ARAB / ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE CASE OF FATAH PARAMILITARY A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Abdulaziz Abdullah Al-Asmari Department of Politics and History May 2009 Abstract This thesis provides a composite picture of the Islamic concept of intelligence traces the historical roots of Islamic intelligence activities and explains the (Ideological) relationship between the Islamic religion and the intelligence concept adhered to by modern Arab and Islamist paramilitary groups. Special reference is made to Fatah movement which has been taken up as a case study. The thesis shows that the two main sources of Islam (the Quran and the Sunnah) provided the regulative codes of practice towards intelligence activities. Prophet Muhammad‘s intelligence tradition offers the ideal model that the Arab / Islamic paramilitary groups emulate. Referring to the Islamic roots, the research seeks to point out that the hallmarks of the Islamic intelligence concept which emerged from the Quran and Prophet Mohammed‘s tradition, became the framework that accommodated ‗Arab / Islamic modern paramilitary intelligence activities‘, such as Fatah‘s. The thesis uses the modern concept of the intelligence to identify the ancient activities and compares data process within the intelligence cycle. The range of activities is broad: clandestine collection, counterintelligence, analysis and dissemination, and covert action. It also introduces the Arab intelligence tradecraft such as the uses of safe houses, methods of communication, secrecy and concealments...etc. This thesis also aims to correct the perception that Arab intelligence concept developed after the emergence and expansion of the Islamic Empire. i Acknowledgements Foremost, I would like to gratefully thank my supervisor Dr. Philip J. Davies for his guidance, understanding and patience. This thesis could not have been written without his help and encouragement throughout the various stages of the research. My sincere thanks also goes to Dr Kristian Gustafson, for his invaluable advice and suggestions. My thanks go, too, to my dear friends, colleagues and others who introduced me to a number of ex-Fatah cadres or provided me with email addresses, mobile phone numbers and details of the whereabouts of important actors in the Palestinian intelligence community. To the library staff of Brunel University, Cairo University, SOAS, LSE and the British Library, I am greatly indebted for their prompt and professional assistance. Last but by no means least, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to all of those who supported me in any respect during the completion of this project. ii Dates of Important Events Birth of Prophet Muhammad 570 First Revelation 610 Muhammad's Ministry Begins 613 Muhammad Arrives in Medina June 622 First Muslim Raids against Meccan Caravans January 623 Raid near Rabigh February 623 Banu Dhamra Raid June-October 623 Other Muslim Raids October 623 First Break with Jewish Tribes November 623 Nakhla Raid March 15, 624 Battle of Badr April 624 Attack on Banu Quraidha (Jewish Tribe) April 624 Battle of Uhud March 625 Exile of Banu An-Nadheer September 625 Battle of Khandag (Ditch) March-April 627 Banu Lahyan Raid January 628 The Truce of Hudaibiya March 628 Conquest of Kheibar September 628 Battle of Mu'ta September 629 Muhammad‘s Omra Pilgrimage to Mecca February 629 Capture of Mecca January 630 Battle of Hunayn February 630 Death of Prophet Muhammad June 632 Arab-Israeli War 1948 Suez invasion 1956 Fatah Establishment 1959 Foundation of PLO Jun 1964 Arab/ Israeli War (six days war) June 1967 Battle of Karameh March 1968 Yasser Arafat Chairing the PLO February 1969 PLO War of attrition 1969-1970 Black September 1970 iii Jordanian Removal of the PLO September 1970 Arab/ Israeli War of 1973 Camp David Accords 1979 Lebanon War 1982 First Intifada 1987 Oslo Accord August 1993 iv Contents Abstract i Acknowledgments ii Important Dates iii Contents v Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1 Thesis Introduction 1 1.2 Theoretical Background 11 1.3 Fatah and Intelligence 15 1.4 Methodology 21 2. Pre Islamic Intelligence Activities 2.1 Introduction 28 2.2 Intelligence Terminologies in Arabic 28 2.3 Early Arab Records of Espionage 31 3. The Quran and Intelligence 3.1 Elements of intelligence in the Quran 40 3.2 Conclusion 50 4. The Legacy of Islam: Prophet Muhammed‘s Sunnah and Intelligence 4.1 Introduction 52 4.1.1 Clandestine Collection 54 4.1.2 Counterintelligence 58 4.1.3 Analysis and Dissemination 64 4.1.4 Covert Action 67 4.2 Conclusion 79 5. Early Islamic Military and Filed Intelligence 5.1 Introduction 81 5.2 The Battle of Bader 82 5.3 The Battle of Uhud 86 5.4 The Battle of Khandaq (the Ditch) 91 5.5 Conclusion 96 6. Arab Intelligence Tradecraft 6.1 Intelligence Skills in the Early Islamic Period 97 6.2 The First Safe House : Dar Al-Arqam 98 6.3 Time and Communication 101 6.4 Cryptography 107 6.5 Security and Counterintelligence 109 6.6 Secrecy and Concealment 110 6.7 Bribes, Intrigue and Disinformation Techniques 114 v 6.8 Conclusion 117 7. Islamic Jurisprudence (Ijtihad) 7.1. Introduction 118 7.2. Admissible and Inadmissible Espionage in Islam 118 7.3. Spying in the Land of Islam and the Land of Infidels 126 7.4. Conclusion 128 8. Fatah Organization Intelligence Concept 8.1 Introduction 130 8.2 Creation of Fatah 135 8.3 Fatah‘s Rapid Rise 143 8.4 Jihaz Al-Istikhbarat Al-Askaria (PLO‘s Military Intelligence Apparatus) 147 8.5 The Muslim Brotherhood 151 8.6 Fatah‘s Islamic Roots 154 8.7 The Fatah-Brotherhood Divergence over Palestine 162 9. Fatah‘s Security Apparatuses (Case study) 9.1 Introduction 165 9.2 Jihaz Al-Rasd Al-Markazi (Central Surveillance Apparatus) 167 9.3 Jihaz Al-Rasd Al-Markazi- Fari' Lubnan (Central Surveillance Apparatus- Lebanon Branch) 171 9.4 Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Reasi Jihaz 17, Presidential Security Apparatus (Force 17) 175 9.5 Jihaz Al-Amn al-Markazi (Central Security Apparatus) 181 9.6 Jihaz Al-Amn al-Muwahhad (Unified Security Apparatus) 186 9.7 Al-Qita Al-Garbi (Western Sector Command) 190 9.8 Case study conclusion 194 9.8.1. The Jordan stage 1967-1970 194 9.8.2. The Lebanon Stage 1971-1973 195 9.8.3. The Third Stage 1974-1988 196 9.8.4. The Final Stage 1989-1992 197 10. Thesis Conclusion 20 11. Endnotes 21 12. Appendix A 25 13. Bibliography 255 vi Chapter One 1.1 Introduction Intelligence has since time immemorial played a significant role in defending both states and paramilitary groups. Through intelligence, many dangers and threats both foreign and domestic were averted. In providing forecasts, reliable information on all manner of issues and threats, states and paramilitary organizations become better equipped to make appropriate decisions and carry out policies aimed at achieving their own agendas.1 Across history intelligence has always proved to be of vital importance not only to politicians and policy makers but also to military leaders as well: Its effective use has led to the ―killing or saving of millions.‘‘2 History also indicates that no insurgency can survive without an effective intelligence capability.3 It is axiomatic that in order to survive and carry on fighting for their cause, large and well-organized paramilitary organizations depend on the collection and analysis of intelligence.4 These secretive organizations develop highly sophisticated intelligence, counter-intelligence and security systems as well as programmes for covert political action and overt use of violence. They resort to these tactics in order to achieve their political, psychological and morale-boosting purposes. A paramilitary group is defined by the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as ―a force or group distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission‖.5 In practical usage, however, the term has come to apply to everything from self-defence forces or UK Home Guard-style militias, to counter-guerrilla ―death squads‖. Throughout this study, it will be used in its broadest sense: ―a group of civilians organized to function like a military unit‖ in implementing guerrilla agendas including terrorist tactics and carrying out specific duties. These duties include, on the dark side, acts of violence, sabotage, hijacking, subversion, kidnapping, assassination, raiding private or state-owned facilities and more recently, suicide-bombing. The strategies and activities of paramilitary groups have attracted the attention of academic researchers as well as veteran soldiers in the field of combating terrorism. Interest in this vital issue has significantly intensified since the atrocities of September 11, 2001 and the Jihadist attacks in Spain, the UK and elsewhere. These tragic events have generated a deep controversy about how much or how little information we have about the terrorists and their organizations.6 1 A wealth of scholarship and in-depth case studies dealing with terrorist or paramilitary groups has appeared, but most such studies have concentrated on discussing or analyzing aspects such as their ideological, social or political background, fundraising tactics, supporters, methods of arms procurement, leaderships and operations, while not enough attention has been paid to the investigation of their organizational structure, security systems or intelligence apparatuses. The dearth of scholarship on such paramilitary matters may be explained by the immense difficulties which researchers encounter when attempting to access documents containing highly sensitive and confidential information. Beside the multilayered secrecy with which security and intelligence matters are surrounded, paramilitary members are loath to offer any assistance to researchers for fear that they might be liquidated if they were even perceived to have divulged any secrets pertaining to their organizations. The present study will examine how one particular Arab paramilitary group handles intelligence activities such as clandestine collection, analysis and dissemination, counterintelligence and covert action.