Kremlinology

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United States Reviving Kremlinology

Introduction

Like nearly all of the peoples of North and South America, most Americans are not originally from the territory that became the United States. They are a diverse collection of peoples primarily from a dozen different Western European states, mixed in with smaller groups from a hundred more. All of the New World entities struggled to carve a modern nation and

Winston Churchill once said, "Kremlin political intrigues are comparable to a bulldog ﬁght under a rug. An outsider only hears the growling, and when he sees the bones ﬂy out from beneath it is obvious who won." It is true that studying the Kremlin's internal struggles is more an art than a science. Stratfor uses systematic approaches in much of its work, though the art of Kremlinology involves watching hundreds of seemingly unconnected events and pieces move while attempting to draw common threads into a narrative. It is an imperfect art but an important one nonetheless, and it is back in demand now that the Kremlin is facing multiple crises.

Source: Wikimedia Commons, Bundesarchiv Source: Wikimedia Commons* Source: kremlin.ru Bild

This study was originally published by Stratfor in May 2015 as a four-part series.

*“Red Square, Moscow, Russia” is used here under terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. The image has not been altered in any way. Terms of the license are viewable here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en.

Introduction 1 Introduction 2 Table of Contents 3 Part 1: 4 Studying the Kremlin in Soviet Times 4 Part 2: Deciphering the Kremlin Today 8 The Kremlin Elite 9 Figure: Russia’s Circles of Inﬂuence 10 Russia's Turning Point 13 Part 3: The Kremlin’s Current Intrigues 14 Part 4: Current Intrigues and Emerging Clues 17 Accelerating Oddities 18 Questions Linger After Putin's Absence 20 Appendix: Timeline of Events December 2013-May 2015 22

Soviet-era Kremlinology was akin to sifting through mounds of pine needles before stepping back to see the whole forest. Kremlinologists studied every meeting to see who participated, looked at published photos to see who stood next to whom, and took note of who attended social events, such as the Bolshoi Ballet, to see which box each member of the elite sat in. Certain factions used various media outlets to publish formal agendas, gossip, slander and disinformation. The Communist Party used Pravda; the Soviet military used Red Star.

XIV Communist Party Congress, April 1925. From left to Manipulated image of XIV Party Congress, showing right: Mikhail Lashevich, Mikhail Frunze, Vlas Chubar, Mikhail Frunze, Klim Voroshilov, Josef Stalin and Sergo Alexei Rykov, Klim Voroshilov, Josef Stalin, Nikolai Ordzhonokidze. (Public domain) Skrypnik, Alexei Bubnov and Sergo Ordzhonokidze. (Public domain)

Through these varying levels of hints and information, a Kremlinologist could make sense of the ever changing web of alliances, rivals and influencers. These relationships and the struggles between them reflected the power and stability of the leader of the Soviet Union, the power and distribution of assets of Russia's most influential institutions, and the overall strength of the state. The difficulty for outside observers lay in the fact that changes in these relationships and balances of power mostly took place in secret.

After Josef Stalin's death, a power struggle took shape among members of the Kremlin elite. The ﬁght lasted ﬁve years, until Nikita Khrushchev managed to purge his opponents. During the struggle, alliances and clans among the elite constantly shifted between personalities,

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 4 control of assets and levels of power. For example, in the months after Stalin's death, Khrushchev aligned with the head of the secret police, Lavrenti Beria, to oust Communist Party leader Georgy Malenkov. Three months later, Khrushchev teamed up with Malenkov to remove Beria.

Georgy Malenkov (Public domain) Nikita Khrushchev (Public domain) Lavrenti Beria (holding Josef Stalin’s daughter Svetlana (Public domain)

At the time, it was inconceivable to outside observers that anyone other than the deceased Stalin could take down Beria. He was, after all, in charge of the most powerful organization in the Soviet Union: the NKVD, which later evolved into the KGB and today's FSB. Malenkov and Khrushchev, who believed Beria would take them down eventually, were careful in their plan, understanding that Beria had eyes and ears in every dark corner. The men knew the only way to take Beria out of the picture was with the support of the Soviet military. They spread rumors that he was a U.S. agent and organized a swift confrontation by calling him to a presidium meeting, where they laid all his transgressions before him while the military waited in the wings to arrest him.

An important aspect of this power shift was that Malenkov and Khrushchev were able to take down the mighty Beria in extreme secrecy. His disappearance went unnoticed for two days, and authorities kept his arrest secret for two weeks before executing him nearly five months later. The first evidence of Beria's fall was his absence from a performance at the Bolshoi Ballet, followed by rumors of arrests of top NKVD officers.

Secrecy also played a key role in Leonid Brezhnev's plan to oust Khrushchev from ofﬁce. Knowing he would need a group of power players within the Communist Party on his side, Brezhnev set his plan in motion some six months before Khrushchev stepped down. During these months, evidence that Khrushchev was on his way out mounted: Anti-

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 5 Khrushchev rhetoric increased in Pravda, the Communist Party's media outlet, and Khrushchev took more vacations away from Moscow, giving Brezhnev room to work more openly against him.

After Brezhnev took ofﬁce, hints of a signiﬁcant struggle between the new Soviet leader and Yuri Andropov emerged in media and in anti-corruption campaigns. Brezhnev's control over the KGB began to erode when Andropov took over the organization, even though Andropov did not have a background in intelligence. Andropov began a media campaign to boost the popularity of the KGB by planting pro- KGB stories in Pravda and other outlets on the 50th anniversary of Soviet intelligence apparatuses and on the Leonid Brezhnev, April 1967 (Public domain, Bundesarchiv 100th anniversary of Soviet secret police founder Felix Bild) Dzerzhinsky's birthday.

Andropov also began increasing the KGB's importance by lobbying Politburo members for expanded powers to combat inﬁltration by Western intelligence. At the same time, the KGB spread rumors throughout the Soviet media that corruption within the government was Yuri Andropov’s KGB identity card, showing expiration date of Dec. 31, 1980 (Public rampant under domain) Brezhnev's watch. When the Politburo granted the KGB jurisdiction over economic crimes, the organization launched a campaign against Brezhnev's loyalists and family members and purged them from the KGB ranks. These moves solidiﬁed both Andropov's power base and the KGB's weight, eventually enabling Andropov to succeed Brezhnev.

Kremlin politics do not occur in a vacuum, though, and events throughout Russia and the world can shape how and when such intrigues take place. For example, Beria's ouster was postponed by a rebellion in East Germany that required a Soviet military response.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 6 In each political transition, countless seemingly unconnected pieces could be detected, but as Churchill said, the victor was a mystery until he emerged from under the rug. The same is true today in the Kremlin, where a struggle for power over policy, assets and funds is taking place.

Such struggles are hardly new, but this one comes as Russia is facing a series of crises, such as the standoff with the West over Ukraine, plummeting government revenues because of low oil prices, and growing discontent among the Russian people. It is this confluence of factors that makes it more difficult for Russian President Vladimir Putin to arbitrate between members of the elite and protect his own position. But to know how significant the current power struggle is, we must return to the old tactics of Kremlinology.

Understanding current Kremlin intrigues calls for tactics similar to those used during the Soviet period. Because Russia is more open than the Soviet Union, more pieces are visible, which can either confuse or help Russia experts. Today's Kremlinologists still study official meetings and personnel shifts in government posts, particularly changes in who oversees the most influential government institutions and businesses. With the fall of the Soviet Union, ownership or influence over both state and independent assets became crucial. Assets and companies give the elite not only tools to shape policy but also sources of profit.

Many Kremlin factions still use particular media outlets for their preferred leaks, agendas and gossip. For example, the Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly uses Itar-Tass, Izvestia and Sputnik (formerly RIA Novosti) to leak information and push its agenda. It also uses Russia Today to spread propaganda. The elite tied to Russian natural gas ﬁrm Gazprom subtly spread information via Echo of Moscow, one of the last independent media ﬁrms in the country. Russia's more liberal opposition groups go to Novaya Gazeta or Moskovsky Komsomolets, and anti-FSB members of the elite reportedly push their leaks through Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

An additional tool for watching members of the Kremlin elite is social media, particularly VKontakte, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. Most of Russia's top leaders do not use social media, though there are some important exceptions, such as Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and Russian presidential adviser Vladislav Surkov. Watching the family members of the Kremlin elite on social media is another way to gather hints. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s ofﬁcial Twitter proﬁle page (Screen capture)

In studying the Kremlin under Russian President Vladimir Putin, Stratfor has seen many iterations of who and what are considered the most powerful elite and institutions because Russia's political cycle is directly tied to the country's overall cycle of power and stability. Putin came to power on the heels of Boris Yeltsin's disastrous presidency, which left the country economically weak, regionally fractured, socially disillusioned and politically disorganized — while also facing a major security problem in Russia's North Caucasus.

Putin's ascent did not eliminate the elite who were in place before he became president. He had to contend with countless factions vying for power: Yeltsin loyalists, oligarchs, Communists, liberal parties, the FSB, St. Petersburg politicians who bled into the FSB, Chechen clans and more. While Putin was still Russia's FSB chief and prime minister, he began collecting loyalists who later helped him consolidate power during the ﬁrst few years of his presidency. As he designed his power base, Putin stabilized Russia economically and regionally and clamped down on the North Caucasus. He centralized political parties, various institutions, assets and businesses under his new government.

During the stabilization process, Russia caught two lucky breaks. First, the West and particularly the United States became preoccupied with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, oil prices skyrocketed, giving the Kremlin a massive ﬁnancial windfall. Both of these strengthened the Kremlin's ability not only Russia’s Circles of Inﬂuence to consolidate power within Russia but also to begin its resurgence in the former Soviet space and beyond.

By the mid-to-late 2000s, the most powerful inﬂuencers and institutions in Russia began to settle into place. These are not the richest or most vocal Russians, nor are they necessarily connected to Putin, but they are the parties that can change Russian policy and strategy and make decisions for the country both internally and abroad. Though hundreds of players and institutions in Russia could be considered inﬂuential, approximately 18 See full graphic, pages 10-12 personalities and 19 institutions currently stand out.

Sergei Chemezov

Rostec Rosoboronexport

FSO GRU

Sergei Shoigu Russian Investigative Armed Ramzan MVD Vladislav Committee Kadyrov Surkov Forces

Igor Sechin Sergei Naryshkin

Nikolai Patrushev Sergei Sobyanin Sergei Ivanov

Russian Orthodox FSB Church

Camp 1

FSB - Agency for internal intelligence and counterintelligence activities, counterterrorism and border security Russian Orthodox Church - The largest religious organization in Russia - 68% of Russians identify themselves as Russian Orthodox Igor Sechin - Former deputy prime minister and Chairman of Rosneft, FSB - Senior FSB member - Highly influential in the energy sector, particularly oil - Foreign ties to Africa, Asia and Latin America - Influence in the arms export sector Sergei Naryshkin - Chairman of the State Duma - Rumored FSB member - Chairman of Channel One’s Board of Directors - Manages foreign relations portfolios for CIS and East Asia Nikolai Patrushev - Secretary of the Security Council, FSB - Former FSB chief, senior (if not top) FSB member - Influence over current FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov Sergei Ivanov - Chief of Presidential Administration, FSB - Senior FSB member - Influence within the military industrial complex via Rostec Sergei Sobyanin - Mayor of Moscow - Highly popular with the Russian people - Influence within United Russia party - Closely aligned with Orthodox Church and FSB

Camp 2

FSO - Presidential protection and communication GRU - Military intelligence for the Russian army MVD - Law enforcement overseeing Interior Ministry troops and federal police Ramzan Kadyrov - President of Chechnya - Commands 40,000 Chechen battalion soldiers -Extremely loyal to Russian President Vladimir Putin - Aligned with former Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov Vladislav Surkov - Former Deputy Chief of Staff - Rumored senior member of the GRU - Influence within the Kremlin’s hybrid strategy in the periphery - Influence within Chechnya and over Chechen President Kadyrov - Influence through political parties, propaganda and ethnic and social portfolios

Rostec - Russian state’s corporation for civil and defense sectors, overseeing the eight largest defense production complexes Rosoboronexport - The state intermediary agency for Russian arms and defense-related exports and imports Sergei Chemezov - CEO of Rostec - Influence within the military industrial complex - Influence over security mouthpieces such as Dmitri Rogozin - Influence in foreign military relations via Rosoboronexport

Camp 4

Sergei Shoigu - Defense Minister - Highly popular with the Russian people - Inﬂuence within the Russian military Russian Armed Forces - Russia’s military service

Camp 5

Investigative Committee - The primary federal investigative authority, subordinate to the oﬃce of the president

The power of these inﬂuential people and institutions rises and falls, as it did during the Soviet period. Putin is also constantly adjusting the inﬂuence they hold to create a balance of power beneath him and to address different situations inside Russia and abroad.

Thus far, Putin has acted as the grand arbitrator among these power players, and he has had the ﬁnal say in struggles between them. His personal position has rarely been called into question during the ﬁrst 15 years of his leadership, and no single actor has had the clout to potentially challenge Putin or his presidency.

It was fairly easy for Putin to manage the competition among the elite while he was very popular and while Russia was experiencing growing wealth, sufﬁcient assets for each member of the elite, a return to the international stage and stability in the North Caucasus. However, this period of harmony has ended for both Putin and Russia.

The crisis in Ukraine has proved that neither Russia nor Putin are the unstoppable forces they appeared to be after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Since then, Western powers have teamed up against Russia by cutting their large investments into the country and levying a series of sanctions that are picking away at the Russian state and its banks and major ﬁrms. The West has turned Putin into the new international pariah, and the Kremlin is being forced to bail out many of Russia's large businesses and banks. Oil prices have dropped, biting into the Kremlin's revenues, and the Russian economy has plummeted into its second recession in six years. The Russian people are more concerned with the state of the economy than any other issue, including Ukraine. Moreover, Russia is losing Iran, one of its tools against the United States, as Tehran and Washington engage in negotiations.

Source: Public domain Source: Stratfor Enterprises LLC Source: Public domain

All of these crises naturally affect the Kremlin in several ways. Members of the elite are blaming each other for failures in Ukraine. Moreover, there is less money to go around, and Western sanctions targeted many members of the elite or the institutions they control. This has led to increased infighting among the most influential players in Russia. Although there are always disagreements and power struggles among the elite, the circumstances have made the competition more difficult to contain. Putin's ability to remain arbitrator among these dueling factions — and Russia's unchallenged leader — is becoming increasingly uncertain.

To understand how unstable the Kremlin and Russia are and whether President Vladimir Putin could face a challenge to his hold on power, we must return to the difﬁcult study of Kremlinology. As in the Soviet period, the Kremlin's instability and challenges are not public or overt. Piecing together events, rumors and media stories, however, can give indications about signiﬁcant changes on the horizon.

Stratfor is beginning to see these pieces fall into place. This is not to say that the Russian government is on the verge of collapse, or that Putin will soon fall from the presidency. However, it does indicate that a dangerous struggle is underway that could bring about a signiﬁcant change in the country's power structure.

Of all the battles currently going on inside the Kremlin, one has

Sergei Ivanov risen high enough to cause noticeable instability. Stratfor has (Source: Veni Markovski*) meticulously gathered a timeline of events, rumors, lies, meetings and other clues pertaining to the actors and institutions involved in this struggle. Because Kremlinology is not a perfect science, many items do not ﬁt into the narrative and many items critical to the narrative are not known. Some items may just be coincidence, while others could be fabrications or disinformation.

The struggle revolves primarily around inﬂuential individuals connected to the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's most

Igor Sechin powerful institution. Putin is cut from the FSB cloth, though he has (Source: Dyor, STRF.ru*) never been its center of power. Putin led the FSB in 1999, but there have long been rumors that he relied on members of the FSB elite to garner loyalty within the organization. Those FSB elite now hold some of the top positions in the Kremlin: Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Ivanov, Rosneft chief Igor Sechin and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. In addition, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, and State Duma Chairman Sergei Naryshkin are rumored to have been members of the FSB (or its predecessor, the KGB), and the current Nikolai Patrushev mayor of Moscow is reportedly loyal to this clan and, more broadly, (Source: kremlin.ru*) the FSB.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 14 Individually, none of these men can challenge Putin, but when united, they could act with impunity. Putin knows this. On occasion he has allowed the FSB to push ahead with its agenda, while at other times he has balanced the interests of the FSB group with those of other clans. Putin has also ensured that many non-FSB clans and individuals such as Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and presidential adviser Vladislav Surkov remain extremely loyal to him. The FSB clan has long been at odds with Kadyrov and Surkov, and though Putin initially acted as an impartial arbitrator in the clashes between them, he now may be forced to choose a side.

Like most of Russia’s current troubles, the most Stratfor’s Russia experts have recent dispute likely began with the crisis in compiled a timeline of events Ukraine. Many of the indicators of a serious power relevant to the ongoing power struggle within the Kremlin have emerged over the struggle within the Kremlin. It past 17 months, since the Ukraine conﬂict began. is presented as an appendix Together, they create a relatively clear narrative — at the end of this report. by Kremlinology standards — of a potentially signiﬁcant change in Russia’s power structure ahead.

During the protests that led to the fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's pro-Russia government and its replacement with a pro-West government, hints of a heavy FSB presence emerged. Ukrainian activists claimed that the FSB aided the Ukrainian government's Berkut security forces, which were cracking down on the opposition. Furthermore, when the West- friendly government came to power, it accused the FSB of ordering Yanukovich to crack down on the Maidan protesters. Overall, people ultimately regarded the FSB as having miscalculated and failed in Kiev.

In the months following the Maidan protests, the Ukrainian government's accusations of FSB meddling lessened, while its accusations against Russia's Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) became more numerous. This shift was important because Ukraine had long been considered the FSB's territory for intelligence. Media agencies independent of the FSB began to pick up on the GRU's gains in Ukraine, reporting that Putin was bolstering the GRU and containing the FSB. Indeed, Putin had awarded Surkov, a rumored GRU member, the Kremlin portfolio overseeing the Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine by the start of May 2014.

The same month, the FSB clan initiated a power grab at home by taking the Main Directorate of Economic Security and Anti-Corruption, a key part of the Interior Ministry. The FSB has long sought to inﬂuence the Interior Ministry because it does not have a military or police force of its own, and the Interior Ministry commands more than 200,000 troops and police.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 15 In June 2014, Kadyrov announced that he would set up his own intelligence and policing forces in Chechnya, similar to the FSB and Interior Ministry forces. Kadyrov hired a former FSB major, Daniil Martynov, to help design the forces — a move Martynov's former cohorts say the FSB did not sanction. Kadyrov had sidelined the FSB in Chechnya for nearly a decade, and with his own Chechen version of the FSB (in addition to approximately 40,000 Chechen soldiers he already commands), Kadyrov would become far more powerful in both Chechnya and Russia proper.

The jockeying for power between the FSB and Russia's other inﬂuential players is just one signal among many that the competition within the Kremlin is becoming more volatile.

*Photos provided under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license. These images have not been altered in any way. Terms of the license can be viewed here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en.

Kremlinology is more art than science. It requires a constant awareness of potentially pivotal events, such as Russian President Vladimir Putin's temporary disappearance during the spring of 2015, which fueled a great deal of speculation. Rumors that Putin is ill have abounded for years, but his absence from the public eye at the culmination of struggles between Federal Security Service (FSB) and non-FSB players in the Kremlin adds to the intrigue surrounding his disappearance. Putin remains at the heart of the Kremlin, and his brief absence could signal his weakening ability to arbitrate clan feuds.

A series of odd circumstances surrounding Putin began Aug. 7, 2014, when Svoboda Radio, a series of Duma members and state television operator VGTRK reported that Putin planned to give an "emergency speech" about Ukraine that night. Russian media speculated that the speech could signal a change in Russia's tactics in Ukraine and possibly a military intervention. However, Putin's emergency speech never happened. That night, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said no speech was planned. Speculation rose that either something was wrong with Putin or there was a division within the Kremlin on Ukraine.

The following week, Putin gave a speech in Crimea that was set to air live across all Russian time zones on multiple state television stations. However, the speech was never broadcast. Four hours after Putin gave his speech, small pieces of footage appeared on state-controlled television with no audio. Instead, a news anchor read a transcript published by Interfax and

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 17 Itar-Tass, both FSB-controlled media outlets. Rumors re-emerged that Putin was ill or that something occurred that the FSB had not approved.

In early September, Putin casually mentioned in an interview that the FSB would undergo a "restructuring." The president did not indicate what the restructuring would entail, and other than rumors of layoffs in the middle tiers of the intelligence organization, the restructuring's intent is unclear. The next month, Putin behaved oddly once more by celebrating his 62nd birthday in the Siberian forests instead of in Moscow or working as he had in previous years.

With the declining economy, the critical situation in Ukraine and intensifying internal struggles in the Kremlin, Putin's trip to Siberia could have been an indicator of the pressure he was under or evidence of illness, as the media have frequently speculated.

By October, the competition within the Kremlin began to escalate. Rumors from media outlets independent of FSB inﬂuence suggested that Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev would soon resign and be replaced by First Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Zolotov. Zolotov once served as Putin's bodyguard and is known to be extremely loyal to the president. The rumors could indicate that Putin was concerned about the FSB's inﬂuence in the Interior Ministry and needed to ensure that the ministry's powerful security forces were directly under his command. Though the rumors have not yet proved to be true, they have been mentioned frequently since they emerged.

In December 2014, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov gathered some 20,000 of his troops, fully armed and wearing backpacks, in a sports stadium in Chechnya. Kadyrov told the troops that they could resign and volunteer to go fight in Ukraine but that he was awaiting Putin's order. He ended the speech by rallying the soldiers, chanting, "Long live our national leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin!" That same month, Stratfor received a report that influential FSB figure Nikolai Patrushev would soon be dismissed as the head of the Security Council — a rumor that also has yet to come to fruition.

In early February, Putin began consolidating lesser intelligence groups under the Interior Ministry, the FSB's rival. By the end of the month, events began to unfold rapidly and became even more confusing.

Accelerating Oddities

On Feb. 27, leading Russian opposition ﬁgure Boris Nemtsov was assassinated on a bridge near the Kremlin. On March 4, Kadyrov posted a picture on Instagram showing himself with Putin, laughing and embracing, and posted a message that he would lay down his life for

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 18 Putin. That same day, Vladislav Surkov, Kadyrov's ally and an anti-FSB power player, left Russia with his family. It is possible that Putin went "missing" the following day, although the public did not know of the president's absence until March 10.

Source: kremlin.ru, Global Panorama** Source: Johnny Silvercloud via Flickr** Source: Instagram screen capture

On March 8, FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov announced the arrest of two suspects in the Nemtsov assassination and the detention of three other suspects, with a sixth having committed suicide while being apprehended. All of the suspects were Chechens, and one of them (Zaur Dadaev) had personal ties to Kadyrov. Kadyrov took to Instagram to call Dadaev a "true patriot." During the next week, rumors erupted that the FSB was targeting Kadyrov, with some theories speculating that Kadyrov ordered Nemtsov's death to show the FSB that he could get away with such a public assassination. Meanwhile, the Kremlin announced that Putin had awarded Kadyrov the Order of Honor, a clear sign of support for the Chechen president.

On March 11, the Kremlin canceled Putin's March 12-13 trip to Kazakhstan to meet with the Kazakh and Belarusian presidents, as well as a meeting with a South Ossetian delegation that was already in Moscow. Peskov said the meetings were simply "postponed." The Kremlin also posted a picture of Putin holding a working meeting with the head of the Republic of Karelia — a meeting that was conﬁrmed to have taken place six days earlier, meaning that Putin was out of the public eye and his whereabouts were unknown.

The day before the story broke that Putin was "missing," the FSB's top brass began to make a show of important meetings. Patrushev met with Kadyrov after a Security Council meeting. The following day, Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Ivanov and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin convened with Russian Orthodox Church ofﬁcials. The FSB also held one of its large annual meetings, which Putin missed.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 19 The president was not seen for 10 days, raising rampant speculation in the media about his whereabouts, whether there was a coup, and if he was ill or dead. Rumors spread of various members of the elite being killed or fired and of the Russian military deploying on the streets of Moscow, none of which transpired as far as we know. Peskov was hammered with questions about Putin's location, to which he gave a string of contradictory explanations before ordering the media to stop asking. When Putin finally emerged 10 days later in a meeting with his Kyrgyz counterpart, he remarked, "Life would be boring without rumors” — a fitting response to the Kremlinologists trying to untangle this string of events.

Questions Linger After Putin's Absence

Though the struggles between the FSB and non-FSB members of the elite are fairly clear, two key questions emerged after Putin's disappearance. First, has the FSB interpreted Putin's afﬁnity for loyalists such as Kadyrov and Surkov as a stance against the FSB? If Source: Stratfor Enterprises LLC so, then this is a power struggle between the FSB and Putin. Second, has the struggle already been settled behind the scenes in the FSB's favor, and the security agency is now acting as the puppeteer behind the Putin presidency?

Once again, we must sift through a series of clues to form a complete answer. Since Putin's vanishing act, the FSB has made a series of power grabs in key areas. FSB counterintelligence chief Oleg Syromolotov was appointed deputy foreign minister and charged with managing counterterrorism operations. State Duma deputy and FSB Col. Igor Barinov was appointed head of the newly created Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs. The two appointments put FSB personnel in positions that oversee many issues regarding Chechnya and Kadyrov.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 20 In addition, Russian commentators in social media and on Russian television channel NTV frequently mention the feud between Patrushev and Surkov over the Ukraine portfolio. It is possible that this battle could lead to an attack on Surkov. For example, Russian ultranationalist Ilya Goryachev will be going on trial any day now for allegedly masterminding 10 high-proﬁle murders carried out in recent years by the Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists. Goryachev has said Surkov was actually the mastermind behind the assassinations, and media outlets have said the FSB is orchestrating the trial to give Goryachev the opportunity to accuse Surkov.

The biggest indicator that the FSB has gained the upper hand in the ongoing struggle involves reports from Ukraine that pro-Russian Chechen forces ﬁghting there are leaving. If Surkov and Patrushev were struggling over control of the separatists in Ukraine, the exodus of the forces that report to Kadyrov, Surkov's right hand, could signal that the FSB has greater inﬂuence over the Ukraine portfolio.

Together, the indications that the FSB has gained strength could explain why both Kadyrov and Surkov have once again begun acting strangely. When Interior Ministry forces killed a suspected criminal in Grozny on April 19, Kadyrov took to the media to order Chechen interior forces to "shoot to kill" any non-Chechen forces in the republic. Later that day, he again took to the media to clarify that he was not at war with the FSB. A week later, on April 30, Kadyrov said that he was prepared to resign from the Chechen presidency and that he had asked Putin to allow him to do so. All of these events could signal an FSB-induced crackdown on Kadyrov behind the scenes. In addition, Surkov took to Instagram during Victory Day celebrations to congratulate the FSB on the holiday, an odd singling out of the security services.

Each day a few more clues emerge, but the direction and magnitude of the Kremlin struggle are difﬁcult to see clearly. Like many previous competitions for power, it could take days or years for the most recent contest to settle or spur a change within the Russian government. As Winston Churchill said, the nature of the Kremlin's intrigues is not clear until a victor emerges from the obscured ﬁght.

**Photos provided under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic license. These images have not been altered in any way. Terms of the license can be viewed here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/.

Note: This is a timeline of events possibly related to the power struggle among the elite in the Kremlin. It is not a perfect or complete list, and some of these events may not be connected to the inﬁghting. Keep in mind that rumors, news reports and their sources can be false or deliberately misleading. This timeline is meant as a general guide to the atmosphere in the Kremlin.

This timeline was last updated May 12, 2015.

December 2013-March 2014 Protests in Ukraine lead to the fall of Viktor Yanukovich's Russia-friendly government and to the installation of a pro-Western government. In response, Russia annexes Crimea from Ukraine on March 16, 2014.

Ukrainian activists claim Russia's Federal Security Services (FSB) helped Ukraine’s Berkut security forces crack down on the Maidan protests.

When the West-friendly government comes to power, it accuses the FSB of having ordered Yanukovich to crack down on the Maidan protesters.

February 2014 Maj. Gen. Borys Kolesnikov and Lt. Gen. Denis Sugrobov, chief and deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Economic Security and Anti-Corruption, are arrested on corruption charges.

Investigative Committee chief Alexander Bastrykin begins lobbying for the Main Directorate of Economic Security and Anti-Corruption to become independent of the Interior Ministry.

Ukrainian Security Service chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko accuses Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov of being in Kiev during the Maidan uprising.

Spring 2014 Russian President Vladimir Putin reshufﬂes 18 governors, mostly in May.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 22 Surkov takes the portfolio for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, according to Igor Girkin (also known as Igor Strelkov).

May 2014 The Ukrainian government begins accusing the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) — not the FSB — of supporting separatists in Ukraine’s eastern regions and in Crimea.

Russian media (Interpreter, RT and Novaya Gazeta) report that Putin has given the GRU more authority in Ukraine, limiting the FSB’s role.

FSB Maj. Gen. Dmitri Mironov is named head of the Main Directorate of Economic Security and Anti-Corruption.

Russian media (RBC, Moscow Times) report that Federal Protective Service chief Evgeny Murov will soon retire.

June 2014 Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov announces that he will set up his own intelligence and policing forces, modeled after the FSB and Interior Ministry. Kadyrov says he has hired former FSB Maj. Daniil Martynov to help design the group. Media report that the FSB did not sanction Martynov’s participation.

July 2014 July 31: Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev signs into law the new rules expanding how the government regulates the Internet and personal data, despite Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich's refusal to sign the directives per protocol. According to a leak from the Communications Ministry to the New Times, Medvedev waited until Dvorkovich was on vacation to sign the laws per FSB instructions.

August 2014 Aug. 6: Putin quietly dismisses several Interior Ministry ofﬁcials, ranging from the head of the intelligence services to regional deputy commanders of the Interior Ministry troops.

Aug. 7: Svoboda Radio, a series of Duma members and state television all report that Putin is planning an “emergency speech” about Ukraine. Russian media speculate that the speech could mean a change in tactics for Ukraine and possibly a military intervention. Later the same night, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov says no speech had been planned.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 23 Aug. 14: Putin gives a speech in Crimea that is set to air live across all Russian time zones on multiple state television stations. However, the speech never airs. Four hours after the speech, small pieces of footage appear on state-controlled television, though instead of audio, a news anchor reads a transcript published by Interfax and Itar-Tass. Aug. 28: A leak from the presidential administration in media outlet Moskovsky Komsomolets says Putin is organizing local militias to counter protests or Maidans in Russia. According to the leak, one set of militias was being organized under Orthodox Christian organizations and the others under Cossack groups.

September 2014 Sept. 3: Putin mentions in an interview at a pro-Kremlin youth forum that the FSB is undergoing a restructuring, but gives no details.

Sept. 8: Putin moves control of the Russian Military Industrial Commission from Medvedev's supervision to his direct control.

October 2014 The New York Post quotes unidentiﬁed sources as saying Putin is suffering from pancreatic cancer. Peskov replies to the report, saying, "May their tongues wither.”

Oct. 8: Putin celebrates his 62nd birthday in the Siberian forests instead of in Moscow or working, as he has done in previous years.

Oct. 29: Rumors emerge that Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev will soon resign. The rumors begin with a Dozhd TV report citing sources in the Defense Ministry but are picked up by most major Russian media in the following weeks. Peskov acknowledges the rumors Nov. 11 but does not conﬁrm or deny them. Pravda leaks that Kolokoltsev will be replaced by First Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Zolotov.

December 2014 Stratfor receives a report from Moscow that Nikolai Patrushev will soon be sacked as leader of the Security Council.

Dec. 12: Rosneft is issued approximately $10.9 billion in new bonds with a guarantee by the Central Bank that it would back up the bonds to be used as collateral for the company’s loans. Interfax reports that Sechin had a "secret" deal with the Central Bank chief to collapse the price of the ruble at the same time Rosneft paid its latest debt payment in order to help Rosneft ﬁnancially. Sechin called the rumors a "provocation."

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 24 Dec. 17: Following the mass currency devaluation, Sergei Glazyev, many Duma members, and FSB-aligned media (Tass, Izvestia, RT) call for Medvedev's resignation.

Dec. 28: Kadyrov gathers some 20,000 of his troops, fully armed and wearing backpacks, in a sports stadium. Kadyrov told the troops that they could resign and volunteer to go to ﬁght in Ukraine but that he was waiting for Putin's order. He ended the speech by rallying the soldiers, chanting, "Long live our national leader of Russia Vladimir Putin!”

February 2015 Feb. 4: USA Today reports that the Pentagon believes Putin may have Asperger’s syndrome. Peskov replied that the report was "stupid and didn’t deserve a comment."

Feb. 5: RBC media group reports that Putin has decided to consolidate two smaller security services — the Federal Drug Control Service and the Federal Migration Service — under the Interior Ministry.

Feb. 19-20: FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov visits Washington for a conference on counterterrorism.

Feb. 27: Russian opposition heavyweight Boris Nemtsov is assassinated on a bridge near the Kremlin two days before he was to help lead an anti-Kremlin march.

March 2015 March 4: Kadyrov posts a picture on Instagram of himself and Putin laughing and embracing and praises the Russian leader, saying he would lay down his life for Putin.

March 5-15: Putin is "missing" from public sight.

March 8: Bortnikov announces the arrest of two suspects behind the Nemtsov assassination and the detention of three others. A sixth suspect committed suicide. All the suspects are Chechens, and one suspect, Zaur Dadaev, has personal ties to Kadyrov. Kadyrov takes to Instagram to call Dadaev a "true patriot."

March 9: Novaya Gazeta quotes an anonymous FSB ofﬁcial saying Kadyrov’s cousin, lawmaker Adam Delimkhanov, organized the Nemtsov hit.

March 9: Kadyrov reportedly receives the Order of Honor award from Putin (it is unclear if this actually occurred a week earlier).

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 25 March 10: The heads of the FSB, Federal Protective Service and Interior Ministry, along with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, hold a meeting in Crimea with 40 security ofﬁcials.

March 10: Security Council Chief Nikolai Patrushev meets with Kadyrov on the sidelines of a Security Council meeting. March 10: Rumors start in Russian media (Novaya Gazeta, Moscovsky Komsomolets, Echo Moscow) that the FSB (particularly Patrushev, Bortnikov and Ivanov) is at war with Kadyrov.

March 10: Surkov (aligned with Kadyrov) and his family embark on a vacation in Hong Kong.

March 11: The Kremlin cancels Putin’s trip to Kazakhstan to meet with the Kazakh and Belarusian presidents March 12-13 and to meet with a South Ossetian delegation that was already in Moscow. Peskov says the meetings were simply "postponed."

March 11: The Kremlin posts a picture of Putin holding a working meeting with the head of the Republic of Karelia. Vesti Kareli media says the meeting was actually held on March 5, leading to speculation that Putin had been "missing" from the public eye for six days already.

March 11: Ivanov meets with Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and Orthodox Patriarch Kirill.

March 11: The editor of Nezavismaya Gazeta, Kinstantin Remchukov, tweets that he was pulled aside at the Bolshoi Ballet by a Kremlin ofﬁcial and told Sechin would be sacked the next day.

March 12: Peskov begins his media tour (Tass, RIA, Echo Moscow), explaining that Putin was working but that "not all meetings are public."

March 12: Putin misses a planned meeting with the FSB, though there is YouTube video footage of the presidential helicopter arriving that evening at Lubyanka, FSB headquarters.

March 12: Medvedev leads a government meeting attended by all ministers.

March 13: The Kremlin publishes multiple meetings for Putin’s schedule (Supreme Court chairman Vyacheslav Lebedev and another with Medvedev), though no live footage of these meetings is given.

March 13: A rumor emerges on social media that Zolotov was assassinated after Putin tried to make him head of the FSB.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 26 March 14: Head of Russia’s Islamic Committee (and Kadyrov ally) Geydar Dzhemal says the FSB "neutralized" Putin.

March 15: Putin reappears in public at a meeting with Kyrgyz President Almazbek in St. Petersburg. Putin remarks to the media, "Life would be boring without rumors." March 15: Peskov tells the media that he will no longer discuss Putin’s health.

March 19: FSB counterintelligence chief Oleg Syromolotov is appointed deputy foreign minister and charged with managing counterterrorism operations.

April 2015 April 1: Commentary appears on both NTV and on Kremlin watch blogs, such as IMRUSSIA, on the growing feud between Patrushev and Surkov over control of the separatists in Ukraine.

April 6: State Duma deputy and FSB Col. Igor Barinov is appointed head of the newly created Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs.

April 7: Putin ﬁres 20 senior Russian civil defense ﬁgures within the Emergency Ministry.

April 8: Andrei Patrushev, the son of Nikolai Patrushev, is named to the Board of Directors of Gazprom Neft.

April 8: Russia’s Investigative Committee reports that it is investigating government subsidies to anti-Kremlin media groups: Echo Moscow, RBC, Dozhd and Moscovsky Komsomolets. The Kremlin media watchdog Rosechat says the subsidies were part of educational and humanitarian programs.

April 14: Russian opposition politician Ilya Yashin says that Kadyrov’s mastermind in the Nemtsov assassination, Ruslan Geremeev, has ﬂed Russia after the Investigative Committee tried to question him in Chechnya.

April 15: Finance Minister Anton Siluanov says that the retirement age in Russia should be raised; Peskov says the Kremlin will examine the proposal. Russian Deputy Premier Olga Golodets says she does not support the proposal.

April 15-17: Sobyanin and a delegation of businessmen make a three-day visit to Turkey to meet with the mayor of Ankara to discuss trade, agricultural, tourist and communication deals. Stratfor receives a report that Russian businessmen meet with U.S. Assistant Secretary

April 16: Putin holds his annual "direct-line" question-and-answer session with the Russian people. During the ﬁrst hour, Putin gets into an aggressive debate with Alexei Kudrin. Kudrin criticizes Putin’s lack of economic reforms, and Putin replies that Kudrin drafted the program. Kudrin says only 30 percent of his program was put in place. Putin ends the debate by saying political constraints keep him from taking more dramatic steps.

April 16: A draft law is submitted to Russia’s State Duma that would legally make the Interior Ministry’s forces a "Federal State institution" rather than a "military unit." RIA Novosti says this would empower the Interior Ministry.

April 19: Interior Forces, along with police from the Stavropol region, gun down a Chechen man, Dzhambulat Dadayev, in Grozny over a weapons violation.

April 21: Rosneft sends a letter to Dvorkovich’s office asking for emergency funding by June 1 to avoid a shortfall in tax payments and stalls in oil production in two major fields (Russkoye and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye). Previously, Rosneft asked for $25 billion and had received $5 billion. An unnamed source in Dvorkovich’s office calls the letter "blackmail."

April 21: Three members of the ultranationalist Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists are given lengthy prison sentences for 10 high-proﬁle murders, including those of a federal judge, a human rights lawyer, a journalist, a migrant and three anti-fascist activists. Ilya Goryachev, who is accused of being the group's ideological head, is soon to stand trial. A former member of the group has said that it has ties to Surkov. Goryachev claims that Surkov ordered the murders and that the FSB is behind the witch-hunt.

April 23: Kadyrov orders Chechen law enforcement to "shoot to kill" any security forces from other parts of Russia conducting operations in Chechnya without consent. Later that day, Kadyrov appears on the Lifenews channel to clarify his statement and says there is no conﬂict between him and the FSB, but "there are devils who seek to seed disorder on the territory of the Russian Federation, and that’s why they make such assertions."

April 30: Putin gives a rare personal op-ed to Pioneer Magazine, in which he discusses his family’s hardships during World War II.

April 30: Naryshkin, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobanin and Kirill gather at a ceremony for the reburial of Great Prince Nikolai Romanov and his wife.

COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 28 April 30: Kadyrov says on Govorit Moskva that he is prepared to resign at any moment. He says he has asked Putin to allow him to resign 20 times. He also reiterates that he is ready to die for Putin.

May 2015 May 4-6: Naryshkin travels to Central Europe and then Cuba.

May 6: Kadyrov says he is unhappy with the media and orders them to stop publishing false information and rumors.

May 7: According to Ukrainian media, journalists in Ukraine’s Donetsk region say there is a mass exodus of pro-Kremlin Chechen ﬁghters.

May 8: Putin sacks 21 generals across the Interior Ministry, Investigative Committee, Emergency Ministry and federal anti-narcotics branches.

May 10: Surkov congratulates the FSB on its anniversary via Instagram.

May 12: Rumors arise from Bloomberg that Rosneft will sell 19 percent of its shares to Surgutneftegas. Rosneft and Surgutneftegas deny the rumors the next day.