BRI and FOIP: Are They Compatible?
Akio Takahara Dean, Graduate School of Public Policy The University of Tokyo What is the Belt & Road Initiative?
Cf. “New Model of Major Country Relations” with the US No confrontation, mutual respect, win-win cooperation Xi Jinping wished to stabilise big power relations, avoid confrontation b/n a rising power and the hegemonic power ←However: strategic competition could not but intensify over cyberspace, the Pacific (incl. East and South China Seas), science & technology, etc. China Turns to Eurasia: The Advent of BRI
Swing in the diplomatic policy pendulum from America First to Eurasia First, i.e. turn to the neighbours and to the west Connect East Asia and Europe, & develop the routes Share institutions to facilitate investment and trade Counter TPP; establish a new international bank (AIIB) Utilise excessive construction & production capacities
Domestic and International Impact of BRI
Attracted great attention and “participation”; investment and trade increased Raised concerns about the profitability of some projects and China’s strategic interests (NB BRI projects are mainly for business, not development)
4 Concerns about China’s Actions
➢Maritime Advancement, establishing faits accomplis • Intruding territorial waters, oil and gas exploration, construction of artificial islands, harassing fishing boats & reconnaissance vessels, etc. “Action first-ism” i.e. action first, diplomacy second
5 Dredging in the South China Sea http://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/3049567
6 China’s Soft Words, Tough Deeds: Why?
It now has the capabilities Disrespect for rules: Pax Sinica as an extension of Pax Communista The need to unite the nation & the party Heightened heat of nationalism: better to avoid internal critique Xi Jinping’s propensity to act Problem in self-perception 7 Who Said This?
“Chinese nation’s energy has been suppressed for too long; let it explode and realise the China Dream!” (July 19, 2016)
8 “Me!”
9 Problems of Self-Perception in China’s Diplomacy: “Big Power Syndrome”
E.g. Calling its neighborhood diplomacy “Peripheral Diplomacy” E.g. Xi Jinping: “The blood of the Chinese nation does not contain the DNA to invade others and become a hegemon.” E.g. Zheng He (Cheng Ho), the symbol of China’s peaceful maritime advancement in fact invaded kingdoms in Sri Lanka, Indonesia BRI is a Constellation
The concept: a diplomatic and political genius, an attractive constellation (definition is unclear) Cf. the China Dream In reality what matter to us are the stars, i.e. projects (let us not be dazzled by the constellation) A signature project of Xi Jinping: the symbol of Xi’s power and authority in the world Free & Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP): Another Constellation • “Improve ‘connectivity’ between Asia and Africa through free and open Indo-Pacific, and promote stability and prosperity of the region as a whole” (Japan’s MoFA homepage) • Key areas: 1) developing an environment for international peace, stability and prosperity, and sharing universal values; 2) addressing global issues toward achieving SDGs and promoting human security; 3) together with developing countries, contributing to economic diplomacy and regional revitalization that aims at "quality growth"
Two Aspects of the Two Initiatives
• Strategic: geopolitical/geoeconomic competition • Economic: competition and cooperation Cf. Fragility and Resilience in Japan-China relations ⇒ If we focus on the economic aspect, then the two constellations can overlap and coexist What Should We Do to Co-prosper?
• Prevent adventurism and maintain peace: develop our network of security cooperation • Link-up and promote basic principles such as free trade and rule of law (CPTPP, Japan-EU EPA, supporting South East Asian nations over the South China Sea issue, etc.) What Should We Do to Co-prosper?
• Let BRI & FOIP overlap: cooperate in developing Asia and Africa • Conduct better public diplomacy towards the Chinese We can’t change China; but we can support the people change NB Perception gap based on information gap; “propaganda war” Cf. PLA’s “3 Warfare”: psychological; public relations; legal
APPENDIX
Perception Gaps b/n the Japanese & Chinese
16 Perception Gaps: Senkaku/Diaoyu Case What caused tension in the East China Sea? Chinese government’s View: Provocation by Japan—just could not but respond ・2010 Collision of a Chinese trawler & J’s coast guard vessels—Japan applied domestic law ・2012 Governor Ishihara announced Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t will buy the Senkaku Islands Noda Cabinet decided to buy them instead ・PM Abe adopted new defence policies
17 →Japan has changed & become more assertive! Information Gap b/n Japan & China e.g. Trawler Collision Incident, Sept.2010
The Chinese Version
18 http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-09/08/c_12529310.htm
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Case Japanese government’s view: Recent incidents are only a part of a trend: 1992 Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone included the name of Diaoyudao (Senkaku Islands), i.e. China started to touch on the issue 1996 Chinese research vessel intruded Japanese territorial waters for the first time 2001 Reached agreement on mutual notification of sending research vessels, but the Chinese side often breached the agreement 19 Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Case
2003 Association for Protecting Diaoyudao set up; 2004 its activists landed on Uotsuri-jima 2004 Chinese nuclear submarine entered Japanese territorial waters without surfacing 2006 China State Oceanic Administration introduced the system for regularly patrolling “territory” in the EC Sea 2008 Chinese patrol boats intruded into Japanese territorial waters for the first time to claim sovereignty; they stepped up their activities following the 2010 trawler collision incident 20 →China has changed and become more assertive! Information Gap b/n Japan & China e.g. Trawler Collision Incident, Sept.2010
The Japanese Version
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sVVM2AmvD5U 21
2010.9 Trawler Collision Incident http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/TKY201009150452.html
At Ishigaki, Japan At Jinjiang, China 8 September 2010 15 September, 2010
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