#278 When the did not End: The Soviet Peace Offensive of 1953 and the American Response Jeffrey Brooks

Jeffrey Brooks is a professor in the Depar~ ment o(: History at Johns Hopkins University aaC: a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The at-:.thor would like to thank Karen Brooks, Georgiy Cherniavskiy, Daun van Ee, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Louis Galambos, John Higham, Anna Krylova, Lary May, Yale Richmond, Blair ::.\.uble, Ron Suny, Ruud van Dijk, and Ron Walters for :heir helpful comments. Dr. Brooks presented early versions of this paper at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago in January 2000, a joint seminar of the Kennan Institute and the Cold War Interna­ tional History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and the Russian Stuciies Workshcp at the Unive:sity of Chicago. The Kennan Institute Named in honor of Ambassdor Kennan's relative, George Kennan ~~~he Elder," a nineteentn­ century explo::er of and Siberia, the Kennan Institute is commited to improving AmericaE expertise and !

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© August 2000 Vvoodrow Wilson International :enter for Scholars WHEN THE COLD WAR DID NOT END: THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE OF 1953 AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE1

The world devoted enormous was nonetheless conciliatory, He sums in human energy, lives, and invoked the wartime alliance and economic resources to the military­ challenged Soviet leaders to match strategic competition that was the ~o~ci their words with deeds.2 "What is the war. Each side invested billions in Ready to Do?" armaments tnat could have been spent Eisenhower asked rhetorically. "What­ otherwise, fought wars, and forced ever the answer be, let it be plai:Uy much of the developing world to spoken." choose between a client of Scholars disagree about oligarchs anci dictators and some Eisenhower's options.3 John ~ewis variant of a Soviet style one-party Gaddis cites a missed "opporturity to system. Neither side was willing to reunify Germany."4 Walter Lafeber shift the conf;.:ct to the terrain of notes American hesitation under economics and culture, for neither pressure of McCarthyism, and could imagine a future in which the Vladislav Zubok and Konstantin other system existed. There were Pleshakov see a lost chance "for those moments, however, when the reigning in the Soviet leadership prepared to Manicheanisrr. seemed in doubt. move away from the universalist Among them, none was more plau­ ideology of and the sible than fl.e weeks after Stalin's practice of global confrontatioc."5 death, when the shock of his absence Contrarily, Richard H. Immecman and led Soviet leaders as well as some in Robert R. Bowie stress Soviet intransi­ the West to eschew the familiar dis­ gence, as does , who course of diametric opposition. As they finds the Soviet desire for change probed a possibly different relation­ "strictly limited."6 In the discussion of ship, they ultimately failed to commu­ the motives and intentions of the two nicate and ended up on the road states, the issue of communication traveled over the next three decades. remains unexplored. How well die. the Soviet concessions between rivals understand each other's mes­ Stalin's death o:::-: March 5, 1953 and the sages? Did the new Soviet leadership June 17 uprising in East Berlin are well fail to convey a desire for detente documented. In the ~irst weeks of the simply because they lacked a language new era, Soviet foreign policy de­ that American policymakers and pended chiefly on , American jocrnalists could under­ the Chairman of the Council of Min:s­ stand? Alternatively, if their objective ters, and Lav:rency Beria, minister of was simply propagandistic, did ~hey the newly merged Ministry of Interr.al blunder for the same reason in an Affairs (MVD) and State Security effort to split the emerging westerr, (MGB). Neither leader had a savory alliance and prevent West German reputation, and 3eria was a very rearmament? In either case, as unlikely reformer. Yet jointly or singly Eisenhower observed, Stalin's succes­ they made statements and launched sors needed the skill of "plain speec~1.." initiatives that led the newly elected wrote to Eisenhower to respond in his speech, Eisenhower of a similar concern or, "The Chance for Peace," on April16. April11: "We do not know whet these The President made no concessions but men mean. We do not want to deter 1 them from saying wha.: they mean."7 back to Teddy Roosevelt. The resort to We have no equivalent statement of arms in foreign relations also suited linguistic puzzlement from the Soviet ~enin and Stalin's thir.king. The side, but it is not unreasonable to military-strategic character of the cold assume that they found the language war was not predetermined, however. of American politics equally trouble­ On the American side, ~eorge F. some. The long hiatus in close rela­ Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, and others tions, broken only by the brief and sought a competition more re£ective of guarded wartime cooperation, left each the Jeffersonian and Wilsonian tradi­ side nearly bereft of skilled interpreters tions, according to which the United of the other's culture and political States could peacefully radiate free­ language. dom to all peoples. Eisenhower was ihe strategic balance after Stalin's also wary of enlarging the military's death can be considered favorable to role in American life. On the Soviet mutual agreement. It was a moment of side, Stalin's first successors, eager to perceived parity, if only in :he sense of raise living standards and satisfy the mutual anxiety. The United States rising expectations of Soviet citizens, worried over the Chinese Communist likewise sought to diminish military victory and the imminent French expenditures. In exploring this option, defeat in Indochina, but took comfort they inadvertently fell back on ap­ in Western Europe. Soviet leaders proaches to the West developed con­ faced a crisis in Eastern Europe but currently and contradictorily after the success in Asia, as well as in their Soviet Civil War by diplomats Georgy peace propaganda.8 Both nations had Chicherin and , and to acquired thermonuclear weapons, and a lesser extent by Nikolai Bukharin although the American superiority in and his rival Leor_ ~rotsky. Bukharin bombers was considerable, the Soviet and Trotsky, although far from gentle side could take consolation from its by character, stressed economics and suc:essful networks of spies. Citizens culture because they genuinely be­ in ead~ country yearned for peace and lieved in the superiority of the socialist a better material life. Soviet wartime system. Chicherin and ;_,itvinov valued memories were heartrending, and be benefits derived from diplomatic victory led some to question the and economic relations with capitalist Stalinist system.9 Nearly thirty million powers without giving up the revolu­ people had died, and Soviet poverty tiona::y project. Stalin saw the world was galling to those who had seen life otherwise, but with his passing, :he abroad. Stal~n's death was less of an pattern of implacable military and opening in America, where anger over political confrontation he established the takeover of Eastern Europe and the appeared to float free of :ts moorings. had spurred Dwight D. On March 15 Malenkov launched Eisenhower's landslide victory in 1952. ~~Js "peace offensive," announcing, Nevertheless, there were signs of a with reference to the United States, possible opening there too and also "there is no dispute or unresolved among America's closest allies. question that cannot be settled peace­ Belligerency in foreign affa::-s -v 1as fully by mutual agreement of the intrinsic to each nation. Militarism interested countries."10 Yet he and 11is accorded wifu an American willL"f'lg­ colleagues could not deal with the ness to advance America's special rcle American democracy as Sta!in had in the world by force that harker_ec with Hitler or even the western de- 2

------mocracies during World War II. The the leader, the party, and the state took informational world in which they crecit for all achievements and in operated had changed thanks in par': w~uch Soviet citizens were beholden to to the Voice of A:nerica and the Britisn. their leaC.ers for everything allotted to Broadcasting Company To convince therr .. I have elsewhere called this Eisenhower and his militantly anti­ relationship between state and citizen Communist advisors, they had to :t.e economy of the gift.13 Its effect on make a case that would resonate with ~oreign affairs was to encourage a the Americar_public. To do this they oe"spective in which the Soviet Unior. needed to modify the language o:: ap?eared larger than life and the Soviet public life. Khrushchev accom­ sarrounding world smaller. Thus the plished something of the sor: with the story the press told after May 9, 1945 thaw and so -:leared the way for was that Stalin had foreseen the war, agreements by himself and his succes­ saved the country, and also the world. sor. Gorbachev and .bis advisors did By stressing the world's obligation, considerably more, but at a point when jou:-':"lalists appeaJed to Soviet pride it was already too late to prolong the an:~ ~nlarged the economy of the gift. Soviet system. The notion of Stalin as benefactor was The politicalianguage available to epitot:'ized by his portrayal as Grand­ Soviet leaders in the spring of 1953 father Frost, the Russian Santa. He had reflected a lor.gstanding censorship appeared in this role on the front page and monopoly of pub!ic expression. of Labor, the official trade union news­ Lenin instituted this hegemonic lir­ D EP.Jet, an December 30, 1936, smiling ... ~ gt:istic order, and Stalin extended it by a: a cree decorated with schools, buses, adopting rituaJs of theater to rally planes, and other such "gifts" and support for his brutaJ prograrr:s. Public ringed with happy children. utterances acq·uired a bombastic and The Soviet press fit the Truman self-reflexive c!l.aracter, more appropri­ Doctrine and into this ate for giving orders than making narrative by portraying the U.S. as a arguments, and the government false benefactor, beneath whose secured confor:nity through terror. '"charitable' mask shows a policy of Varlam Shalamov summed up the imperialistic expansion/' power of this performative culture in editorialized on March 14, 1947. 0:::1 his Kolyma Tales, when he recorded a New Year's Day, 1949, the paper cynical camp saying, "If you don't showed Uncle Sam as Santa, handing believe it, take i~ as a fairy ta1e." 11 Bd, Europeans a pie marked "credit/' in fact, Soviet people could not take beside a t::ee decorated with "crisis," the official public narrative as a fairy "unemployment/' and "atom." The tale because it infiltrated every aspect caption was "The Marshallization of of life. Therefore the "plain speech" the Christmas Tree." 14 C. D. Jacksor., a Eisenhower urged was neither acces­ hard-line advisor to Eisenhower sible nor familiar to the new leaders, observed in late 1955 that "So long as who were not fluent in any language the Soviets had a monopoly on covert other thar the linguistic conventions of subversioc and threats of military Stalinist pu.blic lifeY aggression, and we had a monopoly on The content of "the fairy tale/' as Santa Claus, some kind of seesaw well as its lexicon, also presented game couJd be played. But now the difficulties. Foremost was the legacy of Soviets are muscling in on Santa Claus Stalin's cult, a cuJtural system in which as well, whlch puts us in a terribly 3 dangerous position."15 The lasting cLinbersome requirement on Soviet power of tills cultural construction was journalists and spokesmen for they still evident on December 31, 1999, had to downplay the country's most when presented Vladimir militant activities. Thus Soviet editors Putin to Russian voters with a New largely ignored the , Year's tree in the background. the , and ever. the The Soviet "Santa's" proffered gift 's expulsion of Yugoslavia to the postwar world in 1948 and 1949 in late June 1948. :he Soviet press was peace. Nothing cor:-.plicated the allowed American and British radio six Soviet-American dialogue following weeks to shape the teiling of events in Stalin's death so much as the Soviet Yugoslavia before denouncing Tito as peace propaganda of the previous five an archenemy. Similarly, it was Truman

years. Soviet publicists had debased and not Stalin who on September 23 1 the word and the concept to such an 1949 announced the successful Soviet extent that it became virtually useless explosion of the atomic bomb a month in communication with the after the test. Soviet journalists could Eisenhower administration and Ameri­ have celebrated Soviet possession as a can society. The Soviet sponsored nzJional acillevement or as a victory "peace movement'/ was launched in for the international proletariat but early August 1948 at the World Con­ neither presentation fit the story of gress of Cultural Activists in Defense Soviet benevolent leadership of the

of Peace in Brotslav (Wroclaw)1 West­ peace camp, and hence the successful ern Poland.16 In January 1949 Stalin test went unreported.20 proposed a Soviet American 1'peace The adulation of Stalin as world pact," and moved the peace campaign benefactor reached its zenith in the to the :::enter of the Soviet public cul­ official celebration of ills seventieth ture.17 A World Congress of Pez:::e birthday in December 1949. Soon Advocates convened in Paris in AprL., afterwards, on January 30, 1950, in the and Pravda reported on the Stockholrr" wake of the successful bomb test and Petition to ban nuclear weapons/ whicr, the v:ctory of the Chinese communists, had allegedly been signed by 500 he secretly authorized the North miEio:r. people. "Who are you with­ Korean attack on South Korea and the 500 million ... or the handh:l o:: provided Soviet assista:1ce.21 The imperialists and their hired agents!·" invasion began on June 25 when the asked Iurii Zhukov, Pravda's Par~s North Korean People's Ar::ny (NKPA) correspondent.18 At issue was the rr' or2~ entered South Korea. Seoul, less than merit of the rival Santas. The writer and fifty miles from the border, fell on June cillef Soviet delegate, A. Fadeev, re­ 28. Concealing Soviet involvement and buffed the claim that "people of tre so­ denouncing that of America, Soviet called Atlantic community possess 2 publicists brought the Manichean 'monopoly' on culture and kunanisx, i:heme of peace and war to a crescendo and we, Soviet people, heirs to Pusr kin and Soviet public life was choreo­ and Tolstoy, Mendeleev and ?av!ov, graphed to suit tills purpose. As the who have created the first country o ~ NKPAadvanced in late June and July, in the world with our hands, the Soviet press dwelled or, several are some how the enemies of "west­ pre-arranged domestic events that 1 19 ern," "Atlantic/' culture. ' h.ighlighted the peacefulness of the The division of the world ir.to co·.mtry and its leader. The first was "camps" of peace and war placed a the 1'free discussion" of the ideas of 4 deceased linguist Nikolai Marr, which advocate of peace. Ignoring Soviet began in Pravda on May 9, 1950 with military involvement, Soviet publicists an anno~cement of shortcomings in praised the North Koreans' bravery Soviet linguistics, and filled two of and charged the U.S. with atrocities. In Pravda's six pages every Tuesday until late Augu.st, Pravda's correspondent, V. July 4. Stalin intervened three times in Komilov charged MacArthur with the "discussion" about Marr, begin­ carrying out "germ warfare," ar. ning on June 20, six days before the accusation that figured in later propa­ North Korean attack, so that when ~he ganda campaigns.24 The Soviet propa­ fighting began he appeared to be ganda weekly New Times was vocifer­ engaged in a high-minded intellectual ous in contrasting the two superpow­ dispute about linguistics.22 Meetings of ers. The issue for July 5, 1950, the first the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the war, devoted its front page to beginning on June 12, and of ~he pictures of the Stockholm Appea1 and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Repub­ its lead article to "American Aggres­ lic on July 5 to consider "a budget of sion in Asia."25 A cartoon on July 19 peace," served a si..-rnilar purpose. showed one hand holding a dove with ~ese were followed by the opening o£ a ;Je~~tion titled "peace signatures­ a Soviet campaign ~o sign the hu:-tdreds of millions in favor"-and Stockholm Appeal on June 30, and ar.oth.er showing "the Voice of meetings of peace advocates in Mos­ America," spewing out"Atom bomb! cow in October and in Warsaw in :::: o ~ d war! Shooting War! Hydrogen November. L.astl)j from June 28 Bomb," labeled "one against."26 The through July 9 a Joint Session of the Second World Peace Congress, held in Academy of Sciences and Academy of Warsaw from November 16 to 20, Medical Science of the USSR met to issued an "Address to the United consider Pavlov's legacy. Nations" urging the withdrawal of Korea was a milestone in the foreign armies from Korea and an official self-representation of the international commission to investi­ co"Jntry. By pretending to act peace­ gate crimes and "in particular, the fuJ.:y, while secretly aiding North question of the responsibility of Gen­ Korea militarily, Soviet leaders, propa­ eral MacArthur."27 Speaking at the gandists, and rank-and-file partici­ congress, the Soviet writer, Alexander pants in the official culture validated Fadeyev, accused the U.S. of" All the the Manichean division of the world horrors of the fascist atrocities that on the basis of peace and war. Hence came up at the Nuremberg trial."28 The in the realm of images Stalin loftily Soviet government continued its pe2.ce discussed the nature of language, campaign throughout the Korean War. while Truman, "leader of the free Bohlen, ambassador to the Soviet world," met with generals about Union soon after Stalin's death, re­ troops, bombs, and casualties. called ineffective "meetings at which Ehrenburg recalled how incongruous the CIA discussed ways to counter the Stalin's public stance see:r:1.ed at a time Hate America campaign."29 w hen many feareci wa:-: "Stalin busied The Korean War also changed himself with issues of linguistics, but America's self-image. Until the inva­ ordinary citizens bought salt and sion, the United States had competed soap."23 with the Soviet Union for the role of The result was to freeze the peaceful benefactor, and President official Soviet national identity as the Truman had rebuffed those in his 5 administration eager for rearmament. the rearmament ?lan sketched out in As the war approached, the press was the April14 report to the National indecisive; the tone of The New York Security Council known as NSC-68, Tz'mes in May and early June, 1950 was now opted for military , to defensive, with many references to the chagrin of Kennan and Bohlen. Soviet militarism and the growth of Bohlen later noted, apparently regret­ Soviet power.30 A cartoon on Sunday fully with reference ~o the proliferation May 21, showed a giant "Powder Keg" of U.S. military oases, "It was the looming over Berlin and a small man Korean war and not World War II that with the globe for a head covering his made '..IS a world military-political ears.31 A week later the paper pub­ power.33 The moderate voices that had lished a picture showing a confident survived Joe McCarthy's campaign Uncle Sam fencing a surprised bear out against domestic subversion disap­ of Western Europe with barbed w ire peared from the press, which adopted labeled "Arms Aid Program."32 The a uniformly combative tone. On June Times summed up the U.S. position in 28, 1950, three days after the invasion, the lead article of the News o/ the Week :tailed Truman's in Review for June 11 with a statement decision to intervene with a lead by Secretary of State Dean Acheson: editorial 1'Democracy Takes its Stand," All during the week in statements and the columnist Hanson W. Baldwin oy other top-ranking officials-and suggested that the United States might by :?resident Truman himself-the have blocked "a communist program same theme was reiterated. The of conquest during the sununer theme is that American policy is mo:1ths in which Korea was to have peace policy-to strengthen the been merely the first step." ~n July 17, West in order to discourage Soviet Ttme featured Stalin's menacing face on agg::ession and thus prevent war. its cover. The editors asked, This was a kind of 'lpeace offen­ Where is the Korean War leading sive"-the West's offensive. Hereto­ the World? Will the fierce forest fire fore ~he Americans have more or less in the mountainous land below the assu~ed that the world knows that 38th parallel be confined to the the United States is not an aggressor Korean peninsula? Will it spread nation. At the same time the Russians around the globe, to sear the capi­ have sought to /'monopolize" the tals of the world with atomic fire? dove of peace--which they have Or is 1950 the beginning of a series made the symbol of the Communist of slow limited wars that will keep peace drives-and the propaganda the U.S. and its allies committed in has had considerable effect." battle for generations?" The war ended the effort to wrest A map in the new sectwn, "War in the dove from the Soviets. The experi­ Asia," showed lines from Moscow to ence :ed many Americans to concl,..1de Korea, Formosa, Indochina, Iran, that t~'le country could not set the Turkey, Yugoslavia, and West Germany world right simply by virtuous ex­ "NEXT?" was the caption. British ample. National pride now became cartoonist David Low expressed the entangled with the impulse to exi:enC: consensus in the New York Ttmes on Americar. military power. Reactir.g to T'...ily 2. While tanks roll across the the North Korean invasion, the Korean border, Stalin and his advisors Truman administration, which had stand arm in arm holding a sign defended a peacetime budge: agains·: :;-eading "Next step to shove fullerica 6 out of the Pacific." The caption reads, 1953, ~he Austrian State treaty on May "Honest Mister, there's nobody here 15, 1955, and the arms agreements of out us Koreans." subsequerJ decades represe::1ted no Throughout the war, American more than temporary interruptions. and Soviet policymakers clung to their In the aftermath of Stalin's death, initial stances. Thus when Stalin died these two rigid national identities were on March 5, 1953, the superpowers momenta::-ily shaken. Stalin's heirs confronted each other with sharply launched their peace initiative to gain contrasting public faces. The Soviet legitimacy by increasing the state's gif: Union professed peaceful intentior:s. to society. Better relations with the The United States in the person of the United States could mean trade and new secretary of state, John Foster decreased military expenditures. Dulles, blustered. It can be argued that Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov ~he Soviet stance was hypocritical broached the issue on March 9, but in 2: since they professed peace and made manner likely to confirm American war, whereas America's aggressive skepticism about the gap ~etween rhetoric approximated the leaders' words and deeds in Soviet behavior.34 intention to defend the perceived Molotov gave the premier address. national interest militarily. Hence, from After reaffirming that "Staiin's cause L•e Soviet view it may have appeared will live for ages/' he stated simply, that American policymakers meant "In foreign policy our chief concern is what they said; whereas their Ameri­ not to penr.it a new war, to live in can counterparts could conclude t~at peace w:th all peoples." Beria, while the Soviets did not. hailing Stalin's legacy with equal This mutual perception had fervor, went further in stressing the possibly serious consequences, since importance of peace and the American leaders were soon to disr:~iss government's "policy of international Soviet initiatives as mere propaganda, cooperation and the development of arguing that the bear was again cryillg business-like ties with all countries on \Arolf. Soviet analysts read Dulles' the basis of reciprocity." Each affirmed ~ough rhetoric rather than the continuity of Soviet foreign po!icy. 5isenhower's more moderate state­ In effect, they broached the issue of ments as indicative of American peace while insisting that noeling .had i:-.:entions. Each side stumbled ove: changed. Beria, for example, described the content of the other's propaganda the government's foreign policy as as well as its institutional foundation. "the Leninist-Stalinist policy of the Soviet leaders were confounded by a preservation and strengthening of eultiplicity of voices, while Americans peace/' inadvertently invoking with pc.ssed over nuance :n an ideological his American audience the hypocritical system that they believed to be mor:o­ peace campaigns of the Korean War. lithic. Tragically, this was probably the Molotov's statement may have equally moment when these two contrasting baffled outsiciers. After denying that ·1ational identities were set in stone. the Soviet Union had any "aggressive Ahead lay the ar:ns race, the wars in aims," he announced: Indochina and , the ideo­ Our foreign policy, which is known logical polarization o~ Africa and Latin to the whole world as the stalinist America, as well as myriad smaller peace-loving foreign policy, is a conflicts fought largely by proxies. The policy of the political defense of troubled cease fire in Korea on July 27, peace between peoples, of the 7 :.;.nwavering defense and strength­ published "Peace Bids: A Calendar of ening of peace, of the struggle Communist Offers," and the against the preparation and un­ magazine's list was also impressive. leashing of new wars, a policy of Soviet leaders made other accommo­ international cooperation and the da'.:ing decisions or overtures. These development of business-like ties included the freeing of ten British with all countries who also strive civilians held for three years in North for this. Korea (NYT, March 21); the amnesty on The Eisenhower administration March 27 of all Soviet prisoners serv­ and :he American press initially ing sentences of less than five years, discounted these overtu::-es. Yet ges­ which resulted in freeing roughly one tures and proposed actions accompa­ rrillion, a third of the camp popula­ n:ed Soviet rhetoric. On April 1, Carton tion;36 the granting of permission for Savage of the State Department's the Russian wives of some non-Rus­ Policy Planning Staff noteC. to the sians to leave the country, and an Director of the Staff (Paui Nitze), agreement to trade ill and wounded "Since on March 5, prisoners in Korea (NYT, March 29). 1953 :here have been more Soviet North Korea agreed on April 11 to the gestures toward the West than at any exchange of prisoners. Another sign of ofne::- similar period."35 He offered a change observed at the time was the "cieck list of Soviet gestures" that repudiation of the Doctors' Plot on inc1ucied the following: 1. Agreement April 4. The Charge' in the Soviet to exchange sick and wounded prison­ Union (Beam) wrote on the evening of ers of war; 2. Proposal for the resump­ April4: "This startling event, perhaps tion of armistice talks in Korea on more than any other, provides most what appears to be a reasonable basis; concrete evidence thus far of the 3. Prooosal fo r British-Soviet talks in present regime's break with Berlin to reduce air incidents in Ger­ since it must be accepted that Stalin many (a British plane had been shot himself either engJ!eered the doctors down).; 4. Statement by General plot, or gave his approval to one 37 Chuikov that a conference "called to initiating bloc." Willston Churc ~till prepare a peace treaty with Germany agreed. He informed Eisenhower on and the reunification of the country April11, "Nothing i..-npressed me so corresponds fully and wholly to the much as the doctor story This rrcust cut Soviet Union's attitude; 5. Soviet very deeply into communist discipline admission in propaganda that the and structure. I woui.d not like it i: o be United States and Britain had a hand tnought that a sudden American in the defeat of Germany in 1945; 6. cieclaration [presumably a reference to Sov:et permission for a group of Eisenhower's upcoming speech] l"las American correspondents to enter prevented this natural growth of 38 Russia; 7. Sovie: approach to a Norwe­ events." On April24, the new Ameri­ gian representative at the UN, discuss­ can ambassador to the Soviet Union, ing a possible meeting between Presi­ "Chip" Bohlen noted "the cessation of dent Eisenhower and Malenkov to the ha:e-America campaign," bu'.: consider subjec·:s of tension including warned that little of substance hc.d 39 atomic energy control and disarma­ changed. Materials 'rom Soviet ment. archives suggest that Beria may have The press was privy to most of considered proposing a neutral capital­ this activity, anc: on April 13 Newsweek, :s: Germany and that Malenkov st.:.p- 8 ported him, possibly because he was fi:st two years of the Korean War. worried about nuclear weapons.40 In W:'1ereas the aging Churchill thought fact, Soviet relations with the West of lo:s ?lace in history when he consid­ warmed somewhat. Later, iP. addition ered western policy toward the post­ to ending the Korean War and sigring Stalin regime, Eisenhower recalled past the Austrian State treaty, the Soviet slights in the war of words. Churchill Union annulled the ban on marriages wrote to Eisenhower on March 11, "I with foreigners; repatriated German have the feeling that we r:1ight both of prisoners of war; established relations us together or separately be called to with Greece, Israel, and Yugoslavia, account if no attempt were made to and renounced claims to Turkish tum over a new leaf."42 Eisenhower territory replied, however, the same day: "Even In view of the events in the weeks now I tend to doubt the wisdom of a after Stalin's death it seems surprising formal multilateral meeting since this that the Eisenhower administration would give our opponent the same did not respond more favorably to the kind of opportunity he has so often initial Soviet gestures. The difference had to use such a meeting simulta­ between Eisenhower's and Churchill's neously to balk every reasonable effort perceptions is striking, even given the of ourselves and to make of the whole language of the Republican Party occurrence [sk] another propaganda platform on whid-. he was elected, the mill for the Soviet."43 paranoia of America's new cold war Three weeks later, on AprilS, culture, and the American concern to Churchill wrote again with the same promote Western European military ~Jurpose, noting "the apparent change integration.41 Eisenhower repeatecly for the better in the Soviet n:ood," dismissed as propagandistic the Soviet suggesting "that we ought to lose no initiatives ChurchL.l wished to explore. chance of finding out how far t~e The American press largely accepted Malenkov regime is prepared to go in the Eisenhower administration's easing things up all around."44 reading of events. '"":11us on April29, Eisenhower replied on Apd 6 that he the New York nmes ran a front-page was considering a speech but again article o~ Dulles' rejecjon of Soviet warned of propaganda: "This whole overtures with the caption, "U. S., In field is strewn with very difficult Effect, Bars Molotov Peace Bid." The obstacles, as we all know; but I do fac: that the Eisenhower administra­ think it extremely important that the tion rejected Soviet overtures and great masses of the world understand c:or.vinced the American public that it that, on our side, we are deadly se~ious vvas proper :o do so probably owed in our search for peace and are ready something to previous Soviet peace to prove this with acts and deeds and propaganda and to the competing not merely assert it in glittering !lational postures of the two countries phraseology"45 In fact, the EiseiLltower as world-wide benefactors, as well as administration had been preoccupied to Soviet policies throughout the with propaganda and "psychological world. In refusing to engage with the warfare" from the moment of Stalin's Soviets and to accept the Soviet peace illness.46 initiative as genuine, the Eisenhower Eisenhower sought to counter administration chose to replay the Soviet proposals, and on April 16 he propaganda match that ~he United gave the speech he had been consider­ States was perceived to ~ave lost in the ing, despite Dulles' oppositio!l.Y He 9 recalled the hopes of 1945 and con­ will and interests of t~e broadest trasted Soviet force and subversion masses of the people," to the bou:-geois with American efforts for "true peace" state, "which by ~ts very nature is alien based on cooperation and on each and hostile to the masses of Llte cation's right to choose its form of people."50 This presentation was government and economic syste:n 48 unlikely to generate a positive re­ He stressed the cost of t~e anT:S race sponse from eithe; the Eisenhower and the new Soviet leaders' "preciou.s administration or the American press. opportunity . .. to help tum the tide of The Times first emphas;zed the nega­ history" He pointed to conflicts in tive features of ~ASS' commentary, and Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Austria, and then questioned its meaning.51 Geroany, proposed a fund for world On the very day of the Soviet aid 2nd reconstruction, and challenged response, Dulles described tr.e Soviet government to provide Eisenhower's speech as a "peace "concrete evidence" of its desire for offensive" based on America's rebuff peace. He offered a tve point propose.'. of Soviet aggression."52 He derided for arms reduction, including l~ita­ Soviet initiatives as a "peace defen­ tions on the numbers of a ~med forces, sive," a retreat before American power limits on the proportion of all pndvc­ and "a tactical move of the kind which tion devoted to military purposes, Soviet communism has often prac­ international control of atomic energy, ticed." By Sunday, April19, Du.:les had limitations on other weapons "of great gained sway, and American journalists destructiveness," and enforcement began to treat Soviet initiatives as a through inspection by the United continuation of the ongoing pro?a­ Nations. The New York Times praised ganda struggle between the two the speech. "Eisenhower Asks Soviet sides.53 On April20, Newsweek caught Deeds: Peace in Asia and Disa:-rrv:­ the flavor of the moment with the men t; Would Use Savings to Aid caption, "Western Cold Peace Strategy: World," read the headline.49 Check the Gift Horse's Teeth."54 A On April17, Pravda published a week later the magazine's headline short summary of Eisenhower's was sharper: "Ike Demands Deeds, not address in the middle of page •ou.·, Words as Reds Talk Peace, Wage criticizing him for defending the arms War."55 A cartoon showed a smal1 race and "the North Atlant;c b!o::," fc: dumpy Malenkov threatened by a ignoring China's national rights, c;;nd towering wave labeled "Ike's 5 I'oints for failing to support the unifica~ion of for Peace."56 Sermany according to the .Potsdam On April 22, the Soviet press Agreer.:1ent. The authors listed the five again signaled interest j) :'1egotiations, points on nuclear disarmament. ~c but perhaps too subtly to attract notice. confuse the issue, however, the So

------On April25, Pravda and Izvestz'ia anxiety" ~hat "the American newspa­ responded directly to Eisenhower's !Je:-s were hailing it [the commentary speech by printing a translation and in Pravda] as a great and concrete identical front-page commentaries. Tr.e co:.cession by the Soviet Union," ever editors welcomed Eisenhower's appeal, ~hoJgh "they had offered :to compro­ but defended previous Soviet policies mises."62 Jackson worried for naught. and criticized those of America. They The New York Times welcomed the too urged action not words. They Soviet response on April25, but soon expressed puzzlement at the contrast soured on Soviet motives.63 "Observers between Eisenhower and Dulles' thought the White House caution was speeches. "It is difficult to judge what well taken," the paper reported on comprises the external policy of the Sunday April 26 . The editorialist USA," they wrote. Soviet analysts were concluded: "This new statement... divided on the meaning of dashes humanity's hopes that the Eisenhower's speech, but after Dulles' Soviet leaders' declamations about address they concluded that there was peace since Stalin's death would be little chance of improving relations.57 followed by a real change o: policy" The American response to the An accompanying cartoon showed a Soviet commentary and translation was highflying :?eace dove carrying largely negative. Again propaganda "Eisenhower's Peace Program," was the issue. On April 25 Bohlen cited followed by a huffing Malenkov with a the editorial and "accurate and full dove on a leash labeled "Soviet Peace translation" of Eisenhower's address as Offensive."64 Newsweek on May 4 also "unprecedented," but the intention, he justified the administration's caution: observed, was to defend the Soviet "Until it is satisfied that there's no position and to "avoid the appearance hook in the lure, the Eisenhower of throwing cold water on any pros­ Administration won't bite ['at che pects of peaceful solution and im­ Soviet peace bait']." US. News and proved relations initiated by the Presi­ World Report printed Dulles' warning dent."58 Similarly, a high level "interde­ that "The free peoples are susceptible partmental report" dated April24 noted to Soviet guile because they so pas­ that "there is no basis fo:- concluding sionately want peace that they can that the fundamental hostility of the readily be attracted by illusions of Kremlin toward the West has abated, peace."65 Its cover story was "Africa that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Next Goal of Communists." rulers have changed, or that the menace The Soviet initiative suffered from of Communism to the free world has the opacity of Soviet politics, which diminished."59 Another ~:tterdepart­ kept outside analysts and journalists mental report dated April30, conveyed guessing about who was in charge. a similar judgment that "the rulers of "The great question confronting the USSR envisage a pro~onged political intelligence officers was to determine warfare campaign exploi~ing the 'peace' whether this new set-up in Russia theme." 60 Dulles likewise warned the constituted personal dictatorsrcip by NATO council in Paris in late April Malenkov or some sort of committee against Malenk.ov' s "phony peace control," observed Allen Dulles at the campaign. "61 National Security Council on March At the 141st :neeting of the Na­ 11. 66 Six weeks later, Bohlen wrote: tional Security Council on April28, C. "The great question for the future D. Jackson, expressed "surprise and which only time will answer is 11 whether or not the Soviet system can "when the Soviet peace offensive is be r...m by a committee or whether it raising doubts in people's minds." reqt;.ires the arbitrary power of final Despite a stroke on June 5, Churchill decision by one man."67 The press was persisted, but was reportedly 1osing also at sea. On March 11 The New York patience with his ally His private Times printed an article by its Soviet secretar_Yt Sir John Coville, noted in his specialist Harry Schwartz comparing diary after they had lunched on July the new ieaders' speeches with that of 24: "Very disappointed in Eisenhower Stalin on Lenin's death thirty years whom he thinks both weak and stu­ earlier. On March 14, Schwartz pro­ pid."72 vided an expose of a doctored picture In Moscow, on April 24, Bohlen of Molotov with Stalin and Mao began to question his initial appraisal captioned "Pravda Edits Picture Made suggesting that although Soviet rheto­ in '50, Moving New Premier Up." Such ric sounded familiar it might have a apparent readiness of the part of Soviet different meaning because the leader­ leaders to distort factual records did ship could not "disregard as cynically little to reassure the American public as he [Stalin] did the contradiction and the administration regarding the between word and deed."73 The Berlin veracity of Soviet official statements.68 uprising intervened, :.. wwever. Speak­ Churchill pressed on in vain for a ing at the National Security Council on summit, anticipating developments June 18, the day after the event, that would only come much later in Eisenhower reiterated his determina­ the wake of detente. His objective, he tion to "lend no semblance of moral told Eisenhower on March 27, w as "to support for Soviet ," encourage and aid any development of stating that "he had made it crystal which leads to a wider clear that if there were to be a four­ enjoyment by the Russian masses of power conference he himself would the consumer goods of which you certainly not be presen:."74 At the same speak, and modem popular amenities meeting C. D. Jackson voiced the and diversions which play so large a opinion that "the East Berliners had part in British and American life."69 On pulled the rug from under the Krem­ April11 Churchill wrote that "great lin." As he put it: '{The Russians can hope has a:-isen in the world that there scarcely come, in the circumstances, to is a change of heart in the vast, mighty any four-power conference posing as masses of Russia and this can carry spokesmen for a contented democratic them far and fast and perhaps into Germany which only seeks to be re­ revolujon."70 On May 4, he had even united."750n July 7, nearly three weeks sent Eisenhower a draft letter to after the clash in Berlin, Bohlen re­ Molotov, suggesting a meeting, buc ported to the State Department: Eisenhower replied negatively. "?c::r I believe that we can no longer from there having been any Commu­ without detrime:1t to our purposes nist actions which we could accept as continue to dismiss the present indications of such seriousness o~ pnase of Soviet policy both internal purpose, the Pravda editorial ~abou t h:;s and external as simply another speech] repeats all the previous Soviet "peace campaign" designed solely posi~ions and we are now faced with or even primarily to bemuse and 71 new aggression in Laos." He a:so divide the West. The events trat warned against "any action whic:!.-. have occurred here cumulatively could be misinterpreted" at a :ime ac.d up, in my opinion, to some- 12 thing considerably more important, :::,ea. th, as revealed in the transcript of offering on the one hand more ~he speeches at the secret Plenum of opportunities and on the other the Ce:::1tral Committee of the CPSU considerably more dangers thar. t!--_e from July 2 through July 7, 1953 at standard propaganda gestures "Nhich Beria was denounced.81 which we have seen since the er.d o::= '::0 engage effectively with the the war."76 Jnited States in the spring o; 1953 He concluded, "In its foreign Soviet leaders would have needed to reiations most evidence to date would jettison the most fundamental precepts indicate that the Soviet Government of their political speech and formulate desires a return to diplomacy and a oH-.ers. They would have had to dis­ lessening of world tension for an pense with the Manicheanism on indefinite period of time."77 Years later which the legitimacy of the regir:le had in a June 1964 interview, he looked depended almost without interruption back with sorne disappointment: "I since the days of Lenin. In 1953 this think it would have been very useful would have meant giving up the to have had a Summit conference in contrast between a peaceful Soviet '53. We might have gotten a great deal "camp" and the warlike America.• one. out of it. I mttst say, I didn't advise it Discarding the old basis for discourse then because I didn't see the situation would also have undercut the as it looks now."78 The insight came too country's claim to be hu:nanity's chief late. Harrison E. Salisbury, who met benefactor. Nor could a more open­ often with Bohlen in Moscow, recalled speaking regime have maintained the of Eisenhower and Bohlen: "He core value of the political order that [Eisenhower] seemed to have no citizens had to thank the leader, the :nterest in the i:ales Bohlen wanted to party, and the state for all goods and tell about the new crowd in Moscow. services. To pursue negotiations with ~ough not surprised at Dulles, the United States would have reqaired Bohlen was shocked and bitter at a rhetoric consistent with a different !ke."79 conception of the Soviet place in the The American reluctance to test world and of the nature of Soviet !:he sincerity of Malenkov's and Beria's society apparent desire for normalization of Only a tremendous crisis or ~elations owes much to the linguistic trauma could cause Soviet ~ eaders to :::or;ventions in which the Soviet drop the lens :hrough which they saw leaders expressed their views. Yet the world and the voice they used to Soviet rhetoric was more than off­ describe it. The initial defeats by the ·?utting. Those who used it sharply Nazis and the threat to national sur­ restricted their range of actions as well vival in World War II was one Stlch as the extent to which their American trauma, and the rhetoric changed, if 82 co .. mterparts could understand them. temporarily As soon as the tide The :tistorian J. G. A. Pocock has turned favorable, however, the G.escribed this dilemma: "Men cannot Stalinist leadership returned to the old do what they have no means of saying rules of speecil.. Stalin's death was :hey have done; and what they do another trauma, since he had effec­ must in part be what they can say and tively centered the language of poEtics conceive that it is."80 The old political on his person. The fact that the s~ogan language retained its hold on most "Thank You, Comrade Stalin," was no Soviet leaders months after Stalin's longer relevant provided an openi.r.g 13 for new leaciers to develop new fo rms to :messages of both sides, but as an of speech, but the process was slow, American ally he could do no more uneven, and ultimately unsuccessful. than state his views as he did. In the crucial months between March 5 Could Soviet leaders have mas­ and the East Berlin uprisir.g, Stalin's tered a new politicai language in the heirs proved unable to express them­ short time availabie to them before the selves differently enough to win a East German uprising? Such a depar­ hearing from the skeptical Eisenhower ture would have pro:,ably required a administration and the American phase of preparation, such as "the public. The message the new leaders thaw" under Khrushchev or conveyed was not sufficient to defeat under Gorbachev. Soviet public culture the powerful and enemies of normal­ and its message, including the cult of ization in the United States. If a the leader, the economy of the gift, and chance to tone down the was official Manicheanism could not have in fact missed in 1953, failure to com­ been discarded in their entirety with­ m-...J.nicate may explain in part why out imperiling the system itself, as Soviet ideology, which suffused the Khrushchev and Gorbachev both language of public life, constrained the found later. new leaders' ability to express a desire What might an agreement have for peace and perhaps even to imagine looked like in the spring of 1953 had what such a policy would entail. leaders successfully expressed a desire Americans in government and in the to forge one? Faced with the prospect media for :heir part neither accepted of a rearmed West ~ermany in NATO, Soviet peace overtures as literal state­ Stalin's successors were willing to ments nor as meaningful messages. consider a neutral united and demilita­ They were so fully invested in the cold rized alternative, and ~hey did not war rhetoric that they were unable or commit themselves to the two-state unwilling to perceive nuance or option and the promotion of a socialist subtlety in Soviet statements. For the East Germany until after the June 83 Eisenhowe~ administration to have uprising in East Berlin. A second area engaged w:th the new Soviet leader­ of accord might have involved the ship would have required a significant movement of military observers. The break with the militant vision of four-power agreements after the war America's world role set out in the allowed for some such movement in :952 Republican Party Platform. Germany, and an extension of this Why did Churchill and Eisenhower arrangement might have had a prospect hear the same Soviet rr,etoric sc differ­ of success. Later Eisenhower was to ently? Churchill, from his vantage propose the open skies program, which point in war-ravaged Britain, was not the Soviets were unwilling to accept. immersed in the almost religious Although neither option would have American cold war culture. No:- c:ia he :ed to significant arms reductions, have to contend with tr.e same expec­ either would have represented a start. tations about his country's role i.il. t:1.e -=::ultural exchange was another area in world. He may have also beec less 'Nhich the possibility for an openiTlg angered by the Soviet peace Cari'.pa:g:""ls :nay have existed, even though the of the Korean War. Perhaps in the Soviets were suspicious of such activity twilight of his career he had the vrs:o,l. l.n each case, howeve::', the momentum to move beyond Manicheanism. of the strategic-military struggle proved Churchill may have been more attune(, too great to overcome. 14

------The cold war continued as a :Tom the high cost of the protracted largely military and strategic struggle cold war. If indeed a window of his­ for almost another four decades, at toric opportunity opened partially on great cost to Americans, Russians, and Stalin's death neither of the opponents other peoples around the world. ~e was able to use it for effective commu­ 1970s and 1980s were marked not by nication. Rhetorical constrai.r.ts, largely peaceful competition but by bloody of expression on the Soviet side and of local wars. T:1.e hardships at present perception on the American, closed the for so many people in the post-Soviet window before anyone had a chance to successor states derive in large part see the view.

15 Enci Notes 1. I ~hank Karen Brooks, Georgiy Chemiavskiy, Daun van Ee, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Louis Galambos, John _E ;_gham, Anna Krylova, Lary May, Yale Richmond, Blair Rubie, Ron Suny, Ruud van Dijk, and Ron Walters for their ~elpful comments. I presented early versions of this essay at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association ir: Chicago in January 2000, a joint se:r.inar of the Kennan Institute and the Cold War International History Project at t~e Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C, and the Russian Studies Workshop at t~

16

------Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making, 1/ parts 1-3,journal of Cold War Studiesvol. 1 (Winter, 1999), 3-55, vol 2 (Spring, 1999),3-38; vol. 3 (Fall, 1999), 3-66. 9. I argue this poi.:1t in Thank You/ Comrade Stalin/ Soviet Public Culture from Revolu­ tion to Cold War (Princeton/ 2000), 195-98; See also E. S. Seniakovskaia, Frontovoe pokolenie. lstoriko-pszkhologicheskoe iss/edovanie (Moscow, 1945). 10. Pravda, March 15, 1953. !1. Varlam Shalamov, Kolyma Tales, trans. John Glad (New York, 1994), 284. 12. The penetration of this language into the secret counsels of the leadership is evident in the many ?ublications of documents. See, for example, J. Arch Getty and Olge V Naumov, eds., The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Se(f-Destruction of the Bo/shevzks/ 1932-1939 (New Eaven, 1999). 13. Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You/ Comrade Stalin/ 82-105. 14. See also the article by B. Gribo:::- 'ev, ul' Tovogodnie 'ciary' g-na garrimana," in Trud, January 8, 1949. 15. Quoted from the C. D. Jackson paper~. , Eisert ower Library, Abilene, Kansas in 3~ands, The Devzl We Knew, 43. 16. Pravda, August 26, 1948. 17. Pravda and lzvestiia February 2-5, ~ 949 also g2ve foreign comments or, Stalin's remarks. ~8. Pravda, April7, 1949. ~9. Pravda, April27, 1949. 20 . David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (l Jew Haven, 1994), 237-50. He cites a pamphlet by Major-General G. I Pokrovs:7 published in 1946. 21. The document appears in Katheryn Weathe:sby, //Korea, 1949-50: To Att2ck, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," in Cold War Interna­ tional History Project BulletinS (Spring, 1995), 9. 22. He corrmented in Pravda on June 20, 1950, July 4, 1950, and August 2, :950. !-lis comments on August 2, 1950 consisted of three replies to letters, w!Uch to­ gether with his earlier remarks were reprinted as a sepa~ate booklet. 23. Il'ia Erenburg, Liud!f God!f Zhizn~· Vospominaniia v trekh tomakh (Moscow, 1990), 3:154. 24. Pravda, Ju~y 30, 1950, August 11, 195C. 25 . New Times, no. 27, (July 5, 1950). 26. New Times, no 29 (July 19, 1950), 4.

27. u Address to the United Nations, New Times, Supplement to no. 48 (November 29, 1950), 2. 28. //Report of ~he Second World Peace Cv:n.gress," New Times, Supplement to no. 48 (Nov. 29, 1950), 9. 29 . Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York, 1973), 295. 30. See for exa.t-nple Bess Furman, "President P.ejects Yielding to Russic:" May 24, 1950 and C. L. Sulzberger, //Soviet ?ushes Eas: as U.S. Eyes Europe," New York Times, May 28, 1950; and "Clayton Sees U. S. i..,osirg 'Cold War"' New York Times,

17 June 3, 1950. 31. By Morris of The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle. 32. New York Times, May 28, 1950. The cartoon is by Mergen from The Atlanta journal. 33. Bohlen, Wztness, 303 34. Izvestiia, March 10, 1953. 35. FRUS, 1138. 36. Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz, 105. 37. FRUS, 1141. 38. The Churchill-Eisenhower Corr?spondence, 41 . 39. FRUS, 1158. 40. Vladislav M. Zubok, SPSU PlenJrr\s, ::..,eadership Struggles, and Soviet Cold War Politics, CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March, 1998), 29; See also C. M. S~ickle , The Berza Affair. The Secret Transcripts of the Meetings Signalling the End of Stalz7usm, tran. Jean Farrow (New York, 1992); "Delo Veriia. Plenc.m Ts KPSS Iiul' 1953 goda, Ster.ographicheskii otchet,!zvestiza Ts KPSSS1 (199 ~) , 139-214, 2(1991), 141-208. On Malenkov's views, Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz, 131-132. 41. See for example, Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, 1991) and Lary May, The Big Tomorrow: Hollywood and the Polztics of the American Way (Chicago, Illinois, 2000), particularly chapter five. 42. The Churchzll-Ezsenhower Corrr;spondence, 31. Sic appears in ~he quoted passage. 43. Ibid., 32. 44. The Churchzll-Etsenhower Correspondence, 36. 45. Ibid., 38. 46. The first discussion of Stalin's illness at the National Secu:-ity Council O!l March 4 concerned the exploitation of Stalin's death for propaganda. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Union of Soviet Soc~alist Repubks, Volume Yilt 1091-1095. 47. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. vol. 2, The Preszdent, 92-93. 48. I cite the cext in FRUS, 1147-55. 49. New J0rk nmes, April 17, 1953. 50. Ma:tin Walker in The Cold War: A History (New York, 1993) suggests thc:t Pravda published a critical commentary whereas lzvestiza, Malenkov's power base, published the speech in full. He cites G. Arbatov, The System (t.Jew York, 1992), 43. In fact, both Pravda and Izvestiza published the critical summary oy TASS on the 17 ar_d both also published the speech and a commentary on April25. 51. New J0rk nmes, April 17 and April19 (New ojthe Week in Review), 1953. 52. I c:.te the text in the New J0rk nmes, April ~9, 1953. 53. New J0rk nmes, April 19, 1953. 54. Newsweek, April20, 1953, 40. 55. Newsweek April27, 1953. 56. Newsweek, April27, 1953. The cartoon is by Pac~er from the New York Mirror.

18 57. Zubok, "Soviet Intelligence," 461. 58. FRUS, 1164-65 59. FRUS, 1163. 60. FRUS, 1163. 6~. Private memorandum, late April, :953, Du,les Papers; cited by Tow::~.ser. d Hoopes, The Devzl and john Foster Dulles (Boston, 1973), 173. 62. Eisenhovver Mss. Papers as President (Ann Whitman File) NSC Series. Dwight G. Eisenhower Library, Abilene Kansas. 63. New York Times, April 26, 1953. 64. New York Tz!nes, April26, 1953, by White from The Akron Beacon-journal 65. US. News and World Report, !'lay 1, 1953,94. 66. FRUS, 1L. 67. FRUS, 1157-58. 68. "Is Malenkov slipping?," asked Newsweek on April20. See also New York Tz!nes, April26, 1953, New ifthe Week in Review, Harry Schwartz, "Who Now Rules Russia? Four Theories Weighed," and US. News and World Report, May 1, 1953,42. 69. Quoted by Martin Gilbert in Churchzl!- A Life, (New York, 1991), 923. 70. The Churchzll-Eisenhower Correspondence, 41. 71. FRUS, 1170-71. 72 Gilbert, Churchill, 915. 73. FRUS, 1158. 74. Discussion at the 150th Meeting of the National Security council, June 18, 1953, 10, Eisenhower Mss. Papers as President. (Ann Whitnan File) NSC Series. Dwig ~1.t D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene Kansas. See also Christian F. Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of ," working paper No. 11, Cold War International History Project (December, 1994). 75. Ibid., 10. 76. FRUS, 1193. 77. FRUS, 1195. 78. Quoted by Rostow in Europe rifter Stalin, 70, from the J. F. Dulles Oral History Project in the Seeley G. Mudd Mar_usGip t Library, Princeton University, 79. Harrison E. Salisbury, A journey for Our Tz'mes: A Memoir (New York, 1983), 456. 80. J. G. A. Pocock, "Virtue and Corn...rnerce in the Eighteenth Century," journal if Interdisciplinary Hist01y 3 (SWillT'.er, 1972), 122. 81. D. M. Stickle, The Ben'a Affair. The Secret Transcripts ifthe Meetings Signalling the End ifStalinism, tran. Jean Farrow (New York, 1992); "Delo Veriia. Plenum Ts KPSS Iiul' 1953 goda, Stenographicheskii otchet, lzvestiia Ts KPSSS 1 (1991), 139-214, 2(1991), 141-208. On Malenkov's views, Pikhoia, SovetskiiSoiuz, 131-132. 82. Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin/, 159-94. 83. Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession St::·uggle," journal ofCold War Stud­ ies, vol. 1 (Fall, 1999t 12-14.

19