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Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183-2439) 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 104-119 Doi: 10.17645/mac.v4i2.583 Article Target Gutahuka: The UN’s Strategic Information Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob Communications and Multimedia Design, American University of Nigeria, PMB 2250, Yola, Adamawa State, Nigeria; E-Mail: [email protected] Submitted: 2 February 2016 | Accepted: 7 April 2016 | Published: 4 May 2016 Abstract This paper examines the nature and impacts of two information intervention radio programmes broadcast on Radio Okapi—the radio service of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A matched randomization technique was used to assign Rwandan Hutus and Congolese autochthons in South Kivu to listen to either of the two programmes within their naturalistic contexts for 13 months. At the end of the treatment, participants’ perceptions of barriers to peace; descriptive and prescriptive interventions; victimhood and villainity; opportunities for personal development and civic engagement; and knowledge of repatriation processes were assessed in 16 focus groups across four contexts. The study concludes that international media intervention programmes that provide robust information and a platform for objective analyses within a multiple narrative and participatory framework can enhance greater engagement with nascent democratic reforms, positive perception of long term opportunities for personal development and empathy with the ethnic Other. Keywords demobilisation; dialogue entre Congolais; disarmament; Gutahuka; repatriation Issue This article is part of the issue “International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century”, edited by Gary D. Rawnsley (Aberystwyth University, UK). © 2016 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction border into the DRC. Despite the presence of some 20,000 UN peacekeepers, Rwandan Hutu militants con- The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) of- tinue to operate in the eastern region of the DRC prin- ficially ended in 2002, but it has remained one of the cipally under the banner of Forces Démocratiques pour world’s worst humanitarian crises. 5.4 million people la Libération du Rwanda or Democratic Forces for the have died from war–related causes since 1998 (IRC, Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). There has also been the 2008), representing about 10% of the country’s popu- Rwandan Tutsi-led M23 armed group operating in lation, and two million people have been displaced North Kivu province. The UN Mission in the DRC (MO- (UNHCR, 2009). The involvement of combatants from NUC)1 is one of the world’s largest UN Missions and the neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda makes the DRC conflict highly complex and intractable (Afoaku, 1 On May 28 2010 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2002; Autesserre, 2006; Crises Group, 2009; Feeley & 1925 (2010) to extend the mandate of MONUC. Effective July 1 Thomas-Jensen, 2008; Nest, Francois, & Kisangani, 2010, Resolution 1925, renamed the Mission as the United Na- 2006; Prunier, 2009; Swarbrick, 2004; Thakur, 2007; tions Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO). Still act- Turner, 2007). ing under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MONUSCO places more emphasis on supporting and stabilising the DRC’s mili- Though the Rwandan conflict itself ended in 1994, tary, law enforcement and justice institutions and consolidat- it continued in the DRC when the Hutu genocidaires ing the peace. Throughout this paper however, the old acro- along with millions of Rwandan refugees crossed the nym MONUC is used to refer to the UN Mission in the DRC. Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 104-119 104 most expensive. An essential element of MONUC’s tions, a series of interviews were conducted with lead- Public Information Operations (PIO) is Radio Okapi. Ra- ers of Hirondelle Foundation and MONUC’s Public In- dio is easily accessible and is a very popular medium in formation Staff between November 2006 and March the DRC. A rich oral tradition, low literacy rates, poor 2010. The interviews were unstructured. They were infrastructure (which limit the growth of other media controlled dialogues between the author and the in- such as television, newspapers and internet) are some terviewees—in some cases face to face, in others by of the factors that make radio the main communication phone and in some other cases online using either medium in the DRC. These factors informed the focus Skype or email exchanges. Comments from the inter- of this research on the radio component of the UN views and online exchanges provided a sound basis for Mission’s PIO. defining and streamlining the core ideological debates Moreover, the UN’s Radio Okapi is unique in many of the study. ways. It is structurally and operationally different from previous UN Mission radio projects. Its operation is 2. The Significance of this Research “outsourced” to a Swiss-based NGO—Hirondelle Foun- dation. While previous UN Mission radio stations were This study is a reminder that radio as a communication directly operated by the Mission’s Public Information medium is still a powerful tool of mass communication Department, Radio Okapi is operated by Hirondelle and indeed worthy of continued research. In an era Foundation but under the authority of the Special Rep- where the Internet is the main buzz–word, researchers resentative of the Secretary General and Head of MO- and research funders have been understandably more NUC. Interestingly, Radio Okapi sets its own news and attracted to new media and Internet communications. information agenda. With increasing interest and research funding going the Hirondelle Foundation has a policy of providing only way of online deliberation spaces, radio research is objective and impartial information in crises areas. once again threatened with a return to the doghouse, Contemporary understanding of the extent to which to borrow Hilmes’, (2002, p. 8) parody. “objective information” can change prejudiced percep- The study of radio has not been particularly attrac- tions of the Other and violent behaviour is vague. Also tive to 21st century media scholars and indeed funders. limited is our understanding of what works in terms of The disinterest dates back a bit more. In the past four the content of Information Intervention: the approach decades, the study of popular culture has bloomed. But that provides objective information without any embel- this bloom has unfortunately excluded Radio. Michele lishments or the psyops approach broadly defined as Hilmes attributes what she calls the negative “academ- planned operations to “convey selected information ic legitimation” of radio since the 1960s to the medi- and indicators to foreign audiences to influence emo- um’s “cultural marginality” and “low brow roots” tions, motives, objective reasoning” with the intention (2002, p. 6). Indeed, since the late 1960s Radio has in- of inducing or reinforcing foreign attitudes and behav- creasingly been considered as low profile and inferior iour favourable to the originator’s objectives (Joint to other more technologically enhanced media such as Publications, 2010). Television. By the 1970s, as Hilmes has noted, industri- Within the UN itself there are contesting narratives ally, culturally, historiographically, and theoretically, and a seeming ambivalence over what approach works Radio had been rendered invisible by the temper of the during peace support operations in crises states. Jean- times. But Radio’s ostensible degeneration into a “vast Marie Etter, Hirondelle Foundation’s President, be- cultural wasteland” (Squier, 2003, p. 1), did not appar- lieves that “in the long run, in areas of violent conflict, ently affect international radio because it actually an informative approach—which may have fewer re- bloomed during the cold war as a tool for propaganda sults in the short term, but will be more solid and will and public diplomacy. During the cold war, Radio Free build confidence in the long term—will eventually be Europe, the VOA, the BBC and other International preferred,” (Domeniconi, 2004, p. 45). There has not broadcasters expanded and took on more strategic im- been any empirical research on the ground to prove portance in the international affairs departments of what approach works over time. Moreover, while there sponsor nations. Rawnsley has substantially filled the have been increasing interests on the role of the media gaps on the use of radio as a propaganda tool during in transforming conflicts in crises states, impacts of ac- the cold war (1999, 1996). tual media intervention activities in ongoing conflicts As a tool for psyops, public and cultural diplomacy, have remained under-studied. The purpose of this “surrogate radio” continues to occupy the attention of study is to fill the gaps. It is a multi-method qualitative key Western Governments and their intelligence agen- study—combining participatory, quasi-experimental cies in borderlands including Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and field based focus group methods. The study exam- etc. This work calls to mind that in Africa, beyond the ines the nature and impacts of two intervention radio realms of Western Governments’ use of radio for stra- programmes broadcast on Radio Okapi. To build a clear tegic purposes, radio remains the most popular medi- picture of the ideological leanings of both organisa- um of communication—used