The New Frontier for Jihadist Groups?
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Promediation North of the countries of the Gulf of Guinea The new frontier for jihadist groups? www.kas.de North of the countries of the Gulf of Guinea The new frontier for jihadist groups? At a glance At a glance tion has led to increased competition for access to However, these efforts are still not enough. In natural resources and to rising tensions between addition to operational or material flaws in the several communities. security network, there is also a weakness in terms of political and military doctrine. Since In 2020, armed jihadist groups in Sahel faced the authorities believe that the unrest on their Burkina Faso’s southern border is also of inter- jihadist insurgencies have developed in the increased pressure in their strongholds in Mali, northern borders will eventually spill over into est to the jihadists because it is a very profitable Sahara- Sahel region, no state has yet found an Niger and Burkina. their territory. No attacks have yet been carried area for all kinds of trafficking. Both to the east adequate response to contain them. Priority is out on Beninese soil, but incursions by suspected and west, this border has been known for several given to the fight against terrorism, often to the While the Support Group for Islam and Muslims jihadists are on the increase. Côte d’Ivoire was years as an epicentre for the illicit trade in arms, detriment of dialogue with communities and the (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara first attacked in the north in June 2020. Jihadists gold, drugs, ivory, or goods such as cigarettes and search for local solutions. (IS-GS) clashed violently throughout 2020 for have bases there, particularly in the north-east, motorbikes. For the time being, the jihadists are control of certain territories (Gourma in Mali, the bordering Burkina Faso and Ghana. The jihadists not controlling this trade. But they can take part Two different experiences, one in Burkina Faso Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border region, and the do not currently have any hegemonic ambitions in in it and therefore secure considerable sources of and the other in Benin, illustrate the difficulties Sahel and East regions of Burkina Faso), national those two countries. Rather, they seem to want to funding. in finding the right balance between the security and international armed forces increased their use them as transit areas (especially when moving response and socio-economic solutions in a crisis sweep operations. This temporarily hindered their towards the Nigerian front) and for withdrawal Although jihadist groups have easily established or pre-crisis context. The first initiative demon- territorial expansion towards the Gulf of Guinea purposes. themselves in eastern Burkina Faso, it will be more strates that involving citizens in the fight against countries and their desire to extend their influ- difficult for them to gain territory and support- terrorism − the path chosen by Burkina Faso − is ence beyond Sahelian countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, the attacks made in Kafolo and ers further west, due to the vigilance of the local no guarantee of success. On the contrary, it fuels Kolobougou on 29th March 2021 and the planting population and the presence of traditional hunters inter-community tensions and violence against After establishing insurgent strongholds in cen- of an IED (improvised explosive device) a few days (Dozos). Similarly, they will no longer be able to civilians. The experience in Benin, where the state tral Mali in January 2015, and in northern Burkina later in the Kafolo area can be seen as signalis- take the coastal countries’ security services by sur- is trying to engage in local issues together with Faso in late 2016, Islamist fighters have continued ing an offensive against one of West Africa’s most prise. Like the local populations, the Gulf of Guinea the African Parks Network (APN), a nature conser- to gain ground, giving the impression that they important coastal countries, and perhaps as a states are on the alert. Benin and Côte d’Ivoire vation NGO, and in particular support the local intend to move further south. Today, the southern desire to establish a foothold there. It is too early have placed particular emphasis on intelligence populations living near the natural parks, shows borders of Burkina seem to be in their sights. to anticipate the jihadists’ ability to settle there and have reviewed their military arrangements. that interesting results can be produced. permanently, but what the late Prime Minister They have been spreading into eastern Burkina Hamed Bakayoko feared seems about to happen: Faso since 2018. A large part of the region is no “Planting the black flag in Côte d’Ivoire would be a longer under the control of state authorities, who resounding success for the jihadists”. have lost their foothold in all the wooded areas, particularly the Arli and W parks, as well as along Burkina Faso’s southern border is likely to be a certain key roads. Apart from a few attempts to highly coveted area because of the large number impose their rules in some villages, the jihadists of forested areas that can provide safe havens do not seem to have any ambition to extend their for hiding, training and recruiting. These forests governance to the majority of the population. All are a source of frustration for the local inhabit- indications would show that they have turned ants because of the many prohibitions imposed this region into a refuge for fighters from north- by authorities aimed at protecting wildlife or pri- ern Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, or even into a vate interests. When they take over, the jihadists financing area. During the same period, attempts lift all these bans, thus gaining supporters. From to establish themselves in the south-west of the this point of view, the WAP complex, encompass- country have multiplied: in the Cascades and the ing the Arli, W and Pendjari forests and spanning Upper Basin as well as in the south-west and mid- the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Niger west. So far, the insurgents have failed to estab- and Benin, represents a possible refuge for the lish themselves in a fully effective way. insurgents. The situation in northern Benin is par- ticularly worrying: the northern populations are Neighbouring countries are viewing develop- strongly impacted by the presence of the W and ments in southern Burkina Faso with concern. Pendjari national parks, where all human activity Both Benin and Côte d’Ivoire feel threatened: is prohibited. In recent years, this unique situa- 2 3 Contents 1. A border, but for how long? 1. A border, but for how long? 5 Armed jihadist groups in Sahel faced increased reason to believe that they have turned the region pressure in 2020. The national armies of Niger, into a refuge for fighters from northern Burkina, 1.1. Eastern Burkina Faso: a safe haven outside state control 6 Mali and Burkina increased their sweep opera- Niger and Mali, and even into a financing facility. 1.2. Northern Benin, an area on borrowed time? 9 tions, with the support of the French Barkhane 1.3. Unsuccessful attempts to gain a foothold in the south and south-west of Burkina Faso 12 force, which saw its numbers increase after the During the same period, the number of attempts 1.4. North-eastern Côte d’Ivoire in focus 14 Pau summit (13th January 2020), and carried out to establish themselves in the south-west of the numerous ground and air operations, particularly country increased: in the Cascades and Hauts- in the “three-border” area (Mali-Niger-Burkina Bassins (those two regions were studied in a Janu- 2. The “El-Dorado” of protected areas 18 Faso). From February–March 2020, the Support ary 2020 publication by Promediation, devoted to Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) [Groupe de the Mali-Burkina-Côte d’Ivoire tri-border region2), 2.1. Ideal bases for hiding, resting and recruiting 18 soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans (GSIM)] and the and also in the south-west and centre-west. Tak- 2.2. Trafficking ripe for exploitation (gold panning, arms, cattle, etc) 21 Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) [État islam- ing advantage of the many forests in this border 2.3. Populations to be used … or seduced 27 ique au Grand Sahara (EIGS)] also clashed violently area with Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, the jihadists for the control of certain territories in Mali and carried out several attacks on security force posi- Burkina Faso, breaking the tacit non-aggression tions in 2018 and 2019. But so far, they have failed 3. How resilient can populations be? 41 agreement that had prevailed until then. This to gain a permanent foothold. Some of their bases fighting, in which dozens of men were reportedly have been dismantled. 3.1. Increased vigilance of populations 41 killed, had a significant impact on them. The situ- 3.2. Better prepared states 43 ation has probably slowed down their territorial Neighbouring countries are watching the devel- 3.3. Counter-terrorism to be (re)defined 46 expansion and their desire to extend their influ- opments in southern Burkina Faso with concern. ence beyond Sahelian countries. In Cotonou, the general feeling among Beninese authorities is that disorder in eastern Burkina Conclusion 53 After establishing insurgent hotbeds in central Mali Faso will eventually spill over into their territory. in January 2015, and in northern Burkina Faso in No attacks have yet been carried out on Beni- late 2016, Islamist fighters have continued to gain nese soil. Few instances of preaching have been Methodology 54 ground, giving the impression that they wanted to recorded (mainly in the areas of Monsey, Karimana move further south, probably as much to gain terri- and Malanville in northern Benin) and immedi- tory useful to them1 as to reduce military pressure ate threats are diffuse or even not very credible Promediation 55 in their strongholds.