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Iraq Elections Pieter 2018 Elections in Iraq ! " Reactionary Sectarianism vs Reformist Nationalism Special Report #193" # 2018 Elecons in Iraq Reaconary Sectarianism vs Reformist Naonalism Pieter-Jan Dockx Researcher, Centre for Internal and Regional Security, IPCS SPECIAL REPORT!1 #193 2018 Elections in Iraq ! " Reactionary Sectarianism vs Reformist Nationalism Special Report #193" #Table of Contents Execuve Summary 1 Introducon 2 Reaconary Sectarianism 5 Reformist Naonalism 7 Domesc Consequences 11 Foreign Policy Ramificaons 14 Conclusion 16 !2 2018 Elections in Iraq ! " Reactionary Sectarianism vs Reformist Nationalism Special Report #193" Execu2ve Summary On 12 May 2018, Iraqis will take part in general elecons, which could serve as a stepping stone for addressing the drivers that facilitated the rise of the Islamic State (IS). Largely, there are two compeng ideological currents in the Shia polity in this elecon: sectarianism and naonalism. On the sectarian side, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is joined by the Popular Mobilisaon Forces (PMF). This grouping has a reaconary agenda that will most likely witness a perpetuaon of Sunni discriminaon and closeness between Iraq and Iran. In this scenario, the drivers that facilitated the IS will be relegated to the background. In response to this, a naonalist movement spearheaded by Muqtada al-Sadr has emerged. This reformist movement aims to tackle issues like ethno-sectarian discriminaon and corrupon that played into the hands of the IS. In this scenario, Iraq will aXempt to pivot away from Iran and move closer to Saudi Arabia and possibly the US. !1 2018 Elections in Iraq ! " Reactionary Sectarianism vs Reformist Nationalism Special Report #193" Introduc2on Iraq has been engulfed by sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shias ever since the 2003 US invasion. However, the rise of the IS was arguably the country’s most daunng challenge to date. Apart from external factors such as the American troops’ withdrawal from Iraq and the Syrian civil war, the emergence of the IS was aributed to Shia-centric state building led by former Prime Minister Maliki, who ruled the country from 2006 to 2014. Maliki, a Shia with strong es to Iran, centralised decision-making under his and his Shia allies’ authority, excluding Sunnis from power. Subsequent dissent within the Sunni community was met with a crackdown under the guise of vaguely-defined An-Terrorism and De-Ba’athificaon laws1. With many Sunnis disillusioned and disenfranchised by Maliki’s sectarian rule and the Iraqi army decimated by corrupon, the IS was able to gain control of large swathes of predominantly Sunni territory2. Under internaonal pressure, Maliki was replaced by current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. Seen as a less sectarian figure than his party leader Maliki, Abadi, himself a Shia, was tasked with removing the IS from Iraq and reversing Maliki’s discriminatory policies. With the Iraqi army in disarray, Abadi relied on the Popular Mobilisaon Forces (PMF) to militarily destroy the IS. This umbrella organisaon was established in 2014 and comprises of predominantly Iran-linked Shia milias. Although the PMF was pivotal in the fight against the IS, the organisaon became notorious for their abuse of the local Sunni populaon and the destrucon of Sunni towns in areas recaptured from the IS. This has further exacerbated sectarian tension in the country3. Furthermore, in the realm of governance, Abadi’s aXempted reforms were met with resistance from reaconary Shia Islamists. Against this backdrop, Iraqis will go to polls on 12 May 2018 for what has been dubbed the most important elecon in the country’s history. Although this claim was also made during previous 1De-Ba’athificaon laws are a set of laws that intended to reduce the influence of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party in the polical system; “Ahmad Chalabi and the Legacy of De-Baathificaon in Iraq”, The New York Times, November 3, 2015, hps://www.nymes.com/2015/11/04/world/middleeast/ahmad-chalabi-and-the-legacy-of-de-baathificaon-in- iraq.html 2Pieter-Jan Dockx, “ISIS and the Importance of Popular Support”, Internaonal Perspecve, May 7, 2017, hp:// www.internaonalperspecve.be/impression/2017/05/isis-and-the-importance-of-popular-support/ 3Pieter-Jan Dockx, “The Return of Maliki and a New Sunni Insurgency in Iraq?”, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, July 12, 2017, hp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2017/07/12/the-return-of-maliki-and-a-new-sunni-insurgency/ !2 2018 Elections in Iraq ! " Reactionary Sectarianism vs Reformist Nationalism Special Report #193" elecons, this me it holds more credibility. This first post-IS elecon could be the start of addressing the aforemenoned drivers that led to the rise of the terrorist group. First, this report aims to uncover the main ideologies and actors that will be compeng in the elecons. On one hand there are the Iran-linked sectarian Shia Islamists, who have primarily dominated Iraq since 2003. In this side of the spectrum, Maliki, who intends to regain his posion as prime minister, is joined by the PMF. Although the inial purpose of the PMF was solely defeang the IS, the organisaon has transformed itself into a polical alliance. On the other hand, as a response to this dominant sectarianism, a more reformist non-sectarian naonalist movement was born. This movement is spearheaded by Muqtada al-Sadr. The Shia cleric, who became infamous for leading a sectarian milia during the Iraqi civil war, has transformed himself into a more naonalist figure, calling for an end to sectarianism and the concomitant corrupon4. Apart from Sadr, Prime Minister Abadi has appropriated a similar naonalist narrave. Both figures will be parcipang in the elecons with their own cross-sectarian lists. It needs to be noted that all the actors discussed in this report are Shia Arabs. While the scope of this report does not allow a detailed analysis of all the various other contenders (Sunnis and Kurds), there are also objecve consideraons for discussing only the Shia actors. Firstly, Shia Arabs constute the largest ethno-sectarian group in the country, making their polical actors indispensable within Iraq’s power sharing instuons. Furthermore, with high levels of internal displacement of the Sunnis and the widely reported voter disillusionment, the Sunni community is less likely to parcipate in the ballot. Hence, an increased importance of the Shia vote and their polical actors. Sectarianism Nationalism Political Figure Associated Electoral list Political Figure Associated Electoral list Nouri al-Maliki Dawa Party Muqtada al-Sadr Sairoon Alliance Fatah Coalition Hadi al-Amiri Haider al-Abadi Victory List (Popular Mobilisation Forces) Second, this report also comprises a scenario-building exercise in which possible post-elecon coalions are discussed. Iraq’s power-sharing polical instuons make coalion formaon a crucial part of the polical process. This report also discusses the possible consequences of the elecons for Iraq's domesc and foreign policy. On the domesc front, the elecon will impact 4Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army was one of the most violent sectarian milias during the 2006-2008 Iraqi civil war in which over 40 000 civilians lost their lives; “Who are the Mahdi Army?”, Al Jazeera, August 30, 2007, hps:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2007/01/2008525135739989284.html !3 2018 Elections in Iraq ! " Reactionary Sectarianism vs Reformist Nationalism Special Report #193" the treatment of the Sunni community in the future and whether the drivers behind the rise of the IS are addressed. The paper also sheds light on the fate of the PMF as a security actor and Baghdad’s relaons with the Kurds. On the internaonal front, the paper discusses both camps’ relaons towards Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US. !4 2018 Elections in Iraq ! " Reactionary Sectarianism vs Reformist Nationalism Special Report #193" Reac2onary Sectarianism This secon discusses the two main Shia sectarian actors, former Prime Minister Maliki, and the PMF. In the Shia Islamist camp, Maliki, who aspires to regain his posion as prime minister, is joined by the PMF which will parcipate in the elecons for the first me as a single enty. Like Maliki, the principle groups within the PMF, such as the Badr Organisaon, are Shia Islamists5. PMF leaders like Badr’s Hadi al-Amiri aim to turn their military victory over the IS into electoral gains during the May 2018 elecons. Large scale Sunni displacement that took place due to the IS insurgency and the former's disillusionment from mainstream polics could lead to low Sunni voter turnouts. This would increase the weight of the Shia vote, which is more likely to be in favour of Shia Islamists, thus benefilng Maliki and the PMF. Despite the electoral law that is designed to prohibit milias from forming polical pares and Abadi’s moratorium on their aXempts to form polical groupings, the milias were able to enter mainstream polics. Furthermore, while the Badr Organisaon was already in parliament, they have recently announced the Fatah alliance, which unites all the various PMF facons under one polical banner6. If Fatah is able to achieve electoral success, it will become the dominant force both in security and polics, giving the group unprecedented influence in the country. In January 2018, to the surprise of many Iraq analysts, naonalist-minded figure Abadi formed an alliance with the Islamists of Fatah, led by Badr’s Hadi al-Amiri7. Although the coalion was short- lived and collapsed in merely three days, it demonstrated Amiri’s desire to be in a posion of 5The Badr Organisaon is the oldest Shia milia in Iraq
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