Echoes of Empire: Turkey's Crisis of Kemalism

ANALYSIS PAPER Number 26, June 2012 ECHOES OF EMPIRE: Turkey’s Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy Michael A. Reynolds The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Copyright © 2012 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 26, June 2012 ECHOES OF EMPIRE: Turkey’s Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy Michael A. Reynolds Table of Contents Executive Summary..........................................................iii Acknowledgements ........................................................viii The Author................................................................ix Introduction ..............................................................1 Kemalism and Its Crisis ......................................................5 Davutoğlu: Exponent and Implementer in Chief................................11 Foreign Policy: Compliment to Domestic .....................................19 Conclusion ...............................................................28 ECHOES OF empire: Turkey’s Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy ii Executive Summary urkey and its foreign policy have under- century demanded a powerful, technologically ca- gone a fundamental transformation. For- pable, and centralized state in tight control of a ter- merly a passive presence in the Middle ritory containing a homogenous population. The TEast, an eager aspirant to the European Union, and Kemalists therefore strove to create a secular nation- close partner of the United States, Turkey has today al identity, sever Turkey’s cultural ties to its Muslim become an active regional player that is ambivalent neighbors, and inculcate a materialist philosophy of about joining the European Union, and behaves progress among the population of their new state. independently of, at times even at cross-purposes They maintained a suspicion of Islam, which they with, the United States. Turkey’s current foreign pegged as a key obstacle to the modernization of policy represents a clear break with the tradition Turkey. The Kemalists made sure to embed these that characterized the republic’s foreign policy for principles in the institutions of their new state. nearly eight decades. That change is the product of several factors, including a more permissive interna- Looking back some nearly nine decades after the tional environment and Turkey’s increased wealth. formation of the Turkish Republic, one can say that By far the most important factor, however, is the the Kemalist project has by most standards been rise of a new political elite with a distinctly different a marked success. From a desperately poor, over- worldview. This worldview, and the foreign policy whelmingly illiterate, and ethnically disparate mix that it inspires, represents not just the preferences of Muslims, Mustafa Kemal and his successors cre- of this newly ascendant elite but also an emerging ated an educated, dynamic, and intensely patriotic response to the exhaustion of the founding ideology nation that has made Turkey a political and eco- of the Turkish Republic—Kemalism. nomic standout in the region. Yet by one critical criterion, the project has failed. Despite its effort Kemalism was the culmination of more than a cen- to forge one common unifying identity for all its tury of efforts to transform and save the Ottoman citizens, the republic has not assimilated the bulk state from external predators and internal dissolu- of its Kurdish population, and thus its population tion. Although those efforts nominally failed in so remains ethnically divided. far as the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist in 1923, they bore fruit with the birth of the Turkish Repub- lic that same year. Led by General Mustafa Kemal The Worldview of Turkey’s (Atatürk), a core of former Ottoman military of- New Elite ficers and statesmen in Turkey’s War of Indepen- dence defied the great powers’ attempts to carve up The electoral victory in 2002 of the Justice and De- Anatolia and ultimately succeeded in preserving velopment Party or AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Par- Turkish sovereignty. They distilled the bitter lessons tisi) brought to power a new elite whose members they took from the Ottoman experience as Kemal- self-consciously distinguish themselves from the ism, and concluded that survival in the twentieth old through above all an unapologetic affirmation ECHOES OF empire: Turkey’s Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy iii of their Islamic faith. This elite, including Turkey’s authorities routinely declaimed Iranian meddling current minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoğ- in Turkey’s internal affairs. The Turkish-Israeli part- lu, regard Kemalism today as not the solution to but nership of that decade was based in substantial part rather the source of Turkey’s problems. Kemalism, on containment of Syria, and the avowedly secular with its core principle of Turkish nationalism, inter- Turkish Republic was portrayed as the opposite of nalized the Western principle of ethno-nationalism the Islamic Republic of Iran. and thereby perpetuates the disintegration of Mus- lim fellowship. By converting Turks and Kurds from For this reason, Turkey’s outreach to the so-called brothers in faith into ethnic enemies, the Islamists anti-Western “resistance bloc” confounded observ- hold, Kemalism created an insoluble problem that ers accustomed to thinking of Turkey as intrinsi- condemned Turkey to endless conflict with its own cally pro-Western. One interpretation based it on population and chronic tension with its neighbors. tactical expediency, the product of a bargain struck According to Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, the so- for cooperation in combating Kurdish separatism. lution to the persistent/enduring challenge/threat To be sure, Syrian and Iranian willingness to col- of ethnic disintegration is to do the opposite of the laborate with Turkey in fighting Kurdish separatism Kemalists and reject ethno-nationalism as a political had generated goodwill in Ankara, placating Tur- principle. key’s military and nationalist circles in particular, and Ankara understandably sought to reciprocate. For Davutoğlu, the Kemalist project to build a Economic motives also contributed to the rap- Turkish nation-state in Anatolia has not merely prochement. Turkey’s rapidly growing economy run out of steam with its failure to assimilate the is highly dependent on imported energy—natural Kurds, but it has created within Turkey a ticking gas in particular. The desire of Turkish industrial- time bomb in the form of the Kurdish question. A ists to diversify and expand their sources of energy Turkish-Kurdish civil war, however, is not inevita- and turn Turkey into a regional energy hub has ble. To the contrary, Davutoğlu emphasizes, Turks undoubtedly pushed the country closer to Iran. At and Kurds share a history more than a millennium the same time, Turkish exporters’ search for more old of living together. To revive this legacy of har- markets helped expand the country’s ties with Syria. monious coexistence is not impossible; it would re- quire liberalizing politics at home, including lifting Nonetheless, Turkey’s decision to deepen relations restrictions on Kurdish identity, and relaxing barri- with Syria, Iran, and other actors in the region, ers to travel and trade throughout the region. such as Hamas, cannot be reduced to a collage of tactics. Davutoğlu’s program is grander, and reflects Foreign Relations: Challenging his quasi-mystical conviction that the Middle East the Worldview constitutes a single, coherent region, the product of a unique process of cultural and civilizational gestation The AKP’s Kurdish policy exhibits important par- that has been unfolding since the expansion of Islam allels to Davutoğlu’s effort to refashion Turkey’s in the eighth century. The Ottoman Empire (1299– foreign relations. The themes of reconciliation, 1923) played a crucial role in this process. As the pri- openness, and cooperation marked Turkey’s for- mary heir of that empire, Turkey can and must draw eign policy throughout 2003 and 2011. During upon the legacy that the Ottomans bequeathed to that time, Turkey insistently expanded ties to Syria it. Turkey’s geography and the historical and cultural and Iran. Turkey’s courtship of these two countries links with its neighbors, according to Davutoğlu, marked a substantial change from the 1990s, when lend it an extraordinary “strategic depth.” By engag- Turkey threatened Syria with war and when Turkish ing its neighbors and drawing them closer, Turkey ECHOES OF empire: Turkey’s Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy iv can simultaneously meliorate its domestic tensions because the Turks and Iranians know each other in- while acquiring greater influence throughout the re- timately for centuries, Davutoğlu believes, there is gion and thereby on the global stage. every reason they should have good relations. Davutoğlu thus has been a forceful advocate of the To what extent such “Iranophilia” will continue to free movement of people and goods throughout the

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