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Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: a Two State Comparison Marilyn Peterson Armour

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Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: a Two State Comparison Marilyn Peterson Armour Marquette Law Review Volume 96 Article 3 Issue 1 Fall 2012 Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison Marilyn Peterson Armour Mark S. Umbreit Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Marilyn Peterson Armour and Mark S. Umbreit, Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (2012). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol96/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 08 - UMBREIT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013 9:18 PM ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION ON HOMICIDE SURVIVORS: A TWO STATE COMPARISON* ** MARILYN PETERSON ARMOUR *** MARK S. UMBREIT Numerous studies have examined the psychological sequelae that result from the murder of a loved one. Except for the death penalty, however, sparse attention has been paid to the impact of the murderer’s sentence on homicide survivors’ well-being. Given the steadfastness of the public’s opinion that the death penalty brings satisfaction and closure to survivors, it is surprising that there has been no systematic inquiry directly with survivors about whether obtaining the ultimate punishment affects their healing. This Study used in-person interviews with a randomly selected sample of survivors from four time periods to examine the totality of the ultimate penal sanction (UPS) process and its longitudinal impact on their lives. Moreover, it assessed the differential effect of two types of UPS by comparing survivors’ experiences in Texas, a death penalty state, and Minnesota, a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) state. Comparing states highlights differences primarily during the postconviction stage, specifically with respect to the appeals process and in regard to survivor well-being. In Minnesota, survivors of adjudicated cases show higher levels of physical, psychological, and behavioral health. This Study’s findings have implications for trial strategy and policy development. * This Study was made possible through funds provided by the General Convention of the Episcopal Church, U.S.A. and Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The authors express their appreciation to Stephanie L Rivaux, Ph.D., and Richard Pargament, Ph.D. for their assistance with the quantitative analysis. The authors would also like to thank Margaret McAbee, Executive Director of Survivor Resources, St. Paul, Minnesota and Karen Martin, Regional Coordinator-Austin/Central Texas Region, Office of the Attorney General, Crime Victim Services Division, as well as the survivors who participated in this study. ** Ph.D. University of Texas at Austin, [email protected]. *** Ph.D. University of Minnesota, [email protected]. 08 - UMBREIT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013 9:18 PM 2 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 4 II. THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION .................................................... 5 A. Texas and the Death Penalty......................................................... 6 B. Minnesota and LWOP .................................................................. 9 III. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND FAMILY SURVIVORS OF HOMICIDE VICTIMS ...................................................................... 11 A. Crime Victims’ Rights .................................................................. 12 B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence .......................................................... 13 C. Closure as Justification for the Death Penalty and LWOP ........................................................................................... 15 D. Evidence of Closure in VIS and Executions ............................. 17 IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, SURVIVORS, AND CONTROL ............................................................................................. 20 V. PERCEIVED CONTROL THEORY ....................................................... 23 VI. THE PROCESS OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION .................... 24 A. Texas ............................................................................................. 24 B. Minnesota ..................................................................................... 26 VII. SUMMARY OF ULTIMATE PENAL SYSTEM ...................................... 27 VIII. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 27 A. Design ........................................................................................... 27 B. Measures ....................................................................................... 28 C. Sample Procurement ................................................................... 30 D. Data Collection ............................................................................ 31 E. Data Analysis ............................................................................... 32 F. Sample Profile .............................................................................. 34 IX. QUALITATIVE FINDINGS ................................................................... 36 A. Category 1: Impact of the UPS on the Conviction Experience .................................................................................... 36 B. Category 2: Impact of the UPS on the Postconviction Experience .................................................................................... 49 C. Category 3: Aftermath of Murder and the UPS on Survivors’ Lives ........................................................................... 68 X. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS.................................................................. 82 A. ICG-R Scores by State and Time ................................................ 83 B. Select Event Themes and ICG-R Scores .................................... 83 XI. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ................................................................. 84 A. Outreach and VIS ........................................................................ 85 B. Social Expectations, Ambiguous Loss, and Closure ................ 86 C. The Involuntary Relationship ..................................................... 88 D. Rumination and Vengeance ........................................................ 89 E. Civil Actions and Accumulated Injustices ................................. 90 08 - UMBREIT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013 9:18 PM 2012] ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 3 F. Satisfaction with the Criminal Justice System ............................ 91 G. Physical and Mental Health of Survivors .................................. 92 H. Summary of Findings .................................................................. 93 XII. LIMITATIONS ....................................................................................... 94 XIII. IMPLICATIONS ..................................................................................... 95 XIV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 97 APPENDIX A: FIGURES ................................................................................. 99 APPENDIX B: TABLES ................................................................................. 108 APPENDIX C: UPS INTERVIEW GUIDE ..................................................... 123 08 - UMBREIT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013 9:18 PM 4 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1 I. INTRODUCTION Homicide bereavement is marked by long-lasting and penetrating upheaval in the lives of victim survivors. Current prevalence estimates project 15% of young adults are survivors of homicide, reflecting a 6% increase over previous estimates made in 1991.1 In most cases, these survivors have unresolved feelings because the murderer, if apprehended, does not receive the punishment he or she deserves—the ultimate penal sanction (UPS), which is death or life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) depending on the jurisdiction.2 Indeed, the chance that the murderer will even be charged with a capital offense is rare—the death penalty is sought in only 1% of capital eligible cases.3 Although small in number, capital murder cases consume the attention of the public through mass media, trend-setting legal decisions, and public opinion polls. In contrast, family survivors receive little attention except when family survivors’ need for justice is used by proponents in debates about the purposes of the death penalty. Since the early 1990s, the death penalty has been touted as bringing closure to survivors.4 Support for this belief has grown. In 2010, a national poll found that 60% of respondents supported the death penalty.5 The primary reason given for their support was that the death penalty gave victim families satisfaction and closure.6 This same contention is increasingly advanced as the reason to support LWOP.7 This belief, though popularly held, has never been systematically 1. Heidi M. Zinzow et al., Losing a Loved One to Homicide: Prevalence and Mental Health Correlates in a National Sample of Young Adults, 22 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 20, 24 (2009). 2. Margaret Vandiver, The Death Penalty and the Families of Victims: An Overview of Research Issues, in WOUNDS THAT DO NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED
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