In 1944, B.H. Liddell Hart wrote in Thouahts on (Avenue of Heroes) near the entrance to Ar- War, "The spirit of discipline, as distinct from its lington Cemetery. Section 2 of Public Law 99- outward and visible guises, is the result of as- 620 states, "The United States shall not pay sociation with martial traditions and their living any expense of establishment of the memorial." embodiment." Sponsoring organizations include the US. Our Armored Force's body of martial tradition Armor and Artillery Associations; World Wars began to take shape 70 years ago in the St. Tank Corps Association: Veterans of the Battle Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns, when the of the Bulge: 1lth ACR Association; Tank first American tankers traded their horses for Destroyer Association: 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, primitive mechanical mounts on which they 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, loth, llth, 12th, 13th, 14th, would spearhead a new development in ground 16th Armored Division Associations: Council warfare, leading inevitably to the creation of a of Armored Divisions Association; and the Na- new combat arm. tional Association of Uniformed Services. Subsequent generations took that budding The memorial will feature a panoramic evolu- legacy and built on it in Tunisia, Sicily, Bas- tion of Armor and will honor all those "men of togne. Pusan, Inchon, Operations Cedar Falls steel" who served in WWI, WWII, Korea and and Junction City, and at Ben Het. The heritage Vietnam in armored divisions or separate ar- we have received is rich in stories of courage mored battalions; tank destroyer battalions; ar- under fire, comradeship, and audacity. mored mechanized infantry, artillery, engineer Today, our regimental system, with its battalions; cavalry regiments and squadrons: honorary colonels and sergeants major, retells and Marine Corps armored units. those stories to yet another generation of The cost of this memorial is relatively inex- tankers and cavalrymen who aspire to move pensive - $400,000. But time is running out. down the same proud road. This is the associa- Funding must be completed by November tion with martial traditions and their living em- 1989 if the monument is to be completed in bodiment of which Liddell Hart wrote. time for the 50th anniversary of the Armored While we work to see that these martial tradi- Force in 1990. The sponsoring organizations tions and accounts of Americans in battle are have done their part, but appeals to industries handed down to following generations and are that built our tanks and APCs over the years thus not forgotten, perhaps it is appropriate that have netted next to nothing. The Armored For- the American people have a visual reminder of ces Monument Committee needs help to avert the accomplishments of our Armored Forces. falling short on this project. If you are inter- Toward this purpose, the Armored Forces ested in seeing a monument to our Armored Monument Committee formed in 1986 to erect a Forces of the past, which would serve as an in- monument in our nation's capital. Its congres- spiration to armored soldiers of the present sional liaison team successfully met its chal- and future, perhaps you can help. Please con- lenge of securing Congressional approval, and tact on 6 November 1986, the president signed Armored Forces Monument Fund Public Law 99-620 authorizing the monument, P.O. Box 1146 which will be constructed on Memorial Drive Fort Myer, Virginia 2221 1 - PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

CARL E. VUONO R. L. DILWORTH General, United States Army Brigadier General, United States Army Chief of Staff The Adjutant General ARMOR I The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB- 17-88-6 (Test)

Editor-in-Chief Features MAJOR PATRICK J. COONEY 8 Assault and Tactical Bridging for Armor Units Managing Editor by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolt6 (Ret.) JON T. CLEMENS 13 Red Army Tank Commander Commandant by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Armstrong MG THOMAS H. TAlT 20 Cavalry Scouts at the Joint Readiness Training Center by Captain Alan R. Horn ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox. KY 40121. 22 The Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum Disclaimer: The information contained in Has Expanded and Improved ARMOR represents the professional opinions of by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it 25 The Desert Training Center: Yesterday and Today change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. by Francis G. Blake Official distribution is limited to one copy for each heavy brigade headquarters, armored 30 Cavalry Missions and Structure cavalry regiment headquarters. armor battalion by Colonel (P) Jarrett J. Robertson headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- 34 Armor Training 1997 pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of by Major H. Critz Hardy the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and 37 Soldier Training Publications: MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for ar- Supporting Training in the 1990s mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or- ganizations. and the training of personnel for by Major Albert E. Bailey such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief. Departments Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the US. Army Armor 2 Letters Center has proponency. That proponency in- cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat 2 Contacts systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 6 Commander’s Hatch carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 7 Recognition Quiz systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 40 Professional Thoughts any miscellaneous items of equipment which 49 armor and armored cavalry organizations use Recognition Quiz Answers exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 128, and 50 Bustle Rack 12C officers and for all CMF-1Pseries enlisted 51 Armor Branch Notes soldiers: and information concerning the train- 52 Books ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregi- ment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. Secondclass official mail postage paid al Fort Knox. KY. and additional mailing offices. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor. ARMOR, AlTN ATSB-MAG. Fott Knox. KY given to ARMOR and to the author, except 40121. where copyright is indicated. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited USPS 467-970 November-December 1988, Vol XCVlI No. 6 The Lessons of Vietnam ly, ignoring of history and hard lessons Tung. It was clear at that time (1964), that learned, have gotten our military estab- LIC demands thorough analysis and Dear Sir, lishment into situations for which they doctrinal study on the part of every were not prepared. More important, these branch and element involved. This is par- Major Michael R. Matheny ("Armor in were situations for which the troops in the ticularly applicable to those arms in Low Intensity Conflict," July-August 1988 tanks were not prepared. mutually supporting roles. ARMOR) is to be commended for address- This is a fact, despite the vast resources ing this sticky topic of Armor doctrine. His and documentation of LIC around the Vivid lessons in the application of statement, "There is still little written world available for command and staff Armor/lnfantry teams to LlCs were avail- doctrine on armor operations in Low Inten- utilization at the time of troop commit- able to us prior to our commitment of sity Conflict," is not profound, but all too ment. And today, stacks of staff studies, armor and armored cavalry to the Viet- factual, and references the post-WW11 fixa- combat journals and official lessons nam conflict. French use of limited armor tion of our strategic and tactical planners learned appear to be gathering dust. resources in Indochina should have with the great European land battle. provided glaring examples of how NOT to Two deadly "non-wars" since the 1 spent nearly two years researching commit tankfinfantry elements. Bernard B. Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay clearly il- Low Intensity Conflict in its 1960s guise - Fall in his masterful work, Street Without lustrate that ignorance, or more realistical- revolutionary war as defined by Mao Tse &, described the destruction in detail of

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ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL

Editor-in-Chief Commandant (ATZK-CG) Major Patrick J. Cooney 2249 MG Thomas H. Tait 2121 Managing Editor Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG Dennis V. Crumley 7555 Assistant Editor Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC) Robert E. Rome 2610 COL Claude L. Clark 1050 Production Assistant Command Sergeant Major Vivian Thompson 2610 CSM John M. Stcphens 4952 Contributing Artist Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA) SFC Robert Torsrud 2610 COL Garry P. Hixson 8346 Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS) MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN ATSB- COL A. W. Kremer 5855 MAG, Fort box, KY 40121-5210. Weapons Dept. (ATSB-WP) LTC(P) George R. Wallace 111 1055 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and Directorate of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD) accuracy in editing. manuscripts should be originals or COL Donald E. Appler 7250 clear copies, either typed or printed out in near-lettcr- Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD) quality printer mode. Stories can also be accepted on COL Donald L. Smart 5050 5-1/4" floppy disks in Microsoft WORD, MuhiMate, Dir. of Eval. & Standardization (ATSB-DOES) Wordperfect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please in- Mr. Clayton E. Shannon 3440 clude a printout). Please tape captions to any illustra- Training Group (ATZK-TC-TBF) tions submitted. LTC William C. Malkcmes 3955 NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School (ATNCG) PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report delivery problems CSM Johnny M. Langford 5150 or changes of address to Ms. Connie Bright, circula- Director, Reserve Component Spt (ATZK-DRC) tion manager, (502)942-8624. COL James E. Dierickx 1351 Office of the Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) MILITARY DISTRIBUTION Report delivery LTC Albert F. Celani 7800 problems or changes of address to Ms. Vivian TEXCOM Armor & Engineer Board (ATZK-AE) Thompson, AV Mi-2610; commercial: (502)624-2610. COL Garrett E. Duncan 7850 Requests to be added to the free subscription list TRADOC Sys Mgr for Tank Systems (ATSB-TSMT) should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief. COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 ARMOR - November-December 7 988 ~ ~~ Groupement Mobile 100, a mixed lets and hedgerows of the coastal plain in diers and scholars to important primary motorized infantry, armor, and artillery Binh Dinh Province. Too often. as Major sources. group, on QL 19, east of Pleiku, in 1954. Matheny states, air and artillery assets Uninformed sceptics used to take cheap were brought into a target, while ground shots at armor. ground cavalry, and I refer to this, not only because it is stark elements pulled back. Result? A lot of mechanized infantry by citing one photo testimony to failed doctrine, but because I blown-up hooches, blood trails, and the of a mired track as proof that our heavy stood on that very spot in 1967, trying to bad guys melting into the jungles and tun- units did not belong in the Republic of explain to my tank crew the monument nel complexes. Despite the addition of Vietnam. They should be reminded now erected there. armor, the Cav's mission became even that: more complex without adequate training When all is said and done, the sum total of infantry/air cavalry troops in tank/in- 0 The Hanoi victory came two years of the experience and doctrinal lessons fantry operations in this particularly nasty -after the departure of the last U.S. learned of Korea, Indochina, Malaya. Viet- type of combat environment. maneuver and artillery battalions. nam, etc., should be compiled in geographic and situational scenarios, Working with COL Karhos and his staff, 0 The NVA force that achieved it was suitably condensed and structured into we established an interim program of some 15 divisions, most of them what we REQUIRED doctrinal studies at the com- familiarization and training with Cav ele- would now describe as motorized and pany-grade officer level. ments rotating through LZ Uplift. This mechanized. rudimentary training was designed to I and my fellow lieutenants proceeded show company- and platoon-size in- 0 The first NVA soldiers to reach through Armor Officer Basic Course 1-66 fantry/cav elements just how effective Saigon's presidential palace knocked with barely a whisper of the armor role or close infantry-armor team operations down its gate with their tank before rais- experience to date in Southeast Asia, could be in the village sweep, cordon and ing their flag on the balcony. though I dare say that at least 75 percent search, and hedgerowbunker-busting mis- of us wound up busting jungle in M48A3s, sions common to this area of operation. Robert P. Fairchild ACAVs, or Sheridans. LTC, Armor, NYARNG Even at this point in the "Vietnam Ex- True, these are basic tactics which HQDA. ODCSOPS perience," there were a goodly number of should be known to every combat arms of- officers and NCOs fresh from Vietnam ficer. But more important, they should combat who might have made significant have been part of an overall combat Vietnam Remembrances contributions to the development and first- operations and training doctrine common hand communication of interim doctrine to both armor and infantry, because varia- Dear Sir. to combat-bound officers and NCOs. tions on the basic theme were certainly applicable in all of the RVN tactical zones. As a member of the United States Armor Major Matheny is absolutely correct in Properly applied, these tactics fixed the Association since 1946, 1 have read with his allusion to the fact that Vietnamera enemy in his holes and allowed destruc- great interest well over 200 issues of our armor doctrine was, in essence, "play-as- tion of his forces in detail before he could excellent magazine. However, no issue you-go" system. The tankers of my unit, A slip away. has really struck me as being as repre- Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, and sentative of what our association is all our sister companies, participated in "OJT The European land battle always looms about than the May/June 1988 issue. In a Doctrinairing." The grievous lessons of the as a dire possibility and should receive a word. camaraderie is the glue that binds French disaster, and our own experience large share of doctrinal consideration. all men that engage in the profession of up to that point, should have been in- However, the hard lessons of history must arms. "The Bugle Call Has Faded," by Ted grained in our minds BEFORE we got to not be ignored. LIC, in all of its forms, is Browne, lieutenant colonel of infantry, un- the bamboo-crunching stage. here to stay. The Combat Arm of Decision derscores this basic principle. I am indeed must lead the way in developing and humbled and proud to be remembered Armor has, since its inception as a com- maintaining flexible doctrine which can be by a splendid trooper in his own right. bat branch, suffered in its effective ap- taught and understood at the lowest pos- Ted speaks to those of us who wore plication due to a lack of study and under- sible level - where crew and tank or APC tankers' boots, yet in my view it encom- standing of its capabilities and use by in- meet the enemy. passes the entire Armored Force - the fantry and other unit leaders. I refer very soldiers who are first to hear the specifically to the parceling of armor bat- J. F. Walker sound of guns and to suffer the high talions and companies to support other USAR Armor (Ret.) casualty rates that result from close com- commands, usually infantry. This is not Roanoke, VA bat. the singular malaise of the U.S. Army, but it was particularly rampant in Vietnam. The greatness of our association Low'lntensityConflict emanates from the cameraderie of Between August 1967 and March 1968, FoIIow-UP legions of men who have answered the my platoon was OPCON to no fewer than "Bugle Call." It may have been coinciden- seven major commands, most of which Dear Sir, tal that this issue of ARMOR Magazine were infantry. The one exception, attach- had a blue cover. If so, let me say that ment to the 2nd Brigade of MG Jack In his article, "Armor in Low Intensity this blue is for you, Ted Browne, and all Toleson's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Conflict the US. Experience in Vietnam," other infantrymen I have served with, espe- allowed for the application of armored (July-August 1988 ARMOR), Major Michael cially the gallant men of my battalion task force in at least platoon strength. The mis- R. Matheny describes well how lessons force in Vietnam. It was an armored force sion of the 2nd Brigade, commanded by bought in blood led us to better techni- built around the more than 1,ooO men of COL Fred E. Karhos, was to find, fix, and ques and procedures. In citing Starry, the mechanized 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry destroy main force Viet Cong and infiltrat- Stanton, the 1967 MACOV study, and Ber- (Bobcats), 25th Infantry Division, whose ing NVA units dug into the fortified ham- nard Rogers, Matheny directs other sol- exploits won the Presidential Unit Citation

ARMOR - November-December 7988 3 in heavy fighting In the latter pari of 1968. (Major Good's letter was referred to the I realize that ARMOR merely published So, as Ted has eloquently asked, "Join all USAARMS Commanding General's office what it had every right to believe was an to make this last." God bless you, Ted, for comment. -Ed.) authentic statement. What has been hit and all others who continue to hold our upon, however, is a very, very sore point colors high. I am proud to have been Dear Major Good, with many long-term members of the counted among your ranks. Armor Association. General Tait shares your concerns about Andrew H. Anderson not re-learning lessons of the past on the From its inception following World War I, Major General, USA (Ret.) next battlefield. There is always room for through the days of the horse cavalry and Trappe, MD improvement, but I think you will find the mechanization in World War II, to its reor- Armor School programs of instruction ganization as the 104th Armored Cavalry liberally laced with historical examples Regiment in the post-World War II era, the Inheriting Combat Knowledge and lessons learned from a variety of na- 104th was a revered Central Pennsylvania tions and wars, Vietnam being one. In a institution, with roots to the Sheridan Dear Sir, recent summary we completed at Fort Troop of Tyrone, PA.. and the Governor's 1 was glad to see MAJ Mike Matheny's Knox, I found Vietnam lessons learned in Troop of Harrisburg in the 19th Century, article, "Armor in Low-Intensity Conflict," in six instructional blocks, varying from reor- among other distinguished local units. Its the July-August issue of Armor. We need ganization and consolidation at Dong Ha demise, to permit concentration of the en- to capture the lessons of Vietnam while to combat service support operations in tire 28th Infantry Division in Pennsylvania, there are still a few veterans of that con- Cambodia. Thare are numerous profes- was ameliorated somewhat at the last mo- flict on active duty. sional books that recount the lessons of ment, only because CW04 Ralph H. Kline Vietnam combat, but three, I feel. will help of Carlisle went to the State Adjutant The recently released brigadier general us retain those lessons are: Armor in Viet- General and asked that, as the senior promotion list consisted of officers who nam, by Frederick Eugene Oldinsky; cavalry unit in the state, the 104th designa- served, in most cases, as company grade Mounted Combat in Vietnam, by General tion be applied to the division cavalry officers in Vietnam. R will not be very Donn A. Starry; and Airmobility 1961-1971, squadron, up to then essentially a deriva- many more years until we have a division by Lieutenant General John J. Toison. All tion of the 103d Cavalry. This, of course, commanded by an officer with no combat three of these books are available at Fort was entirely in keeping with the letter and experience. As the pool of active duty of- Knox, and in most Branch School spirit of the Combat Arms Regimental Sys- ficers with Vietnam-era combat ex- libraries. tem, in that the division squadron is only perience dries up, we must ensure that one element of the regiment. quite proper- the next generation of Armor leaders in- You will also be glad to know that the ly retaining its own lineage to the Philadei- herits the knowledge gained with the "cloverleaf," now called the Fan Method, is phia-area 103d Cavalry and other units, blood and sweat of their predecessors. still taught as a technique at Ranger but under the colors and heraldry of the School in zone reconnaissance, along senior unit, the 104th. with the Box Method and multiple techni- While it is a popular cllchb to say that ques for reconnaissanceof successive sec- Earlier, in the early 1960s. while sewing the Army often prepares for the last war, tors. The mechanical ambush has also as public affairs officer of Headquarters, or for the wrong war, it would be lnex- been retained, and is taught at the Pennsylvania National Guard, I had cusable for us not to prepare for a low-in- Ranger School. Those items are listed in staffed to Department of the Army ap- tensity conflict. The fundamentals learned the Ranaer Handbook, SH 21-76, dated proval the traditional regimental designa- in Vietnam would work just as well in March 1987, on pages 5.5 and 14.10, tion so that it should always be written: Central America or elsewhere. No major respectively. FM 5-34, Enaineer Field "104th Cavalry (The Governor's Troop)." revision of doctrine is required: no new Data, dated September 1987, details tactics are called for: just some grassroots beveral other field expedient firing devices Now, not only that hard-won traditional practice of lessons learned would prepare for mechanical ambushes in Chapter 3. designation, but also our distinctive "Over, the Armor and Cavalry units of our Army Armor Branch sends roughly 75 to 100 of- Under, or Through" motto and crest, plus to perform well in combat in a low-inten- ficers per year to Ranger School. Those a century of history - including participa- sity environment, a far more likely contin- young officers are in turn distributed tion in the Spanish-American War - and gency than an all-out war in Europe. throughout the Armored Force, spreading even the primary geographic locale of the the techniques you mentioned, and many regiment, have simply disappeared, as How many Armor lieutenants and cap others. though someone hit the wrong key on a talns know how to conduct a cloverleaf computer. sweep? When is the last time an Armor Melvin J. Uttig task force commander practiced a ham- LTC (P), IN I have written to the commanding mer-and-anvil maneuver with dismounted Chief, Professional Development Division general of the 28th Infantry Division, re- infantry? Would it really be any different questing that he request official correc- to clear a banana plantation than a rubber tion. We ask that you support that by plantation: but who knows how it is done? Convolutions of Lineage publishing this letter and returning the It is up to the Armor community to show lineage as published to wherever you got some initiative In preparing for any poten- Dear Sir, it, noting that it is being protested. We tial combat environment before we are ask also that you publish a corrected left behind in a future conflict in which we What is shown to be the crest, motto, lineage and heraldry when that is could have been the deciding force, if and lineage of the 104th Cavalry, on the forthcoming. only someone had known. back cover of the July-August 1988 ARMOR, is most definitely not that of the William V. Kennedy James E. Good 104th. What is shown is in fact the lineage COL, AUS (Ret.) Major, Armor and heraldry of the 103d Cavalry, a junior Commander, Troop D. 104th CAV Riyadh, Saudi Arabia regiment. (The Governor's Troop), 1959-61 I 4 ARMOR - November-December I988 I Was Cav Team Really Cav? the spirit of the Boeselager competition team members with significant athletic and send true cavalry teams, from the prowess, self-confidence, and fierce com- Dear Sir: cxavalry squadrons: win, lose or draw. petitive spirit that will sustain them This does not mean that the soldier has to through several months of arduous train- The first thing that I would like to do is be a 19D, but that he be assigned to the ing. Nelther 1-1 Cav, nor any other single congratulate the 1st Squadron, 1st Caval- squadron (honestly assigned to the battalion has sufficient talent to support ry (First Regiment of Dragoons) "Black- squadrons). Return to the runoff competi- this competition.'' Hence the final selec- hawks" on their victory in the Boeselager tion to choose the teams to represent tion of members from elsewhere In 1st Ar- competition. My hat is also off to the USAREUR at the international competi- mored Division and in the 2nd Armored members of the 11th Armored Cavalry tion. When we go to Fiddlers Green, we Cavalry Regiment. Regiment (Blackhorse) team on their fine as cavalrymen must be able to with our showing. As a former member of the heads held high with pride. As a final note, I would like to point out Blackhawks (April 76 - June 82) I was that while the 1-1 Cavllst ADMI Corps proud to see the team do so well, a fact Once again, my deepest congratulations team won the overall and allied competl- that I kept the members of the Infantry to all the members of both the VI1 Corps tion, the 1-1 Cav's partnership unit (the battalion that I am assigned to now, and V Corps teams, a job well done. 4th Aufklaerungsbataillon) topped all of aware of. the 10 German teams and placed third David E. Rose overall. This dual standing reflects con- What disturbs me Is the method that SFC, Cavalry siderable partnership training and refutes was used to ensure the victory (during the 4th Bn 41st Inf the notion that the squadron entered the week, I cheered the team on via the AFN Garlstedt, FRG competition with a "win at all costs" men- reports). 1 was dismayed to learn that the tality. patrol leader was an Engineer officer (16th Eng Bn)! Only four members of the (We asked Headquarters, 1st Sqn., 1st Major George Webb team were from the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav, Cavalry, to respond. -Ed.) Executive Officer two were from the 2d ACR (a fine unit in it- 1-1 Cav self), and one each from 1-52 Inf, 2-59 Dear Sir: FRG ADA, and 3-35 Arty. This was a Corps TN ARNG Gets M60A3s, llVs team, not a 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav team as I Thank you for the opportunity to was lead to believe. was under the im- respond to SFC Rose's articulate letter I Dear Sir: pression that this was a reconnaissance and sincere concern about the true nature (read cavalry) competition, and as such of the Boeselager cornpetition. I'd like to I noticed in the July-August Issue of should be made up of teams from the put the whole competition in perspective. squadrons, NOT the Corps. As it was, ARMOR that your magazine gave mention these teams should have be designated First, the winning team was at once the to ARNG fielding new equipment. Our as VI1 Corps and V Corps, not from caval- VI1 Corps team, the 1st Armored Division brigade (30th Separate Armd. Bde, TN ry squadrons. team, and the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry ARNG) recently completed fielding of team. The corps and division were largely M60A3 tanks at Camp Shelby, MS. We When I departed Germany In 1982, responsible for resourcinq the team; the 1- received 129 tanks from Anniston Depot, there was a USAREUR-level cavalry com- 1 Cav trained the team. The squadron has TARP, Germany, and FORSCOM units. petition to determine the teams that been generous in citing all of these com- would go to the Boeselager competition mands, but what one reads in any given We also fielded 23 M901 ITVs In a direct and represent USAREUR. These teams article may be as much a result of each National Guard Bureau purchase. were made up of members of the reporter's style as anything else. The squadrons, 10 teams - 3 from each ACR squadron is proud to acknowledge being The Guard Is receiving the same equip and one each from the divisional the 1988 Boeselager team, but it has ment that the active component has, and squadrons, not a Corps all-star team. This never excluded the corps or division from 1 thought you might want to make men- was, I felt and still feel, in keeping with the accolades which follow victory. , tion of this In a subsequent issue. the spirit of the Boeselager competition and an opportunity for the squadrons to In the final analysis, however, the winner LEWIS F. ZERFOSS "strut their stuff." 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav always was not a team from any of these units. MAJ, Armor, TN ARNG did well in the USAREUR Cav Cup, and Rather, it was a team of American soldiers did well In the international competition. who represented themselves and their na- Author Query tion in a competition which has reached My questions are: Must we stack the almost Olympic proportions. To enter any Dear Sir: deck to win? Where do we draw the line, competition. particularly one that is inter- do we send one USAREUR team next national in scope, without an intention of On the eve of WWII, when General John year to ensure another American win? winning, is irresponsible and, some might K. Herr was Chief of Cavalry, he is said to What price victory, win at any cost, say, "un-American." have written a letter to all officers in the anyway, is this the message that we are branch asking them to express a There should be no concern over the sending our soldiers? Where are the preference between horse cavalry or the ethics that we talk about, that we expect ethics of assigning non-l9Ds to the team. mechanized force.... I am looking for an the young soldiers to use and live by? Are The selection process and 10-month train- example of this letter. we being honest with ourselves? If this is ing program clearly establish the fact that the only way we feel confident of winning, finding quality soldiers (the raw materiel, should we be in International competition if you will) is but the first step in a tough, at all? thorough train-up of cavalry standards. Dr. Lewis Sorley 1 may be speaking blasphemy, but I One status report, from July 1986, con- 9429 Garden Court believe that USAREUR should return to cluded that the competition "...requires Potomac, MD 20854

I ARMOR - November-December 1988 5 MG Thomas H. Tait Commanding General US. Army Armor Center Safety - A Continuing Problem

In the September-October 1987 and send the causes and trends to when the aft cap catcher is not in- issue of ARMOR, I wrote ahut you through your chain of command. stalled. safety. I described three incidents that occurred at Fort Knox that Recently, two soldiers lost their The "long pole in the tent." when were clear safety violations. I used lives during a live-fire exercise when qualifying, is not loader speed. It is Fort Knox as the example, but the crew attempted to shave the ability of the gunner to identify safety problems existed throughout seconds off its firing times by not targets and to lay the gun on the tar- the Armored Force then and they following established safety proce- get acquired by the tank com- exist now. dures. An MlAl tank crew was mander. Our tankers are pros. the firing Table S. In order to speed up best in the world. They know what For instance. in FY 88 we had 58 the firing sequence. the loader car- to do. and leaders at all levels must Ml/MlAl tank fires. They occurred ried a round in his lap and reloaded make sure they do it. Commanders for a myriad of reasons. However. as soon as the gun Gred and went are still unit safety officers. As I there may be systemic problems: we back into battery. The aft cap wrote over a year ago, the unit com- may not be removing the power catcher was not installed on the tur- mander has superb assistance in pack often enough and inspecting ret floor and this meant that the aft preventing accidents. He has well- and cleaning the engine compart- cap from the fired round. with a qualified tank commanders and ment, leaving oil-impregnated primer that had an initial tempera- squad leaders who are the safety of- sludge on the hull floor. The nozzles ture in excess of 70°F, rolled free ficers for their equipment. They are on the hull lire extinguisher bottles on the turret floor. This was a safety resonsible for everything on their get clwed and may not discharge violation. vehicle. including crew safety. If when a fire is sensed, or when the leaders at any level do not want to system is manually activated. The The loader dropped a round on assume the responsibility for safety. correction may be a PIP to raise the the turret floor. the aft cap primer we don't need them. We lose too nozzles off the hull compartment evidentally hit it and ignited the many soldiers, in peace and in war, floor. We will also have to make combustible cartridge case. The due to carelessness. sure the nozzles get checked during tank commander and gunner were those maintenance services when unable to get out ol the tank and Most accidents are preventable. the power pack is pulled. Perhaps lost thcir lives. This was a terrible Caring leaders make every effort to we should pull packs once again accident and did not have to hap- prevent accidents. Our soldiers during quarterly maintenance ser- pen; the tank commander knew bet- deserve demanding and safe train- vices. It is also essential to check ter. The shaving of a couple of tar- ing. Let's ensure they have both. hydraulic and fuel lines to make get engagemen t seconds wadt The cost of accidents in terms of sure they aren't frayed, and that all worth the cost. We have tested the lives. time lost, equipment connections arc tight. firing tables at Fort Knox and have destroyed, and dollars spent is enor- found that a crew can receive ma4- mous. A lean, mean, ready Army These are just a few possible mum scores when it follows correct cannot afford accidents. Let's all do causes of the engine fires. Our data procedures: there is no compelling better. are incomplete. When we have all need lo cut corners. Tanks are now the information, we will analyze it, considered non-operable for firing Treat 'Em Rough!

6 ARMOR - November-December 1988

Interior and ramp sec- tions of Ribbon Bridge can be joined to Assault and Tactical Bridging- provide rafts for heavy for Armor Units combat vehicles.

by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolt4 (Ret.)

The role of assault and tactical tember 1944, the 5th Inlantry to give up and wait fur construction bridging has been an important one Division and its supporting en- of a treadway bridge. In the 119th throughout U.S. military history. gineers had to bridge three water- Inrantry Regiment sector, the cul- That role is no less important today ways: the Moselle Canal, not only verts fcll apart while thc tanks than it has been in the past. Be- deep but also 80 feet wide; the Rupt dragged them to the crossing site. cause main battle tanks are not am- de Mad, a small Moselle tributary; Even when the engineers con- phibious, bridging can have sig- and the Moselle River itself, ap- structed a treadway bridge. deep nificant tactical impact on armor proximately 2.50 feet wide. Before mud halted attempts to get tanks to operations. Is assault and tactical the operation was over, engineers the infantry. bridging, though, getting the attcn- had erected two Bailey bridges, two tion it deserves? treadway bridges, one double tread- During his 1960-6I assignment to way bridge, and a heavy pontoon the US. Military Liaison Mission in Waterways, both natural and man- bridge over the three obstacles. Potsdam, then-Lieutenant Colonel made, are a major terrain feature in Clarke T. Baldwin observed War- Europe and vary in size from minor In attacking the Siegfried Line saw Pact maneuvers in East Gcr- streams and canals to rivers, such as near Aachen in late September many in which tanks crossed rivers the Rhinc, Meuse, Moselle, and 1944, the 30th Infantry Division using snorkels. In his next assign- Danube. The planner who ignores counted on getting tanks into the ment at Fort box, he stirrcd up European waterways imperils the bridgehead early by using culverts the armor community’s interest in success of his operation. designed for bridging the stream. In developing such a capability for the area of the 117th Infantry, the American tanks. U.S. Army European operations banks of the stream became such a Study revealed that a stream un- during WWll are replete with ex- quagmire that the tank do;.er crossable with normal tank fording amples uC the criticality ofwaterway- charged with preparing the banks capability occurs in Europe ap- crossing operations. became niired in the mud. Tanks proximately every 10 kilometers. In its Moselle River crossing sent to assist also became bogged The end result was development operation at Arnaville, 11-14 Sep- down, so that it became necessary and procurement of a deep water I f 8 ARMOR - November-December 7988 fording kit for the MW-series tanks, allowing the tanks to ford to a "The frequent occurrence of unfordable waterways in depth of 13-1/2 feet. Although the Europe remains a fact of life, and the importance of assault Marine Corps has required develop- and tactical bridging has become even more important" ment of a lording kit to allow land- ing of its MLA1 tanks during am- phibious operations, the Army has shown no interest in this capability. create obstacles. Antitank ditches in the inherent advantages of such In fact, the Army seems to have lost critical areas, particularly where vehicles are lost. interest several years ago in the movement is canalized by terrain deep fording capability of its forces fcatures, can slow the movement of Readily available, rapidly deploy- in Europe. an armored lorce to a disastrous de- able bridging is a necessity. Even gree. Readily available bridging of- where bridges exist, their number is One can argue the practicalities ol fers one means to allow armored always limited, and they are subject deep water fording in Europe. The forces to rapidly cross such ditches. to battle destruction. Assault and many bridges available, the difficul- tactical bridging can provide the ty in determining the depth at which AirLand Battle doctrine em- means to replace suddenly a tank will find firm footing, and the phasizes seizing and holding the in- destroyed bridges, or provide a requirement to prepare ingress and itiative, and stresses maneuver and greater degree of flexibility in the egress sites are among the reasons deep attack. The doctrine becomes selection ol crossing sites. advanced for considering the meaningless without the battlefield capability not worth the effort. mobility to implement it. With the Current U.S. assault and tactical Nevertheless, the frequent occur- Abrams tank and the Bradley fight- bridging capabilities applicable to rence of unlordable waterways in ing vehicle, the U.S. Army has the armored forces include the Ar- Europe remains a fact of life, and armored vehicles lo capitalize on mored Vehicle Launched Bridge the importance ol assault and tacti- the tactical advantages of rapid bat- (AVLB), the Rihhon Bridge, and cal bridging has become even more tlefield movement, and to imple- the Medium Girder Bridge (MGB). important. ment thc doctrinc of AirLand Bat- The first is assault bridging, and the tle. However, obstacles to such other two are tactical bridging. There are other reasons for the im- movement, in the form of waterways portance to armor of assault and and manmade ditches, can severely The AVLB, mounted on an MCfl tactical bridging. Warsaw Pact for- restrict the movement of armored tank chassis, provides heavy forces ces have an impressive ability to vehicles, particularly tanks, so that with a bridge that can be emplaced

The Medium Girder Bridge can be deployed to span a wide body of water.

ARMOR - November-December 7988 9 rapidly under combrrt conditions. The %meter bridge can pass MLC (Maximum Load Capacity) 60 track loads across a 17-meter gap, and MLC 70 track loads across a 13- meter gap. It is found in armored cavalry regiments, heavy division en- gineer battalions, and separate bridge engineer companies.

The Ribbon Bridge, actually based on reverse-engineering of a Soviet design, was developed by the U.S. Army Mobility Research and Development Command in conjunc- tion with Pacific Car and Foundry Company. ConDiesel Mobile Equip- ment Company produces the bridge. It provides tactical elements with a rapidly deployable MLC 60 wet gap crossing capability. It con- sists of a modular, continuous flota- tion bridge system made up of inte- rior bays and ramp bays that are transported, launched, and Current Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge, mounted on M60 chassis, retrieved by a wheeled transporter/ is too slow to keep up with M1 units and presents weight restrictions. launcher vehicle. The bridgebays are transported in a Folded position. length. Because it can be ercctcd the 2-meter vertical abutment of the To launch the bays, the transportcr quickly without heavy equipment, it type found on many canals. The backs partially into the water, the can be used far forward under tacti- BMY Division of Harsco is under operator releases the bays, which cal conditions. With one bridge set contract to develop the necessary automatically open lo form a 6.9- containing 31 meters of bridging, improvements under the Improved mcler section of bridge. Bridge crec- the MGB provides the commander Ribbon Bridge program. lion boats join the sections. A com- with a dry-gap capability in excess plete bridge set of 10 interior hays, of the 18-meter capability of the The AVLB as mounted on an two ramp hays, and 12 transporters AVLB. With the use of two sets and M60 chassis is incapable of match- can be erected at a rate of about a reinforcing kit, a 47-meter span ing the mobility of the Abrams tank. seven meters per minute to provide can be constructed. Nominally an The bridge is only 19 meters long, an MLC 60 bridge across a 77- MLC 60 bridge, the MGB can cross and it is an MLC 60. The Army had meter water gap. Five bays can also Class 70 loads with a reduced to establish a formal requirement form a Class 60 raft. The Ribbon bridge life (7.00() instead of 10,ooO for a replacement. Bridge is found in corps engineer crossings). The MGB is in corps en- The Heavy Assault Bridge (HAB) float bridge companies. gincer units. is now being devcloped under U.S. Army contract with the BMY The MGB, designed by the These current systems provide ar- Division of Harsco. Israel Military Military Vehicles and Engineering mored units with considerable as- Industries (IMI), as a major sub- Establishment at Christchurch (now sault and tactical bridging support. contractor, is responsible for the Royal Armored Research and However, required improvements development of the bridge itself, Development Estahlishmenl), and are underway. In the case of the while BMY is the launch manufactured in England by Fairey Ribbon Bridge, required improve- mechanism developer and systems Engineering, is a hand-erectable, ments pertain largely to obtaining a integrator. The HAB, with an MLC prefabricated deck bridge that can basic MLC 70 capability and a 7U load classification, will bridge he assembled into bridges of varying longer ramp bay to accommodate wet or dry gaps of 30 meters.

10 ARMOR - November-December 7988 Various modifications have been proposed or are under considera- lion for the MGB. In addition, pos- sible long-tcrni rcplacements are in research and development, includ- ing an Israeli bridge known as the Rapid Deployment Bridge.

Concerned with shipping space - both air and sea - the U.S. Marine Corps has been pursuing a different course in heavy assault bridging. Ex- perienced in the challenge of cross- ing antitank ditches, the Israeli Dcfense Forces initiated develop- ment, with IMI as the contractor, of t The Improved Ribbon Bridge, seen in an artist's a 12-meter Towed Assault Bridge rendering, above, as it prepares to deploy from its (TAB). The USMC has tested the transporter-launcher. bridge but has established no procurement plans yet. The TAB is mounted on a single axle, and a tank or other vehicle tows it to the crossing site. At the site, the vehicle is reversed - or the bridge can be switched to the front - and the bridge is pushed across the gap. Folding "horns" guide the bridge onto the far bank. The crew discon- nects the bridge from the towing tank without exposure. The TAB is Above, the Towed Assault Bridge, which rides on a a rapid means 01 providing an MLC single axle, is shown being towed to a crossing site 70 bridge across gaps up to 10 by a tank, but other vehicles can be used. Below, the meters. The bridge easily separates bridge in use spanning an antitank ditch. into two sections to allow transport by C-130 aircraft. It is desiped to I continue functioning at the MLC 70 level after losing up to 50 per cent of its structural beams to mines, ar- tillery, or direct fire. Deployment takes less than one minute.

The Marine Corps has also con- tracted through the Army with 1MI (this time with BMY as a sub- contractor) for prototypes of the 24- mdcr Trailer Launched Bridge (TLB-24). This bridge is towed into position and launched using hydraulic power furnished by two diesel engines mounted on the trailer. The bridge itself, with three folding sections, is in many ways

I ARMOR - November-December 1988 doubts that a towed bridge could keep up with the supported unit. The Marine Corps will almost sure- ly have to procure at least some TABS and/or TLB-24s. Its bridging capabilities are sadly lacking, and the fewAVLBs are a somewhat slender reed on which to lean. Fur- thermore, the AVLB does nothing to solve the shipping space problem nor the challenge of air transpor- tability. It is notahle that newer designs and materials have greatly reduced the weight per foot of all of these new bridges.

One thing is certain: The ability to cross both wet and dry gaps is an important factor in the battlelicld mobility of heavy forces. Effective assault and tactical bridging is a sure force multiplier. Bridging and The Heavy Assault Bridge will provide armored units with a 70-ton battlcficld mobility are too interrc- crossing capability over gaps up to 30 meters wide. lated for the armor community to look on gap-crossing as solely an en- gineer problem. The successful ap- similar to, although shorter than, MGB for now. A "Safety of Use" plication of AirLand Battle doctrine the HAB bridge. It provides an message on the AVLB has already may well depend on an Army-wide, MLC 70 crossing Capability of gaps placed "caution" crossing limita- cost-effective approach to providing up to 22 meters. Deployment is ac- tions, such as that the M1 tank can- combat elements with the bridging complished in live minutes and not cross al speeds greater than 8 they need. recovery from either end in ten. mph. The Army will certainly face an af- The HAB and the TLB-24 are fordability problcm with the HAB both being designed so that they because the mobility of the bridge Brigadier General Philip L. can transport and launch both types depends on procurement of a tank Bolte is a 1950 graduate of of bridge, as well as the AVLB chassis. Given the success to date ol USMA. He served 30 years bridge. Marine Corps consideration of the in the Army in a variety of TAB and the TLB-24. the Army armor and R&D assign- 11 appears as if development might well give some thought to ments, including command programs are proceeding to satisfy procurement of these less expensive from platoon to brigade, the requirenients of both the Army alternatives to the HAB, at least to and combat tours in Korea and the Marine Corps. However, in fulfill some of its requirement. and Vietnam. His R&D as- thc current and prqjected budget Procurement savings would be more signments included service climate, procurement of these im- than matched by reduction in opera- as an assistant project portant combat support assets may tional and personnel costs, because manager of the Abrams lag. Even though the two services neither requires a dedicated vehicle tank and program manager are moving into MLC 70 bridge re- or crew. Nevertheless, the Army of the Bradley fighting quirements, the services may con- may consider the TLB as unsatisfac- vehicle systems. He is cur- clude to accept the less-than-op- tory for such reasons as its asymetri- rently a consultant and timnl MLC 70 capabilities of the cal roadway (half the M t track over- military writer. AVLB, the Ribbon Bridge, and the hangs the narrow roadway) or

12 ARMOR - November-December 1988 Red Army Tank Commander

A legend in the Red Army, General Andrei Kravchenko led his tanks in an unprece- dented river crossing under freezing condi- tions in one of the most remarkable baffles on the Eastern Front. Im- provisation was the key.

by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Armstrong

On 3 October 1943, the Red Army early by the Soviet High Command the Stidinwdd front that were ad- tank corps commander did not as a fully capable and aggressive vancing north in an attempt to close know how his day would end. He operational commandcr.' In those the noose around the extended Ger- received an urgent call to the com- trying early times of 1941, if one man units. Meeting at 16OU hours mand post of the Voronezh front. could show command ability, one on 23 November, only five days advanced rapidly in position and after the offensive began, Krav- General-Major Andrei Grigor- responsibilities. Kravchenko became chenko's tank corps met General V. evich Kravchenko. who had been a rising star. In June 1942, he T. Volskii's IV Mcchanked Corps fighting in Red Army tank forces received command of the I1 Tank near the small settlement of since the beginning of the war, had Corps, and later, in October, was as- Sovietskii, just east of Kalach. With come up through the ranks in the signed to command the IV Tank filled glasses of captured chani- typical fashion. Hc joined the Rcd Corps. pagne, each excited corps com- Army in 1Y18, got the right school- mander celebrated and toasted the ing, and served as chief of staff for a Assigned to the Southwest Front, other's forces and fighting prowess. motorized division, then a tank his IV Tank Corps played a division in the Finnish War. Krav- dramatic part in the fight to save The swift, decisive action won chenko commanded a separate tank Stalingrad from the encroaching Kravchenho's tank corps the brigade during the hard, desperate German armies. On 19 November coveted "Guards" designation. Now, fighting against the German in- 1942, Kravchenko's tank corps, as the seasoned and wcll-known com- vasion in late 1941. part of the 21st Army, began the his- mander of the 1V Guards Tank toric battle that culminated in the Corps had unexpectedly been sum- He commanded a brigade of the encirclement at Stalingrad of the moned to appear before his new T-34 tanks, and like many of Germans' ill-rated Sixth Army notoriously stern front commander. these new brigades, his played a under Colonel-General Friedrich decisive role in battles to save Mos- von Paulus. His tank corps slashed Immediately upon arrival at the cow and help stabilize the front through the defenders' line and front headquartcrs, General Krav- against the advancing German for- moved rapidly to exploit success in chenko, a tall, well built, com- ces. Although he earned a reputa- the rear area. Moving in a southern mander with broad shoulders, tion as a quiet, almost reserved direction, Kravchenko's tankers reported to the front commander, man, Kravchcnko was recognized sought to link up with the forccs of General Nikolai Vatutin. A short,

ARMOR - November-December 1988 13 ~ squat man, Vatutin was a no-non- To build a bridge across it to cover "In his usual quiet, sense, hard-driving lighter; these our weight requirements would take muffled voice, Krav- wcre the traits necessary to obtain no less than eight to 10 days. That chenko directed his and hold a front-level command. wait will preclude any timely sup- staff to organize an im- Kravchenko had been assigned to port to the 38th Army's fonvard mediate reconnais- Vatutin's front since early 1943, and units, and it will be a diflicult battle sance of the Desna. A fought on the southern face of the to support the bridgehead across tank platoon leader Kursk salient as the Voronezh the Dnepr."' was about to earn his front's armored reserve. extra pay and rations At Vatutin's sidc sat his earthy, Thc Dncpr, the second largest as a "Guards" lieu- but astute, political oKicer, Nikita Russian river, had concerned the Khrushchev, a future premier of the Soviet tieneral Staff planners since Soviet Union. On this occasion, early 1943. Anticipating success in Gcneral Vatutin had good news to thc Kursk battlc during the summer, share with Kravchenko. Vatutin, the Red Army leadership saw the west hank and rushed reinforce- who had an amazing ability to ac- Dnepr as the retreating Germans' ments tu seal the area. curately describe the situation and next likely line of defensive posi- foresee developing events, told Krav- tions, and a difficult one to breach. The Voronezh front's first chance chenko how lead elements of the The river was wide, with a west to breach the river had failed, but 38th Army fought to the banks of bank 100 feet higher than the east. given the 38th Army's mall the Dnepr River and crossed north Dubbcd the "eastcrn rampart," it of- kridgehead, Vatutin's front had or Kicv. Thcy forced the river with fered a very dcfcnsible barrier to a another chance to achicve SUCCCSS. makeshift means. Using rafts from continuation of the Red Army's Showing his typical relentless style, hastily fellcd trees, empty gas cans, westcrn advancc. Vatutin refused to Ict this oppor- and small fishing boats, they tunity slip. German commanders snatched a hold on the west bank of Hoping to preempt a strong dcfen- had learned to always count on the wide river in the area of the sive line, advancing Soviet units on Vatutin to do the unexpected. Now, small village of Lyutezh. Some 15 the left wing of Vatutin's front he raccd against time. Vatutin kilometers north of the prized city raced the Germans to the river would have preferred to use the of Kiev, the Red Army now early in September. Advanced ele- more powerful 3rd Guards Tank breached a potentially difficult Ger- ments of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, but it was too far south in the man defensive line. It was not an Army approached the Dnepr while Bukrin bend. and was engaged with ideal bridgehead, but nonetheless, it German forces were still located on strong German forces containing its was large enough to move more the eastern bank. The Soviets at- bridgehead. Generat Kravchenko's Soviet infantry and tanks to the west tempted to cross the river south of IV Guards Tank Corps could move bank. Kiev in the area of the Great Buk- faster, and appear unexpectedly in rin, a large bend in the Dnepr. In a the new bridgehead - if Krav- "These units," said Nikila Khrush- poorly coordinated effort, rhc Soviet chenko could get his tanks across chev, sobering the momentary High Command attempted to assist the Desna. euphoria, "are hearing great losses the Voronezh front with a hastily- and resisting continuous German planned airborne operation using a With his knack for inspiring con- counterattacks. It's unlikely that full airborne corps. fidence in his subordinates, Vatutin they will be successful in securing directed Kravchenko, "You must the captured bridgehead on the But in dropping paratroopers into look for a" ossible ford to get over right bank if,they are not supported the Bukrin bend, everything went the Desna. l) by our tanks.- wrong. The airborne drop scattered jumpers on both sides of the river, Receiving his mission with full "On the way to the Dnepr," con- some landing in the river itself. The awareness of his commander's ur- tinued the front commander, "is a assault was a complete disaster. gency, General Kravchenko im- serious obstacle, the Desna River. The Germans slipped away to the mediately left for his tank corps' as- 14 ARMOR - November-December 1988 I semhly area, in the woods northwest the 38th Army in widening and General Kravchenko listened atten- of Brovary near the Desna River. securing the Lyutezh bridgehead. tively to his subordinates' progress There, his unit was refitting and re- reports. Later, he would attribute equipping after recent combat, and The search for a river crossing the success of the operation, in it still suffered from some major per- finally succeeded. The tankers large measure, to hard, continuous sonnel and equipment shortages. Of found a potential ford in the vicinity work and precise coordinittion and an authorizcd tank strength of 210, of the village of Letki. There, the planning by his corps chid of staff, the unit had approximatcly 90 tanks Desna was 250 meters wide and two and rigorous execution by the tank in good repair. Interestingly, some meters deep. But two meters was corps' engineers. 15 of these tanks were British Lend- twice the fording depth of the T-34 Lease Churchills, a heavy, slow tank tanks. The river bed of packed The tanks, personally led by their - diflicult to manage compared to sandy soil was also a potential corps commander. began crossing the faster T-34s. problem. After a few tanks crossed, the river on 4 October, less than 24 it could quickly become dceper. In hours after recciving thc mission. !n his usual quiet, muffled voice, addition, the march route to the Across the top of the water, two Kravchenko directed his staff to or- fording site twisted like a snake rows of spar buouys marked the ganize an immediate reconnaissance through swampy tcrrain. It was not ford. The tanks nioved along this of the Desna. A tank platoon leadcr the best of crossing sites, but Krav- designated path in first gear iit no was about to earn his extra pay and chenko had to risk it. more than 7-8 miles pcr hour. The rations as a "Guards" lieutenant. He drivers drove blindly, carrying out received the task to measure depths The tank crews carried out neces- changes in steering directions callcd and find the most shallow point for sary river crossing preparations, dis- from their tank commanders, who a crossing. Tankers from the 20th playing great inventiveness. All sat on the turret tops just out of the Guards Tank Brigade, designated cracks, openings, hatches, engine water. Exiting on the opposite bank, for the reconnaissance, searched louvres, and the turret race were the tanks continued moving towards with local fishermen to find a pos- caulked with oakum soaked in the Dnepr River. sible ford. grease or tar. Any other potential In the middle of the Desna cross- openings were sealed with tar- ing operation, General N. E. The tankers dived several times in paulins, oiled and battened-down. Chihisov, commander of the 38th the now-cold October river watcrs Air could reach the engines through Army, arrived from his head- to determine the character of the the turret hiItch, hut exhaust fumes quarters at Letki. While anxious for river bottom. They looked for an had to be fed through exhaust pipes the tankers' arrival in his area with a solid river bed and no made from tarpaulin sleeves, which bridgehead, he was impressed by large rocks, tree trunks, or other carried the gases to the water sur- everyone's sacrifices. obstacles which might stop their face. tanks as they drove across the river "Andre; Grigorevich, what people bottom. It was a long, cold, arduous Tankers of the 22nd Guards Tank your tankers are! For my many task. Brigade made special protective years of service," he observed, "I covers for their main guns, and in a have never seen more courageous few of the battalions, soldiers soldiers than 1 see at this time. The At the same time, Kravchenko had crafted air intakes from corrugated people are hours in the cold water his tank brigade commanders begin hoses. without getting out. And such a risk preparing their tanks for the cross- the drivers take driving to the op- ing. He reported his actions to the Engineers from the 38th Army as- posite bank!"' front commander and received from sisted the tank corps and prepared the front staff the mission to attack the banks for the descending ap- Tankers had to spend time in the in the direction of Lyutezh, to force proach into the river. In the swampy icy cold waters, fastening chains to the Desna and Dnepr rivers, and to areas, sappers layed a corduroy tanks that bogged down in the river render help to the forward units of road made from brush wood. bottom. The sandy soil was begin-

I 1 I ARMOR - November-December 1988 15 /Ul i the bridgehead, the Soviets would increase it rapidly - a small battalion would grow overnight to a division or The 5th Guard8 Tank Corps more, making it impossible In actlon north of Kiev for the Gcrmans to reduce during Ocr-Nov 1943 the bridgehead. The Rus- sians, on the other hand, knew that every day, even every hour, increased the Gcr- mans’ potential to cordon off the fragile bridgehead with additional forces, mines, and systematic fires, as they had \ done at the Bukrin bend. I’..’ ~~NOV e WSnuunuu General Kravchenho began to think of the fight ahead. -1\ \i/ PUSHCHA-VODITSKA He contacted the com- manders of the forward rifle BROVARY divisions at Lyutezh. Thcy reported that there were cur- ROAD rently two German infantry &y &y and one tank division in the area. The Germans’ defensive line consisted of three posi- tions, each of which hid f MAP1 trenches, prepared machine gun and mortar emplace- ments, and earth and timher ning to give way with the passage of A pleased General Kravchenko, in field obstacles. Forward of their so many tanks. Three such tanks a fur waistcoat over his field shirt, positions were antipersonnel and an- had to be towed to the opposite stood on the opposite bank with a titank mines. Crossing such a hank. The engine compartments broad smile. He presented awards defense to expand the bridgehead had lcaked and flooded. In many of for hcroic pcrsonal ethrts in the would be no small task for Krav- the tanks that did make the cross- unique crossing. For the first time, a chenko’s corps. But, first, the 1V ing, the drivers did it blindly, sitting Red Army armor unit had crossed a Tank Corps had to cross the Dnepr. in a foot of frigid water. river underwater - a first time for any army without specially designed The Dnepr River at this point was underwater equipment. The Party 650 to 750 meters wide and hetween Nonetheless, hy 0800 hours, 5 Oc- and the Mothcrland wcre grateful, 2.5 and 9 meters deep. With the tober, 71 tanks had crosscd the hut none more than the waiting corps’ advance to the river, recon- Desna. Although Soviet sources do front commander. naissance was again dispatched and, not develop the point, the disparity with the help of local inhabitants, in number of tanks making the After crossing the Desna, the 1V found two partially-damaged barges crossing and the unit’s on-hand Guards Tank Corps rushed on- which the Germans had sunk when strength indicates the Soviets did wards to the Dnepr River. Time withdrawing. They raised and not drive the Churchill tanks under- was precious. The Germans had repaired these barges. Each barge water, like the T-34s. Thcy left them long since lcarned to react quickly could carry three tanks across the behind in the rush for the and strongly to Red Army Dnepr. In addition to the repaired bridgehead.- bridgehcads. No matter how small barges, the corps prepared two tank 76 ARMOR - November-December 7988 1 ferries from pontoon bridging sec- bridgehead began to expand. With rode on the tanks, Kravchenko’s tions. Through the night ol 5-6 Oc- the addition of the tankers, the tankers rapidly advanced toward tober, these improvised methods depth of the Red Army’s hold their assiqed obiectives. As usual, resulted in approximately ten trips, across the Dnepr expanded to a Kravchcnko was well forward in his and by dawn, Kravchenko had 60 of width of 8-11) kilometers and a observation post. He always located his tanks in the bridgehead. depth of 5-6 kilometers from a pre- himself at the most difficult situa- viously shrinking area only 2-3 tion, or most critical spot, sternly German Field Marshal Erich von kilometers wide and 1-1.S gazing on the action. His whole Manstein’s Army Group South was kilometers deep. Shutov’s tank manner projected to his lighting an old opponent of Vatutin’s brigade had figured significantly in tankers his strong-willed character. Voronezh front. The Army Group’s the fierce fighting and Krav- For four days, the tank corps fought Fourth Panzer Army had General chenko’s tankers widened and toward Kiev and the highway to the Hauffe’s XI1 Corps in the area of secured the bridgehead. General west that was the Nazi lifeline. the bridgehead. The sector was Hauffe’s soldiers could not drive defended by the Hessian 88th and the Russians back into the river. Then, just as the tank corps moved Brandenburg 208th Infantry They fought fiercely to contain the out for the raid, the situation in the Divisions along the stcep river bank. burgeoning bridgehead. Lyutezh bridgehead turned worse. In order to secure the crossing over The 38th Army was under strong the Dnepr, Kravchenko ordered Even as the corps’ rear element German counterattacks from the preliminary artillery fire on (iermiin was waiting to cross the Dnepr, areas of Vyshgorod and Pushcha- observation posts on the opposite General Kravchcnko received a new Voditsa on the southern perimeter. bank. He also directed powerful order from the tireless and aggres- The German command understood suppressive artillery fires, supported sive front commander. The IV the danger of Kravchenko’s tank by a large number of the famed Guards Tank Corps was ordered to corps maneuvering against the criti- Katyusha rocket launchers, to conduct a deep raid outside the cal line ol communications in their neutralize German machine gunners bridgehead. Its oljective was to cut rear area. Strong forces of infantry and artillery positions. off the highway between Zhitomir and tanks struck from Kiev to the and Kiev, in the area of Makarov, north along the Dnepr River’s west The first man to cross was the and then halt the approach of Ger- bank, attempting to cut off Krav- 20th Guards Tank Brigade com- man reserves from Zhitomir to Kicv. chcnko’s tank corps and liquidate mander, Colonel Shutov, a seasoned the menacing bridgehead. professional who had served in the Kravchcnko’s raid to Makarov Red Army since 1918. Before the began as aggressively as the crossing It was a desperate effort to stem war, he had been stationed in the of the Desna toward the Dnepr. the Red Army advance and breach ancient captial of Mother Russia, The corps tank brigades successful- of the Germans’ major defensive Kiev, and he knew the city well. His ly passed their tanks through the obstacle, the Dnepr River. wife and two sons had remained in kind of difficult and marshy terrain Kiev since the beginning of the war. that normally inhibited the Kravchenko was ordered to return He anxiously sought battle for the maneuver of armored formations. his corps to the bridgehead and relief of his family and Kiev. The tank units ground through the strike in the direction of the swamp-lined lrpen River to the counterattacking Gcrnian forces. The arrival of Kravchenko’s tank southwest of the bridgehead and This recall troubled Kravchenko. corps was the key to the Red Army moved as rapidly as possible These instructions were in error, he defense in the bridgehead. The through a large tract of lorest. After thought. The corps’ attack to morale of the forward infantrymen overcoming light resistance from a Makarov was progressing successful- in the rifle corps was bolstered and small group of German infantry, the ly and bearing results. the reinforced German counterat- tank corps, upon reaching good tacks were successfully repelled. high ground, began to maneuver in Believing the attack should con- Within 24 hours of the IV Guards the German rear area. With special- tinue, he called the front staff to Tank Corps’ appearance, the ly attached airborne infantry, which question the order. He hoped to

ARMOR - November-December 1988 17 "ln the month's fighting, Kravchenko led his tank corps in crossing the Desna, Dnepr, and - three times - the lrpen rivers, and his unit was the first to pierce to the cen- ter of Kiev. Kravchenko 's tireless, aggressive perfor- mance earned him his country's highest decoration, the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union." change minds, but Vatutin himself bridgehead, within the range of Ger- redesignated on 20 October). began reaflirnied his order to immediately man artillery. Vatutin clearly and a classic large-scale Red Army artil- return to the Lyutczh bridgehead. laconically stated the operational lery preparation along the entire Kravchcnko's tankers were still plan, and pcrsonally assigned the front south of Lyute7h. A powerful necessary to hold the Red Army's army, corps, and division missions. strike from a full Artillery grab on the west bank. Generally, the plan was to capture Breakthrough Corps at the disposal Kiev from the north and, moving in of the 38th Army initiated the offen- "With an ache in our hearts," a southwest direction, destroy ele- sive in the direction of the main at- wrote Kravchenko after the wiir. ments of the Fourth Panzer Army tack. "we abandoned our gains, rushed and seize important population During the evening of 5 Novem- back towards the River Irpen."' centers to the west of the Dnepr. her, Kravchcnko met with his staI'I' None in his command regretted the "The Supreme Commander (Stalin) in the outskirts of Kiev. Leaning withdrawal morc than Coloncl has ordcrcd us to launch the offen- over a map, Kravchenko indicated Shut ov. sive on 3 November," he said in con- the march routes of the tank clusion. "The Ukrainian capital is to columns and the coordination re- With the tank corps' arrival back he liberated not later than 6 Novem- quirements of the brigades. He in the bridgehead, and in coordina- ber."' marked on the map the portion of tion with 38th Army rifle units, they the city they would attack. He or- repelled all the (ierman counterat- Kravchenho stood quietly in the dered the concentration of units tacking forces and again expanded back, against the wall. He made no and preparations for the advance to the bridgehead. Meanwhile, Vatutin comments. His tank corps, in coor- the final jumping4 positions. And worked to rush other I'orces to fully dinated tank and infantry tactics. then Kravchcnko addcd a surprising exploit the Dnepr crossing. would fight as a mobile group for requirement, "The tanks must drive the 38th Army. Attacking in the lirst in the niLg.ht at high speeds with German aircraft dropped leaflets echelon, his corps would again cross headlights on."9 throughout the hridgehead area. In the lrpen River. He knew what was an attempt to demoralize the expected ol' him and he would get it His staff and commanders ex- tankers and dash the hopes of the done. changed glances in disbelief. Noting infantrymen, the leaflets read, the puzzled stares, Kravchenko con- "(ieneral Kravchenko losl all his 240 While in the assembly area, 1V firmed his instructions. "Yes. all tanks and now sits entrapped." GudsTank Corps became the tar- vehicles - tanks, self-propelled Reading one of the lcallcts brought get of marauding German Stuka guns, transports - will move at a to him. Kravchcnko remarked. "If I aircraft. Kravchcnko quickly high speed with headlights on and had 24) kinks, I would drive those decided deception would be neces- sirens blaring."'" Fascists all the way to Berlin."' sary for his unit's third crossing of the Irpen. He had his engineers At 200 hours, 5 November, With the arrival of additional for- huild false crossing sites over the General Vatutin gave the order to ces - the 3rd Guards Tank Army- river and fabricate mock tanks from begin the final assault on Kiev. The in the bridgehcad, Vatutin, on 30 plywood in the assembly areas. The tanks' rapid night advance, with Octoher. held a war council with his dummy tanks drew the German headlights on and firing thcir main army and corps commanders. The bombing strikes. guns on the move, stunned the Ger- conference was conducted in the man defenders and created con- cellar of a bombed-out school house At 0600, 3 November, the 1st Uk- fusion and panic. Fearing encircle- in Novo-Petrot-tsy in the Lyutezh rainian Front (the Voronezh was ment, the Germans began to

18 ARMOR - November-December 1988 ~~ withdraw from the city and, by 0400 tinued to fight through the Balkans 3' Ibid. 4. hours, 6 November, the German and Carpathian mountains to the Ibid. resistance in Kiev ceased, Announc- end of the war in Europe, in May 5' Anna Stroeva, Komandarm Krav- ing the capture of the city. Vatutin 1945. chenko (Army Commander Kravchenho), phoned Stalin, who ordered salutes Polizdat Ukraine, 1984, pp. 63-64. fired in Moscow and all Russia to After the war in Europe, Krnv- ''Ibid., p. 70. 7. celebrate the victory. chenko and his tank army wcre Ibid., p. 70. In the month's lighting, Krav- transferred to the Far East military 8' David Dragunsky, A Soldier's Memoir, chcnko led his tank corps in cross- theater. In August 1945, his tank Progress, Moscow, 1983, p. 11 1. ing the Desna, Dnepr, and - three army attacked across the Greater 9' Stroeva, p. 68. times - the Irpen rivers, and his Khingan mountains and desert of "'lbid. unit was the first to pierce to the western Manchuria against the center of Kiev. Kravchenko's tire- Japanese Kwantung army. In a Bibliography less, aggressive performance earned lightning campaign, forward ele- him his country's highest decora- ments of his tank army ended the Carell, Paul, Scorched Earth, Ballantine, tion, the star of the Hero of the Wilr on the shores of the Pacific New York, 1966. Soviet Union. He became marked Ocean. Kravchenko for the second Dragunsky, David, A Soldier's Memior, for advancement in command. time received his country's ultimate Progress, Moscow, 1983. recognition. "Gody v brone," Voenizdat, Moscow, In January 1944, combining the 1V 1975. Guards Tank Corps and V Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, a Erickson, John, The Road To Berlin. Mechanized Corps. the Red Army title earned by only a select few, Westview, Colorado, 1983. created its last tank army during the General Kravchenko became one of Grechko, A. A., "V boyakh za stolitsu Uk- war, and Kravchenko became its the major fighting heroes of the rainy," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. commander. His organization, the Great Patriotic War. Unfortunately, 11-1963. new 6th Tank Army, was completrd his accomplishments, like like those Kravchenko, Andrei, "Tankisty forsiruyut in time for participation in the Kor- of many of the other Red Army ryeki," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 4 sun-Shevchenko operation in tank commanders, have not been 1963. January-February 1944. With his spotlighted in the West's poshvar Khrushchev, N. S., Khrushchev Remem-

tank army, Kravchenko now attack- literature, leaving a vague, and often _.bers, Little, Brown, Boston, 1970. ed as the mobile group for the 1st incorrect, notion of the fighting on Mackintosh, Malcolm, British Military Ob- Ukrainian Front. slicing through the the Eastern Front. server to the Soviet Army who met Krav- German forward defense and encir- chenko, interview, 2 October 1986. cling a salient of some 70,000 Ger- But as Kravchenko stood at the Stroeva, Anna, Komandarm Krav- mans. The operation was a end of a long and hard-won triumph chenko, Polizdat Ukraine, 1984. catastrophic defeat for the Ger- against the Germans and Japanese, mans, forcing them to completely he understood, and represented abandon the Dnepr River area. fully, the words of a traditional Rus- sian warrior creed, "He who comes to us with a sword shall perish by In August 1944, Kravchenko led Lieutenant Colonel Richard the sword." the 6th Tank Army in fighting in the N. Armstrong was comrnis- Yassy-Kishnev operation. Executing sioned from West Virginia Notes a brilliant 11-day operation, Krav- University in 1969. He has chenko conducted operations at 1. served in military intelligence night, crossed water obstacles, as- Author's interview with Malcolm Mack- in such posts as Department sisted in the destruction of an army intosh, British Military Observer to the of the Army, 1st Cavalry group, and placed the German situa- Red Army, who met and knew Kravchenko Division, the USAREUR staff tion on the strategic flank in jeopar- and in the European, dy. The army's actions in this opera- 2' A. Kravchenko, "Tankisty forsiruyut Korean, and Vietnamese tion won it the "Guards" designa- reki (Tankers Force the Rivers)," Voenno- theaters. He is currently G2, istoricheskii zhurnal (Military History Jour- tion. The 6th Guards Tank Army, 1st Cav Div. under Kravchenko's leadership, con- nal), No. 9-1963, p. 63. I ARMOR - November-December 1988 19 Cavalry Scouts at the Joint Readiness Training Center

by Captain Alan R. Horn

The impact of the National Train- Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Though it Air Force and Army active and ing Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, is a new organization, the results reserve component contingency for- California. on the U.S. Army is ob- have been extremely positive. The ces in deployment and tactical vious. Tank and mechanized in- post covers a total of 50,UOO acres, operations under anticipated condi- fantry units fight bctter because mostly heavy brush, marsh and tions of low- to mid-intensity com- they now train to fight. With the ex- woods. Some scenarios call for all bat. The training includes the execu- panding role and size of the light or portions of the exercises to take tion of sustained collective tasks forces, the need for a "Light Train- place in othcr locations. under conditions beyond those nor- ing Center" became obvious. Ac- mally possible at unit home stations. cordingly, the Army created the Mission Joint Readiness Training Center The JRTC mission is to provide an The mission of the Opposing (JRTC) on 27 February 1987 at advanced level of unit training for Force (OPFOR) is to provide rota- tional training units with a highly- trained aggressor force that employs Threat tactics and is capable of operating at several levels of combat, from insurgent for- ces to mid-intcnsity mechanized units.

COMMAND In common with the rest of the GROUP Army, the JRTC has sulfercd from severe manpower restraints. Be- cause of these restrictions, someone who could perform in a dual role as EXERCISE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT both a light infantryman and a GROUP CONTROL tanker was needed. The desired mix of 1 IB and 1OE skills resulted in the ,/ selection of 1YDs for the job. 19D suitability for the job was evident when it became clear that small unit initiative and leadership was going to be a key ingredient for success. The cavalry scout is ideally suited for any mission that requires this mix. The organization ol the JRTC is shown in Fig. 1.

Equipment

The JRTC NTC OPFOR is equipped like the NTC OPFOR. with OPFOR uniform shirt, insignia. and beret. (One difference is BDU pants, because of the greater need for pocket space.) The OPFOR is Fig. 1 armed with the M16A1 rifle, M60 machine gun and the M249 SAW,

20 ARMOR - November-December 1988 though AK47s may soon replace the obstacle courses, and numerous talion. The MRB attack is the major M16s. For mid-intensity battles, the field exercises in the sweltering sum- battle of the niid-intensity phase. M551 Sheridan armored reconnais- mer heat. Temperatures topped IOU Several smaller hattles with smaller sance airborne assault vehicle degrees. with humidity in the upper tank and/or motorized forces take (ARAAV) is visually modified to 90s. Heat in,jury training was a vital place at the end of the training rota- resemble the T-62 tank. M113 ar- necessity. With the coming or tion, with the OPFOR in a dcfcn- mored personnel carriers resemble winter, cold weather training be- sive posture. BMPs. Though most OPFOR artil- came just as important. January lery is notional, plastic tubes and temperatures of 15 degrees or Rotations plastic rounds represent 82-mni below are not uncommon in the mortars. Stingers represent Grails, area, and are often backed up by 15- Seven force-on-force rotations and a further M551 is visually 30-knot winds. In a tactical environ- were scheduled rkr FY 88 and a modified to appear as a ZSU 23/4. ment, the buddy system \vas con- similar numhcr for FY 89. Each ex- For the low-intensity phase, jungle stantly reinforced. ercise liWs 11 days. Thc plan calls hats are worn with the MILES halo for light infantry units from fastened on them. This allows for Additionally, (he 19D training in- CONUS to dcploy to Fort Chaffce definite target recognition between cluded the JRTC-OPFOR weapon and the JRTC in the same way that forces, even in the heat of simulated of choice, the hooby trap. Troops heavier units deploy to the NTC. At combat. Plastic OPFOR helmets trained on numerous types of booby this time, units from Forts Sill, are used during the mid-intensity traps, including L6OO simulatcd Brag, Drum, Ord, and Benning phase. Troops integrated all of this booby traps, L602 simulated Ilashcs, have rotated through the JRTC. Fu- equipment during the train-up and L495, surface trip flares. Excel- ture rotations include the remainder period for the lirst rotation in Oc- lent results during operations came of the active duty light units, as well tober 1987. from this intensive training. The in- as some National Guard/Reservc ability of the average soldier to light units. Training resist picking up magazines clepict- The Joint Readiness Training ing the female body in various posi- Center is here to stay. Whether its Training for the first force-on- tions of repose led to many casual- impact on light units will he as great force exercise began in earnest in ties. Naturally, these magazines as the NTC's on heavy units June 1987. The OPFOR spent most (only the covers were used lor remains to be seen. What we can of June to September on terrain military purposes) were attached to see, however, is the important role familiarization. The OPFOR at the trip wires. the cavalry scout has in a light en- NTC gives a large portion of credit vironment, and the caliher of the for its continued successes against Scenario job the 19Ds are performing. rotational units to its thorough knowledge of the desert terrain. On a fictitious island called Atlan- Every cavalry scout at .lRTC walked tica. the US.-backed Cortinians his terrain countless times, by night fight the Soviet surrogate Atlan- as well as by day. The unit also ticans. The Cortinians ask for U.S. spent an enormous amount of time military assistance. which is granted Captain Alan R. Horn is conducting MILES gunnery with in the form of a U.S. light infantry the commander of Tank small arms and tank weapons sys- task force. Each scenario is esldb- Co, 1/50!3th Parachute In- tems. Extensive use was made of the lished around the rotational unit's fantry Regiment (OPFOR), Small Arms Alignment Fixture mission essential task list. This, in JRTC. Previously, he had (SAAF), Mobile Conduct of Fire turn, forces the OPFOR to remain served in Germany as a fire Trainer (MCOn), and rifle ranges. flexible. Certain units land at nearby support team chief, fire sup- MSS1 Sheridan maintenance and Fort Smith airport and march into port officer and battalion training was constant. After each the exercise area, while others jump S2. He transferred from training period, drivers and into Arrowhead DZ. field artillery and attended mechanics gained valuable hands-on AOAC and was assigned to experience, and the OR rates for Upon completion of the low-inten- the NTC, where he served the vehicles stabilized in the high sity phase of operations (usually five as assistant S3, S1, B Co. 80s or low 90s. days), the Blue Force unit has 48 commander, and as 1-73 The training was physically tough, hours to prepare a defcnse capable AR/2d Motorized Rifle Bat- including long-range marches, of stopping a motorized rifle bat- talion commander.

E-November-December 1988 27 I Three famous German tanks of WWII, from left: Tiger I, Panther, and Tiger II on exhibit at RAC Museum.

The Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum Has Expanded and Improved by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz

The Tank Museum at the Royal decision to preserve some of the earliest Jays of tank development. Armourcd Corps Centre at original WWI tanks. During the Little MSllic, the first tank ever, built Bovington Camp - the British 1920s the collection grew, and ex- in 1915, is one such survivor. equivalent of Fort Knox - is the panded in the 1930s with the addi- oldcst tank museum in thc world. tion of experimental vehicles that Othcr examples of WWI tanks in- Thousands of people have visited had completed their trials. During clude six of the original, trapezoidal- the museum, including more than a the early days of WWII, when in- shaped British heavy tanks of the few readers of ARMOR. However. vasion threatened Britain, museum 1916-1928 era. These range from anyone who visited the museum a officials dispcrscd the collection, the Murk I, which was the first type few years ago would hardly recog- and several of the WWI tanks took of tank to see action in September nize it today because of its expan- up duty again as pillboxes at vital 1916, to the Anglo-American hlark sion and improvcrnents. road junctions. Othcr priceless CIII and the Murk ZX, the latter rep- vehicles were cut up to meet the na- resenting the first attempt to build The nucleus of the museum's ex- lion's demand for scrap steel. Merci- an armored infantry carrier. tensive collection of tanks and other fully, some of the most valuable armored vehicles was created more vehicles survived and they now Post-WWI tanks housed in the than sixty years ago with the provide a trcasured link with the museum's collcction include a V'ick-

22 ARMOR - November-December 1988 An M4 Sherman (105 mm. howitzer) and a British Chur- chill infantry tank guard the new entrance to Britain’s Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum at Bovington Camp. Many of the vehicles previously on display outdoors have been moved inside since the completion of new buildings.

(Photos by permission of RAC Tank Museum.) I em Mcdiiiiii, which was the most Ve ry comprehensive collection of Students from the Royal Military numerous tank built anywhere in wWII tanks, including the famous College of Science (See “Graduate the world during the 1920s. The Ti)yr I& which, at 76 tons, was the Studies in Combat Vehicle Technol- Royal Tank Corps used this tank in he aviest tank to see action in that ogy,” Sept-Oct 1087 ARMOR) are its pioneer experiments in mobile ar- W2ir. also frequent visitors. mored warfare. 1*he museum’s comprehcnsive col- Such visits uphold the original pur- Another interesting tank on dis- IC(:tion of post-WW1 tanks and ar- pose of the museum, lo provide a play is the bidepeitdeitt, an ex- mc xed vehicles includes the British basis of instruction for members of perimental heavy tank with five tur- CC ncprcror of the 196Os, the heaviest the Royal Tank Corps and other rets. This represents the most ex- POst-WII tank to see service, and components of British forces. In treme example of a between-the- t hc : Chiefrun, still the most 1947, the museum opened to the wars craze for multi-turreted tanks. nu merous tank in the British Army. public and has become one of the At nong the newer acquisitions is a most popular British museums, with The WWII tanks and armored French-hilt Panhard AML 90 ar- more than 200,OW visitors each year. vehicles have been assembled in a mt xed car captured by the British new exhibit that includes not only in the Falkland Islands, and a During the past few years, the British, but U.S., German, and Rus- Br ,azilian-built Engesa EE-9 Cas- museum has undergone a con- sian tanks, as well as French, cu vel armored car, used in the siderable expansion. Now, most of Italian, Japanese, and Swedish ar- rec cent Iraq-Iran war. its vehicles are under cover. As far mored vehicles. There are now as possible, each vehicle is dis- more than 180 vehicles in this ex- 1he inclusion of such vehicles in played against a contemporary back- hibit, and it continues to grow as thc :museum makes it not only of his- ground. which helps visitors acquire newer models are donated by the t0lrical but of current military and a better appreciation of its British Army, or through exchanges tec :hnical interest. As such, the capabilities and characteristics. of duplicate machines with other mi mum is a source of general infor- museums. mi ition about the development of ar- The museum owes much of its mc Ircd vehiclcs and is visited military and public success to a suc- In addition to the collection of the ‘el Fularly by Royal Armoured Corps cession of dedicated curators, all of earliest tanks and armored vehicles, CC :nlre personnel, as well as those whom have been retired olficcrs of the RAC Tank Museum houses a frc)m other military establishments. the Royal Tank Regiment. The I ARMOR - November-Deceml5er 1988 23 Mark V heavy tank fought with the 8th Bn. of the Tank Corps in WWI. This vehicle is still in run- ning order.

museum has recognized the present society’s several hundred members nical instruction on armor to the curator, LTC George Forty, by assist in vehicle restoration and in British forces and educational naming one of the new display halls their opcration on special oc- recreation to the gcneral public. It alier him. casions. The society is also in- is a prime point of interest to visit- strumcntal in fund-raising activities ing tankers and one well worth In addition to its great array of for the museum. seeing when you come to England. tanks and armored vehicles, the museum also contains other histori- Among the museum’s operational cal and technical materials. These tanks is a Mark V of 1918 vintage, Richard M. Ogorkiewicz include medals won by tankers in ac- as well as several WWII tanks. is a professor at the Royal tion, uniforms of different periods These vehicles frequently par- Military College of of the Royal Armoured Corps, and ticipate in demonstrations of ar- Science and a consultant the first gas turbine engine designed mored equipment. and provide a on armored vehicle tech- and hilt for tank use in 1954. The valuable historical perspective with nology. He is the author museum also has an extensive later models. Other uses for these of two books and more reference library and a hook shop, operilble tanks, especially the later than 300 articles on which contains what is probably the models. includc support of such cur- armor, including 76 in most extensive stock of books on rent defense technology activities as ARMOR. He is a consult- armor. the study of tank seismic (sound) ing editor of International signatures. Defense Review and presi- For the past five years, the Society dent of the Society of of Friends of the Tank Museum. a The Royal Armoured Corps Tank Friends of the Tank voluntary organization, has backed Museum more than meets its dual Museum. the cxpansion of the muscuni. The role of providing historical and tech-

24 ARMOR - November-December 7 988 IT WAS THE NTC - 40 YEARS BEFORE THERE WAS AN NTC

The Desert Training Center: Yesterday and Today

by Francis G. Blake

Above, the Freda QM Depot site is abandoned today, with only tank tracks to recall its history. The same scene in the 1940s included lines of Shermans, Lees, and Stuarts prepared for railroad loading. At right, MG Patton and MG Walton Walker observe an exercise.

I ARMOR - November-December 7988 25 Typical layout of DTCs tent camps is shown above. Each was about one by two miles "Seven armored divisions in area. "FCI is the flag circle, and 13 infantry divisions the center of the camp. trained there, but not one of Below, the camps were them ever fought in the spread over a vast area of the Mojave Desert. deserts of North Africa."

With an eye on the major armor battles in the deserts of North Africa in the early years of WWII, ! + the War Plans Division of the War Department concluded that special- i UTAH ly trained and equipped troops \ .- were needed to fight in desert and '*\ NEVADA !---- other extreme climatic conditions. '\ i The Army chose MG George S. Pat- the Army's largest maneuver area, ton, Jr., commanding general, I Ar- unhindered by civilians and un- mored Corps, to survey, establish, restricted as to property damage. '\ =' organize and operate a training cen- CALIFORNIA ,..\ :.) ....,. Although Patton remained in com- . . I ... ter where U.S. armor troops and :!Rs .'.; ARIZONA their support elements could learn mand of the DTC for only live kamfn. ;.. ..' and practice desert fighting. The months (Mar-Aug 1942), the center site Patton selected in southern has always been "Patton's Training ,...... California became the U.S. Army Ground." In 1943, the name official- C4v-f m-'.""" Desert Training Center (DTC) ly became the California-Arizona Mqjave Desert, California. Seven ar- Maneuver Area (CAMA), but the mored and 13 infantry divisions Patton connection remained. trained there, but not one of them ever fought in the deserts of North Ten or more tent camps (see '.. Africa. All went to Europe and the Figures 1 & 2) were built, at least MEXICO '-., -. Pacific theaters, including Alaska, six of them in California and as -'-. because none of them completed many as four in Arizona. Six major DMalonalCamp their training in time for the North combined maneuvers were held on African invasion. The DTC became DTC-CAMA environs from mid-

26 ARMOR - November-December 1988 - - A 19 )r to Camp 1oun- tain It the huge relief map of the mi area, a may ge a foot bridge was needed to see it all. Earth was shaped to duplicate topog- raphv was spraye t for permanence. At right, few fence stubs remain ana desert scrub the -map's -ains." ~~ cThe garrison flag flies over Headquarters, Desert Training d Center in photo above. Camp Young is in the background of this photo, taken in 1942.

Today, the headquarters site is eroded and overgrown. The power lines were postwar addi- tions to the landscape.

"...The combined DTC-CAMA enclosed for the ground forces. 77,750 acres in California and Nevada and up 790,000 men served there..." Seven general officers commanded to the DTC-CAMA during its brief ex- istence: MG Patton, MG Alvan Gil- 1942 to early 1944, when CAMA The DTC site was ideal for its pur- lem, Jr., MG Walton H. Walker, ceased operations and was dis- pose; the terrain varied from moun- MG Charles H. White, MG Wade mantled. Opposing "red and "blue" tains to canyons, from dry lakes to H. Haislip, MG Alexander M. armies consisting of armor, infantry, sand dunes. Cactus and low bushes Patch, and MG Jonathan W. Ander- mechanized cavalry, tank gave no cover, and summertime son. The combined DTC-CAMA destroycrs, artillery, air units, and daytime temperatures zoomed to enclosed 17,750 acres in California support units thrashed out the 130 degrees, while winter saw the and Arizona and up to 190,OOO men basics of armor doctrine in the mercury plummet to freezing. Oc- served there in all capacities from desert wastes. They stressed opera- casional flash floods in the canyons combat training to messing to medi- tions with restricted water supplies, taught troops to be aware of such cal to maintenance. sustained operations remote from occurrences. Nearby towns were railheads, speed in combat supply, small and ill-equippcd to handle the All that remains of these camps supply in darkness, desert naviga- masses of troops, which made life and training sites are some scat- tion, laying and lifting minefields, doubly hard for the sand-chewing tered camp name signs, a few paved maintenance and evacuation of trainees. Army Air Force planes, bits of road, some wrecks of build-

vehicles, hygiene,.- sanitation, and based at Rice Army Airfield, ings, gravel paths, foxholes--and medical training. provided close-support--and attack, memories. 28 ARMOR - November-December 7988 I 1 Above, ranks of M3 medium tanks of the 33d Armored Reg., 3d Armored Division, as seen in 1942 at Camp Iron Mountain. (Note relatively rare cast-hull version at left, front row.) View is to the east and the Turtle Mountain range, with the Colorado River aqueduct crossing the desert to rear of the tank park.. Today, little more than the tank tracks remain.

Francis G. Blake is a paleontologist - a scien- tist who studies fossils and ancient life forms - and an amateur his- torian with particular in- terests in motor vehicles. He is a regular contributor to Wheels and Tracks and Army Motors, the quarterly journal of the Interna- tional Military Vehicle Collectors Club. He has been studying the Desert Training Center This outdoor stoie altar, erected by the 183d FA Group at Camp Iron sites since 1983. Mountain, is one of the few surviving landmarks from the DTC days.

ARMOR - November-December 7988 29 Cavalry Missions and Structure

by Colonel (P) Jarrett J. Robertson

with the OPFOR under realistic, Another noteworthy aspect of the Introduction challenging conditions. divisional cavalry organization was its robust organic CSS structure, For three key reasons, interest in Historical Background which gave it the capability to sus- reconnaissance, security, and tain itself independently for some economy of force operations has Cavalry contributions in North period of time. It was not a bad or- heightened in recent years. AirLand Africa and Europe in WWII were ganization, and it gave the division Battle doctrine places a primacy on well understood in the late '40s and commander great flexibility. a commander's ability to see the bat- early '50s. General (Ret.) James H. tlefield. It also stresses a nonlinear Polk and several others sat down The next chapter in the evolution battlefield, requiring a commander after the war and were instrumental (or disintegration) of cavalry oc- to mass his combat power at the in designing the type of cavalry or- curred in the late '60s and '70s. The decisive point. Obviously, a com- ganization they felt necessary to be U.S. Army became fvtated with a mander cannot mass a reserve at successful on the battlefield of the need for firepower. The NATO the decisive point without owning a future. Having fought WWII with in- dilemma of dealing with a large unit capable of an economy of force adequate structure and organiza- Warsaw Pact armor threat led the role. Finally, even if doctrine did tion, and having had to deal with U.S. to start tinkering with the two not require these capabilities, constant attachments and detach- border regiments in West Germany. recent practical experience at the ments, they were convinced that We made the scouts into tank National Training Center (NTC) cavalry needed to be a self-con- killers and eliminated the infantry. has stressed their need. At the tained organization, a combined This carried over into the divisional NTC, commanders have become arms team of scouts, tanks, infantry, cavalry as well. This era was fol- painfully aware of the consequences artillery, and air defenders. The or- lowed by the leader-to-led issue and of failure to see the battlefield. For ganization also needed sufficient or- the Army of Excellence of the late all of these reasons, a commander ganic logistical support to allow it to '70s, in which we again tinkered should have organizations to fulfill operate independently. with cavalry as trade-offs for other these requirements. initiatives. In the process, we ruined These principles and requirements the divisional cavalry squadron com- Accordingly, this article will as- led to the cavalry structure that pletely and damn near ruined the sume a requirement for reconnais- emerged in the '50s and '60s for cavalry regiment. With the estab- sance, security, and economy of both the cavalry regiment and, the lishment of the NTC, we have come force missions, and will discuss how divisional cavalry squadron. The full circle and are now rediscover- we can design these forces to ac- cavalry platoon in both divisional ing the need for a cavalry structure complish such missions. and regimental cavalry in the mid very similar to the post-WWII or- '60s was a typical result of this ganization. The NTC lessons These thoughts are not resource- work. It consisted of a scout squad, learned clearly point to the need for constrained. Structural trade-offs tank section, infantry squad, and a reconnaissance, security, and are not identified. The thoughts are 4.2-in. mortar crew - a self-con- economy of force missions to deal not the results of any strict, clinical tained combined arms team. The with the OPFOR. The NTC ex- testing. Instead, they are the result only significant change to the post- perience has also shown glaring of 24 years of observation and WWIl organization was the addition deficiencies in our current force reflection regarding the cavalry of an air cavalry troop to comple- structure, particularly in the cavalry force and, in particular, more than ment the three ground cavalry or reconnaissance organizations two years of experience at the NTC, troops in the divisional cavalry or- from battalion through division where units continue to grapple ganization. level. With only one rotation of I 30 ARMOR - November-December 7988 I 0.. BATTALION 'Mt the NTC, we've PLT LEADER L SCOUT >MAN CREW clearly seen the need for PLATOON scouts at the battalion task force level. The structure of the platoon I YMMWV is not far off...." I_

squad would consist of M3 Brad- leys. The other squad could he light, perhaps mounted in HMMWVs, €or more close-in reconnaissance. Given people, equipment, and train- HMWs - 5-MAN CREWS H31 - %MAN CREWS PLTJ SGT ing, this organization should be able TOTAL: e to do the job. 5 HMWs 4 M35 Brigade Cavalry Troop 1 M2 54 PERSONNEL (Figure 2)

INFANTRY SQUAD M2 BRADLEY Obviously, our divisional brigades 10 MEN are especially bankrupt of any recon or security capability. A brigade Fig. 1 commander must rely on either sub- ordinate battalion scout platoons or divisional assets for help. Neither regmental cavalry completed at the solution works. The NTC proves NTC, it's too early to draw defini- Battalion Scout Platoon this with every rotation. tive conclusions regarding ACR (Figure 1) structure, but the need for some In contrast, the 194th and 197th modification is apparent. We will At the NTC, we've clearly seen the brigades have organic cavalry focus here on the need for an ade- need for scouts at the battalion task troops, consisting of scouts, tanks, quate cavalry organization for the force level. The structure of the and mortars. While these two maneuver heavy battalion, brigade, platoon is not far off. It should be brigades have only been allowed to and the heavy division. Only passing capable of reconnaissance and bring their cavalry troops on recent comment will be made concerning security missions (less guard, which rotations, the demonstrated poten- regimental cavalry issues. brigade or division cavalry organiza- tial influence in reconnaissance. tions should handle). The platoon security, and economy of force Structural Recommendations should be capable of screening for operations has been significant. the battalion and reconnoitering the The types of organizations kind of units the battalion would The separate brigade commander detailed here are those I feel are re- normally attack. I would add four has a great asset. Its use need not quired for reconnaissance, security, vehicles to the platoon for a total of be confined to reconnaissance and and economy of force missions from ten. One would transport an in- security operations. In fact, given battalion through corps. Once fantry squad for dismounted recon- the organization of the troop, the again, I emphasize that these are naissance/security. The othcr separate brigade also has an personal opinions and are unjus- vehicles would form two scout economy of force asset, which tified by empirical data. squads of four crews each. One enables the brigade commander to

ARMOR - November-December 1988 31 "One solution is to give DIVISIONAL BRIGADE every divisional brigade 12 MlAls commander his own caval- CAVALRY 14 M3s ry troop.... The troop would TROOP 3 M2s have three line platoons APPROX 150 and a headquarters PERSONNEL platoon with a fair amount for CSS and communica- tions capability for ex- tended operations. '' 0.. 0.. 0.. 0.

shape a battlefield to his best ad- vantage. @ 4 SCTM3s 3 4.2-In MORTARS 4 MlAls Therefore, one solution is to give 1 M2 INF SQUAD every divisional brigade commander his own cavalry troop. The platoon organization reverts to the early H- -Series TOSrE, and integrates scouts and tanks within a platoon. The extended operations. The infantry Divisional Cavalry Squadron have line squads are added for dismounted (Figure 3) and a headquarters reconnaissance and security mis- platoon with a fair amount for CSS sions. The current organization does not and communications capability for appear to be what a division re- quires for a cavalry force. Its design appears out of balance and it can- not fullill necessary missions. With two ground troops of scouts and DIVISIONAL two rather small air cav troops. the squadron is a hybrid organiiation SQUADRON APPROX 850 that really doesn't fit any normal PERSONNEL scenarios for employment. Due to structural limitations, the squadron is only capable of performing recon- naissance missions either on the ground or in the air on limited ayes and with little staying power. An in- herent requirement of cavalry is the capability to fight. if necessary, to APPROX 200 12 OH-58DS complete the reconnaissance mis- 14 M3s 7 AH-IS PERSONNEL 3 M2s 10 UH-60s sion. As an example, a cavalry unit 12 MlAls AERO RIFLE PLT should be able to probe the enemy's 3 4.2-in APPROX 130 position and eliminate enemy recon APPROX 150 PERS. PERSONNEL and security forces. Our current divisional cavalry squadron really NOTES: can't do that. On the other hand, its other mission of security can only 0 SUFFICIENT COMMO FOR EXTENDED DISTANCES be partially met. The squadron can 0 SUFFICIENT ORGANIC CSS FOR INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS 0 ROBUST AIR CAVALRY FOR SUSTAINED/EXTENDED OPERATIONS screiri for the division, both offen- 0 CAN RECON, PROVIDE SECURITY, FIGHT TO FULFILL MISSIONS sively and defensively, but it cannot guard anything. It cannot function as

32 ARMOR - November-December 7988 an advance guard, nor can the Cavalry Regiment Squadron Tank Company: The 14 squadron guard a division flank. tanks in this company provide insuf- Finally, the squadron cannot Overall, the armored cavalry regi- ficient sustainable combat power for provide the division commander a ment is a sound organization. The regimental squadron operations. realistic economy of force evolution of the support squadron, Each tank platoon should be a five- capability. Therefore, the division air cavalry squadron, and the addi- tank platoon with the traditional cannot use the squadron to occupy tion of certain separate companies two tanks in the headquarters a sector or a battle position in order make the regiment a fairly well platoon. to free maneuver battalions for balanced combined arms team. other missions. The book says that However, we require some addi- Conclusion if a unit requires such a capability, tions and changes to complete a the division can beef up the very capable, lethal, and well- This represents a highly personal squadron with maneuver com- rounded organization. Here’s what view regarding cavalry structure. panies. This solution will not work. we should change: Two points are worth emphasizing, We learned that during WWII. First, more than one gencral officer That’s why we organized the type of has expressed the view that he cavalry units that we had in the ’50s Engineers: One engineer company would willingly surrender one or and ‘60s. The ability to blend scouts is insufficient to satisfy the require- more maneuver battalions to gain a and tanks into an effective fighting ments of a cavalry regiment. Two reconnaissance and economy of force is a major training challenge. more independent engineer com- force capability at the brigade and panies are needed. They should be divisional levels. Second, the next The other problem that we have integrated at the squadron level by war will feature acute requirements created centers around the aviation giving each line squadron a separate for the capabilities which cavalry assets for the squadron. Because of engineer company. We don’t need should be structured to provide. these assets, most divisions put the the engineer battalion headquarters. The U.S. Army must abandon nar- squadron under the aviation It is just overhead. row arguments concerning branch brigade. While this helps aviation proponency and space trade-offs to training and maintenance, it hinders Artillery Batteries: We should con- address legitimate war-fighting re- the ground troops’ training and vert each squadron howitzer battery quirements. While we may argue maintenance requirements. to the 3-by-8 configuration. It is a over types of equipment required, proven advantage which cavalry, by or whether the old TO&Es are bet- As a solution, I see no better virtue of its extended operational ter, the overriding issue remains. answer than to return to the H- frontage, cannot be without. We need to rethink the missions series TO&E. The three ground and structure requirements of our troops would be the mirror image ADA Battery: Addition of an cavalry organizations as we continue of the brigade’s cavalry troop dis- ADA battery to the regiment is cur- the evolution to AirLand Battle cussed earlier. The air cavalry troop rently scheduled for the 1990s. It is doctrine. Let the debate begin. would be more robust than the cur- a critical necessity now. We should rent version, to allow for sustained expedite its integration into the air operations. This squadron is force structure. capable of all types of reconnais- Colonel Jarrett J. sance and can fight to fulfill its mis- Cavalry Troop Structure: We Robertson, a brigadier sion. It is also capable of providing should design the regimental cavalry general-designate is the security for the division, to include troop in the same manner as the 3d ACR commander. guard. Lastly, the squadron can brigade and divisional cavalry He was commissioned provide an excellent economy of troops, intregrating scouts and tanks in Armor at Southwest force capability to the division com- at the platoon level, along with an Missouri State University mander, freeing his heavier infantry squad. The third mortar in 1963. Recently, he maneuver battalions for other mis- should be returned to the cavalry has served as deputy sions. It should also have the com- troop mortar section to increase or- commander for Training munications capability and training ganic firepower and flexibility. It is and Commander Opera- to work under either divisional or important that the divisional and tions Group at the NTC. brigade control. regimental troops be similar.

I ARMOR - November-December 1988 33 Armor Training 1997 An Application of Embedded Training

by Major H. Critz Hardy

Technological progress in training Embedded training subsystems familiar tanks from either pre-posi- now offers exciting opportunities to can range from training subsystems tioned stocks (POMCUS) or war improve the U.S. Army’s ability to added on to equipment to suhsys- reserve. Embedded training will effectively employ modern, lethal tems that are built in. At the low also provide a readily available train- weapons systems in combat. Advan- end or the scale are appended train- ing package for sustainment training ces in computational capacity and ing subsystems, which can be quick- in units, and a training manage- storage, interactive dynamic high- ly attached to existing mounting ment (record kccping) capability fidelity imagerv, networking, hardware and datdelectronic con- that will relieve this t-ype of ad- software and courseware, full-con- nections. At the mid-point are train- ministrative burden from unit tent voice recognition and genera- ing subsystems that are permanently trainers. This capability may ul- tion, and artilicial intelligence’ may mounted to the cornbat system, hut timately provide more objectivity in make possible far more effective are ad,junct to the operational the readiness reporting system. training subsystems than previously hardware. On the opposite end of available. this continuum are training suhsys- Another advantage of embedded tcms that are totally integrated into training is that it standardizes train- The way we train and when we the operational hardware (subsys- ing across the force, regardless of train may dramatically change by tems that share the same black box). the soldier’s geographic location or the late IWs and into the 21st Cen- major Army command. The lesson tury. Moreover, the potential to ac- Embedded training requires more content and performance standards tually apply this new training tech- than the simple presentation of in- originate from one source and are nology increases as our fighting formation. It must assess the part of the combat system? vehicles become more technological- proficiency level of the user, feeding ly sophisticated - solid-state fire this assessment back to the user to Embedded training is not without control computers, very high-speed improve his performance or rein- its disadvantages. First, it is costly. integrated circuitry, and electronic force correct performance. It must This cost includes not only the ac- display screens are a few key ex- also keep records of the operator’s quisition price of the hardware and amples. training proficiency progress. software to run the training subsys- tcm, but also the cost of software This same capacity to improve a Most available training technology development of each lesson and vehicle’s onboard data processing has been fielded after the new com- changes to those lessons as doctrine and storage capability permits a bat system has arrived at the using evolves ovcr the life of the combat practical discussion of embedded unit, hut embedded training must system. These costs will drive up the training in future combat systems. be designed into the combat system total procurement costs of the com- at the earliest engineering stages. bat system - aggravated because What is embedded training? This training subsystem must then the training system is often partially Eiiibcddcd trairiirig is training “that be tested and produced at the same funded from sources usually not ear- is proriiled by capabilities clesipied time as the combat system. Em- marked for combat system develop- to he built into or added onto opera- bedded training will permit instruc- ment. tional .YVS~C~I~I.Yto enharice arid main- tion on how to operate the tank tain the skill proJicieiiqv iiccessun’ to without the need for instructors. A second disadvantage is that em- operate arid niuiiirairi that eqiriyrrient This capability will permit rapid bedded training requires more fre- end item ’” trainup of soldiers who must use un- quent use of the combat system. 34 ARMOR - November-December 7988 0 PRECISION TACTICAL 0 DRIVERTRAINER ENGAGEMENT

SIMULATION 0 INDIVIDUAL CREW STATION OPERATING 0 LEADER AND CREW INSTRUCTIONS TACTICAL TRAINER

0 0PERATOWORG.MAINT. NETWORKEDPLT- TRAINER THROUGH-EN

BATTLE SIMULATION 0 GUNNERY PROCEDURES TRAINER

EMBEDDED TRAINING 0 PERFORMANCE FEED CAPABILITIES IN THE M1 (Block 111) BACK

Therefore, there is more risk to the The first armor combat system teractive instruction on display reliability, availability, and main- that possesses real potential for an screens at each crew station. Crew tainability of the system. The parts embedded training subsystem is the gunnery procedures training will of the system used for training must Abrams Block 111 tank. It will be provide "how to fight the tank" train- be made just as rugged as the sys- developed according to the guide- ing through on-board, computer- tem itself to ensure the system can lines of the Army policy on em- generated imagery presented on dis- maintain its rcquired operational bedded training The Abrams Block play scrcens and direct view optics. rate. For those parts of the training 111 is currently scheduled for field- This training will be similar to subsystem that are fully embedded ing in the late 1990s. Its training sub- today's tank commanderlgunner in the operational hardware, desig- system will integrate embedded training that occurs in the Unit Con- ners must ensure that failure of the training applications into the four duct of Fire Trainer, but will in- training subsystem does not affect areas of armor training: gunnery, clude the driver as well. Gunnery performance of the operational sub- tactics, driving, and maintenance. sustainment training (as well as tacti- system.'5 Embedded training will support cal table-type training) will also unit sustainment, cross- and transi- occur during field training exercises Finally, because ernbedded train- tion training. Instruction at the through the use of an embedded tac- ing requires advanced technology, Armor Center will likely rely on tical engagement system that fully there are technical risks associated separate stand-alone trainers (e.g., rcpresents the operational fire con- with choosing a technology thitt will ICOV, driver trainer, close cornhat trol system. This capability may be available in time for production. tactical trainer, and organizational share many of the components of Failure to advance a key tcchnology maintenance traincr) to avoid re- the operational system, such as the may dramatically change the em- quiring large numbers of the laser rangefinder and fire control bedded training approach (of Abrams Block 111 at Fort Knox. cornputcr. The fire control and dis- course, this is a risk to the opera- However, institutional training will tribution training that now occurs in tional system as well, but in the include instruction on how to use Simulation Networking (SIMNET) past, training developers frequently the ernbedded training subsystem will be provided by the embedded relied on proven technology to on the tank. systems of single tanks networked to develop training devices for existing three (platoon) or more (com- systems).6 So, what is the potential applica- pany/team) tanks. These tanks will According to a 1987 Army policy tion of embedded training to the be networked through a mobile letter: Abrams Block Ill? Gunnery train- central processing unit, which can ing will include individual and crew be located at a field or garrison site. "Art embedded trairtirig capability "how to" training, crew gunnery pro- will be thoroiigli!?~ewliiated arid con- cedures training, precision tactical Tactical training will employ many sidered as tlic preferred alteniative engagement simulation, and largcr of the samc cmbedded training com- ariiortg otlier approuclies to the incor- unit (platoon, company) fire control ponents used to support gunnery poration of training siih~vsteritsin rite and distribution training. Individual training. Software will be added to dervlopriierit arid follow-ori Prodiict and crew "how to" training will be the onboard computer (or provided Iritproveriterit Pro Tanis of ull Amiy provided by artificially intelligent, from a central processing unit) to ritateriel qrteriis. It computer-assisted instruction - in- train the skills necessary for tactical

I 1 ARMOR - November-December 1988 35 proficiency. Artificially intelligent fault programs will train the use of computer-assisted instruction will these systems, as well as provide Notes provide leader instruction on the practical experience in the use of tactical employment of the tank, sec- the ernbedded maintenance ”Armored Familv of Vehicles (AM tion, and platoon. Tank com- software, which provides remove, Training Studv, U.S. Army Project manders and platoon leaders will be replace, and repair instructions. Manager for Training Devices, 30 Sep 87, able to participate in tank TEWTs Training performance feedback pp 64-60 and 75-78. or CPXs using doctrinally-correct will improve dramatically over what *“Embedded Training,” GEN M.R. Thur- automated crewmembers (similar to is available today. This feedback man and Hon J. R. Ambrose, Army policy ICOFT) and battle simulation capability, engineered from the letter, 3 Mar 87. presented on display screens and beginning into the training suhsys- “Embedded Training as a Svstem Alter- vision blocks. This will permit tcni. will provide audio, visual, and native. H. C. Strasel. F.N. Dyer, J.T. Roth, leader-only training (other crew hard copy (disk or paper) records Dec 87, VOL 2, pg 6. 4. members would be able to conduct of individual, crew, and unit perfor- ImDlementina Embedded Training: In- other mission-related activities) mance during the training exercises terim Overview, D.C. Finley, i.N. Alder- under the physical constraints of his that occur on the tank. These exer- man, D.S. Peckham, H.C. Strasel, Mar 87, tank crew position. Trained leaders cises include those that use em- VOL 1, pg 2. will then be integrated with their bedded training subsystems, as well ’Armored Familv of Vehicles (AFV Train- crews to conduct battle simulation as training that uses the operational ing Studv, US. Army Project Manager for exercises, much like today’s SIM- system (e.g. live fire and FTXs). Training Devices, 30 Sep 87, pp 82-84. NET. Leaders, crews, and units This training performance software “Trainina Svstems ConceDts for the Ar- trained using this embedded battle will also do the analysis required to mored Familv of Vehicles with Considera- simulation will then apply this enable trainers to provide im- tion of the Roles of Embedded Traininq knowledge in field training exercises mediate after-action reviews. This and Stand-Alone Trainina Devices, J.T. supported by the same embedded performance data will also be Roth, W.P. Cherry. H.C. Strasel, 31 Aug precision tactical engagement linked (easy data transfer via floppy 87, PP 38-40. simulation used during gunnery disk) to the Integrated Training ““Embedded Training,” GEN M.R. Thur- training. Management System (ITMS) so man and Hon J. R. Ambrose, Army policy that leaders can assess what addi- letter, 3 Mar 87. Driver training will occur through tional training is required. 8’This discussion of ET applications for individual “how to” training and the Abrams Block 111 was taken from the driver simulation training. Driver Our goal is to provide the Armor draft requirements documents for the knowledge and procedure training Force with an improved Abrdnis tank, the approved final draft of TC 17-12- will occur using the same embeddcd that fully exploits the technological 7, Armor Training Devices Macrostrateav, computer-assisted instruction with advantages we can bring to hear. and the views of the author. driver-specific software. Unit driver This includes both maneuverability training will occur through em- and lethal fircpower, as well as bedded simulation using the same trained leaders and soldiers who hardware interfaces that support can effectively apply this technology the embedded gunnery procedure in combat. Embedded training will Major H. Critz Hardy is a and tactical training. This unit provide the force a training 1975 graduate of the U.S. driver training will Iwild upon the capability that will help us to under- Military Academy. He driver proficiency gained from stand modern warfare better than served with the 1st Bn., driver trainers at the Armor School previously imaginable. Our chal- 37th Armor, and the 4th and complement the driver training lenge over the next several years is Bn., 40th Armor. He recent- that occurs as part of embedded to define the most effective mix of ly served as chief, Opera- gunnery and tactical training, as training capabilities for the Abrams tions Research and Sys- well as the driver training that oc- Block 111. It is this training tems Analysis Division, curs as part of live-fire gunnery capability mix that will sustain our Directorate of Training and training and vehicle-based Geld training proficiency - a key element Doctrine, U.S. Army Armor training exercises. in our ability 10 provide a credible School, and is currently at- Maintenance training will train detcrrence - until the next oppor- tending the U.S. Army Com- crewniembers and organizational tunity to apply training technoloe mand and General Staff Of- mechanics in the use of the onhoard advances - the Future Armored ficers Course, Fort Leaven- embedded diagnostic and prognos- Combat system (Armored Family of worth, KS. tic maintenance systems. Simulated Vehicles). 36 ARMOR - November-December 1988 ---..- e-,.,, e-,.,, a~~~~~~~*~MANUAL a I,. ".,",.."n

SOLDIER'S MANUAL- ",1*,., Annor Crawman I MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS n a

-----.

Soldier Training Pub1 cations: Supporting Training in the 199Os?

by Major Albert E. Bailey

The evolution of AirLand Battle skill performance, and/or survival in doctrine has resulted in the revision Soldier Training Publications serve combat. Previous editions of Sol- of the doctrinal manuals for all as the foundation of training sup- diers Manuals have usually been echelons of the Armor force. These port for the training and evaluation separated into a skill level 1 book manuals form the basis for all of critical individual tasks in both and a combined skill level 2,3,4, ARTEP Mission Training Plans the training base and in units. STPs Trainer's Guide book. (AMTP), which are currently under consist of Soldiers Manuals, which revision. are the cornerstone of standardized This combination has been the individual training and evaluation in result of a smaller number of tasks We have a tremendous oppor- units, Trainer's Guides, which for anyone above the skill level 1sol- tunity before us, as we field these provide information for trainers to dier. Development of these books manuals for collective training, to use in the management and conduct has occurred backward, starting at steer the course for Soldier Train- of individual training, and Job SL 1, instead of SL 4. Soldiers ing Publications (STPs) develop- Books, which give trainers a means Manuals fall into two general ment in a way that will establish to record the results of training and categories, MOS-specific manuals, STPs as a significant factor in the evaluation for skill level 1 and 2 sol- for which each service school is training of soldiers, emphasizing in- diers. responsible, and the Soldiers dividual tasks that support collec- Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT), tive tasks. Soldiers Manuals are broken into for which the U.S. Army Training My objective is to provide a brief skill levels that correspond with Support Center is proponent. The overview of STPs and their develop- MOS skill levels specified in AR MOS-specific Soldiers Manual is ment, a summary of some problems 611-201. The tasks found in these the basis for the Skill Qualificatioa that have occurred in the past, and manuals rcpresent the critical tasks Test (SQT), while the SMCT is the a way to make STPs a viable that are essential for accomplish- basis for the Common Task Test product for unit training. ment of the unit mission, successful (CTT). Both tests are administered

ARMOR - November-December 1988 37 annually to the Active Component mon manual and a branch specific force, companyheam, tank platoon, soldier, biannually to the Reserve manual. The MQS common and scout platoon has presented us Component soldier. manuals can serve as a guide for the with an opportunity to create officer in the daily administration, stability in the STP process, and ef- Often overlooked as a training leading, and training of a unit (see fectively link these publications with management tool is the Trainer's Table 1). ARTEP Mission Training Plans. Guide, usually found in a higher Previous attempts to link STPs with skill level Soldier's Manual. The The MQS manuals being ARTEPs have focused on higher Trainer's Guide provides the trainer developed for the Armor Force echelons (Le. ARTEP 71-2); with information on the level of maintain an exclusive "combat however, the preponderance of training given to a soldier in the in- focus," complementing the ARTEP tasks in the CMF 19 and SC 12 in- stitution, recommended training fre- Mission Training Plans with the ventories fall within the crew, quency, and the ARTEP tasks that critical leader tasks that support the platoon, and companyheam. a given individual task supports). critical unit tasks listed in the The Trainer's Guide has been ARTEP MTP. We must closely link these STPS plagued with several problems in with ARTEP MTPs for the com- the past: Development of Soldier Training pany/team, tank platoon, and scout Publications (STP) for the Armor platoon. This will enable trainers to e Hidden in a Soldicr's Manual, Force has bccn marked by biannual utilize standardized individual Irain- it is often overlooked by training revisions of Soldiers Manuals. ing and evaluation that complement managers, reducing its value as a These revisions have occurred standardized collective training and training management tool. throughout the 1980s, as a result of evaluation. In this way, there will be the doctrinal, organizational, and minimal need to stand down to e The frequencies established for equipment changes (see Fig. 1). A prepare for the SQT, which is based sustainment training have too often large number of tasks have on the Soldiers Manuals. been arbitrarily assigned. remained virtually intact, varying only editorially. However, the Individual hip-pocket training will e The ARTEP interface has been manuals were revised in their en- be directly related to ARTEP tasks, somewhat weak, negating some of tirety. The result has been a tremen- and constrained training time will its value in supporting unit training. dous expenditure of time and be optimized. This has tremendous money producing manuals that have implications for the Reserve Com- These proldems are the object of inundated the field. This has had a ponents, who utilize the same train- change in forthcoming Traincr's ripple effect in the dcveloprnent of ing products for individuals and Guides for CMF 19 MOSS. the SOT for CMF 19, requiring units, but with less than 20 percent total revision after each Soldier's of the training time available to A recent addition to the family of Manual. (All SQT questions must their Active Component counter- STPs is the Military Uualification be validated with samples of sol- parts. Standards (MQS) manual, designed diers. Any change to a task requires to support officer training and review of the questions and revalida- Linkage of STPs and ARTEP professional development. MUS tion. This not only expands the MTPs must be followed by a reduc- manuals are broken into MQS I, workload of SQT developers, but tion in the size of the STPs, especial- Precommissioning; MUS 11, also becomes a training distractor. ly for the skill level 1 soldier. This Lieutenants; and MQS 111, Cap- because soldiers have to be pulled can be done by determining only tains. Designed as a manual-based from training to validate the SQT the most critical individual tasks professional development system questions.) (within the collective context) and for officers, MQS identifies tasks developing concise, yet meaningful, that arc combat critical and also As we look to an era of diminish- task summaries. This would tasks that are critical in peacetime. ing resources, especially in the area eliminate the reference-based task MQS addresses duty position tasks, of training development, a credible summaries that exist in current tasks common to all officers, and alternative must be pursued for manuals. (Reference-based task tasks (or skills/knowledge) neces- developing and fielding STPs. The summaries provide nothing more sary to the success of officers in the recent development and approval of than an evaluation guide, condi- daily work environment. MUS ARTEP Mission Training Plans for tions, and standards. These normal- manuals are also broken into a com- the heavy brigade, battalionhask ly require the soldier to perform the

38 ARMOR - November-December 7988 TASK SUMMARIES IN STP-21-II-MQS Leadership 26 tasks SUMMARY OF SOLDIERS MANUALS Operationsflactics 15 tasks REVISION HISTORY NBC 2 tasks 1979 -Soldiers Manuals revised Training Management 8 tasks upon conversion to CMF 19 Munitions Management 5 tasks 1982 -Soldiers Manuals revised upon Land Navigation 1 task elimination of MOS 19 F,G,H, & J Maintenance Management 5 tasks 1984 -Soldiers Manuals revised to reflect new Supply Administration 7 tasks STP literary category. Incorporates pass/fail RadioMre Communication 1 task format. Updates 19K tasks. Unit Administration 15 tasks 1986 -Soldiers Manuals revised to reflect Health Service Support 2 tasks Division 86 doctrinal changes. Military Law and Justice 6 tasks 19K Soldiers Manuals updated to reflect Communication Skills 11 tasks TABLE 1 M1A1 tasks. FIG. 1 task to the standard established in quired for a given skill level. As receive that equipment. It just the reference, normally a TM.) revisions take place in the future, makes sense to reduce the size of These tasks do nothing more than confining these to one skill level will these manuals where possible. take up space. ignoring the fact that enable training developers to con- unit leaders will require manuals for centrate their efforts, resulting in a Change is inevitable. given the such tasks as perform PMCS, more thorough product. This will state of continual equipment transi- troubleshoot. This will lead to the mean that Soldiers Manuals for tion and evolving doctrine. The ef- development of Soldiers Manuals higher skill level soldiers may in- fectiveness of our training will hinge that are smaller and similar to the crease in size. As an example, the on our ability to provide the best small unit ARTEP MTPs. recent revision of Armor ANCOC possible resources to trainers. The has resulted in a significant expan- support of individual training must To link our training publications sion of the skill level 4 Soldiers focus on products that support unit and create stability, we must slow Manual. training and provide stability in the the pace of revision. STPs should standardization of training. As we follow a five-year cycle, allowing Other options to improve Soldiers look to the IWs, the question that two years for development and Manuals include deleting low-den- we must answer now is: three years for uninterrupted use in sity, system-specific tasks from the the field. The two-year development basic manual and producing system- "Will we control the changes cycle will ensure subsequent specific manuals to be distributed before us, or will the changes con- revisions are linked with ARTEP only to units possessing that equip- trol us?" How we answer that ques- MTPs. During this period, any chan- ment. For example, the tasks on the tion will shape individual traininE ges due to errors, new equipment, M551 vehicle are found in every into the 21st Century. or other factors can still be accom- copy of the current 19E and 19D modated. TRADOC service schools Soldiers Manual. are allowed to create SUT supple- Major Albert E. Bailey ments to incorporate tasks omitted A separate manual for M551 sys- was commissioned in from STPs. These supplcments can tem-specific tasks can easily be Armor in 1975 from ROTC also provide tasks for training on produced and sent only to the one at the University of Geor- new equipment, and serve as an in- battalion possessing the M551. Not gia. He has served as a terim document, pending an STP only does this make training sense, cavalry platoon leader, revision. The SUT supplements but it reduces the page count in all cavalry troop commander, would be forwarded with the SQT other 19E and 19D manuals, there- and on various staff posi- notice, minimizing distribution by saving money. Similar task sup- tions at battalion level. He problems. plements can be applied to the units also was an ROTC instruc- using the HMMWV. As we project tor at North Carolina State In concert with the slower pace of the decreasing density of a certain University. He is currently revision, publishing manuals by skill vehicle, we can pull it from the assigned as chief, Train- level will allow service schools to main manuals and only target units ing Division, Directorate of produce STPs that comprise the that will continue to have that Training and Doctrine, largest complement of tasks re- vehicle, and the units designated to U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY.

ARMOR - November-December 1988 39 I Aviation Doctrine - Where Are You? by Lieutenant Colonel Gordy Sayre

When Armor Branch was the fair." I feel that we have taken a units can operate successfully in proponent for air cavalry and attack giant leap backward. We no longer mid-intensity conflicts. There is no helicopter units, the doctrine and consider aviation to be a maneuver known reason to believe that avia- tactics those aviation units used asset and employ aviation units in tion units cannot operate over a were basically similar to those of the same manner as we employed high-intensity battlefield. The armor and armored cavalry ground them in the 1965-1970 time frame - mobility of the helicopter provides units. The only difference was the as aerial antitank reinforcing fires. the commander his most responsive means used to accomplish a given combat maneuver firepower on mission. The Armor Center was in Where have the concepts and sup today's battlefield. No other units the forefront of pushing the rest of porters in the armor community can move to trouble spots in the the Army to get aviation out of the gone that supported such novel close battle, rear battle, or deep bat- "support" role and to fully integrate ideas as TRICAP, ACCB, attack tle, as quickly as attack helicopter it into the maneuver scheme. Air helicopter companies and bat- units. With the more capable sens- cavalry and attack helicopter units talions, air cavalry squadrons, ing systems for night- and limited- are, alter all, maneuver units, not ACATs, and ACAB? What has visibility operations now available, support units, possessing superior changed the thinking within the there is no other unit that can per- mobility at the expense of armor Armor Branch to make us believe form area or zone reconnaissance protection and the ability to that air cavalry and attack hclicop- and shift to screen missions morc dominate terrain. The Armor ter units are incapable of conduct- quickly than air cavalry. It is time Center stressed that air cavalry and ing independent operations and that we start to realize these facts attack helicopter units were combat being employed as combat aerial once again. units and should receive such treat- maneuver units? Is it the perceived ment. When we gave air cavalry and threat? If so, then why do we think If we at the Armor Center truly attack helicopter commanders that the helicopter is so vulnerable, believe in the combined arms con- definite missions, they task-or- yet the tank and the Bradley are cept, then let us stop treating avia- ganized to best accomplish the not? Why do we seem to believe tion like an ugly step sister and ground commander's intent. What that Soviet helicopters are a tremen- make aviation units respond as has happened to change that con- dous threat to close combat (heavy) equal partners in the missions of cept? operations, but our helicopters are finding, fucing, and destroying the not the same threat to Soviet for- enemy. We need to determine the Since the proponency for air caval- ces? Maybe we ought to stop paint- missions, roles, and functions we ry and attack helicopter organiza- ing the Threat as being nine feet tall want air cavalry and attack helicop- tions went to Fort Rucker, the em- and reflect upon our capabilities ter units to perform. Once we have phasis on their maneuver role has and experiences. done that, then Fort Rucker can been lost. Fort Rucker is "systems"- design organizations, equipment, oriented and continues to em- We know that air cavalry and at- and the personnel to accomplish phasize the system (e.g., LHX, OH- tack helicopters can operate superb- those missions. We can then assess 58D, etc.) instead of the missions ly in a low-intensity conflict environ- the capabilities of aviation units to those systcms must execute. In ment (50 to 70 percent of the com- perform those missions. response to this changing nature of mitment of combat forces in Viet- doctrinal employment of aviation, nam was as a direct result of air We need to define the roles, mis- we at the Armor Center have cavalry reconnaissance). European sions, and functions of the Combat adopted a position of "benign tests and exercises, as well as Aviation Brigade and decide neglect," since Fort Rucker is now CONUS tests and Mideast after-ac- whether or not it should become a the proponent and "it is not our af- tion reports, tell us that aviation fourth maneuver brigade. When the

40 ARMOR - November-December 1988 Armor Center, in conjunction with maneuver units (air cavalry and at- regressing back to the same argu- Fort Rucker, developed the Combat tack helicopters) cannot currently ments cavalry had for retaining the Aviation Brigade concept for perform those missions by themsel- horse: Division 86 (1978-1981), there was ves, but then neither can pure no question at the time that the or- armor units. My only parochial con- It (riiechariiied cavalr?l) has riot !'et ganization would become a fourth cern is whether the ex-Transporta- reached a positiori iri wliicli it cari be maneuver brigade. We were push- tion Corps CH-47 pilot, who may be relied iipori to displace horse cavalni. ing for that to happen. Somewhere in command of the brigade, has For a corrsiderable period of time, it along the line, that concept was lost. enough ground and air maneuver ex- is boirrid to plav an iriiporfartt hiit I believe that the Combat Aviation perience to handle it! ririrtor role, while the horse cavaly Brigade should be the fourth Either the Combat Aviation plaw the major role so far as our maneuver brigade of the division. Brigade is a combat maneuver coirritqr is corict~ted... I feel thal the Its mission should be to find, fq brigade or it is a combat support p.ycliolog?, of tlie pirblic, as ivell as and destroy armored, mechanized, brigade like DIVARTY. We must that of iritporfarit kqv riieri iri oiir or other forces as an aerial make the choice. The Combat Avia- legislatiw brariclies arid riieri iri the maneuver unit. It must use fire and tion Brigade cannot be both! I A17ii~itsell; has riiistakcrilv becoriie maneuver as an integrated, full- recommend that we start defining iulfavorable to the hors e... We ritirst fledged member of the combined the missions, roles, and functions riot be riiislead to oiir own detrintertt arms team. that we want air cavalry and attack to ussiuiie that the untried riiacltirie helicopter units to perform, con- cari displuce [lie proved arid tried The Combat Aviation Brigade tinue to press for more firepower horse. should conduct offensive, defensive, and mobility in aviation operations, -Meriiorartdirnt fi'o~it the Chief of delaying, economy of force, and and once again become the "driver" Cavalr?r to tlie Chief of SlufJ 1938. security missions. To make that hap- for aviation employment. Aviation pen, the Combat Aviation Brigade assets can be used in all battlefield Due to similar arguments, we needs to be resourced with the environments and on all areas of seem to be unable to realize the full proper staff and assets comparable the battlefield. We have spent con- potential of Army Aviation. to ground combat maneuver siderable time and resources brigades. Yes, sin of all sins, I demonstrating to the non-believers would OPCON tank and mech for- (aviators and non-aviators), from Lieutenant Colonel Gordy Sayre ces to give the Combat Aviation both within and outside the Army, is assigned to the Scores and Brigade a ground-holding capability that the bulk of aviation units are Concepts Branch, Directorate of and give it a separate sector on the combat maneuver organizations. It Combat Developments, Fort battlefield. Aviation combat is a shame that we seem to be Knox.

I nteroperability: Training Now to Fight with Our Allies

by Captain James F. Nolan

To fight alongside our allies will On the way to link up with the Ger- list offers some ideas that help be a future battlefield reality. To man company commander, hun- make working with allies less work the kinks out now is the key to dreds of questions race through traumatic for platoon- and company- success. your mind. What are you going to grade leaders. These suggestions do? are based on personal experiences Your mission: Counterattack as during numerous training exercises part of a West German-U.S. task Because it will be the platoons and with a German armor battalion, but force. Your platoon is on the Ger- companies that fight the battle, our are applicable to other situations as man flank, so you must coordinate armor leaders down to platoon level well. to provide the German mechanized must be prepared to work effective- 0 Train your crews extensively in infantry company with tank support. ly with allied units. The following vehicle identification. This helps out

ARMOR - Novernber-December 1988 41 "...After you both under- stand the mission. kev on at SQT time but, more important, it tion. Be sure he understands your interoperability. By her- can be a vital skill when cross-at- full capabilities. Let him know, for operability,/ mean doing tached to, or coordinating with, an example, that you have thermal everything possible to be- allied force. To mistake a Marder sights and also that you can shoot come one cohesive for a BRDM could cause you to on the move. Ask about his set-up. force." shoot your "new" company com- In particular, remember to check on mander. Also, learn about the basic radio frequencies and refueling. As capabilities of allied vehicles. How a platoon leader on an ARTEP with short, do everything you can thir many men do they carry? What's a German tank battalion, I was of to make sure you're working the range of their primary weapon surprised at how long it took to together, not as separate entities. system? Your unit S2 can give your refuel four Mls using five-liter Ger- platoon or company classes on this. man fuel cans. I was also shocked to Perhaps most important is to in- hear 28.50 given out as the new com- still a positive attitude in your sol- 0 Make a "language sheet" part of pany command frequency (Remem- diers about the joint operation. the basic load for every vehicle. ber that 32.00 is as low as our FM Highlight any advantages (your own This is most applicable to units radios will go, and you must operate maintenance team, priority of tires, deployed in Germany or Korea, but in the "old squelch on" mode to in- platoon medic, extra ammo, etc.) stateside units with specific missions terhce with older model radios). that you receive because of your uni- can also benefit from this practice. que situation. Explain some of the A single sheet of paper, with Even your best checklist won't strengths of the allied unit (like columns listing key phrases in both cover everything. Still, to take the detailed knowledge of terrain). Em- English and German (or other ap- time to think about it now will help phasize that this is a chance for propriate language) can help bridge you be more successful when you your tankers to show how good U.S. language barriers. Again, your unit must do it on the battlefield. soldiers really are. S2 can help you out in this area. Make sure all of your soldiers un- Once you actually begin to operate I have led a cross-attached derstand the sheet. Even when your with an allied unit, aggressively platoon during German ARTEPs, allied unit leader speaks some work to make sure you both agree gunneries, and two-week-long field English, or you speak some Ger- on your mission. Your concept of a exercises, and have observed man, such a sheet can be helpful. delay operation might differ from numerous German platoons per- his. Define your terms as specifical- form as they were attached to my 0 Prepare a flank coordination ly as time and language allow. company. I'm convinced that the plan. The allied platoon leader on motivation and professionalism of your flank will probably speak a dif- After you both understand the mis- the cross-attached soldiers is the ferent language and will not be used sion, key on interoperability. By in- key difference between success and to working with you. He may forget teroperability, I mean doing every- failure. to tell you if he moves. Basic armor thing possible to become one tactics tell us flank coordination is cohesive force. If at all possible, link Regardless of where or when we especially critical in defensive opera- up face to face. Establish signals for fight the next war, odds are we will tions. Have the tank commander attack, engage, withdraw, etc., so fight with our allies. We must train closest to the allied flank of your that language doesn't interfere with now to ensure the leaders of our position make physical contact and understanding commands during a tank platoons and companies can ef- maintain visual contact with the critical point in the battle. Find out fectively operate with allied forces other unit's vehicles if at all pos- what types of ammunition you have to close with and destroy the enemy. sible. Consider putting yourself in common, and if there are any and/or your platoon sergeant on the maintenance assets (the Germans flank(s), and your wingmen in the also have M88s) that you both can Captain James F. Nolan center of your sector. use. Trade information about per- served in Germany as an M1 sonnel strength, equipment status, tank platoon leader and com- 0 Makc a chccklist of things to and so forth, exactly as you would pany XO, and was later an ADC discuss with an allied unit com- with any cross-attached U.S. unit. in the 3d ID. He wrote this ar- mander if you are cross-attached or Go into as much detail as possible. ticle while a student in AOAC 3- are responsible for making coordina- Learn as many names as you can. In 86. 42 ARMOR - November-December 7988 I Applied Mentorship: Off-icer Professional Development by Captain Jeffrey R. Witsken

The good commandcr is always or policy. The commander must con- ficers. This approach keeps the teaching and training, and one ac- sider officer development as the training worthwhile and maintains tivity complements the other.' goal of his overall mentoring the interest of the officers. The ini- program. A fully developed tial challenge in developing a An officer incurs a great respon- program goes far beyond generic program is to study what can be sihility to develop subordinates. For classes in the officers club and trained. There are many suhjects, the commander and staff officer, strives to develop the officer in all but they can be categorized into the development of his subordinates areas. It is a comprehensive, in- four groups. is a high priority for both training tegrated program tailored to the in- benefit and professional develop- dividual officer and the needs of the The armor officer must have a ment. Leader development pays im- unit. The Oflicer Professional thorough knowledge of gunnery and mediate dividends and contributes Development Program encompasses tactical skills and techniques. He to the success of an officer in that all activities that aid subordinate of- must be able to meet the same he becomes more proficient and bet- ficers. standards as his soldiers and con- ter undersbmds the goals and stand- tinually work to be an expert. Sub- ards of his superior. As this officer The program that a commander in- jects can range from basic gunnery continues on in the Army, he will stitutes aims to train the officers, techniques and individual tactics to develop his own subordinates in better develop their standards, and advanced gunnery skills and coor- turn. This education effort has the expand their horizons in many dination of complicated tactical potential to affect many units and in- professional areas. To do this, the problems at any unit level. dividuals over the years. leader who is directing an OPD program must bring many elements Officers need constant develop- Despite the clear advantages of into play. He must formally train his ment of professional and staff skills. developing officers, there is a ten- officers, counsel formally and infor- These classes cover discussions on dency to treat OPD classes as just mally, and constantly describe what ethics, professional values, planning another requirement to be ac- he expects and wants to see. The skills, briefing techniques, complished. Important subjects are overall program must allow those of- managerial skills, writing ability, in- covered, but the overall program ficers who need more help to formation briefings on other stops with the periodic classes, and receive greater assistance, while branches of the Army and the other does not emphasize comprehensive, others headed in the right direction services, and classes meant to round complete training of officers. Of- receive "attaboys" and positive rein- out the officers' training. This train- ficers are expected to do well on forcement. The desired result is in- ing is meant to serve the officer their own without assistance. Coun- formed, competent officers with a throughout his career. seling only occurs under extreme cir- team perspective who know what cumstances. Because OPD is often must be done. The great quantity of complicated lightly treated, this article will con- weapon systems and associated sider how to develop a thorough All officers are included in the equipment in armor and cavalry program that best fulfills the needs Professional Development Program. units demands a detailed knowledge of the unit and the officers themsel- This does not mean that every of- of supply and maintenance systems. ves. ficer should be at each class. Tailor Our officers must know the system classes to certain ranks or duty posi- in order to troubleshoot it when Officer Professional Development tions in the unit. The oftkers par- things do not happen as Cas1 as programs are much more than a ticipate in several concurrent clas- needed. Officers have to be profi- weekly or monthly effort to "spread ses, or in classes at different times cient in maintaining their assigned the word about some current issue which address specific groups of of- vehicle(s), and they particularly I 1 I ARMOR - November-December 7988 43 need to understand property ac- The actual conduct of officer Military history provides a superb countability. development can vary greatly with vehicle to bring out the principlcs of minimum strain on the unit. Avail- war, illustrates the value of training Of course, OPD classes are excel- able tools fall into general and good tactics, and provides in- lent opportunities to emphasize categories of tactical training aids, sights into problems facing the command programs and subjccts of gunnery training aids, professional Army today. Research can find particular interest to the chain of study, and feedback mechanisms. many examples of lessons learned in command. For example, classes Which tool to use depends on the any area in history, regardless of the could discuss changes to critical subject(s) trained and the resources specific war or time period. The areas of unit SOPS, command available. study of successful tacticians and philosophy, goals, standards, and leaders helps to provide insights to current events.’ Plan the OPD The armor officer needs a com- help solve the problems we face program to occur on a continuous plete understanding of tactics to be, today. basis, covering many sub.jects, in successful. These essential tactical spite of the limited time and resour- skills can be covered in the class- During OPD sessions and actual ces available. This training can be room, on the hood of a vehicle, or unit training exercises, after-action scheduled formally, but much train- just described and sketched out on reviews (AARs) are good vehicles ing and development takes place in- paper. A terrain board can help the for assessing performance and in- formally. initial training on tactical missions dicating room for improvement. and principles. You can easily build Particularly in collective training, Personal example is also a great your own or order one through a the officer may be unsure whether training tool for every officer teach- training support center. Miniature his judgment errors or his unit’s ex- ing subordinates. Specifically, the vehicles or unit symbols allow the of- ecution caused the problem. AARs commander should try to take every ficers to go through a tactical help identify the true causes. possible moment to conduct some problem and demonstrate their type of officer training. To take the knowledge. Tactical Exercises Feedback on performance and the officers aside in the motor pool for Without Troops (TEWTs), map ex- discussion of alternative methods of specific vehicle training or main- ercises, and command post exer- leadership and problem solving is es- tenance training is a good example. cises can further develop principles sential to broaden the officer’s The leader should find ways to give learned on the terrain board. horizons. Counseling, either formal his officers continuous feedback on or informal, plays a major role in their performance and discuss with Gunnery skills can be initially the officer’s development. The ac- them other ways to do their duties. reviewed in the motor pool. If no tual counseling format is up to the The daily training should provide vehicles are available, perhaps ac- counselor, but the feedback should plenty of opportunities for this. cess is available to an be frequent and continuous. This is Make formal training time by plac- ICOFT/UCOFT facility, or other difficult to put into practice, but at- ing NCOs in charge of the unit for a gunnery simulator. Most skills in tention to counseling will improve day or more to allow the officers to this area will be taught during ac- the officer and clarify the standards train. tual unit gunnery training. To en- and goals. An example is to place the NCOs sure that the officers can complete in charge of recovery from major the TCGST for their assigned tank A superior method to develop of- training. The commander will find is a good start for initial training. ficers is to insist on their participa- himself with several hours, perhaps tion in the training actually going on a day or more, in which to train the Book reviews, whether oral or writ- in the unit. They will then learn the officers. This takes advance plan- ten, have a two-fold benefit. First, standards and quality of training ning and coordination, but it can be the officer improves his knowledge present in the unit. In addition, they done. The key point is that NCOs by reading the book. Second, he will will know many of the duties of can fill the gaps whenever the com- exercise his oral presentation and/or their soldiers and be better able to mander wishes to pull out his of- writing skills. If assignments for plan and manage their unit’s train- ficers for training. This action has book reviews are properly rotated, ing. the added benefit of developing the then the reading load will not be The critical step in developing the NCOs. severe. OPD program is to prioritize the

44 ARMOR - November-December 1988 'Hbout 45% of the of- bitious and lengthy training events spread their skills and knowledge, ficers in the Army are as- can be incorporated into the unit extending the impact of the OPD signed to TDA organiza- schedule by planning for the NCOs program well into the future. tions. for these officers to continue the operation of the unit. professional develop- Most important, officer develop- ment is harder because About 45% of the officers in the ment is planned and executed be- many resources are not Army are assigned to TDA or- cause it is a fundamental respon- available.I' ganizations. For these officers sibility of the leader. As Perry M. professional development is harder Smith states: L because many resources are not available. However, much training '2 leader should iiot on(v be a list of subjects and keep the training can be done. The actual form of the teacher 01 siibordbrate leaders birt tied to the officers' most critical OPD program will have to be sliould teacli tltaii also how to he needs, the important events coming tailored to the specific location, mis- teaclien tlreiiiselves, bji establishiirg up, and those subjects needed to sion, and makeup of the TDA unit, yenoiial standards, bv being air CY- benefit the officers throughout their but the following alternatives may aniyle orlien can aiiiilatc, by taking career (so called "survival skills"). be available: tlie tiiiie to teacli, and bv teacliirig sjs- Obviously, this process involves a First, use nearby available training teiiiaticaliv arid regular!\iJ" detailed review of unit and in- locations. This may be an active or dividual needs. Guidance from Reserve installation, or even a Boy Notes higher headquarters must also be Scout camp or state park. Obtain 1. considered during planning. Finally, maps, and conduct tactical exercises Common Sense Training, Arthur S. the planner must determine who as described above. Collins, Jr., Presidio Press, San Rafael, will be the instructor for each train- Second, contact the training exten- CA, 1978, p 56. ing event. The commander may sion offices at service and branch 2. Taking Charge, Perry M. Smith, Na- want to emphasize some of the sub- schools that will provide training tional Defense University Press, jects by teaching them himself. material by mail. You can use these Washington, D.C., 1986, p 146. Members of the staff can teach sub- references to build training 3' FM 22-103, Leadership and Com- jects in their specific areas of inter- programs for a very diverse group mand at Senior Levels, June 1987, pp. 54- est. of officers. Third, focus the OPD 55. 4. program on basic skills like writing, Smith, Op. Cit., p. 146. Classes can be rotated among the military reading, professional sub- officers, either at random or based jects, historical lessons learned, and on the expertise of each officer. For leadership. You can include brief- Captain Jeffrey R. Witsken exceptionally difficult new subjects, ings on new organizations and has served as a tank platoon bring in outside experts. Don't over- equipment in the Army to keep the leader, support platoon look warrant officers and NCOs officers informed of current events. leader, company XO, bat- within the unit. They represent a The program may be limited, but talion S3 and S4, and D valuable source of information, with imagination and effort, it can Troop Commander, 5th Sqn., knowledge, and experience. Be- serve the basic needs of the officers 72th Cavalry. He is currently sides, to present the subject to of- of the 0rganization.A properly ex- assigned to 3-17 Cavalry at ficers will help to improve the ecuted OPD program involves Fort Drum, NY. NCO's training and presentation thought and planning by the com- skills? mander and his staff. Although the Famous Firsts: training itself does not necessarily The execution of an officer profes- demand great resource require- 'The first battlefield ap- sional development program in a ments, the planning and preparation pearance of an armored car TOE unit can be readily integrated do. The dividends are great, be- took place in Libya in 1912 into the unit's current training cause an intense, comprehensive during the Italo-Turkish War." schedule without disruption. Times OPD program provides better of- and locations can be identified ficers and leaders. These officers -From Tank Facts and Feats, by during training that minimize the will go on to other assignments and Kenneth Macksey (Guiness Books) overall impact on the unit. More am- 1 I ARMOR - November-December 1988 45 The Keyto Maneuver by Captain Clemson G. Turregano I

The key to maneuver is logistics. wavs riiakes it. nial stifllabout logis- He always comes back to the field tics ral(virig poirirs is blink ariyway. trains first. Curious. What a mess. Picture, if you will, the Alpha Com- rite .first sqgeaiit can make it twice pany commander of an armor bat- as fast, ann I don't need to womi talion, situated somewhere near the aboiit making ariv siliv coordiiiatiori If this scenario is all too familiar, East German border. A recent wit11 the log guys. you have discovered that the biggest Armor Officer Advanced Course show-stopper, the biggest SNAFU, graduate, he pauses over the latest "Wiv do iliq need the siippl\l ser- the biggest problem that could easi- edition of ARMOR as his crew futes gearit iii tke field trains arivwa!? He ly be solved is logistics. Battalion the track he has just thrown to the could be fonvard, where lie woiild do and squadron-level logistics is very inside. As the crew labors outside, us some good. He doesn't do aq- simple. It is an interweave of he monitors the radio and ensures thing escept sit 011 his can. hist like reports, anticipations, coordina- the heater is working. As he mind- evenloiie else wlto works iii the rear." tions, discipline, and execution. If lessly nips through the pages, he en- one of these links is broken, either counters this article. Let's take a lit- by enemy action, lack of communica- tle trip through his mind: While our intrepid commander tion, or failure to understand the has been worrying over the deficien- system, the battle, maneuver, or "Oh, no! Nof another logistics ar- cies of the logistics system, his first operation is as good as stalled lrom ticle. Well, riiaybe I can switch to the sergeant was ambushed and killed the beginning. Rccoptition Quiz or Professional by OPFOR. The supply sergeant is niotigltts. Anything brit logistics!!! in the field trains awaiting instruc- In North Africa, Rommel, one of Logistics is boriiig, arid it has iio ac- tions, and since he never operated history's most mobile tacticians, lost tion. Everyone knows that the real ac- on his own anyway, will probably two consecutive battles because of tivit), is tip front, where tlie biillets are wait for the first sergeant. The S4 improper or poor logistical planning Jviiig. Uliat is so mcitiiig aboiit cook- never received any log reports from and execution. His logisticians did ing '7-rations arid jiving tnicks? Alpha Company, so he didn't not understand the meaning of project any fuel or ammo to send to short supply lines and the "push "B! the wav, where & chow? Ii was that company, other than the package." Thus, Rommel had a 400- sipposed to haw been liere over an regular push package. And because mile supply line stretching from Iiotir ago. And wliile we are at it, the S4 can't project requirements Benghazi to the Alam Halfa Ridge. wliere is the fiiel? We haven't topped out of thin air, he told the HHC The distance, combined with the off siiice !vstcrday, arid the tanks are commander to send Alpha Com- trickle of fuel he received from this living ofl fiiiites arid nieniories of fiiel pany's LOGPAC out short. After supply line, restricted his freedom long gone. Just how do thev apect iis all, they never did call in, so they to maneuver. This lack of tactical to conduct aii attack to @on, if must not be in very bad shape! advantage resulted in his defeat at THEY cart 't get 11s aiiv fiid orfuod? the Battles of Alam Halfa and the The HHC commander is con- First Battle of El Alamein. "Oh, the log reports: Hell, no one is cerned, because he has no input 011 the adiiiiii-log net arivwav, so wliv from Alpha Company, and must Rommel learned that the key to wasie iiiy time? I've got a battle to send out the LOGPAC short of maneuver is logistics. Today, in this plait for, wliv slioiild I won?, nivself what he would like to give. They'll Army of huge, gas-guzzling with minor details wlieii riothirig real- get to the LRP and sit around, and monstrosities of tanks and helicop- lv changes? h[v first seqyarit goes no one from that unit will be there. ters, the demand for fuel, quality back to the field trains arid picks iip Eventually, like always, the first ser- fuel, has increased ten-fold. Opera- chow arid fiiel. He alwaw gcts it iip geant will show up and go get them, tional and logistical leaders must to its, iiiadw a little late, brit lie al- but he would never go to the LRP. report status, anticipate needs, dis-

46 ARMOR - November-December 7988 cipline commanders, and cwczrte the logistics planner, the S4, which log nets, and remain abreast of the logistics. unit is in the most dire need of sup- frontline trace. The HHT com- plies. Then, with his emergency mander cannot do this, he doesn’t Discipline in the logistics chain, supply of Class 111 and V, he can have the assets. The S4/S1 must also both in reporting, anticipation/coor- send them to whcre they will have integrate logistics into maneuver dination, and execution, is the key the greatest impact on the bat- planning. The S4 must be an in- to the logistics battle. tlefield. tegral part of the present and future operations planning. He must col- Logistics is a battle just like the Where do replacements come late all information available con- front. In a forward-moving screen, from? Why is it that Bravo Com- cerning logistics, and gauge the im- the logistics executors and pany always gets the new replace- pact of logistics on maneuver. operators must keep pace with a ments? Well, commander, check rapidly advancing element. With a your reports status. Is the first ser- Now, who does this if the S4 is at unit such as a divisional cavalry geant sending his personnel a decon site because of a chemical squadron, the logistics operators reports? Or is he relying on the attack while he was in the field must keep pace with helicopters “Good 01’ Boy system, and depend- trains? The battalion XO. If the and Bradleys, all of this while in a ing on his ol’ buddy in G1 to square logistics planner is not present chemical environment or under at- him away? during an orders drill, the XO is tack by retreating forces. Support- responsible for obtaining the infor- ing forces must defend themselves, Good reports reflect good logistics mation and ensuring the logistics and still cook, fur, arm, and refuel discipline, good units, and strong situation is considered during opera- forward. How is this accomplished? units that can truly sustain combat tional maneuver planning. operations. Very easily. There are four easy Now we have sent reports and in- steps to logistics: Wy? Because reports allow the tegrated the logistics picture into logistics planners, the SVS4 cell, to the operational scenario. What 0 Report anticipate requirements for all clas- next? The HHT commander comes 0 Anticipate ses of supply and personnel. into the picture. This is the coor- Discipline Without thc information in the dination and execution phase. While 0 Execute reports, this is impossible. Once it the S4 was planning the operation, has the reports from the frontline he checked with the HHT com- Let’s go back to my favorite of- fighters, the S4/S1 cell makes them mander to ensure that HHT could ficer. He didn’t like to send reports into requests to send higher to ob- support the logistics plan. Now, - and look where it got him: tain more fighting material. with the logistics annex published, hungry, out of fuel, and out of bul- the S4 needs to assist the HHT com- lets. He is now sitting in a tank in The S1/ S4 cells are the brains of mander in coordinating the collec- the truest 1918 sense of the word; the logistics system. They are the tion of assets needed to support the his vehicle is fit for only one thing - logistics planners. They receive the OPLAN. HHT must draw wire, holding water. nerve impulses from the first ser- food, more fuel, body bags, and geants and convcrt them into com- everything clse needed to support Reports are the nervous system of plete plans, to be sent to the flexing the operation. The S4 calls higher the battalionhquadron body. Just as arm of logistics, HHT. The ALOC and ensures the coordination is operational reports go to the S3 to consolidates reports, balances them made, so the HHT commander can reflect the changing battlefield situa- against the overall combat situation, dispatch the assets to retrieve the tion, reports milst go to the ALOC then reacts accordingly. It coor- material. to describe the constant flux in the dinates with higher and adjacent logistical situation. First sergeants, units to obtain the needed materials As you can see, this is an area this is your job. If you don’t send for sustained combat operations, as where the HHT commander and reports, you aren’t taking care of well as plan future logistics opera- the S4’s roles overlap. The logistics the soldiers or the unit. Reports tions. planner, the S4, and the logistics ex- start the log chain working. They ecutor, the HHT commander, coor- are the nerve pulses that cause the This planning requires the ALOC dinate logistics priorities and estab- logistics muscles to flex. Reports tell to monitor the command and admin- lish the execution phase of the log

ARMOR - November-December 1988 47 "The key to HHT's suc- cessful execution of the order. The HHT commander must LOGPLAN is discipline. mander must treat it as one. He be intimately familiar with all the Every soldier in the log must instill in his log operators a support assets assisting him, so in chain must understand sense of iritriiediate urgency and pur- the absence of the S4, he can make his role as key to the pose. If the logistics chain does not all necessary coordination. This is operation forward. Every have a sense of immediacy, the log crucial. If the plan is not made in a leader must understand operators place the forward fighting timely manner, coordination for the "crucialify" of logistics. I' troops in peril. material cannot be made in time, and resupply suffers. If resupply suf- The log battle will be intense and fers, or is insufficient, maneuver is unyielding. Every soldier will be crippled. SOP is necessary, but logistics ex- screaming for support. Task over- ecution discipline is vital. load on all logistics systems will be The field trains are the muscle of commonplace. The log commander the logistics chain. They make Battles will dramatically alter the must plan and fight his battle, just things happen. They are the back- logistics picture. The commandcr as the line commander forward. bone of the squadron, providing a must rely on a good SOP and good Every log system must have a firm foundation of all classes of sup- leaders when he is forced to alter or sound, tested SOP, and use if!!! If it port. The cooks, mechanics, and adapt the plan. Mass casualties, does not work, the leaders must medics all combine to put out a NBC, unanticipated battle success have the flexibility to he able to LOGPAC. The HHT commander or failure, sending soldiers forward change the system to make it work. must plan and coordinate their ac- as replacements - all will occur. If The commander must be able to tivities to fit into the S4's OPLAN the commander has not instilled dis- control logistics, plan for the next to support the operation forward. cipline into the support chain, it will operation, and defend himself con- Now that there is a plan for the not be able to handle the rapid currently. Only if the commander squadron, the HHT commander changes, and logistics support will and the log systems overcome this must put together his own plan. break down. If the commander has task overload, and execute sharply, not disciplined his personnel to will they be able to support the line The field trains' support plan is adapt to a rapidly changing bat- troops forward. crucial to avoid congestion, con- tlefield situation, to loss of person- fusion, and chaos within the field nel, to operation in an NBC environ- Logistics requires a synergism that trains during LOtiPAC times. ment, the logistics battle is lost. must occur even under intense bat- Everyone wirhin the field trains tlefield conditions. Many say that must understand his role in support Now, a quick review. We have dis- the logistics system will break down of the operation. The HHT com- cussed the generation and impor- completely once the first round is mander puts together all require- tance of reporting, and the respon- fired. I disagree. Just like a forward ments, balances resources against sibility of the first sergeant in the unit, the reaction to the first round demands, then develops a com- support chain. We have seen the is directly related to the training, prehensive LOtiPLAN to ensure all reports generate the coordination esprit, and discipline of the unit. If the supplies that are needed get out and allocation of resources, and the the logistics chain considers itself an to the forward troops. This includes S4 and HHT commander imple- integral part of the battalion team; any LOGPAC items that may he dif- ment the support plan. We have il it has been well-trained and well- ferent from the SOP, and all the demonstrated the importance of dis- led, the log system will work. HHT changes that battle will force the cipline throughout the support commanders, battalion XOs, and HHT commander to make in his chain, both in reporting, planning, battalion S4s must understand that logistics plan. and training. the log chain is not to be ignored, hut employed as a rearward The key to HHT's successful ex- Now, EXECUTE!?! maneuver arm, one with different ecution of the LOGPLAN is dis- equipment, but a vital mission. cipline. Every soldier in the log The HHT commander must ex- chain must understand his role as ecute logistics with the same inten- The alternative is failure. key to the operation forward. Every sity, urgency, and precision that the leader must understand the line commander uses forward. So, let us look at Bravo Company, "crucialitv" of logistics.- A good - Logistics- is a battle, and the com- set in a tree line about four 48 ARMOR - November-December 7988 "The key to maneuver is logistics." kilometers from Alpha Company. It "W7, this is 1.1'64. Move irtznzediate- commander was relieved of his com- has just finished chow, and the sol- I\, to Passage Point 6 arid act as pas- mand because he could not fathom diers are putting the final rounds sage point for the corvririg force. it: from the cross-level into their ready Alpha Troop screwed rip its reports 77ie Kq,To Marierrrvr Is Log-stics. racks. The HEMTT fuelers are top- arid did riot get the riglit LOGPAC. ping off the third platoon, and have its ~~ Yoii rzecd to take place arid erisrire only one tank to go. the cav gets tlzroiigli safe& arid cor- Captain Clemson G. Tur- rect@. I lirzow yozi 14ere siipposed to regano served in Germany as The commander is conducting an go irito reserve toriiglzt, brit sirice platoon leader, mortar AAR with his officer 's and the first Alpha Cortipariv dropped the ball, platoon leader, and company sergeant. discussing the plans for yoii will have to cover for it. Good XO with the 3d Bn., 63rd the next day. Luck." Armor in the FRG. He current- Suddcnly, the commander is called ly commands HUT, 2nd Sqn., to his HMMWV to speak with the The Bravo commander under- 4th Cavalry, at Fort Stewart, battalion commander: stood the old saying; and the Alpha GA.

Recognition Quiz Answers 1. T-72 MBT(USSR). Crew, 3; combat weight, 4. BMP-1 MICV(USSR). Crew, 3 + 8 infantry; com- 41,000 kg; max. road speed, 60 km/hr; max. road bat weight, 13,500 kg; max. road speed, 80 km/hr; range, w/o auxiliary tanks, 480 km, w/auxiliary tanks, max. water speed, 6-8 km/hr; max. road range, 500 700 km; armament, 1 x 125-mm main gun, 1 x 7.62- km; armament, 1 x 73-mm main gun, 1 x,71.62-mm mm coaxial machine gun, 1 x 12.7-mm AA machine coaxial machine gun, 1 launcher rail for Sagger gun. ATGW.

2. 152-MM SP Gun-Howitzer(USSR). Crew, 6; com- 5. BMD(USSR). Airborne combat vehicle. Crew, 7; bat weight, 23,000 kg; max. road speed, 55 km/hr; combat weight, 6,700 kg; max. road speed, 70 max. road range, 300 km; armament, 1 x 152.4-mm km/hr; max. water speed, 10 km/hr; max. road main gun, 1 x 7.62-mm AA machine gun; main gun range, 320 km; armament, 1 x 73-rnm main gun, 1 x elevation, +65 degrees, depression -3 degrees; 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, 2 x 7.62-mm forward- range, up to 37,000 meters, depending upon am- firing machine guns, 1 launcher rail for Sagger munition type (i.e., high explosive, rocket-assisted). ATGW.

3. T-64 MBT(USSR). Crew, 3; combat weight, 6. T-55 MBT(USSR). Crew, 4; combat weight, 38,000 kg; max. road speed, 70 km/hr; max. road 36,000 kg; max. road speed, 50 km/hr; max. road range w/o auxiliary tanks, 450 km, w/auxiliary tanks, range w/o auxiliary tanks, 500 km, w/auxiliary 700 km; armament, 1 x 125-mm main gun, 1 x 7.62- tanks, 600 km; armament, 1 x 100-mm main gun, 1 x mm coaxial machine gun, 1 x 12.7-mm AA machine 7.62-mrn coaxial machine gun, 1 x 7.62-mm bow gun. machine gun, 1 x 12.7-mm AA machine gun.

~~ I ARMOR - November-December 1988 49 I Who Were the "Tank Aces?" twice as the 1st Squadron's com- LTC Gene M. Lacoste, 5th mand sergeant major, is the regi- Squadron (2d ID). The Armor Simulator Division of ment's Honorary Sergeant Major. the Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, Horse-mounted soldiers passed is seeking information on the best The 1st Squadron, now a unit of in formation, amid the unit's combat tankers of the U.S. Army the 82nd Airborne Division, will modern helicopters parked beside in WII. The division will use the serve as the regimental head- the parade field. LTG Becton, now information to set up a hall of quarters. The unit's current com- the head of the Federal Emergen- honor at the school's Tank Con- mander, LTC William D. McGill, cy Management Agency, reviewed duct of Fire Training Complex at was the commander of troops at the troops in a cavalry Stetson. Hill Hall. the ceremony. Also present were the current commanders of the The unit's history dates from According to a spokesman for other active squadrons in the regi- 1916 and includes service along the project, documentation has ment, LTC Henry C. Ruth 111, com- the Mexican border, in the been hard to find. Guidelines are mander, 2d Squadron (1Olst ABN Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and that the nominees should have Div.); LTC William A. Belich, 3d Grenada. had fie confirmed kills against Squadron (10th MTN Div.); and enemy armor. He said the project directors will also consider ex- ploits of action against non-armor USAREUR Battalions units. Continue M1A1 Transition

He asked that those with informa- The 3d Armored Division has tion - photographs, names, bio- completed its rollover to the M1A1 graphical details, and accounts of while the 8th Infantry Division con- specific actions - contact Mr. tinues its transition. There are now John Sanders, USAARMS, Attn: 20 battalions of MlAls fielded in ATSB-WP-ASD, Fort Knox, KY Europe. 401 21 -5212 (502-624-1571).

Affiliation Certificates For Ordnance Soldiers 17th Cavalry Activated The Ordnance Corps has an- The 17th Cavalry was activated nounced that its certificates of af- under the Army's Regimental Sys- filiation are now available for all tem in a ceremony at Fort Bragg Ordnance enlisted men, warrant in July. officers, and commissioned of- LTG Julius W. Becton, Jr., (U.S. ficers. To be eligible, the soldier Army, Ret.) commander of the 2d must hold an Ordnance MOS or Squadron in Vietnam, is Honorary LTG (Ret.) Julius W. secton, area of concentration. Colonel of the Regiment, and Jr. inspects the troops at activa- Schools within the branch are SGM Clifford Hart, who served tion of the 17th Cavalry. now issuing certificates. Certifi-

50 ARMOR - November-December 7988 Armor Branch cates for Ordnance soldiers al- and more than 600 townspeople Professional Notes ready assigned to units can be ob- joined in the day-long celebration. tained on request, but the branch Patton stayed, in utmost secrecy, Official Military Photos play a criti- asks that battalion level or higher at Nehou in July and August of cal role in how board membership consolidate the requests and for- 1944 while planning the Allied views an officer's promotion or ward them to: Office Chief of breakthrough at Avranches, a key school selection file. A quality, cur- Ordnance, ATTN: ATSL-0-S, Aber- battle in the liberation of France. rent photo can often make the dif- deen Proving Ground, MD 21005- ference between selection and 5201. Requests should include the pass-over. At Armor Branch, we name of the unit, the soldier's Q are committed to assisting our of- name, his UIC, military address, ficers in their efforts to prepare for La Commune de NiHOU a eu I'honneur the unit point of contact and de recevoir un h6te prestigleux. DA boards; however, we continue phone number, and the number of le Gniral George s PATTON Jr to experience difficulty in securing certificates required. sa ow*, &lhl iMt -0 drr 5. billago quality, timely photos. To clarify ai 11 .i- .U rcnl Mu.du 6 .hdW .u 2 *oJ( lM4 cnt da 5. 1h.A qvll .p6pui d 4 the photo process, we have out- I hntmqw "Percie d'AVRANCHES" v.3mn diem pow nob. Lhinbm lined the steps an officer should fol- low in order to ensure his photo is Patton Monument a quallty product, which arrives in Dedicated in France Monument inscription a timely fashion. Our recom- reads: mended steps for success are: The city of Nehou, France, honored a famous visitor of 44 "The city of Nehou has been 0 Schedule the photo appoint- years ago - then-LTG George S. honored to host a prestigious ment at least four months prior to Patton - in a June ceremony guest. LTG George S. Patton. the convening date of the board. which included the unveiling of a "His headquarters was set up in This early start will allow the re- monument to the legendary Third this village. where he stayed, in quired time for a re-shoot should Army commander. the utmost secrecy, from 6 July to the product not measure up to French national and local offi- 2 August 1944. It is from here that your expectations. cials, representatives of French he planned and commanded the 0 On the day of the scheduled and American veterans groups, historic Avranches Breakthrough, a appointment, take your freshly decisive victory for our liberation." pressed uniform to the studio on a hanger, do not wear it there. Addi- tionally, try to take a trusted con- temporary along to offer critical ad- vice on posture, etc. 0 When the photo has been developed, take a critical look at it prior to authorizing it's release. When in doubt, seek the advice of your commander. If the photo is not the best image you can portray, get another taken. It's that important! 0 If you're close to the wire, send a personal copy of your photo straight to your assignment officer at Armor Branch. As is true with a precombat inspection, the mission isn't complete until you check one final time! After mailing your photo directly to branch, wait 10 to 15 days and call your assign- ment officer to verify its receipt. Never take anything for granted. Officials dedicate the Patton Memorial at Nehou, France. I 1 I ARMOR - November-December 1988 51 I- I August 1944:

The battles behind the lines complicate the fighting during f- t-jl'-* Y this historic month of World War II American armor and infantry approach.Paris in August 1944.

August 1944: The Campaign decisions made in spite. The outspoken how a massive two-pronged attack can for France, by Robert A. Miller. Patton was no stranger to such controver- disrupt a centrally-located enemy's plans, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1988. 255 sies, and his own statements broadcast operations, and logistics. OVERLORD cap- pages. $17.95 his ridicule of the British and Canadians tured the imagination, but DRAGOON was who faced the bulk of German armor. equally important. This is reading for the historian, but the layman will benefit much from this book, There was another, much less Miller has done his homework. This is too. A day-by-day account of the historic publicized, invasion of France during that popular military history at its best. Profes- and crucial month of August 1944, when historic month, Operation DRAGOON, sional or layman, if you have an interest the Allies battled to establish and expand (originally ANVIL), the invasion of in the invasion campaign, this book is for their Normandy bridgehead, this book is southern France. The book documents you. telling in more ways than one. this campaign well, too, and illustrates ARMOR Staff

One does not often get to delve too deeply into the interpersonal and interna- tional politics that bedevil high level com- The Helicopter manders of every army in the world, but August 1944 gives some excellent insights Comes of Age into the machinations of the generals and their politico backers, as the battles raged In Vietnam in the hedgerows. The commanders made a number of crucial military decisions in that month, based solely on PLEIKU; The Dawn of Helicop political advice or outright pressure. The ter Warfare in Vietnam, by J.D. German generals, of course, had to fight Coleman. St. Martin's Press, N.Y., 1988. Hitter as well as the Allies, and they had a 293 pages. losing battle on both hands. Hitler's megalomania, his so-called "insight," led This is a great book, military history as it him to order many military moves in should be written. LTC (Ret.) J.D. France that were cataclysmic to the Ger- Coleman has done a magnificent job in man armies. Most notable of these was making history readable. From a strictly his insistence on the counterattack at Mor- historical perspective, he has written a fac- tain. This attack failed, and led directly to tually accurate and complete account of the Falaise Pocket and all but total dis- the formation of the U.S. Army's first air- aster for the German armies in France. mobile division, the unit's transfer to Viet- nam, and its first campaign against the Nor were the Allied generals free from enemy. But, of more significance, he has such political pressures. Allied, military captured - in an extremely interesting, and civilian, insistence on more progress often exciting style - the human drama on the eastern flank of the beachhead - associated with these historically impor- the British sector - led to several ill-fated tant events. offensives against superior enemy armor; but the politicos had their say, and the Pleiku tells the story of the Army's first GIs and the Tommies did the dying. In Vietnam, airmobility grew experiments in using the helicopter to There was an abundance, too, of interper- from a concept into an bring added mobility and firepower to the sonal rivalries among the Allied generals everyday combat reality for the battlefield. Using official documents and that led to ill will and to some battle first time. interviews with key players, the author re- 52 ARMOR - November-December 1988 lates all of the institutional and personal Vietnam War books, and assures it a spe- Military Pistols and Revolvers, resistance they encountered in those early cial place on anyone's bookshelf. by Ian Hogg. Sterling Publishing, New days of "airmobility," and the determina- York. 128 pp., $24.95. tion of the visionaries who persevered to Some may wonder at the author's ex- make it a reality. The unexciting but uberance and obvious pride in "his" Well written, well illustrated, authoritative necessary details of who had how many division. "Hyperbole," they may scoff, at books on small arms are remarkably hard of what type assigned to which unit are the claims of "firsts" for the First Team. to find, which is surprising in a nation as dealt with accurately, then dispatched in But in 1965, in the la Drang Valley of well-armed as the US. Too much short order. At this point, the narrative as- South Vietnam, before airmobility was an American gun literature, unfortunately, is sumes its own inertia. The reader is drawn accepted way of life in the U.S. Army, the written by opinionated windbags and on, as in any good story, anxious to find 1st Cavalry Division was making historical laced with questionable "war stories." out what happens next. Who lives and firsts, and J.D. Coleman has done these rather than information about the guns dies, who's a hero and who isn't. The deeds justice. themselves. Another problem has been a reader invariably will not be disappointed clear bias against weapons not invented by reading on. DONALD C. SNEDEKER here. LTC, Cavalry Perhaps the greatest asset which LTC This new book, by veteran British small Coleman brings to this work is his per- arms authority Ian Hogg, is an exception. sonal involvement. He was there in the Hogg writes well, combining a thorough Central Highlands in 1965. when the Excellent Photos knowledge of the history of military pistols events took place. He was in a position arId revolvers with clear information on (as a public information officer) to ob- And Authoritative Text how they work. What's more, Hogg has a serve first-hand and to collect documents fine writing style, often peppered with un- on the scene. Moreover, he has sought Describe U.S. Systems derstatement and humor sorely missing in out the leaders and the led, and he fre- the typical columns of US. gun books quently uses their words to explain not In a New Reference and magazines. only what happened. but also why. While relatively expensive, this By Two Experts hardbound is a good example of a finely But the strongest point of the book is its made book. The black and white halftone use of captured NVA and VC documents illustrations are clear and detailed, reflect- - original operations orders, after-action U.S. Mechanized Firepower ing points made in Hogg's text. The typog- reports, etc. - to complete the story, to Today, by Stephen J. Zaloga and Ar- raphy is clean and modern. Three appen- tell what the other side intended to do nold Meisner. Arms & Armour Press, New dixes are useful and interesting: one is a and what it actually did. This alone makes York, 1987. 72 pages. $9.95. list of the major nations and their service Pleiku unique among the spate of recent pistols over the years: another covers data Two world-recognized authorities on on the weapons mentioned: and a third gives specifications on service pistol am- munition.

Hogg's chapters cover the military revolv- ers first used in the 1800s. the early automatic pistols, 20th Century revolvers. and automatics of the two world wars. A final chapter traces developments since

"-5. Ai"). &.rrnj.l srhnnl. Bids 2369, Pam s",,.. Y1 10111-5200 firepower weapons fielded in sup- 1945, bringing the reader to the current 161.. LI d c-,,". ".,,,* m,., port of the foot soldier. era of high-capacity service automatics *.,0r Palriri I, L<.""e". US**R)(S. Bid8 "0,. roir xnw. K" '0121-12," *_.~"II."~.I_"~C.UllYIX_ like the US. Beretta, Austrian Glock. Covered in detail are the M109 Swiss SIGs, and Spanish Stars and Astras. and M110 series of self-propelled The author manages to pack a lot of infor- - -~ .~ - -. -- ""------artillery pieces. the M48 tank, mation in limited space. His inclusion of and the M163 Chaparral and Vul- many historical details also helps the can air defense systems, DIVADS reader understand much of the "why" of (Sgt. York), the M728 combat en- firearms design over the years. This book gineer vehicles, the M88 tank is a fine reference for the soldier, who

~~ __ .- _-~ - recovery series. LAVs, M60 AVLB often knows a lot about the small arms he e I.. L-.,_ ,, .-_.. .-- L. \_*.."a. 11,- 048, _. .~.X.-.II_..*I1."I..I...... ".,l",.~~.1"..--01.1-1..r~.I..-WD.-...~-. and counterobstacle vehicles. trained on, but has little perspective on

-.y.x~,.-c c..-.c 0.- I-," *_._.I what's been going on in the rest of the .c..l .c..l 1-s .-..... LI I..",-..."...CYII* :::2==2:f3:Arms & Armour Press has estab- world. And pistols, after all, grew out of . ~- ~---~~--,~z.~--~ - . I."..C...... c,- ,>,>lo 11.117. - lished itself as a reputable the cavalry tradition. They may seem ._-ll.l.dcl.10 -I ....ll~,.l.-..-..-.~c.-- -_ . 1: 5'" "0- - publisher c" . military matters. small potatoes in the world of the U1- 2 Y ..._" ,..,a 7~l? - U.S. Mechanized Firepower timate Magnums - the high-pressure can- Todav continues that reputation nons cavalry and armor soldiers work with - and the authors enhance it. This every day - but there are more L1.L Y - is good material for the serious similarities than you might suppose. And s E-rnc4.m.dI or<.- 11/.* ld*_l.*.lll.w LW - 1 ".llI I*.. .m. armor buff, the armor pro, and with Hogg as your guide, this package c 10111-"L n-r,-u.r*-ra.---*l -- 15,110 the serious modeler. tour is both informative and enjoyable. I' I rr4 M m nn- md.4 ARMOR Staff JON CLEMENS ARMOR Staff I i ARMOR - November-December 1988 53 T-80 SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANK

T-80

"-80

This 24-by-27-inch poster of the Soviet T-80 is the first in a series on Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and ATGMs to be produced by Threat Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Knox. PIN: 063513-000 Units may request copies by phoning AV-464-5764 or 502-624-5764. U.S. Government Printing Office 1900 740-050l00-6