Is God Good? Aquinas, Åıamkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese Åıaivism
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Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies Volume 29 God and Evil in Hindu and Christian Theology, Myth, and Practice Article 3 2016 Is God Good? Aquinas, Śamkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese Śaivism, and the Problematics of the Argument from Evil Lance E. Nelson University of San Diego Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Christianity Commons, Hindu Studies Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Nelson, Lance E. (2016) "Is God Good? Aquinas, Śamkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese Śaivism, and the Problematics of the Argument from Evil," Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies: Vol. 29, Article 3. Available at: https://doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1626 The Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies is a publication of the Society for Hindu-Christian Studies. The digital version is made available by Digital Commons @ Butler University. For questions about the Journal or the Society, please contact [email protected]. For more information about Digital Commons @ Butler University, please contact [email protected]. Nelson: Is God Good? Aquinas, ?amkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese ?aivism, a Is God Good? Aquinas, Śaṃkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese Śaivism, and the Problematics of the Argument from Evil Lance E. Nelson University of San Diego I have long thought that comparative theology The question of God’s goodness is what I could make important contributions to the want to focus on in this paper. What exactly perennial discussion of “the problem of evil,” or “good” means in this context is often more specifically in the present case, the extraordinarily ambiguous. Nevertheless, the modern “argument from evil.”1 As an argument assumed meaning nowadays seems to be that against the existence of God, the latter was first God is morally good. Richard Dawkins, in his book forcefully articulated by philosophers of the The God Delusion, remarks, “It is childishly easy to Enlightenment.2 As is well known, however, its overcome the problem of evil. Simply postulate importance continues to the present day. It has a nasty god.”5 Must the God of monotheism long been considered “the most powerful therefore necessarily be a “nice” God, as objection to traditional theism.”3 Dawkins seems to imply?6 One problem with this The problem of evil—as opposed to the formulation is that it takes for granted that God argument from evil—is an ancient one, but it is a moral agent that can be judged, and found was not initially formulated as an argument in wanting, by the same sort of external standards support of atheism. God’s existence was taken that we apply in judging other human beings. Is for granted, and on that basis thinkers like this uniformly the case in the Christian Augustine engaged an serious intellectual tradition? What about thinkers and myth- struggle with deep questions about the divine makers in other religious traditions? raised by the presence of evil in the world: the In exploring a small aspect of this question unicity of God, the knowability of God, the here, I will be working with Aquinas, Śaṃkara possibility of Divine providence.4 The atheist and the Advaita tradition, and Abhinavagupta argument from evil—especially as expounded of and the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir. I will also late by the New Atheists--tends to reduce this refer briefly to Balinese Hinduism, an history to a caricature. interesting expression of pre-Abhinava Śaivism. Lance E. Nelson is professor of theology and religious studies at the University of San Diego, where he teaches courses in world religions, Asian religious traditions, and religion and ecology. He received his Ph.D. in religious studies from McMaster University. Nelson’s research focuses on medieval Hindu theology, the relation of religion and environmental activism, and Hindu-Christian dialogue. His writings on aspects of South Asian religious and philosophical thought have appeared in books, reference works, and scholarly journals in the United States and India. He edited Purifying the Earthly Body of God: Religion and Ecology in Hindu India. Nelson is a former president of the Society of Hindu-Christian Studies. Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies 29 (2016):4-12 Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2016 1 Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 29 [2016], Art. 3 Is God Good? Aquinas, Śaṃkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese Śaivism 5 Aquinas—though he has a lot to day about rather, that it was included as a prima facie view, God, good, and evil—does not seriously engage according to the Aristotelian-Scholastic formula the atheist argument from evil. Śaṃkara was for such disputations, which required an initial aware of the challenge of atheism, and he does statement of objection.9 In any event, here it is: offer a theodicy, but it is a preliminary one, not It seems that there is no God. For if one of representing his final view. Abhinavagupta and two contraries were infinite, the other his tradition, in terms of theological discourse, would be completely destroyed. But by the have scarcely anything to say on evil as it might word 'God' we understand a certain infinite problematize conceptions of God, for it seems to good. So, if God existed, nobody would ever them not a problem, though the Śaiva mythic encounter evil. But we do encounter evil in corpus speaks in its own way. For Hindus in Bali, the world. So, God does not exist. (Summa the idea that God is good is taken to be 10 Theologiae 1a.2.3) simplistic. To be clear, my concern here is not any We do not have space to dwell on this solution to the problem of evil as such, but example here. Neither, it seems, did Aquinas. As rather the prior question of God’s goodness. In Hickson points out, Aquinas dispatched it in two particular, I’m interested in whether or not God sentences. But let us note in passing that this is is properly considered to be morally good in a a metaphysical, not a moral argument: there way that the modern argument from evil cannot be room for two infinite realities that are assumes that God, if God exists, must necessarily assumed to be contraries. What it specifically be.7 My basic proposition is that, for the writers does not offer as a premise is the supposed moral and ways of thought I’m looking at, God is goodness of God. precisely not morally good, in the sense that any I would suggest that one important reason moral standards we use in judging our fellow for this is that while Aquinas, with the rest of the human beings are not properly applied to God. Christian tradition, certainly thinks of God as It should be, I hope, obvious that this does not good, he does not define that goodness in moral mean that these traditions think of God as terms. Thus we read: immoral; for these writers God is—in a word— The goodness of something consists in its transmoral. being desirable. Hence Aristotle's dictum that ‘good is what everything desires’. But Aquinas desirability evidently follows upon As it happens, Aquinas offers what Hickson perfection, for things always desire their suggests is an early prototype of the argument 11 8 perfection. (Summa Theologiae Ia.5.1) from evil. Prior to this occurrence, Hickson can identify no discussion of evil aimed directly at So goodness is defined in terms of disproving the existence of God (as opposed to desirability and perfection. On that basis, provoking reflection on the unity or knowability Aquinas proceeds to argue for (1) the goodness of God or gods, or divine providence, or such of God, (2) for God as the supreme good, and (3) questions). But Hickson is not at all sure that that only God is essentially good—but none of Aquinas took this argument seriously. He thinks, https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol29/iss1/3 DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1626 2 Nelson: Is God Good? Aquinas, ?amkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese ?aivism, a 6 Lance Nelson this in terms of God’s morality. The discussion, certainly in Advaita discourse, it would properly as Stump characterizes it, is meta-ethical.12 be translated “truth,” “reality,” or simply God is certainly the cause of moral goodness “existence” or “being,” in a purely ontological in his creatures, but he is not himself a being sense.17 that is possessed of moral virtues as humans are Śaṃkara’s definition of sat is quite simple: it and that humans can understand. Neither is God is that which does not change (na vyabhicarati).18 subject to external moral obligations. As Brian Alternately, in the standard formulation of the Davies argues, Aquinas would consider any later tradition, sat is defined as that which is discussion of the “moral integrity” of God to be never sublated by some higher knowledge in seriously misplaced.13 Aquinas is certainly aware past, present, or future (tri-kāla-abhādya). I am that scripture and tradition have used words not aware of Śaṃkara or his followers using sat like “just,” “truthful,” “loving,” “merciful” and, in the sense of “goodness”—certainly not “moral yes, “good” in reference to God.14 As is well goodness”—in relation to Brahman. Nor, for that known, however, Aquinas believes such matter, am I aware of any passages in the attributions are analogical. He does not take Upaniṣads where sat could be construed in this them to mean that God possesses these qualities way in relation to Brahman. When paired, sat in anything close to the way in which humans and asat must invariably be translated as being do. and nonbeing; satya is contrasted with anṛta, as While, like Augustine, Aquinas had a good “truth and untruth.” The concern is deal to say about God and evil, he had, as Davies predominantly ontological and epistemological, points out forcefully, pretty much nothing to albeit within a wider axiological and say on “what contemporary philosophers have soteriological framework.