UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE Romantic Liberalism DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in English by Brent Lewis Russo Dissertation Committee: Professor Jerome Christensen, Chair Professor Andrea Henderson Associate Professor Irene Tucker 2014 Chapter 1 © 2013 Trustees of Boston University All other materials © 2014 Brent Lewis Russo TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii CURRICULUM VITAE iv ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION v INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: Charles Lamb’s Beloved Liberalism: Eccentricity in the Familiar Essays 9 CHAPTER 2: Liberalism as Plenitude: The Symbolic Leigh Hunt 33 CHAPTER 3: Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Illiberalism and the Early Reform Movement 58 CHAPTER 4: William Hazlitt’s Fatalism 84 ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Charles Rzepka and the Trustees of Boston University for permission to include Chapter One of my dissertation, which was originally published in Studies in Romanticism (Fall 2013). Financial support was provided by the University of California, Irvine Department of English, School of Humanities, and Graduate Division. iii CURRICULUM VITAE Brent Lewis Russo 2005 B.A. in English Pepperdine University 2007 M.A. in English University of California, Irvine 2014 Ph.D. in English with Graduate Emphasis in Critical Theory University of California, Irvine PUBLICATIONS “Charles Lamb’s Beloved Liberalism: Eccentricity in the Familiar Essays.” Studies in Romanticism. Fall 2013. iv ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Romantic Liberalism By Brent Lewis Russo Doctor of Philosophy in English University of California, Irvine, 2014 Professor Jerome Christensen, Chair This dissertation examines the Romantic beginnings of nineteenth-century British liberalism. It argues that Romantic authors both helped to shape and attempted to resist liberalism while its politics were still inchoate. By shifting the question of Romantic politics away from the traditional radical/revolutionary and conservative/loyalist binary forward into the more ambiguous realm of early liberalism, the dissertation develops new readings of both first- and second-generation Romantic authors, including Charles Lamb, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Leigh Hunt, and William Hazlitt. v INTRODUCTION This is a collection of essays on a group of later Romantic writers who either harnessed or wrestled with nascent liberalism in the early nineteenth century. Liberalism was not, by then, a defined concept, so the writers were responding to a tendency more than a concrete, named program. Part of the interest of this study, then, lies in the insight it gives into the prehistory of liberalism’s formation. Liberalism was developed and critiqued differently by those for whom it was on its way than it would be by those for whom it had already arrived. Nineteenth-century liberalism can be defined in at least three ways: as an ideology, as a method of governance, and as a mode of subjectivity. As ideology, according to Immanuel Wallerstein, liberalism represents one of three competing ways—and ultimately the triumphant one—of responding to the “new political reality” in post-Napoleonic Europe, that “political change had become normal.” Perceived as norm rather than as aberration or crisis, change became the focus of political thought. Substantively, the most important variable, according to Wallerstein, was the fate of “popular sovereignty.”1 Conservatism developed as an ideology, or “political metastrategy,” first, to discount the radical, democratic aspirations of the French Revolution.2 It counseled gradualism and subtlety and decried revolutionary methods as misguided abominations. Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France provided the touchstone British example. Subsequently liberalism availed itself of the antinomy between revolutionary and conservative logic: “its destiny was to assert that it was located in the center,” however abstract or “rhetorical” such a domain was. Under the auspices, first, of “reformism,” liberalism positioned itself as a sensitive, intelligent 1 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 1. 2 Ibid., 1-2. 1 moderator between conservatism and radicalism. It advocated neither slow nor sudden, but timely, guided change, for it believed that, “in order for history to follow its natural course, it was necessary to engage in conscious, continual, intelligent reformism.”3 Liberal politics emerged neither as a defender nor as a skeptic of history, but more charismatically, as an engineer of time, ready to steer history on its progressive course. Rather than rejecting popular sovereignty or embracing it, liberals promised to prepare the way for it by using political power to secure and ensure the proper conditions for popular citizenship. Thus the paradox that liberal ideology insists on both liberty and strong government: Liberalism has always been in the end the ideology of the strong state in the sheep’s clothing of individualism; or to be more precise, the ideology of the strong state as the only sure ultimate guarantor of individualism. Of course, if one defines individualism as egoism and reform as altruism, then the two thrusts are indeed incompatible. But if one defines individualism as maximizing the ability of individuals to achieve self-defined ends, and reform as creating the social conditions within which the strong can temper the discontent of the weak and simultaneously take advantage of the reality that the strong find it easier than the weak to realize their wills, then no inherent incompatibility exists.4 It would not be until 1848 that a new dialectic would produce a third ideology, namely socialism, which would call for accelerated change, and emphasize society as a whole over the individual as the true incarnation of the “sovereignty of the people.”5 Besides as an ideology, liberalism can also be studied as a method of governance. Compared to Wallerstein’s intellectual, dialectical, Germanic account, Jonathan Parry’s work is 3 Ibid., 6. 4 Ibid., 10. 5 Ibid., 13. 2 more English, empiricist, and historiographic—amassing facts, tracking individual changes in liberal politics over time. Although acknowledging the in some ways inherently incoherent nature of liberalism, Parry nevertheless, and in spite of his empiricist methodology, identifies unifying features of liberal leadership in the Victorian period. In particular, he observes that a commitment to disinterestedness informed parliamentary liberalism: Liberals saw government as a matter of integrating and harmonising different classes and interest groups within the political nation. To them, good government involved guiding the people so as to strengthen their attachment to the state and to the firm, fair rule of law, and using policy to shape individual character constructively. … If nineteenth-century Liberalism meant anything, it meant a political system in which a large number of potentially incompatible interests – whether nationalities, classes, or sects – were mature enough to accept an over- arching code of law which guaranteed each a wide variety of liberties.6 This method of governance corresponded, naturally enough, to a distinctively liberal paradigm of subjectivity. Elaine Hadley’s work, employing a more skeptical methodology in the French tradition (Hadley credits Jacques Ranciere in particular as an inspiration), identifies the formal— and thus in some sense paradoxically constraining—features of “liberal cognition” in the period of liberalism’s political ascendancy: “a wide range of strikingly formalized mental attitudes, what the Victorians might call ‘frames of mind,’ such as disinterestedness, objectivity, reticence, conviction, impersonality, and sincerity, all of which carried with them a moral valence.”7 So- 6 Jonathan Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 3. 7 Elaine Hadley, Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 9. 3 called liberal individuality, according to Hadley, in fact entailed disciplined, willful abstraction from concrete particularities of locality, embodiment, class, and so on: In place of the brutal social body, riven by violent divisions of interest; in place of a vulgar, classed body, burdened by impulses and habits; even in place of the physical body, determined by its biology, mid-Victorian liberalism offers the promise of abstracted individuality, which emancipates the subject from these diverse formulations of bodiliness and their constitutive social spaces through its twin practices of privatization and abstraction.8 Hadley’s study attests to the profound success of the liberal methods of government that Parry’s history recounts. Likewise, her work shows how the liberal ideology of ambiguous progress that Wallerstein highlights also manifest itself at the formal, individual level in the liberal subject’s self-abstraction from time: The individual’s ability to think abstractly in the present and thus to simultaneously be in the moment but think outside it, marked his eligibility for other sorts of abstractions (for instance, the voter in an election, the citizen of the nation), but also, oddly, made him an individual, immune from conventional and majoritarian assumptions.9 So described, Victorian liberal subjectivity seems to have an obvious ancestor in the Romantic imagination, with its well-known,