Politicization of Religion

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy

Series Editors: Ted G. Jelen and Mark J. Rozell

A generation ago, many social scientists regarded religion as an anachronism whose social, economic, and political importance would inevitably wane and disappear in the face of the inexorable forces of modernity. Of course, nothing of the sort has occurred; indeed, the public role of religion is resurgent in US domestic politics, in other nations, and in the international arena. Today, religion is widely acknowledged to be a key variable in candidate nominations, platforms, and elections; it is recognized as a major influence on domestic and foreign policies. National religious movements as diverse as the Christian Right in the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan are important factors in the internal politics of particular nations. Moreover, such transnational religious actors as Al-Qaida, Falun Gong, and the Vatican have had important effects on the politics and policies of nations around the world. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy serves a growing niche in the discipline of political science. This subfield has proliferated rapidly during the past two decades, and has generated an enormous amount of scholarly studies and journalistic coverage. Five years ago, the journal Politics and Religion was created; in addition, works relating to religion and politics have been the subject of many articles in more general academic journals. The number of books and monographs on religion and politics has increased tremendously. In the past, many social scientists dismissed religion as a key variable in politics and government. This series casts a broad net over the subfield, providing opportunities for scholars atall levels to publish their works with Palgrave. The series publishes monographs in all subfields of political science, including American Politics, Public Policy, Public Law, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. The principal focus of the series is the public role of religion. “Religion” is construed broadly to include public opinion, religious institutions, and the legal frameworks under which religious politics are practiced. The “dependent variable” in which we are interested ispolitics , defined broadly to include analyses of the public sources and consequences of religious belief and behavior. These would include matters of public policy, as well as variations in the practice of political life. We welcome a diverse range of methodological perspectives, provided the approaches taken are intellectually rigorous. The series does not deal with works of theology, in that arguments about the validity or utility of religious beliefs are not a part of the series focus. Similarly, the authors of works about the private or personal consequences of religious belief and behavior, such as personal happiness, mental health, or family dysfunction, should seek other outlets for their writings. Although historical perspectives can often illuminate our understanding of modern political phenomena, our focus in the Religion, Politics, and Policy series is on the relationship between the sacred and the political in contemporary societies.

The Catholic Church in Polish History: Politics, Religion, and Cultural Resistance By Sabrina P. Ramet Global Religions and International Relations: A Diplomatic Perspective By Pasquale Ferrara Beyond Religious Right and Secular Left Rhetoric: The Road to Compromise By Karin Fry Christianity in Chinese Public Life: Religion, Society, and the Rule of Law Edited by Joel A. Carpenter and Kevin R. den Dulk Mitt Romney, Mormonism, and the 2012 Election By Luke Perry Clerical Sexual Abuse: How the Crisis Changed US Catholic Church–State Relations By Jo Renee Formicola Mediating Religion and Government: Political Institutions and the Policy Process Edited by Edited By Elizabeth A. Oldmixon and Kevin R. den Dulk Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy: Jimmy Carter the Disciple and Ronald Reagan the Alchemist By William Steding Politicization of Religion, the Power of Symbolism: The Case of Former Yugoslavia and its Successor States Edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić Politicization of Religion, the Power of State, Nation, and Faith: The Case of Former Yugoslavia and its Successor States Edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić Worldview, Redemptive Violence, Empire and the United States By Wayne Lavender Faith-Based Organizations at the United Nations By Jeffrey Haynes Politicization of Religion, the Power of State, Nation, and Faith

The Case of Former Yugoslavia and its Successor States

Edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić politicization o f religion, t h e p o w e r o f s t a t e , n a t i o n , a n d f a i t h Copyright © Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, 2014. All rights reserved. First published in 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–1–137–48413–0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Politicization of religion, the power of the state, nation, and faith : the case of former Yugoslavia and its successor states / edited by Gorana Ognjenovic, Jasna Jozelic. pages cm.—(Palgrave studies in religion, politics, and policy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–1–137–48413–0 (alk. paper) 1. Religion and politics—Yugoslavia. 2. Religion and politics—Bosnia and Hercegovina. 3. Religion and politics—Serbia. 4. Religion and politics— Serbia and Montenegro. 5. Religion and politics—Kosovo (Republic) 6. Religion and politics—Slovenia. 7. Religion and politics—Croatia. I. Ognjenovic, Gorana, editor. BL65.P7P636 2014 3229.109497—dc23 2014025584 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2014 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This book is dedicated to all the victims in Southeastern Europe.

Contents

List of Figures ix Foreword: A Note on Sociology xi Keith Tester Preface: Politicization of Religion xvii Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić Acknowledgments xxi

Introduction: State, Nation, and Faith 1 Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić 1 Politicization of Religion: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 Jasna Jozelić 2 Was the Bosnian War (1992–1995) a Full-fledged Religious War? 33 Sergej Flere 3 The Role of the Catholic Church in the Bosnian Conflict 1992–1995: A Historical Approach 55 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić 4 The Gospel and Politics: Transforming Grace for Transformed Society? 95 Kosta Milkov 5 Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics: Post-2000 Period 115 Milan Vukomanović

vii viii Contents

6 The Political Dynamics of Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 151 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović 7 The Separation between Church and State in Slovenia: A Political Fiasco 171 Srečo Dragoš 8 Religion and Politics in Kosovo 193 Anton K. Berishaj Conclusion: State, Nation, Faith 213 Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

Notes on Contributors 217 Index 221 Figures

7.1 Population by religion and type of settlement, Slovenia, Census 1991 and 2002 176 8.1 Pashko Vase Shkodrani poem—which one do you agree with? 203 8.2 Use of headscarf in public schools 207 8.3 Do you support Kosovo’s western path 210

Foreword: A Note on Sociology Keith Tester

Europe was still being remapped when the conflict in the former Yugoslavia broke out. The collapse of the Berlin Wall had destroyed the old, taken–for-granted, bipolar distinction between them and us. All of a sudden it seemed possible for “Europe” to come together through the rebuilding of the bridges of the common culture and heritage, which the Wall had cut. This common culture was understood in either secular or market terms. It was marked by a capacity to work together tolerantly and to accept the truths upheld by others. Now, allegedly, we could all be cosmopolitans, freed of the constraints of politics and national differences. Religion was given a rather secondary role in this remap- ping. Where religion was noticed at all, it was identified as a tradition that some people still clung to but which would become of decreasing social and political significance in the new dispensation. If anything, religion was seen as little more than a peculiarity, a reminder of the roots of the common heritage to which we could now return, but in so doing, move on from the churches. Religion would be of little or no civic and therefore political significance. The war in the former Yugoslavia seemed to contradict all of these assumptions and conceits. Here was a conflict of remarkable brutality and deep intolerance in which religious affiliations and identities played a significant role. How could this be explained? However complex they might have been, the dominant—and certainly the Anglophone—answers to the question revolved around a shared and yet never explicitly

xi xii Foreword stated assumption. Religion was important in the conflict because the former Yugoslavia was presumed to be backward and mired in intolerant traditions. The former Yugoslavia was presumed to be insufficiently cosmopolitan, and therefore insufficiently European. The traces of Orientalism were never too far removed from these kinds of answers. The historical involvement of the Ottoman Empire in “the Balkans” was often emphasized, and consequently also offered a ready explanation for a commitment to Islam in what was otherwise taken for granted as “Christian Europe.” The Ottoman dimension was also often hinted at in order to explain the brutality of the conflict—the rapes, concentration camps, tortures, and sieges. But the local versions of Christianity were themselves exoticized and thereby removed from what was presumed to be the European mainstream. Orthodoxy was identified as a Slavic incursion, and the Balkans’ version of Catholicism was identified as little more than superstition of a kind that mainstream Europe had overcome many years previously. For Anglophone Protestants, at least, the very exoticism of the religious life in the former Yugoslavia—and indeed the virtual incomprehensibility of much of it to the religiously unmusical denizens of the secular world—was almost sufficient explanation of the content of the conflict. In short, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was identified as something like a ghost from the past that mainstream Europe, supposedly, and most definitely the Anglophone world outside of Europe, had long left behind. If these kinds of understanding were peculiar to barroom discussion, they would be dangerous and bad enough. But their traces can also be found in the attempt by a leading European intellectual to explain the conflict and the role of religion in it. It is worth focusing on his comments because he is one of a very small band of academics who have managed to find a place in the institutions of power. Politicians and opinion-formers have listened to what he has said, to quite an unusual degree. In his 1994 book, Beyond Left and Right, Anthony Giddens offered some words on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Giddens is to be applauded for quickly recognizing the conflict as an important event that demanded a response by intellectuals and, more specifically, by European sociologists. (After all, sociology claims to be the analysis of contemporary social relationships and structures, and war is such a relationship.) Unlike many sociologists, Giddens wrote something about this conflict. But he tended to make the conflict relatively distant from his readers. What Giddens wrote made it possible for us to believe ourselves to be rather superior to them. Foreword xiii

Giddens explained the conflict as a throwback to a condition of untrammeled fundamentalism. First, he commented in the context of a discussion of the wider issue of male violence toward women: “The war in Bosnia . . . witnessed the systematic rape of Muslim women as a deliberate way of humiliating them—and as statements from those involved made clear, of humiliating their menfolk also.”1 A page or so later, in the context of comments about ethnic and cultural difference, Giddens states that differences can no longer be ignored through strategies of separation, isolation, or exit from communication. Rather, differences now have to be confronted because we have all become dependent upon one another. For him, this mutual dependency and the daily confrontation with difference that it implies and involves can lead to the respect of cosmopolitan dialogue, but it can also lead to a degeneration of communication into mutual hatred, where the recognition of dependency creates fear and anxiety. In those circumstances, communication degenerates, and there is a retreat to old certainties, secure fundamentals:

I would define a degenerate spiral of communication as one where antipathy feeds on antipathy, hate upon hate . . . How else could one explain the events in Bosnia, and parallel happenings elsewhere? Fundamentalisms . . . are edged with potential violence. Wherever fundamentalism takes hold, whether it be religious, ethnic, nationalist or gender fundamentalism, degenerate spirals of communication threaten . . . Bosnia sits on a historic fault-line dividing Christian Europe from Islamic civilization. Yet one cannot produce a sufficient explanation of the Yugoslavian conflict only by reference to old hostilities. Those hostilities, when refocused in the present, provide a context; once conflict begins, and hate starts to feed on hate, those who were good neighbours can end as the bitterest of enemies.2 In the then-current edition of his Sociology textbook, Giddens made two other comments. First, Giddens wrote, “the conflict in Bosnia- Herzegovina . . . claimed 500,000 lives. Appalling though that figure is, the Bosnian conflict remained relatively local and confined.”3 Second, in the chapter on religion, he claimed, “the nation-state is no longer the main influence in international relations; rivalries and conflicts will therefore occur between larger cultures or civilizations. It is just such a conflict which was enacted in Bosnia . . . where the Bosnian Muslims fought against the Serbs, who represent a Christian culture.”4 The Croatians seem to have disappeared from this account, and strangely, Muslims appeared to have become the initiators of the violence. Giddens seems to xiv Foreword have read a different history of the conflict than anyone else. Moreover, it would be interesting to know how this statement can explain why “the Serbs who represent a Christian culture” were prepared to kill Croatians who also “represent a Christian culture”—and, of course, why Croatians were prepared to kill Serbs). According to Giddensian sociology then, the conflict was about fundamentalism: the fundamentalism of men in their relationship toward women, the fundamentalism of religious groups toward one another. “What is fundamentalism? It is, so I shall argue, nothing other than tradition defended in the traditional way—but where that mode of defense has become widely called into question . . . Fundamentalism tends to accentuate the purity of a given set of doctrines, not only because it wishes to set them off from other traditions, but because it is a rejection of a model of truth linked to the dialogic engagement of ideas in the public sphere.”5 Fundamentalism therefore is the opposite of cosmopolitan tolerance. It is an undesirable attempt to shore up an identity that is being drastically challenged and unraveled by the processes of globalization, post- traditionalization, and reflexivity. Giddens believes that these processes are the main and dominant trends of the present, and he defines them. Globalization: “I define it as action at a distance, and relate its intensi- fying over recent years to the emergence of the means of instantaneous global communication and mass transportation.”6 Post-traditionalization is the direct result of globalization, and “a post- traditional order is not one in which tradition disappears—far from it. It is one in which tradition changes its status. Traditions have to explain themselves, to become open to interrogation and discourse.”7 Reflexivity: “In a detraditionalizing society individuals must become used to filtering all sorts of information relevant to their life situations and routinely act on the basis of that filtering process.” This means that “in a post-traditional order, individuals more or less have to engage with the wider world if they are to survive in it.”8 Of course, this raises the interesting problem of how individuals are able to survive in the world when they are denied the means of engagement. Reflexivity does not fill an empty stomach. Similarly, there is the methodological problem, which Giddens glosses, that there is no necessary linkage whatsoever between an ability to “filter information” and an ability to act. Inevitably, all of this has implications for how Giddens understands the role and the meaning of the individual and identity. As he says, Foreword xv

“The self, of course, has never been fixed, a given, in the manner of external nature. To have a self is to have self-consciousness and this fact means that individuals in all cultures actively shape their own identities.”9 Elsewhere, Giddens has defined self-identity as “the self as reflexively understood by the individual in terms of her or his biography.”10 The Giddensian conclusion is clear; insofar as the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was a product and expression of fundamentalism, it was atavistic and had no proper place in the tolerant world and the cosmopolitan Europe that is emerging out of globalization, post- traditionalization, and reflexivity. Furthermore, the participants in the conflict are implicitly identified as different than the reflexive selves generated by, and flourishing in, the contemporary world. Inasmuch as we who read people like Giddens must be such reflexive selves, then it becomes valid, by this argument, to identify the participants in the war in the former Yugoslavia as different than us in a very fundamental way. They are not like us, and little else needs to be said. The logic of the argument seems to be that any community that resorts to what Giddens defines as “fundamentalism” is not up to the challenges and needs of the present. Such a community is not at all like the reflexive citizens who can embrace “an ethics of a globalizing post-traditional society [which] implies recognition of the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization—coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and an attitude of respect towards non-human agencies and beings, present and future.”11 It is this ethics that is reflected in Giddens’s comments on the conflict. What he is saying is that the conflict can be reduced to two sorts of fundamentalism, which are themselves indicative of a refusal to practice cosmopolitan toleration and demonstrate lack of respect for others. In this kind of approach, religion is both a sign of, and a justification for, fundamentalism. There is no need to tackle the content of religion, nor, indeed, to seek to analyze precisely how religion might relate to politics. This is why the chapters in this volume are of such importance. They do go into detail and show the processes and contradictions of religion when it is implicated in a conflict. The chapters in this volume avoid large but largely meaningless terms such as “fundamentalism” and indeed uncover the warp and weft of the detail. They undermine the easy answers and inspire thought rather than taking cover under the safety of easy—fundamentalist—answers. xvi Foreword

Notes

1. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 242. 2. Ibid., p. 245. 3. Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 1994a), p. 357. 4. Ibid., p. 459. 5. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 6. 6. Ibid., p. 4. 7. Ibid., p. 5. 8. Ibid., p. 6–7. 9. Ibid., p. 223 (emphasis added). 10. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 244. 11. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 253. Preface: Politicization of Religion Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

Quo vadis? Romam vado iterum crucifigi. The Constitution of Tito’s Yugoslavia, Chapter V, which addressed the rights and duties of its citizens, also contained Article 25, which prescribed the state’s relationship to religion as an institution.

The state guarantees citizens their freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. The church is separate from the state; religious communities whose teachings do not work against the Constitution, are free to conduct their activities and religious rituals. Seminaries are free but under the state’s surveillance. The abuse of church and religion for political purposes is forbidden, together with political organizations based on religion. The state can financially assist religious communities.1 With this starting point, the AVNOJ2 presidency passed a law on May 25, 1945, which prohibited the provocation of national, racial, or religious hatred and conflict.3 Another legal paragraph in reference to the position and function of religious communities in Yugoslavia, passed before the new Constitution, was the state law concerning the organization of the state and republics’ commissions for dealing with the questions related to religion as an institution.4 State and religion were separate institutions. School and religion were separate institutions.

xvii xviii Preface

In Tito’s Yugoslavia, three amendments to the constitution were made (in 1946, 1963, and 1974). The changes made were not essential when it came to the constitution’s relationship to religion as an institution, or the work of religious communities within society. All three guaranteed the freedom of conscience and the practice of religion as basic to the realization of freedom of all citizens in the socialist community. Religion was looked upon as a private affair and treated as of no importance to the state. The Constitution of 1946 prescribed the freedom of religious schools under the overall surveillance by the state. The Constitution of 1974 cleared up the previous ambiguity by clarifying that religious schools were permitted only as seminaries. All three constitutions prescribed the right to ownership of property for all religious communities and declared the “abuse of religion for political purposes” as being an “abuse of religion against the constitution.” Until 1974, freedom of religion was prescribed on a state as well as a republic level. The amendment to the constitution in 1974 prescribed freedom of religion in the constitutions of the autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina also. In other words, there was no ban on religion prescribed in all three editions of the constitution of ex-Yugoslavia. Therefore, it was a great surprise when, at the beginning of the 1990s, what was referred to in the West as “freedom of religion” apparently arrived in Yugoslavia’s successor states. In daily practice, this meant that every single one of these earlier constitutional bans was systematically broken. Religious organizations had put on political hats and they took over important roles of influence in our society on many different levels: as moral guards of the nations (each religion for its own), as educators (by becoming a part of the regular schooling), and as a mobilizing agency for all the different kinds of political goals one could have imagined on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia at the end of the twentieth century in Europe. The people of Yugoslavia were told by the individual state and religious leadership that new and unprecedented “freedom of religion” was the result of a democratic development in the area. Finally, one could practice one’s religion, which, they claimed, was banned in Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the 1990s and prior to the conflict, this resulted in religion being (falsely) identified with nationhood and used to mobilize people for the battles of independence and for the bloodshed that followed. After the wars were over, religion and the newly gained nationhood (some voluntary and some less voluntary) were used to justify all of the misdeeds committed prior to, during, and after the bloodshed. All sins Preface xix were forgiven, and people were ready to enroll into the European Union, while suppressing quite a few reasons why one of the worst bloodsheds in Europe ever occurred in the first place. Today, 23 years later, well into the twenty-first century, all ex-Yugoslav successor states are more or less bankrupt. People are miserable, and religious institutions, despite certain signs of decline and internal decay, have never had more power and control over the lives of the individual. It is important to remember here that the individual nation states, young democracies, under the safe dominance of their religious institutions, underwent this process in the course of 20-odd years, which is by any measure a very short period in the life of a nation. Therefore, it should not be a surprise to anyone that discussions about the nature of the 1990s’ conflicts and postwar developments in ex-Yugoslavia are still very much in progress. The boundaries of what was earlier considered possible have been stretched drastically. The stretching of boundaries of what previously was a well-established terminology for describing what was possible (or not) resulted also in a considerable blurring of a definition of a “religious war.” The blurring continued to the point where the conflict had all the necessary aspects of a religious war without actually being precisely that. In laymen’s terms, this means that because something looked like a duck, walked like a duck, and sounded like a duck, still one could not inductively conclude that it was a duck! Why? As in any well-told story, there are fine lines that define the number of aspects in a debate that have to be recognized when making the final judgment about the nature of the matter at hand. The final result of an analysis is always dependent on how willing and able someone is to see and take into consideration the relevant details. The two volumes we present here offer such nuances necessary for an improved understanding of what really happened.

Notes

1. УСТАВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНЕ НАРОДНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ (1946), ГЛАВА V, ПРАВА И ДУЖНОСТИ ГРАЂАНА, Члан 25. 2. Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia. 3. Slobodan Nesovic and Branko Petranovic, AVNOJ i revolucija (Beograd: Nolit, 1983), p. 696. 4. Ivan Lazić, Pravni i činjenični položaj vjerskih zajednica u Jugoslaviji, Vjerske zajednice u Jugoslaviji, pp. 45–77 (Zagreb: Binoza, 1970), p. 57.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Marie Hulleberg for her tireless efforts to perfect our English.

xxi

Introduction: State, Nation, and Faith Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

Yugoslavia’s successor states have been in transition for a couple of decades now, and despite financing, advice, pressure, and good will from the international society, they still remain in transition. More than 20 years later, the problems are escalating because individuals on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia are facing another identity crisis from which religiously political organizations are claiming to be able to save them: the crisis is brought about as a tension between nation-state values,1 fought for during the 1991–1995 conflicts and the neoliberal ideal of social atomism2 that gives “rights” primacy over “obligations” to others, thus affirming the individual’s self-sufficiency. The tension that results from the nation-state ideal based on the socialist welfare-state idea of community which, at its core, demonstrates a key value: a responsibility for others that is being plundered of its content. This time, however, the plundering is committed by none other than “national bandits,” heavily equipped by the mechanisms enabled by the neoliberal globalization of the world economy.3 Between being victimized in a bloody conflict and—in the process of recovery or transition, being victimized again by globalized market economy straight after—it only helped religious institutions in presenting themselves as the only alternative to antidepressants. Moreover, just as churchgoing was the salvation of one’s troubled soul,

1 2 Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić another set of reality premises now sets in, and the whirligig keeps turning. History has taught us that, however many cultural influences an area has, it inherits just as many political influences and demands. The fact that the Catholic Church identified the catholic religion with Croat nationhood4 whereas the Orthodox church identified orthodox religion with Serb nationhood was old news, because the emperor was, this time, only wearing new clothes. The origins of this political practice, reaching back to Rome, the Byzantine, and even further, is a known fact. As a result of this historic development, differences between the ethnic groups that used to be at the core of the ethnic conflicts have been drastically reduced. In the case of Bosnia, we have families from the three different religions and “ethnic backgrounds” who have the same surnames. The conflict in Bosnia5 was not religious in the traditional sense of the word (Crusades) or in the sense that any religious war would involve at least two sides fighting a war for each of their own religious persuasion. It seems simply too convenient to forget that there is an actual time sequence that has to be taken into consideration as well as a difference between fractions of the total population: although the Catholic and Orthodox population were continuously under the religious spell, Bosnian Muslims were mainly secular prior to the conflict. After the conflict started, of the total Bosnian Muslim population, only one section embraced “religious observance,” and they did so, mostly, as a reaction to the persecution. The religious institutions at hand, as always, were—and still are— indulging in the two primary feelings of ownership: the territorial ownership6 and the ownership of a nation (each religion with its corresponding nation) at any price. The years of separation anxiety during Tito’s rule have created a historic hunger for regaining power and a compensation for the time (in case of religion, that would be “souls”) lost. An obsessive compulsion impossible to satisfy since, as any disorder when not controlled, always is a source of a guaranteed self-destruction.7 In daily practice, this compulsion is reflected in the systematic imposing of homogenous images of nationhood, and is both historically incorrect as well as very far from the daily experience of the individual.8 One of the main concerns is that these subtle ways have resulted in the current level of involvement gained in their respective societies9 that is almost absolute. The power these new forms of political organization have managed to accumulate is exemplified by the new level of influence they gained Introduction 3 in relationship to the state institution. Currently, they are influencing both—state policies for education as well as state policies for the armed forces. If there is any aspect of the individual’s daily living left outside of its dominion, it is not easily apparent. What this indicates in practice is that the basic value of any democratic society reflected in the individual practice of free will seems to be almost out of reach. However, the same tension is also clarifying a major obstacle for a possible condition of the democratic system moving toward full and lasting reconciliation in the region: a chronic lack of motivation and obvious reasons for democratic participation. In the search for easy explanations for the current status quo, it is always convenient to blame the situation on the nature of the traditional conflict of the people in the South East and, therefore, take them off the front page of the newspapers and TV screens. But, is the superficial and devious underlying claim about 1990s as a clash of civilizations even, by any standards, legitimate? The answer to this is NO. It is very clear that, even two decades after the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia and long international involvement, successor states on the practical level face huge challenges in achieving democratization. Two decades after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was virtually no progress made in facing serious difficulties where fervent nationalism remains a huge challenge. The measures that include criminal prosecution of war criminals, truth commissions, reparation programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms have difficulties in being implemented properly. Constitutionally mandated separation by ethnicity in political and public life by the Dayton agreement makes progress even more challenging. The strategy used to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their pre-war homes has been unsuccessful. The prosecution of war crimes in local courts is hampered by inadequate capacity, funding, and the unwillingness of the officials to follow-up. Wartime victims of sexual violence are, in some places still not or no longer recognized as an eligible category for social assistance. As a result of a renewed traditionalism combined with an economy in permanent crisis, the state of women’s rights, such as labor rights outside the home, has drastically regressed. The education in the region remains divided along separate national narratives, and change in that regard can be crucial for processes of dealing with the past and furthering peaceful coexistence. 4 Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

However, if history has taught us anything, it must be that taking things this far in any respect always comes at a great price. What these new forms of political organizations did not count on when they started their political nationalist campaign was the corrosion which was bound to come from within their own inner circles.10 For example, although the one-party system no longer exists in the current period of Slovenia’s independence 11, the previous ideological pattern would appear to persist. This aspect, combined with the problem of an insufficiently defined constitutional principle of separation, inevitably results in a sole rule of power. If the peoples of the Former Yugoslavia know how to do anything and to do it well, it is how to deal with a dictatorship and still survive and live well within the “communist state of mind”—a heritage encompassing all its totalitarian shades of blue.12 Even if we turn the tables and look at the situation from the perspective of an institution, the message is clear: for any form of organized religion to be able to enjoy a prosperous life, religious observance needs to come from individual choice. Religious observance must not be the result of any form of sociopolitical pressure. The moment that religious observance abandons the element of free will, a lack of authenticity is inevitable. A proof of this is the Bosnian Spring that took place, before our very eyes, 20 years after the bloody genocide. In this part of world, the search for homogeneity in religious communities as a form of nationhood always was, is, and will be contrafactual in at least two resepects: (1) they never were homogenic in the first place, despite historic data showing a number of successful attempts at ethnic cleansing (even genocide) aiming to do so and (2) the survival of the nation as the carrier of religious homogeneity—reflective of the main three religious movements in this area of the world—is turning them in the opposite direction from where the average individual wants them to head: which is, an entry into the European Union and its multicultural constitutional policy.

Notes

1. Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates About the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Introduction 5

2. Charles Taylor, Philosophy and Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 187–189. 3. James G. Carrier, “Introduction,” p. 2, in James G. Carrier and Daniel Miller, eds. Virtualism: A New Political Economy (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998), see also Karl Polanyi, “Aristotle Discovers the Economy,” in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson, eds. Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1957), see also Gareth Dale: 2010. 4. See chapter 1 of this volume. Jasna Jozelić, Politicization of Religion: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 5. See chapter 2 of this volume. Sergej Flere, Was the Bosnian War (1992–1995) a Full-Fledged Religious War? 6. See chapter 3 of this volume. Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić, The Role of the Catholic Church in the Bosnian Conflict 1992–1995: A Historical Approach. 7. Frano Prcela, Bogozaborav Razmišljanja o aktualnim izazovima Crkve, (Zagreb: Synopsis, 2014). 8. See chapter 4 of this volume. Kosta Milkov, The Gospel and Politics: Transforming Grace for Transformed Society? 9. See chapter 5 of this volume. Milan Vukmanović, Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics: Post-2000 Period. 10. See chapter 6 of this volume. Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović, The Political Dimensions of Orthodoxy in Montenegro. 11. See chapter 7 of this volume. Srečo Dragoš, The Separation between Church and State in Slovenia: A Political Fiasco. 12. See chapter 8 of this volume. Anton K. Berishaj, Religion and Politics in Kosovo.

1 Politicization of Religion: The Case of Bosnia- Herzegovina Jasna Jozelić

It is generally believed that the denial of the Muslim identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a recent phenomenon because it was not until the 1970s that the Muslims in former Yugoslavia were allowed to officially declare their Muslim identity. What this chapter will show is that there is a long and painful history of this denial, which is only reaching its climax in the present day within the European political context. This article focuses on “when” and “how” the politicization of religion was used in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a basic mechanism for the development of nationalist ideologies and dogmas. The “when” is presented in a historical overview whereas ‘how’ is analyzed in two respects: (1) How the transformation of the religious institutions led to the building of nationalist political organizations with a clearly religious denouncement and (2) how such (mis) use of religion as a practice in this historic setting played a significant role in the creation of a political platform for constructing both: the nationalist pretension from the

7 8 Jasna Jozelić neighboring states to the territory of Bosnia–Herzegovina and the formation of the Bosnian Muslim national identity. After the fall of the Yugoslav republic during the 1990s, and as a result of this systematic politicization, a newly awakened religious observance flourished in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The three-term trend “revival–reaction–politicization”1 is, today, clearly reflected in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a link between religious life and political nationalism is now firmly established. The nationalists mobilized forces and pushed the country in the direction of national “allocation” and the development of the modern Bosnian state. Such mobilization appears to be at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims and, especially, at the expense of an independent Bosnian state. This development is expressed in two ways: (1) the politicization of religion for the purpose of promoting nationalist extremism and the prosecution of Bosnian Muslims (Bošnjaks) before and after the 1990s and (b) Bosnian Muslim’s (benevolent) politicization of history and religion as a form of response to the extremism and genocide they were exposed to during the 1990s. In order to see the extent to which these processes have gone, and to get a complete picture of these processes, one has to be aware of the history of the Bosnian statehood in the Middle Ages. Therefore, first, in brief, certain historic events and processes vital to the question around politicization of religion will be discussed together with the impact that have on today’s situation in Bosnia–Herzegovina. There are four key elements to understanding how religion, specifically Islam, in the case of Bosnia–Herzegovina was used in order to achieve substantial nationalist goals.

1. The Bogumil2 question and the question of the independent Bosnian Church; both questions used and abused for the purpose of denying the continuity and existence of the Bosnian State 2. The islamization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3. The politicization and use of religion in the wake of the war in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s that resulted in the genocide and war crimes committed against Bosniaks in Bosnia–Herzegovina. 4. Islam as a common basis for the identity construction of a national identity. Politicization of Religion 9

Historical background: Medieval Islam and Bosnia’s entry into history

The Bosnian state is mentioned, for the first time, in history in 900 AD. The Bosnian state formed around the river Bosnia, the center of today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina.3 The population primarily consisted of Southern Slavs who moved to the area in the seventh century, at the time when the supremacy over Bosnia shifted between the Roman Empire, the Hungarians, and the Byzantines. Bosnia, as a feudal state, is mentioned in historical sources for the first time in 1180.4 The Golden Age of Bosnian history is the Kulin Bans reign (1180–1204), when Bosnia was at the inter- section between Roman and Byzantine influences—a time of conflict and rivalry between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Church. This conflict was, according to historians, the background for the creation and distribution of the Bosnian Church, although this claim is often denied due to scarcity of historical sources on the Bosnian Church.5 According to historians, Bosnians created their own version of indigenous Christianity and the independent Bosnian Church identity based on the Bosnian feudal state.6 Their identity as an independent Bosnian Church was a foundation for the resistance against the growing pressure from the Byzantine and the Roman Catholic Church.7 In return, the reaction, especially from the Vatican, was persecution, Crusades, and increased missionary activity. Under the rule of king Stjepan Kotromanić’s Bosnian dynasty (1322–1353), the Bosnian medieval kingdom, as the Bosnian state, expanded toward the Adriatic and Herzegovina and incorporated these areas as a part of Bosnia. When the Kotromanić dynasty later converted to Catholicism, the Bosnian Church lost its position of power in relation to the ruling class and its political influence. During the rule of king Tvrtko I (1353–1391), Bosnia became a strong medieval state with a population divided into three denominations: Catholics, Orthodox, and Bogumil (members of the Bosnian Church). Catholics lived in central and western Bosnia, the Orthodox Christians lived in the east, and Bogumils lived in northern and central Bosnia. After the death of king Tvrtko I in 1391, Hungary and the Vatican forced Bosnia to pursue the Bogumils because they were regarded as heretics and, as such, were a danger to the powerful Vatican. The subsequent power struggle between the Bosnian nobles for the political and economic influences led the Bosnian kingdom into a chaos that lasted until the Ottoman Empire’s occupation of Bosnia. 10 Jasna Jozelić

The long and complex process of islamization of medieval Bosnia started at the beginning of the fourteenth century as the result of the Ottoman Empire’s military triumphs.8 At that time, the majority of the Bosnian population were Christians. Catholicism dominated most of the kingdom’s territory. Orthodox Christians dominated the eastern parts of Bosnia, whereas the rest of the population belonged to the Bosnian Bogumil Church. During the islamization period, a large number of the Catholic population escaped to the northern parts of Bosnia and, further on, to the territory of Croatia. The Bogumil and the Orthodox population, however, showed interest in conversion to Islam.9 One of the possible explanations as to why this part of the population showed an interest in conversion to Islam was also that the Ottoman Empire guaranteed the right to exercise religion (as well as in Serbia and Bulgaria) in the occupied territory. In return, the Ottoman Empire demanded loyalty. As a result, despite conversion, most of the population managed to retain some of their own traditions, including the language. The Christians’ religious rules and traditions that survived this conversion were predominantly the rules and traditions regarding marriage, inheritance, mourning of the dead, and similar cases.10 Another explanation as to why the population showed interest in conversion to Islam was that Islam also fused well with other local religious forms in the area. Today, still, one can see similarities in various religious rituals that have remained preserved in all groups, regardless of religious affiliation. As a result of the Turkish occupation, Bosnia—previously characterized by poverty and fragmentation—suddenly experienced prosperity and growth. “In Bosnia we had a unique situation, the political and economic power was with a Slavic, Muslim upper classes that had hereditary nobility privileges and were allowed to keep their goods.”11 The “good will” of the people toward religious conversion played a key role for Bosnia–Herzegovina’s prosperous future in the Ottoman Empire. The process of occupation was considered as successful by the occupy- ing power and, in return, Bosnia received a special status within the Ottoman Empire, which was bestowed by Sultan Mehmed El-Fatih.12 During the Ottoman period in Bosnia, Islam was a state religion, and the local authorities were mainly recruited from the local population. This was a form of “inclusion” of the local community in the leading structure that was not seen in other parts of the area occupied by the Ottoman Empire. In other words, those who converted to Islam received Politicization of Religion 11 status and power beyond that of their Christian co-citizens. Moreover, this resulted in a kind of “juridicial discrimination” that was expressed in forbidding Christians from carrying weapons or riding horses, both of which were considered status symbols in society, or from the possibility of Christians taking a Muslim to court.13

Bogumils and Islamization

The Bogumil question in Bosnia is, without doubt, a case of more alleged facts and interpretations than in any other part of Bosnian history. Bosnian historians believe that the Bogumil question played a crucial role in the process of islamization of medieval Bosnia14 because the Bosnian Church was regarded as a counterweight to religious pressure from the Catholic and the Orthodox Church.15 Its role as a counterweight followed by mass conversion as a part of the islamization process has been interpreted by the Bosnian Muslims as identity-forming or a form of symbolic representation of national continuity and legitimacy. At the same time, no other factor except the unique history of the Bogumils in medieval Bosnia was used, by either Bosnia’s neighboring countries and by the Bosnians themselves, for the purpose of creating myths and ideologies about the Bosnian nation’s building and identity. Myths of how a nation is built always have the same logic behind them, regardless of which nation is building them: “through myth, boundaries are established within the community and also in respect to other communities. Those who do not share in the myth are by definition excluded.”16 In the case of Bosnia, these myths were essential for the bordering neighbor’s 17attempts to cast doubts on the Bosnian nation’s continuity. By these attempts to deny the sovereignty of the Bosnian nation, the neighboring countries were hoping to achieve the realization of their own territorial aspirations to the Bosnian territory. The existence and purpose of the Bosnian Church in their common history was the primary target of these attacks because “ . . . a national heretical (or allegedly heretical) Church arouses a more special sense of identification, for many historians of Bosnia, this peculiarly Bosnian phenomenon lies at the heart of Bosnian nationhood.”18 The interpretations of historical theories about (the) Bogumils and their role in social and political development in Bosnia had strict nationalist tendencies regardless of the neighboring country from which they came. 12 Jasna Jozelić

Today, these tendencies and political trends have been “modernized” and, nevertheless, are still an important contribution to the nationalist and ideological dogmas of modern Bosnia–Herzegovina. This approach included a number of complex (political) aspects: (1) questioning the existence of a heretic medieval Bosnian Church, (2) doubting the number of church followers and their impact on politics and religion, (3) questioning the role of the Bosnian Church, if it at all had played any role in the building of Bosnian identity, and (4) doubting whether the “Bogumil question” had played as important role as alleged in the massive and successful conversion of medieval Bosnians to Islam. Much of the literature written about this specific historical period is filled with an intense nationalist agenda. This literature almost always ends by presenting an unfortunate mythological conception of the Bogumils and their role in the formation of the Bosnian state. What all of these rogue stories, not to say straightforward negations, have in common, is the expressed doubt toward the recognition of the continuity and the historical existence of a separate and independent Bosnian state. The most frequent example of such negation is the widely used mythologization of Bogumils among Serbian historians who portray Bogumils as nothing other than a breakaway sect of the Orthodox Church. They reject the claim of the Bogumils of having been members of an independent Bosnian Church who opposed the Orthodox Church’s pressure and influence.19 According to Serbian nationalists, there was an Orthodox majority in Bosnia, and the Bogumils were never a separate entity outside the Orthodox Church. Such political attacks are made despite the number of historic sources and the literature written on the theme document- ing Bogumils as members of an independent Bosnian Church, which opposed the Orthodox Church’s pressure and influence. Such misinterpretations is one of many similar misinterpretations that demonstrate attempts to increase the collective feelings of nationalists and, thereby, legitimize and justify their nationalist pretensions to Bosnia. Parallel to the Serb nationalists, Croatian nationalists also make use of similar misinterpretations. Among Bosniaks the theory of Franjo Rački is mainly used as a legiti- mization of the Bosnian state and as proof of its continuity. Franjo Rački was a Croatian historian of the nineteenth century who documented the link between the Bosnian Church and the Bogumils and, thus, Politicization of Religion 13 documented the organization, structure, and teaching of the Bosnian Church and the Bogumil tradition in Bosnia.20 His theory proves that the Bosnians are direct heirs to a native Bosnian culture and tradition, and their benevolent conversion to Islam was a kind of rebellion or a form of escape from the emergent pressures of the Orthodox and Catholic politicization of religion in the area.

Islamization

The islamization of Bosnia in the 1400s is, just as the Bogumil question in Bosnia, a very controversial topic. Some believe that islamization was carried out by force whereas others believe that the success of islamization was due to economic incentives.21 The widely accepted theory among Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) is the theory of the historian Alexander Solovjev,22 wherein he claims that the conversion of Muslims took place on a large scale because of the similarities between the Bogumils’ teaching and Islam: their religious teachings (“heresy” and Islam), their common ethical standards, and the Bogumils’ reaction to the pressure from the Catholic and Orthodox church. In addition, Solovjev claims that the benevolence toward converts was a reaction to the persecution of Bogumils carried out by the Catholic and the Orthodox Christians. Solovjev’s main contention is that the disappearance of the Bogumils and the Bosnian church is a direct consequence of the islamization of Bosnians. The most accepted view of the islamization of Bosnia in Bosnia– Hercegovina today is Mark Pinson’s23 notion of the “acceptance” of Islam. Pinson’s notion of “acceptance” follows logically from Soslovjev’s argument. “Acceptance” compared with the concept of “conversion,” in Pinson’s opinion, explains more plausibly the conditions under which Bosnians turned to Islam. Through the act of “accepting” Islam, Bosnians preserved their own traditions, meaning that, to some extent, they also preserved Christian religious rituals. For Pinson, the islamization process was a long and gradual process. Pinson refers to the Turkish “defter” or tax lists,24 where you can see an overview of households in the Middle Ages in Bosnia and wherein there is sufficient evidence that islamization took place overnight. What these tax lists shows is that the Ottoman Empire has led to a culture and a civilization that was based on an urban way of life and structure. The introduction of Ottoman 14 Jasna Jozelić institutions such as mosques and “Medrese” (education institutions) led to an organized society. It was in contrast to the political, social, and economic fragmentation that characterized medieval Bosnian society. Moreover, this would serve as another explanation for reasons why the people of Bosnia accepted Islam and looked at the occupation by the Ottoman Empire as a “step forward” for their community. A common factor among these theories is that they are selectively accepted by several political groups as a way of supporting their ideological positions with regard to the existence of common Bosnian heritage and identity.

Denial of the Bosnian State

After the fall of communism and the return of religious freedom,25 the intensity of the denial of the existence of the Bosnian state and pressure on the Muslim identity by Serbian and Croatian nationalists continued to increase. The denial came to a climax when Croatia and Serbia went to war against Bosnia–Herzegovina in 1992, a war which continued until 1995.26 The place of the Bosnian Muslims in ex-Yugoslavia and, later, in the Bosnian state was marginalized. The “knowledge” about the past (the Bosnian state) played a key role in this process of marginalization. This “knowledge” had an effect on the present experience: the Bosnian Muslims’ position in relation to the Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs) nationalists and the Bosnian Catholic (Croats) nationalists, who do not recognize the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniak) as equal partners in the political and cultural reality in Bosnia–Herzegovina today. Systematic persecution of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniak) in their own country was carried out by Croat forces as was the genocide27 by Serb forces. Bosniaks were systematically killed, tortured, and raped while the international community failed to prevent or stop these unprecedented hostilities at the end of the twentieth century, within the borders of Europe. One of the effects of such hostilities was a change in the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniaks) perception of the political and religious reality.28 The complex cultural, political, and economic reality was usually “explained” by the nationalists by means of narrative historical flashbacks and through mythological representations29 of certain historical events. Such Politicization of Religion 15 positions were, and still are today, intended to legitimize the derogation and denial of the place Islam and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) should have in modern Bosnia–Hercegovina. The alleged main argument, described earlier, concerning the absence of the continuous national existence of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and a Bosnian state by Serb and Croat nationalists was, and is, continually on the increase. The attacks, these days, are coming into full and renewed strength within the political, economic, and cultural power struggle that took and still is taking place in modern Bosnia–Herzegovina, as witnessed by the “Bosnian Spring” protests on the streets of almost all sizeable urban environments across the country. The islamization of Bosnia as a historical process has a definite impact on the position of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. During the 1990s, almost all political statements and actions from Serb and Croat nationalists related precisely to this historical process. Catholicism and Orthodoxy were, at the political level, seen as epicenters for establishing and developing Croatian and the Serbian enclaves on the territory of Bosnia–Herzegovina, whereas the Muslims were excluded from this process under a ridiculous excuse: the conversion to Islam in the Middle Ages. The statements ranged from claims that Bosnia–Herzegovina never existed as a politically independent state to claims that the existence of Bosnia was connected to its neighboring states. This was the result of the majority of the Bosnian Catholics (Croats) and the Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs) perceiving it to be more natural to lean toward their “original” homeland of Serbia and Croatia. During the construction of their own understanding of identity after the dissolution of the Yugoslav republic, an independent Bosnian state was predominantly seen by both neighboring groups as a burden on the already developed national states of Serbia and Croatia. Such neighborly attitudes only reinforced the decision by the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) to claim recognition of both the state and their national identity.30 Serbian and Croatian nationalism spread quickly across Bosnia– Herzegovina in two directions. First, the realization of the long-standing territorial pretensions by Serbia and Croatia was demonstrated by the use of their military force on the territory of Bosnia–Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. Second, there was the renewal of the denials of Bosnia–Herzegovina’s sovereignty and of Bosnian Muslims’ (Bosniaks) rights to their independence. This exclusion of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) from the planning of the nationalistic reorganization of 16 Jasna Jozelić

Bosnia–Herzegovina was, nevertheless, based on the role Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) had in the political reality of the former Yugoslavia, which unfortunately was marginal. The fact that the Bosnian Muslims did not have the “right of reservation” or the possibility of support from either one of the neighboring countries only intensified the importance of defending themselves and re-asserting the continuity of medieval Bosnia and the Muslim “natural” affinity (Bogumil background) within the same state. The attempted historical misinterpretations of Bosnia–Herzegovina created by the Serbian and Croatian nationalists was a means to an end that, in this case, was mobilization for their own cause: an attempt to impede the creation of an independent Bosnian state in the wake of the disintegration of the Yugoslav republic (SFRJ). Establishing the independent modern Bosnian state31 stood in the way of the reconstruction of the Serb nationalists’ dream of “all Serbs in one state, Great Serbia” as well as all the nationalism associated with the dream of “Great Croatia.” Besides their obvious territorial pretentions to Bosnian territory, their cultural aspirations were also clearly demonstrated at a symbolic level.32 Each side in the conflict was eager to eliminate the religious symbols of others and to replace them with their own as an attempt at marking a territory as their own while keeping other nationalities at a safe distance. The political–symbolic reconstruction of the three national groups in Bosnia–Herzegovina was made with extensive use of oral re-telling and re-interpretation of historical events and historical facts. For the Serb and Croat nationalists, these falsified reconstructions were a necessary means to creating misrepresentations of evidence for the discontinuity of the Bosnian state and a distinctive Bosnian nation. Nonetheless, the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) demanded political and the cultural recognition from the Serbian and Croatian sectors. This requirement—a reaction to the pressure that Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were exposed to—resulted in the mobilization of members of the three main national groups in Bosnia–Hercegovina33 into a tug of war: the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) against the other two groups whose intentions were to create a nation and a national identity based only on an extension of the two national states: Serbia and Croatia. The ethnic identity of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) is linked to the territorial integrity and political and legal continuity of the Bosnian state; therefore, the Muslim ethnic identity cannot be seen apart from Bosnian history.34 This pressure led to problems in defining itself as a Politicization of Religion 17 national group, as the Serbs (Bosnian Serb-Orthodox) and Croats (Bosnian Catholics) have defined themselves. The fact that the Bosnian Muslims were subjected to persecution and genocide during the war of 1992–1995 shows that these current factors determine their memories whereas past factors determine their experience of the present.35 Gaining control of their social memory has been extensively adapted by the power hierarchy. Most of the historic strategies nationalists used in Bosnia–Herzegovina during their recruitment of people for their nationalist purpose were adapted to the power struggle to win “the truth.” Polarities between the different performances, especially the ones connected to religious symbolism, gave strength to the imagined opposing community in all three national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.36 With its imagined community, they legitimized their actions, their attitudes, and, above all, their values. What is special about Bosnia-Herzegovina is that all three religious groups (as well as other smaller groups) have shared a common memory.37 This common memory is based on a shared common culture, language, and, especially, a common history. In the case of Bosnia– Herzegovina, national ideology is interpreted in three different ways, even if these historic performances, in turn, create a kind of common social memory. There are three different views on the role of the medieval Bosnian Church in relation to a distinctive Bosnian identity and islamization in the Middle Ages. The three national interpretations of this historical process and the repetition of these interpretations among the three main national groups led to the formation of a notion as to what was meant to be the proper historical presentation. On the one hand, it legitimized the marginalization of a single group—the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks)—whereas, on the other, it legitimized the creation of a common national identity that acts as a counterweight to the Serbian and Croatian nation-states. The argument most frequently used in connection with the denial of the state of Bosnia was the historical requirement of continuity of the Bosnian state. Ivan Lovrenoviċ, well-known Bosnian writer and intellectual, pointed out in his article on Bosnian continuity that looking at the continuity of the state as the sole criterion38 for the award of state was used in the construction of an unchecked political, national–symbolic use of history and its processes. Discontinuity characterizes the entire 18 Jasna Jozelić

Bosnian history, in terms of national political organization, religion, and other cultural processes. Not that this provides a justification to accord a special status for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What he emphasizes in his interpretation and argumentation is that the “discontinuity evidence of a common heritage” is something that none of the main three national groups in Bosnia can escape from.39 What made the position of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) more vulnerable in relation to the Serbian and Croatian national revival was that the Bosnian Muslims had to both reinforce and “rediscover” their own identity and gain the recognition of their identity from the other two groups. Bosnian Orthodox and Bosnian Catholics, under “friendly” political pressure from their “mother countries,” that assumed they had on the continuity of their national consciousness through their “native” countries. As part of their assumption, they engaged into an intense denial of any form of common continuity, either national or cultural, among the three main nations of Bosnia–Herzegovina. They turned to, as they claimed, their “native countries” through the rediscovery of their common religious connection, rather than recognizing their true, common, and uniting Bosnian nationhood. They did so despite the fact that the only thing these two groups ever had in common with their “native” countries were their respective domineering religions—Catholicism and Orthodoxy. How has the religious, cultural, and political struggle and the national recognition of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in relation to the Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs) and Bosnian Catholics (Croats) influenced the recognition of the Modern Bosnian state? Mohammed Filipović40 claims that the referendum on independence for Bosnia–Herzegovina from Yugoslavia in 1992 has been a very important point in Bosnian history. When the referendum results showed that the majority of Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs) opposed independence, the political reality became even more hostile in relation to the issue of an independent Bosnian state. The referendum in Filipović’s opinion definitely decided the future of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in several ways. First, he looks at the decision of the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) politicians who were under religious influence to associate the identity of the Bosnian Muslims to their religion, Islam, and not to the Bosnian state that, in his opinion, has a 1000-year long state tradition. The problem is that, for Filipović, such a decision indirectly implicates that they do not necessarily connect Politicization of Religion 19 the existence of a state to (existence of) the state’s borders and territory. Second, Filipović sees such a decision concerning the Bosnjaks existence and the existence of the state of Bosnia as being made in relation to both the Serb and Croat nation states.41 The use of religious symbols, the interpretation of historical events, and of even more the religious character were the means of resurrecting a national Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) ideology. This was seen as necessary because the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniak), as a group, were defined42 as a territorial, comprehensive high society in which most members did not know each other personally. Imagined communities43 were, thus, instrumental to the Bosnian Muslims’ (Bosniaks) share of a national identity. According to Michael A. Sells, one could, during the 1992–1995 war, see a form of religious nationalism, such as in the army, that had its basis in religion and the use of religious symbols. This confirmed a common basis for nationalist attacks toward the Bosnian government and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in general. An image was created of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) through “a national mythology that portrays Slavic Muslims as Christ killers and Race Traitors.”44 The Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs) and Bosnian Catholic (Croats) nationalists presented their political agendas against the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniak) by accusing the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) of the desire to create their own Muslim state in Bosnia–Herzegovina. In this case, the argument45 that our experience of the present depends on our knowledge of the past, and that our ideas about the past legitimize the present social systems was, clearly, the way forward for the nationalists: Serb and Croat nationalists used these conceptions (performances) and, thus, legitimized their claims to domination over Bosnia–Herzegovina, while, at the same time, nationalism among Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) emerged. There is little doubt that Islam has become a burden for Europe and the world at large, and the fear of a Muslim state in the European ideological and political space appeared in the form of a reluctance to respond to and initiate serious negotiations to assist Bosnia–Herzegovina before and during the war. Such a policy led Europe to witness the worst war crimes on its territory since World War II. The war in Bosnia (1992–1995) was characterized, among other things, by a very strong religious symbolism and mythology.46 Michael Sells went so far as to call it a religious genocide in several senses. The victims of genocide were 20 Jasna Jozelić targeted based on their religious identity, the violence was grounded in religious mythology, and perpetrators were protected by policymakers in a Western world culturally dominated by Christianity.47 All this led Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) to see no other way out but, in order to secure their purely physical survival, to promote their own ethno-national unity and defence of their Bosnian state borders. Unfortunately, that was not a new or unknown policy because similar Serb and Croat claims to Bosnian territory were also well manifested during the World War II.48 In 1993, at the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniaks) conference held in Sarajevo, it was decided that the national designation “Muslim” should be changed to “Bosniaks.” Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) believed that changing the designation would lead to experiencing national independence and, arguably, religious independence. The Islamic religion becomes the basis for the national otherness in relation to the Bosnian Serb–Orthodox (Serbs) and Bosnian Catholics (Croats).49 Did this decision endanger the idea of a joint multi-religious, multi- national, multi-ethnic Bosnian state? To a certain extent, the answer is: yes it did. When Islam became the basis for national identity formation, it became much easier for both the Serbian and Croatian nationalists to claim that the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) wanted to create a separate Muslim state without “making” the Bosnian state for the Bosnian people as it was previously. Defending the boundaries of the state of Bosnia–Herzegovina was difficult. By attacking the state borders, the neighboring states denied the sovereignty of the Bosnian state and its independence. Moreover, by doing so, they denied the existence of and their right to nationhood [to the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks)]. Only the existence of the Bosnian state and its sovereignty allows the survival of the Bosnian Muslims.50 Bosniaks, in particular, cannot separate themselves from the unity of Bosnia because, in their case, national sovereignty does not automatically result from the adoption of a national identity.51 The ethnic identity of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) is associated with the territorial integrity and the political and legal/judicial continuity of the Bosnian state. Therefore, the ethnic identity of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) cannot be seen as separate from Bosnian history, which is the common history of all three major ethnic groups. Questioning the Bosnian Muslims’ (Bosniaks) religious and cultural origin is the biggest paradox of the existing nationalistic myths. Any attempt to minimize the fact that Bosnia, in its long history, was under intense influence from other Politicization of Religion 21 cultures and religions as well as how it, in turn, influenced society, the culture, and its people is a clear denial of their own heritage.52

The definition of the Bosnian Muslims’ identity

Placing the focus on religion, Islam in particular, when defining the identity of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), can be seen as a response to the new political, social, and, definitely, the religious realities that prevailed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during and after the war of 1992–1995. Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were politically in the middle of the conflict between the neighboring countries. Serbia and Croatia used the Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs) and Bosnian Catholics (Croats) in their own battle to take over the Bosnian territorial and traditional cultural areas by putting pressure on them through their nationalist propaganda. At the same time, even greater pressure was placed on Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). In a war-ravaged country with a destroyed infrastructure, major demographic changes resulted from ethnic cleansing, genocide, and partition of the Bosnian state. (ref. Bosnian Federation and R.S.) After the signing of the Dayton Agreement, they felt forced to accept all these drastic political and demographic changes. Seen from the perspective of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), it appeared as if they had no choice in relation to the enforced changes but to take up the line of enhancing their own identity as a separate ethnic entity in an attempt to balance the power struggle. The need for a clearer definition of their place in the new society required the construction of strong national institutions and their recruitment on the basis of their common background, in this case, Islam. Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) intellectuals started a nationalist mobilization of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in their struggle for recognition and the formation of a nation. At the time, there was little to no interest from Europe to support the nation building of modern Bosnia–Herzegovina. Left without options within Europe, Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) looked for support from a larger context in the direction of the Islamic world, turning to the Muslim countries— Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia—among others. The dilemma that the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were facing was twofold: it was a question of clarifying the Muslims’ position in relation to Serbia and Croatia, and it was a question of building their own individual identity that could refute all claims of Serbia and Croatia to the 22 Jasna Jozelić

Bosnia–Herzegovina’s territory and cultural heritage. In other words, the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) had to build their own national identity as a countermeasure to the parallel, national identity-building processes by Bosnian Catholics and Bosnian Orthodox, enforced by the correlation to the same processes in Serbia and Croatia.53 The Muslim leadership, both political and religious, wanted to define the Muslim identity through rebuilding Muslim institutions, by showing such a reconstruction to be the only way for the Bosnian Muslims to survive as a group. Religious affiliation was an important element in defining the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). Islam was presented as a common basis for Bosnian national identity. The reconstruction of the nation was necessary in order to legitimize the growing nationalism of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). The Bosnian Muslims legitimized nationalism in response to their experiences from the war years. From a sociological perspective, it is, by no means, strange that religion is central to the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) nation and to building a national identity.54 In a modern society, religious practice breaks down into: (1) how each religious tradition grows and affects the social lives of people who participate in society, (b) that religious tradition involves a set of beliefs that influence and are part of the rituals and institutions, and (3) that each tradition constructs a religious ethos that defines acceptable and unacceptable behavior, defines identity, legitimiz- ing social order, and, not least, gives “guidance” for everyday life. This religion-based identity was the response of Bosnian Muslims to their desire for a stronger self-definition in relation to the Bosnian Orthodox and Bosnian Catholics who have associated their national identity with the Orthodox and the Catholic Church, respectively. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Muslims had to “find” answers to the question of how it was possible that such suffering (genocide and ethnic cleansing) could befall them. After socialist secular society disintegrated, the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were “forced” to look for answers necessary for their rebuilding of nationhood in a different place: religion. Nevertheless, the fact that “religion” has survived for thousands of years in various social forms testifies to its ability to deal with overwhelming problems.55 As Connerton formulates it so well: The existence of past injustice and the continued memory of that injustice raises the question of the reification of injustice. For if past injustice has shaped the structure of a society’s present arrangements for holding property Politicization of Religion 23

in various ways or analogously if it is held that past injustice has shaped the structure of a society’s arrangements for founding it sovereignty – the question arises as to what now, if anything, ought to be done to rectify these injustices.56 What significance did the historical reconstruction have on the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and their ability to rediscover and strengthen their religious togetherness? For Connerton, historical reconstruction is not dependent on social memory. However, this independence from social memory—the practice of historical reconstruction—can, in important ways, receive a guiding impetus from, and can, in turn, give significant shape to, the memory of social groups.57 The promotion of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) as inheritors of the medieval Bosnian Church as the cornerstone of the Bosnian identity, in turn, laid the foundation for a common social memory in Bosnian Muslims. The fact that the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) have a common religion that connects them to each other reinforces their identity as a group in relation to Bosnian Orthodox and Bosnian Catholics. Defining the Bosnian Muslims, both politically and nationally, was done in order to point out their cultural and religious backgrounds. The myth of the Bogumils and their alleged heresy in relationship to the Orthodox and the Catholic Church and the Muslim’s background as “converts” contributed to the definition. “ . . . Whether the activity of historical reconstruction is systematically repressed or whether it flourishes expansively, it leads to the production of formal, written histories.”58 Because the story was conveyed narratively, the reconstruction of history by the nationalist and political ideologies had enhanced effect: “The production of more or less informally told narrative histories turns out to be a basic activity for characterization of human actions. It is a feature of all communal memory.”59 In Bosnian history, specific historical narratives have become a sensitive element in the political arena. The fact that the war was justified by reference to the myth of the defence of Christian Europe from Muslim attacks reinforced the war’s actions in the sense that it was easier to recruit those who were willing to die for the cause.60 The Democratic Action Party (Stranka Demokratske Akcije SDA), the Bosnian Muslim political party (the carrier of the process of political emancipation of Bosnian Muslims),61 was central to the development of the Bosnian Muslim national identity. They did their “duty” to the nation 24 Jasna Jozelić by presenting “official nationalism”62 as a conscious, self-protective policy, closely linked to the preservation of the interests of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and their physical and cultural existence. This is official nationalism in the sense that it is initiated by the state and that it primarily serves the interest of the state. However, this method of constructing national identity was met with resistance by the secular Bosnian Muslims and other Bosnian citizens who believed in a common Bosnian identity based om multi-religiosity and culture. Why did Bosnian leaders need to justify these changes to the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), and how did they proceed? There were several reasons for the necessity of this justification. One of the reasons was that most Bosnian Muslims had their own perception of identity. For many Bosnian Muslims, national and religious identities were not crucial to their own self-understanding, their own sense of who they were, and to whom they belonged. Such self-awareness led to the fact that Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), in relation to the Bosnian Orthodox and Catholics, never developed their own (strong) national institutions that could represent them and their national unity either politically or culturally. One of the reasons for this lack of identity as a third national entity was the way in which Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were looked upon in the Yugoslav state; that is as marginal when it came to the distribution of power. Firstly, Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were not recognized as a national group until the 1970s when the national question was solved and they defined themselves as “Muslim.” Prior to that, the Bosnian Muslims had their national identity defined as either Serbs or Croats, or remained “undeclared.” By defining themselves as “Muslim,” the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were finally recognized as a national group. This hesitant attitude towards the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a national group made them weaker with regard to their own place in the Bosnian nationhood in relation to the Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs) citizens and Catholics (Croats). Furthermore, the development of their nationhood was closely related to the ongoing national construct in Serbia and Croatia. Secondly, another reason for the explanation and justification of re-islamization of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) was that the majority of Bosnian Muslims were secularized. This means that their identity was not mainly related to religion. In other words, the desired development of national identity Politicization of Religion 25 through religious awakening also had to persuade and include secular Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslim political elite with Alija Izetbegović and other leaders of the political party SDA63 wanted to build national independence on the Bosnian Muslim national identity, with an undoubtedly religious character. These re-definitions of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were not broadly accepted initially. The religious and political leadership had underestimated the strength of a large number of Bosnian Muslims who linked their identity to a Western European way of life, secularism, and a common Bosnian heritage. Many Bosnian Muslims, especially the secular population, saw their religious identity as tradition–symbolism and not as something that would either identify them as individuals or designate their national affiliation. Many of the rural, as well as the majority of urban, Muslims had a sense of being a Muslim that was limited, more to a cultural tradition than an expression of their religious identity. The reason for such a secularized Muslim population, can be found in the context of the Yugoslav state that was secular. Islam’s religious expression in the Yugoslav state was secularized with elements of Christian syncretic elements, superstition, and influence by Sufi mysti- cism.64 In a conservative religious, sense there were not many practising Muslims. Religious expression was visible among the Bosnian Muslims, but it was more of a popular interpretation of Islam and its practices. The use of hijab (shawl) prevailed mainly in the rural part of Bosnia. All religious activities and rules were significantly interpreted liberally as compared to Islamic practices in other Islamic countries. This was accompanied by a very liberal interpretation of, for instance, the consumption of alcohol and a relaxed approach to the covering of hair in women. Muslims, as have other religious communities, have kept their autonomy from state regulation regarding the institution of marriage, the circumcision of boys, the celebration of Ramadan, and the use of traditional Muslim clothing that, at the same time, was considered more a cultural than a religious tradition.65 Within the Muslim nation discourses were initiated in which: “Two quite distinct trends can be seen in Bosnia during this period: this movement of secular ‘Muslim nationalism’, and a separate revival of Islam religious belief.”66 The way the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) politicians, led by Alija Izetbegović, handled the challenge was by combining Islamic values with a humanistic ethical ground so that the increasing religiosity within 26 Jasna Jozelić the re-building of a national identity would not alienate the rest of the population that was not religious. This strategy worked by not choosing exclusively the side of either the secular or the not-so-religious Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) actors in society.67 Structuring the approach in this way ensured that the debate on a common definition of the Bosnian Muslims did not dispearse the already politically divided Muslims. What was the reception of this idea among the religious Muslims? There was a great opposition to the “secularization” of the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) national identity from the political and religious elite, with, respectively, Alija Izetbegović and Reis Mustafa Cerić in the lead. They saw the need to re-Islamize Bosnian Muslim national identity as a kind of compensation for a weak Bosnian state and the persecution that Muslims had been through. The intention was that a strong Muslim nation would make Muslims gain equal status with other national groups in Bosnia–Herzegovina. Furthermore, the idea was met with resistance (by two other national entities) within the Bosnian state and in neighboring countries (Serbia and Croatia) and, above all, in the larger European context/community. At this time, it was clear that no one in Europe wanted to see the construction of a Muslim nation at the heart of Europe. Muslims were prepared to accept such a rejection although they felt a natural part of both the Bosnian state and Europe. This was clearly expressed by the Bosnian religious leader Reis Mustafa Cerić:

. . . The truth is that the Muslims in this country (Bosnia) do not understand Islam . . . They do not practice Islam, they have only their names which are Muslim, and that is tradition. Some of them do not even know they are Muslim. And yet, as Muslims in this country, we live in a paradox all the time. On the one hand we are European, on the other we don’t know what to do about Europe. We cannot at the moment love it, we cannot trust it, we cannot hate it, we cannot deny it, for we are part of it. We are in a similar position in relation to the Serbs and Croats, with whom we share this country, and who disagree between themselves over everything except one thing: their relationship to the Muslims, and their common need to destroy us. We are “Muslims” now, because they did not allow us to be Bosnians. And now that we are Muslims, they all say “that is a religious category, not a nationality, it doesn’t count.” And so we say then can we please be Bosnians after all, and they, Europe included, say no, because there is no Bosnia anymore.68

However, the secular Bosnian Muslims still had a negative attitude toward the religious influence in their national definition, despite all Politicization of Religion 27 the assurances that came from the Muslim political leaders: turning to their religious roots, being presented as the only way to unite all Muslims under a common basis—namely, Islam. This debate continues to occupy the majority of Bosnian Muslims who believed what Rusmir Mahmutćehajić expressed: The ethnic identity of the Bosnian Muslims cannot be separated from Bosnian history. This means that Bosnia’s lasting unity in diversity has shaped this people’s spiritual and cultural features. It is expressed in a continuing process of coexistence between different religious traditions in the same region for a thousand years of history.69 The desire to build the national independence of Bosnia–Herzegovina has, without a doubt, put a religious stamp on the Bosnian Muslim national identity. For ordinary citizens of the Bosnian state who are Muslims, the definition of their Muslim identity is more an expression of frustration that has its roots in the physical, religious, and cultural denial of their existence and the existence of the Bosnian state. Their relationship to religion is more intense than was the case before, only to show to the world that they are Muslims, to become more visible and accepted than before. The first step toward an independent and free expression in the direction of a broad acceptance of their role in the new reality was to regain their own self-understanding of being Muslim. These were the first signs of a re-islamization of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and the Bosnian state and national institutions. What is happening today in Bosnia–Herzegovina? Much has changed since the 1990s. The new religious and political Bosnian elite emphasize Islam as a key element in the new Bosnian identity. Islam has become a marker of national identity, and is used as the controller of the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) population.70 With the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the world, together with the Bosnians, Serb, and Croat leaders, laid the foundation for a split and “confused” political reality. The Dayton Agreement has built the constitutional framework that, on the one hand, ensures all Bosnian citizens protection against discrimination but, on the other, sets up a political system that actually discriminates on the basis of ethnicity.71 At the time, the argumentation for doing so was a hope that the three constituent ethnic groups (Muslims/Bosniaks, Orthodox, and Catholic), after a certain time, would agree on ethnic balance in the state system (parliament, government) and try to build a civil statutory system. Instead, so many years later, the Dayton Agreement has created the climate for an 28 Jasna Jozelić apparent continuation of the nationalist “dream” of decentralization and ultimate destruction of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as we know it. During the implementation process, Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two units. Republika Srpska is now populated by a mostly Orthodox majority, after all the other ethnic groups who originally lived in these areas were subjected to ethnic cleansing and war crimes. The acceptance of the foundation of the Republika Srpska by Europe and the West, in general, created great controversy. The construction of a state within a state was allowed and, not least, not condoned as a creation built on the basis of the worst of war crimes—genocide. The second unit is the Bosnian Federation that is populated with Muslims (who are in the majority), Catholics, Orthodox, and many national minority groups. The questions whether this is the beginning of the end or if there is still hope for the Bosnian state to finally get its deserved place as an independent state, for the time being, remains open.

Notes

1. Ateş Altinordu, Comparing the Past and Present of Religious Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2009), p. 5. 2. Bogumiler was a Gnostic religious political sect believed to be founded in Bulgaria. The Bogomils were dualists in that they believed the world was created not by the Abrahamic God, but by an evil demiurge. They used neither the cross nor built churches, preferring to perform rituals outdoors. Their primary resistance to the state and church authorities is believed, among scholars, to be the reason why Bosnians adopted the church as a resistance against the growing pressure from the Byzantine and the Roman Catholic Church. 3. See Svein Mønnesland, Før Jugoslavia og etter (Oslo: Sypress, 1994), p. 119. 4. Mustafa Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture Preporod, 1998), pp. 30–31. 5. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, New, Updated Edition (London: Papermac, 1996), pp. 27–28. 6. Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka, p. 45. 7. Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 14–26. 8. Ibid., p. 51. 9. Mehmedalija Bojić, Historija Bosne I Bošnjaka VII-XX vijek (Sarajevo: Šahinpašić, 2001), p. 38. Politicization of Religion 29

10. Mønnesland, Før Jugoslavia og etter, pp. 120–122. 11. Ibid., p. 120. 12. Bojić, Historija Bosne I Bošnjaka VII-XX vijek, p. 38. 13. Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 66. 14. Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka, pp. 138–154. 15. Although Noel Malcolm (Bosnia: A Short History (London: Papermac, 1994), pp. 51–61), believes that the Bogumil struggle did not have a larger role in their massive conversion to Islam than the other cultural and social processes in Bosnia at that time. 16. George Schöpflin, “The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths,” in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöplin, eds. Myths and Nationhood (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 20. 17. There were Croat and Serb nationalist projects throughout the entire Bosnian state history. 18. Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 27. 19. Ibid., p. 28. 20. Ibid., p. 29. 21. The converted retained property and land, acquired rights to support and paid less tax. 22. Encyclopedia of Islam, Bind 1, New Edition (Leiden) 1960. 23. Mark Pinson, The Muslim of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 24. Ibid., pp. 80–81. 25. Here, it is important to remember that religion was not banned in former Yugoslavia, in general, as in some of the communist Eastern bloc countries. Despite the widespread popular view that no one was allowed to practice their religion, it was only members of the communist party who were not allowed to practice religion in public. This may be interpreted as their religious freedom being limited within the boundaries of former Yugoslavia. 26. One of the major shortcomings in the literature on the period from 1991 to 1995 is the lack of a systematic distinction between Croatia’s defense against the aggression of Serbia and the Franjo Tudjman cynical imperialist project towards Bosnia–Herzegovina (1991–1995) that he shared with Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic: to divide Bosnia–Herzegovina to Croatia and Serbia, each taking over and appropriating parts of Bosnia. Croatia’s defense against Serbian aggression has to be seen separately from Tudjman project in Bosnia–Herzegovina. 27. James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2003). 28. Jasna Jozelic, Islamisering og islams posisjon i dagens Bosnia og Hercegovina, hovedoppgave, Universitet i Bergen, 2006. 30 Jasna Jozelić

29. Jasna Jozelic, Ethno—Nationalism from a Psychiatric Perspective, Dictum, Det kritiske blikket, Volum 5—bokanmeldelse, 2007. 30. Muhamed Filipoviċ, Bosna i Hercegovina, najvažnije gografske, demografske, historijske, kulturne i političke činjenice (Sarajevo: Edicija Science, 1997), p. 6. 31. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Living Bosnia: Political Essays and Interviews (Ljubljana, Slovenija: Oslobodjenje International, 1994, 1995), pp. 21–22, 48. 32. Amra Hadžimuhamedoviċ (ed.), Ljudska prava i razaranje kulturnog pamćenja: slučaj Stoca/Human Rights and Destruction of the Cultural Memory: The Case of Stolac (Sarajevo and Oslo: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Hercegovina Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2005). 33. Reference is made mainly to these three national groups whereas, according to the census from the beginning of the 1990s, there are several national groups in Bosnia–Herzegovina that constitute the Bosnian nation. 34. Mahmutćehajić, Living Bosnia, p. 141. 35. Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 2. 36. Benedict Anderson, Forestilte Felleskap, Refleksjoner omkring Nasjonalismens opprinnelse og spredning (Oslo: Spartacus Forlag AS, 1996), p. 19. 37. Connerton, How Societies Remember, p. 3. 38. Ivan Lovrenoviċ, Bosanski kontinuitet (Sarajevo: DANI, nr.123) October 8, 1999. 39. Ibid. 40. Muhamed Filipović, Bosnian Disidentes from Tito’s Yugoslavia, the leader of the political party MBO (Bosnian Muslim organization). During the war he was BiHs ambassador in Britain. 41. Interview with Muhamed Filipović, State That is Not, Ten Years of Independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina (by Nerzuk Ċurak, published in DANI, Sarajevo) January 3, 2001. 42. Connerton, How Societies Remember, p. 1. 43. Anderson, Forestilte Felleskap, Refleksjoner omkring Nasjonalismens oprinnelse og spredning, p. 19. 44. Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 27. 45. Connerton, How Societies Remember, p. 3. 46. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), p. 9. 47. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, p. 144. 48. Sabrina P. Ramet and Ola Listhaug, Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Sabrina P. Ramet, The Independent State of Croatia 1941–45, Totalitarianism Movements and Political Religions (London: Routledge, 2008). 49. Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka, p. 17. 50. Mahmutćehajić, Living Bosnia, p. 31. Politicization of Religion 31

51. Mahmutćehajić, Bosnia the Good, p. 33. 52. Srećko Džaja, Bosanska povijesna stvarnost njezini mitološki odraz (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2003), p. 42. 53. Mahmutćehajić, Living Bosnia, p. 142. 54. Lester Kurtz, Gods in the Global Village: The World’s Religions in Sociological Perspective (Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1995), p. 18. 55. Anderson, Forestilte Felleskap, Refleksjoner omkring Nasjonalismens opprinnelse og spredning, p. 23. 56. Connerton, How Societies Remember, p. 9. 57. Ibid., p. 15. 58. Ibid., p. 16. 59. Ibid., p. 17. 60. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, pp. 27–28. 61. Party has defined itself as a “The political alliance Yugoslav citizens who belong to the Muslim cultural community, as well as other citizens of Yugoslavia to accept the program and objectives of the Party,” http://sda.ba /home/o-name/licna-karta-stranke/. 62. Anderson, Forestilte Felleskap, Refleksjoner omkring Nasjonalismens opprinnelse og spredning, p. 154. 63. SDA is short for Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije). 64. Gyorgy Lederer, Bosna—Centar balkanskog islama (Sarajevo: DANI, nr.129) November 19, 1999. 65. Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 222. 66. Ibid., p. 200. 67. Lederer, Bosna—Centar balkanskog islama. 68. Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 248. 69. Mahmutćehajić, Living Bosnia, p. 141. 70. Lederer, Bosna—Centar balkanskog islama. 71. Gro Nystuen, Achieving Peace or Protecting Human Rights (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005).

2 Was the Bosnian War (1992–1995) a Full-fledged Religious War? Sergej Flere

Pursuing from the definition of religious as one “commanded by a deity,” the author analyzes the Bosnian 1992–1995 War fares. In the case of two of the three religious parties involved—the Islamic Community and the Serbian Orthodox Church—it is discernible that, for both the religious authorities and the flock, this was considered a religious struggle; however, the Roman Catholic Church never committed itself explicitly in words. Deeds on the part of Catholic officials indicate that it also understood the War and the participation of its members as part of a religious endeavor, amounting to more than a benediction of the War effort. The War was articulately comprehended as religious in nature by combatants from all sides. Moreover, there are major consequences of the War pointing to its religious nature. Thus, the War can be considered as religious by most indicators, and issues of moral accountability do arise. It is often considered that religion, if not directly pacifist in its attitude, is, at least predominantly, contrary to war—particularly so in modern times. Thus, religion often

33 34 Sergej Flere recommends detachment from all worldly affairs, particularly from conflict and violence. For example, the Bible recommends, “ . . . be at peace with one another” (Mark 9:49) on numerous occasions, and even in The Quran one can read “But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace” (8:61). Anti-war positions may be considered even more typical of today’s Christianity. New concepts have evolved in Christian theology to promote this view.1 Empirical evidence, on the other hand, does not support such a position. The history of Christian involvement in war is long and rich in incident. Early in the development of Christianity, a theological stance aimed at justifying war was drafted, its core being the concept of a “just war” (ius ad bello and ius in bello). Classic statements include that by St. Augustine, who holds that “Those who act according to a divine command, or even God’s laws as enacted by the state and who put wicked men to death have by no means violated the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill’” De( Civitate Dei). In Islam, the Quranic notion of Jihad has drawn notorious attention. The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) provides an interesting, recent case study. It came about as part of the dissolution of Communist Yugoslavia, but remains a separate phenomenon, albeit with distinctive features. It has attracted much scholarly attention, with some authors focusing on its religious aspects.2 Although these authors note the religious component, they fall short of defining it precisely. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate that the Bosnian War can be considered a religious war, in spite of its being also a conflict with other characteristics, including foreign aggression. Numerous authors have come close to defining the religious aspect of the War, but fall short of precision. Thus, Mojzes writes: “Many [religious] individuals and groups have sanctioned and sanctified these wars,”3 whereas Vrcan, beside many other keen observations, writes that each religious party comprehended the War as a just one on the part of their institution and their flock.4 Noone, however, defines the religious aspect in totality and without reservation. For the purpose of this book, the religious war will be understood in keeping with Kelsay’s definition of religious war as one “commanded by a deity”5 and understood by participants as having been ordered by forces of a higher order. This article is divided into sections: addressing arguments against the War being religious, followed by a section elaborating on the notions of The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 35 religious war, one on the three actors and their positions, a section on the authorization by religious authorities, a section on experiencing the War, a section providing an epilogue of events, and a conclusion.

Arguments to the contrary

Both theoretical and empirical arguments may be advanced against this War being a religious one. Among arguments to the effect that the Bosnian War was not or could not have been a religious war, one should mention the insight expressed by the Bosnian sociologist Esad Ćimić, who held that a religious conflict would need to have aligned various Christians against non-Christians— that is, the Orthodox and the Catholics against the Muslims—which was not the case during most of the events during the Bosnian war.6 This argument does not hold as a general dogmatic rule, because each religious identity is separate and particular, regardless of theological differences that may be greater or smaller. Neither does it meet the empirical test. Orthodox–Muslim clashes did predominate in the beginning, with Catholic–Muslim ones following, and only at the end was there a picture to be seen, albeit unclearly, of two Christian sides fighting, predominantly jointly, against the Muslims. In fact, the picture was one of confusion if “theological distances” are taken as a criterion. Historical experience in interpreting the meaning of religion becomes relevant here: many religious conflicts pertained to ephemeral theological questions, although the conflicts were, themselves, major. The issue offilioque is and was such a one. Others maintained that the War was not a religious war, but, rather, an act of aggression on the part of the Serbian armed forces from Serbia proper,7 a position which introduces another level of analysis—that of international law. As Calic8 conclusively demonstrates, there was aggression. Another way of denying this was a religious conflict is by stating that the role of the confessions and religious communities was a minor, subordinate, supplementary one in their relationship to the political players, and instrumentalized by the latter.9 Such a contention is difficult to prove. With the same plausibility, one may entertain the opposite notion, as does Zgodić, who holds that, in this case, the “political parties ha[d] become the extended arm of religious communities.”10 Srdjan Vrcan, probably the most authoritative sociologist of religion in the 36 Sergej Flere region, assessed the situation as one of “nationalist political strategies having obtained explicit religious legitimacies since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis.”11 Thus, he does not deny the religious nature of the conflict, but does not dwell upon whether or to what extent it is marked by power and the originality it has. Furthermore, he seems to hold that, as the War evolved, its religious character became more pronounced, which only some facts mentioned further would seem to corroborate. Finally, whether the religious diginitaries and the entire religious flock were instrumentalized by a political or intellectual elite need not, in the end, be decisive in assessing the prominence of religious dimensions of the War, if this instrumentalization truly took firm hold.

What is a religious war?

The term “religious war” does not have the historical and intellectual standing to be compared with “holy war” and “just war.” In Jones’s Encyclopedia of Religion (2005), “religious war” is mentioned routinely and on numerous occasions—usually without special explanation of the term. For example, it is mentioned within the context of Judaism as war, which “is required as a moral and spiritual obligation”12; it is also mentioned in denoting the Crusades, the XVI century European wars (2005: 3557, 3929, 6036, 7282), and jihad is translated as religious war (4614). Finally, it is indirectly conceptually defined when theEncyclopedia claims that “[t]he development of explicitly religious wars changes the relationship between religion and violence: religion now is the very source of violence, at least in the reading of the actors themselves.” 13 In a similar vein, Kelsay associates religious war with occasions where “fighting is commanded by a deity.”14 This can only be interpreted as war being perceived as commanded by a supernatural authority. The antecedents of the War are, of course, to be found in the form of an escalation of conflict between confessional and ethnic groups, with major voices instigating conflict, thus adding to the interaction of rising intolerance, and a constructed awareness of the impossibility of coexistence. However, this author would rather emphasize the escalation of mutual inter-group fears. In addition, it surpasses the scope of this chapter to analyze the social groups that were most active in this discourse. On the other hand, scholarship holds that modern wars are not predominantly caused by religious factors, but rather, by economic The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 37 motives. Thus, in the same Jones’s Encyclopedia of Religion, one finds the opinion that “Among the most contemporary students of war, ideological factors are generally viewed as subordinate or epiphenomenal to material ones, religious and other forms of legitimation being understood as the convenient or even necessary means that serve to mask or mystify the acquisitive competition that is the primary motivation for armed conflict.”15

The three actors The War took place between three main actors: Bosnian Muslims/ Bosniaks (institutionalized in the internationally recognized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “the legitimists”), Orthodox Serbs (later politically organized into the Republika Srpska), and Catholic Croats (calling themselves the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; their official titles were susceptible to change during the War). Moreover, there were other minor participants within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, including Fikret Abdić’s units in Cazinska Krajina—who later called themselves the Province of Cazinska Krajina, although these were also Muslims—fiercely opposing and fighting the “legitimists.” Thus, all parties took on a quasi-legitimate form—attempting to appear neither as aggressors nor as rebels. This issue cannot be properly understood without taking history into consideration. The history of religious pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina goes a long way back. Before Ottoman rule was imposed, during Medieval times, a Bosnian Church of the Patharene (Bogumil) creed seems to have prevailed. This meant that the two major religious groups—the Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox—did not have a stronghold comparable to the ones the Serbs and the Croats had in the vicinity. Some take this to be the explanation for a relatively strong intrusion of Islam during Ottoman times. Ottoman times were characterized by a relative tolerance between Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Jews (a group which has almost disappeared), and Muslims, in spite of a rule based on despotism. Ethnoreligious strife among the groups became more evident during Austro-Hungarian rule (1871–1918).16 Relative harmony was typical of Tito’s times, as well, during which the Muslims (Bosniaks) made further steps toward national establishment. The issue of whether there was inherent hatred among these groups, as upheld by the Nobel prize writer Ivo Andrić, or inherent tolerance, as held by Donia et al., remains open. One 38 Sergej Flere may assume that, as usual, both phenomena were present. In either case, such approaches do not lead to exploratory success in terms of our issue. A basic fact pertaining to the nature of the War was, of course, that the three main religious groups coincided with ethnic groupings: thus, the parties were Muslim Bosniaks (40% of the population by the 1981 census—the last taken under normal conditions prior to the war, Savezni zavod za statistiku: 1991: 45); Roman Catholic Croats (18%), and the Serbian Orthodox (32%).17 Of course, at the individual level, not everyone pertaining to an ethnic community considered himself as also confessionally belonging and religious. This coincidence of ethnicity and confessionality is not a chance circumstance, but rather one indicating that the formation of modern nationalism followed confessional lines in this environment, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Muslim Bosniaks were the last to form, both because of the negative Muslim attitude toward nationality and as the other two groups opposed their ethnic establishment. Thus, the Census of 1971 may be taken as the demarcation when “Muslims within the national meaning” were allowed to declare themselves as such.18 The fact that the parties were at the same time confessionally and ethnically defined does not mean that individual members of other groups did not join certain armed forces, usually as a result of coercion. The best-known instances involve the Serb General Jovan Divjak, technically one of the leading officers of the “legitimist” armed forces (pertaining to “official Bosnia and Herzegovina,” but, in fact, to the Bosniak Muslim faction only), and the convicted war criminal (ICTY no. IT 96–22, http:// www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm) Dražen Erdemović, a Croat who served in the Serbian armed forces (“Army of Republika Srpska”). The three parties differed in terms of their power backing in the War, as the Bosniak Muslims (the internationally recognized state) could rely on the authority and power of the state, which had been officially declared, whereas the other two parties claimed de iure and de facto independence (Republika Srpska and the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna) from this newly declared state.19 The other two parties, particularly the Serbs, could rely on major military resources from the neighbouring national matrix states and powers, in contrast to the legitimists.20 Other details of the War pertaining to its historical, political, legal, and other dimensions, factors, and circumstances are outside the scope of this chapter, although very interesting. The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 39

Authorization by religious authorities for achieving religious ends by war: The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC)

Mojzes, a knowledgeable source, holds that the “the SOC seems to have played a most harmful role,”21 pursuing definitely from the War’s tragic nature, causing immense suffering. The SOC was rather explicit in its official stand on the War in Bosnia.22 The head of the SOC, Patriarch Pavle, reflected on the issue when he told the international intermediary, Lord Carrington, that Serbs cannot take part in any part of independent Croatia, as they have to be under the same roof with Serbia and all Serbian Krajinas (border regions, one of which was located in Bosnia – S.F.) . . . It is time to comprehend that victims of genocide cannot live together with their former and perhaps their future executioners. He continued, These co-nationals of ours, of the same faith and blood, are confronted by the following fateful choice: either they will, by the arms in their hands, win existence in the same state with the matrix of the Serbian people, or they will be forced to emigrate from this new Independent State of Croatia, sooner or later. This is not a call to arms, but it is an explicit justification. The Patriarch legitimated the Serbian armed struggle, citing historical reasons. He also gave lip service to Christianity: “The Serbian Church wishes nothing else . . . but to be on the side of truth and justice, of universal Christian principles . . .”23 These quotes mentioned earlier pertain directly to the war in Croatia, which preceded the Bosnian one; however, they are just as valid, as the policy of the SOC toward Bosnia was the same, motivated by the same rationale of the ideology of “Greater Serbia,” which proclaimed that all the Serbian Orthodox flock should live in a single state. On the eve of the com- mencement of hostilities in Bosnia, the Holy Council of Church Hierarchs, on January 17, 1992, communicated that the SOC and the Serbian people never accepted the artificial and illegitimate AVNOJ24 borders established without historical and ethnic foundation, established on the part of the Communist guerrillas under conditions of occupation and civil war.25 Patriarch Pavle explicitly blessed the Serbian forces “the defensive struggle during an imposed War” in July, 1994,26 as did many other SOC dignitaries. 40 Sergej Flere

The rationale for the active Serbian role in the Bosnian War is expressed from the point of view that there is legitimacy in Serbian military action of any type: because Serbs have historical experience allowing for “preventive” action, every Serbian action is essentially a defensive one, regardless of form. This statement basically follows Mazzini’s revolutionary formula, “One nation – one state. Only one state for each nation.” Although it is not surprising that the SOC could maintain such a position, as Serbs were a very scattered nationality within the former Yugoslavia, this formula was a successful mobilizational formula in the ninetenth century—one neither fully nor easily achieved in the nineteenth century, and completely out of line with events at the end of the twentieth century. The SOC position was expressed even more explicitly by Bishop Amfilohije in the early stages of the War when he—anticipating victory—cheerfully announced that “God has given the Serbs a new chance to achieve their dream of living in one state.”27 Similar optimism was expressed when he said, in the same breath: “God expects something great from this People, when He positions the People in the focus of world events. We need to endure, as the victory belongs to the innocently crucified.”28 Bishop Amfilohije stated a year later, when the War was at its fiercest, that “The War in Bosnia today is a struggle by our brethren in Bosnia and Herzegovina for priceless liberty and the honour of the entire Eastern Orthodoxy . . . Let God grant every assistance and the power to withstand the pressures of the world, as our Lord Jesus Christ has already been victorious over such pressures.”29 These sentences come close to, but still fall short of, Kelsay’s understanding. One of the rare instances of more theological attempts to contemplate the War occurs in the Second Theological–Philosophical Symposium during the Days of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, held in Cetinje in 1996, directly after the end of the War.30 The proceedings of this symposium deserve attention, both owing to the typical nature of the positions expressed as well as the composition of the participants. Besides the most prominent SOC theologians and Bishops (Amfilohije Radović, Atanasije Jevtić), one finds numerous other authors, including the notorious Radovan Karadžić—the War-time president of Republika Srpska and, presently, an indicted war criminal. The nature of his activities could not have been unknown to the organizers at the time of the symposium. The position of the SOC on the War usually emerges without direct reference to it. The popular topics touching on the War are the The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 41 imperfection of human nature, the special nature of morality during wartime, accentuation of the Serbian’s Christ-like nature, and and a view of their history as one of Calvary. The struggles of Serbs against foreign domination are accentuated with reference to the “Kosovo covenant” to avenge defeat and alleged treason during the Kosovo Battle of 1389. At the symposium, one could hear such war-praising assertions, as “ . . . we Christians are against this-worldly peace, because it is in enmity towards God, but we opt for war against the self-satisfied peace . . . The five year Fatherland War in Republic Srpska and Krajina cleansed our national soul, illuminated our Christian intellect, renewing our Covenantal conscience . . . “ The final panegyric stated that “Liberty is always achieved by the Holy Cross and by violence.”31 Here, Kelsay’s definition is practically met. Among statements from the Symposium, one can find many to the effect that the modern world is morally debased, which is also manifested in wars, this being “a consequence of Godless Communist ideology” or of “wars being without justice, as American ones are,”32 but there are no direct statements about individual acts or misdeeds, particularly not those committed by members of their own flock. One of the few SOC prelates demonstrating some awareness of the responsibility of this Church was the Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana Jovan, who stated, in 1996, that “individuals from the SOC were, aware and unaware, introduced into the dangerous war game by way of manipulation” where extra-ecclesiastical intellectuals (writers, the circle around the Serbian Academy) truly defined policy.33 The active and almost vanguard SOC position in defining the goals of warfare comes close to sufficing for the other two confessional parties— also with historical memories of injustice and tragedy—to comprehend the War in religious terms.34 However, the other two actors were far from playing reactive roles. Today, it is clear that, in this War, peaceful instruments for the settlement of claims were not exhausted and that these SOC prelates (with the exception of Jovan) invoked reasons for waging War with too much ease—or with little or no grounding—thus exposing themselves to, possibly, even more blame than they deserve. Amfilohije’s words, in particular, can be considered without hesitation as ungrounded war-mongering. The Orthodox concept of apophasis and justice to be found in God only, human justice being questionable, cannot be considered excuses for these positions. 42 Sergej Flere

The Islamic religious community of Bosnia and Herzegovina

To comprehend the role of the Islamic Community, it should be recalled that Islam and any particular Islamic religious community (such as the Islamic Religious Community in the former Yugoslavia and, later, the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina) are not organized in a church-type organization. Their organizational structure is more complex, not bureaucratic, in Weber’s meaning with a rationally ordered hierarchy. The complexity includes branches, traditions, orders, schools in the educational meaning, schools of thought, brotherhoods, and endowments, as well as autonomous laymen and spiritual leaders, not to speak of historical and spatial variation in association with the state. This allows for lay individuals to attain great authority and charisma in the religious sense. A special place in the formation of its position and that of its flock, but particularly in comprehending the Muslim position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is attributable to Alija Izetbegović. Although he was a layperson, his impact carried great religious authority. Thus, an Islamic individual had a particular impact upon events in Bosnia. On account of his book, The Islamic Declaration, he was sentenced by the then-Com- munist authorities for enemy propaganda and spent years in jail. He was to become the first elected president of the Presidency (collective head of state) of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the then-Yugoslavia in 1990 (still within the Yugoslav set of institutions), and continued his mandate as head of state after independence. The other two nationalities under- standably comprehended his book as a program for the future Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite his current pronouncements. He was regarded not only as a martyr, but also as almost a prophet, “next to Mohammed,” and his having received the King Fahd medal for the promotion of Islam was regarded as confirmation of such a conviction.35 This is not sufficient direct support for the War in Bosnia as being a religious one on the part of Muslims, but it does lend some indirect and tangential support. It helps in our understanding of how the other two ethnoconfessional parties may have comprehended the conflict in religious terms from the initial stages, with the book being published in 1990. In the Islamic Declaration, Izetbegović hypothetically pictures a state based on Islamic principles, stressing its superiority and purity as a religiously homogenous society. The Declaration does not provide a particularly detailed plan for a purely Islamic state. Written in 1970, The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 43 first published in 1990, it speaks of the need for the state to be fully based on Islam in all walks of life, without details being spelled out too clearly. Islam is regarded as superseding religion, “a unity of faith and law, education and force, ideal and interest, spiritual community and state, voluntariness and coercion.”36 Never does it say to which state it is to be applied—although that may be evident with Izetbegović being a Bosnian. Its particular features may be found in promoting the idea of Islam allegedly being in line with the republican form of government,37 and speaking of a future Muslim world federation.38 It is not difficult to imagine that, under the circumstances of the existing uncertainty in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990, with fear being disseminated, these words, coming from a then-prominent politician and later president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could be understood as a battlecry for the establishment of a purely and fundamentally Islamic state in Bosnia. This was completely at odds with the then-multiethnic and tolerant social reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, these statements contribute somewhat to “setting the stage” for the War in a religious framework. They were not directly stated by a religious prelate, but Izetbegović was regarded almost as a religious martyr for having been in prison and, among Muslims, laypersons may have spoken with greater authority, as there was no hierarchical church organization. Moreover, during the War itself, we note two events indicative of the Islamic Community’s position on the War. First, there are the words of the highest Islamic Community authority, Reis-El-Ulema Mustafa Cerić, who stated: “It will be difficult to convince Muslim Bosnians that what is happening to them is not a continuation of the Crusades waged against Islam and Muslims by Europe . . . ,”39 let alone that it was not religious, but rather anti-Islamic in nature. In the next year, Cerić went further and said “ . . . the defense of the country of Bosnia is now a holy issue for every (Islamic) believer.”40 A similar statement was given by the Ryaset (the highest Islamic collective body in Bosnia in 1994). Although possibly understood as reactive, these words both reflected and further contributed to the articulation of the religious nature of the War. Moreover, they may coincide with Vrcan’s assessment of progressive articulation of the religious nature of the war, during its course. Lower level imams in direct communication with believers asserted the Islamic concept that dying in war for Allah was a special honor and that becoming a shehhid would take the militant directly to the precincts of paradise.41 44 Sergej Flere

The second clear indication of the position of the Islamic Community toward the War is to be found in a deed—an activity doing where participation is a religious undertaking. In the official Bosnia and Herzegovina Army in 1993, a special combat unit was composed of imams only.42 Furthermore, this was a case of authorization on the part of the clergy by setting an example. Thus, on the part of the Islamic Community, one does not hear of the War being waged by Muslims as a religious endeavor but, rather, of its being imposed upon them as a religious conflict. This (particularly the comprehension of Izetbegović’s book on the part of non-Muslims) suffices for the War’s comprehension in religious terms. Combined with other circumstances, one may conclude that Kelsay’s terms have been met de facto.

The Roman Catholic Church (RCC)

“It is not easy to find explicit claims of the Roman Catholic complicity with war efforts with the Croats. It is clear, however, that Catholic leaders were most effective in producing an enormous amount of information material, with their interpretation of events . . .”43 Mojzes also notes, in another paper, that the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and Bosnia “gave signals to the Serbs that they [were] endangered . . .”44 by supporting a particular political party and by taking stands on the linguistic issue (whether Serbian and Croatian are a single language). Mojzes, finally, singles out the “hypocrisy” of the Roman Catholic Church.45 This still falls short of meeting the definition of religious war. Most of the official Catholic pronouncements stated the unfortunate nature of the war, its being imposed on Catholics, and the sufferings of Catholics.46 Catholic prelates even condemned the war crimes committed by members of their own flock, albeit in a general way.47 The statement closest to supporting the War effort can, possibly, be found in the ascension speech by the Bishop of Mostar in 1994, when he mentioned, among other issues “I extend my fraternal encouragement to the brave defenders of our people and country,”48 thus, unconditionally endorsing the Catholic war effort. Notwithstanding the fact that, if the other two religious parties were involved directly it was almost impossible for the Catholics not to view the War similarly, that is, in religious terms, there are some data on direct complicity and perception of the War in religious terms. The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 45

Thus, a survey carried out by I. Cvitković in 1993—during the central part of the war effort—among Croatian militants of the King Tvrtko Brigade in Bosnia indicated that 18% of the militants confirmed that their current armaments had been blessed by Catholic priests.49 Despite evasive words on the part of the Catholic clergy, particularly its higher echelons (of which only written evidence is to be found), the wearing of rosaries by Croatian militants was promoted and organized by the Catholic Church. The parish priest from a Herzegovina village distributed over 1000 such sets of beads. The wearing of rosaries was not a spontaneous event of popular religiosity. In the Croatian military newspaper (published in Croatia, but distributed in Bosnia as well, among Croat militants), the theologian and then Croatian official Dr. Adalbert Rebić wrote, “With rosaries around their necks, our defenders went to the defense of the homeland and saved their lives in a miraculous way by the protection of the Virgin,”50 as Serbian militants wore Byzantine style crosses. The benedictions and the rosaries are good examples of direct Catholic involvement, although complicity was never officially confirmed. It cannot be held that full confirmation of Kelsay was found in this case, because of the lack of a direct call by the official Catholic Church.

Experiencing the war as a religious endeavor

In contrast to the religious dignitaries and officials, the common religious flock of confessional members were the ones who had to bear the direct misery of the War. We do not have sufficient information on how they perceived, comprehended, and experienced the War with regard to religious terms. However, Vrcan, who spent the War in the direct vicinity, can be given credence: “The Croatian fighters do not wear51 HDZ signs, but Catholic crosses, the Serbian ones not Milošević’s photos but Orthodox crosses, Muslim fundamentalists and mujahedeen kill under the slogan of Allah,”52 indicating a religious perception of the War and the religious meaning of the militant undertaking. Serbian fighters sang: “God is a Serbian, heaven is ours!”53; similarly, Bosnia fighters: “For whom [do we fight]? For Allah? Against whom? Against the Wallach!”54’55 In a survey done during the War, 75% of the Croatian combatants declared that they believed “God was on their side.”56 Similarly, popular folk songs, which had long been a popular practice in the region, contains direct religious symbolization from the time of 46 Sergej Flere the War. For example, a Muslim Bosniak folk poem of the time reads, in liberal translation: “In the holy jihad rests our salvation! To jihad, to jihad, let us all go! The green banner flies with pride, the Islamic brotherhood let us join us, we hold contempt for death and let us all join together in the battle!”57,58 One figure who came to prominence at the time as a war-effort mobi- lizer among Serbs in the capacity of a singer of quasi-epic songs was a certain Baja Mladi Knindža, who sang (in liberal translation): “We have a lion’s heart, we defend Eastern Orthodoxy.” In Krajina59, Orthodox candles will never cease to burn,60,61 implying that the Serbian Orthodox pay traditional respect to their dead by lighting candles, and that they will retain the lands of Krajina. On the Croatian side, somewhat earlier in 1992 when the Yugoslav Army still existed technically, a popular chant in a rhyme traditional to both Serb and Croat mountain people (deseterac), went “Let it be known to the Yugo-Army, that Croatia will win the War, as Holy beings side with us, whereas they [the adversary] are with (have accepted among themselves) the damned ones,”62 implying that the Yugoslav Army engaged Serbian informal units, whom they imputed to be demonic figures. Such symbolization cannot be considered as simply instrumentalizing religious motives—something common in war. In the case of this War, in the historicocultural background of at least two actors, there is a sacralization of one’s ethnic group. “There is a traditional interpretation of national history as a kind of sacred or quasi-sacred martyrology (in Serbian Orthodoxy) or Calvary (in Croatian Catholicism) of the entire nation, resulting primarily from an (alleged) dedication of the respective nation to religious beliefs and sacred values.”63 Although God as commander is never invoked directly, many of these concepts—”Holy beings” siding with “us,” “God [being] on our side,” considering one’s confession as the cause being defended, and invoking holy war, included all parties in the popular understanding of the War as religious, quite within or close to Kelsay’s definition.

Epilogue

Finally, one can judge the War by its consequences. The study of this is mainly beyond the scope of this paper. The following outcomes, however, deserve mention: The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 47

▸▸ the mass exodus of members of the major groups to new settlements within ethnically and confessionally homogenous areas of their own group—a major change in comparison with the picture before the War of indiscriminate residential mixing; ▸▸ the establishment of two peculiar territorial–political units within Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serbian (Orthodox) one (Republika srpska) and one composed of (Catholic) Croats and (Muslim) Bosniaks, but, in practice, also separating the latter two groups within this entity (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina)64,65; ▸▸ a rise in a more absolute type of religious identity within all groups concerned, with the possible exception of Catholic Croats,66 where it had already been marked previously. The particular change to be noted is among Muslims, where not only was lax Islamic faith and practice replaced by stricter codes, but also a definite influence of Wahabis and conservatives began to be noted.67 Readiness for religious dialog and tolerance have, of course, almost vanished. Religiosity in these regions is not a private, intimate affair, but rather, a public and political one.68

This goes beyond Kelsay, lending further support to classification of the War as religious.

Conclusion

Although one can hold that Kelsay’s definition has not technically been met, the summation of indications yields a picture of a war with definite religioconfessional substance. Moreover, clear support for Huntington’s general contention on the Bosnian conflict has been found. Officials of the three groups did endorse and promote belligerent activity on the part of the flocks, and these promotions, endorsements, and blessings could have had no other effect but to instigate and enflame war efforts. This effort goes beyond the usual legitimation of wars on the part of the religious authorities; it builds into the essence of the War, although other components also exist (beyond the scope of this chapter). This effort was most prominent and active among the Serbian Orthodox religious dignitaries. Religion, thus, introduced a dimension of ultimate (divinely sanctioned) morality into the War efforts. Along with Kelsay, one may hold that a deity—and a monotheistic one—was present, active 48 Sergej Flere and possibly even “commanding” the effort, in the comprehension of the ordinary believer and combatant. Although the SOC may have been the first to undertake such activity and, definitely, was the most explicit in carrying it out, all three sides undertook such activities, only traces of which are to be found today in documents, as many activities were not advertised. Thus, the SOC bears possibly the greatest blame for inflaming war in an explicit manner. The flock, the rank and file of combatants, the ordinary people, as we have demonstrated, also experienced the War as one with pronounced religious identity issues. The issue of religious identity was in the forefront. The stands analyzed do suffice to term the War a religious one, as commanded by a deity, in perception. War being a totally destructive phenomenon, blame goes to those who instigated such an understanding—the Serbian prelates, and all of those following them. Such an understanding of Christianity and of religion, in general, is at odds with trends in Christianity advancing a just peace, peacemaking, and ethical peace, bearing in mind the suffering and destruction war brings about.69 In fact, here the words of Burke apply fully: “Just warriors seek to enshrine their isolated and partisan advocacy as moral truth, to steal for themselves the tragic vocation of the judge rather than submit the decisions they exonerate from blame to international structures . . . “70 The globalization of the world, with the creation of more functional interconnectedness and even functional unity in all spheres of life, is par- alleled by varied cultural reactions, not the least of which are to be found in ethnic, confessional, and other types of parochialism and unconditional and absolute clinging to one’s cultural, particularly religious, identity, which may dominate and attain aggressive form and extent at times of crisis and challenge. It is questionable whether a cosmopolitan and general humanist orientation remains in force beyond ordinary times and “good times.” Accordingly, this author doubts that we have truly entered a new civilization of generalized values, with human life prized as such a value. In critical situations, one returns to the basic, primary group and a clan-like sense of commitment. The Bosnian case may not have been an exception and anomaly, as has already been pointed out by Huntington and Vrcan. The issue of religious identity was in the forefront of events, of motivation, and, particularly, of legitimation (which itself was more precarious in the face of media propaganda wars and of the questionable authority of particular leaders); thus, we may be close to being able to characterize it The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 49 as a war with a prominent religious substance, although not in the same category as the Crusades or the Thirty Years’ War. Identity issues in the forefront bring about irreconcilable situations into politics and religious identity politics even more so. The issue of religious roots may be inherent to the nature of monotheist religion. As Parenti writes: “The Judeo-Christian god of the Holy Bible . . . is ferociously vindictive, neurotically jealous, intolerant, vainglorious, materialistic, unforgiving, punitive, sexist, racist, xenophobic, homophobic, sadistic, chronically violent, and a mass murderer.”71

Internet sources www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/religious/holywar/shtml, retrieved 28 July, 2007 www.neaadvent.org/cathen/1546c.htm retrieved 19 July, 2007 http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm retrieved 19 July, 2007

Notes

1. Glen Harold Stassen, Just Peacemaking: Ten Practics for Abolishing War (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 1998). 2. Srdjan Vrcan, “Seven Theses on Religion and War in the Former Yugoslavia,” The Public, 1, 1994, pp. 115–124; Srdjan Vrcan, Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije (Split: Glas Dalmacije, 2001); Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: ethno-Religious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum, 1994); Paul Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Mitja Velikonja M., Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegzovina (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003); Mitja Velikonja, Željko Mardešić, Paul Mojzes, and Esad Zgodić, “The Role of Religions and Religious Communities in the Wars in Ex-Yugoslavia,” Religion in Eastern Europe, 24, 2003, pp. 1–42. 3. Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, p. 126. 4. Vrcan, Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije, p. 33. 5. John Kelsay, “Religion and Religious War,” in W. Schweiker, ed., pp. 536–543 in The Blackwell Comapnion to Religious Ethics (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 542. 6. Esad Ćimić, “Bosnian Crossroads,” in P. Mojzes, ed., pp.132–144 in Religion and the War in Bosnia (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998), p. 132. 50 Sergej Flere

7. 14 and other authors aligned with the Muslim/Bosniak/Bosnian “legitimist” interpretation) Velikonja, Mardešić, Mojzes, and Zgodić, “The Role of Religions and Religious Communities in the Wars in Ex-Yugoslavia,” pp. 1–42. 8. Marie-Janine Calic, “Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995,” in Charles Ingrao and Thomas E. Emmert, eds., pp. 114–150 in Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009). 9. Velikonja, Mardešić, Mojzes, and Zgodić, “The Role of Religions and Religious Communities in the Wars in Ex-Yugoslavia,” pp. 1–42, p. 25; Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia, p. 27. 10. Velikonja, Mardešić, Mojzes, and Zgodić, “The Role of Religions and Religious Communities in the Wars in Ex-Yugoslavia,” pp. 1–42, p. 25. 11. Vrcan, “Seven Theses on Religion and War in the Former Yugoslavia,” pp. 115–124, p. 119. 12. Mark Juergensmeyer, “Nonviolence,” in L. Jones, ed., pp. 6646–6649 in Encyclopedia of Religion (Detroit, MI: MacMillan Reference, 2005), p. 6648. 13. Fritz Graf, “Violence,” in L. Jones, ed., pp. 9595–9600 in Encyclopedia of Religion (Detroit, MI: MacMillan Reference, 2005), p. 9597. 14. Kelsay, “Religion and Religious War,” p. 542. 15. Bruce Lincoln, “War and Warriors,” in L. Jones, ed., pp. 9679–9683 in Encyclopedia of Religion (Detroit, MI: MacMillan Reference, 2005), p. 9680; Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). 16. Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina; R. J. Donia, John V. A. Fine, and J. C. Hamer, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (London: Columbia University Press, 1994). 17. There were numerous lesser ethnic groups, among which the main position was held by the “Yugoslavs.” 18. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Jugoslavija 1918–1988: Statistički godišnjak (Beograd, 1991), p. 45. 19. The referendum for the declaration of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina took place on March 1, 1992, and the declaration itself followed immediately, as did the first clashes. Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), pp. 413–440. 20. Ramet, Balkan Babel, pp. 440–469. 21. Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia, p. 84. 22. The SOC was openly criticised by numerous Protestant churches and agencies in the World Council of Churches for “a sin similar to that of Deutsche Christen who gave support to Hitler’s nationalistic policies” [quoted from Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia, p. 85]. The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 51

23. Patriarch Pavle, “Pismo Patrijarha Pavla britanskom lordu Karingtonu, predsedniku Međunarodne mirovne konferencije,” Pravosavlje, 576, 1991, p. 1. 24. AVNOJ 3 (Third session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) was a provisional Communist-led parliament of Yugoslavia in 1945–1946. The borders between the republics of the former Yugoslavia were never officially explicitly defined, although they were drawn up by a group of Communist officials led by Milovan Djilas. 25. Sveti arhijererjski sabor Srpske pravoslavne crkve, “Poruka Svetog arhijerejskog sabora Srpske pravoslavne crkve,” Glasnik: Službeni List Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve, 76, 1995, pp. 4–5. 26. Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva, Glasnik: Službeni List Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve (Beograd), 75, 1994, p. 121. 27. Tanjug, “Hoće Bog nešto veliko od ovog naroda,” Politika, 91, no. 28539, 1993, p. 8. 28. Ibid. 29. Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva, Glasnik, p. 123. 30. Ratko Mladenović and Jovan Ćulibrk (eds.), Jagnje Božije i zvijer iz bezdana: Filozofija rata (Cetinje: Svetigora, 1996). 31. Arsenijević, in Ratko Mladenović and Jovan Ćulibrk (eds.), Jagnje Božije i zvijer iz bezdana: Filozofija rata (Cetinje: Svetigora, 1996), p. 234. 32. Radović, in Ratko Mladenović and Jovan Ćulibrk (eds.), Jagnje Božije i zvijer iz bezdana: Filozofija rata (Cetinje: Svetigora, 1996), p. 269. 33. Quoted from Milorad Tomanić, Srpska Crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj (Beograd: Krug, 2001), p. 17. 34. All nationalities and religious communities are likely to speak, through the mouths of their ideologues, of being particularly tragic in fate and self- sacrificial in behavior. For Muslims, see, for example, M. Mustafa Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998); Mašanović in Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia, pp. 145–149; For Croats, see, for example, Franjo Tudjman, Bespuća povijesne zbiljnost: rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1994), who stressed the ante-murale nature of the position of Catholic Croats and their tragic fate in confrontation with larger nations (first, the Hungarians and, later, the Serbs). For Serbs, an entire ideological circle of ideas on the tragic nature of Serbdom was present, including their martyrdom for the establishment of Yugoslavia, the bad deal they got in that state, particularly as to internal borders, the unjust nature of economic redistribution, the anti-Serbian position on the part of Communists before and after they came to power, Tito included, and ideas on the messianic nature of Serbian history as a whole; for a critical overview, see Nebojsa Popov (ed.), Srpska strana rata: Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju (Beograd: Republika, 1996). 35. Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 278. 52 Sergej Flere

36. Alija Izetbegović, Islamska deklaracija (Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990), p. 19. 37. Ibid., p. 29. 38. Ibid., pp. 50–51. 39. Mustafa Cerić, Islam ovjde i sada (Sarajevo: Press centar armije BiH, 1994), p. 29. 40. Ibid., p. 33. 41. Reported by Ivan Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu (Sarajevo and Zargeb: Svijetlo riječi-Oči u oči, 2004), p. 25. 42. Ibid., pp. 25–26. 43. Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, p. 89. 44. Velikonja, Mardešić, Mojzes, and Zgodić, “The Role of Religions and Religious Communities in the Wars in Ex-Yugoslavia,” pp. 1–42, p. 20. 45. Ibid., p. 23. 46. Metropolija Vrhobosanska, Vrhbosna, Službeno glasilo biskupija metropolije vrhbosanske (Sarajevo, 1991), p. 5. 47. Cardinals Puljić and Kuharić in 1993, quoted in Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 271. 48. Vrhobosanska, Vrhbosna, Službeno glasilo biskupija metropolije vrhbosanske, p. 137. 49. Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 124. 50. Quoted in Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 129. 51. HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica—Croatian Democratic Union), the dominant poitical party in Croatia at the time, most instrumental in attaining independence, led by the late President Tudjman, with an arm of the Party inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as mobilizing Croatians. 52. Srdjan Vrcan, “The War in Ex-Yugoslavia and Religion,”Anthropos (Ljubljana), 26, 1994, pp. 155–168, p. 168. 53. Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 72. 54. The Wallachs are an ethnic group in the Balkans. Its nature and limits are subject to considerable some dispute. Here, the denomination is used for Serbians in a denigratory sense. 55. Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 72. 56. Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 129. 57. In the original: “U svetom džihadu leži naš spas! U džihad, u džihad pođimo svi! Gordo se vije zeleni stijeg, islamsko bratstvo neka nas veže, prezrimo smrt i pođimo u boj.” 58. Sead Trhulj, Mladi muslimani (Sarajevo: Oko, 1995), p. 152. 59. Krajina designates the land Serbians claimed to the west of the borders of Serbia proper, which was partly populated by Serbs (in Bosnia and Hezegovina and in Croatia), and then became the main stage of the War. 60. In the original: “Mi imamo srce lavlje, mi branimo Pravoslavlje, u Krajini pravoslavne sveće nikad ugasiti neće.” The Bosnian War (1992–1995) 53

61. Quoted in Ivan Čolović, Bordel ratnika: folklor, politika, rat (Beograd: XX vek, 2000), p. 172. 62. In the original: “Jugo-vojska mora znat, Hrvatska će dobit rat, uza nas su svetinje, a s njima su prokletinje.” Čolović, Bordel ratnika, p. 128. 63. Vrcan, “The War in Ex-Yugoslavia and Religion,” pp. 155–168, p. 168. 64. This, well, may be contrary to the intent on the part of the international community when imposing the Dayton Accords, that ended the War, with instruments built in to heterogenize the two “entities.” 65. Ramet, Balkan Babel, pp. 471–494. 66. Among the Croats, Cvitković’s survey found that 43% members of a Croatian military unit declared that they had become more religious during the War. See Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 130. 67. Ćimić, “Bosnian Crossroads”; Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu. 68. Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 188. 69. Stassen, Just Peacemaking. 70. Anthony Burke, “Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence After 9/11,” International Affairs, 80, 2004, pp. 330–353, p. 351. 71. Michael Parenti, “God’s Fundamentalist Politics: A Radical View,” New Political Science, 27, 2005, pp. 397–406, p. 406.

3 The Role of the Catholic Church in the Bosnian Conflict 1992–1995: A Historical Approach Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

When investigating the role of religion in the wars following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, one cannot avoid the question of the interrelationship between religious and ethnic—or national—identities. Moreover, the exploration and disclosure of their mutual reinforcement offer the prospect of providing an explanation for the outbreak of savage violence in the 1990s. That these atrocities followed the crumbling of a secular federal state makes the quest for its cause and effect urgent for Europe, which is in the process of enlarging a federation of nation-states that are bound together by precisely such a secular framework. In the Balkans, Slovenia and Croatia have already entered this new union—at a time when strong winds are battering its integrity. The final words of Vjekoslav Perica in his book on religion and nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, therefore, ring somewhat hollow when, after many dark pages, he attempts to strike an optimistic final note by invoking a new Europe: “After ages of war, the new Europe—more

55 56 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić religiously indifferent and less ideologically passionate than ever—seems to be making progress in attaining unity with little concern about any kind of brotherhood.”1 However, in contrast to such a faith in a new age of ideological apathy, the brutality of the war crimes in Bosnia awoke a sense of “the mystery of iniquity” within the European mind, recalling memories and unsolved questions from the 1930s and 1940s. Is this form of ethnic hatred some type of madness, with periodic relapses? Slips from modernity into a primordial hatred of the Other? Alternatively, are these social attitudes very much a part of modernity, the mere result of cynical political power games?2 The basic position is that such cruelty calls the goodness of human beings into question. How could people living together peacefully suddenly tear one another to pieces like wild beasts, building concentration camps once more on European soil? Is the veneer of civilization so thin? Such savagery has followed the totalitarian secular ideologies of twentieth century—communism and fascism—like dark shadows; however, in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of the century, the role of religion also came to the forefront. In this article, by focusing on Catholicism and the Roman Catholic Church during the conflict, we attempt to balance historical and social science explanations with the existential challenge to which the events give rise; the “mystery” is a call to also reflect on present conditions, as we cannot claim immunity from this affliction for ourselves or our societies—especially when the New Europe faces what appears to be a perfect storm. First, we present background information describing the historical genesis of the circumstances of the Roman Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), such as the particular role of the Franciscan order. This is an important component of the article, because links between adequate knowledge of history and understanding of modern developments are strong. By the nouns “Catholicism” and “Catholic Church” and the adjective “Catholic,” we denote the Roman Catholic Church of the Latin (or Western) Rite headed by the Pope as well as the religious tenets and culture associated with it. This clarification is important because other religious denominations are also called Catholic, such as the Greek Catholic (Eastern-Rite) churches ecclesiastically united with Rome and the Old Catholic churches separated from it. In the Balkan context, The Role of the Catholic Church 57 moreover, it is important to note that the “Great Schism” between the Eastern and Western Churches, which developed from the eighth to the eleventh centuries, had profound impacts on both the Balkan churches and the political structures aligned with them, as the territory of Bosnia was located on the fault line between these two ecclesiastical powers. In these regions, over the course of several centuries, the distinction between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy was blurred, as demonstrated in the section explaining the phenomenon of the Bosnian Church. The noun “Bosnia” and the adjective “Bosnian,” we understand, indicate anything concerning the entire territory and population of present-day BiH, including references to these in the past, unless the context suggests otherwise. Historically, these proper names were applied inconsistently, in some instances, to narrower whereas, in others, to broader areas than those of the present BiH. In such cases, the term “Bosnia proper” may be used. The same, mutatis mutandis, apply to the terms “Croatia” and “Croatian”. In contrast, the term “Croat” is used to denote ethnicity in cultural terms rather than belonging to a state called “Croatia”; an example would be “Bosnian Croats,” not “Bosnian Croatians.” One complication concerning Catholicism that must be borne in mind is that it is a universal religion with a global presence and a centralized organization in Rome. This stands in marked contrast to the Serbian Orthodox Church, which embraces ethnicity in a more radical sense. Thus, a radical collapsing of ethnic and religious identity cannot be achieved within the Catholic Church without encountering an inherent, universalistic resistance. As argued by Gerard Powers,

The Church in Croatia embraces a weak form of ethno-nationalism which sees the “church among the Croats” as nurturing and protecting the spiritual values, historical memory, and culture of the Croatian people, but the church does not advocate a form of religious nationalism that equates national identity with adherence to the Catholic faith, and it has been outspoken in opposing efforts to create ethnically-homogeneous societies.3

Nevertheless, we need to make a distinction between the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Catholic Church in Bosnia.4 In the case of Bosnia, the Church historically acted as an important, or even the most important, agent in spreading a Croatian national identity, at least since the turn of the twentieth century. 58 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

After the historical section, we provide two brief case studies. The first describes the position of the Catholic Church and the challenges of managing a Catholic identity during the siege of Sarajevo, whereas the second study focuses on the pilgrimage shrine in Međugorje, Herzegovina, which represents an interesting mixture of the local and the global. In this way, although we may not be able to provide a comprehensive answer to the basic pressing questions, we can at least provide some pieces of the puzzle and offer the reader a gateway to other resources. Moreover, we wish to make a case for the contemporary importance of this theme for the European project, which must discover a new form of cohesive identity or risk collapse. When a secular union focused on material prosperity disintegrates, the role of national and religious identities can very well appear in a new light. Then, the Balkans must again face the centrifugal forces of state formation.

Background: The history of Catholicism in Bosnia

This section aims to provide insights into the history and formation of Bosnian Catholicism and its relationship to modern political movements among the South Slavs. Particular issues arising from this theme are: (1) the special place held by Franciscan regular clergy in Bosnian history and their complex relationship with both secular political powers and secular diocesan clergy; (2) the role of the Catholic Church in spreading Croatian nationalism in the South Slav areas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and (3) the instrumentalization of Catholic identity and symbols in the processes of the ethnicization of conflicts during both the Second World War (WWII) and the Wars of Yugoslav Succession.5 The territory of present-day Bosnia was, throughout late antiquity and the early medieval period, exposed to the competing jurisdictional claims of the Eastern (Byzantine) Church and the Western (Roman) Church over the administration of dioceses. Thus, topographically situated between these ecclesiastical aspirations, isolated and removed from contemporary political centers, medieval Bosnia never developed a strong church organization with the diocesan clergy, confessional institutions, and discipline typical of feudal, pre-modern society. This fact likely contributed to the subsequent emergence of the religious The Role of the Catholic Church 59 phenomenon known in scholarly works as the “Bosnian Church” (Crkva bosanska, ecclesia bosniensis). The confessional, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal nature of this Church has been the subject of academic debates after the publication of the studies on the Bosnian Bogomils by Božidar Petranović in 1867 and Franjo Rački in 1869–1870.6 In contrast to their thesis—that this Church was a Neo-Manichaean offshoot of the Bogomil movement and, thus, essentially heretical—that has been dominant in South-Slav historical writings for many decades, some recent discover- ies argue that it was, although schismatic and autocephalous, in fact, a Christian church that followed orthodox doctrine and confession.7

The Bosnian schism and the early Slav Christianity in the Middle Ages

The history of early Christianity in Bosnia prior to the thirteenth century has yet to be fully explored. However, certain sources suggest that the Christianization of the ruling chieftains in Bosnia occurred in the second half of the ninth century.8 Prior to this development, the Bosnian territories had belonged to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Archbishopric of St. Methodius, “the Apostle of the Slavs,” who authored the first translation of the Holy Scriptures into Slavonic and developed the Slavonic Liturgy.9 It seems that, in this case, we should instead discuss “re-Christianization” because the first known bishopric on Bosnian soil already existed in pre-Slavic late antiquity as of approximately 530 CE with its See in Bistue—a place situated either in the vicinity of Sarajevo10 or somewhere between Zenica and Travnik.11 In the eleventh century, the Bishopric of Bosnia fell under the jurisdiction of the Archdiocese of Bar (present-day Montenegro). Due to a complex network of external political conflicts and alliances, however, this jurisdiction was continually shifting among Bar, Dubrovnik, Split, and Kalocsa until the Bosnian Bishopric finally relocated out of Bosnia proper to Đakovo (present-day Croatia) and, then, became defunct in the mid-thirteenth century, merely retaining its title. In this period from the sixth to the thirteenth century, Bosnia was, largely, an acephalous area—a region without organized churches and clerical jurisdiction, lacking in confessional discipline and a trained priesthood. Although nominally Christian (numerous individual local rulers and nobles officially adhered to this religion), Bosnia remained 60 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić a rural, peasant society that, due to its geographical isolation, high rate of illiteracy, and lack of an educated elite, acted as a hotbed for religious syncretism.12 Magical domestic practices, folk religious beliefs, and patriarchal obedience, such as a respect for elders, were more important than understanding scriptures, Christian doctrine, or discipline. It is, thus, no surprise that such a religious situation appeared to external contemporary religious and political centers as heretical—”patarin,” “dualist,” or “Manichaean.” In this respect, although we are focused, in this study, on the development of Catholicism in Bosnia, it seems justified to address, at least briefly, the nature of the Bosnian Church—all the more so because its historical appearance was somehow connected with the disappearance of the Bosnian Catholic Bishopric. Members of this Bosnian Church who simply called themselves “Christians,” (krstjani) were actually members of a monastic order, the foundation of which was likely a result of St. Methodius’ missionary work in the ninth century. 13 It seems that both the Bosnian Catholic Bishopric and the network of krstjani monasteries appeared simultaneously circa the mid–eleventh century, that is, in the period of the Great Schism. Indeed, the two may, in actuality, have merely been different forms of the one, undivided Church of Bosnia.14 The Catholic bishop was formerly elected from the ranks of indigenous Slav-speaking krstjani monks (a practice consistent with Eastern/Byzantine traditions) until 1233, when, due to their alleged heresies, the first foreigner—a Dominican monk—was ordained a bishop.15 These foreign Catholic bishops neither spoke the Slav language nor were acquainted with Bosnian traditions; therefore, the Pope ultimately decided to move the Catholic Bishopric out of Bosnia proper to Đakovo.16 When the Bosnian kings, faced with Ottoman expansion on their eastern borders, undertook efforts to eradicate the “heresy” and convert as much of the population to Catholicism as possible in the mid–fifteenth century to strengthen their alliance with the Papacy, the Bosnian Church disappeared from history.17

Non-established Catholicism18 under the Ottomans

The withdrawal of the Catholic Bishopric in the mid–thirteenth century left an empty arena in which the schismatic Bosnian Church gradually The Role of the Catholic Church 61 established itself as a “state church,”19 autonomous from both Rome and Constantinople. The popes, nonetheless, persisted in their efforts to reform, Latinize, and bring this church into the fold of Roman Catholicism, occasionally using the secular powers of the neighboring kings of Hungary who, on their part, laid claims of suzerainty over the Bosnian Banate (Kingdom after 1377) as their vassal state. Although the first Franciscans may have already began to arrive in Bosnia in the mid-thirteenth century to investigate the accusations of heresy advanced by the Archbishop of Kalocsa against Ban Matthew Ninoslav, the full activity of Franciscan missionary work began circa 1340 with the establishment of the Franciscan Bosnian Vicariate.20 This was the result of an agreement between Ban Stephen II Kotromanić and the Franciscan General Minister, who sought to employ only peaceful means to convert the “heretics.”21 However, although most of the Bosnian rulers during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were nominally Catholic, they felt uneasy about unconditionally supporting the establishment of the organized Catholic Church on their territory—as made clear by the actions of two powerful figures, Ban Stephen II and King Tvrtko I.22 They cultivated cordial relationships with Catholic clergy and often appointed them court chaplains and counselors23; however, due to constant pressures from the Catholic Kingdom of Hungary threatening their political ambitions, Bosnian rulers also favored and protected the krstjani of the Bosnian Church, whose traditional moral authority was respected.24 This may explain why only four Franciscan monasteries were constructed before 1385 in Bosnia proper, whereas in the entire territory of the Bosnian Vicariate, which encompassed the vast lands of Pannonia and the Dalmatian coast, there were 35 monasteries in total.25 The imminent Ottoman threat in the mid-fifteenth century, however, forced kings Stephen Thomas and Stephen Tomašević to seek additional support from the Papacy, represented in Bosnia by the Franciscan Vicariate. As a result, the number of monasteries grew rapidly during the fifteenth century and, by the 1463 Ottoman conquest of Bosnia, they numbered nearly 40 in total.26 The Ottoman destruction of the Kingdom of Bosnia had negative consequences for Bosnian Catholicism. More than a century of continuing missionary activity by the Franciscans had resulted in conversion of the majority of the Bosnian population, at least nominally, by 1463. A Franciscan source mentions half a million converts by 1402.27 Immediately upon the fall of the Kingdom, Sultan Mehmed II, alias the Conqueror, 62 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić bestowed special privileges on the Franciscan community through the unilateral agreement known as Ahdname,28 which guaranteed their personal safety and freedom of movement and religion in return for their loyalty to the Sultan.29 These privileges were, however, implemented only selectively, depending on the concrete political situation in a region, and they often contravened the general laws restricting the construction and maintenance of churches and other non-Muslim religious activity. There were ten Franciscan monasteries in Bosnia proper (which was only a smaller part of the larger Franciscan Bosnian Province) until 1675. The Great Vienna War had devastating consequences for the Catholic community in Bosnia,30 such that, in the period surrounding the Karlowitz Peace Treaty (1699), the number of these friaries fell to three, whereas the number of Catholic adherents in Bosnia was reduced to only 17,000.31 During the Ottoman period, the Bosnian Franciscan community experienced several internal organizational reforms. The single Bosnian Vicariate was divided into two vicariates in 1514: Bosna Croatiae for the territories free from Ottoman rule, and Bosna Argentina for the Ottoman domains, primarily covering Bosnia proper and Dalmatia.32 In 1517, both of these were elevated to the status of province although, in the same year, the Pope decided to divide the Franciscan Order into “Observants”—a stricter branch adhering to the oath of poverty—and “Conventuals”—a liberal branch allowing certain material possessions. The Dalmatian section of the Bosnian Province became independent in 1735, as did the Trans-Sava region in Slavonia in 1757. The remainder was, first, demoted to the custody status, but was reinstated as the province of Bosna Argentina in 1758.33 Because the Catholic bishop of Đakovo was also a titular Bishop of Bosnia, the Holy See decided to found the office of the Apostolic Vicariate for Bosnia in 1735. The Apostolic Vicar was to act as a de facto bishop for the Bosnian territory, performing and administering necessary clerical duties and caring for the faithful. All of the Apostolic Vicars in the period until 1881 were to be recruited from the ranks of the Franciscans.34 The final important reform of the Provincial structure in this historical period occurred in the 1840s in connection with the Barišić controversy. During his term as Apostolic Vicar between 1832 and 1846, Bishop Rafael Barišić initiated a power struggle that ultimately involved the Holy See, Vienna, the Ottoman Porte, Dalmatian Franciscans, Ottoman regional governors in Bosnia, and the early nationalist Illyrian Movement from the neighboring Hungary-ruled Croatia proper—all due to his ambitions to have his own jurisdiction distinct from Bosna The Role of the Catholic Church 63

Argentina.35 The conflict ended with Barišić being appointed the first Apostolic Vicar of Herzegovina, a territory that was proclaimed a custody independent of Bosna Argentina in 1846, and ultimately recognized as the new Herzegovina Province in 1892.36 TheSunni branch of Islam was the established religion of the Ottoman Empire, and although several different schools of jurisprudence coexisted, the sultans promoted the Hanafi version.37 The Sultan, acting as the head of state and the protector of Islam and its holy places, mobilized his administration to enforce Islamic law (sharia), which applied to all Muslim subjects. In general terms, all non-Muslim subjects enjoyed limited cultural and political autonomy under the millet system, which initially recognized only three communities: Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish. Each millet was headed by a supreme cleric, millet başı, who was appointed by the Sultan, and these communities—as constituted in the nineteenth century—were hierarchically organized religious bodies with a decidedly political function.38 The millet enjoyed autonomy in the field of private, civil law, such as resolving disputes concerning religious and family matters, or when organizing basic education for their children. Using their privileged position as members of the millet, whose millet başı (i.e., the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople) resided in close proximity to the Porte, the Greek Orthodox bishops continually strove to place the Catholic communities under their ecclesiastical jurisdiction to collect additional tithes. In the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Bosnian Franciscans struggled to preserve their autonomy through repeated appeals to the Porte referring to their old Ahdname privileges. Only after substantial bargaining between the two Christian communities and the receipt of large amounts of money as bribes did the sultans acquit the Franciscans from the Orthodox aspirations by issuing special decrees—firmans.39 This practice only ceased after the official recognition of the Catholic millet in 1830, when the entire system was more strictly organized, resulting in 12 separate millets by the end of the nineteenth century.40 An important aspect of Catholicism in the Ottoman Empire, in general terms, was the missionary zeal of the Papacy and Western Christian powers to Latinize and unite the Eastern Orthodox Christians with Rome—attempts that were effectively prevented by the Ottoman millet organization.41 However, a specific characteristic of Bosnian Catholicism under the Ottomans can be described through the continuing struggle between Rome and secular clergy on one side, aiming to 64 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić organize bishopric jurisdiction over the Catholic parishes on the model of the established Roman Church, and the Franciscans on the other side, struggling to retain their historical possession of parishes in a non- established manner,42 reflective of the rich history of Bosnian-Ottoman Catholicism.43 Paradoxically, this strife did not cease once the Islamic imperial rule in Bosnia was replaced by the Roman Catholic rule in 1878.

Bosnian Catholic establishment and Croatian nationalism until WWII

Following the 1878 Berlin Congress, the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied Bosnia, whereas the Ottoman Empire retained only formal sovereignty over the province that lasted until the Austro-Hungarian annexation in 1908. Through an agreement between the Holy See and the Vienna government, a diocesan organization of the Catholic Church in Bosnia was established in 1881—the first following the retreat of diocesan clergy in the mid-thirteenth century. Josip Stadler was accorded the rank of Archbishop of Vrhbosna, with his Episcopal See based in Sarajevo44 and suffragan bishoprics in Banja Luka and Mostar. The Franciscans, thereby, lost their “monopoly” over Bosnian Catholicism, which they had preserved during the centuries of Ottoman rule. However, the Catholic establishment represented by Archbishop Stadler was involved in several controversial issues during this period that rendered Bosnian Catholicism highly politicized. Although the Austro-Hungarian government strove to balance the interests of the three major religious communities that, as we have observed, had already been shaped into a peculiar type of political community by the Ottoman millet system, the Catholic Church exploited its position in the “Catholic Empire” to expand organizationally, economi- cally, and politically. This is clear when comparing the sheer numbers of Catholics in official census records during the Austro-Hungarian reign. In 1879, there were 209,391 Roman Catholics, that is, 18% of the total population of Bosnia. By 1910, that number had increased to 434,061 (23%).45 If we also consider the number of the Greek Catholics, which increased from a mere 200 in 1879 to 8139 in 1910, we can note that the growth of Catholicism in Bosnia was considerable, although perhaps somewhat relativized by the emigration of numerous Muslims The Role of the Catholic Church 65 to the Ottoman lands.46 However, two other highly controversial efforts that had lasting impacts on Bosnian Catholicism can be attributed to Archbishop Stadler: (1) his conflict with the Bosnian Franciscan Province and (2) his role in the “Croat Catholic Movement” and the rising Croatian nationalism. Immediately upon the establishment of the diocesan organization, Archbishop Stadler, in coordination with the Imperial government, sought to minimize Franciscan influence by seizing a certain number of Franciscan parishes and submitting them to the secular clergy, even if this violated canonical requirements concerning the division of parishes.47 Furthermore, Stadler attempted to incite Franciscans to leave the Order, thereby becoming secular priests for the purpose of filling vacant positions in the newly established dioceses.48 The papal bull Felicitate quadam of 1897, which was intended to unify various branches of the Franciscan Order and restore orderly discipline, including the abolishment of friars’ private possessions, was misinterpreted by Stadler, according to Franciscan sources,49 and enforced with the aim of destroy- ing the Order and providing a space for his growing political ambitions, which culminated in his 1910 foundation of a Catholic political party, Hrvatska katolička udruga (HKU).50 The strong language employed by some Franciscans in response to the frequent attacks from the Archbishopric’s press, such as qualifying Stadler’s deeds as “treacherous ambush attacks worse than those of the Turk,”51 “grave sin in contradic- tion to the Catholic theology,”52 or even as outright heretical,53 evince the types of grievances many friars must have felt during this period. Another heavy blow to Bosnian Catholic identity coincided with the rise of Croatian nationalism. This political and cultural movement with a clear political agenda, corresponding to Miroslav Hroch’s Phase B in his chronology of nationalism in Europe,54 was developed in Croatia proper during the 1860s to 1880s under the leadership of Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik. Known as pravaštvo (after their ‘Party of Rights’, or Stranka prava), it advocated the political unification of all lands that they considered to be populated by Croats (Hervati). Furthermore, they demanded the political independence of such a Croatian state in line with the theory of the “historical right of statehood” (povijesno državno pravo), combining contemporary European currents of liberalism and nationalism and applying them to local circumstances and traditions.55 Although Starčević employed liberal arguments in his writings to criticize the church and the clergy, accusing them “to have caused the majority 66 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić of the misfortune of the Croat people,”56 he respected Christianity and Catholicism as moral ingredients of the emerging Croatian national identity, in keeping with the liberal ideas of the separation of church and state and religious freedom.57 These ideas of a trans-religious “construction of nationhood”58 were also present in other writings of the period, including in the draft of the Constitution of the Triune Kingdom (i.e., Croatia proper, Slavonia and Dalmatia), which clearly sought to separate religious identity from the “national character” of Croats.59 Starčević’s adaptation of Giuseppe Mazzini’s republican nationalist slogan “God and the people!” (Dio e popolo!) into “God and the Croats!” (Bog i Hrvati!)60 would, however, prove useful for the subsequent late twentieth century equivocation of Croat ethnicity or nationhood with Roman Catholicism during the Yugoslav collapse, when the slogan was often used.61 This equivocation, also evident in the frequently used expression Crkva u Hrvata (“Church among/of the Croats”) in both popular and academic writings, can be historically traced from the “First Croat Catholic Meeting” held in Zagreb in September 190062 that was organized within the context of the Croat Catholic Movement (Hrvatski katolički pokret). This movement rejected modern ideology in the forms of liberalism, social democracy, and the secular state, according to Marija Vulesica, because “the Catholic Church in Croatia found itself and its principles threatened in 1894 by the liberal legislation, which was implemented in Hungary.”63 This turn toward “political Catholicism” may be attributed to two key figures of the Movement in Croatia proper: Stjepan Korenić, editor of the Catholic bulletin Katolički list since 1896, and Antun Mahnič, the Bishop of Krk. Their difference in the prioritization of nationalism was summarized by the slogans—Mahnič’s “first Catholic, then Croat” versus Korenić’s “both Croat and Catholic”64—as both directed the Croat Catholic Movement into a specific form of Catholic Croatism that strengthened the notion of Catholicism as the core element of Croat identity. Archbishop Stadler, who was the main instigator and organizer of the Zagreb Catholic Meeting in 1900,65 remarked in his speech: “ . . . We are Croats and Catholics and we wish to be so . . . [S]ince everything in the world has been done by the Son of God . . . therefore our Croatia has been made by Him . . . .”66 The Bosnian Archbishop only briefly mentioned his country of residence during the speech at the ceremonial banquet after the Meeting when he said the following: The Role of the Catholic Church 67

I will say my only two wishes, the first wish regarding the people and the second wish regarding our holy religion. Regarding the people, I wish Bosnia and Herzegovina to be united with the motherland as soon as possible . . . And regarding religion and the episcopate . . . I wish that God gives to Croatia many smarter, more intelligent and more pious bishops than myself there [in Bosnia]. But still, there is one thing I do not wish – I do not want anyone to love the Croat people both here and in Bosnia more than I do.67 Archbishop Stadler, as is evident from these citations, advocated the thesis that the Bosnian Catholics should integrate into the Croatian nation68 whereas simultaneously espousing Catholic integrism against secularizing trends, even in the Habsburg-ruled Bosnia, where modern ideas such as liberalism or social democracy were hardly existent.69 In this way, Stadler was the progenitor of a religio-nationalist-political ideology and the accompanying mentality that still persists.70 The elements of “Stadlerism,” thus, include immunization of the notion of “Bosnian identity” (national and political) among the Bosnian Franciscans, alienation of the Bosnian Catholics from their own country and historical memory, and the Croatization of the Bosnian Catholics to merge the territory of Bosnia into the Croatian nation-state.71 Croatian nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, however, was hardly anomalous in an age of nationalist political trends throughout Europe. It was an era when new nations were made from symbols, identities, and historical memory, and old nations were reimagined. According to Ernest Gellner, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist ‒ but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on.”72 The ‘Croat’ ethnonym was certainly one such pre-existing differentiating mark since medieval times, although it was not the most frequently or exclusively used. A historiographic study of identity in pre-modern Western Balkans by John V. A. Fine uncovered that circa 1800, [P]eople in what is now Croatia were . . . divided among several possible identities, none of which was certain to triumph . . . The identity of “Croat” was a minority one, often accompanied by a second, frequently more important and broader identity, [such as “Illyrian”, “Slavic”, “Slavonian” or “Dalmatian”, while in the 1840s] many truly felt “Illyrian” and did not see themselves as “Croats.”73 This thesis can be supported by the fact that the literary gazette Danica ilirska, the editor-in-chief of which was the Illyrian Movement leader 68 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

Ljudevit Gaj (born Ludwig Gay), in its annual volume No. VII of 1841, used the ethnonym Illyrian to refer to the general South Slav population that he envisaged for the purpose of national awakening and emancipation from the foreign powers, including the people of the contemporary Ottoman Bosnia.74 In contrast, in his 1852 public announcement at the opening of a bookshop intended to popularize literature in the native language, the only ethnonyms that Gaj used were “Yugoslav” (jugo- slavenska književnost) and “Slav” (u slavjanskim jezicima).75 However, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Gaj’s death, which occurred in the context of the Zagreb Catholic Meeting, in his April 1902 lecture, Stjepan Ortner pronounced Gaj “the first Croat bibliophile,” “the greatest Croat” (najveći Hrvat), and “the reformer of the Croat people” (prepo- roditelj hrvatskoga naroda).76 This seems a clear example of the process whereby nationalism reads the present into the past. Sociopolitically, one can argue, as Walker Connor notes, that “what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is”77 and, therefore, that once a sufficient number of the members of a group come to believe that they belong to a nation, nationalism has succeeded as a mass phenomenon.78 In the case of the Bosnian Catholic masses, this most likely only occurred later during the Yugoslav Kingdom period.79 The most radical consequences of Croatian nationalism occurred during WWII, when mass atrocities against civilians—ethnic (Serbs, Jews, Roma) or political (communists, anti-fascists, liberals) minorities—were committed by the Ustaša regime on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). This puppet-state of the Axis Powers, fueled by the Greater Croatian nationalist theory, claimed that all Bosnian Catholics and Bosnian Muslims (together representing the majority of the Bosnian population) were ethnically Croats,80 thus encompassing the entire Bosnian territory. Although there is little doubt that the racist nature of its political ideology was aligned with that of the Nazi Germany, the role of the Catholic Episcopate in NDH is much more controversial. On the one hand, being disillusioned with its position in the Yugoslav Kingdom and through the actions of the Yugoslav Government following the Concordat Crisis,81 the Catholic Episcopate welcomed the establishment of NDH82 and the demise of the Yugoslav State. Because, as we have already observed, the Croat ethnic identity had been aligned with Catholicism, the Catholic Church considered itself the “church of the Croats who are persistently fighting the Greater Serbian hegemony.”83 Thus, it considered NDH to be a legitimate expression of the will of the The Role of the Catholic Church 69

Croat people to have their own state.84 Senior Catholic prelates such as Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac of Zagreb and Archbishop Ivan Šarić of Sarajevo endorsed loyalty to the Ustaša regime of Ante Pavelić.85 The latter even published poems in the Catholic bulletin Katolički tjednik glorifying the Pavelić regime.86 Moreover, there are documented cases of active involvement by Catholic priests, both diocesan and Franciscan, in the Ustaša civilian and military organizations,87 including the notorious case of Tomislav Filipović (a.k.a. Miroslav Majstorović), a renegade friar who personally participated in the executions inside the Jasenovac concentration camp.88 Such an attitude on the part of Catholic clerics in NDH could also be understood in the broader context of the so-called “silence of Pope Pius XII” during WWII when the Church was reluctant to openly condemn fascist ideologies across Europe.89 The role of Archbishop Stepinac during the war is also controversial, particularly regarding his attitude toward the existence of concentration camps for civilians. One of the accusations against him is that he complained to Pavelić only about the “inhuman treatment of non-Aryans during their transportation to the concentration camps,”90 protested that “the whole Jasenovac camp was a disgrace to the Independent State of Croatia”91 only in early 1943, when he learned of the murder of several Slovene Catholic priests inside the camp, and was reluctant to offer his aid in late 1941 to early 1942 when repeatedly asked for assistance in the case of a group of imprisoned women and children.92 On the other hand, the Vatican never formally recognized NDH, only recognizing it as a de facto state, and Archbishop Stepinac occasionally pleaded to the Pavelić government on the behalf of persecuted individuals.93 Furthermore, the Catholic Episcopate opposed the NDH policy of forcible conversion of Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism, although some lower level clerics, at times, yielded to such pressures and allowed the Pavelić regime to enforce its secular conversion laws in the canonical legal sphere.94 Finally, an implicit condemnation of the Ustaša regime from the Catholic side had already been voiced in summer 1941, shortly after the beginning of the persecutions. The General Administration of the Franciscan Order issued an instruction to all Franciscans in NDH requiring them, inter alia, to refrain from joining the Ustaša forces or participating in the persecutions or forced conversions of Serbs and Jews and advising them to attempt to protect persecuted persons if possible.95 Shortly after the Bosnian Franciscan Province learned of his presence among the Ustaša troops who committed atrocities against 70 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

Serb civilians in the Banja Luka area, friar Filipović was expelled from the Order.96 Finally, although Archbishop Šarić of Sarajevo supported the Ustaša regime, his suffragan, Bishop Mišić of Mostar, expressed his bitterness over the atrocities committed in his diocese.97

Uneasy relations with two Yugoslav States

With respect to the legal position of churches in the Yugoslav Kingdom, “there was no state church in Yugoslavia, but there was no separation of church and state. Religious confessions had a special status and not all were treated equally.”98 Both constitutions adopted during the period of the Yugoslav Kingdom contained similar provisions regarding the legal status, rights, and obligations of religious communities.99 Indeed, none of these constitutional texts explicitly mentioned any religious denomination. However, the Serbian Orthodox Church100—the religion of the ruling Karađorđević dynasty—enjoyed a privileged position as the de facto state religion101 and, following a 1929 legislation, as a de jure state church that was not fully autonomous but, instead, placed under the overall administrative supervision of the monarchy.102 Although the Kingdom’s constitutions differentiated between accepted (usvojene veroispovesti) and recognized (priznate vere) confessions,103 both types of religious communities:

performed certain functions for the state; they kept registers of birth, mar- riages and death, and had jurisdiction over matrimonial disputes. There was, for example, no civil marriage anywhere in Yugoslavia after 1921, except in the Vojvodina, where it had previously existed.104 Regarding the Catholic community in Bosnia, although it no longer belonged to the majority religion of the state, it seems that Catholics now occupied a more favorable position than they had previously, at least from the Franciscan viewpoint.105 Although Stadler’s successor, Archbishop Šarić, continued the former’s policy of suppressing the Franciscans’ public influence, Franciscan activities in the fields of schooling, education, literature, and church building in this period were considerable.106 Moreover, this is the period during which the Catholic population in Bosnia reached its peak since the Ottoman conquest of the Bosnian Kingdom, which still remains unsurpassed. The census of 1931 reported that nearly a quarter of the population of Bosnia was Catholic, The Role of the Catholic Church 71 a total of 547,948 or 23.58%, whereas some church sources arrived at a figure of even 571,130 or 24.6%.107 This represented a slight increase since the 1921 Census, which listed a total of 443,914 or 23.48%.108 On a more general level, the major contested issue between the Catholic Church and the Yugoslav Kingdom was the Concordat agreement. Although the beginnings of the negotiations over the treaty between the Holy See and the Monarchy can be traced back to 1920,109 it was only after the personal involvement of King Alexander that the first draft of the treaty was completed in 1931. By this time, the Catholic Church was the only one of the major denominations in Yugoslavia, the legal status of which remained unregulated. Moreover, the Royal Government found it politically convenient to use the Concordat to attract the loyalty of both the Catholic clergy and the Catholic masses and to break the influence of HSS, which used Croatian nationalism and populism to oppose the central government in Belgrade.110 Furthermore, the Concordat served as a vehicle for the foreign policy ambitions of the premier, Milan Stojadinović, who sought an alliance with Italy and Germany, and he succeeded in signing the treaty with the Vatican in 1935. Prior to this juncture, the opposition to the Concordat primarily came from secular HSS politicians and the minor, anti-Roman Croatian Old Catholic Church, whereas the Roman Catholic Episcopate in Yugoslavia remained largely uninterested in and suspicious of a treaty negotiated directly between the Papacy and the Royal Government without their participation.111 Furthermore, Bosnian Franciscans seemed to have generally remained silent regarding the Concordat issues. The historian Ivan Mužić reports that they were only interested in securing state subsidies for the educational institutions of Bosna Argentina and special bonuses for Franciscan priests working as chaplains.112 However, at this point, the Serbian Orthodox Church was firmly opposed to the signed treaty and worked zealously to prevent its ratification by the Yugoslav Parliament. According to some sources, the signed Concordat would have provided privileged legal status for the Catholic Church,113 given its more effective structure and greater influence and opportunities for expansion in the unified Yugoslav state—a risk deemed unacceptable by the Serbian Orthodox Church, which considered itself a genuine defender of the Yugoslav State, unlike the Roman Catholic Church, which the Orthodox Church considered excessively cosmopolitan and an essentially alien, anti-state body.114 Further, the Orthodox Church feared that the Concordat might have prevented their ambition of creating a single 72 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić national church that would help merge Croats and Slovenes into a unified Serbian nation.115 The struggle against the Concordat was completely politicized in 1937, and the Serbian Orthodox Church acted in concert with the political opposition in Serbia proper, whose aim was to over- throw the Stojadinović government. Despite violent protests during the so-called Bloody Procession in Belgrade and the Orthodox bishops’ threat of excommunication for all Orthodox deputies, the Concordat was adopted in the Parliament but never reached the Senate for final ratification. The sudden death of Orthodox Patriarch Varnava during the voting process further complicated the situation, and the Government was ultimately compelled, in late 1938, to entirely abandon the Concordat project.116 Although the Catholic Episcopate in Yugoslavia was never a particularly enthusiastic supporter of the Concordat signed without their involvement, the Catholic press publicly expressed their embitterment that the Yugoslav Government capitulated under the pressure of the Serbian Orthodox Church—a clear sign that the Catholic Church could not rely on the constitutional proclamation of the equality of all accepted and recognized religions. As a consequence of the failure of the Concordat, the Holy See changed its policy toward the Yugoslav State and this resulted in the ambivalent role of the Church in NDH during WWII. In the period of Titoist Yugoslavia, 1945‒1980, two particular issues burdened the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church. The first was the trial and imprisonment of Archbishop Stepinac, and the second was the state-sponsored establishment of the associations of priests. Because the new socialist Yugoslav Federation was established on Marxist–Leninist principles, religion was regarded with greater suspicion, based on both the atheist convictions of the Communist Party and the bitter experiences of the war, when a segment of the Catholic clergy supported the enemies of Tito’s victorious Partisans—in this case, the fascist, pro-Axis Ustaša regime.117 This suspicion fuelled the turn to greater state control. A leading figure of the Catholic Episcopate, Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb, was arrested in 1946, put on trial, together with a group of persons connected to the NDH policies during the war, and sentenced to prison.118 However, the real reasons behind his imprisonment seem to have been (1) the Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops in September The Role of the Catholic Church 73

1945 condemning the Communist persecution of Catholic clergy and believers and the nationalization of church property and private schools, with appeals to the faithful to oppose the state119 and (2) his refusal to collaborate with the government to loosen its ties with the Vatican120 and the establishment of a more national Catholic Church of Yugoslavia, according to the alleged personal wishes of President Tito himself.121 This problem in the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church was, furthermore, heavily politicized due to the conviction of the Yugoslav government “that the Vatican supported the expansionist claims of Italy directed against Yugoslavia”122 in the context of the pro- longed post-war territorial dispute (the Trieste Crisis) between the two states that concluded with the 1954 London Agreement.123 One major consequence of the Stepinac Trial was that it transformed “the Catholic Church [in Yugoslavia] . . . into a symbol of the national aspirations of the Croatian masses”124 that would prove essential during the collapse of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and the reconstruction of Croatian nationalism by Franjo Tuđman. Another burning issue in this period was the establishment of “associations of priests” that the state used to control religious communities. The earliest associations of Catholic priests were organized in Istria and Slovenia in 1948 and 1949, respectively, and this was a largely a spontaneous and homegrown movement based on the close wartime alliance between the Communist-led National Liberation Front (“the Partisans”) and Christian–Socialists in these regions.125 After these initial alliances, the first association of Catholic priests was formed in Bosnia in January 1950 under the title “The Good Shepherd” Dobri ( pastir).126 It chiefly gathered Franciscans from the Bosnian Province, and its first president, friar Bono Ostojić, was reported to have given the following remark at the inaugural meeting: “I greet you with the Catholic salute ‘Praise to Jesus’ and with our combat [Partisan] salute ‘Death to Fascism – Liberty to the People’!”127 Although the regime pressurized priests to join the association,128 some joined voluntarily because the severe postwar conditions entailed that numerous problems demanded rapid and practical solutions that were only feasible in direct communication with the state and not through the Episcopate.129 Under the legal conditions of the introduction of the self-management system of workers in 1950, these associations were integrated into the political mass organization—the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ)—which provided priests with social benefits such as health insurance, pensions, 74 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić and state subsidies.130 The Catholic Episcopate, quite naturally, viewed these associations as undermining their bishopric authority and, in 1950, pronounced membership in these associations inexpedient,131 although the official ban came from the Vatican in 1952.132 In addition to the Papal bestowing of the title of Cardinal on Archbishop Stepinac, these events culminated in the severance of diplomatic relations with the Holy See in December 1952. Following a period of severe persecution, the mid-1960s witnessed an era of significant rapprochement between the state and the Catholic Church. The “Protocol of Discussions between the Representatives of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Representatives of the Holy See” was signed in June 1966, whereas full diplomatic relations were restored in 1970.133

The first case study: The Catholic Church and Catholic identity in Sarajevo during the Siege

The political dimension of Bosnian Catholicism prior to and during the 1992–1995 conflict can be understood in its relationship with the politics of the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and the question of Bosnia’s independence as a sovereign state. Tuđman is often described as a Croatian nationalist whose main goal was to create a Croatian nation-state on the ruins of Yugoslavia, a country that, in his opinion, was doomed to be divided along civilizational fault-lines. In his 1981 writings, his historical determinism accords with Samuel Huntington’s subsequent paradigm of the “clash of civilizations.”134

From time immemorial to the present day the interests of different nations, states and powers have crisscrossed the area of present-day Yugoslavia . . . Various races and civilizations, opposing ideologies and cultures, have clashed, intermingled and imbued each other here . . . The most fateful historical determinant for the development of the nations and cultures in this area was the split in the Roman Empire into West and East . . . and the schism in Catholicism (864–1054) into the western Roman Catholic and eastern Orthodox churches. The dividing line of this split went almost right through the middle of the present-day territory of Yugoslavia [where] the Croats and Slovenes developed separately within the framework of the western church and culture . . . 135 The Role of the Catholic Church 75

In 1991, Tuđman’s political party, the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica—HDZ), won the first, and what would prove to be the last, multi-party elections held in the socialist Yugoslavia. They immediately began working on their ultimate goal—Croatian independence. Croatian ethnic nationalism was already on the rise and had been supported by the Catholic Church.136 Its official bulletin, Glas Koncila, published by the Archbishopric of Zagreb, actively promoted Croatian national identity in the religioethnic sense (Catholic Croatism) during the latter half of the 1980s, thus shaping the Croatian nation following the blueprint of the Croat Catholic Movement from the previous century.137 According to the sociologist Ivan Cvitković, long before the outbreak of the Bosnian war, the Catholic Church had been pre-occupied with Croatian national identity and history while confronting the Yugoslav communist political system.138 Further, the HDZ established a branch in Bosnia and, according to Cvitković, “there is no doubt that the Roman-Catholic Church leadership in Bosnia, as well as in Croatia, initially fully supported the HDZ foundation and their activities, seeing in them a chance to get rid of socialism, but neglecting the question of the destructiveness of those politics.”139 The Catholic theologian rev. Mato Zovkić made a similar point in an email on December 1, 2012, when he explained that despite the canonical legal ban on bishops and priests advocating the interests of a particular political party, some of them, in practice, supported HDZ, especially in Herzegovina. There was a deep division among the Catholic clergy, which was confirmed in interviews with both prof. Ivan Cvitković (October 23, 2012) and friar Luka Markešić (January 11, 2013). The Archbishop of Sarajevo, Bishop of Banja Luka and the Franciscan Bosnian Provincial, on the one hand, stood for a united Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state within its internationally recognized borders and denied proposals to relocate the metropolitan see outside Sarajevo, whereas on the other hand, the Bishop of Mostar and the Franciscan Herzegovinian Provincial supported the separatist policy of HDZ. However, the Catholic Church advocated the Bosnian referendum for independence on March 1, 1992 and, according to some sources, the Sunday Catholic mass that day was crucial in securing the majority vote of the Catholic electorate in Bosnia.140 The Holy See immediately recognized Bosnia as an independent state and, in 1994, established a separate Bosnian Bishopric Conference, independent of the Croatian Bishopric Conference. As an additional sign of this recognition, Archbishop Vinko Puljić was awarded the title of Cardinal.141 76 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

During the same year, Pope John Paul II announced his desire to visit Sarajevo during the siege, but due to security concerns, the event had to be postponed until 1997. Moreover, it is noteworthy that, despite internal divisions among Catholic clergy during the war, the Bosnian Episcopate was firm and consistent in its appeals for peace, the cessation of hostilities, and the preservation of a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia against the policies of ethnic cleansing and so-called “humane resettlement,” and it worked for the protection of all persons in need and the rights of all refugees to return to their homes.142 The siege of Sarajevo from April 1992 to March 1996 was oneof the most significant events of the Bosnian conflict, which itself was an episode in the Wars of Yugoslav Succession during the 1990s.143 According to the official 1991 Census, the total population of the Sarajevo City was 527,049,144 and according to the report by the Research and Documentation Center, 14,385 persons were reported killed or pronounced missing in connection with the military activity during the siege throughout the city’s ten pre-war municipalities.145 Only a narrower segment of the city—roughly corresponding to the present four municipalities of the City of Sarajevo—was besieged, and an estimated approximately 11,500 people were killed in this area146 and more than 55,000 were wounded as a consequence of military actions and from severe conditions in connection with the blockade such as the lack of food, running water, medicine, or heating.147 In military terms, the siege was initially conducted by the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army’s Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the paramilitary units organized by the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka— SDS); subsequently, when a part of the Yugoslav forces withdrew, their remnants became the Army of the Serb Republic (Vojska Republike Srpske—VRS), retaining the name of the Corps.148 The city was defended by the First Corps Sarajevo of the Army of the Republic of BiH (Armija Republike BiH—ARBiH) together with several paramilitary groups headed by gang leaders with criminal backgrounds. Moreover, there was a unit of the Croat Defense Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane—HVO), an HDZ militia initially allied with ARBiH. The international peacekeep- ing forces (UNPROFOR) were deployed inside and around the city during the siege as observers. When the conflict between HVO and ARBiH escalated elsewhere in Bosnia (chiefly in the Herzegovina region around Mostar and in central parts of Bosnia proper), the HVO Brigade King Tvrtko (BKT) in Sarajevo was disarmed by ARBiH and abolished The Role of the Catholic Church 77 in November 1993, to the dismay of some Sarajevo Catholics.149 Later, BKT was reorganized and resubordinated to the chain of command of the First Corps Sarajevo and disconnected from the HVO command.150 Although the HVO membership consisted of soldiers of different ethnic backgrounds (as was the case with ARBiH), the majority were Catholic Croats. A sociological study conducted among the BKT troops during the siege reveals that 62% of these soldiers regularly or occasionally said individual prayers, 72% attended mass, and 43% wore the rosary during the war, whereas only 18% of them did so before the war. A further 25% was of the opinion that the war was religious, and 47% claimed that they fought in the war, in part, to defend their confessional rights. One third, however, reported that the war had nothing to do with religion, and the same percentage of soldiers was of the opinion that killing in combat was not morally justifiable.151 Given that, in some parishes in Bosnia, the Church equipped the HVO soldiers with rosaries,152 the Franciscan Luka Markešić said, in 2013, when asked to explain the significance of religious symbols in military units, that there were at least two answers to that question:

One meaning of this symbol is positive. The beginning of the war was such a kind of an event that things like wearing the rosary or a necklace with the cross meant that a soldier was defending himself out of religious motives. In a combat situation, especially when going to the frontline, a Catholic soldier is inspired to face even death for the purpose of defending himself or his home. Later, during the course of the war and in connection with the changes of politics on the Croatian side, namely the politics of president Tuđman, minister [Gojko] Šušak and Mate Boban [the leader of the Bosnian branch of HDZ], the situation changed. When the conflict with Muslim Bosniaks escalated, an internal conflict between the initial allies, . . . these two armies [ARBiH and HVO] fought against each other and organized concentration camps, [while] these religious symbols were defamed. The rosary, the cross, the church, some priestly activities and other symbols were abused by many people.153 The defamation of Catholic religious symbols was, perhaps, most evident in the case of the brutal murder of two friars from the Fojnica Franciscan Monastery—an event that was approximately contemporaneous to the period during which the BKT in Sarajevo was disarmed and “re-subordinated.”154 Ironically, these Bosnian Franciscans, arguably the only institution from medieval Bosnia that had survived through the centuries, were killed inside the monastery by a soldier of the army 78 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

(ARBiH) wearing the stylized coat of arms of the Kotromanić dynasty, under whose reign the Bosnian Franciscan community once flourished. Although the perpetrator was caught in 1994, convicted, and ultimately sentenced to 15 years imprisonment by the Supreme Court of RBiH in 1995,155 the symbolic damage to the Bosnian historical and political identity was grate. Prior to the siege, the Catholic population of the ten municipalities of Sarajevo City was registered at 35,223 or 6.68% during the 1991 Census, whereas in the territories of the four central urban municipalities that were to be besieged (Centar, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo and Stari Grad), there were 24,272 Catholics or 6.71%.156 This was only a minority of the Catholic population of the entire Archbishopric of Vrhbosna, covering most of the densely populated central and north-eastern Bosnia, which at the time numbered more than 520,000 Catholics organized in 144 parishes.157 During the war, this Archbishopric lost approximately two thirds of its clergy and its faithful; some were killed, but most were forced to leave their homes and parishes under the processes of ethnic cleansing.158 During the siege, which encompassed the central urban areas of the four municipalities, according to church sources,159 some 30,000 Catholics lived in the besieged area. This increase in the number of Catholics during the siege—provided it was not a case of “wishful thinking by some of the Catholic clergy,” as suggested by Luka Markešić when interviewed (January 11, 2013)—may seem surprising, particularly when faced with the fact that a number of Catholics did leave the city after the 1991 Census, both prior to the hostilities and in the early months of the siege.160 A probable explanation is that many irreligious individuals or those who did not identify as Catholics in 1991 rediscovered their Catholicism during the challenging living conditions of the siege. Although the Catholic charity organizations distributed aid to Sarajevans of various religious backgrounds, including those without religious affiliation,161 to “turn Catholic” was a way for some to survive or to ease the sufferings.162 Moreover, there were reports of many non-Catholics in Sarajevo attempting to obtain baptism certificates to be eligible to cross the siege line under the guise of a Croat appearance and leave Sarajevo. Although serious Catholic priests refused to violate the canonical rules for baptism, it was common knowledge among Sarajevans that certain trading channels existed whereby a person could purchase this document and, thus, “turn Croat” with the aim of reaching HVO territory in nearby Kiseljak and then departing for Croatia and beyond.163 The Role of the Catholic Church 79

Many Catholic institutions were situated in the city of Sarajevo during the siege.164 They shared the destiny of the city as a whole in terms of the substantial destruction caused by shelling and sniping. Other institutions, either religious or secular, were (re-)established immediately prior to the war or during the siege such as the Catholic Educational Center with a primary, a secondary, and a medical school165 and Catholic charities—the diocesan Caritas and Franciscan St. Anthony’s Bread. Moreover, and perhaps most significant, was the—Croats’ Cultural Society, “Progress” (HKD Napredak). It was initially established in 1902 and reorganized in 1990. It is something of an umbrella organization for all things Croat and consists of a network of cultural associations in Bosnia and Croatia with branch offices in Vienna and Ulm (Germany). According to one of its members, it was the “fundamental cultural institution of the Croats.”166 It is organized in sections and subsections covering a vast array of different activities, including arts and culture, media, sports, science, and business.167 Catholicism was a major ingredient of its religious and cultural identity. A simple content analysis of the front page images of Stećak magazine reveals that, of the 23 issues published from January 1994 to December 1995, Catholic religious imagery was present in ten. During the siege, Napredak closely collaborated with Kamerni teatar ’55 (Chamber Theater ’55, a vital small-scene theatrical house), perhaps the most active cultural institution in the city during the siege. The theater was housed in Napredak’s building in the heart of the city on Titova Street. Napredak was often a sponsor of Kamerni’s programs, which, in turn, expanded its activity during the siege and did not restrict itself to producing dramas, as is evident from the programs of its summer festivals.168 This strong institutional base, which provided space for many Sarajevo Catholics (but not only Catholics) to feel protected and cared for, should be understood in the context that Catholics (therefore, ‘Croats’ and vice versa) were viewed with suspicion by the ARBiH and the local authorities as “bad patriots” or even traitors, which resulted in numerous injustices.169 Finally, although most Sarajevo Catholics are ethnically self-identified as Croats—in 1991, there were 35,223 Catholics by religion and 34,873 Croats by ethnicity170—there exist some ambiguities. All three interviewees selected for this study agree that there is a specific cultural identity or mentality shared by Sarajevo and Bosnian Catholics that is distinct from that of Croatians living in the Republic of Croatia. For example, Cvitković perceives this specificity in the fact that the Sarajevo Catholic 80 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić community carries a strong inheritance from the intellectual urban elite of the Habsburg period, when many immigrants from other parts of the Empire (architects, writers, historians, archeologists, musicologists, pro- fessors, businessmen, doctors, or lawyers) had Catholic backgrounds. Although many of these immigrants came to Sarajevo from Austria, Bohemia, and other regions of the Empire—there was still a small number of ethnically declared Slovenes, Hungarians, Italians, Czechs, Poles, and Germans in 1991171—“once they settled here they became Croats,” as noted by Markešić. In personal communication by email in 2012, Zovkić explained that there was a “Catholic identity in a Sarajevan and a Bosnian way” related to the specific mentality of the people of Sarajevo who care for their neighbors, concluding that he was “proud to be a Catholic in a Bosnian way.” Markešić172 confirms that “there is of course a Sarajevan and Bosnian Catholic identity,” but he also adds that “there is no such thing as “pure” religious or national identity.” During the conversations with the interviewees, the adjectives “Catholic” and “Croat(ian)” (hrvatski) were often used interchangeably to refer to the same thing or concept, which demonstrates that, in the real-life communication, the people in Sarajevo do not recognize a clear difference between the two. Many Catholics, moreover, share multiple identities that are taken inclusively. For example, Archbishop Puljić remarked in a published interview that his identities as a Bosnian, a Catholic, and a Croat were intermingled and indivisible,173 although under stressful circumstances, such as that in 1994 when the political circles in Zagreb questioned the Croatness of the Bosnian Croats, he replied in a manner resembling Archbishop Stadler from a century earlier: “We are Croats and Catholics and we shall remain so, no matter their provocations!”174

The second case study: The apparitions in Međugorje

In 1981, in a fairly remote village in western Herzegovina, something rather unusual transpired: six children claimed to have received apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Because this occurred in a socialist, one-party state, the authorities became alarmed and feared an outburst of religious fervor. However, the mystical experiences of the children also became subject to internal Church politics; in the Herzegovina Province in particular, there were tensions between, on the one hand, the diocesan clergy supported by the authority of the bishop and, on the other hand, The Role of the Catholic Church 81 the Franciscan order that was frequently responsible for managing parish life. The local bishop, Pavao Žanić (of Mostar-Duvno diocese 1980–1993), vehemently opposed the apparitions and denounced them as frauds, as his successor, Ratko Perić, has continued to do.175 To make things more complicated, the Serbian Orthodox Church perceived this to be an unacceptable affront because the neighborhood contained mass graves from the Ustaša crimes against Orthodox Serbs during World War II. Because the apparitions were not appearing within the Socialist Republic of Croatia, they could also become an aspect of an argument for a greater Croatia, feeding into the question—which was central during the war—of whether Bosnia should be divided between Croatia and Serbia based on the ethnicity and cultural markers of the population or become an independent state. In late 1991, a political unit of Bosnian Croats was formed in western Herzegovina, The Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and according to Vjekoslav Perica: “Medjugorje became a ‘sacred capital’ of this new Balkan state.”176 He contrasts a cynical nationalist agenda with the gullibility of believers. However, a simple nationalist conspiracy is insufficient to explain the remarkable character of the apparitions as a religious and social phenomenon because the numerous pilgrims that came from other countries to Međugorje were not primarily concerned with political questions of nationhood but, rather, were drawn to what they perceived as a powerful manifestation of the supernatural. The international feature of the Međugorje shrine is important because it indicates a dynamic relationship between the now global apparitional subculture within the Catholic Church and national and regional amalgams of locality and particular identities. A duality is built into the Catholic Church itself because it is global with a universal claim although simultaneously incarnated in particular cultures that are aspects of interconnected identities. A simple conspiracy theory that considers the apparitions to have been cleverly designed by nationalist religious leaders with criminal intentions, thus, does not provide us with a satisfactory explanation of the Međugorje phenomenon. From the beginning, the Međugorje apparitions faced fierce resistance from the socialist state and church authorities, although they were welcomed by the Franciscan clergy. Because the visions had begun to appear a decade before the war, the shrine had, despite the opposition, the time necessary to develop into a global pilgrimage site. In the wake 82 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić of the war, the socialist state disappeared, and the site became part of the internationally unrecognized Bosnian Croat para-state (1991–1994). Since the war, the resistance from the local Church has continued and the global nature of the phenomenon developed, and a commission in Rome conducted an investigation, demonstrating the global character of the phenomenon. The conclusions and recommendations in the commission’s report have the potential to cause substantial uproar, regardless of which side it will endorse. Certain characteristics are peculiar to Međugorje. First, the number of visionaries is quite large—although the most famous Marian apparition of the twentieth century in Fatima had only three, there are six visionaries in Međugorje. The alleged visions and locutions in Međugorje have also continued for 30 years, and all of the visionaries have married; therefore, none entered a convent, as was the case with Lucia in Fatima and Bernadette in Lourdes. New Međugorje messages continue to appear monthly and are emailed to subscribers.177 We can contrast Međugorje with the Croatian pilgrimage site of Marija Bistrica that has a sculpture as its sacred object—that of a black Madonna holding the baby Jesus. In 1935, the archbishop in Zagreb crowned it as Our Lady of Croatia. Here, we can observe a close connection between Croatian national identity and the shrine of the Madonna, but no comparable global pilgrimage phenomenon. Furthermore, this Madonna-nation tie was, for example, endorsed by cardinal Alojzije Stepinac (1898–1960), who was archbishop of Zagreb from 1937 until his death and beatification in 1998 by John Paul II in Bistrica. The specific Croatian national character of the Bistrica shrine can be contrasted with other local madonnas in Croatia. For example, the annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Gospa od Zečeva (our lady of the rabbits), located on a small island outside of the town of Nin on the Dalmatian coast, is a particular local custom. The pilgrimage is performed in May, with the pilgrims of Nin arriving at the island in small boats. The tradition is based on an apparition from the sixteenth century during the wars with the Ottomans, and commemorates the recovery of the statue of our lady. An important characteristic of the Međugorje apparitions is that they, to a certain extent, share the dynamics of the holiness of place with Marija Bistrica and Zečevo. In both of the latter places, statues of the Madonna were lost or hidden during the war with the Ottoman Turks but were recovered with supernatural aid. However, in Međugorje, the sacredness is connected not to a particular statue, but to the apparitions The Role of the Catholic Church 83 that are only witnessed by the visionaries. As the visionaries are mobile and have visions and locutions in places other than Međugorje—one of them lives, for example, in Italy, and one lives in the United States part of the time—the locality of the sacred exists in a dynamic relationship between the village of Međugorje and a non-local emergence of the transcendent connected to six persons. In, for example, Lourdes in Southern France, which was also a site of Marian visions, these took place in a distinct location, a grotto, which, therefore, became the sacred center, whereas the visionary, Bernadette, entered a convent and the public visions and messages stopped. The person of the visionary and the manifestation of the sacred were, thus, strongly separated, which was not the case in Međugorje, as the visions have continued and the visionaries have chosen to live in society as laypersons. In a 2007 statement, the present bishop of Mostar considers this to reduce the credibility of the apparitions.178 However, it profoundly reflects the dangerous position of visionaries for a hierarchical church, in which laypersons in large numbers come to benefit from their intermediary role. The case of Međugorje transformed this old tension between prophetic and priestly charisma and authority into a conflict between diocesan and monastic spheres of authority, was enmeshed in the totalitarian fears of a secularist socialist state, and was then embraced by the Croatian nationalism of western Herzegovina. Moreover, it became a concern of the central organs of the Catholic Church in Rome, making a statement at the highest level necessary. The Madonna in Međugorje came as the Queen of Peace but became subject to one of the bitterest wars of the twentieth century. Mart Bax in 1995 attempted to apply the theory of Norbert Elias, which contrasts barbarization and civilization, but in a tone reminiscent of Bauman’s coupling of modernity and the holocaust; Bax seems to perceive an increasing order in barbarization and, thus, a close connection between the orderliness of civilization and the intensity of barbarity.

Civilization and barbarization would seem to be such closely linked or interwoven aspects of the processes that it is difficult to stipulate where one stops and the other starts. If we are to adequately describe and explain this interrelatedness, a theory is required that focuses on these close links.179 Perhaps, Međugorje offers an important window on this process of civilized barbarity, in that it, although small and insignificant, is located at a site where civilizations have clashed for centuries and nationalism, 84 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić fascism and communism left their bloody marks during the twentieth century. History is, thus, a prerequisite for understanding the events of the 1990s, but the intensity of the religiosity involved opens this place of apparitions to the global scene. Because the civilizing project of the European Union has now reached the borders of Bosnia, this question of the close links between civilization and barbarity, the totalitarian aspect of detailed state control, from which Bosnia emerged after so much suffering, must not be forgotten or whitewashed with ever-increasing bureaucratic regulation and control. The sacred and profane story of Međugorje is not finished. Rome will deliver its verdict, and we will have to wait and see whether the fragile process of state formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina will endure and how the European Union will manage the tremendous attendant challenges. Irrespective of the outcomes, the balance and connection between civilization and barbarity will continue to develop on the border of the New Europe, forcing us to address the mystery of iniquity close to the heart of the modern project: its Faustian pact with destiny.

Interviews

Ivan Cvitković, PhD in sociology, professor at the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, corresponding member of the Bosnian Academy of Sciences and Arts and Chairman of the Board of Sociology in the Department of Social Sciences of the Bosnian Academy of Sciences and Arts. The interview was conducted in Sarajevo on October 23, 2012. The audio recording is in the possession of S. S. Fetahagić. Luka Markešić, PhD in theology, Friar of the Franciscan Province Bosna Srebrena, Provincial (1982–1991), professor at the Franciscan Faculty of Theology in Sarajevo, Chairman of the non-governmental organization “Croat People’s Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina” since 2002. The interview was conducted in Sarajevo on January 11, 2013. The audio recording is in the possession of S. S. Fetahagić. Mato Zovkić, PhD in theology, Catholic priest, professor emeritus at the Department of the Holy Scriptures–New Testament at the Faculty of Catholic Theology in Sarajevo, editor of the Journal Vrhbosnensia. The interview was conducted by email in December 2012. The emails are in the possession of S. S. Fetahagić. The Role of the Catholic Church 85

Notes

1. Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 243. 2. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001). 3. Gerard F. Powers, “Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Peace in Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia,” in Paul Mojzes, ed. Religion and War in Bosnia (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998), p. 230. 4. Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 105. 5. Although the causes, nature and the legal status of these wars remain disputed, depending on the methodological standpoint and/or on the country of origin of the individual author, this phrase is widely accepted among scholars, see, e.g., Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (Washington and West Lafayette: United States Institute of Peace and Purdue University Press, 2009), p. vii. 6. Božidar Petranović, Bogomili, Cr’kva bosan’ska i kr’stani: Istorička rasprava (Zadar: Demarhi-Ružier, 1867); Franjo Rački, “Bogomili i Patareni,” Rad Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, VII, 1869, pp. 84–179, and VIII, 1870, pp. 121–187. 7. Srećko M. Džaja and Dubravko Lovrenović, “Crkva bosanska (Ni bogumilska, ni dualistička nego šizmatička i državna crkva),” Jukić, 38–39, 2009, pp. 237–255. 8. Muhamed Hadžijahić, Povijest Bosne u IX i X stoljeću (Sarajevo: Preporod, 2004), pp. 209–223. 9. Ladislas Abraham, “Sts. Cyril and Methodius,” The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1908), retrieved February 10, 2013, from New Advent, www.newadvent.org/cathen/04592a.htm. 10. Marko Vego, Postanak srednjovjekovne bosanske države (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1982), pp. 14, 63. 11. Archbishopric of Vrhbosna, “Počeci kršćanstva u Bosni,” accessed February 10, 2013, http://vrhbosanska-nadbiskupija.org/nadbiskupija/povijest/od-osnutka -do-danas. 12. John V. A. Fine, The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation: A Study of the Bosnian Church and Its Place in State and Society from the 13th to the 15th Centuries (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1975), pp. 10–16. 13. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Pan Books, 2002), p. 34. 14. Hadžijahić, Povijest Bosne, pp. 237–239. 15. Ibid., p. 236. 16. Srećko M. Džaja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine: Predemancipacijski period 1463–1804, transl. L. Z. Fišić (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1992), p. 163. 17. Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 41–42. 86 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

18. This expression was taken from Džaja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 127. 19. Džaja and Lovrenović, “Crkva bosanska,” pp. 249–250. 20. Ignacije Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History: Seven Centuries of Bosnian Franciscans (Sarajevo: Svjetlo riječi, 2001), p. 37. 21. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, pp. 39–40; cf. Džaja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 163. 22. Nada Klaić, Srednjovjekovna Bosna: Politički položaj bosanskih vladara do Tvrtkove krunidbe (1377. g.) (Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1989), pp. 263–265. 23. Anto Babić, Iz istorije srednjovjekovne Bosne (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1972), p. 284. 24. Vego, Postanak srednjovjekovne bosanske države, pp. 82–83. 25. Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 18. 26. Džaja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 134–136. 27. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, p. 43. 28. Sándor Papp, “Ahdname,” in Gábor Agoston and Bruce Masters, eds. Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Facts on File, 2009), pp. 21–22. 29. A similar practice was evident 10 years earlier when the Sultan issued privileges to the Catholic community of Galata in Constantinople after the fall of the Byzantine Empire; see Džaja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 153. 30. Džaja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 127. 31. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, pp. 77–79, 87. 32. Ibid., p. 57. 33. Ibid., pp. 91–92. 34. Ibid., pp. 92–93. 35. Ibid., pp. 122–126. 36. Ibid., p. 131. 37. Bruce Masters, “Millet,” in Gábor Agoston and Bruce Masters, eds. Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Facts on File, 2009), p. 548. 38. Ibid., p. 383. 39. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, pp. 70–72, 106; cf. Charles A. Frazee, Catholics and Sultans: The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453–1923 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 105. 40. Masters, “Millet,” p. 384. 41. Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, pp. 312–313. 42. Džaja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 169–171. 43. Ivan Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati: Esej o agoniji jedne evropsko-orijentalne mikrokulture (Zagreb and Sarajevo: Synopsis, 2010). 44. Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 144; cf. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, p. 140. 45. Rudolf Horvat, “Katolici u Bosni i Hercegovini,” in Josip Pasarić and Blaž Jurišić, eds. Hrvatsko kolo: Književno-naučni zbornik, (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1929), p. 281. The Role of the Catholic Church 87

46. Snjezana Buzov, “The Problem of Muslims in Non-Muslim States of the Balkans: Bosnians, Albanians and Others” in Lawrence A. Tritle, ed. Balkan Currents: Studies in the History, Culture, and Society of a Divided Land (Los Angeles: Loyola Marymount University, 1998), p. 34. 47. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, pp. 142–143. 48. Ibid., pp. 143–145. 49. Ibid., pp.144–145; cf. Prosperus Dalmata, Nadbiskup Stadler i Franjevci, reprint edition, Sarajevo: Rabic, 2003 (Split: Spljetska Društvena Tiskara, 1909), pp. 11–15. 50. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, p. 181; cf. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, p. 145. 51. In original: “Valjda ovakih zasjednih, vjerolomnih busija nije ni u vrieme turčina doživio,” Dalmata, Nadbiskup Stadler, p. 25. From this point onward, all translations from the original Serbo-Croat (Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian) sources to English are done by Sead S. Fetahagić. 52. In original: “Dosljedno, onaj čin Stadlerov težko je griešan po sebi,” and “Njegova tvrdnja kao katoličkoga teologa u skrajnoj je protivnosti sa katoličkom teologijom,” Dalmata, pp. 28–29. 53. Dalmata, Nadbiskup Stadler, pp. 25, 28–29, 67. 54. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2nd edn., (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 12; cf. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, “Introduction,” in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, eds. Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 5. 55. Mirjana Gross “Starčević i Kvaternik: Spoznaje i nadahnuća,” Politička misao, XXXVII, no. 1, 2000, pp. 3–24. 56. In the original: “U istinu, narod hervatski ima svu svoju nesreću najvećma popom pripisati.” Ante Starčević, Pasmina slavoserbska po Hervatskoj (Zagreb: Tisak Lav. Hartmana i družbe, 1876), pp. 103–104. 57. Gross, “Starčević i Kvaternik,” p. 14. 58. Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 59. Bogoslav Šulek, Hrvatski ustav ili Konstitucija godine 1882 (Zagreb: Dionička tiskara, 1883), p. 36. 60. Gross, “Starčević i Kvaternik,” p. 16. 61. Petar Anđelović, Mi ostajemo!: Razgovori, izjave, poruke, prosvjedi 1991–1995 (Sarajevo: Rabic, 2009), p. 19. 62. Dubravko Lovrenović, Bosanska kvadratura kruga (Sarajevo and Zagreb: Dobra knjiga and Synopsis, 2012), p. 305. 63. Marija Vulesica, “How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism in Croatia- Slavonia around 1900?” Quest: Issues in Contemporary Jewish History. Journal of Fondazione CDEC, July 3, 2012, accessed January 17, 2013, http://www.quest -cdecjournal.it/focus.php?id=301. 88 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

64. In the original: “Drugim riječima, za razliku od Mahniča, koji je hrvatski katolički pokret želio usmjeriti u skladu sa svojim geslom ‘ . . . najprije katolik, onda Hrvat . . . ’, Korenić je ponajprije nastojao djelovati u skladu s načelom ‘ . . . i Hrvat i katolik . . . ’.” Mario Strecha, “Od katoličkog hrvatstva do katoličkog pravaštva,” Radovi, 2004, p. 107. 65. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, p. 178. 66. In the original: “Mi smo Hrvati i katolici, i to hoćemo da budemo . . . Imajući pred očima, da je po Sinu Božjem sve u svijetu učinjeno, . . . da je dakle po njem i naša Hrvatska učinjena;” Božidar Nagy, “Katolicizam u Hrvatskoj u prvoj polovini 20. st.,” accessed October 12, 2012, http://www.ffdi.unizg.hr/bnagy /katolicizam.php. Taken from Stjepan Korenić, Prvi hrvatski katolički sastanak održavan u Zagrebu dne 3., 4. i 5. rujna godine 1900, Zagreb, b. d., pp. 209–218. 67. In the original: “Ja ću reći samo dvije želje i to prvo, što se naroda tiče, a drugo, što se tiče svete naše vjere. Što se tiče naroda, želim, da se što prije Bosna i Hercegovina sjedini s materom zemljom . . . A što se tiče vjere i biskupa, . . . želim, da Bog dade Hrvatskoj mnogo pametnijih, mudrijih i pobožnijih biskupa, nego što sam ja tamo . . . Ali jedno ipak ne želim, a to je, da bude tko više ljubio narod hrvatski i ovdje i u Bosni, nego ja,” Nagy, “Katolicizam u Hrvatskoj,” pp. 336–337. 68. Cf. Husnija Kamberović, “‘Hrvatska misao’ u Bosni i Hercegovini 1913–1914 godine: Model građenja nacionalnog identiteta,” Historijska traganja, 1, 2008, p. 86. 69. Entoni Šeperić, “Nadbiskup Josip Stadler i katolička obnova u BiH: O nekim političko-pragmatičnim vidovima štovanja Srca Isusova,” Status, 13, 2008, p. 116. 70. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, pp. 182–183. 71. Šeperić, “Nadbiskup Josip Stadler,” pp. 118–120. 72. Ernest Gellner, “Nationalism and Modernization,” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 62. 73. John V. A. Fine, When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans: A Study of Identity in Pre-Nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early Modern Periods (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 558. 74. In Volume VII of Danica ilirska, no. 28–32, dated from July 10 to August 7, 1841, Bosnian Franciscan author Ivan Frano Jukić, writing on the people in Bosnia, states that “there is one people in Bosnia, which is Slavonic of the Illyrian vernacular, and this language of the Bosnians is the purest one that has been preserved [of the existing vernaculars]”, in the original: “Narod u Bosni jest jedan i to slavjanski narěčja ilirskoga, i ovo kod Bošnjakah da je najčistie se odèržalo, netrěba, da ja to dokazujem . . . ” J. F. Jukić, “Zemljopisno-pověstno opisanje Bosne,” Danica ilirska, July 17, 1841, p. 117. In Volume VII, we also find personal endonyms such as “the Illyrian from Trieste” (Ilirka iz Tàrsta) (no. 30), “the Illyrian from Croatia” (Ilir iz Horvatske) (no. 31) or “the Illyrian literature” (Literatura ilirska) (no. 32). The ethnonym “Croat”Horvat ( ) was rarely used, The Role of the Catholic Church 89

and when it was, it related to “Croatia proper” (Horvatska), a land stretching roughly from Velebit mountain to Varaždin town and surrounded by the Habsburg provinces of Slavonia, Dalmatia and Kranjska and Ottoman Bosnia. 75. Stjepan Ortner, Dr. Ljudevit Gaj prvi hrvatski bibliofil (Zagreb: Tisak F. Bogovića, 1902), p. 26. 76. Ibid., pp. 3–4, 23, 28. 77. Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a . . . ” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 37. 78. Walker Connor, “When is a Nation?” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 159. 79. Fine, When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans, p. 561, fn. 7; cf. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, p. 27. 80. Mladen Lorković, Narod i zemlja Hrvata, reprint edition, Split: Marjan tisak, 2005, (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1939), pp. 149–151. 81. Ivan Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, 4th edn. (Split: Marjan tisak, 2003), pp. 276–294. 82. Hrvoje Matković, Povijest Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavičić, 2002), p. 51. 83. In original: “ . . . Katolička crkva je bila i crkva Hrvata koji su vodili upornu borbu protiv velikosrpske hegemonije,” Matković, 2002, p. 51. 84. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 227. 85. Matković, Povijest Nezavisne, p. 52; cf. Perica, Balkan Idols, p. 25; Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 228. 86. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, p. 228. 87. Matković, Povijest Nezavisne, p. 52. 88. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, pp. 239–243, 296. 89. Marko Oršolić, Zlodusima nasuprot: Religija i nacionalsocijalizam (Rijeka and Sarajevo: Adamić and IMIC, 2006), pp. 36–43. 90. In the original: “Čujemo sa više strana da se tu i tamo nečovječno postupa s nearijevcima prilikom deportiranja u sabirne logore [ . . . ],” Jure Krišto, Katolička crkva i Nezavisna država Hrvatska 1941–1945, Vol. II (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest and “Dom i svijet,” 1998), pp. 77–78. 91. In the original: “Ovo je sramotna ljaga i zločin, koji vapi u nebo za osvetom, kao što je i čitav jasenovački logor sramotna ljaga za Nezavisnu Državu Hrvatsku,” Aleksa Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, Hrvatski Kardinal (Rome: ZIRAL, 1974), pp. 418, 626. 92. Nataša Mataušić, Diana Budisavljević i akcija spašavanja djece žrtava ustaškog režima, PhD thesis, University of Zagreb, 2013, pp. 20, 54–55. 93. Matković, Povijest Nezavisne, p. 52; cf. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 229; Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 123. 90 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

94. Jure Krišto, “Crkva i država: Slučaj vjerskih prijelaza u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj,” in H. G. Fleck and I. Graovac eds. Dijalog povjesničara i istoričara, 1 (Zagreb: Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 2000), pp. 196, 199. 95. Oršolić, Zlodusima nasuprot, pp. 59–62; cf. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, pp. 244–245. 96. Oršolić, Zlodusima nasuprot, p. 30; cf. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, pp. 240, 296. 97. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati, p. 245; cf. Ramet, Balkan Babel, p. 123. 98. Stella Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia Since 1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 209; cf. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and Its Problems 1918–1988 (London: C. Hurst, 1988), p. 98. 99. Constitution 1921, Устав Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца. 28 јуна 1921. Digitalna Narodna biblioteka Srbije. Srpski ustavi. Accessed November 16, 2012, http://scr.digital.nb.rs/document/RA-ustav-1921,, Art. 12; cf. Constitution, 1931, Constitution (1931) Устав Краљевине Југославије. 3 септембра 1931. Digitalna Narodna biblioteka Srbije. Srpski ustavi. Accessed November 16, 2012, http://scr.digital.nb.rs/document/RA-ustav-1931, Art. 11. 100. Known under that name since the unification of all Eastern Orthodox dioceses on Yugoslav territory under the newly established Patriarchate in Belgrade in 1920, see Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 31. 101. Perica, Balkan Idols, p. 18. 102. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 33. 103. “Accepted confessions” were Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic (including Greek-Catholic), Islamic, Jewish, Lutheran, Calvinist and Old-Catholic, Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor, p. 98. Other religions could be “recognized” by the Government. 104. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 209. 105. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, p. 158. 106. Ibid., pp. 160–165. 107. Lorković, Narod i zemlja Hrvata, p. 148. 108. Đorđe. Pejanović, Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1955), pp. 53–54. This trend ran in the opposing direction to that in Yugoslavia as a whole, where over the same period, the size of the Catholic population diminished by 2%, Perica, Balkan Idols, p. 19. 109. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 64. 110. Ibid., pp. 95–97. 111. Ibid., pp. 51–52, 89–91, 102–103. 112. Ibid., p. 182, fn. 226. 113. Ibid., p. 114; cf. Perica, Balkan Idols, p. 17; Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor, p. 99. 114. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, pp. 114–115. 115. Ibid., p. 134. 116. Ibid., pp. 130–205. The Role of the Catholic Church 91

117. Lovrenović, Bosanska kvadratura kruga, p. 276. 118. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 103; cf. Ramet, Balkan Babel, pp. 126–129. 119. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 102; cf. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 242. 120. Perica, Balkan Idols, p. 27. 121. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 240; cf. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 58; Ramet, Balkan Babel, p. 124. 122. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 120. 123. Ibid., pp. 81–84. 124. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor, p. 103. 125. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 124. 126. Ibid., p. 126. 127. In the original: “Pozdravljam vas katoličkim pozdravom ‘Hvaljen Isus’ i našim borbenim pozdravom ‘Smrt fašizmu—Sloboda narodu’,” Lovrenović, Bosanska kvadratura kruga, p. 274. 128. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, pp. 125–126; cf. Ramet, Balkan Babel, p. 130. 129. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, pp. 172–175. 130. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 125; cf. Ramet, Balkan Babel, p. 131. 131. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, p. 125. 132. Mužić, Katolička crkva i Stepinac, p. 248. 133. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia, pp. 246, 313–315. 134. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 135. Franjo Tudjman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1981), pp. 138–189, accessed January 18, 2013, http:// coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~fisher/bosnia/readings/Tudjman1.html. 136. Perica, Balkan Idols, pp. 140–142. 137. Maja Brkljačić, “Croatian Catholic Church Imagines the Nation: Glas Koncila and the Croatian National Question 1985–1990,” in Balkanologie, V, 2001, pp. 1–2, accessed February 10, 2011, http://balkanologie.revues.org/index668.html. 138. Ivan Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu (Sarajevo and Zagreb: Svjetlo riječi and Oči u oči, 2004), p. 164. 139. In the original: “Nema sumnje da je vodstvo Rimokatoličke crkve u Bosni i Hercegovini kao i u Hrvatskoj u početku davalo punu podršku osnivanju i djelovanju Hrvatske demokratske zajednice kao šanse za zbacivanje socijalizma, zanemarujući pitanje destruktivnosti nacionalističkih politika,” Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 173. 140. Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, pp. 169–170; cf. Medina Delalić and Suzana Šačić, Balkan bluz: Bosanska hronika 1975–1995 (Sarajevo: Authors, 2007), p. 162; cf. Luka Brković, “Genocid nad Katoličkom crkvom u Bosni i Hercegovini,” Stećak, 23, 1995, p. 24. 92 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

141. Vinko Puljić, O stradanjima s nadom II: Misli, stajališta, poruke (Sarajevo: HKD Napredak, 1997), p. 29; cf. Mirko Marjanović, “Kardinal,” Stećak, 11, 1994, p. 3. 142. Mato Zovkić, Vrhbosna, Official Bulletin of Vrhbosna Metropoly: Pastoral Letters, Statements and Appeals of the Catholic Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990–1997 (Sarajevo: Biskupska konferencija BiH, 1998), pp. 174–175. 143. Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) Annex VI—Part 1 Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo, accessed January 8, 2013, http://ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/VI-01.htm; cf. Dani, “Hronologija opsade Sarajeva 1992–1996,” Dani Special Issue, April 2008, pp. 10–15. 144. Zavod za statistiku Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, “Etnička obilježja stanovništva, rezultati za Republiku i po opštinama 1991,” Statistički bilten, 233, 1993, Sarajevo. 145. Mirsad Tokača, “Istraživačko-dokumentacioni centar Sarajevo: 14.385 poginulih,” supplement, Dani, April 2008, pp. 126–127. 146. Euronews, “Remembering 11,500 Victims of the Siege of Sarajevo,” April 6, 2012, accessed January 8, 2013, http://www.euronews.com/2012/04/06/remembering -11500-victims-of-the-siege-of-sarajevo. 147. Bassiouni, Final report, Item C. and D. 148. Ibid., Item F.2. 149. Mirko Marjanović, “Mrcvarenje naroda,” Stećak, 1, 1994, p. 23; cf. Puljić, O stradanjima, p. 128. 150. Bassiouni, Final report, Item F.1. 151. Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, pp. 54–134. 152. Ibid., p. 56. 153. In the original: “Jedno od značenja je pozitivno. Početak rata je bio takav da je nošenje krunice bilo znak prihvaćanja obrane i iz religioznih motiva. Ljudi su bili inspirirani da brane svoju kuću. Kad on stavi krunicu i ide na front, a u to doba nije ni bilo dovoljno oružja, to je bilo skoro u smislu—ide da pogine. Dakle, tako je bilo u početku. A kasnije, kad je došlo do promjene te politike, a to je bila hrvatska politika odnosno Tuđmanova . . . kao i politika [Gojka] Šuška i Mate Bobana, što je došlo do izražaja u ratu sa Bošnjacima, dotad su sa njima zajednički išli u borbu, a sad se vrše međusobna protjerivanja, osnivaju se logori, tada simboli religiozni i kršćanski doživljavaju svoje poniženje. I križ, i crkva i svećenici . . . Tako da sad u toj ratnoj situaciji dolazi do ponižavanja ovih religioznih simbola od strane dosta ljudi.” Interview with Luka Markešić, 2013. 154. Marjanović, Stećak, 1, 1994, p. 14; cf. Anđelović, Mi ostajemo, pp. 174–175. 155. Anđelović, Mi ostajemo, p. 178, fn. 25. 156. Zavod za statistiku, “Etnička obilježja stanovništva, rezultati za Republiku i po opštinama 1991,” p. 25. 157. Puljić, O stradanjima, pp. 66, 125, 232; cf. Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, p. 185. The Role of the Catholic Church 93

158. Puljić, O stradanjima, pp. 66, 141, 232; cf. Zovkić, Vrhbosna, Official Bulletin of Vrhbosna Metropoly, p. 60. 159. Puljić, O stradanjima, pp. 84, 283; cf. Anđelović, Mi ostajemo, p. 56. 160. Interview with Luka Markešić, 2013 161. In the period from July 1 to December 31, 1992, the registered recipients of medicines and other necessities included 44% Muslims, 28% Croats, 24% Serbs, and 4% others. During 1992, Caritas distributed humanitarian aid to: religious organizations, charity societies, judiciary institutions, breadlines serving free meals, academic institutions, etc. Mato Zovkić,“Katolički Caritas u miru i ratu,” Crkva u svijetu, XXVIII, no. 4, 1993, pp. 465–466. Deputy Director of the Sarajevo Caritas Franjo Tomić, in an interview published in July 1994, remarked that 45% of the Caritas aid recipients were Catholics, 32% Muslims, 18% Orthodox Christians and 5% others; 220 patients received medicines from the St. Vincent’s pharmacy daily, while 43,000 individual prescription medicines were delivered during the preceding months of 1994, and there were 200 daily users of free meals. F. Tomić, “Ljubav na djelu,” interview, Stećak, 7, Katolički Caritas, 1994, p. 21. Information provided by the nun Marija Korona Gigić and published in June 1995 reveals that during 1994, the Health Center of the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul in Sarajevo served nearly 20,000 patients, including 45% Muslims, 27% Croats, 26% Serbs and 2% others. M. K. Gigić, “Interview,” Stećak, 18, 1995, p. 19. On the work of “St. Anthony’s Bread” see Gavran, Fellow-Travellers of Bosnian History, p. 187. 162. In the parish of St. Joseph in Sarajevo, of the 1,670 families who received humanitarian aid from Caritas, only 541 were registered as Catholics before the war, while 1,129 families were so-called war-time Catholics, Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu, p. 46. These individuals, also called “newcomers” or “packet- Catholics,” although sometimes completely ignorant of the Catholic religion, lined up to register in a parish to be entitled to receive humanitarian “packets” from Caritas or other charities. An October 1992 account mentioned that the Cathedral Parish of the Sacred Heart of Jesus thus became five times larger than before the war, Ivan Šarčević (ed.), Naše jedino vrijeme (Sarajevo and Zagreb: Svjetlo riječi, 2008), pp. 57–58. In an April 1995 interview, the Archbishop Vinko Puljić confirmed that “all the churches in Sarajevo are full every Sunday,” Puljić, O stradanjima, p. 289. 163. Ljubo Lucić, “Sami sebe čistimo—etnički,” Stećak, 7, 1994, p. 3. 164. Tomo Vukšić, “Stradanje hrvatskih katolika u BiH,” Stećak, 5, May 1994, pp. 15–16; Ivo Tomašević, “Katolička crkva tijekom ovog rata,” Stećak, 9, September 1994, pp. 19–20. 165. Srećko Paponja, “Bez elitizma na elitan način,” Stećak, 12, 1994, p. 33. 166. Mladen Bevanda, “Bez ‘Napretka’—praznina,” Stećak, 4, 1994, p. 39. 167. Sections organized in Sarajevo include: the Croat Society for Science and Arts, Association of Fine Artists and Builders, Association for Education, 94 Clemens Cavallin and Sead S. Fetahagić

Croat Musical Association, Croat Medical Association, Lawyers’ Association, “Napredak” Sport Association (with football, judo and chess clubs), the radio station Vrhbosna, the monthly review Stećak, the Croat Business Chamber, Gospodarska banka dd. Sarajevo, the insurance firm Napredak osiguranje, the business NAPEX, the tourism and catering firm Imperijal, Croat Auto- Club Napredak, the Trebević musical choir, etc. Srećko Paponja (ed.), HNG, Hrvatski narodni godišnjak za 1997 (Sarajevo: HKD Napredak, 1996), pp. 11–12, 186–267. 168. KT55, Kamerni teatar ’55, Summer at Kamerni, program July 1–August 30, 1994, and Summer at Kamerni, program, August 1–September 15, 1995; cf. Dragana Orlando, “Ljeto u Kamernom: Glazba, slikarstvo, teatar . . . ”, Stećak, 22, 1995, p. 33. 169. Puljić, O stradanjima, pp. 128, 154, 166–167, 232. 170. Zavod za statistiku, “Etnička obilježja stanovništva, rezultati za Republiku i po opštinama 1991,” pp. 15, 25. 171. Ibid., p. 15. 172. Interview with Luka Markešić, 2013. 173. Puljić, O stradanjima, pp. 177, 212. 174. In the original: “jesmo i Hrvati i katolici i to ćemo ostati bez obzira na njihove izjave,” Puljić, O stradanjima, p. 144. 175. For the official website of the diocese containing statements and documents regarding the Međugorje apparitions, accessed November 8, 2012, http:// www.cbismo.com/index.php?menuID=98. 176. Perica, Balkan Idols, p. 171. 177. For major websites promoting the apparitions, accessed November 8, 2012, http://www.medjugorje.hr/en/, http://www.medjugorje.org/ and http://www .medjugorje.com/index.html. 178. Accessed November 8, 2012, http://www.cbismo.com/index.php?mod=vijest &vijest=101. 179. Mart Bax, Medjugorje, Religion, Politics, and Violence in Rural Bosnia (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1995) p. 115, for a comparison between Bauman and Elias, see Abram de Swaan, “Dyscivilization, Mass Extermination and the State,” Theory, Culture & Society, 18(2–3), 2001, pp. 265–276. 4 The Gospel and Politics: Transforming Grace for Transformed Society? Kosta Milkov

The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s of the twentieth century progressed in the wake of the fall of Communism in Europe. The end of the one party regime brought to the surface the dormant nationalism that was the driving force of the wars between the ethnic groups, each fighting for more territory for their successor states of the former federation. Religion in Yugoslavia was not banned, but it was certainly not encouraged. It was tolerated, but openly and tacitly suppressed for two reasons. One was ideological, in accordance with the Marx maxim that “religions is opium for the people.” The other reason was more pragmatic, however. Religion, namely Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Islam, and the religious establishment were seen as a threat and competition to the “brotherhood and unity” project of the ruling one-party system in Yugoslavia. When nationalism was let loose, religion (Catholicism for Croats, Orthodoxy for Serbs, and Islam for Muslims) quickly became one of the defining factors of belonging to

95 96 Kosta Milkov a given ethnic group. What followed was a classical example of (ab)use of religion in the service of politics, with war as its final extension. Any worldview is inevitably political, and religion is not an exception. This essay does not claim that politicization of religion, as such, is always negative and an unacceptable process that has no place in the contemporary, pluralistic, and increasingly secularized world. As a matter of fact, the purpose of this study is to evaluate Protestant involvement in the politics of the former Yugoslavia. More specifically, this study looks at how Protestant demands and political opinions have been expressed in the work and writings of the most prominent representative of Evangelical Christianity in former Yugoslavia, Dr. Peter Kuzmič. The influential bookExclusion and Embrace by Miroslav Volf1 is also taken into consideration, as its subject matter, content, and argument support the claim that Protestants in the former Yugoslavia did not have politicization of their religious beliefs as a priority. Finally, a case study from Macedonia analyzes a context indicating that at least one Protestant community, that of the United Methodist Church, did have a lobby group that was supportive of them and encouraged them to insist on some political concessions that have been a privilege of the majority and traditional religious groups in the country. Whereas Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim communities could count on strong support from their religious institutions concerning their political aspirations, this was not the case with the Protestants, who neither had nor expected support from international Protestant lobby groups for gaining political leverage of their religious affiliation. On the contrary, because Protestants from the free Evangelical churches did not identify their ethnicity with their Christian confession, their small congregations have been rather ethnically diverse. In consequence, they proved to be one of the most trusted agents through which their international church partners channeled aid to all in need, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, and acted as brokers for peace and reconciliation.

From sin through metanoia to freedom

One of the most representative letters in terms of politicization of religion is a short letter written by Kuzmič on behalf of the Protestant The Gospel and Politics 97

Evangelical Council (PEV) in Croatia.2 In the manner of the apologists and the polemicists of the second century AD, Kuzmič writes an unusually long introduction that should situate the PEV within the historical, political, religious, and social context of Croatia. He emphasizes that the PEV is an interdenominational body, historically rooted in Croatia and the region, that has used its international contacts to alleviate the consequences of the war in the early 1990s of the twentieth century as well as contribute toward the international recognition of Croatia as a sovereign state. It is especially interesting to see the letter’s use of a New Testament reference from Lk. 2:14 that, according to Kuzmič, discusses the proper meaning of peace although that meaning is certainly not what an unnamed Neo-Platonist imagines as “rest from all hostilities.” What Kuzmič does not elaborate, but is implied in the classical Christian interpretation of the Biblical meaning of peace, is that the peace among men Luke writes about is based on a different vision for which the absence of hostilities is merely a condition for peace. Peace assumes not only certain absence of violence and security. Rather, it requires a positive aspect of eager concern for the wellbeing of one’s fellow citizens. Luke probably had in mind a concept that the Old Testament calls shalom. “Shalom is when everyone will sit under their own vine and under their own fig tree and no one will make them afraid for the Lord Almighty has spoken” (Mic. 4:4). From peace, Kuzmič moves on to the topic of truth. Referring to Jn. 14:6 and 8:32, Kuzmič indicates that the PEV’s constituent communities strive to engage politically in alignment with truth—by which they understand, not the relative truth of claims that God is somehow on the side of certain nation or confession, but rather the truth of the True One who sees and judges everyone from the perspective of his ultimate truth that is never biased to human temporary claims to possess truth. Peace and truth are basic presuppositions for the functioning of a just society that treats everyone equally. Peace, truth, and justice make the basis of what the modern world calls democracy, which Kuzmič connects with a verse in the OT book of Proverbs 14:34 that says, “Righteousness exalts a nation, but sin condemns any people.” It is a well-chosen reference as it refers to the important role that the PEV has played in Croatian society with its promotion of peace, truth, and justice. For Kuzmič, the Croatia of the 1990s was still on the way to democratization. To show that the PEV’s perspective is not myopic and exclusivist, he supports his 98 Kosta Milkov claim for need of further democratization by invoking the authority of Pope John Paul II and his views on “the civilization of love.” However, reading his article 4 years later on a similar topic, it seems that democratization has not progressed very far.3 As Kuzmič interprets its signs, the political parties that promised transformation failed Croatian society. Part of the reason for this, Kuzmič identifies, lies in what he calls “structural sin”: as a remainder of the previous regime, which makes the situation in Croatia similar to that of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Although changes have been made, these are far from what truly needs to be done if the old paradigm with its “structural sin” is to be replaced. However, old habits die hard, and they cannot be eradicated by mere agreement that the society needs substantial transformation. Transformation comes from the inside and, in biblical terms, it requires a change of mind. This change of mind is described by the NT term metanoia. The English equivalent for this Greek word is repentance, but, in literal translation, it means conversion of mind. Kuzmič knows that this word, although not used very often in the NT, is nonetheless central to its message. It is prominent at the beginning of Jesus’ public ministry, both referring to John the Baptist’s activity that was interpreted as preparation for the coming of the Messiah, and also at the initial moments of Jesus’ preaching to the crowds. Kuzmič’s conclusion is that real change might come in Croatia only if the old paradigm is eradicated and replaced by a new vision. This new vision, however, is not possible without metanoia—repentance. His referring to metanoia in this context had a 2-fold purpose. The first purpose can be related to the way John the Baptist addresses people from all social strata including political and religious rulers as well as the common people. Luke the Evangelist makes a direct connection between John’s baptism of repentance and the quotation from Is. 40:3–4. This is a strong text that calls the people who have strayed away from justice and righteousness to straighten their paths. Verse 3 from Is. 40 is quoted in the other syn- optic gospels, but only Luke adds verse four, which likens this making of things right with God’s salvation. In other words the “salvation”(i.e., the just and righteous society Croatia is straining to become) will happen only through change of mind, repentance from the old paradigms, and acquiring a renewed mind. The second purpose can be indicated through Luke’s record of Jesus’ association with people of bad reputation for which he was reprimanded by the social and religious dignitaries of his time. In Luke 5:31–32, after The Gospel and Politics 99 being asked why he eats with tax collectors and sinners, Jesus answers: “Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick; I have come to call not the righteous but sinners to repentance.” It is one of the more-well known facts of the NT that Jesus was using all kinds of parables and hyperboles to bring self-righteous hypocrites—usually people of good social repute—to awareness of their need for repentance. Of course, in order for someone to be ready to repent, one needs to realize that one is a sinner. The 2-fold connection with the situation in Croatia is unmistakable. The whole society needs to go through repentance to rid itself of the old paradigm, but the key to that is often in the hands of those who have been entrusted with the management of the transition. These, according to Kuzmič, are often people of significant social status—hypocrites who are in the greatest need of repentance but are either unwilling to repent or unaware of their need to do so. That this transformation and departure from the old paradigm require building a critical mass in society becomes evident in the approach toward the media, and especially the role that the Croatian state radio and TV stations should play within society.4 According to Kuzmič, the media, and especially the TV stations, must be allowed to undergo a process of de-politicization and liberation from ideology. The fact that the structures of power had been unwilling to assist this transformation indicates their fear of truth and its free distribution. We continue in the same path of a need of change of paradigm, and the incentive for this change is again found in the NT message. Moreover, although it can seem subversive, it is so only for the structures of power that try to keep the status quo that guarantees their privileged position in society. Faced with the proclamation of Jesus, they were not willing to let the truth set them free. The paradigm shift of open truth that Jesus announced was too risky for all those who relied on propaganda to keep their subject in fear and submission. Making this parallel between the first-century Palestine of Jesus and contemporary Croatia, Kuzmič appeals to the words of Jesus that those who keep his teaching and the truth shall be set free (Jn. 8:32). This embrace of truth requires brave steps and, in this context, the step made by Article 7, in spite of its shortcomings, is perceived as an important advancement in the Law pertaining to Croatian radio and TV. One has to keep in mind that, while Kuzmič was writing these articles, he was on the advisory board of the national Croatian television—an 100 Kosta Milkov experience that, according to him, includes various pressures to turn a blind eye to many instances of mismanagement.5 However, his appointment indicates that he has been recognized as an influential public intellectual in Croatia with significant social capital. Much of this capital came from his commitment to personal engagement that the voice of the Protestant minority be heard, not only by insisting on its guaranteed rights, but also in terms of publicizing the positive role that this community has played and can play in the advancement of the flourishing of all society. This became especially evident during and in the aftermath of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. Kuzmič set up Agape, the humanitarian wing of the Evangelical Church in Croatia, through which hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people received essential aid for survival, aid mostly sent from Protestant churches in the West, and especially the United States. This gave Kuzmič and the Evangelical church in Croatia leverage in the emerging new political scene, but certainly not in terms of having a lobby behind them to encourage them to come with some sort of maxi- malist demands from the state concerning its legal status and rights. The concern of the Protestants from the free evangelical churches has not been political at all. First of all, it has been oriented toward social issues, and if Kuzmič has relied on the backing from the international Protestant community, he did so in order to speak out with more freedom about issues such as the situation in the national television. He is able to openly express his disappointment with the government since neither the ministry of culture nor of justice appointed their representatives in the advisory board on time. With this, they have blocked its purpose—to monitor the transformation of the state-owned radio and TV stations into private companies. In spite of these power-play games, Kuzmič publicly announces that, as a member in the new body, he will seek to remove the media from the influence of politics and its tempta- tions and to introduce professionalism. There are two reasons for doing this. First, the media have a formative role to play within a society. Once they are set free from dogmatic bounds, they will be able to educate and serve as an effective counter to a culture of misinformation and lies. The second reason has to do with the fact that the media should be servants of truth, not manipulations, especially when it comes to the news. Thus, once again, knowing the truth will set people free. If we speak, then, about the politicization of religion during and in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia, and seek to see the role The Gospel and Politics 101 and the general position that the Protestants from the free evangelical churches took, we can see that the vast majority of the believers and the church leaders welcomed the pluralization of their respective societies, but, by and large, did not attempt to politicize their own religious belief. Their main interest was neither Constantine’s vision that created Christendom, nor the Magisterial Reformers’ vision that led to the creation of Protestant state churches. Neither were they significantly interested in the culture wars waged by the so-called Christian Right in the United States. Their vision had been mostly linked with the images from the New Testament church and from the first three centuries of its later development, namely, the idea that Christians are only pilgrims on this Earth and that they are citizens of Heaven (cf. Phil. 3:20; 1 Pet. 2:11). That this is truly so has been well researched and expounded upon by Steve Goodwin in his book Fractured Land, Healing Nations. In it, Goodwin develops the argument that, although religion has been politicized during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia to the extent of being actually instrumental in promoting war solutions to the impasse in which the various ethnicities found themselves, religion can, nonetheless, be a positive force for building peace. The careful study of the three main religions complicit in the war, Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam, Goodwin combines with field research data—primary and secondary literature successfully explaining the role of religio-national myths in nation-building. His general observation is that all religions have a supranational character that can contribute to social restoration. This has been especially true of the locally generated initiatives of religious faith sodalities. He pays special attention to the small and scattered Free Evangelical Protestant churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his assessment, they have made disproportionally important contributions toward conflict resolution and peacebuilding. He indicates that the only place where three nationalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained meaningful relationship even in the middle of the War were these small Protestant churches. According to him, the reason for this should be found in the insistence upon not identifying one’s nation with one’s religious affiliation and, thus, refusing its politicization. Religious convictions should play a role in how Protestants relate to the wider society, including politics, but these should be exercised only to further the wellbeing of all people. For example, the insistence on truth—so prominent in the book of Proverbs—is, according to Kuzmič, 102 Kosta Milkov an excellent source for avoiding lies, especially in cases when insiders are to communicate unpleasant news or to issue corrections. This is something similar to the case with the Croatian national TV station. It has reached the point of decay and its stench is spreading in all directions.6 Such demise is caused by the lack of leadership from within—another topic in the book of Proverbs. The leader who could revive the institution needs to be one who would be willing to renounce privileges, political influences, and pressure from the mafia. Kuzmič goes so far as to use the adjective “Fascist” to describe the symbols that are given prominence in the news. This is highly charged language, and its political ramifications are unquestionable. In the same article, the author refers to the pressure that he and the president of the advisory board experienced when they decided not to abstain from voting in order to oppose something they considered to be very wrong. In spite of these pressures, it seems that, some 6 months later, the board was able to stand its ground, and, in the eyes of Kuzmič, the condition of the Hrvatska radiotelevizija (HRT) has been improving.7 This move toward freedom of the media—a condition which Croatia had to satisfy before joining the European Union—was deemed a good sign. It means that the HRT is not any more terminally ill, and that it, finally, can be treated as a patient. Such treatment requires hard work that cannot be substantiated by any instant solutions. In an earlier column, Kuzmič writes about his journalist friend who had diagnosed Croatia as being clinically dead.8 All of this is discussed in the context of Easter and the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, which leads to the question of whether Croatia can be resurrected from its economic collapse and breakdown of social order. Kuzmič’s assessment and advice for the way out of this death scenario represents, par excellence, his Protestant and Evangelical worldview. He believes in miracles, and in God’s supernatural intervention within human history, but he would not yield an inch when it comes to people doing what they can because this capacity is a God-given gift. Exercising this gift is human responsibility, and it is theologically interpreted as making humanity co-creators with God. Being industrious for Protestantism is, first of all, a theological value. That is why Kuzmič does not believe in miracles of this sort such as Croatia being miraculously resurrected from its economic and social demise. Substantial changes in Croatia that can collectively amount to its resurrection can be done only through work and reason. The miraculous, however, is not discarded. On the contrary, it is central to the motivation The Gospel and Politics 103 for work and reasoning. In other words, according to Kuzmič’s theological interpretation of Christ’s resurrection, the efforts to help people in any society flourish find their full meaning because they are inspired by a vision that goes beyond the here and now of human life—a life which inevitably ends in death. The fact that the death of Christ won victory over the grave, so that death does not have the final say, is an inspiration for believers to participate in the process of that transformation through resurrection. Christ’s resurrection has started the renewal of the whole world (cf. Rom 8.). With this, Kuzmič is sending a message central for the free Evangelical churches he represents. The commitment to the traditional Christian beliefs such as the deity of Christ, the Trinity, the reliability of the Bible, and biblical ethics: these things motivate them to make their earnest contribution to the wellbeing of all society, and, for that reason, challenge and resist institutionalized evil in whatever form it comes. At the same time, they know that the final responsibility for transformation of the world is not in their hands. Thus, no matter how little and insignificant their effort might look, these efforts are not to be despised, as they will be part of God’s restoration that is anticipated in Jesus’ death and resurrection. From the perspective of Christian belief, the end is already known. God’s victory over sin, decay, and death is won. However, in the meantime, Christians are called to live a life that actively anticipates this victory in a world where it is, as yet, far from evident. The biblical imagery of a cosmic battle might be too abstract to appre- ciate its significance for our daily life. Nonetheless, the Bible never loses sight of the cosmic battle that has an impact on the Earth’s affairs. The spiritual forces which opposed Jesus’ ministry on Earth exercised their attack through the sociopolitical structures in the Graeco-Roman world. The Kingdom of God that Jesus inaugurated is in contrast to that of the earthly governments (Matt. 20:28 and parallels). We should identify with all victims of power as Jesus himself identified with humanity by taking on himself human flesh. When we consider the historical context of Revelation, we are able to see that the mythological language of the cosmic war depicts the situation in the real world. The application of the message of Revelation has to do more with the Earth than with heaven. It is the hope of heaven, the coming kingdom of God, which gives strength to Christians to continue their fight against evil while on Earth, and to see the Kingdom of God already established on the Earth standing in utmost opposition to the evil kingdoms under the dominion 104 Kosta Milkov of Satan. “Christ is the eschaton, or the divinely ordained climax or crisis of history. It was as a gift of God and not on account of human effort. It was the manifest and effective assertion of the divine sovereignty in conflict with evil in the world.”9 In other words, according to Kuzmič, although it seems that we live in a period of “the eclipse of God” (Buber) and God’s existence is far from self-evident, remembering what God has done for us in the past gives us hope that he will bring the history of creation to a glorious victory over the powers of darkness, sin, and evil. Christians can confidently continue their active growth toward the likeness of Christ and be victorious with his victory. “In Jesus we have exhibited the power by which God rules the world.”10 If Jesus conquered the world (Jn. 16:33), the believers who are joined to him have done the same as well. As far as the social and political ramifications of such reasoning are concerned, for Kuzmič, these have to influence every single aspect of society and enhance its flourishing. In this context, Kuzmič thinks that, in the aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it is of special interest as to how ethnic minorities are viewed and treated in the successor countries. He is concerned that an event addressing this issue convened by some of the most prominent public intellectuals from Croatia did not find any place in the news coverage of the national TV station. According to Kuzmič, the maturity of a society is shown by its treatment of the weak and the vulnerable. In the case of the minorities, the only way forward would be their full integration. This integration will mean that the minorities can serve as intermediaries (bridges) of cooperation between the two neighboring countries such that tensions are resolved by integration, not by forceful removal of populations and stricter border controls, and that the way of cooperation and integration has no alternative within the context of the Balkans.11 When writing about neighboring countries in the Balkans, Kuzmič, first of all, has Croatia and Serbia in mind. He does not shy away from expressing publicly his disappointment at the way these two countries have continued to keep their citizens as hostages to their mutual animosity. Both countries seem to welcome some extreme forms of interpretation of the recent bloody conflict in which acts of brutal violence and war crimes are either minimized or presented as military operations that exercised chivalry and valor. In this context, Kuzmič questions the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in Serbia. According to him, both churches have politicized their religious The Gospel and Politics 105 role and have used religion to further the political agendas of their respective countries. For example, writing on the political situation in Serbia in 2001, Kuzmič refers to the current political developments that are affecting the attitude and the collective memory of the Serbs in Croatia, but especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.12 According to Kuzmič, this way of approaching history and its interpretation in the Balkans has two problems. Firstly, the interpretations are often burdened by mythology and propaganda. Secondly, they are focused on consequences of events, not their causes. This approach has accompanied the abuse of religion for nationalistic ends, as demonstrated by the role of the Serbian Orthodox church during Milosevic’s wars. The same, unfortunately, can be said for the sentiments among Croatian Roman Catholics. In a column written at the tenth anniversary of the massacre in Srebrenica and the so-called operation Storm (Oluja), Kuzmič is disappointed to see how both Serbian and Croatian nationalism rear their heads. He is especially distressed to have witnessed the behavior of the crowds who responded with hissing, booing, and insulting the then president of the country, Stipe Mesic, for admitting that needless violence had been practiced against Serbs after the conclusion of military operations. This behavior was manifested once again when a large picture of Ante Gotovina and Pope John Paul II appeared on the road toward the main entrance into Zadar. Kuzmič noted that these two figures do not go together for many reasons, some of which include different worldviews, different ethical perspectives, and different perceptions of sexual and marital behavior. Thus, this act was yet one more shameful example of Croatian nationalism, against which no one has the courage to respond or to protest.13 One significant aspect for observation of Kuzmič’s role as a public intellectual whose social analysis and activism are unapologetically tied with his Christian worldview—of the Evangelical kind—is his own jour- ney concerning the issue of pacifism. Most of the Evangelical Christians in the Balkans have not thought carefully through their own attitude to war (I personally cannot remember a single case of refusing military service on the basis of conscientious objections), and found themselves off guard when they realized that the breakup of Yugoslavia was turning into a violent war. Nonetheless, the issue of being a conscientious objec- tor became prominent in their circles, and the church leaders on both sides of the warring nations did not use their pulpits to incite, justify, or, in any other way, promote patriotism by encouraging the members of their congregations to take armed part in the conflict. 106 Kosta Milkov

The question, however, remained as to what was the biblical norm in such matters. In the case of Kuzmič, he publicly declared that his leanings toward pacifist views had been radically challenged during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 He was initially challenged to rethink his views in the light of his friends perishing, and then also by non-Christians who questioned his commitment to pacifism on moral grounds. Because so many of the victims were innocent noncombatants, he began wondering when America, the most moral nation in the world, was going to do something to prevent all that suffering. He realized that only a military intervention, which took care of Serb artillery and cut their supply lines, would be able to do the deed and bring the war to an end. In thinking along these lines, he consciously assumed the garb of a military strategist, but this was a decision supported by the notion that power only understands the language of greater power. In adopt- ing this position, there was no ethnic axe to grind. However, the truly remarkable thing is that the international community tolerated a long list of atrocities. The BBC documentary ‘The Death of Yugoslavia’ shows that, contrary to Western perceptions, the war could have been controlled and stopped. Statements to the effect that ethnic wars have always taken place in the Balkans are untrue, and they constitute nothing but attempts by Western politicians to wash their hands off the issue. The war was neither ethnic nor religious, but was fostered by manipulators whose goal was nothing less than using both of these elements skillfully to achieve the expansion of territories. This applies to all three sides in the war, although all three sides were not equally guilty.15 Having in mind all of these aspects, Kuzmič’s verdict is that the “sin” of which the West is guilty during the wars in former Yugoslavia is that of indifference. This indifference was demonstrated politically, diplomati- cally, and militarily, and it lasted for too long. It is the task of Christians to pray that human rights be restored to all who have undergone the ordeal of the war, that they be assured peace, and that they be granted full rights over their own property, including safe return to their own houses.16

Exclusion ot embrace?

At this point, it is relevant to point to the views that were taken by another prominent Protestant thinker with Croatian background, The Gospel and Politics 107 namely, the Yale theologian Miroslav Volf. Although not resident in Croatia, he spent significant periods in the country during the war and in its aftermath and took part in the conversation concerning biblical interpretations about war and violence as justifiable for bringing peace and wellbeing. Volf committed to carefully think through these issues in the light of the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia. Out of this experience, Volf came with a brilliant analysis of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, interpreting them from the perspective of Christ on the cross, and concluded that the Christian vision of conflict resolution is based on the principle of “embrace” rather than of “exclusion.” Analyzing the newly coined term “ethnic cleansing” connected with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Volf makes the conclusion that ethnic cleansing has become our contemporary mortal sin. It is a sin that makes us think about reality through the prism of our own suffering, compelling us to act out of fear and anger, and giving us the excuse to become a source of suffering for others—those outside of our (increasingly smaller) circle—with a clean conscience. To give an acceptable answer to this paranoid division of “them” and “us,” Volf penetratingly analyses the concept of otherness. The point of departure, for Volf, is the New Testament metaphor of salvation as reconciliation. He offers his idea of embrace as a theological response to the problem of exclusion. Outlining his vision for the resolution to this problem of exclusion, Volf listens to the voices of the past and the present. The final result is the creative and persuasive proposition that the Christian teaching concerning the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and the cross is the most suitable platform for the defrayal of the burning social and political themes such as exclusion, subjugation, justice, liberation, and peace. In other words, Volf espouses the view that the answer to these issues has to have for its guide God’s self-sacrificial love shown on the cross of Christ. It follows from this that the reconciliation of groups of people with a history of enmity is a process that requires from them selfless sacrificial and unconditional love. Addressing the victims who almost always emerge as perpetrators somewhere in the future in the name of “just retribution,” Volf inspires them to resist the temptation to retaliate for their suffering with violence. In order to achieve this, each side has to develop a “double vision”—the capacity to see through the eyes of the other. 108 Kosta Milkov

Constantly having in mind God’s embrace, Volf emphasizes its social implications. With his attitude of wide-open hands, God clearly commu- nicates to the godless that he does not want to leave them in the clutches of their own evil. He gives himself in order to bring them into his fellowship. We are, then, invited to do the same with our own enemies. The key theses inExclusion and Embrace have important consequences for the condition of the world today that (paradoxically, in view of the fact that it is turning into a global village) becomes less and less tolerant toward the other. People are called to repentance, to forgiveness, to embrace not only according to the example of Jesus, but also according to the recognition that, solely on the narrow path to justice and peace, can they reach the coveted spiritual happiness. Both Kuzmič and Volf represent the general sentiment of Protestants from the Evangelical churches when it comes to politicization of religion. In other words, they speak as a minority in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

A preacher and a president

One possible exception to the pattern we have been describing is the election of the lay Methodist preacher Boris Trajkovski as president of Macedonia,17 following which the Methodist church was one of the five faith communities to be explicitly mentioned in the Constitution together with the Eastern Orthodox, Islamic, Roman Catholic, and Jewish communities. However, even in this case, one cannot speak of a Protestant lobby group giving political support to their fellow believers. First of all, the new provisions did not include the rest of the Protestant denominations in Macedonia and, second, such recognition was not actively demanded by the Methodist members in Macedonia. On the contrary, one of the reasons Trajkovski was promoted by his party as a presidential candidate was the hope that his international contacts with other Protestant politicians, mainly from the United States, would give Macedonia political, economic, and social benefits. The Orthodox hierarchy, nonetheless, interpreted Boris’ Protestantism as a subversive element that allowed the Protestant minority to radicalize its claims. For example, in the second year of his presidential term, Trajkovski was publicly attacked by the Bishop Petar who in several of The Gospel and Politics 109 his interviews said the following: “With the blessing of the Methodist Boris Trajkovski sects have already entered schools, families, and even the Army. If this is not stopped we the Macedonians (of whom 99% are Orthodox) will soon be crucified between our Church and the sects and with this we will irrevocably lose our nation and culture. Islam is not so dangerous since it is significantly different, the danger for us are Christian sects.”18 The Macedonian newspaper “Dnevnik” quotes more explicit statements by Archbishop Petar. They open with the rather spectacular title: “If Trajkovski were a Satanist, Satanists would have been put in the Constitution of the country. My attitudes are the attitudes of the MOC, “[Macedonian Orthodox Church]”claims Bishop Petar. The so- called Evangelical-Methodist Church is introduced in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia with the goal of enhancing the spread of Protestantism in this territory and to subdue Orthodoxy . . . The Archbishop Petar confirmed that he still keeps the opinion that Trajkovski ‘functions more as a Methodist preacher rather than a President’.” 19 Let us finish with one instance which makes a direct connection between the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) and the government. Trajkovski was elected as a candidate of the then ruling party VMRO. His slogan was that, if elected, he would be president of all people in Macedonia, and not only of VMRO supporters. Much to the dismay of the Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski, Trajkovski tried to keep his word after he got elected. In less than 2 years, the president—premier relationship was quite dysfunctional, and Georgievski was musing on how to be rid of Trajkovski. Ljube Boshkovski, at that time Minister for Internal Affairs and well known for the allegations of the Hague Tribunal against him, offered him a solution. Here is the quote from the newspaper: “The idea is, with a pressure from MOC, for President Trajkovski to be compelled to resign his office. Party gossip has it that this will be the last weapon of Gerogievski to destroy Trajkovski.” The paper asks “Was he [Georgievski] blind to the fact that Trajkovski is a Protestant when he recommended him as a presidential candidate!?”20 One other significant factor that helped Trajkovski to be become a presidential candidate has to do with the Kosovo crisis when Trajkovksi was a deputy minister for foreign affairs. His zeal to help the nearly 400,000 refugees who fled from Kosovo, and the strong and 110 Kosta Milkov charismatic approach he took with the international diplomats, brought him wide public popularity. Moreover, he used the willingness of the small Protestant denominations who used their network with Protestant churches abroad to coordinate humanitarian relief to the refugees. This was a time of exceptional vulnerability for Macedonia, and it could be considered as a period when Protestants could have harnessed the momentum to ask their international partners to lobby for them and put pressure on the Macedonian government to make concessions from which they would have long-term advantages. On the basis of this author’s active participation in, this process, it can be said that this issue was not even raised. This brings us to the final point concerning the view that Protestants from the free Evangelical churches, whether they recognized the fact displayed about the contemporary politicization of religion. Being inspired by the New Testament church and the church in the first three centuries, they instinctively took the position of the early apologists and polemicists. These early authors wrote treatises, not to insist on political methods and activism that could give Christians political and social leverage, but, rather, addressed their writings to emperors and governors in which they gave their best arguments to show that the Christians were loyal citizens, and did not have any subversive elements that could be a threat to the established political order. In a similar vein, the contemporary Protestants from the free Evangelical churches, by and large, communicated in their sermons, writings, and actions that their utmost social goal was to see the country in which they lived flourish.

Conclusion

In an attempt to explore to what extent and how Protestants in the former Yugoslavia joined in the process of the politicization of religion, we have discovered that few theological features and hermeneutical principles have been crucial in forming their political views in light of their Christian faith. For Protestants from the free Evangelical churches, politics and religion were not to be mixed, and, consequently, the majority of them resisted the politicization of their religious views. As far as they have been concerned, the conflicts and wars in the former The Gospel and Politics 111

Yugoslavia were tragic occasions that required not a political but rather a biblical response, and were opportunities, not to lobby for their own interests as evangelicals, but to reach out to the needy and alleviate the human suffering of neighbor and enemy alike. Even so, some issues could not be expressed other than in political terms. We see this in Kuzmič’s newspaper columns, which address numerous issues that beset Croatia as it tries to get back on its democratic feet. Furthermore, we read that Kuzmič, although reluctantly, decided to ask publicly for military action from the United States in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, we saw that Miroslav Volf took a different perspective on this issue, elaborated thoroughly in his book Exclusion and Embrace. However, neither of them tried to politicize their religious views for the purposes of gaining political leverage for the Protestant minorities in each of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Finally, the case of Macedonia and the election of the Methodist lay preacher Boris Trajkvoski as the president of the country again showed that Protestants were not interested in using the situation to increase or radicalize their demands concerning their legal status as a minority confessional group in the country. The overall conclusion is that the Protestants from the free Evangelical churches during the wars that ended the Yugoslav federation, generally and in principle, have resisted the tendencies of the other three religious communities—the Muslims, the Catholics, and the Orthodox—to use religion for political gain of their respective ethnic community. As a final remark, let us turn again to Kuzmič who, when writing about the minorities, indicates that they are not so much as a fifth column, and more an agent of integration and a bridge for cooperation between neighboring countries. Having indicated that treatment of minorities is a test of the maturity of a state and its social coherence, Kuzmič concludes:

For this reason we must always anew and in all levels engage with the basic questions of elementary decency, respecting the other and the different, protecting human rights, the status of religious minorities and the promotion of . . . ecumenism. We have to learn that safeguarding our identity and building fellowship with others are not mutually exclusive, and that the struggle against uniformity and openness for dialogue are always more fruitful for personal maturity . . . There is no other way!21 112 Kosta Milkov

Notes

1. Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996). 2. Peter Kuzmić, “Što sam govorijo Tuđmanu?” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 13–14. 3. Peter Kuzmić, “Nakon perestrojke, treba nam metanoja,” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 16–18. 4. Peter Kuzmić, “Jednoumlje proizvodi jednoglasnije,” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 18–19. 5. Peter Kuzmić, “Kakva Nam (tele)vizija treba?” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 25–26. 6. Peter Kuzmić, “Televizija je trula,” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 32–35. 7. Peter Kuzmić, “Htv u saboru (bez zagrljaja),” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 41–42. 8. Peter Kuzmić, “Može li Hrvatska uskrsnuti?” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 20–21. 9. Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, “The Mystery of Theosis,” in Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, ed. Studies in Eastern Christianity, Vol. 1 (Toronto, ON: The Ukrainian Free University, 1977), p. 56. 10. Gayle Gerber Koontz, “The Liberation of Atonement,” Mennonite Quarterly Review 63, no. 2, 1989, p. 183. 11. Peter Kuzmić, “Manjine—most suradnje, a ne peta kolona,” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 38–39. 12. Peter Kuzmić, “U Beogradu ništa novo?” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), pp. 28–30. 13. Peter Kuzmić, “Hrvatske balkanske i beogradske gluposti,” in Josip Cvenić and Jaroslav Pecnik, eds. Vrijeme i viječnost; etika, politika, religija (Osijek: Grafika, 2006), p. 74. 14. Peter Kuzmić, “On the Way to Peace in the Balkans,” Christian Century 113, no. 6, 1996, pp. 199–200. 15. Ibid., pp. 200–201. 16. Ibid., pp. 201–202. The Gospel and Politics 113

17. President Trajkovski died in a plane crash in March 2004. 18. Р.Т. “Обвинувањата за секташтво – личен став на владиката Петар.” Dnevnik 1744, (2002). http://star.dnevnik.com.mk/default.aspx?pbroj=1744 &stID=8845&pdate=20020108 (accessed October 16, 2014). 19. Ѓорѓевски Бранko “Да беше Борис сатанист и сатанистите ќе влезеа во Уставот.” Dnevnik 1745, (2002). http://star.dnevnik.com.mk/?pBroj=1745 &stID=8906 (accessed October 16, 2014). 20. Р. П. “По оставката на Доста Димовска, на ред е Борис.” Vest 460, (2002). http://star.vest.com.mk/default.asp?id=20873&idg=2&idb=460&rubrika =Makedonija (accessed October 16, 2014). 21. Kuzmić, “Manjine—most suradnje, a ne peta kolona,” p. 39.

5 Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics: Post-2000 Period Milan Vukomanović

The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, a highly secularized society in the 1960s and 1970s, wherein Communist ideology left its mark on the political, cultural, national, and religious levels, suddenly faced a massive ethnomobilization—the ghost of nationalism and the politically imposed identification of religion and nation—in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result of this “cultural shock,” one quasi-religious system (communism) gave way to another (nationalism). At the same time, the secular Serbian society under Serbian President Slobodan Milošević faced its own semi-literacy with regard to religious matters, providing, thus, a secure refuge for an ecclesiastical nationalism and nationalist populism. Thus, in conditions of war and the long-lasting politicization of religion, one witnessed a consequent, secondary “sacralization” of politics and inter-ethnic conflict. This, of course, gave rise to theories concerning the allegedly religious roots of the Balkan wars. These wars resulted, however, primarily from political and inter-ethnic conflicts, arising in conditions of economic deterioration and System crisis.

115 116 Milan Vukomanović

Religion appeared as a significant element of ethnicity (even ethnoma- nipulation during the Milošević government), and this is probably the reason why these wars are sometimes labeled as inter-religious conflicts.1 However, in the perception of some churches (such as the Serbian Orthodox Church), the war was also experienced as involving a territorial issue. In such a perception, it gained legitimacy, because it was necessary to “defend,” as it were—sometimes, at the cost of war-crimes—one’s presence, one’s physical and spiritual survival on the ‘fatherland’. In this context, the destruction of religious facilities was, primarily, a symbolic act of demonstrating political and military dominance: the temples were not destroyed so much as religious objects, but as national and ethnic symbols of a community’s presence on a certain territory. The first post-Milošević democratic government of Serbia, headed by the late Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić,2 attempted to create a sort of symbolic distance to the ideological heritage of the previous regime and, thus, secure the support of the electorate by referring to a set of traditional values and confirming a modern, democratic, pro-European orientation.3 Accordingly, his government introduced confessional religious education as an elective subject in public schools. Djindjić’s vice-president, Čedomir Jovanović, admitted that the decision itself was completely pragmatic, stemming from the government’s attempt to appease the Serbian Church after the extradition of Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal. However, this liberal government was never genuinely attached to the church, and the Serbian higher clergy knew that. The next government, under its conservative prime minister, Vojislav Koštunica, was probably the best that the Serbian Church could have hoped for in the many decades since World War II. Koštunica offered a real symphony with the church; therefore, it seems that whatever his government decided, the church would comply, and vice versa. During the 4 years of his mandate (2004–2008), the Serbian Orthodox Church (hereinafter, SPC4) became a powerful player in political, cultural, and economic sense. It has maintained this role to date.

The Serbian Orthodox Church and the state after October 5, 2000

In what context can we speak about the SPC5 as a political actor after the fall of the Milošević regime in Serbia? The SPC is certainly not a political Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 117 party in itself or an organization formally standing behind a party. Under Serbia’s Constitution, religious communities are separate from the state, the SPC is not a state church, and the structures of political authority do not coincide with religious structures (as is the case, e.g., in Iran). However, religious communities in the central and eastern European countries, many of which are already EU members, have gained a new place and role for themselves in the post-socialist period and become far more prominent in the public sphere. Nonetheless, there is public discussion in Serbia about de-secularization of society and the state and even a process of clericalization,6 referring not just to an increased importance and influence of religion (particularly the SPC) in Serbian society, but also to greater participation of the church in political and state affairs. This impression is widespread not only among the local “civic intellectuals,” non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and independent thinkers in Serbia (who are traditionally critical of the SPC role in public life), but also among the foreign media, political figures, and European institutions, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Council of Europe.7 This study will focus on the place and role of the SPC in Serbian society, state, and political life after October 5, 2000, tackling its pronounced symbolic and normative function. The church now offers a new ideological framework and value system for state institutions such as the armed forces and public education. The state and the church in Serbia established an unprecedented relationship almost overnight. Dealing with a young and fragile democratic society is a completely new experience for the SPC after a decade of authoritarianism in the Milošević era and another four decades in which a single party and ideology held a structural monopoly over state and society. Before World War II, the SPC coexisted with the then monarchy in a relatively “symphonic” relationship in which the SPC was the “first among equals” among the recognized religious communities. A multi- tude of open issues and problems concerning democracy, the character of a democratic state, and church–state relations enter the agenda under new circumstances.8 For example, which social problems are within the jurisdiction of the church and its constitutional frameworks and ramifications? How capable are religious organizations to deal with those problems and what is their capacity for solving them? How relevant are the religious 118 Milan Vukomanović communities’ responses to the contemporary political and social issues? What is the church’s vision of the modern world? What is its relationship with civil society: do religious communities see themselves as an integral part of civil society? During the socialist period, the state one-sidedly determined the character of its relationship with religious communities from a position of total political and ideological supremacy. In the post-socialist era, however, the religious rights and freedoms have been considerably extended; however, this immediately brought into play the question of their increased responsibility in many areas. In Serbia, there is still a great deal of arbitrariness in this respect, including even completely partial interpretations of the church–state relations, on both sides. Already, in 2001, the controversy and inconsistencies became apparent when religious education was introduced in the public school system as a regular subject.

Religious education as a litmus test for future church–state relations

Direct contact between the SPC and state institutions was established in November 2000 when the Bishops’ Assembly requested that religious education become part of standard state school programs. The introduction of religious education in schools and the permission (granted later that year) that clergymen could enjoy access to members of the armed forces were the demands indicative of other, more important problems. Religious education in public schools (both primary and secondary) was not just an issue of the model of religious education proposed for a new and liberated society in which religious communities have much more room and a much better relationship with the state; this immediately highlighted numerous other questions in connection with religious rights and freedoms in a more general sense. Before a new Constitution could be passed, and also before the adoption of a law on religious organizations, a government regulation became effective; this defined, already in its preamble, the status of the seven traditional religious communities. In this regard, the authors of the law obviously sought to assert legal continuity with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.9 This introduced bias into the area of religious freedoms and church-state relations: for example, if only seven religious communities Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 119 are entitled to organize religious education in public schools, how can we speak about the equality of religious communities before the law and the Constitution? If they are truly equal, why can only some of them exercise these rights?10 Is this discrimination or even injustice against some, and, more importantly, how will their status be regulated in the future? Another problem was the attitude toward lay state institutions, such as public schools: can schools in Serbia still be considered lay institutions? Is the public school space still “inviolable,” non-confessional, and does it still enjoy some autonomy, such that religious communities cannot participate in the education process and the possible recruitment of new young believers without major changes in the existing legislation? Not surprisingly, the religious education decision of 2001, subsequently confirmed by a government regulation, very soon found itself before the Constitutional Court of Serbia: several NGOs, and private law firms11 challenged its constitutionality. The hearing in the Court, held on June 24, 2003, featured a synthesis of the arguments that had preceded the July 2001 regulation and attended its issuance.12 According to its critics, the principal objection was that the regulation did not comply with the Constitution of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and international conventions because the introduction of religious instruction and an alternative subject placed national minorities and small religious communities in an unequal position, as only the “traditional” religions were allowed to conduct those classes. As a result, education in primary and secondary schools is not accessible to everyone under the same conditions.13 The second major objection dealt with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Article 41, § 2): given that only religious communities can organize religious instruction, the state cannot participate in those activities. The third complaint challenged the right of religious communities to perform their mission in public schools: although religions may recruit believers, they may not do so in public schools. A further problem was the descriptive grading system, as the existing law on secondary school education did not provide for this form of evaluation. These and some other objections voiced during the hearing led to the following Court assessments: (1) a possible violation of the constitutional separation of church and state; (2) equality of religious communities before the law and the Constitution; (3) a possible violation of laws on primary and secondary school education; (4) a threat against the 120 Milan Vukomanović freedom of religious confession of schoolchildren’s parents and guard- ians, who had to choose between the two school subjects offered; and (5) a possible violation of religious freedoms and the equality of religious communities before the law in those cases where the seven traditional religious communities, along with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religions, draw up religious education plans and programs. The final outcome of the debate was that on November 4, 2003, the Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of the government regulation.14 In any case, the Serbian government chose an optional, confessional, multi-denominational model of religious education. The reasons for such a decision were most likely political and pragmatic. The then prime minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjić, consulted only the religious communities, completely bypassing the most competent republican authority—the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Religious Affairs had, from the outset, unreservedly protected the interests of the SPC, welcomed the prime minister’s decision, thereby contributing to an unusual division in Djindjić’s government. Čedomir Jovanović, a deputy prime minister at the time, admitted later that the decision had been pragmatic and a result of efforts to placate the SPC after the extradition of Slobodan Milošević to the Hague Tribunal.15 Regardless of the political and pragmatic character of the entire process, some believe that the parallel introduction of religious and civic education in the 2001 educational reform could also be seen as part of the then government’s political strategy to implement a “symbolic deflection” from the ideological heritage of the preceding regime and, thereby, win support from the electorate by opting for “traditional” values and confirming their modern, democratic, and pro-European orientation.16 When the Government regulation took effect in July 2001, two deputy ministers of education offered their resignations. At that moment, no one could say for certain whether there would be a sufficient number of trained religious instructors at the beginning of the school year in September or the government would be able to secure the necessary funds (in, or outside, the budget) to pay them, notwithstanding the level of training and experience of the teachers needed for work in public schools. The SPC has, therefore, succeeded in becoming an equal partner of the state in the educational process. The subsequent restoration of the status of the Theological Faculty of the SPC as a faculty of the University of Belgrade was also problematic with respect to the academic criteria and the autonomy of the university, but even more so in regard to the Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 121 observance of human rights in its enrolment policy, as it only admits Orthodox Christian students who receive a bishop’s blessing.

Legal and political aspects: The new law

The political commitment of the Serbian government headed by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica to further strengthening ties with the SPC (this time, far more on ideological than pragmatic grounds), reached its full expression in the Preliminary draft of the Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Associations (released in July 2004) wherein the state makes major concessions to the church, including immunity of the clergy from civil authorities.17 However, after numerous objections were voiced in public, the first preliminary draft was thoroughly revised. In this draft law, the SPC was euphemistically defined as primus inter pares in relation to the other religious communities; nonetheless, it was clear that, in practice, the SPC would—with the logistical assistance of the state—be granted far more extensive powers than any other religious community. The new Ministry of Religious Affairs of Serbia assumed the role of an external state “service” of the SPC. For the first time since October 5, 2000, the structures of political power were beginning to adjust to religious structures, and vice versa. Interestingly, the law’s discriminatory intent was evident from the preliminary draft, wherein religious communities were classified into three categories, which, as was clear from the text, would be treated differently in the registration procedure. Moreover, the text even included theological phraseology, so completely alien to contemporary legislation. According to the document, the state had an obligation to secure or mandate to churches a number of guarantees (e.g., religious instruction in public schools), whereas the religious communities and their officials were relieved of the obligation to pay tax and afforded immunity from civil authorities.18 Even in the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia, churches hardly enjoyed so much autonomy or so many privileges. After 2004, the Serbian Ministry of Religious Affairs worked ona number of other legislative projects—the drafting of which was accompanied by a similar amount of silence concerning the identities of their authors and their competence—and they were completely inaccessible to the professional public. Although the Ministry had done nothing to stimulate a debate of any significance, strong reactions came from 122 Milan Vukomanović independent intellectuals and NGOs who claimed that the SPC would be granted far more privileges than other institutions. This time, the state made a series of concessions to the church that the latter apparently had not even sought, in particular, with regard to the immunity of the clergy, which has no precedent in similar legislation. Moreover, this applies to other issues dealing with the newly established rights of the church. Suddenly, the church became a public institution financed from the state budget; one provision of the draft law even obliged local self-administration to organize referenda if so requested by a church or religious community. It seemed as if the difference between the church and state institutions was diminishing. The 2005 interview of the then Minister of Religions, Milan Radulović, published in Pravoslavlje,19 shows clearly that the biggest dilemma of his ministry was how to reconcile the modern principle of the equality of religious communities before the law and the parallel efforts to give the SPC a special status and primacy.20 In the meantime, the law proposal was revised a few times, and Radulović announced that the full Draft Law would be “submitted” to the competent government committees in January 2006.21 The Law on the Churches and Religious Communities was, indeed, adopted in the Serbian parliament in April 2006. This was the first such law after 1993, when the previous, socialist law was abolished by the Milošević government. In its articles 10–15, this new law defines the status of the traditional churches and religious communities as religious organizations with centuries-long historical continuity, whose legal subjectivity was acquired through special laws adopted in the period between 1914 and 1930 (i.e., in the Kingdoms of Serbia and Yugoslavia). Thus, the traditional churches and religious communities are as follows: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church (of the Augsburg Confession, AC), the Reformed Christian Church, the Evangelical Christian Church (AC), the Islamic Community, and the Jewish Community. Nonetheless, Article 16 of the same law defines the status of the so- called “religious communities” (konfesionalne zajednice) that were registered by the socialist laws in the period between 1953 and 1977. They are not explicitly mentioned in this article; however, from the Law Proposal, we learn that they are: the Christian Baptist Church, the Christian Adventist Church, the Evangelical Methodist Church, the Pentecostal Church, the Evangelical Christian Churches, and “other religious Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 123 organizations” registered between 1953 and 1977. The Law Proposal does not specify those “other religious organizations,” and we may only speculate about their identity. But, this is only one of the numerous ambiguities of this Law. The most important right given to the first group of religious communities is that they may organize confessional religious education in public schools and that they are to be registered automatically, on the basis of their legal continuity with previous laws. The members of the second group, however, are not allowed to administer religious education in public schools, and have a separate and more complicated registration procedure. At the same time, the new constitution of Serbia, adopted in October 2006, stipulates freedom of religion, equality of all citizens based on their religious persuasion, and forbids any discrimination whatsoever (articles 21, 43, and 44). Aware of these inconsistencies, several NGOs in Serbia launched their objections to various drafts of the Serbian “Law on the Churches and Religious Communities.” We have noted that the first draft appeared in the summer of 2004 and, since then, six different versions had been drafted before the Proposal of the Law found itself in the Parliament. However, even the last draft, which evolved into an official proposal of the Law, was sharply criticized by a group of NGOs, including the Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Center for Peace and Democracy, Center for the Advancement of Legal Studies, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Center for Peace and Democracy, and many others. In their joint statement issued in April 2006, the month when the Law Proposal was passed in the Parliament, they stated that this Law would “heavily compromise Serbia.” They asked the members of the Parliament to boycott the debate on this “unconstitutional, uncivilized and worthless text.” Furthermore, these organizations objected that the Law Proposal entered the Parliament without any public discussion. Therefore, the process of church politicization has continued in Serbia, as the state allowed the SPC to become not only a political organization participating in the executive power, but also one of the most powerful economic institutions as well.22 The Law, thus, contains some discriminatory aspects, preventing the registration of a religious organization with a name that includes at least part of the name of another religious organization that has already been registered. This practically prevents the registration of all denominations with alternative names and epithets such as Orthodox, Baptist, 124 Milan Vukomanović

Adventist, etc. Applied to political parties, this would mean that no new political party can be labeled as “democratic,” “liberal,” “civic,” and so on, which is absurd. It is even more absurd when it comes to churches and religious communities that frequently create new denominations. This applies more so if we take into account Article 6 of the Law stating: “Churches and religious communities are free and autonomous in determining their own religious identity.” The Law does not clarify whether an organization that has not been registered with the state body still maintains its legal status, including its right to religious organization and practice. Considering the registration requirements, it seems that they were denied this right. Finally, the Law leaves too much discretionary power to the state executive institutions in making decisions on many aspects of religious organization, which is contrary to the constitution and basic religious rights and freedoms. For example, the so-called “confessional” and “other religious organizations” (we may only guess that the lawmaker is thinking of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Hare Krishna, Buddhists, Sai Baba, Unification Church, etc.) should submit a load of documents to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to be considered for registration. Those documents include: their establishment act; the statute explaining many details regarding their way of organization, list of organizational units, way of administration, etc; the summary of their religious teachings, rituals, goals, and basic activities; and the information on their sources of funding and income (Article 18). On the level of general objections to the new Law, I would be inclined to submit several other arguments. In its Article 31, the new Law protects the religious services in public institutions, such as public schools, but does not protect the inviolability of the autonomous and non-denominational character of a public school. One may rightfully ask: Where are the priorities in school autonomy or in the protection of religious service in a public school? Why should the public school refrain from its own inviolability and non-denominational character, in order to protect the inviolability of the school church service? Additional objections against this Law could be formulated as follows: 1. A complete non-transparency of the drafting process (including the credentials of the legislators themselves); 2. A complete lack of public debate; Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 125

3. An obvious partiality of the Minister of Religious Affairs of Serbia who, albeit a state official, publicly advocated the interests of the majority religious organization—the SPC. The Minister himself, in his interviews, speaks about four branches of authority: the legislative, executive, judicial, and spiritual branch.23 In practice, this Law led to an “etatization” of the Serbian Church, with an apparent partiality of the state executive power in favor of this church, even within the group of “traditional” religious communities, not to speak of the non-traditional ones.24 As a result of many objections and court petitions (mainly from the non-traditional, minority religious communities and the “Coalition for a Secular State”), the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia organized a public discussion on October 5, 2010, with the goal of assessing the constitutionality of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities. In early 2013, the Court ruled in favor of this Law.

The SPC’s experiences with democracy

We mentioned earlier that the SPC’s first true experience with democracy began after October 5, when diverging views in this respect had started being voiced by high-ranking church figures and Orthodox youth organizations. In the words of renowned theologian Radovan Bigović: “In the Serbian Orthodox Church there are various political ideas and opinions on democracy. Some reject it out of hand, some accept it without reservation, and others favor democratization, but with conditions attached.”25 Furthermore, this diversity is visible in the official stand taken by the SPC. On the one hand, there are theologians and archbishops like Amfilohije Radović, who oppose Western liberal democracy and favor “theo-democracy” and “Christian democracy.”26 Accordingly, the SPC’s Information Service stated: “The lethal consequences of democracy are already being felt on the corpus of the Serb people.” Moreover, the Proposed National Program of the Serb Youth for the 21st Century states that “genuine democracy is practically at death’s door. The Serbs do not accept pseudo-democratic politicians who do not respect morality (point 11).”27 Soon after the October 2000 changes, the Office for Religious Education of the SPC’s Patriarchate said that “the state must protect its essence and 126 Milan Vukomanović its nation, to which end it must proclaim Orthodoxy as the national religion – our state must verify itself as an Orthodox state.”28 On the other hand, there are far more sober and better-founded views about the church and democracy put forth by modern theologians. In his book Crkva i društvo (The Church and Society), Radovan Bigović said that

Orthodoxy is neither monarchist nor republican, neither democratic nor republican. Orthodoxy is the Church. The church cannot be identified with any type of state. But if we speak about principles and forms, it is quite certain that the principles and the form of a democratic state – be it a monarchy or a republic – are far closer to the Orthodox Church than the principles of any other state. If a state is truly law-based, free and democratic, then the Church in it also enjoys freedom of mission and action.29

In a purely practical and political sense, SPC clergy have not refrained from occasionally interfering directly with democratic procedures at the state level; one example was the election held in Kosovo in the fall of 2004, when the Synod publicly urged “all political factors in Serbia” to “refrain from calling Serbs living in Kosovo and Metohija to take part in elections for the authorities there.” In October 2004, Patriarch Pavle issued a personal written appeal to the then Serbian President, Boris Tadić, and then Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica, “not to call the remnants of the persecuted and tormented Serb people in Kosovo and Metohija to take part in elections for the authorities there.” Koštunica replied positively, but Tadić did urge the Kosovo Serbs to vote on October 5, 2004. On the same day, the then Bishop of Raška and Prizren, Artemije, sent out an open letter describing Tadić’s call as “shameful.”30 Interference by the church in state affairs on this scale had not been seen since the establishment of democracy in Serbia. The SPC is now one of the main political protagonists on the Serb side in Kosovo. The SPC Assembly said, in a message about the negotiations on the future of Kosovo held in November 2005, that “the act of seizing Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia, however well concealed, would be essentially tan- tamount to occupation.”31 Moreover, during this period, former bishop Artemije aimed unusually strongly worded and insulting words at the chief of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in Kosovo Søren Jessen-Petersen.32 At that time, the Serbian government did not appear to see anything wrong in the SPC’s active and partial interference in state policies. Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 127

The church and “foreign affairs”: The SPC and Orthodoxy in Macedonia and Montenegro

Despite the outspoken opposition to Europe, the West, and the international community voiced by numerous SPC bishops, mainly in a local context, the highest level of interference by the SPC in affairs of the state and politics in the previous decade took place in connection with numerous inter-church and inter-state (inter-republican) incidents in neighboring Macedonia and Montenegro; this is all the more puzzling as both are former Yugoslav republics with Orthodox majorities in their populations. Let us first look at Macedonia, where we are dealing with extremely complex inter-church relations with the canonically unrecognized Macedonian Orthodox Church (MPC),33 including the infusion of the ecclesiastic problems and state politics in Macedonia and Serbia. Details of the conflict can be fully understood only by experts who have investi- gated it thoroughly—OSCE and Council of Europe representatives have usually remained silent or are ill-informed about the matter.34 Soon after the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia within the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, the Orthodox clerics of the church in Macedonia took their first steps toward the formation of an Independent Macedonian Orthodox Church. At the church-national council in Ohrid in 1958, three bishoprics seceded from the Serbian Church. The following year, the SPC granted the use of Macedonian language in church service and the election of the local, Macedonian bishops. However, the Serbian patriarch remained the head of the church. Dissatisfied with the reactions of the SPC, and contrary to the Orthodox ecclesiastical canons, the MPC unilaterally proclaimed its autocephaly in July 1967. Not surprisingly, both the SPC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate refused to recognize this non-canonical autocephaly. The problem was still unresolved in the early 1990s, when the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was established as an independent state. In 1995, the negotiations between the SPC and MPC were resumed. At its own archbishops’ synod, the SPC confirmed the 1967 decision to break liturgical and ecclesiastical ties with the MPC. In 1998, negotiations between the two churches continued, this time through the mediation of the Greek Metropolitan Hristodulos. In early 2000, Macedonian Prime Minister Georgijevski appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to recognize the autocephaly of the MPC, and it 128 Milan Vukomanović seems that the Greek Orthodox Church was willing to acknowledge the MPC as the Archbishopric of Ohrid in exchange for altering the name of the Macedonian state, which had been the major obstacle in the diplomatic relations between Greece and Macedonia. However, the tensions between the SPC and MPC remained.35 The essence of the current conflict between the SPC and the MPC was aptly defined by religious analyst Mirko Djordjević, who has described the situation as paradoxical in many ways: There are two churches in Macedonia and the canonical status of neither has been resolved, while the status of the newly-established archbishopric in the state of Macedonia also remains undefined. The paradox may be illustrated by the following case: Archbishop Jovan, appointed from Belgrade, has been arrested by the Macedonian authorities, his activities have been curbed, he has no canonical territory, he has no churches and no clergy, is not registered with the state and does not collect regular revenue in the form of the so- called ‘parochial’, or tax. On the other hand, the canonically unrecognized MPC has a canonical territory on which it is active, clergy, churches and church structure, its Synod and Assembly . . . 36 The unrecognized MPC is, therefore, seeking autocephaly—a full canonical split from the SPC—whereas all the SPC is prepared to offer it is autonomy. When the Macedonians refused this offer, Serbian late Patriarch Pavle issued a tomos37 from the Assembly granting autonomy to the Orthodox Archbishopric in Ohrid,38 whereas the SPC suspended communication with the MPC and “liturgical communication” with those in Macedonia who support the MPC. After Archbishop Jovan, a Macedonian citizen, was arrested again, a storm of protest erupted from the state authorities in Serbia that went so far that, at the request of the Minister for Capital Investment Velimir Ilić, Yugoslav Airlines grounded two planes leased out to Macedonia over “unpaid debts.” By this action, Ilić assumed the authority to “implement unilateral international sanctions” in the name of Serbia and for the SPC.39 At the same time, when they arrested the archbishop, the Macedonian authorities, even according to an independent arbitration of the Council of Europe, violated the Constitution and grossly breached religious freedoms.40 It would, perhaps, be too easy to say that the Serbian church should— in view of the reality, and by a more sober ecclesiastical policy developed by taking into account the fact that, in Macedonia, the SPC does not enjoy the support of the people, the state, believers, or the church— offer the MPC autocephaly in exchange for a legal provision under Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 129 which other Orthodox churches (including the SPC) may be active in Macedonia. However, what then would be the reaction of the Russian church, which has a similar canonical dispute in the Ukraine, and how would this affect not only the SPC and the MPC, but also Russia’s relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which would have to confirm this canonical division? It is clear that things do not depend entirely on the SPC. What was, however, within the purview of the SPC and for no good reason turned into an international incident was the prevention of a Macedonian state delegation, as well as Serbian state representatives, from organizing a gathering in the Monastery of Prohor Pčinjski on August 2, 2003—the anniversary of Macedonian statehood. A group of Serbian Radical Party members, headed by Bishops Irinej and Pahomije, blocked access to the monastery and violated a bilateral agreement concluded by Macedonia and Serbia.41 Relations with the state of Macedonia improved somewhat in 2004 when (in a letter to Macedonian President Crvenkovski) Patriarch Pavle officially authorized a Macedonian delegation visit to Prohor Pčinjski. Especially encouraging were the Patriarch’s words: “We open the gates to this holy place and to our hearts,” but the very fact that the Serbian Patriarch had to give his permission for a state visit, and that Koštunica’s government saw nothing amiss in this meddling by the SPC in state affairs, speaks volumes about the degree of involvement of the church in state policy. The case with the also unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC)42 is a little different. In Macedonia, the SPC has little overall support whereas, in Montenegro, it has a powerful Metropolitanate and backing among the people and in part of the political establishment. Both the SPC and CPC enjoy significant political support, except that the former also gets political support from Serbia, whereas the latter is backed by the ruling political structures. Those structures, in fact, legalized the activity of the CPC in January 2000, after this church was officially registered by the police in the historic town of Cetinje. This was a culmination of the process that had started in 1993, by the establishment of the Council for the Renewal of Autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church. Again, with the political support of the Montenegrin pro-independence Liberal Party, the Council proclaimed the autocephaly of the CPC, electing a SPC priest from Canada as the bishop of the Montenegrin Church. However, in mid-1995, this Council ceased to exist. The new head of the CPC, priest Miraš Dedeić (who was enthroned 130 Milan Vukomanović as Metropolitan Mihailo in 1998) is also a controversial church figure because, only a year earlier, he had been excommunicated by the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople.43 Needless to say, the SPC never accepted the formation of the new, Montenegrin Church. The SPC Archbishops Synod and late Patriarch Pavle repeatedly condemned this “non-canonical,” “political” entity, whereas Metropolitan Mihailo was condemned and excluded from the Serbian Church at the Synod session in May 1998. The SPC’s most prominent voice in Montenegro is Metropolitan Amfilohije, outspoken just as much against those causing divisions among Orthodox believers in Montenegro and the local politicians. The situation was made even more complex by the Army of Serbia and Montenegro,44 which provided logistical as well as political support for the SPC’s Metropolitanate. Moreover, the Montenegrin authorities, who were advocating full independence for the republic, improperly interfered in church matters and instrumentalized the CPC and its non-canonically elected head, Metropolitan Mihailo (Miraš Dedeić).45 Metropolitan Amfilohije certainly did not remain beholden to anyone when he said that Serbia and Montenegro could separate from each other only “against the will of the people, through violence, theft, black- mail and threats. For this reason the SPC will ignore any independence decision in Montenegro” (Večernje novosti, January 10, 2002). Amfilohije openly demanded religious instruction in Montenegrin schools, against the will of the Ministry of Education, and called Montenegrin Parliament Speaker Krivokapić a “pseudo-brainiac.”46 He accused him of “turning the Parliament into the private preserve of his party and creating new divisions among the people, disgracing Montenegro before Europe and the world” (Večernje novosti, November 7, 2003). In this rather unusual debate between church and state authorities, Krivokapić replied that the SPC no longer had the privilege of decid- ing who would be invited to the Parliament, and that “he [Amfilohije] is coming from the civilizationally defeated side both in the World War II and the latest Balkan war which is now on trial at The Hague” (Danas, November 10, 2003)47. Furthermore, the Montenegrin media described the Serbian metropolitan as the “informal leader of the Serb opposition in Montenegro and even of the People’s Party. United with the tribal assemblies, headed by Amfilohije, the parties of the Serbian bloc are turning Montenegro into Iran. Amfilohije is nothing else but the Ayatollah of the Serbian Montenegro” (Monitor, January 21, 2005). Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 131

The situation in Montenegro was additionally complicated by unofficial tribal “guards and corps,” such as Tapušković’s “Serbian Corps,” allegedly made up of “brigades and battalions from Vasojevići, Kolašin, Durmitor, Boka, Zeta.” Facing them were the “Lovćen guards” of pro-independence author Jevrem Brković. If we add to this the very problematic nomina- tion of nine priests from Pljevlja as martyrs of the SPC (at least two of them are claimed to have committed crimes during World War II), one can well say that the SPC Metropolitanate in Montenegro was adding fuel to the fire ahead of the 2006 referendum in that republic. Furthermore, the role of the armed forces leadership was problematic. The placement of a tin-plate church on top of Mt. Rumija with the help of an Air Force helicopter represented much more than the customary logistical assistance of the military to the church, although the reaction of former Minister of Defense Davinić that no sensationalistic importance should be attributed to the act was a political understatement, to say the least. How sensitive the Montenegrin authorities were to this incident can best be gauged from this statement by the former Deputy Parliament Speaker, Dragan Kujović: “This is not any form of sensation-seeking, but direct and open interference in church-state relations in Montenegro. This is an instance of open siding of the armed forces with the political activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro.” The epilogue of this religious–political quandary was that the state of Montenegro proclaimed its independence in June 2006, whereas the Serbian government (Ministry of Religious Affairs) rejected the CPC application for registration in Serbia on December 22, 2007. The Ministry briefly explained that the non-canonical CPC is just an association of citizens, not a religious community, and, as such, it may not be registered as a religious organization in Serbia.48 On the other hand, the CPC legally operates in Montenegro, side by side with the Serbian Church.

A new ideological framework

A fear that the “true faith” will come to ruin is quite evident in the SPC, and is being manifested through open resistance to the secularization of the contemporary world, in particular, the Western world. Instead of entering into a dialog with that world, which it does only rarely, the SPC opts to condemn secularization. A program for de-secularizing Serbian society was announced from a high echelon in the SPC hierarchy—the 132 Milan Vukomanović

Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral. Moreover, in November 2000, the SPC Information Service said that “secularization has reduced Serbia and its people to poverty . . . and as far as the democratic system is concerned, the bruises it has inflicted to the body of the Serb people are still to be revealed.”49 The problem is, therefore, not so evident in the detrimental policies of Serbia in the 1990s, which should also be investi- gated by the SPC. On the other hand, enforcement—with the help of the state—of some sort of program of de-secularization, as a new political ideology is very reminiscent of the communist era and its utopian belief that secularization and atheism can be forced on people. “Srpske dveri,” a political organization (now a political party) acting with the blessing of the SPC Patriarchate and organizing regular panels at the Belgrade University’s Faculty of Mechanical Engineering with the support of the church periodical Pravoslavlje and the SPC Information Service, openly advocated the “formation of an Orthodox public opinion.”50 Moreover, just like those of social realists before them, the views of the members of the Srpske dveri on art are very much ideology based: “In order for art to make sense it must have an Orthodox dimension.”51 The late 1980s and early 1990s in Serbia could be described socio- logically as a period of de-secularization, where the phenomenon was understood primarily as a social process. Moreover, in the period under Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, a significant shift was taking place in the direction of politicizing religion and sacralizing politics, if not even open clericalization.52 The church was becoming increasingly visible in the domain of politics and affairs of the state. For its part, the state is far more cooperative toward the church than one would expect in a secular society. There is now a close two-way political cooperation between church and state, although the people would perhaps expect the SPC to involve itself more in the numerous social issues and problems burdening Serbia. However, no coherent social thought is evident in the Serbian church. Moreover, there is the problem of unresolved relations with the criminal- ized state: the SPC does not, however, appear to see any major problem here, instead focusing its efforts on speaking out against secularization, democratization of society, the civil sector, and LGBTIQ persons and organizations. If we examine statements made by high-ranking SPC figures and those issued by the Information Service, it is clear that the church sees secularization as an evil that has befallen society. The statements are, sometimes, ambivalent and even contradictory. If we look at their cumulative effect, however, we may observe a condemnation of Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 133 secular society and small religious communities, as well as a negative attitude toward democracy and secularization. All of this is present in the official phraseology of the SPC. It is, in fact, an orientation and direction that indicates the manner in which the church views the society in Serbia and perceives the state.

The church, the military, and the media

It has already been mentioned that the Army of Serbia and Montenegro (and now, the Army of Serbia), almost overnight, embraced Orthodoxy—a new ideology and cultural and historical mission. It is clear that, immediately after the October 2000 shift, a long-term link was established, while several events attracted the attention of the public, the media, and analysts. Late in December 2000, immediately after the SPC demanded that religious education be introduced in Serbian public schools as a mandatory subject, the Office for Morale of the General Staff of the then Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) organized a round-table gathering at which it called for Orthodox chaplains to be attached to VJ units. Speakers in the forum emphasized the importance of Orthodox Christianity for national culture and history, as well as the state-building role of the SPC. Soon after this formal VJ-SPC meeting, the church named Bishop Porfirije as its official representative for relations with the armed forces. In April 2002, Porfirije headed a group of 50 VJ officers visiting Mount Athos (the Chilandar and Vatoped monasteries and Saint Sava’s hermitage in Karyes).53 Some activities of the military in this period are listed in a text entitled “The Army in Chilandar” that was published in the weekly Vojska after Christmas 2003:

It will certainly remain on record that several organized visits of groups of VJ officers were made to Mount Athos and the Chilandar monastery. They also took part in welcoming the Patriarch of Alexandria Peter VII when he visited the Serbian Orthodox Church, in the Holy Savior’s Day procession in Belgrade, in the reception of the icon of the Virgin in the monastery of Grgeteg on Mount Fruška Gora, the transfer to Kruševac of some of the relics of the Holy Prince Lazar from the Ravanica monastery, and in other church festivities. They unselfishly helped in the restoration of numerous churches and monasteries and the construction of roads or water-supply systems to them, and provided a major contribution to the marking of the 750th anniversary of the Morača monastery.54 134 Milan Vukomanović

Activities of this sort continued in 2004, in the Vavedenje monastery near Čačak, when the first official post-World War II collective baptism of officers and soldiers of an army unit in Serbia took place. However, the greatest public impact in this period was certainly that of the army officers present at the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks in Belgrade on February 14, 2004. One of the speakers at the so-called “spiritual commemoration,” hosted by the Srpski sabor Dveri organization was Colonel Rade Rajić, Professor at the Military Academy. Featuring much nationalist rhetoric, Colonel Rajić’s address fit very well into the overall atmosphere of the gathering:

After the First World War . . . it is a fact that between the Slovenes, and especially among Croats and the then Serbs of Muhammadan faith, there never was any affinity or mutual military and historical assistance, but only waging war against the Serbs and Serb-hood as a whole . . . universal treason in the army above all by a majority of Croats, but also Slovenes, ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Albanians, and Serbs of Muslim faith, became a reality . . . During World War Two the foundations of a new Yugoslavia and a new social and political order were laid. As in the First World War period, there was a pronounced tendency to suppress and minimize the achievements of the Serbs in the fight against the enemy . . . We must also not forget the war events between 1991 and 1999, the officers and soldiers, volunteers who laid down their lives in the defense of their own people and their ancient hearths. These brilliant people, those who are known and those who are not, can proudly stand shoulder to shoulder with Karadjordje, Miloš, God and the people.55 Officers of the VJ, and later the Army of Serbia and Montenegro (and still later the Army of Serbia), who until very recently served the idea of Yugoslavism and its ideology of brotherhood and unity and drew credit from an anti-fascist tradition, seem to be gradually changing their out- look on religion and nation. Instead of brotherhood and unity, now only the historical achievements of the Serbian people are being emphasized, and the contributions of the fascists and of the anti-fascists in World War II are—quite in the spirit of the more recent state policies—being viewed as equal. From looking toward the future as a classless society governed by communism, the army’s ideology is gradually shifting toward religion and eschatology: toward the testament of Kosovo, the tradition of Saint Sava, and the heavenly Serbia. However, although a significant ideological transformation is taking place, an antagonistic terminology has been preserved, and the difference betweenus and them is always emphasized. Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 135

In this context, the SPC can offer an almost dualistic rhetoric that can often be heard at para-religious gatherings and spiritual commemora- tions. Like the “special war” that was constantly being waged against the then Yugoslavia during Tito’s era, in some so-called “national” media and interviews with SPC elders, another “special war” is mentioned that new “anti-religion ideologues, atheists and New-Agers” are waging against the church and the army.56 In the mid-2000s, the media also focused on the links between SPC clergymen and paramilitary groups that committed war crimes in Bosnia. The most controversial case was that of hieromonk Gavrilo, based in Šid, who had blessed members of the “Scorpions” group sometime before the war crimes were committed near Srebrenica; that video footage was shown in the War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague as part of evidence against the “Scorpions” and the shots of the execution of young Bosnian Moslems were widely broadcast. Members of the “Scorpions,” blessed by monk Gavrilo from the Privina glava monastery in the aforementioned footage, soon after executed a group of Moslems they had captured. Of additional concern was the fact that the church did not see any need to speak out in connection with the case immediately; it took more than 10 days for the SPC to issue a statement entitled “Gospode, ne ponovilo se” (Lord, Let it Never Happen Again), which only partially eased the shock felt by those who had watched the horrific footage and asked themselves if the SPC had anything to do with the said crime. As a rule, the SPC never sees any need to make additional comments, or, for that matter, to interpret official communiqués issued after assemblies and its media statements, thereby placing the people of Serbia in a completely passive position. Concerning the SPC’s relations with the media, it is interesting to note that Bishop Porfirije liaised not only with the armed forces, but also with the media. The Bishop is now a head of the Serbian Radio Broadcasting Council in charge, not only of religious media, but also empowered to make decisions in connection with the lay media. In his capacity as a representative of the SPC, Bishop Porfirije represents the other, non- Orthodox religious communities as well and, despite the church–state separation, he takes major part in decisionmaking regarding the non- religious public media. The SPC has its own Information Service, but, according to the influential Bishop of Bačka Irinej Bulović, it suffers from serious personnel problems preventing it from improving its relations with the media.57 136 Milan Vukomanović

Well known for a relatively rigid stance toward journalists, Bishop Irinej has complained that “some domestic media are casual, even excessively free, in their approach to cooperation with the Church or other religious communities – as if there was no serious ontological or existential difference between any public organization and the Church as an institution sui generis . . . ” 58 Notwithstanding the excessive sycophancy of the media and their journalists toward SPC clergy (far more pronounced than in the case of politicians, show business figures, and sports celebrities), Bishop Bulović demands a special status for the church in the media. At the same time, at his initiative, the SPC had, for some years, barred a religious affairs correspondent of the daily Danas from attending its events, most probably because she had written a portrait of the Bishop he had not found especially flattering. At the same time, the Bishop did not find it necessary to reflect on the language of hatred and insults hurled out in public by some other SPC bishops.59

From the people to society

In the aftermath of October 5, the SPC began increasingly offering a new ideological framework for state institutions such as the army and the education system, filling—at its own initiative, but also with the support of the state—the ideological void created after the fall of communism. However, the church’s more important, social role remains far from clear. A lot of public space available for religious communities (philanthropy, endowments, humanitarian and social work, etc.) remains unfilled, whereas both conservative politicians and church hierarchy are finding it easy to politicize or instrumentalize the church. An even more serious problem is the lack of genuine contact between the SPC and society in Serbia, that is, the civil society of autonomous individuals with their rights, separate interests, and diverse identities created by living in the contemporary plural world. Although the SPC has managed to establish very solid relations with the Serbian state since October 5, it still has no real contact with (civil) society as, for example, the Roman Catholic Church had in Poland before the fall of communism. SPC clergy do keep talking about the people, but this is an almost metaphysical category, an undifferentiated collective, a “mass,” which is a concept that apparently suits the current “tribal” character of the Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 137

SPC very well,60 not to mention any sort of a more positive perception of secular society and its organizations and initiatives that are often demonized in public.61 Nonetheless, what are the real problems and interests of society in Serbia? What are the political, social, economic, and cultural proclivities of its citizens? No coherent or open debate has been voiced in the SPC on such issues. Official SPC documents make only scanty references to the citizens of Serbia or, for that matter, to society, almost always referring to the people. On the one hand, this points to a certain level of inability within the SPC to cope with the new circumstances, but, on the other, there is a visible and well-defined political philosophy and ideology that, for decades, stood far in the background while the church remained hidden from the public eye in socialism. What ideology are we talking about? We have already mentioned the interview the former Minister of Religious Affairs gave to Pravoslavlje. Besides its emphatically “patriotic” and “traditionalistic” tone, and the classical incomprehension of the contemporary concept of religious freedoms (in an institution that should have more knowledge of those freedoms than any other), the minister’s organicistic perception of the church in the spirit of Nikolaj Velimirović’s essays from the 1930s is also of note:

The problem is therefore to enact a law which will be modern, which will have to say that every normal democratic state today understands that the Church organization is more powerful, more profound and older than any other organization, because the Church has outlived numerous states and remained one and the same, while society changed all the time. There is now awareness that democratic society has to recognize the Church as a constant. It is an organism which is permanent and a guidepost for the state (emph. M.V.). In any case, although the state does not want to guide itself and organize relations according to the teachings of the Church, it may under no circumstances bring into question the organization of the Church.62 Several things may be of interest to an unbiased reader of this excerpt. The former minister—in his capacity as a civil servant in a democratic and secular government in which the church is separate from the state— utters, from his official position, an entirely clerical view that the church is a guidepost for the state. The former minister certainly referred mainly to the SPC when he said that “every normal democratic state today understands that the Church organization is more powerful, more profound and older than any other organization.” 138 Milan Vukomanović

Where is the source of such organicistic views about the church and the state that have found a place for themselves as guiding ideas in state institutions? In a lecture entitled “Saint Sava’s nationalism” held in Belgrade in 1935, Nikolaj Velimirović (besides his most-often-cited panegyric to Hitler) presented a perception of the Church that has apparently deeply affected Minister Radulović. Here is an excerpt from the speech:

This Saint Sava’s nationalism encompasses the people’s church, the people’s dynasty, the people’s state, the people’s education, the people’s culture and the people’s defense. The foundation and centre of all of Saint Sava’s nationalism is the people’s church. It is like a spirit which revives the entire people’s organism . . . History books say that nationalism in Europe awakened and became reality starting from the Hungarian uprising in 1848. If that is true, then Serbian nationalism is no less than 600 years older than European nationalism. Not only older, but more perfect, because it is evangelical and organic.63 Similar to modern SPC theologians and the former Minister of Religious Affairs, Velimirović sees Serbian society as apeople’s organism encompassing the church and the state (monarchy), including state institutions like the armed forces and the education system, with the SPC at the center of that organism. As we have seen, not only some very important decisions of the authorities in Serbia, but also the increasing involvement of the SPC in the sphere of education, culture, and national defense are founded on the ideology of this leading theologian and recently canonized saint. Views of this kind are often heard at Orthodox-national youth gatherings (The Second Letter to Haralampije, 2003) and in the rhetoric of SPC elders—late Patriarch Pavle, Metropolitan Amfilohije, Bishop Atanasije and others.64 In an interview to Danas on the eve of Christmas 2002, late Patriarch Pavle asked, in a similar spirit:

Are the parties sufficiently mature for social relations to be organic, like in a body where every organ performs its own function with which it is tasked for the overall benefit of the organism? And the organism as a whole has no other interest than the good of each of its organs . . . the Church has always favored such organic relationship in society. (Danas, January 5–7, 2002)

The civic church versus the political church

Historically, the SPC, like the majority of other Orthodox churches, evolved in predominantly non-democratic political contexts (medieval Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 139 period, Byzantium, Ottoman conquests, etc). As a result, an excessive hierarchical control and domination took place, including the passiv- ity of clergy and lay indifference. A new element—something that the Church experienced only in the Diaspora (i.e., in the democratic countries in which its bishoprics had been present for some time)—is a whole range of open issues and problems concerning democracy, modernity, national culture, pluralism, civil society, and church–state relations. For example, what is the exact scope of social or political problems that belong in the domain of the concerns of religious institutions and constitutional ramifications? How capable are religious organizations to deal with those problems and what is their capacity to solve them? How relevant are their responses to contemporary social issues? If accession to the European Union is the goal of the Balkans states, can the church promote an anti-European discourse and, thus, cause confusion among the believers and other citizens? The 2010 research concerning the attitude of the citizens of Serbia toward the European integrations shows that the Serbian accession to the European Union is mostly supported by traditional believers (89%), whereas the support of the ambivalent respondents and atheists is 67% and 60%, respectively65. Even if those percentages seem too high for 2010, can we—considering the proverbial criticism of the European Union by the SPC—say that the religious community (community of believers) is in some sort of collision with the religious institution and its Euroscepticism? Does the institution, the church hierarchy, resist European integrations, although the community of (traditional) believers is not inclined to accept such attitude of church authorities? Furthermore, what is the church vision of modern society? Do religious communities consider themselves part of civil society or not? Finally, what is their view of democracy? In the socialist period, the state one-sidedly determined the character of its relation to religious communities. In post-socialism, the extension of religious rights and freedoms brought about greater responsibility of faith institutions in many areas. It seems that, in twenty-first-century Serbia, a broader examination of the political, social, and cultural role of the church took place. The traditional religious communities (especially the SPC), in their “protection of culture,” began to participate in reshaping the classical modernization concept by accommodating it to the local, national, and particular robe. Is Orthodoxy, then, compatible with democracy, seen not only as the will of the majority or political election procedure, but also as the 140 Milan Vukomanović political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Can we conceive of a “civic Orthodoxy” more in line with European democracy and pluralism? Such a civic religion could be compatible with democracy, but a dogmatic essentialism, rejecting the possibility of cultural change, could not. For example, the idea of divine sovereignty (Kingdom of Heaven), a political theology in its own right, directly opposes the political philosophy of the West, that is, the Enlightenment concept of the Great Separation formulated by Thomas Hobbes. The major adversaries of that political theology, in the eyes of many Orthodox theologians, are, in fact, the secular values of the West. The views of Nikolaj Velimirović and Justin Popović of the secular and “de-Christianized” West and Europe are well known in Serbia and often quoted in the works of some contemporary Orthodox theologians. Even the more moderate bishops are inclined to this very critical reception of Western values. The modern Orthodox Christianity, at least in its Balkan context, accepts globalization in the technical, technological, and even economic sense, but, at the same time, it strives for a cultural fragmentation, because culture—as a system of meaning and symbolic relations—is always specific, unique, and local.66 In this sense, globalization in non- Western societies does not necessarily entail an adoption of Western cultural values and norms. Today, those norms also include the secular values of civil society that is neither Christian (Orthodox, Catholic, etc) nor Islamic or Jewish, but instead, international in its character. The demands for human rights based on the common secular values and the democratic political culture are primary in this context. Thus, one needs a consensus between Orthodoxy and secular political philosophy for fundamental values such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance, and individual human rights. Cultural diversity is precious, but it should have clear limits when it opposes the aforementioned values. Multiculturalism in the name of cultural diversity should also respect human rights; it should not be a doctrine that permits everything in the name of culture. Could, perhaps, the concept of the civic Orthodoxy (in contrast to the political Orthodoxy as a mode of political theology) be founded in this same tradition? A secular rationalism is not alien to the Orthodox Church, especially in its western bishoprics, and probably even more during the period of socialism in central, eastern, and Southeastern Europe. Religion, today, enters very complex interactions with the ideological, political, cultural, and economic systems. It is part of the globalization Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 141 processes. However, through its institutions and their interpretative strategies, it still provides safe haven for the “protection of culture.” Religions protect their interpretative traditions that affirm religious institutions (e.g., the SPC as “the long-standing bearer of the Serbian culture, tradition, Cyrillic script”). However, cultural identity is not a sufficient precondition for political identity.67 There is in Serbia, today, including among younger people, a certain reluctance to accept political and social pluralism—an accomplishment of the Enlightenment—and to embrace, instead, an archaic and monistic model of nation and state. It is no accident that, in this context, the SPC’s sharpest criticism is reserved for Serbian educators, or pro-pluralism and pro-Europe “new ideologues,” independent intellectuals, and NGO activists. According to this sort of political philosophy, the authoritar- ian model (Communism and the Milošević regime) should have been replaced by another—the patriarchal, quasi-democratic model of sabor- nost. This revival of the nineteenth-century Slavophile principle ofsobor - nost (conciliarity, congregationalism) that was embraced by the former Prime Minister Koštunica’s government was, in fact, a consequence of abandoning the modern pluralistic concept of society. In the world characterized by major dislocations of the ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities, religious institutions are potent bearers of the collective and group identities. This applies to the societies undergo- ing transformation, such as the Serbian society. Religious and church institutions often respond to the challenges of modernization and secularization by a unique religization of modernity. In turn, any ethnification or religization of politics is a challenge to individual human rights. The culture of the Modernity is established, on the other hand, on the Great Separation between faith and reason, whereby the area of reason and knowledge is left to individual interpretations. According to Thomas Meyer, a German political scientist, the culture of the Modernity differs in principle from the traditional Western [and, for that matter, Orthodox—MV] culture in Europe by its basic concepts, by its metaphysics, social ontology, principles of social legitimacy, and by its political values and institutions.68 Modern Europe emerged only when it rejected Christian understanding of social relations in everything that concerned the political organization of a community.69 For the assessment of the political and social influence of religion, it is not crucial that it has a smaller or larger impact in its cultural setting, but rather how it participates in that setting. Thomas Meyer 70 thus differentiates at least 142 Milan Vukomanović three levels of its activity: (1) ways of believing; (2) ways of life; (3) ways of living together. In the third case, the basic values necessary for the common life of different people in the same society and same political community are at issue. I would be inclined to label Meyer’s first level as the domain of religious (theological) discourse, whereas the second level, in my view, pertains to praxis and ethos. Finally, the third level marks the participation of the community of believers and religious institution in the public sphere, including their attempts at influencing public policy. In the context of Serbia, political Orthodoxy (political church) rejects, for example, secular values and the democratic political culture, becoming, thus, anti-European. This is apparent from the speeches and public statements of the members of para-clerical organizations as well as the church hierarchy and some political parties. Based on the recent empirical research (2010), we have already pointed out that the criticism of the European Union from the ranks of church hierarchy indicates some sort of collision between the community of Orthodox believers in Serbia and their own religious institution. The church hierarchy resists EU integrations and, for that matter, European modernity, whereas the community of (traditional) believers is not inclined to accept this attitude of the church authorities. The function of democracy in a state of law is to provide a minimum on the third level that secures, in the long run, a maximum of differences on the first two levels.71 The basis of the state of law and democracy is, conversely, affected when the majority culture (“primary” culture) vio- lates, in an essentialist manner, the rights of others to their own identities.72 I would agree with Meyer’s thesis that, for democracy in a state of law, one does not need consensus on the first and second levels, but it is important that they both be in harmony with the third level, whose legitimacy will be compromised if it extends outside its domain.73 The consensus regarding political values does not necessarily mean losing the cultural identity or compromising cultural values, their uniqueness. This is where the Orthodox Church may find its place within the plural concept of modernity. In the West, a plethora of different cultural identities coexist, and that diversity is accepted as the state of affairs. At the same time, there is a need to reach consensus about the political identity of political communities and states. The emphasis here is primarily on the consensus regarding the democratic political culture.74 This model is inclusive for cultural and religious diversity, but Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 143 it does not place collective cultural rights above democracy, the rule of law, and the human rights of citizens living in a secular state.

Notes

1. If the religious elements were more important in this context, religion should have been singled out, as a significant factor, in the process of stabilization of Southeastern Europe. This would, at least, apply to official documents, such as the Dayton Agreement or the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Interestingly enough, religion is mentioned only a few times in the Dayton Agreement in a rather general context (in the Constitution and Annex on Human Rights), whereas, in the Stability Pact, religion and churches are not mentioned at all. 2. Djindjić was assassinated in March 2003 by the members of the former Milošević’s secret police. This assassination caused a significant turmoil in Serbian political life, the consequences of which are still felt today. 3. Jana Baćević, Veronauka i(li) evronauka: kritika elemenata reforme obrazovanja 2000–2003 (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 2004), p. 1. 4. From the Serbian, Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva. 5. In this text the Serbian Orthodox Church is viewed primarily as a religious organization whose doctrines, as well as the social and political position, are promoted by its highest institutions (the Bishops’ Assembly, the Bishops’ Synod and others), and by its elders—the Patriarch and other SPC bishops. This is, therefore, a paper about the church in a sociological and political, rather than theological or metaphysical context. 6. Mirko Djordjević, “Sekularizam i klerikalizam,” Republika, no. 370–371, December 31, 2005, pp. 15–18. 7. See, for example, the London Economist: “Rendering unto Caesar,” The Economist, September 8, 2005, or, for example, Ambassador William Montgomery’s article “The Threat of Religious Nationalism in Serbia,”Danas , September 24–25, 2005. OSCE envoys voiced their criticism concerning several versions of the preliminary draft of the law on religious freedom in July and September 2004, whereas the Council of Europe included the SPC activities in its monitoring of this country. 8. In the Kingdom of Serbia, the SPC was a national church, whereas, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, there was no constitutional separation of church and state. 9. For a list of those seven traditional religious comunities, see the next section of this article. In its request of November 2000, the SPC did not specify which communities should be granted their access to religious education in 144 Milan Vukomanović

public schools. The Bishops’ Assembly just presented the request of its own church (SPC). 10. For example, the Christian Adventist Church and the Baptist Church in Serbia could also be considered traditional, due to their historical presence in this country. They even have a theological faculty in Novi Sad where they educate ministers for teaching catechism. However, they were not allowed to conduct religious education in public schools. 11. The Yugoslav Committee of Jurists for Human Rights (JUKOM), the FORUM IURIS, civic association based in Novi Sad, and a Belgrade-based lawyer. 12. See Ljubomir Popović and Zorica Vitorović-Umićević, Referat za javnu raspravu u predmetima IU-177/01, IU-213/02 i IU-214/02 (Belgrade: Constitutional Court, 2003). 13. Ibid., p. 1. 14. Veronauka, Danas on-line, November 5, 2003, http://www.danas.co.yu/20031105 /frontpage1.html; Izbor odbranio ustavnost, Dnevnik on-line, November 6, 2003, http://www.dnevnik.co.yu/arhiva/06-11-2003/Strane/drustvo.htm. 15. TV interview with Čedomir Jovanović, Insajder, B 92, April 13, 2005. 16. Baćević, Veronauka i(li) evronauka, p. 1. 17. There was an inherent ambiguity related to Article 16 of the 2004 draft, and the Minister himself interpreted it differently on various occasions. For example, one version of this draft stated (Article 17): “The clergy and religious dignitaries enjoy the same immunity as national deputies and judges. Their immunity can be revoked only by the Supreme Court of Serbia acting on a justified request from a public prosecutor.” One of the subsequent interpretations, which came as a result of a fierce polemics with the Minister and lawmaker, was: immunity related to confession only. Eventually, the entire draft was withdrawn as biased and ambiguous. The final, 2006 version of the Law (Article 8) reads: “Priests and religious officials are free and independent in administering their religious services in accordance with the law and autonomous right of a church or a religious community . . . Priests and religious officials cannot be held responsible before state bodies for their religious services conducted in accordance with line 3 of this article” (i.e., previous line, MV). 18. The integral text of the preliminary draft from 2004 is available at, www. sanoptikum.org.yu/drustvo/o_nama/pravnI_akti/zakon_o_slobodI_vere .htm. 19. Milan Radulović, “Prednacrt Zakona o verskim slobodama,” Pravoslavlje, no. 930, December 15, 2005. 20. In the words of the minister: “The problem is not in that they [the minor religious communities] should be given that freedom, but in that they believe that the SPC must be brought down onto their level, that it must be equal with them. All the discussions which we have amount to trying to show them that Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 145

all in Serbia have the same rights, but that they are not equal, they cannot be equal. This is not allowed by tradition, people do not allow it. We cannot fulfill the wishes of the two per cent of the population who are adherents of new religions and do ill to the 98 per cent of those who belong to traditional churches. It is a veritable seesaw on which we are still struggling, but the essential thing is the following: this Government is determined, at least I am determined, not to enact a law which will not recognize our tradition, which will not recognize the SPC as the exponent of a nation-building and cultural conscience of the Serb people, which will not recognize our entire tradition; we will not adopt a law which will not establish continuity between the laws of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and this modern law, and we will not accept what everyone else has accepted, even the Russians—a law on religions dictated by the Americans” (Ibid.). 21. Danas, January 11, 2006, p. 7. 22. For example, the SPC had already come forth as a political actor with its interference in the Kosovo negotiations, and the diplomatic relations with Macedonia and Montenegro. In all these cases, its role was counterproductive and detrimental. 23. No wonder, then, that he was recently decorated with the Medal of St. Sava, the highest decoration of the SOC. 24. One of the examples of open violation of religious freedoms and rights by the Serbian Government is its Regulation published in Službeni glasnik late in 2005 on an obligatory postal surcharge from January 11, 2006 in the form of a postage stamp wherefrom revenue would go for the construction of the St. Sava Temple in Belgrade. The 8-dinar stamp was mandatory until July 8, 2006 and had a monthly circulation of three million. Revenue was sent directly to the SPC Synod and earmarked for the completion of the works on the interior decoration of the Temple. The Regulation stated that the revenue would be used in accordance with a program adopted by the Synod and approved by the Serbian Government. By this regulation, the state imposed on all its citizens who use postal services (letters, postcards, greetings cards, etc.) an obligation—whether they want to or not—to finance the building of a religious facility used by only one religious community in Serbia. Freedom of religion was threatened here in several ways: all those using the said postal services were forced to support a single religious community, whether they want to and whether they are religious believers. Secondly, non-Orthodox believers in Serbia, alongside all others, were forced to pay for the construction of an edifice of a community to which they do not belong. In this case, the Serbian Government unambiguously breached the Constitution—the principle of separation of church and state—and also the principle of equality before the law and non-discrimination of non-Orthodox religious communities. 146 Milan Vukomanović

25. Radovan Bigović, Crkva i društvo (Belgrade: Hilandarski fond, 2000), p. 262. 26. Ibid., p. 264. 27. Dejan Anastasijević, “Kruna, Mač i Mantija,” Vreme, no. 685, February 19, 2004. 28. Aleksandra Brkić, “Veroučitelji spremni da drže dnevnik” Politika, December 3, 2000, p. 8. 29. Bigović, Crkva i društvo, p. 270. 30. Andrej Nosov (ed.), Journalists Can Do It (Belgrade and Prishtina: Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 2005), p. 510. In his interview for the Serbian daily Glas javnosti, Artemije commented, again, on President Tadić’s refusal to defend Kosovo by armed forces, calling this openly an act of “treason.” See Glas javnosti, October 25, 2007. 31. Danas, November 5–6, 2005, p. 3. 32. Peščanik B92, October 18, 2005. 33. From the Serbian, Makedonska Pravoslavna Crkva. 34. On October 21, 2005, the Council of Europe spoke out in connection with the arrest of Archbishop Jovan in Macedonia, in written declaration No. 271. The Council demanded that the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia “stop exerting pressure on” Bishop Jovan. Moreover, the Council stated that the arrest had resulted in gross violations of the principles embodied in Articles 9, 14, and 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as relevant UN documents and even the Macedonian Constitution (Source: HRWF.net, International Secretariat Brussels). 35. For more historical details regarding the Macedonian church schism, see Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković (ed.), Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milošević and After (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 268–271. 36. Mirko Djordjević, “Borba za kanonske teritorije,” Republika, nos. 362–363, August 31, 2005, p. 9. 37. A religious decree regulating doctrinal issues in the area of Christology. 38. Nominally, the archbishopric has jurisdiction over three monasteries and about 30 monks and nuns in Macedonia. In 2003, the archbishop was appointed exarch for the territory of Macedonia, a title suggesting non- recognition of Macedonia as an independent state and arousing in the public memories of territorial aspirations once voiced in Bulgaria. 39. Srboljub Bogdanović, “Bog i batina,” NIN, August 4, 2005, p. 12. 40. In the past, a number of SPC clergymen trying to travel through Macedonia, wearing their clerical attire, encountered problems from the Macedonian authorities. 41. For more about this incident and its consequences, see Dragoljub Mićunović, “Čiji je Beli anđeo?” in S. Lukić and S. Vuković, eds. Peščanik FM: Zašto se u crkvi šapuće? (Belgrade: Fabrika knjiga, 2005), pp. 148–156. Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 147

42. From the Serbian, Crnogorska Pravoslavna Crkva. 43. The facsimile of the “Anathema on Miras Dedeic” with signatures of members of The Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople is available at, http://www.njegos.net/en/studies/mirasdedeicanathema/index .html?=mirasdedeicanathema.html. 44. Now Army of Serbia. 45. Dedeić first entered the Montenegrin Parliament on Saint Peter of Cetinje day, in 2003. He claimed that the SPC clergy in Montenegro expressed no loyalty at all for Montenegro and hoped that a state based on law would turn them in that direction, as, in his words, the SPC found it hard to relinquish clericalism, clerical nationalism, counter-secularity, and philetism (Sonja Biserko (ed.), Srbija 2004 (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2005), p. 60). According to him, the SPC “cannot rid itself of its re-feudalized, inquisitional conscience aiming to enslave everything outside its own preserve and abolish it in a human sense” (Monitor, January 14, 2005). 46. Metropolitan Amfilohije, “Nisam sposoban da upotrebim blagu reč” Evropa, no. 72, August 25, 2005, p. 13. 47. Sonja Biserko (ed.), Ljudska prava i odgovornost: Srbija 2003 (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2004), p. 60. 48. Danas, January 8, 2008, p. 4. 49. Novosti of the SPC Information Service, November 24, 2000. 50. First Assembly of Orthodox Journalists, held at the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade. 51. Nikola Lazić, “Sabor pravoslavne omladine jugoistočne Srbije: Krivac Hari Poter,” Danas, September 24, 2005. 52. We must, of course, differentiate between the colloquial use of the term clericalization in texts and media statements (where it is used rather loosely to designate the Government’s efforts bringing the SPC closer to the state) and the purely terminological use of clericalism and clericalization (e.g., in Slobodan G. Marković, “Klerikalizam u Srbiji: mit ili stvarnost?” Nova srpska politička misao—Analize, no. 4, 2005, pp. 15–27. For example, the term pluralism is often used colloquially to designate plurality (e.g., of religious or ethnic communities), whereas terminologically pluralism means more than mere plurality or diversity: it is a positive attitude to plurality as such. In the Serbian context, a more proper designation for the current church–government relations would, in my opinion, would be etatization of the SPC. For a more precise use of the terms clericalism and clerical democracy, see Sabrina P. Ramet, The Liberal Project and the Transformation of Democracy: The Case of East Central Europe (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), pp. 71–72. 53. Vreme, no. 609, September 5, 2002. 54. Vojska, no. 571, January 1, 2003, p. 11. 148 Milan Vukomanović

55. Anastasijević, “Kruna, mač i mantija”. 56. See, for example, Bishop Porfirije’s interview in Evropa nacija, no. 925, published under the title “People Thirst for a True God”. 57. Irinej Bulović, “Srpska pravoslavna crkva, mediji i demokratija,” in Crkva, verske zajednice, mediji i demokratija (Novi Sad: Medijske reference, 2004), p. 170. 58. Ibid. 59. It is of much concern that figures in the SPC and, in particular, its para- clerical organizations, have become very lax to use a language full of abuses, insults, and unfounded accusations, dominated by bias, rudeness, lack of tolerance for different thinking, and proscribing people and institutions not fitting in their own model of the true faith and Serb-hood. It is sufficient to look at the websites of organizations such as “Obraz” or “Srpske dveri.” Not only do they reek of racism and discrimination against people on religious and ethnic grounds, but they are also packed with a completely new type of aggressiveness whose framework probably represents the program of desecularization of society, recently broadcast by church elders (Metropolitan Amfilohije, Bishop Atanasije, Bishop Filaret, and others), themselves very keen to use terms like preudo-brainiac, Euro-whiners, traitors, scoundrels, rascals, and similar. An NGO called Gradjanske inicijative (Civic Initiatives) filed a criminal complaint in connection with an anti-Islamic racist speech made by Bishop Atanasije Jevtić in Valjevo in the spring of 2004. 60. Pavle Rak, “Isus je mlad i jak!,” in S. Lukić and S. Vuković, eds. Peščanik FM: Zašto se u crkvi šapuće? (Belgrade: Fabrika knjiga, 2005), pp. 86–93. Dedeić, Srbija 2004. 61. In a communiqué dated November 24, 2000, the SPC Information Service reacted to a statement of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Serbia that “the initiative of the Serbian Orthodox Church and FRY President Vojislav Koštunica to introduce religious instruction in the education system is a serious violation of the principle of a secular state.” Employing archaic medieval terminology, the SPC described the disputed statement as “the fear of Satan and all his followers in the past six decades—manifested in every place under the heavens of a land which only in name represented what the concept of Serbia comprises in the all-encompassing sense of that word” (Novosti, November 24, 2000). 62. Radulović, “Prednacrt Zakona o verskim slobodama”. 63. Mirko Djordjević (ed.), Srpska konzervativna misao (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, 2003), 55ff. 64. For the religious origins of Serbian organicistic thinking see Djordjević, Srpska konzervativna misao. 65. Dragana Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, “Religioznost građana Srbije i njihov odnos prema EU—sociološki ugao,” in Religioznost građana Srbije i njihov odnos prema procesu evropskih integracija (Belgrade: KAS, 2011), pp. 25–42. Ecclesiastical Involvement in Serbian Politics 149

66. Cf. Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 19. Tribina na Mašinskom fakultetu Univerziteta u Belgradeu, December 2, 2004 (audio recording). 67. Tomas Majer, Identitet Evrope (Belgrade: Albatros, 2009), p. 51. 68. Ibid., p. 61. 69. Ibid., p. 65. 70. Ibid., p. 72. 71. Ibid., p. 74. 72. Ibid., p. 75. 73. Ibid. 74. Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe.

6 The Political Dynamics of Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović

Orthodox churches in central, eastern, and Southeastern Europe have been intimately connected with the region’s dominant post-communist ideology (nationalism), and have actively engaged in national politics.1 The key to this politicoreligious character is the structural organization of Orthodox churches, which render it possible that a “national” church with specific national characteristics can develop with relative autonomy. With no centralized structure within Orthodoxy, churches become a symbol of the national being, and, thereby, rather politicized. In the Balkans, or Southeast Europe, Orthodox churches have, in some instances, supported the politics of intolerance and hate on occasion, explicitly aligned themselves to nationalist political parties or governments that have sought to create ethnically homogenous states.2 However, Orthodox churches have often been burdened by internal splits and competition from “breakaway” factions. Perhaps, one of the most striking examples is the case of the Orthodox Church conflict in Montenegro. There, the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva—SPC)3 have

151 152 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović been one of the key instruments used to maintain the Serb identity of the Montenegrins, firmly supporting the narrative that Montenegro is the “second Serb state” and the “Serbian Sparta.” In 1993, however, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva—CPC), supporters of which claim it was autocephalous until it was merged with the SPC in 1920, was re-established and made a claim for the re- instatement of that autocephalous status. The conflict between the SPC and CPC began in earnest. A cornerstone of the subsequent conflict was the question of autocephaly, but the conflict is not one simply based upon ecclesiastical matters; it was, and remains, essentially, a political conflict that goes to the heart of the question about the national identity of the Montenegrins. This chapter analyzes the historical roots and the more recent trajectory of the conflict, placing a particular focus on the political role played by the churches, issues of autocephaly, and arguments over ownership of property.

The historical and political context of the Montenegrin case

There are four principal religious communities in Montenegro: the SPC, CPC, Roman Catholic Church, and the Islamic community. Other registered religious communities include the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Evangelical Church, and others. Although relations are generally good between the Orthodox churches and other religious communities in Montenegro are stable, relations between the SPC and CPC have been far less so. The ongoing conflict between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is not driven simply by disagreements over mere ecclesiastical debates, differentiations, or disagreements. It is, rather, a struggle of a more political nature and one that has been waged between those who define themselves as Montenegrins (in national terms) and are advocates of Montenegro’s independence and those who see Montenegro as a “Serb state” and the Montenegrins as part of the Serbian national corpus. It is a conflict that was a key component of the debates over Montenegrin statehood in the decade prior to the re-establishment of Montenegro’s independence following the closely contested independence referendum of May 2006, and has been one of the key battlegrounds in the post- referendum period. Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 153

The roots of the current conflict can be traced back to the early years of the existence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Between 1920 and 1993, the SPC and the “Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral” was the sole Orthodox body in Montenegro, with its administrative center in the Cetinje monastery, which was originally built by Ivan Crnojević in 1484. SPC clergy argue that Montenegrins are Serbs, the “best and purest of Serbs,” descendants of those who migrated from Kosovo in the late fourteenth century. According to that narrative, after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Serbs from Kosovo fled from the Ottoman army, settling in the rocky crags of Stara Crnagora (Old Montenegro) where they struggled to keep the flame of Serbian independence alive while struggling to survive in a harsh, unforgiving environment. From there, they continued to resist the Turkish domination of the Balkans, and Montenegro was cast as the Srpska Sparta (Serbian Sparta)—an island of Serb freedom amid a sea of Ottoman repression. This narrative underpins the SPC’s position that Montenegro played a crucial role in the preservation of Serbian identity throughout the dark times of Ottoman occupation. Myriad symbols and myths have been embellished by the SPC in order to consolidate this collective national (Serbian) identity with a sense of a shared history, community, and destiny; thus, children baptized in Montenegro were predominantly, until the re-establishment of the CPC, baptized into the SPC.4 However, the Orthodox Church in Serbia proper was under the control of Ottomans and had little influence over events in Montenegro, and, over time, it developed its own peculiarities—in particular, the role of the Vladika (Prince-Bishop). However, when Serbia and Montenegro “unified” following the 1918 Podgorica Assembly (prior to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in December 1918), the Metropolinate of Belgrade sought a union of all South Slav Orthodox churches, with Belgrade as the location of the Patriarchate. After all, they argued, Serbs and Montenegrins were branches of the same (Serb) nation; they had united politically and should unite under the umbrella of a unified church. Immediately after the South Slav unification on December 1, 1918, Regent Alexander and his government organized a conference of episcopes that “expressed their wish” that all “Serb churches” unify in “a one-Serb church.” These were: the autocephalous Serb Orthodox Church with five episcopates; the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Vojvodina (the Metropolitanate of Karlovac) with seven episcopates; the autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church with three episcopates; and 154 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović the autonomous church in Bosnia and Herzegovina (under the formal jurisdiction of the patriarchy of Constantinople with four episcopates). The following year, on May 26, 1919, a second “conference of bishops” was held during which the Sabor (Central Archbishops’ Congregation) was elected in order to prepare for the unification of the churches. The “decision” of that congregation was confirmed by the decrees of Regent Alexander and Serbian Prime Minister Vesnić’s government on June 17, 1920. By decree of August 30, 1920 they proclaimed the “unification” of the churches. In that proclamation, Alexander simultaneously proclaimed the formation of the Serb patriarchy and that the head of this patriarchy bear the title “Serb Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” Given the contested nature of the Podgorica Assembly, one would expect that there was some opposition to the unification of the two churches among the clergy of the Montenegrin church. Not so, say the SPC. Despite the existence of political disputes over the nature of the post-war union with Serbia, dissension within the Orthodox clergy was rare. (There were some exceptions—the Archimandrite Nikodim Janjušević, for example, kept the Montenegrin Orthodox Church alive in Detroit for several years after unification.) Montenegrin bishops voted unanimously to unite with the autocephalous SPC. The leading voice for unification in Montenegro, Archbishop Gavrilo Dožić, became the Serbian patriarch in 1938. Contemporary supporters of an autocephalous CPC claim, however, that their church had been forcibly and illegally absorbed into the SPC in 1920. Autocephaly, they argued, should be reinstated. To underpin their claims, the faithful of the CPC evoked Article 1 of the Constitution of the Holy Synod in the Principality of Montenegro (1902), which stipulated that the “Autocephalous Orthodox Metropolitanate in the Principality of Montenegro, as the member of the only, holy, catholic and apostolic church, whose shepherd and head is God and our Lord Jesus Christ, protects and maintains unity in dogmas and other canonic institutions with all other orthodox, autocephalous churches and it will protect and maintain this unity forever.”5 In addition, they argue, Article 3 of the Constitution of the Holy Synod determined that the Holy Synod itself governs all church affairs in terms of holy canons and is the highest church authority in Montenegro. The Constitution of the Principality of Montenegro (1905) stipulated in Article 40: “The state faith in Montenegro is Eastern Orthodox. The Montenegrin Church is autocephalous. It does not depend on any foreign church, Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 155 but maintains unity in dogmas with the Eastern Orthodox Ecumenical Church. All other recognized confessions in Montenegro are free.” The nature of the unification of the Serbian and Montenegrin churches by decree of King Aleksander Karadjordjević in 1920 was, thus, grist to the mill of those Montenegrins who saw the merging of the churches as an attempt to rob them of a central pillar of their identity. Therefore, argued supporters of the CPC, Alexander’s acts to abolish the Montenegrin Orthodox Church were illegal, bearing in mind that Alexander was regent of Serbia, and that he acquired “legitimacy” over other south Slav territories through the 1921 Vidovdan Constitution. However, the Constitution of the Holy Synod of the CPC did not contemplate or stipulate its abolishment. Even if the canonical and legal requirements of the self-abolishment of the Montenegrin Church were met, the explicit approval required by the Montenegrin ruler in Article 22 was lacking. It was no wonder, then, that the organizers of such a church “unification” and state “unification” did their best to ensure that the Montenegrin king was absent from Montenegro during those “decisions” and during the Serb occupation of Montenegro. In summary, supporters of the CPC claim the Montenegrin Church was abolished notwithstanding legal guarantees that provided for its constitutional status. The issue periodically reemerged during the communist era, when Montenegro was given republican status. The Serbian patriarchate became increasingly anxious about a regime-driven schism, given the communists’ seeming nurturing of ecclesiastical separatism—a policy it promoted strongly during the early post-World War II years.6 The Communists had recognized Montenegro’s validity as a separate territorial entity and the Montenegrins as a constituent nation within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), but simultaneously acknowledged the dualistic character of their identity. This opaque position suited the SPC, who continued to pursue the argument that despite Montenegro’s status as a republic within the SFRJ, Montenegrins were, in essence, Serbs. The SPC often argued that attempts to attack the unity and integrity of the church were led by the government’s alleged policy of “encouraging of separatist priests in Montenegro.”7 In 1970, the then Serbian Patriarch German left little doubt how he perceived the identity of the Montenegrins, stating that they were simply “Serbs by another n am e .” 8 The most serious conflict between the SPC and the Montenegrin League of Communists (Savez Komunista Crne Gore—SKCG) came in 1972, fuelled in large part by the latter’s decision to destroy the small 156 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović church on top of Lovćen (which had been dedicated to Petar II Petrović ‘Njegoš’) and replace the existing monument with a “secular” mauso- leum built by the Croat sculptor, Ivan Mestrović.9 It was perceived by the SPC as an attack upon their very being by the SKCG. (Conversely, the small church destined to be destroyed was seen as a symbol of the Serbian domination of Montenegro by advocates of a separate CPC.)

The Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro and the politics of Amfilohije Radović

The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral remained the sole Orthodox body in Montenegro, although its influence was rather limited until the late 1980s. The SPC has been led, since 1990, by Risto “Amfilohije” Radović, a Montenegrin born in Bare Radovića in the Morača area. His appointment coincided with a wider mobilization of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia, a process in which the SPC was enthusi- astically engaged. Marking Montenegro as Serb territory included the building of new monasteries (the largest being in Podgorica) and the rebuilding old churches in the “Serb” style. There was also an attempt to “Christianize” the population using corpses and bones to mobilize the faithful and heal spiritual wounds.10 The relics of St. Basil were cut and sent to monasteries of the SPC outside of Montenegro, whereas in new churches in Montenegro, pieces of “martyrs” from Jasenovac were brought in order to further stir anti-Croatian sentiments. Furthermore, the SPC produced two new saints; one of them the brother of the high- ranking commander and a close associate of Tito, Svetozar Vukmanović “Tempo,” who died while retreating with Chetniks from Montenegro.11 Amfilohije’s program also included the opening of a theological school in Cetinje, a radio station, and a publishing house, the construction of a new church in Podgorica, and the reconstruction of many old churches. Amfilohije, thus, became the leading proponent of Srpstvo (Serbdom) in Montenegro while overseeing a flourishing of the SPC in Montenegro. He increased the number of priests, monks, nuns, and the faithful, and, despite the often troubled relationship with the Montenegrin government, continued to lobby energetically for religious instruction (by the SPC) to be compulsory in Montenegrin schools. His views on Montenegrin nationhood were simple, if combative. He regarded the Montenegrin nation as an invention of “separatists” and “communists” Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 157 who were attempting to tear Montenegrins from their Serb roots. He openly referred to Montenegrin autocephalists in the CPC as crnolatinaši (a derogatory term for Catholic priests dressed in black robes).12 Those advocating Montenegro’s independence sought to portray Amfilohije as a dangerous fundamentalist intent on imposing the SPC and, thereby, provoking conflict among Montenegrins of the Orthodox faith.13 His illustrious career began at Sava’s Seminary and continued at the Theological Faculty of Belgrade University (where he later taught after completing a doctorate in Greece). After a spell as Bishop of Banat in the 1980s, he was elected as the Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral in December 1990 as Montenegro entered a period of significant flux.14 Amfilohije soon demonstrated that his talents extended beyond the realm of the spiritual. He initially supported the policies of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević, and later became a vociferous supporter of the Serb nationalist cause during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He played the gusle (choosing verses from the epic poem, ‘The Battle of Mojkovac’) for Montenegrin troops on the Dubrovnik front in 199115 and often praised the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, and his deputy, Biljana Plavšić (whom he described as a “Kosovo maiden”). He invited the Serbian paramilitary leader, Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović and his paramilitary group Tigrovi (the Tigers) to “protect” the Cetinje Monastery on Badnjak (Orthodox Christmas Eve) 1992.16 In addition, he acted as an arbiter in intra-party conflicts within and inter-party conflicts between pro-Serb political parties. In Montenegro, Amfilohije’s political influence increased and, athough his relationship with the Bosnian Serb leadership remained strong, his relationship with Milošević soured after the Serbian President’s break with the Bosnian leadership in 1994 (following the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Vance Owen Peace Plan). Thereafter, Amfilohije became one of Milošević’s fiercest critics. In August 1995, as Serb forces were losing territory as the result of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes, “Operation Storm” in the Srpska Krajina and a joint Muslim–Croat offensive in central Bosnia, Amfilohije addressed the Montenegrin Assembly, berating them for their support of Milošević and demanding that they reverse their decision to impose sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs.17 Moreover, his opposition to Milošević meant Amfilohije found, albeit briefly, common ground with Milo Djukanović when the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista – DPS) split into pro- and anti-Milošević factions in 1997.18 158 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović

Between 1990 and 1997, Montenegrin politics had been characterized by the absolute dominance of the DPS, which took a largely pro-Bel- grade line. In 1997, however, the DPS split into two factions—one which continued to support the policies of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević (led by then President Momir Bulatović), and one opposed to continued cooperation with his regime (led by Prime Minister Milo Djukanović).19 This conflict soon developed into a de facto struggle between supporters of continued union with Serbia and those advocating independence for Montenegro.20 One aspect of that struggle was the conflict between the SPC and the CPC, which increasingly served as a point of reference for expressing national identity and attitudes toward the state. It was, in essence, the continuation of political struggles by proxy, and it brought to the fore religious organizations that had previously, and certainly since 1945, played a rather marginal role in a largely secular Montenegrin society. Djukanović may have received blessings from Amfilohije before his inauguration as president in January 1998, but the Montenegrin president’s shift toward an increasingly independent position in subsequent years ensured that their understanding was brief. Indeed, Amfilohije would become one of his most vocal opponents as he continued to attempt consolidate the position of the SPC in Montenegro. His opponents continued to accuse him of endeavoring to “provoke” the Montenegrin government and the CPC.21

The re-establishment of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church

The issue periodically reemerged (it did so briefly in the 1970s), but amounted to little.22 It remained largely dormant until the early 1990s, when those advocating Montenegro’s independence sought to re-establish the CPC as a part of an endeavor to aid the consolidation of a distinct Montenegrin national identity.23 The issue of the CPC became one which, therefore, became exploited by politicians with a pro-independence agenda. Indeed, the re-establishment of the CPC was openly supported by pro-independence parties, the most influential of which was the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni savez Crne Gore—LSCG), a party led by the charismatic former public prosecutor, Slavko Perović, with significant backing from pro-independence parties and individuals.24 The LSCG was particularly strong in Cetinje, the old capital of the Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 159

Petrović dynasty and the heartland of Stara Crnagora (Old Montenegro) within which there was a strong sense of Crnogorstvo (Montenegrin- ness). It was, however, also the seat of the SPC in Montenegro. As early as 1990, messages such as “Long live the Montenegrin Autocephalous Church” began to appear in the town.25 By June of that year, the LSCG had organised a conference in Cetinje with the objective of debating the subject of the CPC’s autocephaly and, by December of that year, a group led by Sreten Zeković announced their intention to re-establish an autocephalous CPC.26 On 6 January 1991, an “All-Montenegrin National Synod” was held, during which a commitment to restore an autocephalous CPC was stated.27 Pro-independence Montenegrins re-established the church, hoping it would facilitate the unification all Montenegrins through the worship of, specifically, Montenegrin saints and cults.28 This, they hoped, would aid their objective of establishing an independent Montenegrin state, with the church acting as the central pillar of the nation. They became more assertive in their actions, and on bothBadnjak and Petrovdan (St Peter’s Day—29 June) 1991, supporters of the CPC clashed with police and supporters of Serb parties in Cetinje. By early 1993, the pro-independence LSCG, who were among those to open the debate about the autocephaly of the CPC in 1990, had officially recorded their support for the re-establishment of the church as a step toward their ultimate objective of an independent Montenegrin state.29 Soon thereafter, on St Luke’s Day (18 October) 1993, the CPC would, indeed, be re-established.30 An estimated 15,000 people gathered in King Nikola’s Square to celebrate it, firing guns into the air in celebration.31 The basis for a conflict between the SPC and the CPC was now firmly established. Antonije Abramović, a clergyman of the American Orthodox Church in Toronto, was consecrated as the head of the CPC.32 He established his headquarters in a house on the outskirts of Cetinje—the so-called Vladičanski dom. From the outset, the SPC sought to discredit him; rumors were abundant regarding his alleged lack of moral fiber, and the SPC sought to capitalize on any doubt there may be regarding Abramović’s idiosyncrasies. The SPC acknowledged that he had, during the 1950s, spent time in Kosovo with the Bishop of Ras and Prizren, Gojko Stojčović (later the Serbian Patriarch “Pavle” between 1990 and 2009), followed by a spell as Abbot of Savina in Herceg-Novi, but had, by the early 1960s, been asked to leave the SPC, due to alleged homosexual activity.33 Some questioned whether Abramović had ever been consecrated as a priest.34 The SPC then claim that Abramović fled to 160 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović

Greece before migrating to Canada, where he remained until 1993, and then returned to Montenegro. Abramović led the CPC until his death in November 1996, to be succeeded by Miraš Dedeić, known to the CPC faithful as “Metropolitan Mihailo.” He was chosen as Abramović’s successor by the Montenegrin Synod in January 1997 and was ordained as a bishop by Patriarch Pimen of the “Bulgarian Alternative Synod” in Sofia in March 1998, before being formally ordained as the Metropolitan of the CPC in October. From the outset, the SPC were unrelenting in their criticism of Dedeić. According to them, Dedeić was, as a student, viewed with deep suspicion by his fellow Orthodox priests who, it is alleged, doubted his commitment to Orthodoxy. “Unclerical behavior” on Dedeić’s part apparently led to him being de-frocked, ex-communicated, and, finally, anathematized by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. Rejecting these accusations, Dedeić, of course, countered that he would not accept criticism from an organization that has forcibly merged the CPC into the SPC in 1920, which, he claimed, represented a theft of Montenegro’s identity, an impo- sition of Serb identity in Montenegro, and an occupation of the CPC’s sacred buildings.35 Moreover, he claimed, the CPC had existed as an independent entity since 1603, an autonomy which, they claim, had been recognized in 1766 by both the Holy Russian Synod and the Patriarchy of Constantinople.36 He cast the SPC as occupiers who had imposed themselves upon Montenegro after the CPC had been forcibly dissolved against both the 1905 constitution and canon law.37 Furthermore, in opposition to the SPC’s tough anti-European, anti-globalization, anti- Western, and anti-homosexual stand, the CPC adopted a pro-European position advocating Montenegro as multicultural and multi-ethnic community positions that are, in essence, close to the party positions of SDP and DPS, although both parties kept their distance from the CPC.38 The bitter public exchanges between the SPC and the CPC extended beyond the matter of unification to arguments over the ownership of Montenegro’s religious buildings and related property (such as the remains of St Peter of Cetinje and the right hand of St John the Baptist, both held at the SPC-administered Cetinje monastery). The CPC began to assert their claim to 650 churches across Montenegro that had been “requisitioned” in 1920 and were being administered by the SPC. By the late 1990s, the CPC claimed to have had gained, by plebiscites held among parishioners, legitimate possession of a number of churches which had previously been run by the SPC, the majority of these being Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 161 located around Cetinje and Njeguši. The CPC’s stated objective of repos- sessing these churches, sometimes, required that controversial actions to be undertaken. In December 2000, for example, supporters of the CPC attempted to take possession of the Vlaška Church in Cetinje—a building with much historical significance.39 Their objective was to stop the SPC renovating the church (thereby, claimed the CPC, eliminating evidence that the church was originally Montenegrin). In protest against the “appropriation” of the church by the CPC, an SPC priest, Radomir Nikčević barricaded himself inside the building and embarked upon a hunger strike as a protest against the actions of the CPC. The conflict over ownership and control of religious buildings was only one facet of what was a multifaceted conflict. Tensions between supporters of the respective churches became most acutely manifest during festivals and religious holidays, in particular during the “burning of the Yule log” on badnjak (Orthodox Christmas Eve). The SPC protested vehemently that this “Serbian tradition” had been hijacked by the CPC.40 In Cetinje, both ceremonies were held in close proximity of each other—with supporters of the SPC outside the Cetinje Monastery and supporters of the CPC in nearby King Nikola’s Square. The first of these parallel events took place in 1991.41 They became quasi-political meetings, marked by the presence of nationalist symbols and, often, marred by low-intensity violence. Supporters of the SPC carried banners and flags adorned with Serbian national symbols, SPC iconography, and portraits of Slobodan Milošević and King Aleksander Karadjordjević. The faithful of the CPC would, conversely, display symbols of the old Montenegrin state and portraits of King Nikola I Petrović. The rival groups used traditional means of intimidating each other, singing nationalist songs, fist-fighting and, occasionally, the firing of weapons—albeit only in the air.42 These incidents were not confined merely to Cetinje. In Berane, a traditional stronghold of the SPC, a number of violent incidents took place as the CPC attempted to hold their own Badnjak celebrations in the town.43 Six months later, followers of the SPC were forbidden from holding ceremonies in the village of Njeguši, near Cetinje. The Montenegrin government sought, at least publicly, to defuse tensions between the churches, although their position was often opaque. Milo Djukanović courted controversy in 2000 by sending, for the first time, Easter greetings to the CPC as well as the SOC (providing the latter with a pretext to accuse him of encouraging separatism).44 Djukanović frequently implied support for the CPC’s quest for autocephalous status, 162 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović but adopted an ambiguous position, largely because the church issue was one which divided his own party—the DPS.45 Svetozar Marović, the then Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament, condemned the CPC for supporting the seizure of two churches on an island in Lake Skadar. Given the obvious intra-party differences, their position remained rather ambiguous. However, as relations between ruling elites in Belgrade and Podgorica cooled with the preparations of a referendum on Montenegrin independence, relations, likewise, worsened between the SPC and CPC. Indeed, the church conflict became one of the key facets of the debates over Montenegrin identity and Montenegro’s statehood. Pre-existing tensions between the SPC and CPC (and the SPC and the Montenegrin government) were exacerbated by the appearance, in June 2005, of a small tin church on the peak of Mount Rumija near the town of Bar. Mount Rumija has traditionally been a place of pilgrimage for Montenegro’s main religious communities (Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim). Every August, pilgrims from these faiths climb to the peak in honor of St Vladimir, who died 50 years before the split between the eastern and western branches of Christendom in 1054. The tradition is a symbol of inter-religious and inter-ethnic cooperation. However, less than a year before Montenegro’s independence referendum (held on 21 May 2006), the SPC, with the help of a helicopter flown by the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, placed a prefabricated tin church on the peak. Its appearance was immediately interpreted by pro-independence parties and organizations (such as the CPC) as a threat to those who wished to “tear Montenegro from its Serb roots.” Those advocating independence, including the CPC, interpreted these developments as a threat to inter-confessional harmony in Montenegro. Moreover, they argued, this was, once again, proof of the SPC’s misuse of religion for political ends.46 Indeed, in advance of the May referendum, Amfilohije played a significant role in the “Movement for a Joint State of Serbia and Montenegro” (although the CPC played a much lesser role in the pro-independence bloc). In April 2006, Amfilohije railed at the CPC for attempting to force their way into the St Nikola church in Bajice, near Cetinje, stating explicitly that he believed the Montenegrin government to be supporting the actions of the CPC. As it transpired, the issue of the CPC was only a marginal theme in the respective (pro- and anti- independence) campaigns, although the CPC would use Montenegro’s independence to argue that the church, too, should be a pillar of any independent Montenegrin state. Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 163

The SPC–CPC conflict in independent Montenegro

In the wake of the declaration of independence on June 3, 2006, supporters of the CPC grew in confidence; they assumed that the position of the CPC would be much stronger in an independent Montenegrin state and were determined to capitalize on the new political reality.47 Conversely, the SPC was uncertain of what the new political environment would mean for them and for Serbs in Montenegro. On April 9, 2007 the CPC announced a plan to take control of all Orthodox churches in Montenegro, with or without the help of the government. The latter’s reaction was that it would protect the SPC in the event of an attempt to seize control of churches, further fuelling the CPC’s growing perception that the state and the SPC were engaged in a joint endeavor to deny the CPC freedom of worship.48 It was in this context that around 300 supporters of the CPC attempted, on April 18, to force their way into Cetinje monastery.49 Unable to pass the police cordon surrounding the monastery, the CPC held a service outside the nearby Ćipur church (where King Nikola and Queen Milena Petrović are buried), which they were unable to enter because it had been “occupied” by the “Serb Orthodox Youth Brotherhood.” Three months later, in July, the CPC announced that they would hold a service outside the Church of St Archangel Michael in Nikšić, a church administered by the SPC.50 Again, however, they were forbidden from doing so by local police. Tensions were mounting as Amfilohije attentions were drawn back to Belgrade with the decline and death of Serbian Patriarch Pavle. In November 2007, Amfilohije was elected by the Holy Synod of the SPC to take over Pavle’s duties—a role he undertook until the election of Bishop Irinej of Niš at the new Patriarch in January 2010. In his absence, the CPC intensified their activities. In January 2009, they announced that they intended to take possession of monasteries and churches built before 1920. This time, however, their actions would lead to legal proceedings being enacted against them. On January 20, Montenegrin police placed a cordon around the Church of St John the Baptist in Bajice, near Cetinje, to deny access to priests from both the SPC and CPC, both of whom were preparing to conduct services in the church. A legal struggle over the ownership of the church began. Less than a month later, the SPC filed charges against members of the CPC for changing the lock on the church and, thus, violating the rights of the SPC to hold services there. The judge in Cetinje, however, dismissed the case as groundless, 164 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović opting instead to open an inquiry to accusations leveled against two SPC priests—Obren Jovanović and Gojko Perović—who stood accused of illegally entering churches to hold services. Incidents continued throughout the summer of 2009 and, upon Amfilohije’s return, rhetorical exchanges between the SPC and the CPC intensified, this time fuelled by the SPC’s construction of a new church on Sveti Stefan, a development opposed by the CPC.51 Debate, moreover, continued to rage about the fabricated church on Mount Rumija—an issue that became a problematic one for the then Montenegrin Prime Minister, Igor Lukšić.52 His predecessor, Milo Djukanović, in the middle of his “retirement,” again implied support for the CPC, stating that, although the SPC in Montenegro was autonomous (from Belgrade), it was “still part of the Serbian Orthodox Church” and, thus, “not sufficiently in line with Montenegro’s national interests.”53 Furthermore, he hinted at a future unification of the churches in Montenegro, something Amfilohije rejected as impractical; indeed, a matter of days later, the SPC demonstrated it was in no mood to compromise. Moreover, DPS objected that the SPC divided Montenegro among three dioceses. On May 20, 2011, the SPC filed a lawsuit against the Montenegrin state at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, primarily for property allegedly seized from them after the end of World War II. The case was eventually rejected by the court, on the grounds that “the key provisions of the law which they had relied had been declared unconstitutional before they filed their request.”54 Since then, however, there have been very few positive developments. The SPC and Montenegrin government engaged in discussion about how best to improve church–state relations. Montenegro’s ruling DPS have suggested that they will strive for the creation of a single, organizationally independent Orthodox religious community in Montenegro as a way of overcoming the divisions between the SPC and CPC. Their then Chairman, Milo Djukanović, stated that this offered the best possible solution, whereas Ranko Krivokapić (an arch adversary of Amfilohije) expressed the view that such a solution represented the best way to “correct the historical injustice” of 1920.55 Nonetheless, the struggle between the SPC and the CPC, however, continued unabated. In May 2011, Amfilohije was put on trial in Podgorica, charged with “hate speech”—or more precisely with “cursing all of those who wished to destroy the church on Mount Rumija” during a speech on Orthodox Christmas. The long-drawn-out affair led, in November 2012, to Amfilohije, who had rejected the accusations as unfounded, being Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 165 reprimanded by the court.56 In 2013, Amfilohije endeavored to proclaim Petar II Petrović Njegoš a saint, but his action both met opposition by Montenegrin authorities and (more importantly) by the Holy Synod of the SPC. In 2013, DPS got closer to SPC, participating in the big opening of the Podgorica Church of Resurrection of Christ on the occasion of the 1700th anniversary edict of Milan that gathered together, at one place, Serb, Russian, and Constantinople and Jerusalem patriarchs. Among the newly painted frescos is a depiction of Amfilohije presenting the church to Jesus Christ (alongside the late Serbian Patriarch Pavle and the late Russian Patriarch Aleksei); they are accompanied by a number of others, such as Milo Djukanović. In the “Hell” section of the fresco, the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament, Ranko Krivokapić, is portrayed as being dragged into the fiery depths.57 By way of demonstrating neutrality, the DPS sent two of its ministers to be present for ceremony of building new church of rival CPC on Cetinje the following day (although the small delegation was not as high profile).58 The conflict between the CPC and the SPC has lasted for over two decades and continues unabated to this day. Although debates over autocephaly and Montenegrin identity and statehood were inextricably linked in the period prior to Montenegro’s declaration of independence in June 2006, other matters have subsequently dominated the political agenda. Moreover, the Montenegrin government have largely sought to distance themselves from the issue. Proposed legislation on religious communities should, however, demonstrate which path the state intends to take to resolve it. The existing “Law on the Legal Position of Religious Communities” of 1977 is outdated and does not sufficiently regulate the relationship between religious communities and the state or, indeed, between religious communities. In addition, the time for resolving the CPC–SPC conflict may be approaching. Having in mind the advancing age of Amfilohije and Mihailo, the prospect of new religious leaders for both the CPC and SPC might serve to usher in a new and, potentially, more positive era in SPC–CPC relations.

Notes

1. Michael Radu, “The Burden of Eastern Orthodoxy,”Orbis , 2, no. 42, Spring 1998, p. 283. 2. See, for example, Mirko Djordjević, “The Balkan God Mars—The Religious Factor in the [Yugoslav] Wars 1991–1999,” in Dragica Vujadinović et al., eds., Between 166 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović

Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Vol II, Civil Society and Political Culture (Belgrade: CEDET, 2005), pp. 133–143. 3. For a succinct account of the role of the SPC in modern Serbian society and political life (since 1989) see Radmila Radić and Milan Vukmanović, “Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989: The Case of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” in Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges Since 1989 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), pp. 180–211. 4. Novi List, Rijeka, December 4, 1993, p. 8. 5. For detailed analyses of the CPC see, Sreten Zekovic (ed.), Elementa Montenegrina hrestomatija—Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva (Zagreb: CFP-Crnogorski federalistički pokret, 1991); Dr. Danilo Radojevic, Iz povijesti hriscanskih crkava u Crnoj Gori (Cetinje: CDNK, 2000); Branko Nikac, Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva: clanci— rasprave—studije (Cetinje: CDNK, 2000); Veseljko Koprivica, Amfilohijeva sabrana ne-djela (Podgorica: Monitor, 1999); Novak Adzic, Kratka istorija Crnogorske pravoslavne crkve (Cetinje: Dignitas, 2000); Sreten Zekovic, Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva (Cetinje: CKK, 1997). 6. Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 109. 7. Monitor, Podgorica, December 3, 1993, p. 9. 8. Ibid., p. 109. 9. The existing monument on Lovćen was built to house the bones of Njegoš, whose bones were moved there from nearby Cetinje in 1925. The event was attended by King Aleksander Karadjordjević and numerous members of the SPC hierarchy. See Andrew Baruch Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 105. 10. One such event was in May 1996, when the bones of Saint Vasilije Ostroški were paraded through the Montenegrin town of Nikšić. According to Ivan Čolović, “In the eyes of the church, the earthly remains of saints, martyrs or prominent priests and reliquaries (the boxes in which their remains are kept) like their graves and parts of their clothing, have supernatural, miraculous power. They heal sickness of the body and spirit. This is the power, for instance, of the sanctorum reliquiae of Saint Vasilije Ostroški. When his relics were carried recently in a religious procession through Nikšić, it was conceived and carried out as a kind of collective therapy. The organizers explained that through the miraculous power of the holy relics they wished to influence the spiritual state of the inhabitants of that Montenegrin town, where over the last few years there had been an exceptionally large number of murders and suicides. See Ivan Čolović, The Politics of Symbol in Serbia (London: Hurst, 2002), p. 166. 11. Vijesti (Podgorica), September 16, 2002, p. 6. 12. In this context, the term “Black Priest” is a derogatory term used to describe radical Croat Catholic priests. For Amfilohije’s comments on the Montenegrin Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 167

language see B92, Belgrade, January 14, 2011, last accessed on January 8, 2014, www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/ 11/ Region / 826460/Amfilohije%3A+Crno gorski+izmi%C5%A1ljen+jezik.html. 13. See Koprivica, Amfilohijeva sabrana ne-djela; Milorad Tomanić, Srpska crkva u ratu (Beograd: Medijska knjižara Krug, 2001). LSCG leader, Slavko Perović, described Amfilohije as “an instrument of the militant greater Serbian politics in Montenegro,” and, according to Miodrag Perović, the editor of the pro-independence weekly Monitor, he “agitated for war, took part in it, and after its conclusion continues to fight for the ideas that led to war.” 14. In December 1990, Pavle was elected patriarch of the SPC despite the fact that his predecessor, Patriarch German, was still alive. At the same congress, Amfilohije Radović was elected Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral and Irinej Bulović was elected the Episcope of Bačka. Six months later, in May 1991, Bishop Artemije was elected Episcope of Raška and Prizren, and Atanasije Jeftić was elected the Episcope of Banat. 15. Koprivica, Amfilohijeva sabrana ne-djela, p. 25. 16. Šerbo Rastoder, “Religion and Politics—The Montenegrin Perspective,” in Dragica Vujadinović et al., eds., Between Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Vol II, Civil Society and Political Culture (Belgrade: CEDET, 2005), p. 124. 17. Ibid., p. 124. 18. Both Djukanović and Amfilohije became high-profile critics of Milošević. In the Serbian weekly Vreme, Djukanović referred to the Serbian President as “an obsolete politician.” Moreover, he openly supported the Zajedno protests in Serbia in the winter of 1996/1997. Amfilohije, for his part, joined the anti- Milošević protestors on the streets of Belgrade. 19. For a detailed analysis of the DPS split see Ljubisa Mitrović and Aleksander Eraković (eds.), Sto dana koji su promijenili Crnu Goru (Podgorica: Daily Press, 1997). 20. For an analysis of Montenegrin politics in the 1990s, see Kenneth Morrison, “Montenegro: A Polity in Flux 1989–2000,” in Charles Ingrao and Thomas Emmert, eds., Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar’s Initiative, 2nd edn. (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2012), pp. 427–456. 21. See for example Matica Crnogorska, “Kontinuitet provokacija Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve,” Matica Crnogorska Godišnjak 1999/2000 (Cetinje: Matica Crnogorska, 2000), pp. 132–133. 22. See Radojević, “Crnogorsko-primorska mitropolija.” in Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, Vol. 3 (Zagreb: Jugoslovenski Leksikografski Zavod, 1984), pp. 147–150. 23. Monitor (Podgorica), December 3, 1993, p. 9. 24. Borba, (Belgrade), December 28, 1990, p. 15. The program was also supported by the Social Democratic Party and by pro-independence intellectuals. According to Miodrag Perović, the editor of Monitor weekly, “I was asked, as the editor of Monitor, to support the CPC and I supported it. We were 168 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović

hardly alone. The LSCG and the Social Democrats (SDP) also supported it.” Author’s interview with Dr. Miodrag Perović, Podgorica, June 17, 2007. 25. Sreten Zeković, Nauka o samobitnosti Crnogoraca V: Crnogorski autokefalni pokret (Cetinje: Crnogorska prijestonica, 2003), p. 233. 26. NIN (Belgrade), August 20, 1993, p. 20. 27. Ibid., p. 21. 28. Sharyl N. Cross and Pauline Komnenich, “Ethnonational Identity and the Implosion of Yugoslavia: The Case of Montenegro and the Relationship with Serbia,” Nationalities Papers, 33, no. 1, March 2005, p. 18. 29. NIN (Belgrade), August 20, 1993, pp. 22–24. However, the LSCG President, Slavko Perović, argued that his party were not an instrumental factor in the re-establishment of the church, stating that, “the LSCG had nothing to do with the project except on the basis that the party supports human rights.” See Novi List (Rijeka), December 4, 1993, p. 9. 30. The CPC were not an official ecclesiastical body. They were registered as a non-governmental organization (NGO) and simply called the Vjerska zajednica Crnogoraca istočnopravoslavne vjeroipovesti (The Religious Community of Montenegrins of Eastern Orthodox Confession). 31. Novi List (Rijeka), December 4, 1993, p. 8. 32. In a letter to Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Constantinople, Istanbul, from Archbishop Theodosius, Archbishop of Washington, Metropolitan of All America and Canada, the latter claimed that “On 28 October 1993, His Holiness Patriarch Pavle informed us that a retired cleric (Archimandrite Anthony Abramovich) was falsely representing himself as an auxiliary (vicar) bishop of Edmonton (Canada) of the Orthodox Church in America. He has (as we have officially informed) become involved in and supporting the uncanonical and unchristian action of causing schism and division in the Holy Serbian Orthodox Church. On October 29, 1993, we faxed a response in which we affirmed that Anthony Abramovich was never consecrated by us or, to my knowledge, by any other canonical Orthodox church.” See Letter to Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Constantinople, Istanbul, from Archbishop Theodosius, Archbishop of Washington, Metropolitan of All America and Canada, in Budimir Alekšić and Slavko Krstajić, Trgovci Dušama (Nova Varoš: Bonart, 2003), p. 36. 33. Despite this being “common knowledge” within the SPC, there is no substantial proof that Abramović was a homosexual. 34. Letter to Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Constantinople, Istanbul, from Archbishop Theodosius, Archbishop of Washington, Metropolitan of All America and Canada, in Alekšić and Krstajić, Trgovci Dušama, p. 36. 35. Zeković, Nauk(a) o camobitnosti Crnogoraca V: Crnogorski autokefalni pokret, p. 163. 36. Author’s interview with Metropolitan Mihailo, Cetinje, September 11, 2004. See also Adžić, Kratka istorija Crnogorske Pravoslavne crkve. Intra-Orthodox Conflict in Montenegro 169

37. Monitor (Podgorica), December 3, 1993, p. 10. 38. See study Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva i novi srpski identitet, Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji 2006, pp. 5–11 at http://www.helsinki.org.rs/ serbian /doc/Studija-Kupres.pdf. 39. The Vlaška church in Cetinje is famous for its perimeter fence made from Turkish guns captured by Montenegrins during the late nineteenth century. The CPC and SPC both claim ownership of it. 40. Aleksić and Krstajić, Trgovci dušama, p. 73. 41. Šerbo Rastoder, “Religion and Politics—The Montenegrin Perspective,” p. 120. 42. Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav states (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 175. 43. IWPR Balkans Report No. 309, January 17, 2002. 44. As a result, he faced protests by the SPC and the “Orthodox Youth,” and the latter tried to organize a Montenegrin version of the Serbian youth organization Otpor (resistance) in order to oust Djukanović. 45. Ibid., p. 12. 46. RFE/RL Balkan Report, Vol. 9, no. 23, August 12, 2005, p. 3. 47. For an overview of Montenegro’s first five years of independence, see Kenneth Morrison, “Change, Continuity and Consolidation: Assessing Five Years of Montenegro’s Independence,” LSEE Papers on Southeast Europe, no. 2, February 2011. 48. Dan (Podgorica), April 11, 2007, p. 1. 49. Vijesti (Podgorica), April 19, 2007, p. 1. 50. Although the CPC railed against the government for providing support to the SPC, the government showed that they were willing to adopt a combative stance with both churches. In early August 2007, the SPC’s controversial Bishop Filaret was asked to leave Montenegro on the basis that he had entered the county illegally. As justification for the actions, the then Montenegrin Prime Minister, Željko Sturanović stated that the bishop had been asked to leave Montenegro because he was on a Hague Tribunal list of persons suspected to be aiding indicted fugitive war criminals. Dan (Podgorica), August 3, 2007, p. 1. 51. Pobjeda (Podgorica), April 25, 2011, p. 3. 52. For an analysis of these debates, see Kenneth Morrison, “Little Church Causes Big Trouble in Montenegro, Balkan Insight (Belgrade),” February 21, 2011, last accessed on February 8, 2013, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article /little-church-causes-big-trouble-in-montenegro. 53. Balkan Insight, Belgrade, “Djukanović Supports Independent Church in Montenegro,” last accessed on January 8, 2014, www.balkaninsight.com /en /article/ djukanovic-supports-independent- church-in-montenegro. 54. European Court of Human Rights, ‘Decision in the Case of Eparhija Budimljansko-Nikšića and Others V. Montenegro (application no. 26501/05), Press Release, ECHR 387 (2012), October 19, 2012, last accessed on January 8, 2014, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites /eng/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4125009-4857539. 170 Kenneth Morrison and Nebojša Čagorović

55. Vijesti (Podgorica), May 17, 2011, pp. 2–3. 56. Dan (Podgorica), November 20, 2012, p. 3. In May 20102, Amfilohije submitted a request for retirement, although a spokesperson for the SPC stated that he would continue to conduct religious services. VIP Daily News Report (Belgrade), May 10, 2012, p. 4. 57. Ranko Krivokapić incurred the wrath of the SPC on numerous occasions. In November 2009, for example, he stated that the behavior of SPC clergymen in Montenegro had been “disgraceful.” During a visit of the SPC Patriarch, Irinej, Krivokapic refused to apologize for his comments; claiming that he was irritated by the patriarch’s statements, which he believed questioned Montenegro’s independence. 58. Despite the government’s attempts to remain relatively neutral, both the SPC and the CPC are generally critical of the government’s alleged practice of favoring the one side over the other, claiming that the government’s behavior is not impartial. 7 The Separation between Church and State in Slovenia: A Political Fiasco Srečo Dragoš

Even today, some 20 years after Slovenia (previously a part of Yugoslavia) gained its independence and established its own state, the relationship between the state and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in Slovenia is defined in the same way as it was in the former socialist regime: from the top downwards, without public debate and with obsolete logic. During the final decades of socialism, the “dialog” between religious and non-religious parts of the population was only reserved for political and religious functionaries, and reduced to the monopolistic interests of two hierarchical organizations—the former Communist Party and the Roman Catholic Church—which self- understandingly shared their power over the souls of the citizens. Party and church representatives met at round tables, wherein participation was solely reserved for verified cadre, whereas independent intellectuals on both sides were excluded. Although the one-party system no longer exists in the current period of Slovenia’s independence, the previous ideological pattern seems to be persisting. The segment of intelligentsia that is not engaged in

171 172 Srečo Dragoš political parties is still being ignored, along with those Catholic intellectuals who are critical of the RCC and remain completely ignored in Church circles. Thus, according to this persisting ideology, all social interests are represented solely by the representatives of political parties, and all believers are represented solely by the functionaries of the RCC. However, as repeatedly and clearly shown in Slovenian public opinion surveys—indicating that the Parliament, political parties, and the RCC are those attracting the lowest trust of the citizens over a long period of time—politics can neither be equated with society as a whole, nor can the RCC be equated with all Catholics.

The principle of separation

Written even in Slovenia’s Constitution (Article 7), the principle of the separation of church and state is expressed as: “The state is separated from religious communities.”1 This provision is closely related to the principle of equality and freedom of religious communities. Besides ideological and cultural aspects, the principle of the freedom of religious communities primarily includes their right to institutional autonomy. This right provides them with the possibility of making their own internal rules to regulate their internal affairs regarding the practicing of their religious mission whereas, of course, in other (non-religious) matters, they are subject to the state law in force. In these terms, from the perspective of religious communities on the one hand, the separation principle most importantly results in the following: it protects them from state intervention (in religious matters), it prevents them being either privileged or discriminated against, and protects secularized public domains from interventions by any (anti) religious actors. On the other hand, the state is free in that no religious community is allowed to define or decide on matters in the jurisdiction of the state and political organs. The separation principle is binding on the state in terms of three kinds of prohibition or guarantees that can be summarized in the following three expressions: non-identification, neutrality, and abdication. If (only one of) these guarantees become(s) neglected in any way, the separation is directly put in jeopardy; therefore, it is important to underline the essence of this 3-fold attitude to which the state is bound by Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 173

1. The principle of non-identification means that the state cannot be equated with any religion or non-religion (including atheism or agnosticism), be it institutional, ideological, or symbolic. Without this condition, the state cannot represent the organization of all citizens to the same extent: being their biggest, most binding, and strongest form of organization (holding the exclusive monopoly to exercise violence), it is all the more important that none of its members obtains the impression that a particular ideological, religious, or transcendental idea is more important to, appropriate for, or desired by the state than any other, in turn, meaning that all other ways of making sense of this world are less appropriate. As this applies to the state, in turn, it applies to all of its representatives and functionaries. 2. The second principle needed to realize the constitutional principle of the separation of church and state is that of neutrality. This means that the state is bound to maintain an equal distance to all actors in the religious field, whether collective or individual, organized or non-organized, big or small, traditional or modern, older or more recent, “autochthonous” or “imported”, poor or rich, non-influential or influential, non-organized or internationally organized—that is, all to the same extent. As soon as the state attempts to practice neutrality toward certain religions more than others, then, this is no longer neutrality, but its opposite—partiality. 3. The third principle—abdication—derives from the two abovementioned principles of separation. With the state practicing non-identification and neutrality, the temptation of those in power to interfere in internal religious matters is reduced to a minimum. If the state is not equated with any of the communities and when, due to its neutrality, all (non)religious communities are at an equal distance from it, then also the main reasons for state intervention in this sensitive domain lose salience. The state relinquishes by renouncing its religious interference (without renouncing interference in other ways) in the religious sphere; religious intervention, which was once appropriated by the state, is now left to religious actors who autonomously regulate their own affairs (except, of course, where there are breaches of the legislation in force, which also applies when offenders cite religious reasons). However, relinquishing in terms of the state creating a distance from religious communities does not mean the state is 174 Srečo Dragoš

becoming indifferent or passive toward the religious sphere, or allows for confusion. It is still the state that must provide for the regulation of its relations with religious actors so as to take the previous two principles into account because, as we have seen, with the attitude of indifference, it is impossible to either achieve or maintain the state’s neutrality and non-identification. In the circumstances of indifference, the state—despite the constitutional principle of separation—remains without a strategy and rules as well as without a consistent practice for implementing the separation strategy. As we still do not have these in Slovenia, the constitutional principle of separation is not even formally, let alone informally (e.g., as part of the political culture), binding on state representatives. In short, without the state withdrawing from intervening in religious matters, the separation principles are unrealizable. Slovenia, clearly, has problems when it comes to applying these principles. Typically, the top officials of the RCC have (since the collapse of socialism onwards) been increasingly rejecting the state’s neutrality vis- à-vis all religious and non-religious beliefs. The greater the material and symbolic power of the RCC, obtained via its connections with the state, the more negative is the attitude of its functionaries to the separation principle. In this sense, the statement made by the cleric and publicist Ocvirk is symptomatic: Today the standpoint that ‘the state can neither support nor inhibit any religion’ can either mean that among beliefs religious beliefs are considered second-rate or that the state rejects plurality.2 Let us, here, note the persistent violation of the basic rights of the Muslim community. On one hand, the state is paying abundant attention to the RCC, it is extremely generous—mainly financially—with regard to the Church’s buildings and functionaries, although, on the other hand, engaging in the decades old and internationally resonating prevention of the building of the only mosque in Slovenia that would meet the needs of the second largest religious community in the country, and that, of course, in Europe considerably outnumbers the entire Slovenian population. If the constitutional principle of equality of religious communities were consistently implemented, Slovenian citizens of Muslim religious belief would need to have available up to 125 mosques in Slovenia in Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 175 order to proportionally equal the present number of Slovenian Catholics per religious building, that is, 378. Although something of this kind has never been attempted, this statistical argument should be taken very seriously, at least in the attempt to build one—the first and only first mosque in Slovenia. It is shameful that, throughout this time, Slovenian culture, official politics, and public opinion have remained indifferent with regard to—from the aspect of religious pluralism—the catastrophic ratio in the number of buildings available to different religions in Slovenia, which is as follows: not a single mosque, three synagogues (of which only one is fit for use), three Orthodox churches, and around 3000 Catholic churches. Moreover, in just 5 years (1998–2002) in Slovenia, 50 Catholic churches were newly built or renovated. For a long time, the international community—for example, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (Alvaro Gil-Robles), American report on Human Rights, and numerous non-governmental organizations, especially the Slovenian Peace Institute—has been drawing attention to the discrimination of the Muslim community due to the prevention of it building a mosque,3 and so too, on a regular basis, has the Slovenian Ombudsman.4 Eight years ago, the biggest deviation from the principle of separation occurred when a coalition of right-wing political parties was in power and adopted the Religious Communities Act that is currently in force.5 It needs to be remembered that this Act was written and submitted to the parliamentary procedure by the then Slovenian government, and not the clergy. Undoubtedly, the entity that is morally responsible for the Act is the RCC, which supported and lobbied for it although it, formally, has nothing to do with it. The Act was adopted by the Parliament and enforced by the then parties in power that made this happen with a minimum majority over the opposition, which makes the government fully responsible for all of the consequences of this Act. Before we examine this controversial and still valid legal regulation of religious communities in Slovenia, we consider it useful to call attention to the religious structure of the Slovenian population as it was at the beginning and end of the Slovenian transition. As shown in the Figure 7.1, although the Slovenian religious space has not essentially changed during the transition, some smaller shifts toward Figure 7.1 Population by religion and type of settlement, Slovenia, Census 1991 and 2002

Total Urban settlements Non-urban settlements

Religion

1991 1) 2002 1991 1) 2002 1991 1) 2002 TOTAL 1,913,355 1,964,036 971,502 997,772 941,853 966,264

Catholic 1,369,873 1,135,626 578,541 467,566 791,332 668,060 Evangelical 14,101 14,736 2557 3747 11,544 10,989 Other Protestant 1890 1399 1110 673 780 726 Orthodox 46,320 45,908 40,518 39,881 5802 6027 Other Christian 2410 1877 1537 1201 873 676 Islam 29,361 47,488 25,951 41,305 3410 6183 Jewish 199 99 117 63 82 36 Oriental 478 1026 282 777 196 249 Other religion 269 558 191 394 78 164 Agnostic . . . 271 . . . 211 . . . 60 Believer but belongs 3929 68,714 2504 44,638 1425 24,076 to no religion Unbeliever, atheist 84,656 199,264 69,164 147,941 15,492 51,323 Did not want to reply 81,302 307,973 51,465 171,604 29,837 136,369 Unknown 278567 139097 197565 77771 81002 61326

Proportions (%)

TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100

Catholic 71.6 57.8 59.6 46.9 84.0 69.1 Evangelical 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.1 Other Protestant 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Orthodox 2.4 2.3 4.2 4.0 0.6 0.6 Other Christian 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 Islam 1.5 2.4 2.7 4.1 0.4 0.6 Jewish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Oriental 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 Other religion 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Agnostic . . . 0.0 . . . 0.0 . . . 0.0 Believer but belongs 0.2 3.5 0.3 4.5 0.2 2.5 to no religion Unbeliever, atheist 4.4 10.1 7.1 14.8 1.6 5.3 Did not want to reply 4.2 15.7 5.3 17.2 3.2 14.1 Unknown 14.6 7.1 20.3 7.8 8.6 6.3

1) Data recalculated according to the 2002 Census methodology. Source : Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Census of population, households and housing 2002. Use and publication of data is allowed provided the source is acknowledged Figure 7.1 Population by religion and type of settlement, Slovenia, Census 1991 and 2002

Total Urban settlements Non-urban settlements

Religion

1991 1) 2002 1991 1) 2002 1991 1) 2002 TOTAL 1,913,355 1,964,036 971,502 997,772 941,853 966,264

Proportions (%)

TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100

1) Data recalculated according to the 2002 Census methodology. Source : Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Census of population, households and housing 2002. Use and publication of data is allowed provided the source is acknowledged 178 Srečo Dragoš a pluralist structure of the market of religious ideas and groups can still be identified. Let us summarize its basic characteristics:

1. It can be stated that Slovenia has chiefly remained Christian, mostly Catholic, although in the 10-year span the share of the population declaring itself Christian has evidently decreased, representing 61.1% of the population after the last census in 2002 compared with 74.9% at the census before that. This drop took place on account of Catholics as, clearly, the largest religious community both within and outside Christianity. In 10 years, the share of Catholics dropped from the previous 71.6% to the present 57.8% and, within urban areas, it represents less than one-half of the total population (46.9%). 2. Other Christian (non-Catholic) communities did not record such a drop. The Evangelistic community even recorded growth of one tenth of 1 percent, which was also the size of the fall in the share of Orthodox believers (most likely due to their emigration and, partly, due to their assimilation). During the same period, Islam, a religion which is closer to Christianity, recorded a rise by almost one whole percentage point (meaning up to 18,127 more believers). 3. More pronounced shifts occurred in terms of non-institutionalized declarations of religious belief. In the 10 years between the two mentioned censuses, the share of respondents declaring themselves religious without belonging to any particular religion rose from 0.2% to 3.5%. An even bigger rise was recorded by those declaring themselves atheists, which, in the same period, increased by almost 6% (meaning a total increase of 114,608 inhabitants or around one tenth of the total population). Immediately following Catholics, atheists have, thus, become a significantly larger category than all other religions in both urban and rural areas. In addition, the dramatic rise in the number of those who did not want to answer the question regarding their religious affiliation is particularly indicative: at the start of the transition, such respondents amounted to the usual 4.2%, whereas, at the last census, their number skyrocketed to as much as 15.7% of the population. It is impossible to explain this significant rise in abstaining from answering respondents’ potential skepticism regarding the assumed lack of credibility of the census-takers or their methods. More likely, this radical leap in this share of people—who consciously avoided Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 179

answers about their (non)religious belonging—was influenced by the then public discussions about use of the census data. It should be pointed out that, shortly before the last census was to be carried out, there were publicly noticeable requirements among Church circles (RCC) for a census which, in their opinion, would be the only tool to guarantee authentic data due to the assumed lack of credibility of other public opinion surveys.6 At the same time, ideas were emerging in the same circles that the data collected in the census could be used to underpin the calculation of the share of resources used for the state financing of religious communities (i.e., mainly the RCC). Even if, at the time, this possibility had been rejected by the authorities and the census-takers, this is exactly what has been enacted in the new Religious Freedom Act currently in force! Article 27 (Paragraph 4) of that Act states that, for the purpose of obtaining state funding, churches and religious communities can prove the size of their membership also “by using data from the last population census.”7 In short, it is highly probable that the share of respondents who did not entrust the census-takers with data about their religious belonging increased so radically due to their distrust regarding the state’s assurances—that is, that their census data would not be (ab)used for other purposes not envisaged in the census—which has, since, proven to be justified. 4. An important fact that is not evident in the above figure, although it is implicitly included in the figures, is the religious structure in terms of believers. With regard to the largest religious community, this means that, to obtain a structural insight, it is quality and not only quantity that matters. Therefore, what is the nature of the Catholicism of Catholics or those who declare themselves to belong to the Catholic faith? What do they believe in and in what way? It should be kept in mind that, in order to understand the plurality of a religious structure, the question of not only the quantity but also the quantity of religious beliefs and practices should be considered. This question would still be important even if just one religious community existed in society and all of society’s members were members of this religious community. If most members of the same religion give meaning to and demonstrate their belief in different ways, we speak about pluralism, and vice versa. All research studies reveal8 the following characteristics for most Catholics in Slovenia (similarly as for Catholics in other European countries): 180 Srečo Dragoš

▸▸ Catholics are not homogenous in terms of believing in the same image of God prescribed by the official RCC dogma; Slovenian Catholics understand and practice their belief in God in manifestly diverse ways. ▸▸ Most Catholics are skeptical of, or averse to, key religious dogmas the RCC considers the criterion of religious orthodoxy; the opinion of most Catholics is also diametrically opposed to that of the RCC clergy with regard to secular matters such as the question of whether the Church is poor or rich, what is its public mission, questions regarding sexuality, etc. ▸▸ Most Catholics are not institutional believers; only a minority regularly observes religious rituals. ▸▸ Despite the fact that the majority of the Slovenian population is Catholic, the majority of the population is distrustful of the institution of the RCC, which is imbued with the lowest reputation in all public opinion measurements. In 1991, namely, when the independent state of Slovenia was established, 65% and, just 7 years later, 75.5% of the population trusted the RCC and its clergy “little or not at all,” although, in the same period, trust in God did not fall, but, instead, increased by 3%9; the situation was the same even 10 years later when, in 2009, 77% of the population declared themselves distrustful of the RCC.10 ▸▸ Furthermore, with regard to the number of religious communities, the picture is considerably more mixed than may be assumed solely from the population census or official statistics. Only the largest communities are evident in the population census, whereas the number of churches and other religious actors officially registered with the Religious Communities Office also does not reflect the true state of affairs. When, in the period from 2000 to 2009, the Slovenian Religious Communities Office was headed by Mr. Čepar (a Catholic and a declared apologist for the interests of the RCC), the politics of this state office were clearly disinclined to accept new registrations; therefore, the number of registered religious communities remained at 42—the same as during socialism. However, today, the true number of operating religious communities in Slovenia is over 70,11 with their official status being as follows: 50% of them are actually registered as religious communities, 27.4% are registered in the same form as non-religious actors, 4.8% are registered as business entities, whereas 17.7% are groups operating informally. Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 181

In brief, these data and shifts in the religious structure of Slovenian society show that this is a pluralist society. Despite Catholics (still) representing the majority of the population, there are many diverse religious communities—old and more recent ones—and an evident growth in the share of individualist believers not belonging to any particular religious community or organization, along with a growing share of declared atheists or agnostics. Most Catholics (as, by far, the largest religious group) distinctively manifest a reserved, or even adverse, attitude to the RCC as an institution and toward the clergy as its functionaries. Moreover, what is the state’s reaction to such a—pluralist—religious structure?

Privileging the RCC

The first Catholic in Slovenia to make explicit efforts for the separation of the RCC from the state was a Catholic theologist, a renowned Slovenian, social activist, politician, sociologist, and prominent clergyman, Janez Evangelist Krek (1865–1917). More than 100 years ago, that is before World War I, Krek tried to persuade the Slovenian clergy that separation is not only socially beneficial, in general, but also is in the Church’s best interest: with its realization the RCC would gain autonomy from state intervention. Even at that time, Krek farsightedly foretold that it is not at all necessary that the separation be carried out to the RCC’s detriment— except in the case (which actually happened after World War II) of it being a priori rejected by the Church circles themselves in order for them to maintain the link with state privileges. Only in this case, and not otherwise, said Krek, could the separation have posed a threat to the RCC—something to its detriment.12 Incidentally, with regard to the separation, Krek also strove for the RCC’s consistent self-financing from believers’ voluntary contributions. Not only did Krek refuse state funding in any form, but also, in the name of justice, he refused any form of indirect assistance the state might offer when collecting the religious tax; there is no reason for money to flow from the believers’ pockets into the Church’s plate through any imposed taxation or through state intervention, said Krek.13 It is instructive to recall here the contrast between the then and the present political configuration of Slovenia: ▸▸ Krek wrote these comments some 100 years ago, that is, during the time when not a single communist existed as yet in Slovenia (or in Europe), which is why the endeavors to separate the RCC 182 Srečo Dragoš

from the state cannot a priori be stigmatized as stemming from the communist ideology; ▸▸ today’s top clergy still rejects Krek’s argument about the self- financing of the RCC with the very same arguments as they did approximately 100 years ago, with the only difference seen in their increased sharpness today. Up until World War II, these (and other) questions regarding the role of the RCC were publicly, extensively, turbulently, and also competently discussed within the Catholic camp,14 whereas, today, one cannot detect such a discussion among Catholics; ▸▸ politically and ideologically, Krek was positioned on the right, not the left, pole of the political sphere. What do we see if we compare his standpoints (about a consistent separation and the strict self- financing of the RCC) with today’s standpoints defended by the current Slovenian political parties? It can be quickly established that, with regard to the abovementioned questions, the right-wing, conservative Krek was considerably more radical than those making up Slovenia’s political “left” today. These days, it does not come to the mind of any politician—not even those considered the most profiled left-wing ones belonging to the “left-wing” parliamentary political parties—to defend Krek’s ideas, for example, those related to consistent self-financing. Probably, this is because, today, something similar would be regarded as atheist fundamentalist extremism. Thirteen years ago, a similar label was given to the mild and professionally qualified criticism accompanying the nontransparent procedure and disputable text of Slovenia’s state agreement with the Holy See. Back then, the theologist Ocvirk threw his opinion in the face of those who had objected in any way, either to the procedure or the contents of this state agreement with the Holy See, by saying that such doubts were simply being uttered by “ideological fundamentalists who are using all means in their attempt to maintain an atmosphere of civil war.”15 However, let us now move to the present. The Act on Religious Freedom16 currently in force is the basic instrument for regulating the relations between the state and religious communities in Slovenia, particularly with regard to their status, rights, and financing from the national budget. The Act has been problematic ever since it was first drafted, that is prior to 2007 when it was put into force. The state had commissioned the preparation of the theoretical starting points and the draft Act to a Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 183 private institution headed by Lovro Šturm, the then Minister of Justice and a member of the Catholic Order of Knights of Malta. No government official or expert in the field collaborated in the creation of this Act, nor was it put to any public discussion.17 In the Parliament, the Act was adopted with a bare minimum of votes, in which the oppositional variation of the Act on the same subject was rejected without any discussion, along with approximately 100 amendments with which the opposition parties had sought to amend the government proposal—not a single one of these amendments was taken into account. The RCC’s reaction to this legal stew was predictable and typical. The very attempt—the publicly manifested intention of members of Parliament to amend the Act that had patently been drafted to the advantage of the RCC—was labeled as something so horrific that it went beyond any of the events occurring in the communist past. The response of Catholic top officials was as follows:

Those who take pleasure in accusing Mahnič18 for being the one to create the schism among Slovenians can now see that this schism is clearly being further and consciously deepened by today’s opponents of the Catholic Church who in the recent parliamentary discussion on the Act on Religious Freedom have ultimately exposed themselves. Since forever the communists liked to rage against the ‘abuse of religion for political ends’. What they considered to be such abuse – for example a simple sermon – was a piece of cake compared to what their spiritual descendants have been doing.19 It is hard to imagine a clearer example of a religious community interfering in political matters. Although the clergy’s interference in the conditions of the separation of church and state in politics is prohibited, according to Bishop Stres, even the MPs’ remarks on the Act—although completely unsuccessful—were outrageous, and even the expression of such “hatred” toward the RCC that, compared to them, former communism was like “a piece of cake.” As virtually every article of the Act on Religious Freedom is problematic, in the continuation, I will limit myself to the biggest, most long-term, and most scandalous problem: the privileged state funding of the largest Slovenian church. Among the more than 13,000 civil society organizations and 70 different religious communities in Slovenia,20 the RCC is traditionally the strongest and wealthiest and, thanks to the state legislation currently in force, it is even further consolidating this position. 184 Srečo Dragoš

Furthermore, I list the main sources of RCC funding that existed before the present legislation was adopted, and I continue with those that were additionally introduced by the Religious Freedom Act currently in force. The existing sources of RCC funding are as follows:

1. The denationalization21 of property in a unique form and to an extent22, which—except in Slovenia—is not found in any other country. Here, four circumstances regarding this megalomanic state– legal project of “compensating” for injustices deserve our attention: a) One of the main purposes of the denationalization was that religious communities could become self-sustained, that is, they would not use state funding. b) Throughout the entire transition period, denationalization has featured as the main culprit for the escalation of property-related inequality between higher and lower strata. The chief reason for the stratification of the population during the transition from a socialist to a capitalist order is neither wage-class inequalities nor the introduction of market competitiveness in the economy or meritocratic logics which allegedly favor those who are most successful, hardworking, and competent on account of all others. From the time Slovenia gained its independence, inequality between people has started to increase mainly due to the redistribution of property—the leading and main cause of which was denationalization.23 Moreover, this is evident from the latest data: although today the usual wage scale in Slovenian companies is 1:25, with this income indicator classifying Slovenia among the most egalitarian countries, the difference in property between the lowest tenth and topmost tenth of the population results in a ratio of up to 1:52724; here, it needs to be pointed out that the true inequality is still underestimated in this ratio because it only refers to the value of real estate, and does not include other wealth.25 c) Wealth stemming from denationalization has been acquired independently of labor contributions, which is a civilizational paradox (involving a typical pre-modernist redistribution of wealth, legalized in postmodernity and in the formal framework of the social and democratic order). d) Easily the most eligible of all denationalization beneficiaries is the very RCC that, even before the denationalization, was the Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 185

richest civil society institution, and, clearly, the richest of all religious communities. The value of all claims pursued by the RCC against the state under the heading of denationalization amounts to EUR 233,222,136.26 2. Entrepreneurship: with the capital under the patronage of the RCC, profitable activities in all key economic fields have been developing intensively that have nothing to do with religion and which range from banking, the media27, accommodation and food service activities, and other service activities to trading in timber, in which the RCC has even achieved a market monopoly. Even before the ARF was adopted, financial experts estimated the value of the RCC’s property shares in Slovenian companies and its real estate regained through denationalization at over EUR 540 million, “meaning as much as 7 percent of the Slovenian national budget. This sum does not include all the other property owned by the Church prior to denationalization.”28 3. Marketing of religious services through the gray economy: no pricelists, no invoices, and no taxes. 4. Applications to tender for individual programs in which the RCC competes (with other nongovernmental organizations) for municipal or state funding. 5. Voluntary user contributions and donations. 6. Abundant state financing of church buildings under the heading of “immovable cultural heritage.” When the ARF was being adopted, the state Ministry of Culture reserved most of its earmarked funds solely to the RCC under this heading. Among all applications approved for the state funding of “cultural heritage” in 2007, up to 57.6 percent were requests by Catholic applicants that were granted 69.5 percent of all the funds distributed, which amounts to approximately EUR 3 million. However, what is disputable is not the state financing of the RCC under the heading of cultural heritage but, rather, the amount of these funds because it is difficult to believe that such expenses were granted according to completely appropriate criteria. Despite this doubt, which would need further proof, the state’s generosity is obvious enough. Just from this source that I state under this item, the state is financing the RCC with amounts that exceed those earmarked for the following budget users:29 the President of the Republic of Slovenia, the National Council, the Ombudsman, the Agency for 186 Srečo Dragoš

the Review of the Procedures of Property Conversion, the National Review Commission, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Slovenia, the Government Office for Legislation, the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development, the Social Attorney of the Republic of Slovenia, the Administrative Court of the RS, and the Minor Offences Panel of RS; this is also comparable with the funding received by the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (which is the only one of the listed institutions to be granted a little more funding than the RCC). Additional financing resources recently introduced by the ARF (Act on Religious Freedom) are the following: 7. The state will cover the wages of the clergy that, as of the adoption of the ARF, can be employed in all state institutions offering so-called institutional care; apart from the Slovenian Army that has already employed the clergy earlier, these include employment in the police, prisons, homes for the elderly, hospitals, and other institutions providing social care.30 8. Radically increased state financing of social benefits paid for the clergy, including retirement and disablement insurance, compulsory healthcare insurance, and parental protection. These benefits were introduced during socialism by the former socialist country, exclusively for reasons of social protection, namely, as a social corrective mechanism against the pauperization of priests because the property of the RCC as their employer institution had been nationalized and, therefore, presumably it was unable to provide for them. Today, now that the formerly nationalized property has been fully restituted, it would be natural to expect the abolition of these benefits for the clerical profession. However, what has happened is just the opposite. The former social security measure has turned into a privilege that is not enjoyed by any other professional group in Slovenia and, at the same time, this privilege has been increased by the Act on Religious Freedom from the former 42% to, so the Act reads, “not less than 60% of the average salary,”31 meaning what it says: 60% is the bottom limit with the top level having no legal limit. 9. A completely new, unprecedented, financial source is being introduced, namely, the general state funding of churches and religious communities for purposes that are positively undefined.32 Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 187

This gives the green light to the financing of any activities, including religious ones. 10. Total exemption from taxes: in previous drafts of the Act on Religious Freedom, the total exemption from taxes was envisaged by Article 32, which was not included in the finally adopted version of the Act on Religious Freedom. The reason lies in amendments to legislation that happened in the meantime, prescribing that religious communities are exempt from paying the following taxes: ▸▸ cadastral income (the RCC as the largest proprietor of forests and land including those of feudal origin); ▸▸ wealth tax; ▸▸ taxes on inheritance and gifts; and ▸▸ compensation for the use of construction land on which a religious activity takes place. 11. Personal income tax, as a new source of funding in which the state transfers 0.5% of a taxpayer’s personal income tax to a religious institution in accordance with a taxpayer’s choice. Out of all the listed sources of state funding of the RCC, only the fourth, fifth, and (partly) sixth sources are indisputable. All of the others are morally, legally, or constitutionally disputable.

Conclusion

Pushed through by the then right-wing government, the ARF is but the culmination of trends that have characterized the entire period since Slovenia gained its independence. These trends are: (1) an insufficiently defined constitutional principle of separation, (2) each respective national authorities in power making pacts with the RCC for political interests, (3) the poorly developed religious market, (4) the domination of one church, (5) the inappropriately executed denationalization (by making additional, feudalist exceptions in favor of the largest, wealthiest, most powerful, and politically most disputable33 institution of civil society), (6) the aggressive strategy of the clergy toward the state, and (7) the tradition of a “cultural struggle” and historical placement of Slovenia in the Latin religious-cultural pattern.34 The new legislative order has fatally laid out, for the long term, the regulation of the religious sphere on the basis of what are utterly erroneous starting points. Here, I will only summarize those that have constitutional significance: 188 Srečo Dragoš

1. They have definitely breached the constitutional principlef o separation of church and state, whose meaning can commonly vary when practiced, in one direction or another, that is, either coming close to the extreme of a rigorous separation or, vice versa, through practicing a cooperative distinction allowing for the (non-privileged and non-discriminatory!) cooperation of the state with religious communities.35 The ultimate boundary in terms of cooperation that should not be crossed is the direct state funding of religious services. It is this boundary that has been ignored by the new Act, with its provisions allowing the clergy to be employed as civil servants. 2. Equality of religious communities this constitutional principle can be practiced in two ways. The first one is equality in absolute terms, with the state giving equal rights to all religious communities regardless of their interests, size, age, “autochthonous nature,” financial, or other conditions. The second possibility is relative equality according to the criterion of “different things to different actors,” meaning that the state reacts differently to the varying needs, interests, and positions of different religious actors with the aim that the actually existing inequality among them does not remain or become a source of further marginalization or privilege for some of them. This means that the different treatmentf o different communities can only represent equal treatment on the condition that marginal actors are demarginalized and privileged actors are demonopolized. What is legalized by the Act on Religious Freedom currently in force is just the opposite: it confers the majority of privileges on the largest, wealthiest and most powerful religious community, it affords fewer privileges to smaller communities, and no privileges whatsoever to the smallest ones (although, in Slovenia, these are the most numerous). The new Act ensures state funding only for those church employees who belong to registered churches or religious communities that reveal a ratio of “not less than 1.000 believers” per cleric. Not only is this criterion illogical (as those church functionaries who have “no less than 1.000” believers can sustain themselves the most easily): on top of that, this criterion is clearly unconstitutional. As I pointed out earlier, we can only speak of equality in the opposite case, when funding would be provided to smaller religious organizations that, due to their having a small congregation, cannot survive from their believers’ contributions or the property of the religious community Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 189

for which they work. Equally discriminatory are the rules on registration that were written in favor of the largest religious actors and not the smaller ones. 3. The constitutional principle provides, moreover, for freedom of religious communities. However, this freedom is explicitly threatened by this very new Act which legalizes the direct state funding of religious services and makes civil servants of the (privileged) clergy. What the state finances, it also has to control; otherwise, the use of taxpayers’ money would be uncontrolled. Naturally, the RCC in Slovenia is only counting on receiving state money without having to be held liable for its use. Probably, this is what is going to happen.

Notes

1. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Ustava Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana: Uradni list Republike Slovenije, 1992). 2. Anton Ocvirk, “Potrebujemo svet za spoštovanje (ne)verujočih?” Večer (Maribor), August 12, 2002), p. 4. 3. For more on this, see: Srečo Dragoš, “Politizacija rimskokatoliške cerkve,” Socialno delo, 40, no. 1, 2001, pp. 13–28; Srečo Dragoš, “Islam in suicidalno podalpsko pleme,” Poročilo skupine o spremljanju nestrpnosti (Report of the Group on Monitoring Intolerance), no. 2, 2003, pp. 34–53; S. Dragoš, “Džamija— katalizator slovenske nestrpnosti,” Dialogi 40, no. 1/2, 2004, pp. 20–34. 4. Matjaž Hanžek, “Črno-bela brezbrižnost?” Varuh, 9, July 2006, p. 1. 5. Lovro Šturm, Predlog zakona o verski svobodi, August 15, 2006, www.uvs.gov .si/fileadmin/uvs.gov.si/pageuploads/Zakonodaja/verska_svoboda4.doc. 6. This mainly refers to expressing distrust in the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey (SPOS) project, which has been carried out since the 1960s by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences; throughout this time, in professional circles, this project has been regarded as the largest and most credible public opinion survey (due to it being able to gather the biggest sample, having the most elaborate methodology, the most professionally competent researchers, and the longest tradition). Distrust on the part of RCC functionaries in the SPOS project arises from the fact that all measurements of the SPOS research—from the oldest to the most recent—have shown the following three characteristics regarding Catholics: (1) their share is smaller than what is displayed by the top echelons of the RCC (which uses diverse, unclear, or disputable criteria to classify people among Catholics, such as the criterion of baptism); (2) among self-declared Catholics, a larger share of them does not 190 Srečo Dragoš

participate in Church rituals and does not believe in official church dogma; and (3) the public reputation of the RCC and its clergy is the lowest among all other institutions, equalling, for example, the reputation of political parties. These unfavorable findings were explained by the Church’s top officials as having been caused by the SPOS researchers being subjected to “communist” indoctrination although this was the only research project among others in Slovenia to be exposed to the earliest and most diverse ideological pressures (both during socialism and after Slovenia gained independence). 7. Lovro Šturm, Predlog zakona o verski svobodi. 8. Niko Toš (ed.), Vrednote v prehodu II: slovensko javno mnenje 1990–1998 (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 1999). 9. See: Srečo Dragoš, “Staranje v luči socialnega kapitala (na Slovenskem),” Socialno delo, 39, no. 4–5, 2000, p. 248. 10. Niko Toš (ed.), Vrednote v prehodu IV: slovensko javno mnenje 2004–2009 (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2009), p. 496. 11. Gregor Lesjak and Aleš Črnič, “O, Holy Simplicity! Registering a Religion in Slovenia,” Religion, State & Society, 35, no. 1, 2007, pp. 69–79. 12. S. Dragoš, “J. E. Krek—zamujena priložnost za RKC?” in A. Šelih and J. Pleterski, eds., Država in cerkev: izbrani zgodovinski in pravni vidiki (Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 2002), pp. 285–298. 13. For more, see: Janez Evangelist Krek, “Jakobinska svoboda,” Katoliški obzornik, IX, 1905, pp. 122–140; J. E. Krek, Izbrani spisi, Vol. III (Ljubljana: Jugoslovanska tiskarna, 1925). 14. Compare: Srečo Dragoš, Katolicizem na Slovenskem: socialni koncepti do druge svetovne vojne (Ljubljana: Krtina, 1998). 15. A. Ocvirk, “Naš komentar,” Družina, 51, no. 17, 2001, p. 3. 16. Zakon o verski svobodi (Freedom of Religion Act) 2007; accessed at 20, August 2013: http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO4008#. 17. For more details, see: Gregor Lesjak and Davor Lekić, “Država in verske skupnosti: kronika odnosov med letoma 2008 in 2011,” Teorija in praksa, 50, no. 1, 2013, pp. 154–171. 18. Anton Mahnič was a Slovenian Catholic theologist and bishop; at the end of the twentieth century, he was the main initiator of conflictive relationships arising between the RCC and state authorities, and the originator of the so-called “cultural struggle” in Slovenia. 19. Anton Stres, “Zloraba vere v politične namene,” Družina, 55, no. 30, August 6, 2006, www.druzina.si/spletnastran.nsf/all. 20. If the newly formed spiritual communities are added to the religious groups that have been formed in the time after Slovenia gained its independence, the number amounts to approximately 100 collectively organized actors. Despite pluralization of the (quasi)religious space, the RCC is still, by far, the largest Separation between Church and State in Slovenia 191

and most powerful one in Slovenia, and the number of its believers is still approximately 24 times larger than the second (Islamic) religious community in Slovenia; Lesjak and Lekić, “Država in verske skupnosti: kronika odnosov med letoma 2008 in 2011,” p. 155. 21. It is the denationalization of that property (mainly in kind), which, in the former socialist order, was nationalized under the heading of agrarian reforms, nationalization, and other confiscations. 22. The unique form and extent of denationalization refers to 100 percent naturalization, including the return of all (formerly) confiscated property in kind, including property of feudal origin (with extensive amounts of property, particularly forests, being returned to the RCC). 23. See: Srečo Dragoš and Vesna Leskošek, Družbena neenakost in socialni kapital (Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut, 2003), pp. 21–40. 24. Borut Mekina, “Enakost, bogata Slovenija,” Mladina, no. 28, July 12, 2013, p. 24. 25. The total value of the real estate owned by the top 10 percent of the population is EUR 25,130,262,184 million, although the lowest tenth of the population owns EUR 47.6 million worth of real estate (ibid.). 26. Delo, November 13, 2006, pp. 6–7. 27. Among Church investments in the mass media, the most notorious is the RCC’s investment in T-2, the second largest telecommunications company in Slovenia whose program includes pornographic films. In this regard, the top echelon of the RCC obviously decided that the expected financial effects have a priority over morally disputable contents; therefore, the RCC has not withdrawn its capital from T-2, despite frequently being the subject of criticism. 28. Delo, November 13, 2006, p. 4. 29. Data on the listed budget users refers to the 2003 national budget; Delo, January 10, 2003, p. 3. 30. Zakon o verski svobodi 2007, Articles 23–26, August 20, 2013, http://www.dz-rs .si/wps/portal/Home/deloDZ/zakonodaja/izbranZakonAkt?uid=411A661574 85250FC1257A1A00323A53&db=urad_prec_bes&mandat=VI. 31. Ibid., Article 27. 32. Ibid., Article 29, Item 3. 33. Here, I have in mind the political controversy of the RCC in terms of its larger involvement in political conflicts compared with other civil society organizations, either because they were triggered by the RCC or because the RCC allowed for being involved by the others. 34. This pattern typically displays: a (nominal) Catholic majority, the dominant position of the RCC, and its efficient resistance to reformation attempts, protestant churches, and the religious pluralization of society. This pattern includes Italy, Spain, Portugal, Latin American states (from Mexico and Cuba to Chile and Argentina), Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Ireland, 192 Srečo Dragoš

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; for more, see Marjan Smrke, Religija in politika: spremembe v deželah prehoda (Ljubljana: Znanstveno publicistični center, 1996), p. 50 ss. 35. For more on different models of separation or the distinction between the state and church—mainly relevant to Slovenian and former Yugoslav territories, see: Srečo Dragoš, “Cerkev/država: ločitev ali razločitev?” Teorija in praksa 38, no. 3, 2001, pp. 440–455; Srečo Dragoš, “Kam void zakon o verski svobodi,” Poročilo skupine o spremljanju nestrpnosti (Report of the Group on Monitoring Intolerance), no. 5, 2006, pp. 8–33; Marjan Smrke, Religija in politika, pp. 27–60; M. Smrke, “Proselytism in Post-Socialist Slovenia,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 36, no. 1–2, 1999, pp. 202–220; M. Kerševan, Cerkev, politika, Slovenci po letu 1990 (Ljubljana: Založba Enotnost, 1996); Marko Kerševan, Svoboda za cerkev, svoboda od cerkve (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2005); Miklós Tomka, “Tendencies of Religious Change in Hungary,” Archievs de Sciences des Religions, 65, no. 1, 1988, pp. 67–79; Siniša Zrinščak, Sociologija religije: hrvatsko iskustvo (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet, 1999), pp. 51–60; Zdenko Roter, Katoliška cerkev in država v Jugoslaviji 1945–1973 (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1976), pp. 117–172. 8 Religion and Politics in Kosovo Anton K. Berishaj

Religion as a form of conscience is as old as mankind itself. The effective methodology to trace its roots, may seem rather unusual to the reader, as the research is based on data borrowed from either zoology (the cult of bones and skeletons) or anthropology (the burial of the dead). The reason for using this methodology is very simple: the Earth has preserved nothing else, but bones, tools, and, maybe, some works of art.1 Kosovo, as a territory of the ancient Illyrian land, does not contain anthropological elements that would require the application of these methods. The history of Kosovo, in different periods, has been unique, and the end results have been unique religious phenomena that are historic, preserved, well-known, and scientifically accepted. The essence of religion is not a knowledge, or an action, but, rather, a feeling, a particular way of existence without submissions. Girgenson says that it is an “undifferentiated affective state.” Durkheim, Parsons and Luhmann are of the opinion that religion may be a major factor of stability, if it is able to provide to the entire society, or to parts of it, substantive elements of political, social, and psychological contingencies. The conventional wisdom is that religious faith is, first and foremost, a faith that assumes acceptance,

193 194 Anton K. Berishaj submission, restriction, and the helplessness of men in front of a powerful being, full of light and truthfulness, and, in this spirit, the individuals organize their own knowledge.2 However, let us have a look at the chronology of religious developments in Kosovo today.

Christianity

One of the unresolved issues of prehistoric Kosovo that has generated disagreements in the local and international scientific community is the origin, proliferation, and survival of Christianity in the Illyrian, Dardanian, and Albanian lands. Among those with an objective approach, free of emotions, guided by the desire to contribute to the discovery of this issue, and flexible in his approach to available scientific arguments is Don Gaspёr Gjini.3 He says that the fact that there are no documents on the beginnings of Christianity in Dardania, on whose existence we would have based the use this terminology up until the end of the third century, is not helpful. “Illiricum” was introduced in the sacred literature by Paul the Apostle. Paul himself wrote: “From Jerusalem and its vicinities and up to Illyricum, I fulfilled the duty of preaching the happy news on Jesus.” However, nowhere is it said that Paul did not go inside Illyricum. To acknowledge the entrance of St. Paul into Illyricum, Don Shan: Zefi, refers to St. Jerome.4 Some scholars think that the expression “up to Illyricum” excludes the possibility of his visiting and preaching in those known lands. According to them, Paul has only been up to the borders of Illyricum, but did not cross them.5 Further along, the author notes that—nowhere is it excluded that Paul travelled to his compatriots in Paeonia, specifically Dardania. However, it is hard to believe that this endeavor was not undertaken by at least his pupils. In addition, one must not forget the early Christians, members of different trades such as merchants, soldiers, and so on who brought with themselves the practical knowledge of the new religion that introduced radical changes in inter-human relations. Writing about the origins of Christianity in the Illyrian-Albanian lands, Peter Bartl, notes that there are no written documents on the christening of the Albanians. The fact that the Albanian religious words, for the most part, are borrowed from Latin, leads to believe that Christianity started in the Romanized coastline cites. With the division of the Empire in 395, Albania fell politically under Byzantium; however, religiously, it Religion and Politics in Kosovo 195 was under the jurisdiction of Rome; in 732, it was under Constantinople. After the schism of 1054, Albania found itself in the middle of the tense zone between the east and the west church.6 In a letter of the Archbishops of Dardania to Pope Gelasius in 494, the Dardanians inform the Pope that they have always stayed away from the aberrations of Euphemius, Peter Mongus, and Acacius and, from there on, will do so even more forcefully. At the same time, they ask Pope to send someone from the “sacred throne” to further strengthen the good faith.7 These are testimonies that Christianity had started earlier in Dardania, in accordance with the thesis of a number of international scholars, as noted by D. Sh. Zefi. A number of local authors do not agree completely as to when and how Christianity spread. Nonetheless, they seem to agree that Christianity is not of foreign origin, but rather autochthones, because, since apostolic times, the Gospel was preached by the Apostles themselves and their pupils (D.Sh. Zefi, M.LE Quien, D.Farlati, H.Leclero, etc). During the first rite-forming centuries, the apostle-based religion among the Illyrian–Albanian people developed into two main forms: “the modus latinus” took hold in the Northern part of the country, whereas the South, close to Greece, fell under the influence of the Byzantine rites. That is why we can say that both rites existed from the beginning: the rite of the Latin language and the Byzantine rite of the Greek language.8

The Serbian Orthodox Church

Besides its ethnic belonging, being a Serb is strongly defined by its membership in the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Church first got its autonomy from the Greek Orthodox Church in the beginning of the thirteenth century, and became totally independent in 1346; since then, its independence was interrupted several times; however, the use of Slavic liturgies and the dominant role it had played in the Serbian cultural life has continued uninterrupted.9 The Dečani and Gračanica Monasteries represent the two most important objects of the Serbian orthodox cult in Kosovo. The church of Gračanica was built by King Milutin in 1310. The church of Dečani was built between the years 1327 and 1335. These churches were preserved during the entire not-so-symbiotic history of Kosovo. The Serbian Church is present in the public, political, and cultural life; however, its role increases during tense situations, as it helps national 196 Anton K. Berishaj homogenization, especially before armed conflicts. In contrast, its role diminishes during peaceful and prosperous times, as was the case during communism. During this time, the Serbian Orthodox Church was ignored, as broad masses of people embraced the ideology of communism. With the exception of Albania, where religion was banned, its properties, especially those of the Catholic church, were ruined or transformed into storage or sporting pavilions, and the Catholic clergy were persecuted and destroyed, nowhere else has the clergy and religious properties been denigrated more than in Serbia by Serbs themselves. That is why it is rightly said that: “for Serbs religious feelings are neither deep nor intimate. Their churches are mostly empty, with the exception of the main religious events or political celebrations. Contemporaneous Serbs consider the church as a political institution, linked in a mysteri- ous way with the existence of their nation. They do not allow anyone to attack or compromise it, although when it is not attacked they forget about it.”10 During the time the present-day territory of Kosovo was occupied by Turkey, islamization—according to all accounts—was embraced en masse by the Albanians but not by Serbs, although both ethnic groups were together for a long time and were living under the influence of the Serbian power, during the pre-Ottoman period as well as under the Ottoman–Turkey power during the Ottoman period. M. Tёrnava mentions the conversion of the orthodox population to Islam, or the very dubious thesis of Catholics being converted to Islam through orthodoxy. Tёrnava explains it by the myth of the Orthodox faith being closer to Islam than to Catholicism. The conversion of Catholics to Islam, according to the myth, is done through their conversion to Orthodoxy first, which, as the author himself explains, is not hard to understand as a fabrication that aims to divide the Albanians. Father Kerubini, in 1638 writes that—if one goes north of Jakova, one could see the beginnings of the schisms; there are only three catholic houses, and many, many villages with Turks.11 In contrast to catholic churches, the local orthodox churches in Kosovo were allowed to lead their followers. Of course, restrictions were imposed, and the Christians, in general, were treated as secondhand citizens; however, forced conversions to Islam occurred very rarely.12 The relations of Kosovo Islamic Community and Kosovo Catholic Church with the Serbian Orthodox Church have never been good, because of the frequent participation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the formulation of the official Serbian policy toward Kosovo that Religion and Politics in Kosovo 197 climaxed with the war of 1999. Relations have not improved after the war, and have been further damaged by the events of March 2004, when a number of Orthodox Church buildings were burned or damaged, although these attacks were condemned by political and intellectual Albanian circles.

Islamization

According to written documents, the process of islamization in the present-day territory of Kosovo started during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.13 However, many scholars have been more intrigued with the way the conversion to Islam was done in the territory of Kosovo. Was islamization violent, or was it a spontaneous process, a free exchange of traditional values for the benefits offered by the conversion? How “profitable” was this exchange in the historic, religious, cultural, economic, and moral aspects? Whether conversion to Islam help preserve the ethnic characteristics threatened by Slav and Greek neighbors is another debatable topic on which the scholars do not agree (Malcolm, Krasniqi, Pirraku, Zefi, Gjergji etj). To get to a scientific analysis of these dilemmas, one must strive “to penetrate,” as naturally as possible, into the years and circumstances of the Ottoman rule. In many writings, notes, scientific papers, and so on, one finds a number of factors that have helped the conversion. With the exception of a few authors that acknowledge the use of violence during the conversion,14 most deny forced conversions. The scientific literature, both national and international sources, offers a large variety of factors and circumstances, laws, and state politics that influenced the decision to convert to Islam. Among the top factors are the economic policies (heavy taxes for Christians), a denigrated social status “rajё” (in Arabic meaning “herd” a name used later only for the Christians peasants); humiliation and unfair treatment by the law, lack of security and danger for the individual and family, especially for girls and women, ransom in blood (taking of the children), inability to enjoy the right to be part of the state apparatus, inability to own land, not enjoying the same protection by the law as the converted individuals do, and so on. Before we clarify the conversion process, we must initially clarify the concept of “violence.” What does it mean? In the absence of physical violence, do the state measures and circumstances mentioned earlier qualify as violent? What are the alternatives to this pressure? Do 198 Anton K. Berishaj all of these measures apply only to “the infidels,” as a pressure for them to convert, or are those measures routinely applied to all, regardless of their belief? In addition to the abovementioned factors, the pressure on the Catholics derives from the animosity of the Ottomans against the Venetian Republic and the anti-Ottoman policy of the Holy See. Contrary to the Orthodox Church, whose leader is situated in Istanbul, the leader of the Catholic Church, who was planning wars against Turks, was considered a bitter enemy. The period of “pampering” the Orthodox believers came to an end by the mid-eighteenth century, during the Russo-Turkish war; nonetheless, the anti-Catholic disposition of the Turkish administration reflected harshly on Catholic believers. This negatively influenced the ability to supervise and staff the churches with clergy, thus playing a role in their religious apathy. The Ottomans were more concerned with war than with religion, and the most powerful dynamics of the internal operations of their state was the military expansion. The majority of the local officials were converts, and did not have a good reason to spare their “infidel” compatriots who were resist- ing conversion. At the end of the sixteenth century, a large number of renegade Albanians in Constantinople held high positions: among others, two Pashas, one son-in-law of the Sultan, and many viziers. These renegades led the military campaigns and laid the foundation for islamization. In present-day Kosovo, a century later, where islamization is gaining impetus, the number of renegades multiplies. From 92 Grand Viziers that have governed from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, 25 were of Albanian origin.15 According to Georg Stadtműller, the reason of the relatively quick spread of Islam, generally in the Balkans, mostly in Bosnia and Albania, was not for religious motives, but rather was economic and juridical. According to religious laws, (Fikh) was the privilege of the Muslims of the upper classes, whereas non-Muslims were deprived of the political rights. This argument can also be proved by the fact that the conversion to Islam meant a social mobility toward the political hierarchy and the right to enjoy certain privileges. Furthermore, the “Rajah” were deprived of rights and forced to pay high taxes per capita (ðizja). To this measure, the author would like to add the order passed by Sultan Selim II, in 1569, to confiscate all the revenues of the Christian churches in the empire (with the exception of Religion and Politics in Kosovo 199 those in Constantinople, Bursa, and Adrianople), and the destruction of churches and their transformation into mosques.16 According to many sources, the Orthodox Church was exercising powerful pressure and was using the catholic believers to collect the church taxes. In contrast, scientific research from anthropology and psychology says that a primitive mentality does not like free-will innovation, change, and transformation. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl has dedicated an entire chapter to this in his well-known book “La Mentalité Primitive”, where he states, among other things, that: “in general the primitive communities reject everything coming from outside, but for those coming from the neighboring tribes, similar to them, that have similar customs and institutions and with whom they have good relations. From a real stranger they don’t borrow or accept anything. Changes, although progressive, have to be imposed on them. If they were free to choose between accepting and rejecting, their choice without any doubt would be rejection”.17 Furthermore, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, points out: “ . . . for as long as the social community exists and feels that it is alive and does not abandon the war, it instinctively rejects the new elements the foreigners bring. This is how we should understand, as we will see, what is usually called “misoneism18 or the hatred of change or innovation in the primitive social communities.”19 That is why the position of many authors who treat the conversion as a free-will act, and not violent—not only in the case of the Albanians but everywhere in the world—is not well based. One of the most valid arguments in support of the violent conversion is the phenomena of syncretism or Crypto-Christianity.

Crypto-Christianity

One of the unique phenomena of this world is the religious syncretism, or, as it is called in the Albanian literature, Crypto-Christianity. It means a public conversion, an embrace of Islam outwardly, going to the mosque on Friday, but, deep in the heart, remaining loyal to the tradition and rules of Christianity (Zefi, op.cit). In this way, those converted to Islam continue to baptize their children and to observe the Christian feasts.20 Originally, the first to convert was the head of the family. In this way, the family would join the list of converted families and begin enjoying the benefits deriving from the existing laws, which means they would enjoy the mercy of the regime. Such a practice would not have continued for 200 Anton K. Berishaj a long time. It follows another defunct practice—the conversion of the head of the tribe. To oppose the phenomena of the declarative conversion, of Crypto-Christianity, that had assumed worrying proportions for the Catholic Church, the first Assembly of the Arber, held at the Church of Saint John the Baptist, in Merci of the Diocese of Lezha in 1703, decided to take measures to mitigate the trend. Among others it decided to: “punish all those that have converted to Islam to avoid paying taxes.”21 The first consequence of this harsh measure might have had an opposite effect. The phenomenon of Crypto-Christianity has been preserved up to the present day. In these families, besides their Muslim names and some other traces that have been preserved in terms of the life style, tradition and characteristic clothing from their region, nothing else is Muslim. After the end of the last century, and the beginning of the current one, a number of families and individuals belonging to the Crypto-Christians have reconverted to Catholicism, but a considerable number of them continue the Crypto-Christian life. They have been joined by a limited number of families or individuals—some because of their conviction and others because of the euphoria of the European historic and cultural roots of Kosovo. The weakening of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the strengthening of the Slav neighbors that, from the Congress of Berlin (1878), had started to annex Albanian land. Furthermore, this trend was accompanied by conversion campaigns (violent christening) into Orthodoxy that did not spare the Catholics either.22 Later on, after the Balkan wars, Kosovo was part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. During the communist decades, with the exception of ban- ning the yashmak, there were no other harsh measures instituted to ban religious practices.

Bektashis

It is not by coincidence that we placing Bektashis adjacent to Crypto-Christians. Many of their orders (Sufi and Dervish) developed a mystical form of theology that is based not only on the Sunni doctrine, but also on Shiite, Judaism, Neoplatonism, and Christianity. Further, their religion has traces of Asian pre-Muslim Shamanism, whereas, in the villages, they encourage the cult of the local saints and of their tombs (Malcolm: op.cit). All elements that played a role in the embracing Religion and Politics in Kosovo 201 of Islam by the Christian community contributed to the Bektashi order as well. This is a Dervish sect. At the center of the Bektashi doctrine is the original idea of Sufism on the equality of all religions. In a general sense, one sees similarities between Muslims turned into Bektashi with Albanian Crypto-Christians. Those who possess the virtues of wisdom, patience, love for the good, and accept celibacy can achieve the status of Dervish, similar to the Christian nuns, and, as such, they live in their monastery called “tecie” or “tekke”.23 The geographical location, time dimension, as well as the number of Albanian Bektashis, according to D. Sh. Zefi, is not well known because of lack of documentation. According to Evlyia Celebi, in 1662, Bektashi tekkes were found in Mitrovica, Vushtrri, and Kačanik. Of course, there were other centers, although most of the Bektashi orders in Kosovo spread during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Documents on Dervish tekkes in Kosovo are, at best, fragmentary. Geographically, they are not equally spread in the entire territory. Most of them are found in the south-west, close to the border with Albania. Today, they are present in Prizren, Pej, Rahovec, Gjakovë, etc.24 According to this author, the Bektashi Order was expected to have disappeared in 1945 after the communists took power. Their disappearance would have been aided by the open conflict. The Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1952, officially banned the order of the Dervish. However, in Kosovo, during 1974–1984, their number increased. According to the authorities, the number of Dervishes concentrated in Kosovo increased to a hundred thousand.25 Janjevci, is a specific minority in Kosovo, identified ethnically with the Croats. They are Slavs of the Catholic faith. It is not quite clear how they came to Kosovo. One theory is that their concentration in Janjevo is related to a group of merchants from the Republic of Dubrovnik that settled there more than four centuries ago. Since the 1990s, especially after the armed conflict in Kosovo, the Janjevci immigrated to Croatia. Prior to 1991, there were 8062 Janjevci, whereas, in 2007, only 320 remained. Janevci historically have had good interfaith and ethnic relations with their neighbors. Interfaith communication in Kosovo today: Kosovo has been through an interethnic war. As a result, the communication between The Serbian Orthodox Church with the Islamic Community of Kosovo and the Catholic Church of Kosovo has totally broken down. The Serbian Orthodox Church, as an important factor that supported the Serbian 202 Anton K. Berishaj policy toward Kosovo, has shown open contempt and animosity toward its counterparts in Kosovo. On the other hand, Kosovo, differently from other countries in the region, has very good interfaith communication between the Muslim and Catholic populations. The years of crises and the common danger from the Serbs have contributed to getting them closer together. Pjetër Bogdani, Pjetër Budi, Shtjefën Gjeçovi, Father Nikё Prela, Father Lush Gjergji, and many others are renowned figures of the Catholic Church, and enjoy particular respect not only as Church officials but also as Albanian writers in a population with a Muslim majority. The officials of the two main faiths in Kosovo, in the present day, have been willing to cooperate in order to overcome any situation that would have eventually contributed to the worsening of the relations. In the Balkans known to be historically violent, Albanians represent an oasis of communication and peaceful religious coexistence. Whereas for other nations religious belonging is a crucial element of their identity, without which their ethnic belonging cannot be comprehended, for Albanians, religious belonging has never represented a problem. In Albania and Kosovo, interfaith communication offers an unprecedented tolerance in the region. Being a Serb, a Montenegrin, a Macedonian, a Greek, a Bulgarian, and not belonging to the Orthodox Church is close to impossible, just as it is close to impossible to be a Croat or Slovenian without being Catholic, or being Bosnian and not being Muslim. Albanians, not only in Kosovo, but wherever they live, are known for their religious tolerance. However, this often-used word—tolerance— seems not to be the best to describe the interethnic communication among Albanians. Ermal Hasimja, during a scientific debate on religion, rightly stated that the word “tolerant” hardly describes the Albanian interfaith communication. To be tolerant, according to him, means to suffer, to be put under pressure, and to show restraint in your reaction. To support this argument and to defend it from the usual pathetic premises of national-romanticism, or eventual exaggerations, I use the findings of a poll, conducted sometime earlier by the Center for Humanistic Studies “Gani Bobi.”26 According to the results of this study, 44% of those polled say they consider interfaith communication a good tradition that should be preserved. If we add to it the two other numbers (17.9% and 16.6%) that, in a way, respect and recognize this value, you get an absolute majority (74.7%) which states that ethnic belonging has priority over religious belonging. Religion and Politics in Kosovo 203

It’s a good tradition worthy of any time, 44

Important for its time, but still valid, 16.6

Religious more important than national belonging, 8.2

No opinion, 5 Ref/pp, 1.1

Don't know, 5.1 National more important than I believe the individual, not the religious belonging, 17.9 religion or nationalism, 2.1

Figure 8.1 Pashko Vase Shkodrani poem—which one do you agree with? Source: Maliqi, Shkëlzen and Latifi, Blerim. (2010).Study of Religion. Prishtinë: Center for Humanistic Studies “Gani Bobi.”

The question in the poll, as Figure 8.1 shows, is the often-quoted verse of Pashko Vasë Shkodrani, the renaissance poet and activist. Shkelzen Maliqi offers the following explanation for the secularization and the good interfaith communication that emerges from this poll: “Albanian nationalism could have succeeded only as trans-faith nationalism. The founders of the Albanian national conscience were aware of this and that’s why in their writings nationality had always priority over religion. The best example in this context is the call of the Pashko Vasa in the well known poem “Oh Albania, Poor Albania”: “don’t look to the church or mosque, the religion of the Albanians is Albanianism.” Because of all these, the Albanian nationalism emerged as a secular nationalism, whose fathers were not the clergy, like in the case of Serbs or Greeks, but the poets and writers that were educated with the ideas of the European Enlightenment and Romanticism. The Albanian nationalism strengthened and turned the tribal proto-secularism of the customary law into a modern political ideology of all the Albanian.”27 Nonetheless, I think that the poem “Oh Albania, Poor Albania” from which the verses were taken, deserves a thorough analysis. Their survival through centuries cannot be explained (only) by their beautiful lyrics, or (only) by their constructive message. They have been immortalized not only because of their reconciliatory tone and the nationalistic content in 204 Anton K. Berishaj the context of the circumstances created after the Turkish occupation, the bondage, the humiliation (Awaken, Albania, wake from your slumber), but also because of the division of the Albanian people in different religions. Many foreign authors considered this the most nationalistic Albanian poem.28 The message of reconciliation can be seen:

Albanians, you are killing your brothers, Into a hundred factions you are divided, Some say ‘I believe in God,’ others ‘I in Allah,’ Some say ‘I am Turk,’ others ‘I am Latin,’ Some ‘I am Greek,’ others ‘I am Slav,’ But you are brothers, all of you, my hapless people! The priests and the hodjas have deceived you To divide you and keep you poor . . . (Translation by Robert Elsie)

The interfaith coexistence in Kosovo has not always been without problems, despite the fact that, for a conflict to emerge, you need two rivals, two sides, or two armies, relatively equal. The Kosovo Catholic Church, despite its active participation in the religious, public, political, and scientific life, because of the low number of followers (~3%), had not been able to play the role of the rival, even if it wanted to do so. Nonetheless, in particular moments, the Catholic Church and its followers have been attacked by more radical groups and individuals. “The religious tolerance at the center of the peaceful future of Kosovo,” has been denounced, at a very difficult time, during the genocidal violence by the Serbian Orthodox Church against the Albanianism of the Kosovo. However, in the second part: “NO Cathedral in the name of illusionary Albanianism,” we denounce the propaganda of the Catholic Church in the name of the truth of the Religion of the Christ—for the conversion to Catholicism of the Albanian Muslims. At the same time, we say NO to the decision of the President of Kosovo to build a political Cathedral in the backyard of the “Xhevdet Doda” gymnasium in the center of Prishtina.29 Science and random generalizations do not see eye to eye. There have been cases trying to find a way to ruin the good interfaith coexistence and communication that exists in Kosovo, in the form of a “pamphlet,” a writing, a manifesto, a protest, or an expression of dissatisfaction, where even personalities honored and respected by the entire world have not been spared (see: Hoxha Shefqet Krasniqi: Mother Teresa’s place is in inferno” etc.). These are isolated cases that were never able to shake Religion and Politics in Kosovo 205 the foundations of the correct interfaith communication. Individuals, religious officials, intellectuals or private persons, from this or that side, in Kosovo or in Diaspora, express their own opinions and convictions that I think cannot pose any risk for as long as their activity is limited to verbal expression. The Islamic Community of Kosovo has an extended network of institutions: a madrasah, the faculty of Islamic Knowledge, 513 mosques, of which 218 were ruined during the war, and over 95% of the believers. The Kosovo Catholic Church, as compared with the Islamic Community of Kosovo, has a modest number of believers (~65, 000, belonging to 24 parishes with 37 priests and a considerable number of helpers—sisters of honor). This population represents approximately 3% of the general population of Kosovo and it is projected to decline further, because of immigration, mainly to Western countries. This does not mean that the Muslim population of Kosovo is not immigrating; to the contrary, actually. However, because of the low number of the catholic believers, their immigration rate has been high since the time of the former Yugoslavia. Sects in Kosovo: The fall of communism in last century, in the 1990s, brought the emergence of alternative groups, sects, and associations. Among the groups that emerged as an alternative to the Islamic Community of Kosovo and the Catholic Church are: Evangelical Church, Witnesses of Jehovah, Baptist Church, Adventist Church, Hare Krishna, the Church of Unification, the Church of the Latter Day Saints, etc. The exact number of believers of these sects is not known, but the prevalent idea is that it has never been high—and that, in recent years, because their activity has fallen, it will further decline. These mainly Christian sects have been founded and attended mainly by former Muslim believers. There have been no incidents, animosities, or open conflicts with any of the existing religious communities in Kosovo. Wahhabism: This is a new movement in Kosovo. Wahhabism is a conservative Islamic movement, founded in the late seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. The spiritual source of Wahhabism is Muhammed Abdulwahab, the so-called reformer of Islam. The main trend of these reformers is to keep Muslims within the original interpretation of Islam. Wahhabism is found in Asia, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is related to an extreme fundamentalist radicalism. In Kosovo, although it had started earlier, it appeared publicly after the last war and tends to grow and extend its influence in the Islamic Community 206 Anton K. Berishaj of Kosovo. This movement is linked to some excessive situations, attacks, and aggression that have been witnessed, at times, against some officials of the Kosovo Islamic Community. We have not seen similar cases with other religions. In general, according to empirical data, the post-communist period is characterized by a return toward faith, but this return has been very soft.30 Nonetheless, in an interview for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Irfan Al-Alawi, international director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism and executive director of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation, as published in Kosova’s daily newspaper, under the title: “Radical Wahhabist elements penetrate Kosovo,”31 stresses among other things: Radical Wahhabist elements are penetrating in Kosovo and they might damage the interfaith harmony that has existed there for years . . . for years, we have seen the Saudi government, or non-officials that have sent money indirectly to the government or to individuals, to open salafist wahhabi mosques to promote the extreme ideology, which is very dangerous for the Balkans and I believe that if the Muslims are not aware of this, gradually we will have extreme clerics that will flourish in Kosovo, that will use the Islamic sharia law and abuse it. This will not promote peace and harmony, religious diversity and pluralism as we see now, but Islam as a state religion without respecting the other religions. Irfan Al-Alawi, concludes his interview by saying that one should distinguish between those who endanger the interfaith communication and Islam. Islam is a peaceful religion. These extreme phenomena should not be used to justify intolerance or hatred against Islam. “We must make it clear and understandable for the non-Muslims that the threat is not coming from Islam, the threat is coming from Wahhabism, from powerful Salafism, from Tablighi Jamaat or Deobandi movement. We should be clear on that.”32 The efforts of Wahhabis to impose themselves as a new movement, but with an old Islamic ideology in Kosovo, in addition to sporadic conflicts with the Kosovo Islamic Community (which paradoxically is considered as an institution that defends traditional Islam), have climaxed with two requests that, for a secularist society, like that of Kosovo, were seen as a setback by part of the population. These are: the use of headscarf and the cover of the head by females in the public institutions and the introduction of the religious studies in the public schools. Bearing in mind the fact that the Yugoslav state had forbidden the use of yashmak for the Kosovo Religion and Politics in Kosovo 207 women right after World War II, the request to start using it was seen as anachronic. But not for everyone! As we see from the abovementioned research, a considerable number of those polled say they like the practice of women covering their head in public institutions in Kosovo. Are these on par with the concerns of Irfan Al-Alawi—for an increased radicalization of Wahhabis or are these normal requests, non-orchestrated, but sporadic, even for a secular society like that of Kosovo—where the headscarf for girls in public schools and the introduction of religious studies in schools, are worth analyzing. This issue was covered widely by the local media, especially after the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo rejected the requests of the Justice Party of Kosovo. Kosovo preserved its secularism, in accordance with its constitution, and it did not move from this position. To the question: should the girls cover their heads in the public schools, Figure 8.2 from the abovementioned source, offers a surprising result: 42.4% say “it should be allowed by law,” as opposed to 34.5% that say “in no way headscarf should be allowed in the public schools.” Analyzing the poll’s data, Maliqi and Latifi, in their final report,33 offer an explanation that considers the context of a chaotic situation—especially the fact that the ban of the headscarf might violate the freedom and the rights of the individuals. The large number of people (42.4%) can be explained by the confusion created in the public opinion regarding the normative status of allowing the headscarf, where the headscarf is an expression of individual freedom or a religious duty. On one hand,

Should be allowed by law, 42.4 Headscarf should not be allowed to be used in public schools, 34.5

Should be tolerated in practice, 12.1 Not sure/ no opinion, 8.7

Don’t know, 1.8 ref/pp, 0.6

Figure 8.2 Use of headscarf in public schools 208 Anton K. Berishaj the concept of the headscarf as an expression of individual freedom naturally increases the support for it, as people do not want to be against the individual freedom and rights. On the other hand, a considerable percentage (34.5%), thinks that headscarf in public schools should not be allowed. Notably lower is the percentage of those who think that headscarf should be allowed in practice, although the law bans it (12.1%). Meanwhile, 10.5% says that they do not have an opinion/do not know how to solve this issue.34 The Kosovo Justice Party, a political entity with a modest backing, during the electoral campaign, promoted Sharia values, without garner- ing any support either among voters or among the Kosovo officials. “The New Kosovo Coalition, where the Justice Party was member of, during the last electoral campaign promised to incorporated religious studies in the curriculum as well as to create an opportunity for girls that refuse to take the scarf off to follow the studies.” Supported by the Kosovo Islamic Community, the Justice Party states that it defends the rights and liberties of citizens, especially when they contribute to the strengthening of the norms of the Muslim societies. Daily “Koha Ditore,” writes: “The Justice Party cannot push for a referendum on the use of the headscarf in schools and on the introduction of the religious studies in the curriculum, because the constitution does not allow it.” Ferid Agani, the Minister of Health and chairman of the Justice Party said that he will propose a referendum on the issue. The authors, Maliqi and Latifi, in the study on religion,35 call it a “hot issue,” and we will consult precisely them. After the unexpected results on the question of the introduction of religious studies in public schools, the authors say: “the data shows that 59.0% of those polled support the introduction of religious studies in public schools. The explanation can be found in the perception of the society for religion, as having an educational moral dimension that teaches good value to people. This point of view is best articulated in the saying ‘religion teaches good things’, which is found in the everyday popular jargon and is related to the traditional way the Albanians practice their religion.”36 The almost homogenous religious structure of the Albanian population of Kosovo implies the introduction of Islamic teachings in public schools. Such a practice exists in some EU countries, or in some former Yugoslav countries (Croatia, Serbia, etc.). However, such a request is motivated and partly justified with the idea of protecting the youth from the negative influences (narcotics, alcohol, prostitution, etc.) that, Religion and Politics in Kosovo 209 because of the porous borders, the presence of internationals, and of the “overdose” of the Western culture offered to Kosovo after the war of 1999 have assumed worrisome proportions. During the debate in the parliament over the request of the Justice Party, the “Vetvendosje” (Self-Determination) Movement, in principle, supported the proposal, but conditioned it with additional debate about the religious instructions to be introduced in the curriculum and that it focus on the history of the religion and not on its practice. The head of the parliamentary group of Vetvendosje, Visar Ymeri has further clari- fied his party policy: “The state should be secular as it is foreseen in the constitution, but religion can be studied in the public schools. We will decide if the studies would include one faith or more than one.”37 Because of their geostrategic position, the Albanians in the Balkans have experienced a clash of civilizations. Surrounded from all sides by orthodox states and cultures, occupied and living in captivity for five centuries under the Ottoman Empire, and then partially occupied by their neighbors; liberated, reoccupied, supported, divided, challenged by the Western Christian civilization, Albanians represent a unique multi- religious and multi-cultural model in this part of Europe. Nonetheless, “with the fall of communism, the West re-emerged as a dominant ideal for the political and cultural elites while the East exactly as its opposite.” The cultural orientation and the vision of the future, was part of the abovementioned study by the Center for Humanistic Studies “Gani Boni” Prishtine, 2010. As Figure 8.3 shows to the question “Do you think Kosovo should follow a pro-Western Course?” 60.6% responded “yes”. This number leaves no dilemma as to the preference of the Albanians. If we add to this number the 30.9% who say that (yes I’m for the West but I also support the preservation of the values and traditions of the country)—which expresses a certain influence of fear from the globalization and the fading away of the national cultural features—it shows that 91.5% of Kosovars support the pro-Western course of the country for the future. To another question that reflects inclinations toward the culture and religion of the East, only 1.8% say that “they are not for the Western course of Kosovo because the Islamic faith and culture are the only truth”. Such a pro-Western consensus can hardly be found even in the states that are the nucleus of this civilization in the center of Europe. Post-communist Kosovo is experiencing return-to-religion38 attempts of a radicalized Islam through Wahhabism, increased pressure over the 210 Anton K. Berishaj

60.60%

30.90%

2.70% 1.80% 1.80% 1.10% 1%

Yes Yes and No, we No the I din’t have I don’t ref/pp definitely preserving should be Muslim an opinion know traditional careful of culture and values the West religion are the only truth

Figure 8.3 Do you support Kosovo’s western path political institutions to introduce religious studies in schools, and the use of headscarf for elementary and high school girls, incidents and fric- tions among the officials of Islamic Society and the extreme Wahhabist arm, protests against the building of the Cathedral and support for the building of a mosque in the center of the city, and attacks against the per- sonality of Mother Teresa by an official of Kosovo Islamic Community. However, all of these have not damaged the good interfaith communication, as they represent isolated cases, and do not enjoy support among the population that is tolerant toward different faiths. Kosovo continues to be secular and has good interfaith communication.

Notes

1. Andre Leroa Guran, Religija prethistorije (Beograd: Plato, 1991). 2. C, Prandia i “religione” M. Augėa, in Encyclopedia, Einaudi, 1980, p. 201. 3. Gasper Gjini, Skopsko prizrenska biskupija kroz stoljeća, edited by Krsćanska sadašnjost (Zagreb: Kršćan. Sadašnjost, 1986). 4. Don Shani Zefi, Islamizmi I Shqiptarëve gjatë shekuje, Dritta, Prizren, 2000. 5. Ibid. 6. Peter Bartl, Shqipëria nga mesjeta deri sot (Prishtinë: Dukagjini, 1998). 7. Dan Farlati, D. (2013:382), Illyricum Sacrum 1- Ecclesia salonitana 1 – ed. Miće Gamulin, VIII, 5, Venetiis, Rome. Religion and Politics in Kosovo 211

8. Zefi,Islamizimi . 9. Noel Malcolm, Kosova-një histori e shkurtër, botimi i dytë (Prishtinë: “Koha”, 2001). 10. Ibid. 11. M. Tёrnava, Gjurmime Albanologjike IX, Përhapja e e islamizmit në territorin e sotëm të Kosovës deri në fund të shek. XVII (Prishtinë: Instituti Albanologjik, 1979). 12. Malcolm, Kosova-një histori e shkurtër, botimi i dytë. 13. Lucien Lévy Bruhl, Primitivni mentalitet, “Plato,” (Beograd, 1998). 14. For more information see: Gjergj Gjergj Gashi, Martirizimi i shqiptarё ve 1846–1848, “Drita,” Ferizaj; Don, Shan Zefi and Don Lush Gjergji,La situation religiouse des Albanisa en Yugoslavie, “Pontificia Universitas, Urbaniana – (Rome, 1981), pp. 123–135. 15. Stadtmǘller, G. Islamisierung bei den Albanern, in: “Jahrbǘcher fǘr Geschichte Osteruropas,” 3(1955), 404–429; Islamizmi te shqiptarët, source: www.trepca .net. (2003). 16. Ibid. 17. Bruhl, Lucien Lévy (1998:247), Primitivni mentalitet, Beograd: “Plato.” 18. Annual Report, Papua (1911). G. Landtman, The folk tales of the Kiwai Papuans. Acta societatis scentiarum fennicae, XL.VII, fq. 95; B. Spencer, The Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia, fq. 25–26; H. Newton, In far New-Guinea, fq. 125–126; A. C. Haddon, Head Hunters, Black and Brown, fq. 98; R. Moffat, Missionary Labors and Scenes in South Africa, fq. 63; J. Philip, Researches in South Africa, 1828, II, p. 118 etc. 19. Lévy-Bruhl, Primitivni mentalitet; La Mentalité Primitive, Chapter XII is titled: “The hate for innovation in the primitive social communities.” 20. Bartl, Shqipëria nga mesjeta deri sot. 21. Ibid. 22. Albert Doja, (2001), Përdorimi politik i fesë në rindërtimine identieteve, rasti shqiptar, Tirana: AIIS Press, 2001, pp. 34. 23. Zefi, Islamizimi. 24. For more information see: Ger Dejzings (2005: pp 30–55), Religija i identitet na Kosovu, “Biblioteka XX vek,” Belgrade. 25. Anton Berishaj, Islamizimi – mollë sherri apo e vetmja alternativë e shpëtimit të shqiptarëve Buletini i fakultetit Filozofik (1982:253), Fakulteti filozofik, Prishtinë; article: Berishaj, Anton: Islamizimi – mollë sherri apo e vetmja alternativë e shpëtimit të shqiptarëve. 26. Maliqi, Shkëlzen and Latifi, Blerim, Study of Religion (Prishtinë: Center for Humanistic Studies “Gani Bobi,” 2010). 27. Ibid. 28. For more information see: Ger Duijzings, Religion and Identity in Kosovo, Columbia University Press, New York, (2001). 29. Muhamet Pirraku Jo katedrale në emër të shqiptarisë së imagjinuar, Prishtinë, Prill 2003. 212 Anton K. Berishaj

30. Anton K. Berishaj, Religion in Kosovo (Engl. Religions in the Balkans, article of Anton K. Berishaj—The level of religiousness in Kosovo—Bratislava) (Slovak: Uvoren Religozity v Kosove, 2008). 31. Web.p. www.breziiri.com, September 1, 2012. 32. Ibid. 33. Maliqi and Latifi,Study of Religion. 34. Ibid. 35. Maliqi and Latifi, Study of Religion. 36. Ibid. 37. Enis Sulstarova, “Arratisja nga lindja”, “Dudaj”. Tiranë, 2006. 38. Berishaj, Religion in Kosovo. Conclusion: State, Nation, Faith Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

These articles are an attempt to provide an inside understanding of what makes religion so important when nation, state, and faith are under threat, how and why religion is used as a basic mechanism to develop national ideologies and construct national identities. The cultural, political, and religious complexity and absence of the democratic institutions in the South East give the nationalists free pas- sage to sustain their power. An ideology that nourishes the idea that coexistence between different religious traditions is not acceptable continues to drive the South East to the edge of chaos. The construction of identity with, clearly, religious determination becomes more an imaginary story than real growth and recognition that all nations have to go through. The national and religious interpretation of what a nation, state, or identities are, does not lead society into the vicious circle that can be difficult to get out of. Instead, it gives sanctuary and salvation to their believers religion and becomes more an agent of power on the way to intolerance. That power affects not just the social lives of the people, but has a huge impact on future state development. Powerful religious institutions with their collective faith and way of living and thinking confines all possibilities of making a choice. The secular population is ostracized into oblivion whereas the membership in a religious institution is seen as the “elite club” of the saviors of the nation.

213 214 Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

In addition, the individuals who are considered to be true followers of their religious views have difficulties in adapting to this new wave of religiousness in the name of the nation and the state. The individual choice of how one wants to live has been limited, and the aspects of the totalitarian state of mind are the main connection when observed from the outside. There is only one option left: the nation and religion must become one. Religion takes over the role of the leader of the people on the path to national purification. There is no doubt that all of these processes in combination with the state and national power, apart from the war, resulted in demographic changes. Areas that were never homogeneous before are so now, which is completely unnatural for this corner of the world. The cleansing provided these nationalist institutions, supported by churches and mosques, with an unquestionable power over the minds of the general population. At the other end of the scale, this “cleaner” demographic picture is something that makes it easier for the international society to “accept” and find easier solution to the problem. It is as if South-eastern politics are more about what is easier for the international society than what is needed for those societies to regain their economic and, therefore, political independence. The acceptance of the “truth” and insufficient and superficial knowledge about the essence of the problem, together with a lack of will, to get a sustainable solution is a source of the challenges these societies meet. An example of one such solution is the Dayton agreement, which among other things divided Bosnia into two entities, so that “the bloodshed would not occur ever again.” In spite of the fact that, behind the Agreement, lay a thinking that this agreement will be temporary, we witness how short-term thinking based on the wrong assumptions can paralyze the entire transitional process, if it allows nationalist forces to flourish. There are no “easy” solutions to this situation, just as there are no “easy” solutions to any multi-ethnic environment. What this volume and the first volume on symbolism wish to present are certain social political mechanisms and a few reasons for why the efforts of the international society for many years in the South East simply did not work. Such mistakes usually repeat themselves. Conclusion 215

The Bosnian Spring came bringing hope to everyone. After some months, however, hope faded because the international support or recognition it needed was not forthcoming. Then the floods came . . . TV screens filled with faces of desperate people where, again, one could not tell the difference between who is who, as everyone was helping everyone, across state borders, forced by the power of the water masses, which know no political or national boundaries, showing that people can coexist only if there are no sociopolitical manipulators steering their everyday choices. What we do know and what the past has taught us in South Eastern Europe again and again is that: the pragmatism of survival is not the nature of the people of South Eastern Europe. The pragmatism of survival is a product human nature. It is in the order of things.1

Note

1. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human SciencesVintage; Reissue edn. (London: Vintage, March 29, 1994).

Contributors

Anton K. Berishaj is the rector of Prishtina Public University “Hasan Prishtina.” He is the author of “Sacrifice and Altruistic Suicide” (Sakrifica dhe “vetvrasja” altru- iste), Social Studies (Studime Shoqerore, 2014), and A Retrospective on the Educational and Scientific Mission (2013). He is coauthor with Pajazit Nushi, Religion in Kosova (2011) edition in Albanian, and English language (2013). Clemens Cavallin is an associate professor at the University of Gothenburg. He is the author of “Catholic Identity and the Year of Faith,” Seat of Wisdom: A Theological and Pastoral Journal (2013); Ritualization and Human Interiority (2013); “Religious Studies and the Knowledge Society: Open Access as Contributing to an Open Society,” in (eds.) Ferdinando Sardella and Ruby Sain, The Sociology of Religion in India: Past, Present and Future (2013); “After the State Church: A Reflection on the Relation between Theology and Religious Studies in Contemporary Sweden,” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies (2011). Nebojša Čagorović is a research fellow at the University of Montenegro. He is the author of “Anti-Fascism and Montenegrin Identity since 1990,” History (2012); “Montegrinen Identity: Past, Present and Future,” Journal of Area Studies (1993); and “Conflicting Constitutions in Serbia and Montenegro,” Transition (1997). Srečo Dragoš is a senior lecturer of Sociology, Faculty of Social Work, at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. He is the author of “Islamophobia in Slovenia: Politically

217 218 Contributors

Produced Intolerance,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies (2005), and “Religious Freedom in Slovenia,” in (ed.) Ines Angeli Murzaku, Quo vadis Eastern Europe? Religion, State and Society after Communism (2009). Sead S. Fetahagić is a research fellow at the Nansen Dialogue Center, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and coauthor of (with S. Mustajbegović) European Movement for European Constitution (2007); “Islam in Socialism and Post-Socialism,” in (ed.) Zilka Spahić-Šiljak, Contesting Female, Feminist and Muslim Identities: Post-Socialist Contexts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (2012); and (with Nebojša Šavija-Valha), The Dynamics between Religion and Politics in Sensitive Political Contexts: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014). Sergej Flere is a professor of Sociology at the University of Maribor, coauthor of: with “Six Cases Making a Pattern: Special Problems Arising in Countries with an Orthodox Tradition,” Journal of Church and State (with Dragoljub B. Đorđević, Andrej Kirbiš, 2014). He is the author of the articles “Religious Capital and Religious Rewards: A Study in the Economics of Religious Life,” Panoeconomicus (2012), and “Cross-Cultural Insight into the Association between Religiousness and Authoritarianism,” Archive of the Pyschology of Religion (2009). Jasna Jozelić is a dr.philos candidate at the Norwegian Center for Human Rights, University of Oslo. She is a coauthor (with Gorana Ognjenović and Nataša Mataušić) for “Yugoslav: Authentic Socialism,” in (ed.) Zachary Tracy Irwin’s Sixty Years and Counting: Yugoslavia’s Expulsion from the Cominform in Historical Perspective (forthcoming). She is also the author of Integration Politics and Social Stigmatisation: Dictum; The Critical View (2005) and “Islamisering og islams posisjon i dagens Bosnia og Hercegovina” (Islamisation and Islam’s position in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2006). Kosta Milkov is the director and a research fellow at the Balkan Institute for Faith and Culture (BIFC), Macedonia. He is the author of (with Kostake Milkov) “Renunciation According to Maximus the Confessor,” Studia Patristica (2010); “Global Scripture Impact: Balkan Strategy Report,” American Bible Society (2012), “Interfaith Encounters and Evangelical Witness,” Evangelical Interfaith Dialogue (forthcoming). Kenneth Morrison is a reader in Modern Southeast European History of Religion at the De Monfort University. He is the author of “Montenegro: A Polity in Flux 1989—2000,” in (eds) Ingrao and Emmert, Confronting Contributors 219 the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar’s Initiative (2nd ed. 2012); “The Criminal State Symbiosis and the Yugoslav Wars of Succession,” in (ed.) Alejandro Colas and Bryan Mabee, Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires (2010). Gorana Ognjenović is a research fellow at the University of Oslo, a contributor and editor of Responsibility in Context (2009); author of “Which Globalization? Whose Rights?” Nordic Journal for Human Rights, (2006); and coauthor (with Nataša Mataušić and Jasna Jozelić) for “Yugoslav Authentic Socialism,” in (ed.) Zachary Tracy Irwin’s Sixty Years and Counting: Yugoslavia’s Expulsion from the Cominform in Historical Perspective (forthcoming). Milan Vukomanović is an associate professor of Sociology of Religion at the University of Belgrade. He is the author of Fundamentalism in the Modern World (2011). He is also the coauthor of “Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989: The Case of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” with Radmila Radić in (ed.) Sabrina Ramet, Religion and Politics in Post- Socialist Central and Southern Europe, Challenges since 1989 (2013). Keith Tester is a professor of Sociology at the University of Hull, and Bauman Institute at University of Leeds. He is coauthor of What Use Is Sociology? (with Zygmunt Bauman and Michael Hviid Jacobsen, 2013), Humanitarianism and Modern Culture (2010), and Moral Culture (1997).

Index abdication, 172, 173 151, 153, 169, 198,, 202, 206, Agape, 100 209, 212 aggression, 29, 34, 35, 206 bandits, 1 Ahdname, 62, 63, 86 Bible, 34, 49, 103 Albania, 87, 134, 194–204, 208, Biljana Plavšić, 157 209, 211 Bishop, 40, 44, 59, 60–7, 69, 70, Alija Izetbegović, 25, 26, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80–3, 85, 92, 93, 42–4, 52 108, 109, 118, 121, 125–30, 133, alternative, 1, 56, 104, 119, 123, 135, 136, 138–40, 143, 144, 146, 160, 197, 205 148, 153, 154, 157, 159, 160, 163, Amfilohije, 40, 41, 130, 138, 147, 167–9, 183, 190, 195 148, 156–8, 162–7, 170 Bogumil, 8–13, 16, 23, 28, 29, Ante Pavelić, 69 37, 59, 85 Ante Starčević, 65 Bosnia, 2, 9–35, 37–45, 49–51, apologists, 97, 110 56–62, 64, 67, 68, 70, 73, Apparitions, 80–4, 94 75–9, 81, 84–6, 88, 89, 94, Archbishop, 59, 61, 64–7, 69, 135, 157, 158, 198, 214 70, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80, 82, 85, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3, 93, 109, 125, 127, 128, 130, 146, 7–10, 12, 14–22, 26–30, 34, 154, 168, 195 37, 38, 40, 42–5, 47, 50–2, 56, Arkan, 157 58, 63, 67, 75, 76, 80, 81, 84, Army of the Republic of 92, 100, 101, 105, 106, 107, 111, BiH (Armija Republike 154, 157, 201 BiH—ARBiH), 76–9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 50–2 Army of the Serb Republic Bosniak, 8, 14–27, 37, 38, 46, 47, (Vojska Republike Srpske 50, 77 —VRS), 76 Bosnian Church, 8–13, 17, 23, atheist, 72. 135, 139, 176, 177, 37, 57, 59, 60, 61, 85 178, 182 Bosnian Muslims, 2, 8, 11, autocephalous, 59, 129, 152–4, 13–28, 31, 35, 37, 43, 47, 51, 64, 159, 161 68, 87, 93 Bosnian spring, 4, 15, 28, 215 Balkans, 31, 49, 52, 55, 58, 67, Byzantine, 2, 9, 28, 45, 58, 60, 87–9, 104–6, 112, 113, 139, 86, 195

221 222 Index

Canonical, 65, 69, 75, 78, 127–31, 155, Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), 45, 168 52, 75–7 Cardinal, 52, 74, 75, 82 Croatia, 10, 14–16, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, Catholic, 2, 9–15, 17–24, 27, 28, 33, 35, 30, 37, 38, 39, 44–6, 52, 55, 57, 59, 37, 38, 44–7, 51, 55–81, 83–7, 89–93, 62, 65–9, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 87–9, 95, 96, 101, 104, 105, 108, 111, 122, 136, 90–100, 102, 104, 106, 107, 111, 157, 140, 152, 154, 157, 162, 166, 171, 172, 166, 167, 191, 208 175–83, 185, 189–91, 196, 198–202, Croatian, 12, 14–18, 20, 37, 38, 44–6, 52, 204, 205 53, 57, 58, 64–8, 71, 73–5, 77, 79, 82, Catholicism, 9, 10, 15, 18, 46, 56–8, 60, 83, 87, 91, 97–9, 102, 105, 106, 156 61, 63–6, 68, 69, 74, 78, 79, 87, 95, Croats, 14, 15, 17–21, 24, 26, 37, 38, 44, 101, 179, 196, 200, 204 47, 51, 53, 57, 65–8, 72, 74, 77, 79, 80, census, 30, 38, 64, 70, 71, 76, 78, 176–80 81, 93, 95, 134, 153, 154, 200, 201 Christians, 9–11, 13, 35, 41, 60, 63, 93, Crusades, 2, 9, 36, 43, 49 101, 103–6, 110, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201 cultural, 2, 4, 14–16, 18, 20–5, 27, 29–31, civic, 117, 120, 124, 138, 140, 144, 148 46, 48, 57, 63, 65, 79, 81, 115, 116, 133, civic church, 138 137, 139–45, 160, 166, 172, 185, 187, civilization, 3, 13, 48, 49, 56, 74, 83, 84, 190, 195, 197, 200, 209, 213 91, 98, 209 culture, 13, 17, 21, 24, 56, 57, 74, 79, 87, clergy, 58, 61, 63–5, 71–3, 75, 76, 78, 80, 89, 94, 100, 101, 109, 133, 138–42, 166, 81, 116, 118, 121, 122, 126, 128, 135, 136, 167, 174, 175, 185, 209, 210 139, 144, 146, 147, 153, 154, 159, 170, 175, 180–3, 186–90, 196, 198, 203 Dayton Agreement, 3, 21, 27, 143, 214 collective memory, 105 deity, 33, 34, 36, 47, 48, 103 communist, 151, 155, 156, 171, 181–3, democracy, 66, 67, 97, 117, 123, 125, 126, 190–201, 206, 209 133, 139, 140, 142, 143, 147, 166, 167 community, 1, 10–11, 14, 17, 26, 31, 33, democratic, 3, 23, 31, 52, 75, 76, 116, 37, 38, 42–4, 53, 62, 70, 78, 80, 86, 96, 117, 120, 124–6, 132, 137–42, 157, 167, 100, 106, 111, 116, 121, 122, 127, 131, 139, 184, 213 141, 142, 144, 145, 152, 153, 164, 168, denationalization, 184, 185, 187, 191 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 181, 183, 188, 191, denominations, 9, 56, 71, 108, 110, 124 194, 196, 199, 201, 205, 206, 208, 210 desecularization, 148 compensation, 26, 187 Diaspora, 139, 205 compulsion, 2 dictatorship, 4 concordat, 68, 71, 72 discrimination, 11, 27, 119, 145, 148, 175 confessional, 36, 38, 41, 42, 45, 47, 48, 58, dogmas, 7, 12, 154, 155, 180 59, 77, 111, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124, 162 donations, 185 Constantinople, 61, 63, 86, 130, 147, 154, double vision, 107 160, 165, 168, 195, 198, 199 Constitution, 66, 90, 108, 109, 117–19, Eastern Orthodox, 37, 63, 74, 90, 108, 123–5, 128, 143, 145, 154, 155, 160, 172, 154, 155, 168 208, 209 ecclesiastical, 41, 57–9, 63, 115, 117, cooperation, 104, 111, 117, 132, 136, 158, 119, 121, 123, 125, 127–9, 131, 133, 135, 162, 188 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 152, Croat Catholic Movement, 65, 66, 75 155, 168 Croat Defense Council (HVO), 76–8 economy, 1, 3, 5, 184, 185 Index 223 education, 3, 14, 43, 63, 70, 93, 116, Herzegovina, 45, 58, 63, 75, 76, 80, 117–20, 123, 125, 130, 133, 136, 138, 81, 83 143, 144, 148 historical, 122, 133, 134, 138, 144, 146, embrace, 96, 99, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 152, 161, 164, 187, 201, 202 141, 199 history, 2, 4, 5, 7–9, 11, 16–18, 20, 23, empire, 9, 10, 13, 14, 63, 64, 74, 80, 86, 27–9, 34, 37, 41, 46, 51, 56, 58–60, 64, 194, 198, 200, 209 75, 84–7, 90–3, 102–4, 107, 133, 138, enemy, 34, 42, 111, 134, 198 153, 193, 195, 209 entrepreneurship, 185 HKD Napredak, 79, 92, 94 episcopate, 67–9, 71–4, 76, 153, 154 Holy See, 62, 64, 71, 72, 74, 75, 182, 198 equality, 72, 119, 120, 122, 123, 145, 172, homogenous, 2, 42, 47, 151, 180, 208 174, 184, 188, 201 ethnic cleansing, 4, 21, 22, 28, 50, 76, identity, 1, 7–9, 11, 12, 14–27, 35, 47–9, 50, 76, 78, 107 57, 58, 65–8, 74, 75, 78–80, 82, 88, 111, ethnicity, 3, 27, 38, 57, 66, 79, 81, 87–9, 113, 123, 124, 141, 142, 152, 153, 155, 158, 96, 116 160, 162, 165, 168, 211, 213 ethnomobilization, 115 ideology, 17, 19, 39, 66, 68, 99, 115, 117, ethno-nationalism, 30, 57 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 151, 172, 182, European Union EU, 4, 7, 9, 14, 19, 21, 196, 203, 206, 213 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 36, 43, 49–51, 55, 56, Illyrian, 62, 67, 68, 88, 193–5 58, 65, 67, 69, 84, 85, 91, 92, 95, 102, Independent State of Croatia (NDH), 110, 116, 117, 120, 121, 125, 127, 128, 130, 68, 69, 72, 196 138–43, 146–9, 151, 156, 160, 164–6, 169, indifference, 106, 139, 174 170, 172–5, 179, 181, 185, 187, 189, 191, instrumentalization, 36, 58 195, 200, 103, 205, 208, 209, 211, 215 interfaith, 201–6, 210 Evangelical Christianity, 96 international, 1, 3, 14, 30, 35, 37–9, 48, exclusion, 15, 96, 107, 111, 112, 113 53, 75, 76, 81, 82, 96, 97, 100, 106, 108, 110, 119, 128, 129, 140, 146, 173, 174, faith, 36, 39, 43, 47, 56, 57, 101, 108, 110, 175, 194, 195, 197, 206, 209, 214, 215 131, 134, 139, 141, 148, 154, 157, 179, Islamic Community, 33, 42–4, 122, 152, 193, 195, 196, 201, 206, 209, 213 196, 201, 205, 206, 208, 210 fascism, 56, 73, 84 Islamic Declaration, 42 Franciscan, 56, 58, 61, 62, 65, 69–71, 75, 77–9, 81, 84, 88 Jasenovac, 69, 89, 156 Franjo Tuđman, 29, 51 Jews, 37, 68, 69 freedom, 14, 29, 62, 66, 100, 102, 120, 121, 123, 126, 143–5, 153, 163, 172, 179, Kingdom, 9, 61, 66, 68, 70, 71, 103, 118, 182, 183, 184, 186–9, 207, 208 121, 122, 140, 143, 145, 153, 154, 200 Kosovo, 4, 41, 50, 109, 126, 134, 145, Glas Koncila, 75, 91 146, 153, 157, 159, 193–212 global, 57, 58, 81, 82, 84, 108 Kosovo and Metohija, 126 globalization, 1, 48, 140, 209 Great Schism, 57, 60 law, 38, 43, 63, 99, 118, 119–26, 137, 140, 142–5, 147, 160, 164, 165, 172, 197, 198, Habsburg, 67, 80, 89 203, 206–8 hatred, 37, 56, 136, 183, 199, 206 lobby, 96, 100, 108, 110, 111, 156 224 Index

Macedonia, 96, 108, 109, 111, 127–9, nationalist, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 19, 21, 23, 28, 145, 146, 202 29, 36, 62, 66, 67, 68, 74, 81, 88, 115, Macedonian Orthodox Church, 109 134, 157, 161, 214 market, 1, 5, 178, 184, 185, 187 nationalists, 8, 12, 14–17, 19, 20, 213 martyr, 42, 43 nationhood, 2, 4, 11, 18, 20, 22, 24, 29, martyrdom, 51 66, 81, 87, 156 media, 48, 49, 99, 100, 102, 117, 130, 133, NATO, 157 135, 136, 147, 185, 191, 207 nazi, 68 Međugorje, 58, 80–4, 94 neoliberal, 1 memories, 17, 41, 56, 146 New Testament, 84, 97, 101, 107, 110 Metanoia, 98 Nikolaj Velimirović, 137, 138, 140 Methodist, 96, 108, 109, 111, 122 non-identification, 172–4 Metropolit, 41, 75, 127, 129, 130–2, 138, 147, 148, 153, 154, 156, 157, 160, 167, 168 observance, 2, 4, 8, 121 militants, 45 obsessive, 2 military, 10, 15, 38, 45, 53, 69, 76, 77, organization, 2, 13, 15, 18, 13, 42, 43, 57, 104–6, 111, 116, 131, 133–5, 157, 198 58, 63, 64, 65, 73, 79, 84, 112, 123, 124, millet, 63, 64, 86 125, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137, 141, 143, 151, minorities, 68, 104, 111, 119, 141 160, 168, 169, 173, 181 modernity, 56, 83, 85, 139, 141, 142, 184 otherness, 20, 107, 112, 113 monasteries, 60–2, 133, 146, 156, 163, 195 Ottoman Empire, 10, 13, 14, 63–5, 68, monopoly, 64, 117, 173, 185 86, 200, 209 Montenegrin Orthodox Church, 129, ownership, 2, 152, 160, 161, 163, 169 152–5, 158 Montenegro, 5, 59, 127, 129, 130–4, 145, pacifism, 105–6 147, 151–70 paradigm, 74, 98, 99 mosques, 14, 174, 199, 205, 206 participation, 3, 33, 71, 110, 142, 171, Muslim, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13–31, 35, 37, 38, 196, 204 42–4, 46, 47, 50–2, 62–4, 68, 77, 87, 93, Patriarch, 39, 51, 63, 72, 90, 125–30, 132, 95, 96, 111, 134, 157, 162, 174, 175, 198, 133, 138, 141, 143, 147, 153–5, 159, 160, 200, 201, 202, 204–6, 208, 210, 211 163, 165, 167, 168, 170 mythology, 19, 20, 105 peace, 31, 34, 41, 48, 49, 53, 56, 62, 76, 83, 85, 96, 97, 101, 106–8, 112, 113, 123, nation, 1–4, 11, 16, 21–3, 25, 30, 31, 40, 157, 175, 206 46, 67, 68, 72, 75, 89, 91, 97, 101, 106, pillar, 155, 159, 162 109, 115, 126, 134, 141, 153, 155, 156, pluralism, 37, 139–41, 147, 175, 179, 20 159, 166, 196, 213, 214 political, 2–12, 14–28, 30, 31, 35–8, 44, national, 3, 8, 11, 15, 16–28, 30, 37, 38, 47, 49–53, 56–68, 71–5, 78, 80, 81, 84, 41, 46, 55, 57, 58, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 75, 87, 96–8, 100, 102–4, 106–8, 110, 111, 80, 81, 82, 99–101, 104, 115, 116, 119, 115–18, 120, 121, 123–6, 129–32, 134, 12, 126, 133, 135, 138, 139, 143, 144, 151, 137–43, 145, 149, 151–4, 175, 158, 161–3, 152, 153, 158, 161, 164, 182, 187, 191, 197, 165–7, 171, 172, 174, 175, 181–3, 187, 190, 202, 203, 209, 213, 214, 215 191, 193–8, 203, 204, 108, 210, 213–15 nationalism, 3, 8, 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 25, 30, political Orthodoxy, 140, 142 38, 55, 57, 58, 64–8, 71, 75, 83, 85, 87–9, politicization, 7, 8, 13, 96, 99, 101, 108, 91, 95, 105, 115, 138, 143, 147, 151, 203 110, 115, 123 Index 225 politics, 12, 28, 49, 5, 74, 75, 77, 80, Rome, 2, 56, 57, 61, 63, 82–4, 89, 194, 195 89, 94–7, 99–101, 103, 105, 107, 109, rosaries, 45, 77 110, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131–3, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143, sacralization, 46 145–7, 149, 151, 156, 158, 166, 167, 169, salvation, 1, 46, 98, 107, 213 172, 175, 180, 183, 193, 195, 197, 199, Schism, 59, 74, 146, 155, 168, 183, 195 201, 203, 205, 207, 209, 211, 214 sect, 12, 28, 201 power, 2, 4, 9–11, 15, 17, 21, 24, 36, secular, 2, 22, 24–6, 55, 56, 58, 61, 63, 38, 40, 50, 51, 56, 57, 61–3, 68, 74, 81, 65–7, 69, 71, 79, 83, 96, 115, 117, 125, 85, 99, 100, 103, 104, 106, 116, 121, 131, 133, 137, 140, 142, 143 123–5, 129, 135, 137, 166, 171, 173–5, separation, 172–5, 179, 181–3, 185, 187, 188, 191, 194, 196, 198, 199, 201, 187–9, 191, 192 206, 213–15 separatism, 155, 161 powers, 38, 57, 61, 63, 68, 74, 85, 104, 121 Serb Democratic Party (Srpska pragmatic, 88, 95, 116, 120, 121 demokratska stranka, SDS), 76 propaganda, 21, 42, 48, 105, 204 Serbia, 10, 12, 14–18, 20–2, 24, 26, 29, Protestants, 96, 100, 101, 108–11 30, 33, 35, 38–41, 44–8, 51, 52, 57, 68, Proverbs, 97, 101, 102 70–2, 81, 87, 90, 104, 105, 115–23, 125–49, 151–9, 161–9, 195, 196, 210, race traitors, 19 204, 208 racist, 49, 68, 148 Serbian Orthodox Church SOC, 12, 17, Radovan Karadžić, 40, 157 33, 39, 57, 70–2, 81, 105, 116, 122, 125–8, reconciliation, 3, 96, 107, 112, 113, 204 131, 133, 143, 148, 151–6, 158, 159, 161, regime, 68–70, 72, 73, 95, 98, 116, 120, 163–6, 168, 169, 195, 196, 201, 204 141, 155, 158, 171, 199 Serbian Orthodox Church SPC, 116–18, Religious Freedom Act, 179, 183, 184, 120–3, 125–33, 135–9, 141, 143–8, 151–70 186, 187 Serbian, 115–17, 120–3, 125–36, 138, 139, religious war, 2, 5, 34, 35, 36, 44, 49, 59 143, 145–8, 151–61, 163–9, 195, 196, religious, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 201, 204 16–29, 33–9, 41–53, 55–8, 60, 62, 63, Serbs, 14–21, 24, 26, 30, 37–41, 44, 64, 66, 70, 73, 77–81, 93, 95–8, 101, 46, 51, 52, 68, 69, 81, 87, 93, 95, 104, 104, 106, 110, 111, 115–25, 128, 130, 131, 105, 125, 126, 134, 153–7, 163, 196, 200, 133, 135–9, 141–8, 151, 152, 156, 158, 202, 203 160–2, 164–6, 168, 171–5, 178–94, SFRJ, 16, 155 196–200, 202–11, 213, 214 shalom, 97 religization of modernity, 141 siege of Sarajevo, 58, 74, 76–9, 92 responsibility, 1, 41, 102, 103, 118, 139 sin, 50, 65, 97, 98, 103, 104, 106, 107 resurrection, 102, 103, 165 Slavonia, 62, 66, 67, 87–9 retaliate, 107 Slobodan Milošević, 29, 45, 105, 115, rights, 1–3, 15, 29–31, 65, 70, 76, 77, 100, 116, 117, 120, 122, 141, 143, 146, 157, 106, 111, 118, 119, 121–4, 136, 139–46, 158, 161, 167 148, 163, 164, 168, 169, 174, 175, 182, Slovenes, 72, 74, 80, 134, 153, 154, 200 188, 198, 207, 208 Slovenia, 4, 55, 73, 171–92, 202 rites, 195 souls, 2, 171 Roman Catholic Church (RCC), 28, 33, Southeastern Europe, 140, 143, 166 44, 56, 71, 75, 104, 122, 136, 152, 171 Stadlerism, 67 226 Index state, 1, 3, 4, 8–10, 12, 14–21, 24–30, Ustaša, 68–70, 72, 81 34, 37–44, 51, 55, 57, 58, 61–3, 65–75, 80–5, 87–92, 94, 95, 97, 99–101, Vance Owen Peace Plan, 157 106, 108, 111, 116–39, 141–8, 151. 152, victims, 3, 19, 39, 92, 103, 106, 107 154, 155, 158, 159, 161–6, 169–75, victimized, 1 178–93, 197–9, 202, 206, 208, 209, violence, 3, 20, 34, 36, 41, 50, 53, 55, 94, 213–15 97, 104–7, 130, 161, 173, 197204 statehood, 8, 65, 129, 152, 162, 165 Stećak, 79, 91–4 war, 2–5, 8–10, 12–17, 19–24, 16–30, 33–53, synagogues, 175 55, 56, 58, 62, 66, 69, 72, 73, 75–9, 81–5, Synod, 126–8, 130, 143, 145, 147, 154, 155, 87, 93, 95–7, 99–108, 111, 115–17, 119, 159, 160, 163, 165 121, 123, 127, 130–7, 139, 154, 155, 157–9, 164, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173–5, 181–3, 187, tax, 13, 29, 99, 121, 128, 181, 185, 187, 189, 196–203, 205–6, 209, 210, 214 197–200 wellbeing, 97, 101, 103, 107 tender, 185 Tito, 2, 30, 37, 50, 51, 72, 73, 79, 135, 156 Yugoslavia, 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 14, 16, 18, 29, totalitarian, 4, 30, 56, 83, 84, 214 30, 31, 34, 40, 42, 49–53, 55, 70–5, 85, transformation, 7, 98–100, 103, 134, 141, 89–91, 95, 96, 100, 101, 104–6, 108, 147, 199 110–12, 115, 118, 119, 121, 122, 127, 133–5, transition, 1, 99, 175, 178, 184, 214 143, 145, 155, 156, 166, 168, 171, 205