elements receive mainte- Class VII nance and repair parts support from main- Class VII major components and end tenance teams organic to the MI battalion. items are identified in daily loss reports and When MI units are task organized into IEW obtained through formal requisition chan- company teams, maintenance elements are nels. When an IEW company team is included in the organization. Forward- formed, MI elements in the brigade AO deployed MI elements also may receive submit daily loss reports to the IEW com- common equipment repair support from di- pany team commander. The IEW company vision intermediate DS maintenance units commander validates and consolidates the based in the BSA. reports and forwards his report to the MI To expedite maintenance and keep criti- battalion S4 for further action. When an cal systems operating, a direct exchange IEW company team is not formed, MI ele- (DX) system is used. DX is accomplished ments in the brigade AO report losses between the using unit and the intermediate through the IEWSE or EW platoon head- DS maintenance unit. It is a simple system quarters, depending upon the type of main- of trading an unserviceable DX-coded com- tenance support required. The IEWSE ponent or assembly needing repair for a relays this information to the MI battalion serviceable one from stock. S4. MI-peculiar repair parts are requisitioned The MI battalion S4 is responsible for through the MI battalion S4. These supplies consolidating these daily loss reports and may be delivered to the IEW company team for preparing requisitions for replacements. area or picked up from the MI battalion by If the item can be replaced from equipment IEW team vehicles. Maintenance support or systems already in the MI battalion teams take these parts or equipment to the trains area, he arranges for delivery to the using units as required. using element. If the item cannot be replaced from MI battalion stockage, the S4 Specialized repair parts, for such items as prepares a formal requisition. TEAMPACK and ECM sets, must be closely monitored by the MI battalion S4. When major end items are delivered to the Because of the low density of this equip- MI battalion trains area, the S4 ensures ment, sufficient repair parts are difficult to that it is in ready-to-fight condition and maintain in large quantity. The battalion that it is delivered promptly to the using S4 keeps a prescribed load of repair parts on

6-6 hand or on order to support deployed MI this level includes diagnosis, fault isolation, elements in the brigade AO. Repair parts repair by replacement, and repair of for MI-particular equipment are requisi- selected high usage components in support tioned by the unit that provides interme- of the DX system. Each intermediate DS diate DS maintenance support. In most unit also establishes and operates mainte- cases involving MI-unique systems, inter- nance collection points (MCP) and base mediate DS and sometimes intermediate GS maintenance areas for support of all custo- maintenance is performed by elements of mer units. Intermediate GS maintenance is the MI battalion’s service support company. performed in support of the theater supply system through the repair of assemblies, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND components, modules, DX items, printed RECOVERY circuit boards (PCB), and ORF. It is per- Repair is accomplished as far forward as formed by designated TOE and TDA units. possible. When repairs cannot be performed The units are normally located at EAC and on site, or the equipment cannot be trans- operate in semifixed or fixed facilities, and ported to a repair site, recovery operations are semimobile. Intermediate GS mainte- are initiated. Equipment is moved, through nance units are job- or production line- the maintenance system, to maintenance oriented for repair of Class VII and Class facilities that can repair or replace unser- IX items. Maintenance tasks at this level viceable parts, components, or units. Al- include diagnosis and repair of assemblies, though maintenance, repair, and recovery components, modules, and PCB. are separate operations, the overall system supporting these activities is generally Depot maintenance includes complete referred to as maintenance. rebuilding of entire systems and is usually The three-level maintenance system con- accomplished in large, fixed manufacturing sists of—unit maintenance, intermediate plants. Army Materiel Command (AMC) DS and intermediate GS maintenance, and depots or activities, contractors, and host - depot maintenance. nation support (HNS) personnel perform this level of maintenance in support of the Unit maintenance is the care and repair supply system. Repair parts supply support done by a unit on its own equipment. It is for depot maintenance is limited to items to characterized by replacement, minor re- support assigned maintenance missions. pairs, adjustments, cleaning and lubricat- ing, and repair by replacement. It includes Though each level is separate and dis- operator maintenance. tinct, there are times when a shop performs Intermediate DS and GS maintenance are more than one category of maintenance. characterized by a more substantial main- The following chart gives a brief synopsis tenance or repair effort conducted in sup- of the unit or organization which provides port of the user. Units conducting interme- levels of maintenance for different types of diate maintenance are specified. equipment. Intermediate-level maintenance is composed of intermediate DS maintenance and Maintenance Operations intermediate GS maintenance. Intermediate DS maintenance is performed in support of Maintenance operations are conducted in the user. Units performing this level of support of MI elements deployed in the bri- maintenance are tailored to perform repair gade AO. Maintenance for these elements on equipment and return it to the user. during actual combat is guided by the mis- Intermediate DS maintenance units are sion and the situation. Maintenance contact employed at different locations, but the teams are formed from the MI battalion and tasks performed are the same. The focus of deployed to the brigade AO to accomplish intermediate DS maintenance is mobile equipment repair as far forward as possible. support as far forward as possible, repair by They repair this equipment on site, if possi- replacement, and the ability to maintain ble. Other maintenance is situation depen- high volume, fast moving operational readi- dent and generally conducted as time and ness floats (ORF). Maintenance tasked at conditions permit.

6-7 Maintenance and Repair Resources repair support. The team commander coor- MI elements deployed in the brigade AO dinates requests for maintenance support depend upon the IEW company team com- through the brigade S4. These elements mander to coordinate their maintenance support MI units, depending on priorities and repair requirements. A variety of established by the brigade S3, coordinating resources are used to meet these require- with the brigade S4. ments quickly and efficiently. Brigade and battalion also have supporting maintenance resources which can provide intermediate DS maintenance support Organic MI maintenance personnel and to MI elements. The IEW company team equipment deploy with the IEW company commander coordinates this support with team as a maintenance contact team. They brigade and battalion S4s. Depending upon provide unit maintenance and repair sup- priorities established by the combat unit S3, port. They deploy with the capability to each S4 determines the type and frequency provide this support for common, C-E, GSR of support they can provide to nearby MI or REMS, and EW equipment. The IEW elements. The essential ingredient in receiv- company team commander coordinates the ing brigade maintenance support for MI activity of this team and ensures that operations is continuous coordination deployed MI elements receive immediate between all involved personnel: the MI bat- unit maintenance and repair according to talion S4, brigade S4, and IEW company mission priorities. If additional or specialized support is needed, maintenance ele- team commander. ments from the MI battalion service support COMMON EQUIPMENT company may be task organized and de- Vehicles, air conditioners, and power ployed to the AO on a case by case basis. generators make up the bulk of items The IEW company team commander also known as common equipment. The MI may request assistance from elements of company team’s contact maintenance team the forward support battalion located in the performs on-site unit maintenance on MI- BSA. These maintenance elements provide common equipment deployed throughout mechanical and some C-E maintenance and the brigade AO.

6-8 If equipment cannot be repaired on site, it in the MI battalion trains area. The C-E is generally evacuated to the intermediate maintenance platoon maintains a shop DS maintenance facility. It may be repaired stock of repair parts and DX items for this there or further evacuated to intermediate equipment. maintenance or to a corps maintenance Unit maintenance is performed by radar unit. operators. Other unit maintenance is pro- Unit maintenance for vehicles and gen- vided by C-E maintenance personnel found erators belonging to GSR and REMS teams within the MI battalion’s contact team attached to the battalion task force is pro- organized with the IEW company team. vided by the brigade maintenance support This element maintains and repairs equip- team (MST). When it is necessary to evacu- ment on site or evacuates the equipment to ate such equipment to an intermediate DS the C-E platoon repair facilities located in maintenance facility, it is generally moved the MI battalion trains area for interme- by elements of the FSB. If beyond their diate maintenance of DX replacements. repair capability, this equipment is evacu- COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ated to an intermediate maintenance (GS) EQUIPMENT unit. COMSEC equipment cannot be repaired Maintenance and repair parts support are on site. On-site unit maintenance is limited closely related. The maintenance contact to minor adjustments and maintenance teams from the MI battalion carry repair which can be performed by the operator. parts as part of their mission load. These This equipment must be evacuated to the teams carry the following repair parts: C-E platoon facilities in the MI battalion Army-common equipment (track/ trains area for further evacuation to the wheeled vehicle parts, generator parts). division signal battalion for intermediate MI-unique (SIGINT or EW, GSR or DS maintenance. If the signal battalion is REMS) spare parts and assemblies. able to repair the equipment, it is returned through established maintenance requisi- If the contact team does not have the tion channels. If repair is not possible, the necessary repair parts, assistance can be signal battalion evacuates the equipment to obtained from the supported brigades only the theater COMSEC logistics support unit if the item is not MI-unique. Again, coordi- (CLSU). In that case, the MI battalion S4 nation among the MI battalion S4, brigade must requisition a replacement through S4, and the company team commander, is supply channels. essential. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONIC ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT Unit maintenance for C-E equipment Unit maintenance for SIGINT and EW (except for COMSEC and RADIAC equip- equipment is provided to deployed MI element) is provided by the tactical communi- ments by the MI battalion contact teams. cations system repairer of the MI battal- Equipment which cannot be repaired on site ion’s C-E maintenance section. This is evacuated to the MI battalion trains. The equipment is maintained and repaired on MI battalion provides intermediate DS site, if possible. The forward operating ele- maintenance support for this equipment. If ments, elements of the forward support bat- the MI battalion cannot repair it, it is evac- talion (heavy division) may provide on-site uated to an intermediate GS maintenance unit support-depending upon mission battalion repair facility. priorities and available resources—or equipment may be evacuated to the BSA for repair. If additional maintenance is required, the equipment is evacuated to the MI battalion intermediate maintenance facilities located

6-9 RECOVERY AND EVACUATION authorization, systems which have suffered OPERATIONS extensive damage may be repaired by con- Recovery and evacuation (R&E) opera- trolled substitution. tions are important elements of mainte- OTHER COMBAT SERVICE nance operations. Rapid return of equipment to users is required to sustain the SUPPORT battle. R&E operations consist of retrieving Personnel and administrative support for immobile, inoperative, or abandoned mate- MI elements deployed in the brigade AO is riel, including enemy materiel from the bat- coordinated through the IEW company tlefield or immediate vicinity. MI equipment team commander. He coordinates and con- is evacuated directly to the appropriate solidates leave and pass requests, pay dis- activity where repair or other disposition persals, requests for special legal services, may be accomplished. Captured enemy and other personnel and administrative equipment is recovered and immediately support for deployed units. He forwards evacuated to the nearest unit authorized to these consolidated requests, requirements, evaluate and analyze it. and information, along with recommenda- While the MI battalion service support tions, to the S1 section of the MI battalion. company has primary responsibility for Medical support for deployed MI elements recovery of its organic equipment and sys- is provided by medical units supporting the tems, these recovery operations may also be brigade. MI personnel located near the bat- performed by other maintenance units in talion task force receive medical support the brigade AO. The IEW company team from the battalion aid station. When evac- commander is responsible for coordinating uation is necessary, it is generally to a divi- recovery operations. He coordinates them sional medical company in the BSA. Here with brigade and battalion S4s, as well as treatment is given, and the patients are with the S4 of the MI battalion. In this way, returned to their units or evacuated further support for recovery operations is provided to the rear, if necessary. In any case, the by the nearest and most capable recovery IEWSE company team commander must ar- support unit. Recovery operations may be range for medical support for forward MI conducted by elements of the supply and elements, and inform each element where to transportation battalion motor transport get its support. element, by the MI battalion service support Chaplain support is provided to all units company elements, or by organic mainte- deployed in the brigade AO on an area nance units of nearby combat units. basis. Personnel from MI elements may Recovery operations are initiated when attend services nearest to their deployed on-site repair of MI battalion equipment is site. not practical or possible. Whenever possi- The IEW company team commander for- ble, organic or support resources are used to wards requests for additional or special recover and evacuate these damaged or dis- transportation support to the MI battalion abled items. Items of equipment are moved S4 or brigade S4, depending upon the type to nearby safe locations for immediate and amount of support required. repair. If the MI battalion cannot recover the equipment, other maintenance resources When bath and clothing exchange ser- are called to evacuate it to the nearest safe vices are available in the BSA, MI elements recovery point. are authorized to use these facilities. The MI battalion service support com- Laundry service, when available, is also pany evacuates recovered equipment, which provided by units located in the BSA to cannot be repaired, to other maintenance deployed MI personnel. support facilities using MI battalion re- When the combat situation prevents evac- sources. Prior to evacuation, the mainte- uation or recovery of damaged or inopera- nance officer considers a controlled tive equipment, or when equipment must be exchange of parts according to regulation abandoned, MI equipment must be de- and command guidance. With appropriate stroyed to prevent eventual repair and use

6-10 by the enemy. Detailed methods of destroying MI equipment are covered in unit SOPs, user handbooks, and soldier training manuals. Each MI element is responsible for destroying its own equipment when ordered to do so or when capture is likely. Destruction of this equipment must be thorough enough to prevent the enemy from duplicating it or from learning its method of operation. Any accompanying documents, notes, instructions, or other written material concerning the operation, maintenance, or use of the equipment, including drawings or parts lists, must be destroyed in such a manner that they will be useless to captur- ing forces.

6-11 CHAPTER 7 Training The S2, in coordination with the S3, ing the exercise, the S2 should resurface the develops and supervises the unit’s intelli- problem, verify its causes, and take gence and security training program. The action(s) necessary to prevent recurrence. S2 plans and develops the intelligence and Evaluators must be careful when determin- security scenario for exercises and training ing how and why a problem developed to tests. The S2 establishes training levels make sure that the real cause is identified. based on the unit’s ARTEP and the indi- An individual’s performance may be vidual soldier’s training manuals. The S2 blamed, for example, when the real culprit ensures that intelligence training is inte- could be an unrealistic or impractical grated into all appropriate phases of com- requirement prescribed in the SOP. You bat training. must look beyond the symptom to deter- This chapter describes the S2’s and the mine the root cause of the problem. S3’s duties and functions in unit combat Unit training also is conducted during training, training of the individual soldier, nonexercise field training. The S2 assists and the training of intelligence personnel. subordinate units in conducting intelligence COMBAT TRAINING and security training. He periodically in- spects intelligence and security training, The S2 ensures that intelligence is inte- points out weaknesses, and makes sugges- grated with all unit and individual training. tions and recommendations for He develops the intelligence scenarios for improvement. field and command post exercises, as well as training tests and evaluations. Nor- INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER TRAINING mally, intelligence inputs are preplanned It is the commander’s responsibility to and designed to exercise and test intelli- train subordinates. The S2 plans and imple- gence procedures as well as to trigger ments, through the S3, the intelligence and friendly reactions to hostile indicators. S2 security training program to train the com- exercise planners portray the threat as re- bat soldier in scouting, reconnaissance, and alistically as possible, employing recog- the intelligence aspects of patrolling and nized enemy tactics and doctrine. Input into security procedures. All soldiers are trained intelligence channels as the exercise pro- in observation techniques to ensure accu- gresses should present intelligence person- rate description and reporting of what has nel with challenging situations. If indica- been perceived. The ability to recognize and tors of enemy capabilities and intentions report what they have observed, especially are too obvious, or exercise scenarios too under adverse weather conditions, improves standard and predictable, the training with practice. The soldier is trained to value of the exercise is greatly reduced. quickly identify friendly and enemy equip- Since intelligence inputs trigger friendly ment. On the air-land battlefield, this is a moves and reactions, the S2 scenario matter of significant concern. Some types of planners need to gain an appreciation for enemy equipment are very similar in the manner in which the S3 desires the appearance to that of our European allies. exercise to progress. Establishing a close FM 21-2 contains basic intelligence-related liaison with S3 planners ensures that the skills in which every soldier gains profi- intelligence input will present friendly staff ciency. Leaders down to squad level should sections with challenging exercise situa- train to perform the following tasks: tions. S2 personnel note intelligence strengths and weaknesses through the Collect/report information—SALUTE. duration of the exercise to evaluate both Recognize and identify friendly and personnel and standard procedures. Should threat armored vehicles. major intelligence or security problems develop, the S2 determines the underlying Visually identify threat aircraft. cause and pursues corrective action. Follow- Estimate range.

7-0 Send a radio message. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING Identify terrain features on a map. Without a realistic peacetime training Determine the grid coordinates of a program, intelligence personnel gradually point on a military map using the mili- lose their skills. In developing a training tary grid reference system. program for intelligence personnel, the S2 determines the degree of knowledge and the Determine a magnetic azimuth using a skill levels required. These are accom- compass. plished by examining the ARTEP, review- Determine direction using fielding training reports and appropriate field expedient methods. manuals, and by consulting soldier manuals. Individual skill levels can be evaluated Conduct day and night surveillance through assessment or review of— without aid of electronic devices. Daily, routine duty performances. Communications personnel must comply Performance during exercises and unit with proper COMSEC procedures. Radio training tests. communications must be limited in duration to prevent identification and location Supervisor’s periodic performance of the emitter. The C-E officer assists in ratings. integrating COMSEC training into every Results of skill qualification tests. feasible training opportunity. Reconnaissance by combat soldiers, pro- By comparing required and current per- perly trained by S2 personnel, can be a very formance and training levels, strengths and reliable intelligence source and an impor- weaknesses can be identified. Weak areas tant part of the collection effort. S2s rely require additional or refresher training. One heavily on reconnaissance patrols. Each of the best ways to maintain critical intelli- time reconnaissance patrols are used in an gence skills is to work with real world data exercise, their reports are carefully reviewed by producing intelligence documents, for accuracy and the patrols are debriefed. updating data base holdings, developing The individual soldier is trained to appre- PIR and IR for contingency operations, and ciate the importance of security. Soldiers by studying enemy organization, doctrine, are taught what is authorized and prohi- tactics, and equipment capabilities. bited regarding security rules and regula- A comprehensive unit tactical intelligence tions. They are taught the procedures for course is an excellent way to provide handling and protecting classified informa- refresher training and correct training defi- tion and materials. These training require- ciencies. Tactical intelligence blocks of ments are an integral part of the com- instruction are developed and presented at mand’s security education program. the brigade and battalion level to initially The program also includes training train or reinforce all of the components of designed to prevent SAEDA and deliberate tactical intelligence. Because this requires a security violations. Additional periodic considerable amount of time and effort, the security training is provided for personnel S2 should obtain command concurrence who routinely handle classified material. prior to developing the course of instruction. The S3 may agree to incorporate a tactical intelligence course into the command’s INTEGRATED TRAINING overall training program. Other staff sec- A useful method of conducting IEW train- tions provide input within their areas of ing is to integrate it into subjects which are expertise by identifying their standard ordinarily not considered to have IEW intelligence requirements and identifying implications. Imagination and innovation how they use intelligence. The S2 can and can create many additional opportunities should assist these staff elements in the for intelligence training for the unit as a development of intelligence requirements. whole. The following examples show how The S2 may not have to develop the entire this can be accomplished. course. The division G2 and MI battalion

7-1 (CEWI) in support of the division can pro- room. Rehearsals also provide instructors vide expertise and data which can be used with an opportunity to perfect delivery in creating or modifying a course of instruc- techniques and the use of visual aids. A tion. For example, the ASPS at division has soldier’s opinion of the S2 shop’s collective experts on the IPB process. They can assist opinions can affect the quality and quantity the S2 in creating lesson plans on battalion of support the S2 receives. and brigade IPB functions. The CM&D and the CI analysis sections of the division can Evaluation and critique are two separate provide expertise and data on their func- actions used to improve classroom training tional areas. Exportable training packages and course presentation. A course evalua- from service schools could also be used to tion can be conducted by any knowledgea- aid the S2 in unit instruction. ble individual invited to observe the reaction of the students, presentation of course Prior to implementing a course, the S2 material, use of training aids, and the com- ensures that all instructors are thoroughly prehensiveness of the instruction. The versed in their subjects. Good instructors instructor and S2 review the evaluation, always rehearse. Rehearsals provide an and take the necessary action to correct opportunity to identify problem areas and deficiencies. FM 25-3 should be consulted make corrections prior to entering the class- regarding training evaluation.

7-2 Examinations are given to all students to metric information about enemy nuclear assist in identifying weak areas in which weapon capabilities. The S4 needs to plan additional training is required. Additional routes for resupply of forward elements. The instruction is scheduled, and subsequent C-E officer needs to know enemy REC courses are designed to eliminate weak capabilities and doctrine. areas. Troop threat education is designed pri- THREAT EDUCATION marily to teach individual soldiers how to A comprehensive threat education pro- identify enemy weapons and equipment gram, developed by the S2 section, will pay and to rapidly distinguish friend from foe. large dividends in combat. A poorly trained In battle, the combat soldier may have only unit is likely to fail in the first fight. A a few seconds to make an identification. unit’s readiness for combat is made appar- Posters showing US, allied, and enemy ent by its state of training. An important equipment, posted on the walls of barracks, part of that training is a thorough knowl- in day rooms, dining facilities, and motor edge of enemy capabilities and equipment, pools are effective ways of reinforcing and how the enemy fights and thinks. classroom and field training in equipment There are distinct target audiences to which identification. a threat education program is oriented. All soldiers must know what to do with While the depth and detail vary with each captured enemy equipment and personnel. target audience, the subject matter is essen- Soldiers need to know how the enemy tially the same. fights, the extent of their training, and how The RIP published semiannually, and the they think. Our soldiers must be told, truth- Defense Intelligence Production Schedule fully, what our weaknesses are, and how (DIPS), both classified SECRET NO FOR- the enemy will attempt to exploit those EIGN DISSEMINATION, are published by weaknesses. DIA. These two documents provide the S2 EW TRAINING the means to research sources of threat education materials. These and other source The S3 has primary staff responsibility documents should be available at the ASPS, for both training and EW. The focus for division, and corps G2 section. To be placed brigade and maneuver battalion EW train- on automatic the distribution point of con- ing is defensive. That is, those actions tact for either hard copy or microfiche RIP, taken to ensure the continued effective is DIA (RTS-2C). The same office is the friendly use of electronic equipment despite point of contact for DIPS procurement. the enemy’s efforts to disrupt, degrade, DIAM 59-3 provides additional information. deceive, or destroy that use. The preceding Once document requirements are identified, is the standard definition of ECCM. FM 32- the S2 submits a statement of intelligence 30 provides the S3 and unit trainers tried interest (S11) to the G2. and proven ECCM techniques which have been developed for use with current and Intelligence personnel must understand projected equipment. all aspects of the threat. In addition to receiving threat education training, they The S3 also has primary staff responsi- are candidates to present instruction in bility for OPSEC. Training conducted in threat recognition, doctrine, and tactics. ECCM should be integrated with that portion of OPSEC which deals with the Leaders at all levels require knowledge of SIGSEC problem. ECCM and SIGSEC the threat to make sound decisions in tacti- training work together to provide an inte- cal situations. They should be the experts in grated understanding of preventive mea- enemy equipment recognition, tactics, and sures we take to assure secure and con- how the enemy thinks. Principal staff and tinued use of our tactical communication special staff officers have both generalized means. and specific threat education needs. The S2, for example, needs to know about the demo- graphy of indigenous personnel in the AO. The S3 needs specific technical and para-

7-3 APPENDIX A REQUEST AND REPORT FORMATS Standard formats are used to report intel- This appendix provides a brief descrip- ligence or information, task assets, or to tion of the most common intelligence- receive information, intelligence, and orders related formats prepared or used at the bri- or instructions. These formats can be gade and battalion level. Several of the echelon-specific, like the patrol report usu- reports within this appendix have been ally prepared at battalion level; or it may be written in the new JINTACCS format. For general in nature, like the spot report used more information refer to the JINTACCS at all echelons. Users Manual. MIJIFEEDER—Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference Feeder Purpose or Use of Message: The MIJIFEEDER is used to report MIJI incidents to the appropriate C-E officer. The example shown illustrates a representation MIJIFEEDER report.

A-O INTREP–Intelligence Report Purpose or Use of Message: The INTREP is the primary method of reporting HUMINT information. It is used for the joint exchange of information provided through tactical collection efforts. This report provides timely information regarding events that could have an immediate or significant effect on current planning and operations. It is also used to pass critical information to national level agencies.

A-1 INTSUM—Intelligence Summary Purpose or Use of Message: The INTSUM is used to provide a brief summary of information of intelligence interest covering a specific period of time. It provides a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear areas, enemy operations and capabilities, and weather and terrain characteristics.

A-2 ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT TASKING MESSAGE The electronic intelligence requirement tasking message (ERTM) is used for operational control of ELINT collection resources by operational commanders or requests for ELINT collection sources outside the commander’s control.

A-3 TACTICAL REPORT Use the tactical report (TACREP) to quickly report vital intelligence information such as fleeting target, threat or danger to friendly units, distress situation, radio DF and other EW information, newly dis- covered enemy intentions, battle damage assessment data, and combat information that cannot be exchanged with tactical data systems between tactical units. This message includes enemy activity; ship, aircraft, or ground vehicle type; related unit; location; speed and direction of movement for maritime, air, and ground enemy units with amplifying information; and E W information such as emitter frequency, bandwidth, call sign, and type of EW.

A-4 RII—Request for Intelligence Information Purpose or Use of Message: The RII is utilized to request intelligence information from other units. It is also used to request the status of an anticipated response of a previous request.

A-5 RRII—Response to Request for Intelligence Information Purpose or Use of Message: The RRII is utilized to reply to a Request for Intelligence Information. If information is contained in a previous message, the RRII should reference that message.

A-6 TACELINT–Tactical ELINT Report Purpose or Use of Message: The TACELINT is utilized to report time-critical operational ELINT and parametric information. It may be used for indications and warning, data base maintenance, order of battle, and strike planning. ELINT collectors use this message as a reporting vehicle.

A-7 ELECTRONIC WARFARE MISSION SUMMARY The electronic warfare mission summary (EWMSNSUM) is used to summarize significant EW missions and the status of offensive EW assets. It is not to be used for reporting results of ESM operations (see the following illustrations for format and example).

A-8 A-9 ELECTRONIC WARFARE REQUESTING/TASKING MESSAGE The electronic warfare requesting/tasking message (EWRTM) is for tasking units under your control to perform EW missions or to request EW support from units not under your control. This message includes descriptions of ECM and ESM targets you need support against (see the following illustrations for format and example).

A-10 A-11 ORDER MESSAGE Purpose or Use of Message: The Order Message contains the standard five- paragraph combat order. Use it to send directives and instructions to subordinate commands. Send information copies to higher and adjacent headquarters as required. The message includes the type of order; task organization; and comments about situation, mission, execution, administration, log, and command signal.

A-12 A-13 SITUATION REPORT Use the commander’s situation report (SITREP) for changes in the situation since the last report. Areas covered are current operational plans, current status, unit readiness, situations that may affect operations, operational problems recommended course of action, and items are included in other reports. This message is divided into areas of effective time period, map reference, enemy situation changes, friendly situation changes, administration and logistical situation, general comments and recommendations, and the commander’s personal evaluation of the situation.

A-14 A-15 THE INTELLIGENCE oral, detailed or summarized. However, when possible, a written estimate is ESTIMATE preferred. The intelligence estimate is a logical and The intelligence staff officer prepares the orderly examination of the intelligence fac- intelligence estimate of the enemy situation. tors affecting mission accomplishment. It An estimate is prepared at the commander’s provides the commander with a basis for direction or on the intelligence staff officer’s planning operations and for disseminating initiative. intelligence to his staff and to other headquarters. It consists of five paragraphs The intelligence estimate includes— which outline an analysis of the AO, enemy Mission. strength, and enemy capabilities that can influence the mission. Area of operations. It is generally written at division and Enemy situation. higher headquarters and briefed down to Enemy capabilities. battalion, although, in a contingency operation, it may be written at the brigade level. Conclusions. It may be presented to the commander for- An annotated example of an intelligence mally or informally and may be written or estimate format follows.

A-16 A-17 A-18 A-19 A-20 A-21 THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX The intelligence annex is a formal intelligence tasking document that may accom- The purpose of the intelligence annex is pany an operation plan or order. It should to disseminate information about forces be as brief as possible, consistent with clar- essential to the conduct of the operation. It ity. Its first paragraph gives a summary of also gives any other necessary intelligence the enemy situation necessary to under- orders or guidance for the operation in stand the plan or order, and may refer to question. In addition, the intelligence annex annotated maps, enemy situation overlays, serves as a medium for instructing subordi- or current intelligence reports. Subsequent nate commanders to acquire information paragraphs contain specific collection necessary for the conduct of the operation. requirements and instructions. SOP infor- Such information often can only be mation should not be repeated in the intel- obtained immediately before, or during, the ligence annex. An example of an intelli- operation itself. The intelligence annex is gence annex is on the following pages. not a substitute for an intelligence collection plan.

A-22 A-23 A-24 A-25 A-26 A-27 COLLECTION PLAN A collection plan helps the collection manager coordinate and integrate the effort of collection resources. It provides a visible aid for balancing collection requirements. It is a dynamic working tool that changes with requirements and resources. It is a slate where obsolete entries are easily removed and new entries easily recorded. A formal collection plan is used at the division and higher echelons. An informal collection plan may be used by the brigade S2 to help focus the development of the brigade’s R&S plan. Battalion collection operations are directed through use of the R&S plan. A collection plan is not normally developed at the battalion level due to the limited collection assets available.

A-28

APPENDIX B BRIEFING TECHNIQUES

The nature and roles of the military ser- The term “briefing” has been loosely ap- vices require communication skills that are plied to almost every form of oral communi- most exacting. Faced with the need for cation in which a military man is involved extreme accuracy, absolute thoroughness, or in which a military subject is discussed. and attention to detail on one hand, and This usage is unfortunate because it tends brevity, speed, and almost instantaneous to detract from the importance of the mil- response on the other, a highly specialized itary briefing. Consequently, the briefer and stylized type of speech has evolved. must understand precisely what is required This type of speech has been called the of him in each situation. “military briefing”. It requires specific The intelligence briefing is a specialized techniques with respect to the role of the type of speech. Its purpose is to present briefer, to the purpose it serves, and to the selected information. The briefings are nature of the required response. As with the designed to accomplish a specific purpose: intelligence estimate and the OPORD, the to impart information, to obtain a decision, military briefing is an operational tool of to exchange information, or to review the trade. important details. The objective common to every briefing is that of facilitating a rapid, Brigade and battalion S2s must com- coordinated response. municate to the commander, primarily by means of the military briefing. The military briefing is used so extensively that it has Effective briefing cannot be learned by become an accepted staff procedure tech- simply reading a book. Skill in presenting nique. The primary reasons for frequent use briefings requires knowledge of the princi- of the military briefing are to save time for ples of speech and experience gained by the senior officer; to enable him to question considerable practice. Even the most the briefer and to clarify points; and to accomplished briefer will learn something facilitate rapid, coordinated response and new and pick up pointers every time he thereby reduce reaction time. briefs. First, know your user. “Just who is being The principles and techniques of effective briefed?” What is his official position? speaking apply to the briefings just as to What are his personal likes and dislikes any other type of speech. The more concise concerning briefings? What does the user the briefing, the better. It’s usually limited expect of the briefer? to bare, unglossed facts and to the minimum amount of information needed for Each audience to be briefed is different. comprehension. Intelligence analysts and Each has its own particular needs (personal officers often will be required to brief on a likes and dislikes). You should attempt to very broad subject in a very limited time. determine these needs and, on that basis, be guided by them in constructing the briefing. The intelligence briefing usually is a “one This procedure will lead to more effective time only” presentation of unfamiliar facts, planning and a more successful with reference to enough familiar material presentation. to establish the scope and content for the listeners, but it is always tailored to the The second step in analyzing the situa- user. There are no “attention-getters.” Only tion is to determine the purpose of the brief- the essentials are delivered in an objective ing. Is it merely to present the facts, or is a manner. This is the significant difference recommendation required? The purpose of between the military briefing and everyday the briefing is extremely important. It will public speaking techniques. form the basis of the presentation.

B-0 The third step is to survey the facilities. d. Schedule rehearsals Where will the briefing be presented? What e. Arrange for final review kind of aids might be used? If it is to be held in an office, it may be impossible to use 3. CONSTRUCT THE BRIEFING equipment. If it is to be held in the field, a. Collect material there may be no electricity and no means of b. Prepare first draft preparing transparencies. Will charts or c. Revise and edit graphs be placed on chalkboards? Are they d. Plan use of visual aids available? Are draftsmen available with e. Practice material to produce the necessary aids? Is time available to prepare aids? These and (1) Rehearse countless other questions must be answered (2) Isolate key points in the survey step. When planning for, and (3) Memorize outline preparing to use, aids, prepare a detailed (4) Develop transitions presentation plan. Ensure that any assis- (5) Use of definitive words tants, if used, are familiar with what is 4. DELIVERY expected of them. Consider the physical facilities available. a. Posture The fourth step is to schedule preparation (1) Military bearing to ensure that necessary actions are (2) Eye contact accomplished. Every intelligence officer (3) Gestures and mannerisms should formulate a briefing checklist. (See sample, below.) This checklist provides an b. Voice outline of the tasks to be accomplished. Fill (1) Pitch and volume in the outline as the briefing takes shape; as (2) Rate and variety the tasks are accomplished, check off the (3) Enunciation items. Finally, make an initial estimate of the deadlines needed to accomplish each c. Attitude task. Schedule facilities for practice, and (1) Businesslike request critiques. Thorough preparation is (2) Confident essential to a successful briefing. A sample (3) Helpful of a briefing checklist is shown below. 5. FOLLOW UP a. Ensure understanding BRIEFING CHECKLIST b. Record decision c. Inform proper authorities 1. ANALYSIS OF SITUATION After analyzing the situation, the next a. Audience task is to construct the briefing. The analy- (1) Who and how many sis helps to determine which type of brief- (2) Official position ing to make. An information briefing will, (3) Knowledge of subject among other things, consist of assembling (4) Personal preferences all available information, selecting key points, deciding how best to present these b. Purpose and type key points, and deciding what visual aids c. Subject should be used. If it is to be a decision brief- d. Physical facilities ing, the problem must be stated, courses of (1) Location action isolated and analyzed, conclusions (2) Arrangements reached, recommendations made, and an (3) Visual aids understandable decision received. 2. SCHEDULE PREPARATIONS Constructing military briefings is a five- a. Complete analysis step process. b. Prepare outline First, know the subject thoroughly. c. Determine requirements Attempt to acquire as much knowledge

B-1 of the subject as time and circum- Briefings are characterized by concise- stances permit. A logical and thorough ness, objectivity, and accuracy. With cer- briefing is the result. tain exceptions, the basic rules for effective Second, isolate essential points to be speaking also apply to the delivery of a presented. Be certain to present all briefing. The success of the briefing is essential facts. Even if a fact should directly affected by the manner in which it prove detrimental to prepared conclu- is presented. A confident and relaxed, but sions, if it is a vital consideration, dis- forceful delivery, clearly enunciated and cuss it. If the users want to know more, obviously based on a full knowledge of the they will ask questions, giving you an subject, helps convince the users that the opportunity to provide additional briefing has merit. background material. Exhibit confidence, enthusiasm, and Third, arrange facts in a normal and sincerity. Maintain a relaxed but military logical order for presentation. The bearing. Use appropriate gestures, move order of arrangement will depend on about naturally, and avoid distracting the type of briefing, the subject, and mannerisms. These fundamental delivery the visual aids available. principles, common in effective speaking, apply. Fourth, select only those visual aids that will illustrate the point. Aids In a decision briefing, the presentation of should be simple, effective, and clear. all feasible courses of action, their advan- Good titles or captions help. If the aids tages and disadvantages, and a discussion consist of charts, be certain the letter- are required. Use logic to arrive at conclu- ing is large enough to read. Ensure sions and recommendations. Reveal the there are enough handouts for every- reasons for arriving at the stated conclu- one in the room and have an assistant sion as the most logical course of action. pass them out. Try to determine ahead Understand questions before attempting to of time if the users prefer to read the answer them. If you do not know the charts for themselves or have you read answer, say so and offer to provide an them. If the users read the charts, answer later. If the person being briefed allow plenty of time for reading and does not indicate otherwise, be sure to pro- comprehension. Watch the users; many vide him with an answer later. Answer commanders will signal when they are questions directly, briefly, and to the point. ready to continue. Even if the audience Answer the question and only the question, reads the charts, it may be helpful if then stop. The intelligence officer is respon- you emphasize the especially signifi- sible for presenting the material and fur- cant points. Good visual aids, well nishing the user with comprehensive handled, add to clarity; bad or poorly information. used aids are worse than none. If the aids are cumbersome or complicated, Strive for a smooth, convincing, friendly, plan to have someone assist you. and effective delivery, with a proper military bearing. A pleasant, well-modulated The fifth step is to establish key words. voice, suited to the size of the area or room Good briefers ensure that the words is a requisite. Be confident. Confidence is are understood. Use familiar terms, achieved through practice and a thorough when possible, define the unfamiliar, knowledge of the subject. and give warning when familiar words will be used in uncommon ways. Following the briefing, prepare a concise Rehearse, if possible. Adequate prac- memorandum for record (MFR). It should tice within whatever time limits there record the subject, date, time, and place of may be, will pay dividends in familiar- the briefing; as well as ranks, names, and ity with the subject, smoothness of job titles of those present. The substance of presentation, impact on the audience, the briefing may be recorded in very concise and success of the briefing. form; however, depending on local custom,

B-2 this summary may be omitted. Recommen- INTRODUCTION dations and their approval, disapproval, or approval with modification, is recorded, as Greeting. Use military courtesy, address well as any instructions or directed action the person(s) being briefed, and identify resulting from the briefing. If there is any yourself. doubt about the intent of the decision Classification. Announce the classifica- maker, a draft of the MFR should be sub- tion of your briefing. mitted to him for approval or correction Purpose. Explain the purpose and scope. before it is prepared in final form and distributed. Procedure. Explain any special proce- There are four recognizable types of intel- dures such as demonstrations, displays, or ligence briefings: information briefing, tours. decision briefing, staff briefing, and mis- BODY sion briefing. Although there are elements Arrangement. Arrange main ideas in log- common to all, each type is distinct and is discussed separately. ical sequence. Aids. Use visual aids correctly. INFORMATION BRIEFING Transitions. Plan for effective transitions. The purpose of the information briefing is to inform the listener—to keep him abreast Questions. Be prepared to answer ques- of the current situation or to supply specific tions at any time. requested information. It does not require a CLOSE decision. The desired response is comprehension. Information briefings provide— Conclusions. Give a concluding statement. High priority information that requires Questions. Ask for questions. the immediate attention of the Announcements. Announce the next commander. briefer, if any. Complex information, such as statisti- cal charts, that requires detailed DECISION BRIEFING explanation. Although the decision briefing contains Controversial information which elements of the information briefing, it is requires elaboration for thorough much broader and more comprehensive in understanding. scope, and it is presented for an entirely different purpose. The specific response to the The information briefing deals only with decision briefing is an answer to a question facts. It usually does not include conclu- or a decision to take a course of action. sions or recommendations. It should contain a brief introduction to indicate the area The first requirement in preparing for a to which the briefing is addressed and to decision briefing is to isolate and define the orient the listener. As with all briefings, problem. Never present problem-solving presentation of the facts must be orderly, situations too complex for solution by any strictly objective, honest, clear, and concise. step-by-step logical reasoning process. The You should avoid presenting redundant assumptions may be stated or not. Exam- information. Information must be tailored ples of proper assumptions might be “Ade- to the user. quate resources will be provided” or “The Mastery of the techniques of the informa- enemy will continue to defend.” Assump- tion briefing is most important. Mental dis- tions must be both reasonable and cipline is required in order to present the supported. essential facts objectively, without drawing The next step is to collect and present the conclusions. Information briefing elements facts bearing on the problem. This portion form an essential part of each of the other of the decision briefing is essentially the three types of briefing techniques. same as the information briefing, and the

B-3 same rules generally apply, with the follow- In your conclusions, list the possible ing exceptions. courses of action in order of merit. If possi- If already known facts have a direct ble, prior to the actual briefing, solicit con- bearing on the problem they should be currences and nonconcurrence from inter- repeated. Since this briefing is pre- ested staff sections. When presenting re- sented to elicit a decision, the users commendations, you should be prepared to may need to be reminded of pertinent identify nonconcurrence and state from facts directly related to the problem so whom and for what reason they were made. they can arrive at a sound decision. You must be prepared for interruptions Facts previously unknown to the users and questions at any point during the brief- should be limited to those that have a ing. When interruptions occur, questions direct bearing on the problem and that should be answered completely before pro- might influence the outcome of the ceeding. At the same time, you should not be distracted from rapidly resuming the decision to be made or the subsequent planned sequence of presentation. You must action to be taken. be able to support, by explanation, any part In presenting facts, you should strive for of the briefing. When preparing for the objectivity. All of the more pertinent posi- briefing, possible questions are anticipated tive and negative facts should be presented. and answers prepared. All the important facts must be brought out accurately and fully. Facts may be substan- A decision is the expected response of the tiated by citing single authoritative sources, decision briefing. At the outset of the brief- multiple supporting opinions or personal ing, you must announce clearly that you are experiences, or by demonstrating their rea- seeking a decision. At the conclusion, if no sonableness. You should be familiar with decision is received, ask for it. You must be the sources of your information. Wrong certain the decision given by the decision conclusions or recommendations can be maker is understood. If you are uncertain, more readily excused if they are a matter of you should ask for clarification. incorrect judgement than if they are an It is not always necessary to use the com- improper or biased presentation of the plete form of the decision briefing. For facts. The facts must have a bearing on the example, a battalion S3 might present his problem. commander with one new facet of a current Next, state the probable courses of action, problem. He might explain the new aspect and briefly point out the advantages and and its effect on current operation plans, disadvantages of each. Prior to the presen- recommend a course of action, and ask for a tation, you should analyze possible reac- decision. At other headquarters, depending tions to each of the courses of action and largely on the personality and desires of the state concisely the potential dangers commander, only portions of the briefing involved. This discussion is followed by the might be presented. However, the processes conclusions, which consist essentially of used to formulate the decision briefing succinct statements of the acceptability or remain essentially the same, regardless of undesirability of each course of action and the local peculiarities of presentation. reasons why each should be so considered. The decision briefing is designed to Both the discussion and conclusion por- obtain an answer or a decision. It is com- tions of the briefing must be logically con- parable to an oral staff study and generally structed. A logical presentation allows the follows the same sequence. commander to make correct conclusions from the facts presented. Throughout a INTRODUCTION presentation, you must be certain that conclusions flow reasonably from the facts Greeting. Use military courtesy, address presented. Each recommendation should be persons being briefed, and identify yourself. stated so that its words can be used to state Classification. Announce the classifica- the decision, whenever appropriate. tion of your briefing.

B-4 Purpose. State that the purpose of the of the situation is difficult, if not impossi- briefing is to obtain a decision. Announce ble, to achieve by any other means. There- the problem statement. fore, the staff briefing is an effective tool Procedure. Explain any special proce- employed by the commander to ensure dures such as additional briefers. unity of command. In the staff briefing, each staff represen- Coordination. Indicate what coordination tative may be called on to present informs has been accomplished. tion pertinent to his particular activity. The BODY staff briefing is usually presided over by the Assumption. Must be valid, relevant and immediate superior of the general staff or necessary. Omit if there is none. coordinating staff officers. He usually calls Facts Bearing on the Problem. Must be on staff representatives to present matters supportable, relevant, and necessary. that might pertain to, or require coordinated action by, other staff sections. Each Discussion. Analyze courses of action. headquarters usually has an established Plan for smooth transition. order of staff presentation. The staff pre- Conclusion. Degree of acceptance or the sentation might be preceded or followed by order of merit for each course of action. remarks from the chief of staff or XO and by the commander if he is in attendance. Recommendation. State actions recommended. Be specific. Do not solicit opinion. Staff briefings are the commander’s tool for developing coordinated, unified staff CLOSE action. The commander’s personality and the needs of movement will lead him to use Questions. Ask for questions. his staff as he sees fit in the exercise of Decisions. Request a decision. command. FOLLOW UP The nature of the information presented at the staff briefing varies at each level of Inform. Following the briefing, if the chief command. At lower levels, the information of staff or executive officer is not present, will pertain only to the immediate unit and the briefer must inform him or the staff its activities. At higher levels, information secretary of the commander’s decision. will be of a more general nature and will STAFF BRIEFING deal with policies instead of particular actions. In field operations, information The staff briefing is the most widely used will emphasize tactical matters and will type of military briefing. It is designed for tend to take on fewer characteristics of the the rapid oral dissemination of information information briefing and more of the deci- to a group of people and is similar to the sion briefing. information briefing. Although it is not commonly used for planning purposes or for The staff briefing is a valuable and flexi- solving problems, it bears a similarity to ble instrument available to the commander the decision briefing whenever it leads to a or chief of staff at every level of command. command decision. It is used at every mili- It is used to achieve a unified, coordinated tary echelon to keep the commander and his effort in accomplishing the mission of the staff informed of the current situation. The command. anticipated response is a coordinated or unified effort. MISSION BRIEFING In headquarters of larger units, staff The mission briefing is designed espe- briefings are normally scheduled periodically for use during combat operations. It tally. Unscheduled staff briefings are called is used to emphasize information, give spe- as the need arises. In combat, briefings are cific instructions, or instill an appreciation held as often as the situation requires. Such of the mission. The desired response is a briefings are especially valuable in opera- thorough understanding and appreciation tional conditions when a general awareness of operational conditions that will lead to

B-5 the successful execution of the mission. It is assault into Normandy on the night of 5-6 closely related to the information briefing. June 1944. Because each smaller unit and even each individual had a vital role to The intelligence portion of the mission play, mission briefings were used to inform briefing is usually conducted by the G2 or each man of his critical role in the opera- S2, depending on the nature of the mission tion. First, the men were told of the general to be performed, or the level of the head- situation and mission of the division. Then quarters involved. each individual was informed of the specific The first step in accomplishing a mis- mission of his unit and was given detailed sion—informing those involved of their instructions for accomplishing it. Using tasks—is taken by issuing oral or written photographs and terrain mock-ups, the orders. When a situation is unique or the briefers made certain that each man was mission is of a critical nature, particularly intimately familiar with his job and his as it relates to the actions of individual par- particular AO. Each man learned to recog- ticipants, the mission briefing will provide nize distinguishing landmarks, how to individuals or small units with very specific orient himself no matter how far he missed mission data. The mission briefing rein- his drop zone (DZ), where he was to go once forces previously issued orders. It also pro- on the ground, the situation he might vides a more detailed list of requirements expect to find, and how to deal with them. and particular instructions for individuals, Finally, he was told of the significance of often explaining the overall significance of his role, and how it would contribute to the their roles. This type of briefing must be successful accomplishment of the division prepared and presented with great care to mission and, even more, to the success of ensure that it neither confuses mission or the Allied invasion. objectives nor conflicts with previously The purpose of the mission briefing can issued orders. be summarized as the final review of a A good example of the use of the mission forthcoming military action that is briefing in larger operations comes from designed to ensure that those taking part World War II, prior to the invasion of Nor- are certain of their objectives and the par- mandy. The 10lst Airborne Division had ticular problems that may confront them. received its mission: Conduct an airborne

B-6 APPENDIX C THE SURVEILLANCE CARD The preprinted surveillance card is a reusable plastic device used to record temporary information about target areas for preplanning surveillance and to record data concerning targets detected during normal operations of the radar site. By using the mil scale around its outer edge and the attached pivot al range arm, you can also use the card to determine exact locations of targets quickly and accurately. The card is to a scale of 1:50,000 and can be easily fabricated at the radar section level if the preprinted card is lost or mutilated. Normally, the surveillance card is prepared by the senior operator or the team chief from information furnished by the S2, section leader, or platoon sergeant. Surveillance cards should be prepared for primary, alternate, and supplementary radar sites. They should be transferred to the new unit when you are relieved in place by another radar team. This will save them the trouble of preparing a new surveillance card for the same area. ORIENTING THE SURVEILLANCE CARD WITH A COMPASS STEP 1 Determine the 6-digit coordinate of your radar location and mark it on your map with a dot. Select a target in the center of your surveillance area and mark it on your map. With your compass, measure the azimuth to the target (860 mils magnetic).

NOTE: All azimuths used are grid azimuths. Therefore, all compass readings must be converted from magnetic to grid azimuth.

C-1 STEP 2 On your surveillance card, write 8 before the two zeros in the center at the top of the card.

STEP 3 Number the even hundred mil marks around the edge of the surveillance card. Begin, clockwise. with 9. which indicates the next hundred or 900 mils and continue. Counterclock- wise enter 7 on the first hundred mil tick mark and compute all numbers on the card.

C-2 STEP 4 Align the range arm on 860m (azimuth to the target). Since each small tick mark is 20m, the range arm should be three small tick marks past 800m.

STEP 5 Place the surveillance card over the map, aligning the hole at the base of the pivot arm over your site. Rotate the card until the range arm is aligned with the target. Be careful that the range arm stays on 860m and the hole remains over your radar position.

C-3 STEP 6 Tape the overlay to the map. Draw your reference marks on the overlays so that the overlay can be removed and reoriented. On the right and left sides of the overlay outside the surveillance area, find a north/south and east/west grid line cross. Trace over these lines to form a small cross about one-inch long and one-inch wide. At the top or bottom of the north/ south grid line write the 2-digit number of that grid line. At the left or right of the east/west line write the 2-digit number-of that grid line.

STEP 7 Check the orientation of the overlay by shooting two or three more azimuths to objects that are shown on the map. Convert them to grid azimuths. Move the range arm until it is over the object on the map and read the azimuth that you shoot for each object. This reading should be within 10 mils of the azimuth that you shoot for each object. If not, do the orientation procedures again and recheck. ORIENTING THE SURVEILLANCE CARD WITHOUT A COMPASS In most instances the general site and sector to be covered will be designated by the supported unit. In all cases, the LEFT and RIGHT limits of your sector must be determined prior to mounting the surveillance card on your map. MOUNTING THE SCAP The following steps will allow you to mount your surveillance card and plotter (SCAP) quickly and accurately.

C-4 Step 1 Perform a resection and plot this location on your map.

Step 2 Plot the LEFT and RIGHT limits of your sector on your map.

C-5 Step 3 Place your SCAP on the map. a. Locate the SCAP pivot point directly over the radar location. Rotate the SCAP until your surveillance area is centered in the SCAP target area.

b. Now rotate the SCAP, lining the BASE LINE up parallel with either a NORTH-SOUTH or an EAST-WEST grid line.

C-6 The surveillance area MUST remain inside the SCAP target area, though it does NOT have to be centered. Step 4 Tape the SCAP to the map. While doing this, ensure the pivot point remains over the radar location AND the base line remains parallel to the grid line you used to orient the SCAP. Draw reference marks on the S-CA-P-SO it can be removed and remounted. On the left and right sides of the plotter outside the surveillance area, locate a grid line intersection. Trace over this grid line to form a cross about one inch long and one inch wide. At the bottom of the north-south grid line you have drawn, write the 2-digit number of the ‘grid line.

Step 5 Check the orientation of the plotter bv shooting two or three azimuths to objects shown on the map. Convert these azimuths to grid azimuths. Swing the range arm to a position over the object on the map, and read the azimuth. This azimuth reading should be within 10 mils of your compass reading. If not, do the orientation procedures again and recheck. Step 6 Complete your SCAP by filling in the dead spaces, writing in the correct numbers in the azimuth ring, and completing the preparation data. Mark the predetermined point, area, and sector targets in the surveillance area and enter the appropriate information in the legend. If the supported unit has given you specific targets, plot and number these targets on the SCAP. The symbols below will be used to indicate the type of target:

C-7 POINT TARGETS—A point-type target is recorded by making a dot at the point of interest and numbering this line. Indicate this target in the legend using the same number. EXAMPLE: AREA TARGETS—An area-type target is recorded by drawing a line over the area and numbering this line. Indicate this target in the legend using the same number. EXAMPLE: AREA TARGETS REQUIRING A CHANGE IN RANGE—Some area targets require a change in range or a change in azimuth. The area target symbol used above remains the same. EXAMPLE: RECORDING INFORMATION Target numbers. Target numbers should coincide with the number assigned to the target by the S2. Azimuths. Enter the azimuth or azimuths required to orient the radar toward the target or area. If it is a point-type target, one azimuth will be required. Area-type targets, such as a stretch of road, will require both the right and left azimuth covering the area. The single azimuth of a point target is determined by aligning the range arm over the target and reading the azimuth at the top of the surveillance card. This azimuth is then recorded in the legend. The area-type target, which requires two azimuths, is determined by using the range arm to the right and left limits of the area. These azimuths are then recorded in the legend. REMEMBER: The long marks represent 100 mils and each short mark represents 20 mils. A high degree of accuracy (to within 10 mils) can be determined. Ranges. Next, enter the range or ranges required to survey the point or area. The range is obtained by aligning the range arm over the target area and reading the distance marked on the range arm. The arm is numbered from 1 to 10; each number represents 1,000 meters and each tick mark represents 100 meters. In some instances, while monitoring a point, you may have to make range changes. This is determined by measuring the minimum and maximum ranges which can be adequately covered in the area. Elevation Settings. The elevation setting is determined by aligning the telescope of the radar on the target or area and reading the elevation. In hilly terrain, you may require more than one elevation setting for each target or area. When these readings are determined, enter the minimum and maximum elevation in the legend.

C-8 Description. Enter the type and frequency of surveillance for the point or area or any other information that is required. Other uses. The surveillance card overlay can also be used to record dead space that cannot be covered by your radar. If there is a hill that blocks your LOS, record this on your overlay.

Coordinates. With the surveillance card, you can determine the 6-digit coordinate of a target in about 20 seconds. Take the target azimuth and range from the radar. Set the range arm on the correct azimuth and go out the arm to the proper range. Mark the target’s position on the overlay and, using a coordinate scale, read the 6-digit coordinates from the map. Surveillance area. Use a compass or map to determine the right and left limits of your surveillance area. Once you have determined the grid azimuths of the left and right limits, align the range arm on those azimuths and draw a line from your radar position to the azimuth marks. Targets data log. The data log is used to record information about targets or areas of interest not listed in the legend. It is also used as a record of targets detected and reported.

C-9 POINTS TO REMEMBER Each small tick mark represents 20 mils. Each large tick mark represents 100 mils. Be sure to recheck your orientation by shooting two or three more azimuths to objects shown on your map. All magnetic azimuths must be converted to grid azimuths. Be careful that the pivot point hole and range arm do not move when working with orientation. Be simple, accurate, and fast.

C-l0 APPENDIX D ARMY OF EXCELLENCE

Army of Excellence organizations were For example, while redundant and often developed as a direct result of the Army’s dated acquisition systems have been AOE study in 1983. The study recognized reduced or eliminated, new collection capa- the necessity of implementing the revolu- bilities have been incorporated into organi- tionary air-land battle doctrine but with zations within the division in response to organizations that could be manned and intelligence, EW missions, and responsibili- equipped at design authorized levels, parties mandated by the proper execution of ticularly authorized level of organization 1. air-land battle doctrine. AOE design addressed the Army leadership’s studied conclusion that the division was too large and cumbersome to effectively BATTALION IEW RESOURCES move about the battlefield. It was concluded AOE force design changes impose no that most of the corps was dedicated to changes to those IEW capabilities described supporting the division, and that divisions earlier. However, capabilities supporting possessed combat support assets equal to or IEW resources provided by combat and in excess of those at the corps. Under the combat support organizations such as the Army’s emerging air-land battle doctrine, DIVARTY, air defense artillery battalion, the doctrinal requirements existed for the and MI battalion have, in select cases, been corps commander to orchestrate the battle changed by the number and types of sen- through a corps operational plan. The op- sors or acquisition capabilities provided in erational level of war specifically addresses what may be regarded as the nominal “bri- the desired plans and operations required to gade slice.” confront and defeat potential adversaries organized and deployed at a level commensurate with the US corps. AOE organiza- BRIGADE IEW RESOURCES tions represent the culmination of an effort IEW systems and resources available to of force design and force restructuring to support the brigade and subordinate facilitate the force modernization process, maneuver battalions and task forces have while reducing or eliminating the Army’s been changed in some instances with the “hollowness,” and improving the corps emergence of AOE organizations. Described commander’s ability to execute air-land bat- below are the specific changes resulting tle doctrine. from AOE. AOE IMPACT ON FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION/BRIGADE IEW OPERATIONS Field artillery cannon support to the brigade remains unchanged. However, AOE The impact of AOE on IEW operations at changes the organization of target acquisi- battalion and brigade levels is considered to tion assets available within the division be a positive one. At the battalion and bri- artillery’s TAB. The TAB retains the coun- gade levels, no significant changes have termortar, counterbattery capabilities pro- occurred in the AOE-designed combat orga- vided by the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 nizations that would significantly change (FIREFINDER) systems and the moving- IEW operations previously described within target-locating radar surveillance capa- this manual. AOE changes in supporting bility provided by the AN/TPS-25A or combat organizations such as DIVARTY, AN/TPS-58B systems. Eliminated from the the combat aviation brigade and air defense TAB under AOE are the four AN/TNS-10 battalion, as well as combat support and sound-ranging sets which provide part of CSS organizations, have been offsetting. the passive countermortar, counterbattery

D-1 detection capability of the TAB. With the AOE represents a change in HUMINT development and fielding of the PADS and collection capabilities with the addition of a the resulting reconfiguration of survey ele- long-range surveillance capability at the ments with DIVARTY, flash ranging teams corps and division levels. Long-range sur- organized around these survey party mem- veillance operations are conducted in bers and associated with field artillery bat- response to operational tasking from the talion observation posts have been simi- ACofS, G2 at each respective echelon, and larly reduced. The net result of reductions operations are targeted in areas across the within the sound and flash ranging sec- FLOT in response to deep targeting and tions has been the total elimination of the intelligence requirements. Interdiction of DIVARTY sound and flash platoon. Reduc- enemy forces is not an LRSU function. tions in the number of air observers, from While this HUMINT capability is added, CI ten to six; and lasing teams, from three to interrogation capabilities within the heavy one per DS artillery battalion, have also division have been reduced due to force reduced the division’s (as well as brigade’s) level constraints. Within the heavy corps, observation capability by reducing the CI and interrogation teams operating number of eyes observing the battlefield. within the division AO will require augmentation from the corps MI brigade if normal DS (to brigade) and GS capabilities MILITARY INTELLIGENCE are to be provided. When such augmenta- MI resources dedicated to the IEW mis- tion is not available, specific plans will be sion have been selectively altered in required within the corps detailing IPW and numbers and types based on AOE redesign CI support procedures to be followed at criteria. Of significant impact is the knowl- reduced support levels. Concepts commonly edge that, while AOE has led to the forma- associated with light division operations, tion of the new infantry division (light), it is such as the area support concept, may also responsible for the creation of a specif- apply to such operations as mobile CI team ically tailored MI battalion (CEWI) to sup- operations in forward brigade AOs. While port this type division. MI resources remain these teams would be deployed as GS assets organized with multidisciplined capabilities of the division, their operations under area found within the MI battalion structure of support concepts should preclude inter- each type division. While variations are rupted CI support to forward deployed observed in the density of HUMINT vs. forces. IPW assets assigned to the MI bat- technical collection systems provided in the talion, heavy division, are found at mini- MI battalion structure for each type divi- mum essential levels. The ACofS, G2, in sion, these variants have been specifically coordination with the G3 and MI battalion designed in concert with the scope of mis- commander and S3 will determine the sions the IEW system is expected to sup- desired command relationship under which port, the levels of conflict for which each these limited assets will be deployed. As type division is reorganized, force con- IPW personnel within the heavy division straints, and the acknowledgement of are organized as an interrogation team with acceptable risk to IEW mission performance limited communications and mobility, they prompted by constrained manpower ceil- will normally be deployed in GS of the divi- ings. IEW resources organic or OPCON to sion as the nucleus of the division EPW col- the MI brigade and MI battalion continue lecting point in the division’s rear area. to include IPW, CI, aerial surveillance and IPW teams provided by the corps MI bri- aerial EW assets, ground-based EW assets, gade will, when allocated, normally be GSR and, in the airborne, air assault, and deployed in DS of forward-deployed bri- light divisions, the REMBASS. The distri- gades within the division. CI or IPW bution of these IEW resources and their resources allocated to the airborne and air normal allocation of support to the division assault divisions will normally be and its subordinate maneuver brigades and deployed in DS of brigades and GS of the battalions are shown on the following page. division based on the type operations.

D-2 D-3 Within the newly created light division, GSR teams assigned to these divisions and, the HUMINT capabilities provided by with the exception of the heavy division, organic CI and IPW teams are significantly greater reliance upon the lightweight, expanded when compared with similar dis- mobile AN/PPS-15 radar system. GSR allo- ciplines within the heavy division. This cations for each division under AOE are as results from the recognized need for an shown in the following illustration. expanded HUMINT operational capability in support of light division operations in GSR teams will continue to be provided lower levels of conflict for which the divi- DS or attached, less radar maintenance, to sion is optimized. Ground-based EW assets maneuver brigades and battalions or task formerly found within the TEB of the corps’ forces based on reconnaissance and surveil- MI brigade have been reduced to minimum lance planning conducted by the ACofS, essential levels. The reserve component G2. (RC) TEB is organized to increase the corps’ Enemy Prisoner of War Interrogators total IEW capability in war when the full corps complement of divisions are deployed, Interrogators have been assigned to EPW that is, active and reserve divisions. Pro- sections in varying numbers by type divi- vided by the RC, TEB are ground-based HF sion in anticipation of the expected need for collection, HF/VHF jamming, and ground- this HUMINT capability. Manpower force based ELINT capabilities. While pre-AOE ceilings have had impact on the total TOES for MI organizations included provi- number of interrogators which could be sions for remote sensor teams augmenting placed in certain organizations, the heavy the MI structure, the living TOE process division, for example, where a conscious does not. Remote sensors monitoring teams decision was made in decreasing HUMINT

are currently documented in the TOE of the spaces in favor of the return and inclusion MI battalion (CEWI) of the airborne divi- of technical collection assets. The reverse is sion only. REMBASS and remote sensor also true. In the light division, where monitoring teams will be added to other ground based ECM systems are not incor- type division MI battalion TOES based on porated into the MI battalion TOE, due to the basis of issue plan for the REMBASS, their low intensity conflict (LIC) orienta- when fielded. tion, space savings were used to increase the strength of the CI and interrogation Ground Surveillance Radars sections where this added HUMINT man- GSRs remain in the MI battalion struc- power was deemed most appropriate. The tures of all type divisions. AOE design of number of interrogators authorized within GSR sections in each type division has the MI battalions for all types of divisions resulted in a reduction in total numbers of under AOE are as follows.

D-4 Additional interrogators required for sus- EAC. Additionally, manpower limitations tained EPW operations in the heavy, air within the division base structure have assault, and airborne divisions will be caused a reduction in the number of CI obtained from interrogation assets availa- authorizations within each type division, ble within the CI interrogation company, with the notable exception of the infantry TEB of the MI brigade at corps. division (light), where HUMINT resources have been given priority over technical collection systems and resources. While COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SIGSEC authorizations have been placed CI resources within each type division within the MI brigade at EAC, their have undergone important changes in mis- employment in support of ECB remains sions and resourcing with the emergence of integral to operating security doctrine. AOE. SIGSEC assets have been removed CI resource authorizations for each type from the division and corps and placed at division are as follows.

D-5 As with interrogators, the sustainment of QUICKFIX flight platoon, constitutes the CI operations at ECB requires the augmen- only ECM capability organic to the light tation of CI personnel from the CI interro- division. The corps’ TEB is organized with gation company of the TEB, MI brigade at ground-based ECM and ELINT systems in- corps. This is particularly true for CI opera- tended to roundout EW capabilities within tions within the heavy division. CI team the corps’ sector by providing additional deployment using area support concepts ECM and ELINT collection teams where rather than DS is expected to be prevalent most needed. Based on the retention of when CI augmentation from corps is these few EW resources in the corps TEB, unavailable. and in response to the impact of force level ceilings within the corps base structure as a ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT whole, additional EW resources formerly found within the active component TEB of EW support in each type division has the corps’ MI brigade have been removed. remained largely unchanged when com- The EW capabilities provided by the reserve pared to pre-AOE levels. Exceptions, how- component TEB are designed to bring the ever, are found in the allocation of EW sys- corps EW arsenal up to full operating tems within the MI battalion of the infantry strength. With respect to maneuver battal- division (light), and the corps MI brigade’s ion and brigade operations, the impact of TEB. Additionally, the QUICKFIX flight these changes within the corps MI brigade’s platoon has been placed within the combat active component TEB are considered of division brigade structure based on its dem- less import than would have been the case onstrated performance in the airborne divi- if ground-based EW resources had been sion under this organizational design in the assigned to the corps MI brigade, rather past. In the infantry division light, the need than the division’s MI battalion, and for expanded HUMINT resources and con- deployed forward to the FLOT or FEBA as straints on the number of vehicles due to augmentation resources to the division. strategic mobility requirements has taken precedence over the allocation of ground- EW collection and jamming resources for based ECM assets in the MI battalion the AOE divisions are summarized in the structure. Airborne ECM, provide by the following illustrations.

D-6 D-7 AOE restructuring has permitted the teams will normally be deployed in a bri- refinement of organizational and other con- gade sector when sufficient MI battalion cepts key to describing how EW resources resources are deployed forward to warrant are employed. By example, noncommunica- the formation of the company team and the tions intercept teams of the heavy division need for a single MI commander represent- were formerly placed singularly within the ing all IEW elements in the sector is deemed organization of the EW platoons with little appropriate for the successful execution of noncommunications analysis or ELINT DF IEW missions. anticipated. While the product-improved TEAMPACK system will be netted electronically by a data link in a manner similar to OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT TRAILBLAZER, the AOE MI battalion structure for the heavy division places the UNITS noncommunications intercept teams within AOE redesign of other divisional organi- the SIGINT processing platoon. COMINT zations has also produced changes within analysts and noncommunications intercept the overall area of IEW support provided operators or analysts, MOS 98J, assigned to commanders. The reduction in the number the analysis section of the SIGINT process- of FAARs from eight to six systems in the ing platoon conduct initial correlation of heavy division has reduced the overall air COMINT/ELINT DF reporting and provide threat warning capability within the divi- for the enhanced C² of these critical re- sion, though for intelligence purposes, this sources. Similarly, team restructuring under reduction will be more than compensated AOE and modern equipment has permitted for in the foreseeable future with innovative the replacement of generator mechanics changes being evaluated in the integration (MOS 52D) at each of the three RSSs within and exchange of air threat warning infor- the SIGINT processing platoon with EW/ mation between corps and division air SIGINT voice intercept operators (98G) defense organizations. The loss of engineer enhancing their independent voice collec- battalion reconnaissance teams for terrain tion and gisting or reporting capabilities reconnaissance, brigade classification, and when automatic DF operations are not in damage assessment or weather effects effect. assessments necessitates greater reliance, AOE has not changed other key doctrinal as in the past, on similar assessment being concepts stated in FM 34-1, or in previous provided by cavalry reconnaissance ele- chapters within this manual. IEW company ments, scouts, air observers, and other units

D-8 throughout the division. While the loss of Obtains information on possible drop engineer reconnaissance teams can have an and landing zones for airborne and impact on intelligence support provided to airmobile or air assault operations. commanders, training of other elements to accomplish these tasks, and concise state- Provides information on terrain and ments of intelligence requirements related weather conditions. to the terrain intelligence function remedy Provides an assessment of indigenous their loss. IEW support provided by other communications facilities for possible combat support organizations described future allied use. earlier in this manual remain unaffected by The LRSU (heavy division) is organized AOE design. as shown in the following chart.

The C² element includes the detachment headquarters and a subelement for com- LONG-RANGE munications support. It directs the func- SURVEILLANCE tions and activities of all elements of the LRSD. The base station section operates OPERATIONS base communications stations to maintain communications with deployed reconnais- The formation of long range surveillance sance teams and forwards combat informa- organizations within the division and corps tion by secure communications and mes- MI organization under AOE represents the senger immediately to the CM&D section most significant change in IEW support to within the G2. The reconnaissance teams forward maneuver forces. The primary mis- obtain and report information about enemy sion of the long-range surveillance detach- forces, activities, terrain, and weather ment (LRSD), division, is to provide collec- within their assigned areas of surveillance tion by HUMINT means within the and are capable of operating independently. division’s areas of operations and interest; The LRSD may be augmented by an addi- and to observe and report enemy disposi- tional base station from the corps long- tions, facilities, and activities, as well as range surveillance company for timely terrain and weather conditions. Speci- receipt of combat information from corps fically, the LRSU– long-range surveillance teams deployed beyond the range of surveillance provided Conducts long-range information col- by LRSD teams. Long-range surveillance lection through surveillance and plans of the divisions and corps are coordi- reconnaissance. nated to ensure complementary surveillance Determines and reports the location, coverage. strength, equipment, disposition, The LRSD is organic to the MI battalion organization, and movement of enemy of the division. The LRSD provides the divi- forces and determines the location of sion with the capability to conduct long- high-value targets, to include NBC range surveillance missions to supplement weapon delivery systems; nuclear intelligence collection and surveillance pro- weapon storage sites; reserves; C2 ele- vided by other IEW sources. The results of ments; and key installations, including these long-range surveillance operations both fixed and mobile facilities. will significantly enhance the IEW system in providing current intelligence to tactical Conducts damage assessment and commanders as to threat formations within NBC monitoring. their respective areas of operations and Emplaces and employs unattended interest. sensors and electronic intelligence, target acquisition, and designation equipment. Employs photographic and night image enhancement devices.

D-9 D-10 APPENDIX E RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLANNING

The S2 is responsible for planning R&S BTFs’ R&S overlays by the brigade S2 to operations within the BTF or brigade. reveal possible gaps in the brigade’s total Based upon his detailed knowledge of the R&S coverage. Similarly, all brigade R&S enemy, weather, and terrain through IPB, overlays are consolidated by the division his goal is to ensure the full surveillance TSO, who identifies gaps in the division’s coverage of the BTF/brigade battlefield coverage. area to the extent that resources will allow. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Overlay Special attention will be directed to the systematic surveillance of NAI and TAI The R&S overlay is constructed with R&S developed through IPB to confirm or deny assets graphically oriented to satisfy the the enemy situation as analyzed from prior commander’s PIR. As a minimum, the R&S intelligence on hand. In R&S planning, the overlay will include three sections— S2 must consider and include the capabili- A graphic display of deployed R&S ties of all reconnaissance, surveillance, and assets. target acquisition means under his direct control, as well as those which may support A planned R&S deployment. this effort, in providing timely intelligence Distribution and targeting information to his commander. These means normally include GSR, The R&S graphic display should depict— REMS, subordinate company LP or OP, Number, location, and parent unit of scouts and patrols, as well as supporting LP or OP. systems within the brigade and division Patrol routes, SP, RP, and checkpoints. such as target acquisition radars and SIGINT/EW systems. Scout screen line or locations. GSR primary, alternate, and subse- Once the S2 has developed the unit R&S quent locations, left and right scan plan, subordinate units are tasked through limits, GSR mission, and target area the BTF S3 for the execution of missions, (monitor or general search). such as planning LPs or OPs and deploying patrols and scout sections into specific REMS locations (strings or fields). target areas, as outlined in the unit R&S The R&S overlay’s legend will include plan and other intelligence portions of the administrative information (map informa- BTF or brigade OPORD. Requirements tion, title, and preparer) and instructions to beyond the BTF’s or brigade’s R&S capabil- each R&S asset. The instructions include— ities must be satisfied by requests for information to the brigade S2 or division Required operational times. G2, who have access to collection assets at Coordination instructions (passage these echelons. To assist the S2 in planning points through units). for R&S, there are tools including overlays, Enemy activities likely to be detected. scout patrols and GSR or REMS plans, and patrol orders and reports. Reporting requirements. The BTF R&S overlay on the following Finally, a distribution listing will be pro- page is prepared to integrate company team vided. R&S overlays should be coordinated security or counterreconnaissance plans with and provided to— (LP or OP, local security patrols) with BTF Company teams. assets, and those assets provided by the brigade, to eliminate gaps in coverage. The Scout platoon leader. BTF R&S overlay is consolidated with other GSR or REMS team leaders.

E-1 S3. the S2 in specifying mission, control mea- FSO. sures, reporting instructions, time requirements, and coordination measures. These Engineer platoon leader\LNO. plans may be written or oral, but offer the Brigade S2. S2 a means of ensuring that ‘all information required by the R&S asset is provided. Scout, patrol order, and GSR or REMS plans (see illustrations which follow) assist

E-2 SCOUT PLAN FORMAT b. Subunit Tasks c. Coordinating Instructions 1. Mission (PIR or IR included): 2. Start time: (1) Actions at the objective 3. Completion time: 4. Actions upon enemy contact: (2) Time of departure and return 5. Actions at obstacles: (3) Movement technique and order of 6. Location of friendly minefield and movement barriers: (4) Route(s) 7. Routes: (5) Departure and reentry of friendly 8. Boundaries: lines 9. Phase Lines: (6) Rally points and actions at rally 10. SP, LD, RP, PP, and checkpoints: points 11. Fire support planning: (7) Actions on enemy contact 12. Organization and communications fre- (8) Actions at danger areas quency for reporting: (9) Actions at halts 13. Platoon actions upon completion of the (10) Locations of friendly minefield mission: and other obstacles 14. Special instructions: (11) Rehearsals PATROL ORDER (12) Inspections 1. Situation (13) Debriefings a. Enemy Forces (14) PIR or IR (1) Identification (15) Annexes (2) Location 4. Service and Support (3) Activity a. Rations and Water (4) Strength b. Arms and Ammunition (5) Capabilities c. Uniform and equipment each patrol (6) Probable Course of Action member will carry d. Methods of handling wounded, dead, b. Friendly Forces and EPW and their equipment (1) Mission of next higher unit 5. Command and Signal (2) Location and actions of adjacent units a. Signal (3) Mission and routes of adjacent (1) Frequencies and call signs patrols (2) Pyrotechnics (4) Unit providing fire support (3) Hand and arm signals c. Weather (4) Challenge and password d. Terrain 2. Mission (5) Codewords and reports 3. Execution b. Command a. Concept of Operation (1) Chain of command (1) Maneuver (2) Location of patrol leader during (2) Fire Support movement and at the objective

E-3 ANNEXES 4. Location of primary or alternate and sub- A-Patrol Base sequent GSR sites and REMS strings and B-Link-up fields. C-Intelligence 5. Left and right scan limits in mils of GSRs D-Overlay (search missions); point target location E-Air Movement (monitor mission): PATROL PLAN FORMAT 6. Withdrawal routes to subsequent GSR 1. Patrol Number: sites: 2. Unit assigned and size of patrol: 7. Location of friendly minefield and barriers: 3. Mission (PIR or IR included): 8. Actions upon enemy contact: 4. Start time: 9. PP and checkpoints: 5. Completion time: 10. Fire support planning: 6. Actions upon enemy contract: 11. Organization and communications fre- 7. Actions at obstacles: quency for reporting: 8. Locations of friendly minefield and 12. Special instructions. barriers: 9. Route: Patrol reports are prepared in detail, based upon the S2’s debriefing of the patrol 10. SP, RP, PP, and checkpoints: leader and other key members of the patrol. 11. Fire support planning: Results are relayed to potential users as combat information and are included in the 12. Organization and communications fre- S2’s intelligence data base for later use. quency for reporting: Results of patrols are normally transmitted 13. Actions upon completion of the mission: to the brigade S2 when obtained. Patrols will also report information of immediate 14. Special instructions: use via radio to the S2, based on reporting instructions stated in the patrol plan. Other GSR OR REMS PLAN FORMAT R&S assets report combat information 1. Mission: using SOP reporting formats or the SALUTE format. R&S assets may report on 2. Time GSR or REMS required to be the battalion command net, the operations operational: net, or the intelligence net, or some combi- 3. Routes to GSR site or REMS emplace- nation of the three. Reporting is detailed in ment areas: the instructions found on the R&S plan and will be normally based on the unit SOP at the BTF level. An example of a patrol report format is found on the following page.

E-4 E-5 GLOSSARY

AA ...... antiaircraft ALA ...... antiaircraft artillery BAGS ...... Army air-ground system ALMA ...... antiaircraft and missile artillery ACofS ...... Assistant Chief of Staff ACE ...... armored cavalry regiment ACSI ...... Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence actv ...... activity AD...... air defense ADA...... air defense artillery ad ...... adjustment AD ...... atomic demolition munitions ad ...... advance ANEW ...... asset evaluation Worksheet A ...... adjutant general ADOS ...... air-ground operations system air recce ...... air reconnaissance ALA ...... administrative and logistics center ALO ...... Air Force liaison officer alto ...... alternate AM ...... amplitude modulation AM ...... Army Materiel Command ammo ...... ammunition A ...... area of operations ACE ...... Army of Excellence arid ...... armored armd/mech ...... armored and.mechanized ARTEP ...... Army Training and Evaluation Program arty ...... artillery ASOC ...... air support operations center ASP ...... ammunition supply point ASPS ...... all-source production section at ...... antitank ark ...... attack attn ...... attention BUS ...... battery computer system bd e ...... brigade BE ...... basic encyclopedia BICC ...... battlefield information control center bn ...... battalion BOMREP ...... bombing report BOA ...... battalion observation post BAA ...... brigade support area BTF ...... battalion task force BOX ...... ballistic weather

Glossary-0 C²...... command and control C²D...... command and control disruption C³...... command, control, and communications C³CM: ...... command, control, and communications countermeasures C³I ...... command, control, communications, and intelligence CAB ...... combat aviation brigade C&J ...... collection and jamming CAS ...... close air support cav ...... cavalry CB ...... chemical biological C-E ...... Communications-Electronics CAD ...... captured enemy document CEOI ...... Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions CEP ...... circular error probable CEWI ...... combat electronic warfare and intelligence CF...... counterfire CFA...... coveringforcearea C G ...... commanding general CI...... counterintelligence CIA...... Central Intelligence Agency CLSU ...... COMSEC logistic support unit CM ...... countermeasures CM&D ...... collection management and dissemination cmm ...... comma CMTA ...... commander of missile troops and artillery co ...... company coll ...... collection cmd ...... command COMINT ...... communications intelligence COMJAM ...... communications jamming comm ...... communications COMSEC ...... communications security con ...... control CONUS ...... continental United States COP ...... command observation post COSCOM ...... corps support command CP ...... command post CRTA ...... Chief Rocket Troop Artillery CSS ...... combat service support CTL ...... critical task list CUCV ...... commercial utility cargo vehicle C W ...... continuous wave DA ...... Department of the Army DCSOPs ...... Deputy Chief of Stafff or Operations and Plans def ...... defense DF ...... direction finding DIA ...... Defense Intelligence Agency DIPS ...... defense intelligence production schedule DISCOM ...... division support command div ...... division

Glossary-1 DIVARTY ...... division artillery DLIC ...... detachment to be left in contact DMD ...... digital message device DMZ ...... demilitarized zone doc ...... document DOD ...... Department of Defense DP ...... decision point DPC ...... decision point cluster DS ...... direct support DSA ...... division support area DST ...... decision support template DTOC ...... division tactical operations center DX ...... direct exchange DZ ...... drop zone EAC ...... echelons above corps EAD ...... echelons above division EAM ...... event analysis matrix EC ...... electronic combat ECB ...... echelons corps and below ECCM ...... electronic counter-countermeasures ECM ...... electronic countermeasures ECMMEER ...... electronic countermeasures mission effectiveness evaluation report EEFI ...... essential elements of friendly information EEOB ...... enemy electronic order of battle ELINT ...... electronic intelligence elm ...... element ELSEC ...... electronic security EMCON ...... emission control EMP ...... electromagnetic pulse engr ...... engineer EOB ...... electronic order of battle EPW ...... enemy prisoner of war ERP ...... effective radiating power ESM ...... electronic warfare support measures est ...... estimate EW ...... electronic warfare EWO ...... electronic warfare officer EWS ...... electronic warfare section EWTL/JS ...... electronic warfare target lists and jamming schedules FA ...... field artillery FAAO ...... field artillery air observer FAAR ...... forward area alerting radar FALOP ...... forward area limited observation plan (“belt weather kit”) FARP ...... forward arming and refueling point FASC ...... forward area signal center FAST ...... forward area support team FBI ...... Federal Bureau of Investigation FC ...... field circular FDC ...... fire direction control/fire direction center FEBA ...... forward edge of the battle area FIST ...... fire support team FISTV ...... fire support team vehicle FLOT ...... forward line of own troops FM ...... field manual/frequency modulation

Glossary-2 FO ...... forward observer FOMCAT ...... foreign materiel catalog FRAGO ...... fragmentary order FREETEXT ...... free text message FS ...... fire support FSCOORD ...... fire support coordinator FSB ...... forward support battalion FSE ...... fire support element FSO ...... fire support officer FSS ...... fire support section FTX ...... field training exercise fwd ...... forward G l ...... Assistant Chief of Staff, Gl, Personnel G2 ...... Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence G3 ...... Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations G4 ...... Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics G5 ...... Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil Affairs GDP ...... general deployment plan GFC ...... green flare cluster GMT ...... Greenwich Mean Time GS ...... general support GSR ...... ground surveillance radar HB ...... high burst HF ...... high frequency HHC ...... headquarters and headquarters company HMMWV ...... highly mobile and multiwheeled vehicle HNS ...... host-nation support HPT ...... high-payoff target HQ ...... headquarters HQDA ...... Headquarters, Department of the Army HUMINT ...... human intelligence HVT ...... high-value target IDP ...... initial delay position IEW ...... intelligence and electronic warfare IEWSE ...... intelligence and electronic warfare support element IFF ...... identification, friend, or foe (radar) IIR ...... imagery interpretation report IMINT ...... imagery intelligence inf ...... infantry INSCOM ...... Intelligence and Security Command, USA intel ...... intelligence intel net ...... intelligence network intg ...... interrogation INTREP ...... intelligence report INTSUM ...... intelligence summary IPB ...... intelligence preparation of the battlefield IR ...... information requirement JAAT ...... joint air attack team JCS ...... Joint Chiefs of Staff JINTACCS ...... Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems JS ...... jamming schedule JTF ...... joint task force

Glossary-3 KIA ...... killed in action km ...... kilometer(s) KW ...... kilowatt(s) L D...... light discipline LIC ...... low-intensity conflict LLVI ...... low-level voice intercept LNO ...... liaison officer LOB ...... line of bearing LOC ...... line of communication LOS ...... line of sight L P ...... listening post LPA ...... log periodic antenna LRRP ...... long-range reconnaissance patrols LRSD ...... long-range surveillance detachment LRSU ...... long-range surveillance unit LZ ...... landing zone MAE R ...... multiple assets effectiveness report maint ...... maintenance MASTR ...... multiple assets status report MATM ...... multiple assets tasking message MBA ...... main battle area MC ...... mobility corridor/multichannel MCP ...... maintenance collection point MCS ...... master control station mech ...... mechanized/mechanical METT-T ...... mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available MFR ...... memorandum for record MG ...... major general MI ...... military intelligence MIJI ...... meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference MIJIFEEDER ...... beaconing, instrusion, jamming, and interference feeder min ...... minute mm...... millimeter MOPP...... mission oriented protective posture MORTREP ...... mortaring report MOUT ...... military operations on urbanized terrain MP ...... military police MPI ...... mean point of impact MRB ...... motorized rifle battalion MRD ...... motorized rifle division MRDFS ...... man-transportable radio direction-finding system MRR ...... motorized rifle regiment MSC ...... major subordinate command MSR ...... main supply route MST ...... maintenance support team MTLR ...... moving target-locating radar MTM ...... mission tasking message NAI ...... named area of interest NBC ...... nuclear, biological, and chemical NBC-l ...... nuclear, biological, and chemical-1 report NBC-6 ...... nuclear, biological, and cheimical-6 report NCO ...... noncommissioned officer NCS ...... net control station neg ...... negative

Glossary-4 net ...... network NET ...... not earlier than NLT ...... not later than NOD ...... night observation device NRI ...... net radio interface OB ...... order of battle OCOKA ...... observation and fields of fire concealment and cover obstacles key terrain avenues of approach and mobility corridors O/I ...... operations/intelligence OIC ...... officer in charge OMG ...... operational maneuver group op...... operations OP...... observation post OPCON ...... operational control OPFOR ...... opposing forces OPLAN ...... operation plan OPORD ...... operation order OPSEC ...... operations security O\ O ...... on/off ORF ...... operational readiness float org ...... organization P ...... positive PADS ...... position and azimuth determination system para ...... paragraph paren ...... parentheses PCB ...... printed circuit board pd ...... period PIR ...... priority intelligence requirement plt ...... platoon POL ...... petroleum, oils, and lubricants pos ...... position prep ...... preparation PSYOP ...... psychological operations PTO ...... power take-off RADIAC ...... radiation. detectionindication, and computation RAG ...... regimental artillery group RAOC ...... rear area operations center R&E ...... recovery and evacuation R&S ...... reconnaissance and surveillance RATT ...... radio teletypewriter RC ...... reserve component rd ...... road PDF ...... radio direction finding RE ...... radial error REC ...... radio-electronic combat (not a US term) RECCEXREP ...... reconnaissance exploitation report recon ...... reconnaissance regt ...... regiment REMBASS ...... Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System REMS ...... remotely employed sensors

Glossary-5 req ...... request RII ...... request for intelligence information RIP ...... Register of Intelligence Publications rqr ...... required RRII ...... response to request for intelligence information RSR ...... resource status report RSS ...... remote slave station RSTA ...... reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition RTO ...... radioteletype operator

S ...... secret S1...... Adjutant (US Army) S2...... Intelligence Officer (US Army) S3...... Operations and Training Officer (US Army) S4...... Supply Officer (US Army) S5...... Civil Affairs Officer (US Army) SAEDA...... Sabotage and Espionage. Directed Against the US Army and Deliberate Security Violations SALUTE ...... size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment SAM ...... surface-to-air missile S&T ...... supply and transportation SCARF ...... standard collection asset request format SCV ...... single channel voice SDP ...... secondary delay position SEAD ...... suppression of enemy air defenses sec ...... section SED ...... simulative electronic deception sep ...... separate SEP ...... scientific and engineering personnel SF...... spotlight flash/support flash SHELREP...... shelling report SHORAD ...... short-range air defense SIGINT ...... signals intelligence SIGSEC ...... signal security SII ...... statement of intelligence interest SIR ...... specific information requirement/serious incident report SITMAP ...... situation map SITREP ...... situation report SLAR ...... side-looking airborne radar SOP ...... standing operating procedure SOR ...... specific orders and requests SP ...... self-propelled SPP ...... SIGINT processing platoon spt ...... support SS ...... Secret Service SSB...... single side band SSM ...... surface-to-surface missile STANAG ...... standardization agreement STIR ...... Scientific Technological Intelligence Reports survl ...... surveillance svc ...... service SWO ...... staff weather officer sys ...... system

Glossary-6 TA ...... target acquisition T&A ...... transcription and analysis TAB ...... target acquisition battery tac ...... tactical TACAIR ...... tactical air TACC ...... tactical air control center TAC CP ...... tactical command post TAC-D ...... tactical deception TACELINT ...... tactical electronics intelligence TACFIRE ...... tactical fire direction computer system TACP ...... tactical air control party TACREP ...... tactical report TACS ...... tactical air control system TADDS ...... target alert data display set TAI ...... target areas of interest TASS ...... tactical air support system TCAE ...... technical control and anlysis elernent TD ...... tank division TDA ...... tables of distribution and allowances TEB ...... tactical exploitation battalion tech ...... technical TECHDOC ...... technical document TF ...... task force TL ...... target list tm ...... team TM ...... technical manual TMDE ...... test, measuring, and diagnostic equipment TOC ...... tactical operations center TOE ...... tables of organization and equipment TOW ...... tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (missile system) TPL ...... time-phase line treas ...... treasury TRS ...... tactical reconnaissance squadron TSO ...... tactical surveillance officer TVA ...... target value analysis UHF ...... ultra-high frequency US ...... United States USAF...... United States Air Force UTM ...... universal transverse mercator (grid) vic ...... vicinity VFMED ...... variable-format message entry device VHF ...... very high frequency WIA ...... wounded in action WLR ...... weapons-locating radar XO ...... executive officer

Glossary-7 REFERENCES

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication. Field Manuals (FMs) 34-1 ...... Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 34-3 ...... Intelligence Analysis 34-10 ...... Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations 71-2J ...... Task Force Operations 71-3 ...... Armored and Mechanized Brigade Operations 100-5 ...... Operations RELATED PUBLICATIONS Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication. ARMY REGULATIONS (ARs) 310-25 ...... Dictionary of United States Army Terms 310-50 ...... Catalog of Abbreviations and Brevity Codes 380-series ...... Security 381-series ...... Military Intelligence 525-22 ...... (S) Electronic Warfare (EW) Policy (U)

FIELD MANUALS (FMs) 5-15 ...... Field Fortifications 5-30 ...... Engineer Intelligence 5-140-series ...... Engineer 6-20 ...... Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations 6-121 ...... Field Artillery Target Acquisition 7-20 ...... The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne and Air Assault) 7-30 ...... Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Brigade Operations 10-14 ...... Unit Supply Operations (Manual of Procedures) 10-23 ...... Army Food Service Operations 10-67 ...... Petroleum Supply in Theaters of Operations 11-50 ...... Combat Communications Within the Division 17-95 ...... Cavalry 19-1 ...... Military Police Support Division and Separate Brigade 21-2 ...... Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (Skill Level 1) 24-1 ...... Combat Communications 24-24 ...... Radio and Radar Reference Data 24-25 ...... Wire and Multichannel Reference Data 29-2 ...... Organizational Maintenance Operations 29-52 . . . . Supply and Field Service Operations in Separate Brigades and Armored Cavalry Regiment 30-15 ...... Intelligence Interrogation

Reference-0 32-16 ...... (C) Electronic Countermeasures Handbook (U) 34-20 ...... Military Intelligence Group (CEWI) (Corps) 34-22 ...... Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) Aerial Exploitation (Corps) 34-60 ...... Counterintelligence 34-60A ...... (S) Counterintelligence Operations 63-2 ...... Combat Service Support Operations Division 71-1 ...... Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team 71-2 ...... The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force 71-100 ...... Armored and Mechanized Division Operations 90-6 ...... Mountain Operations 90-10 ...... Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) 90-13 ...... River Crossing Operations 100-2-1 ...... Soviet Army Operations and Tactics 100-2-2 ...... Soviet Army Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support 100-2-3 ...... The Soviet Army Troops, Organization, and Equipment 100-10 ...... Combat Service Support 100-15 ...... Larger Unit Operations 101-5 ...... Staff Organization and Operations

TRAINING CIRCULARS (TCs) 30-49 ...... (C) QUICKFIX Operations (U) 34-10-1 ...... Remotely Monitored Battlefield System 34-41 ...... (C) Planning Communications Jamming(U) 34-50 ...... Reconnaissance and Surveillance Handbook 34-60 ...... Radio Monitoring Set, AN/TRR-33 34-83 ...... (C)AN/TSQ-114A, TRAILBLAZER Operations (U) 34-84 ...... AN/TLQ-17A(V) Countermeasures Set Operations 34-90 ...... (C) AN\ MLQ-34 Tactical Communications Jammer Operations(U) 34-94 ...... Standardized Crew Drill–Establish a Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitor Site 34-95 ...... (C) Radio Receiving Sets AN/TRQ-30* AN/TRQ-32(U)

UNITED STATES SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES (USSIDs) 300 ...... Sterilized Products 301 ...... Critical Intelligence 302 ...... Signals Intelligence Alert 306 ...... Tactical Report 306( P) ...... Tactical Report 316 ...... NON-CODEWORD Reporting

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS JCS Pub 1 ...... Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms JCS Pub 12...... Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations, Volume II, Procedures and Formats Basic Encyclopedia

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (STANAGS) 1059 ...... National Distinguishing Letters of Use by NATO Forces 2003 ...... Patrol Reports

Reference-1 2008 ...... Bombing, Shelling, Mortaring, and Location Reports 2014 . . . Operation Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, and Administration and Logistic Orders 2033 ...... Interrogation of Prisoners of War 2044 ...... Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) 2082 ...... Relief of Combat Troops 2084 ...... Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents 2097 ...... Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and Equipment 2113 ...... Destruction of Military Technical Equipment (OP) 2844 ...... Counterintelligence Procedures 2868 ...... Land Force Tactical Doctrine (ATP-35) 2936 ...... Intelligence Doctrine–AINTP-1 3277 ...... Air Reconnaissance Request/Task Form 6004 ...... Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference Report

QUADRIPARTITE STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (QSTAGs) 502 ...... Patrol Reports 506 . . . . . Operation Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, and Administration and Logistic Orders 511 ...... Intelligence Reports 170 ...... Interrogation of Prisoners of War 523 ...... Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) 528 ...... Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents 295 ...... Command and Control of Tactical Electronic Warfare in the 1976-85 Time Frame on a Formation of Corps Size 311 ...... Components of Electronic Warfare Information 321 ...... Electronic Warfare Definitions and Terms 492 ...... Electronic Counter-Countermeasures 593 ...... Tactical Signals Intelligence STANAGs and QSTAGs may be obtained from the Naval Publications and Forms Center (NPFC), 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120. FORMS DA Form 2028 ...... Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms PROJECTED PUBLICATIONS Projected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled for printing but are not yet available. Upon bring printed, they will be distributed. They may not be obtained from the USA AGF Publications Center until indexed in DA Pamphlet 310-1. FM 34-40 ...... (S) Electronic Warfare Operations FM 34-25 ...... Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations FM 34-37 ...... (S) Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations COMMAND Command publications cannot be obtained through Armywide resupply channels. Deter- mine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars (FCs) expire three years from the date of publication unless sooner rescinded.

Reference-2 FIELD CIRCULAR 34-118 . . . The Targeting Process, May 1984, US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000 71-100 . . . Armored and Mechanized Division and Brigade Operations, May 1984, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Reference-3 INDEX

Index-0 Index-1 Index-2 Index-3 Index-4 Index-5 Index-6 Index-7 Index-8 Index-9 Index-10 Index-11 FM 34-80 15 APRIL 1986 By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:

R. L. DILWORTH Brigadier General, United States Army The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11A, Requirements for Battalion and Brigade IEW Operations (Qty rqr block no. 1141).

✰ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: l993-342-421/61834