CANADA AND THE NEW AMERICAN EMPIRE: ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS Bill Dymond and Michael Hart The most frequently asked question by Canadians about the relationship with the United States seems to be: how close or distant should the two countries be? The problem with this question is that “it provides no policy guidance on any critical issue,” write two of Canada’s leading trade policy practitioners. For example, close or distant relations do not impact on whether Canada secures an exemption from the new US visitor card program, which could have a nasty sideswipe effect on cross-border movements. More recently, there has been an impetus of Canadian values driving foreign policy. The assumption that values “can and should inform policy,” they write, “is fatally flawed on both sides of the border.” In any event, they note, Canada’s relationship with the US, “is not the creation, still less the creature, of foreign policy.” À propos de nos rapports avec les États-Unis, les Canadiens semblent surtout s’interroger sur la distance plus ou moins grande qui devrait séparer nos deux pays. Mais ce questionnement ne « fournit d’orientation politique sur aucun enjeu critique », notent deux experts de la politique commerciale canadienne. Qu’ils soient plus ou moins étroits, ces liens n’auront par exemple aucun effet sur le nouveau programme américain de carte de séjour, dont le Canada n’est pas certain d’être exempté et qui pourrait sérieusement compliquer les mouvements transfrontaliers. Récemment, on a fait grand cas des valeurs canadiennes dans la conduite de notre politique étrangère. Mais l’idée selon laquelle ces valeurs « peuvent et doivent nous guider » pose fatalement problème de part et d’autre de la frontière. Quoi qu’il en soit, les relations canado-américaines « ne sont la création, et moins encore la créature, d’aucune politique étrangère ». S scholar Robert Reich once observed that “in distance or closeness and the primacy of values over inter- the life of a nation few ideas are more dangerous est dangerously obsolete guideposts for Canadian foreign U than good solutions to the wrong problems.” policy. In the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world, Canadian Canadian policy toward the United States is particularly policy toward the United States needs a radical transforma- prone to this danger, identifying the problem as the tion from posture to a position rooted in, and aimed at desirable degree of intimacy or distance in the relation- advancing, core Canadian interests. ship, and seeking the solution in striking the “right” bal- The most frequent question asked by Canadians about ance. Compounding this susceptibility is the the relationship with the United States seems to derive from encroachment of “values” on the management of an office design manual: how close or how distant should the Canada-US relations. The inevitable result is a foreign two occupants of the common North American space be to policy defined by posture, accompanied by a remorseless each other? Canadian nationalists worry that pursuing decline in the respect accorded to Canadian interests by Canadian interests in a smoothly functioning relationship US decision makers and in the capacity of Canada to with the United States and trying to build an international sys- influence US foreign policy. tem based on the rule of law are mutually exclusive objectives. The emergence of the United States as the sole super They are fearful, in the words of former minister Lloyd power with most, if not all, the attributes of Empire, renders Ax w o r t h y , of the “the unrelenting torrent of pressures which POLICY OPTIONS 65 JUNE-JULY 2004 Bill Dymond and Michael Hart call into question our ability to choose ship with the United States.” If the gration ignores the essential point that the shape and contours of our commu- pendulum has begun to swing back, the United States will proceed, with or nity and how we relate to the rest of the the interminable dithering and dally- without Canada. How standing aloof world.” Continentalists, on the other ing over whether, when, and in what would enhance Canadian security inter- hand, agonize when sharp differences format the prime minister would meet ests is not explained by the former min- suggest that the two countries are on President George W. Bush showed how i s t e r. Canadian cultural policy divergent paths. Most Canadians, con- powerful the imperative of finding the sensitivities have dictated stout, if not ventional political wis- dom declares, wish the The interminable dithering and dallying over whether, when, relationship to be neither and in what format the prime minister would meet President particularly close nor George W. Bush showed how powerful the imperative of especially distant and will finding the right balance remains in contemporary Canadian punish the government for letting the relationship politics. The intense soul searching among the PM’s advisors on slide intemperately in one how close he should be seen to be to President Bush suggests direction or the other. at best irresolution and at worst an ostrich-like approach to the management of this critical relationship. lready two genera- A tions ago, Prime Minister John right balance remains in contempo- always successful, resistance to US Diefenbaker played the anti-American rary Canadian politics. Although the assaults on the protection of Canadian card against Lester Pearson on the visit occurred April 30, the intense soul cultural industries. issue of nuclear weapons during the searching among the PM’s advisors on 1963 election. “It’s me against the how close he should be seen to be to lose or distant relations have nothing Americans fighting for the little guy,” President Bush suggests at best irreso- C to say about Canadian interests in he thundered. In the 1984 election, lution and at worst an ostrich-like securing a permanent exemption from the Brian Mulroney exploited the cross- approach to the management of this onerous requirements of the new US visitor border tensions of the later Trudeau critical relationship. card program. If this exemption is not years and promised to refurbish rela- secured, the consequences flowing from the tions with the United States. A few he problem with asking whether massive disruption to the business and per- days after taking office, Mulroney T Canada should have a close or dis- sonal lives of millions of Canadians will be declared that not only good relations, tant relationship with the United States incalculable. Indeed, whatever the state of but “superb” relations with the US, is that the answer provides no policy the relationship, the efficient pursuit of a would be the cornerstone of Canadian guidance on any critical issue. vast range of public policies, from air trans- foreign policy. In the 1993 election, Throughout the swings of the pendu- port safety to the prevention of disease, Jean Chrétien campaigned on the lum, core Canadian interests remain Canada has no choice but to develop and theme that Canadian relations had unaltered. Consider the three pillars set nourish the highest degree of cooperation become so close that Canada had lost out in the 1995 Foreign Policy Review: with its neighbour. its capacity for independence of pr o s p e r i t y , security, and culture and val- Clearly, the nature of the relation- action. The Liberal Red Book promised ues. Closeness or distance provide no ship can affect Canadian capacity to that “in relations with the US, Canada guidance on the imperative of preserv- advance interests with the United would reject the camp-follower ing market access to the United States, States. As former Canadian ambassa- approach.” Ten years later, the 2003 essential to Canadian prosperity. Close dor to the United States, Alan Gotlieb, Foreign Policy Dialogue conducted by or distant relations with the United observes, “There are grounds to believe Foreign Minister Bill Graham found States do not alter the case for seeking to that our willingness to address security that Canadians believe that “close rela- protect Canadian security through the issues high on the agenda of the tions with the United States [are] a North Atlantic Treaty Organization United States could have a bearing on fundamental priority.” ( N ATO) and the North American how a president would deal with unre- Prime Minister Paul Martin Aerospace Defense Command lated issues such as steel quotas.” This responded to the growing unease over (NORAD). Closeness or distance provide dimension should not be exaggerated, the relationship by forming a Cabinet no assistance in deciding whether cur- h o w e v e r. The readiness of any US committee and appointing a parlia- rent Canadian security interests warrant administration or Congress to give mentary secretary on Canada-US rela- participation in the US ballistic missile preference to Canadian interests over tions. In his address on the Speech program. Lloyd Axworthy’s view that the opposition of important domestic from the Throne, Martin promised “to Ca n a d a ’ s participation in this program constituencies is modest to non-exis- take a first step toward a new relation- is just the first step toward military inte- tent. For example, US interest in a free- 66 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2004 Canada and the new American empire: asking the right questions trade agreement with Canada predated that Canadians “seem to have become tu r y “only nations that share a commit- the Mulroney government, and its convinced that we are superior to other ment to protecting basic human rights readiness to negotiate at a time when breeds and that this is so universally rec- and guaranteeing political and econom- Canada was ready flowed from deep ognized that our national character can ic freedom will be able to unleash the US frustration with the capacity of the be considered a significant asset.” Former potential of their people.” The strategy multilateral trade system to meet its Canadian diplomat John Holmes, in his itself is replete with statements of values needs.