CANADA AND THE NEW AMERICAN EMPIRE: ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

The most frequently asked question by about the relationship with the United States seems to be: how close or distant should the two countries be? The problem with this question is that “it provides no policy guidance on any critical issue,” write two of Canada’s leading trade policy practitioners. For example, close or distant relations do not impact on whether Canada secures an exemption from the new US visitor card program, which could have a nasty sideswipe effect on cross-border movements. More recently, there has been an impetus of Canadian values driving foreign policy. The assumption that values “can and should inform policy,” they write, “is fatally flawed on both sides of the border.” In any event, they note, Canada’s relationship with the US, “is not the creation, still less the creature, of foreign policy.”

À propos de nos rapports avec les États-Unis, les Canadiens semblent surtout s’interroger sur la distance plus ou moins grande qui devrait séparer nos deux pays. Mais ce questionnement ne « fournit d’orientation politique sur aucun enjeu critique », notent deux experts de la politique commerciale canadienne. Qu’ils soient plus ou moins étroits, ces liens n’auront par exemple aucun effet sur le nouveau programme américain de carte de séjour, dont le Canada n’est pas certain d’être exempté et qui pourrait sérieusement compliquer les mouvements transfrontaliers. Récemment, on a fait grand cas des valeurs canadiennes dans la conduite de notre politique étrangère. Mais l’idée selon laquelle ces valeurs « peuvent et doivent nous guider » pose fatalement problème de part et d’autre de la frontière. Quoi qu’il en soit, les relations canado-américaines « ne sont la création, et moins encore la créature, d’aucune politique étrangère ».

S scholar Robert Reich once observed that “in distance or closeness and the primacy of values over inter- the life of a nation few ideas are more dangerous est dangerously obsolete guideposts for Canadian foreign U than good solutions to the wrong problems.” policy. In the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world, Canadian Canadian policy toward the United States is particularly policy toward the United States needs a radical transforma- prone to this danger, identifying the problem as the tion from posture to a position rooted in, and aimed at desirable degree of intimacy or distance in the relation- advancing, core Canadian interests. ship, and seeking the solution in striking the “right” bal- The most frequent question asked by Canadians about ance. Compounding this susceptibility is the the relationship with the United States seems to derive from encroachment of “values” on the management of an office design manual: how close or how distant should the Canada-US relations. The inevitable result is a foreign two occupants of the common North American space be to policy defined by posture, accompanied by a remorseless each other? Canadian nationalists worry that pursuing decline in the respect accorded to Canadian interests by Canadian interests in a smoothly functioning relationship US decision makers and in the capacity of Canada to with the United States and trying to build an international sys- influence US foreign policy. tem based on the rule of law are mutually exclusive objectives. The emergence of the United States as the sole super They are fearful, in the words of former minister Lloyd power with most, if not all, the attributes of Empire, renders Ax w o r t h y , of the “the unrelenting torrent of pressures which

POLICY OPTIONS 65 JUNE-JULY 2004 Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

call into question our ability to choose ship with the United States.” If the gration ignores the essential point that the shape and contours of our commu- pendulum has begun to swing back, the United States will proceed, with or nity and how we relate to the rest of the the interminable dithering and dally- without Canada. How standing aloof world.” Continentalists, on the other ing over whether, when, and in what would enhance Canadian security inter- hand, agonize when sharp differences format the prime minister would meet ests is not explained by the former min- suggest that the two countries are on President George W. Bush showed how i s t e r. Canadian cultural policy divergent paths. Most Canadians, con- powerful the imperative of finding the sensitivities have dictated stout, if not ventional political wis- dom declares, wish the The interminable dithering and dallying over whether, when, relationship to be neither and in what format the prime minister would meet President particularly close nor George W. Bush showed how powerful the imperative of especially distant and will finding the right balance remains in contemporary Canadian punish the government for letting the relationship politics. The intense soul searching among the PM’s advisors on slide intemperately in one how close he should be seen to be to President Bush suggests direction or the other. at best irresolution and at worst an ostrich-like approach to the management of this critical relationship. lready two genera- A tions ago, Prime Minister John right balance remains in contempo- always successful, resistance to US Diefenbaker played the anti-American rary Canadian politics. Although the assaults on the protection of Canadian card against Lester Pearson on the visit occurred April 30, the intense soul cultural industries. issue of nuclear weapons during the searching among the PM’s advisors on 1963 election. “It’s me against the how close he should be seen to be to lose or distant relations have nothing Americans fighting for the little guy,” President Bush suggests at best irreso- C to say about Canadian interests in he thundered. In the 1984 election, lution and at worst an ostrich-like securing a permanent exemption from the Brian Mulroney exploited the cross- approach to the management of this onerous requirements of the new US visitor border tensions of the later Trudeau critical relationship. card program. If this exemption is not years and promised to refurbish rela- secured, the consequences flowing from the tions with the United States. A few he problem with asking whether massive disruption to the business and per- days after taking office, Mulroney T Canada should have a close or dis- sonal lives of millions of Canadians will be declared that not only good relations, tant relationship with the United States incalculable. Indeed, whatever the state of but “superb” relations with the US, is that the answer provides no policy the relationship, the efficient pursuit of a would be the cornerstone of Canadian guidance on any critical issue. vast range of public policies, from air trans- foreign policy. In the 1993 election, Throughout the swings of the pendu- port safety to the prevention of disease, Jean Chrétien campaigned on the lum, core Canadian interests remain Canada has no choice but to develop and theme that Canadian relations had unaltered. Consider the three pillars set nourish the highest degree of cooperation become so close that Canada had lost out in the 1995 Foreign Policy Review: with its neighbour. its capacity for independence of pr o s p e r i t y , security, and culture and val- Clearly, the nature of the relation- action. The Liberal Red Book promised ues. Closeness or distance provide no ship can affect Canadian capacity to that “in relations with the US, Canada guidance on the imperative of preserv- advance interests with the United would reject the camp-follower ing market access to the United States, States. As former Canadian ambassa- approach.” Ten years later, the 2003 essential to Canadian prosperity. Close dor to the United States, Alan Gotlieb, Foreign Policy Dialogue conducted by or distant relations with the United observes, “There are grounds to believe Foreign Minister Bill Graham found States do not alter the case for seeking to that our willingness to address security that Canadians believe that “close rela- protect Canadian security through the issues high on the agenda of the tions with the United States [are] a North Atlantic Treaty Organization United States could have a bearing on fundamental priority.” ( N ATO) and the North American how a president would deal with unre- Prime Minister Paul Martin Aerospace Defense Command lated issues such as steel quotas.” This responded to the growing unease over (NORAD). Closeness or distance provide dimension should not be exaggerated, the relationship by forming a Cabinet no assistance in deciding whether cur- h o w e v e r. The readiness of any US committee and appointing a parlia- rent Canadian security interests warrant administration or Congress to give mentary secretary on Canada-US rela- participation in the US ballistic missile preference to Canadian interests over tions. In his address on the Speech program. Lloyd Axworthy’s view that the opposition of important domestic from the Throne, Martin promised “to Ca n a d a ’ s participation in this program constituencies is modest to non-exis- take a first step toward a new relation- is just the first step toward military inte- tent. For example, US interest in a free-

66 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2004 Canada and the new American empire: asking the right questions trade agreement with Canada predated that Canadians “seem to have become tu r y “only nations that share a commit- the Mulroney government, and its convinced that we are superior to other ment to protecting basic human rights readiness to negotiate at a time when breeds and that this is so universally rec- and guaranteeing political and econom- Canada was ready flowed from deep ognized that our national character can ic freedom will be able to unleash the US frustration with the capacity of the be considered a significant asset.” Former potential of their people.” The strategy multilateral trade system to meet its Canadian diplomat John Holmes, in his itself is replete with statements of values needs. Throughout the negotiations, celebrated essays on foreign policy thirty that are the stuff and substance of the US position was driven by its com- years ago, noted the preachy quality of Canadian foreign policy at its moralizing best. What distinguishes the US interest in a free trade agreement with Canada predated United States from other countries in the approach to the Mulroney government, and its readiness to negotiate at a values is that the United time when Canada was ready flowed from deep US frustration States disposes of the unilat- with the capacity of the multilateral trade system to meet its eral power to implant such needs. The US position was driven by its commercial interests values while others, includ- ing Canada, have only the and owed nothing to the closeness of the relationship that de s i r e . had emerged between the two governments in the second half of the 1980s. he preoccupation with T values and the ensuing mercial interests and owed nothing to Canadians on the world stage: solution, that values can and should the closeness of the relationship that “Canadians concentrate a little too much inform foreign policy, is fatally flawed had emerged between the two govern- on the purity of their souls.” Graham on both sides of the border. In a ration- ments in the second half of the 1980s. ma r ched along a well-trodden path when al foreign policy, domestic values do During the Mulroney years, Canada he wrote that “a better world might look not supersede the fundamental inter- enjoyed a high level of influence on like a better Canada...shared security and ests of the state. While it may be argued US foreign policy making, but made pr o s p e r i t y , tolerance, diversity, democra- that fundamental interests are little progress on a range of issues such cy , human rights, opportunity, and equal advanced by the international dissemi- as US barriers on Canadian lumber justice for all.” nation of domestic values, the opposite exports. In short, US foreign policy does not apply. The attachment of toward Canada is interest-driven, and he transubstantiation of civic value Canadians to the fundamentals of citi- the relationship between the two T into foreign policy principles is not zenship is neither weakened nor countries functions at its most effi- a uniquely Canadian contribution to the strengthened by the international cient when it is interests, and not the conduct of foreign policy. US President acceptance of those tenets. Throughout closeness or distance of the relation- Woodrow Wilson firmly believed that most of the last century, the countries ship, that inform the agenda. “the same standards of conduct and attached to Canadian values constitut- Re i n f o r cing the Canadian obsession responsibility [should] be observed ed a small minority. Each new accession with intimacy is the assumption that for- among nations and their governments of a colony to independence through- eign policy should reflect the values of its that are observed among the individual out the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s usually citizens. “Canada’s foreign policy agenda citizens of civilised states.” As former sec- added to the list of undemocratic coun- must reflect the nation we are ... free, re t a r y of state Henry Kissinger docu- tries whose adherence to principles of open, and democratic,” Foreign Minister ments, American foreign policy reflects a tolerance and human rights was con- Bill Graham teaches us in the paper pub- permanent struggle between Wil s o n i a n siderably less than that of Canada. By lished for the 2003 foreign policy consul- idealism and a rational pursuit of US the same token, putting Canadian val- tations. The subtext is that Canadian national interests. Democratic presi- ues at risk to enhance the values of values are different, better, and provide an dents, such as Jimmy Carter and Bill other countries would make a nullity of essential point of departure for defining Clinton, are often credited with higher statehood. Canadians and their govern- the relationship with the United States. moral content in their foreign policy, for ment may well support spreading the While prattling about values became example, on the priority attached to benefits of globalization, but it would endemic during the later Chrétien years, human rights issues, than Republican be illusory to expect that Canadians the elevation of rectitude in Canadian for- incumbents. However, the current Bush would be prepared to sacrifice their eign policy to what business schools administration has adopted a no less quality of life, for example, by lowering would call a profit centre, is not especial- moralizing tone to its foreign policy. In sa n i t a r y standards to stimulate food ly new. Canadian political scientist his introduction to the National Security imports from developing countries or Peyton Lyon observed in the early 1960s St r a t e g y , Bush states that in the 21st ce n - by transferring funds intended to keep

POLICY OPTIONS 67 JUNE-JULY 2004 Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

CP Photo President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney at the Citadel in Quebec City during the Shamrock Summit in March 1985. “During the Mulroney years,” write Hart and Dymond, “Canada enjoyed a high level of influence in Washington, but made little progress on a range of issues such as US barriers on Canadian lumber exports.” Proof that US policy toward Canada is interest-driven, as Canada’s should be toward the US.

hospitals open to the aid budget. As It would have been equally plausible to count on Canada and that it had no political scientist Denis Stairs points argue that UN primacy outweighed the right to object to Canada’s decision. out, the invocation of values over inter- slaughter of Bosnians and Kosovars by T he contention by some that ests bears the heavy cost of “a tendency the Serbs and, since UN approval of mil- standing up to the United States to indulge in inflated and self-servi n g it a r y action could not be obtained, then increases our global influence is true if rhetoric...designed to appeal to the no practical help was possible. Such an you believe resigning membership in preferences and prejudices of a popula- an s w e r , plainly unacceptable to the ’s prestigious Rideau Club and tion indoctrinated by its own myths.” Canadian and other NATO govern- joining the West Carleton Rotary Club ments in the case of the Balkans, enhances one’s influence and stature. his proclivity to ask the wrong became the moral ground on which to The United States now stands at the T question and to look to Canadian criticize the invasion of Iraq. The better centre of world power and Canada values as a policy guide combined to answer was that there were no prospects occupies a privileged position as produce the spectacular blunder of of deterring the United States, that the neighbour and sometime ally. Canadian neutrality in the Iraq war. In goal of regime change in Iraq was laud- ci r cumstances where the United States able, and that no good would flow from t the outset, prolonged discussion was plainly determined to go to war, the isolating the United States on a matter A on the origins, nature and dura- right question to ask was the impact of that it considered, rightly or wrongly, bility of the American Empire would the Canadian position upon US behav- vital to its national interest. As British serve no useful purpose. The Empire io u r . There was a plausible, if uncon- Prime Minister Tony Blair observed, “If has been with us since the Second vincing, answer that supporting the the US act alone, they are unilateralist, World War and is distinguished in its primacy of the United Nations was but if they want allies, people shuffle to present form solely by having no com- worth the cost of exclusion from any the back.” Canada’s answer was that on petitors on the near or distant horizon. role in the post-war governance of Iraq. such matters the United States could not With its military reach and the global

68 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2004 Canada and the new American empire: asking the right questions dominance of American business and tially European transplants on an aborig- vulgar American talk show hosts are technology and culture, the Empire inal base absorbing and assimilating sub- paid immense sums of money to put provokes the same mixture of hope stantial influxes of non-European the city on the US map. If Canadian and resentment in the new century as im m i g r a n t s . Both countries are constitu- foreign policy reflects, as the dialogue it did in the last fifty years of the pre- tional democracies and market paper believes that it should, Canadian vious. The internal US debate on the economies. The basic values and prefer- values and preferences, then the basic r e a l i t y, or even the desirability, of ences that define the character of these principles of Canadian foreign policy Empire is no less impassioned today two societies are fundamentally compat- must necessarily be closer to those of than it was in the past. Nor are mourn- ible. As Canada’s first full-time minister. the United States than any other coun- ful warnings about imperial over- of External Affairs, Louis St-Laurent, tr y. Hence, the goals of global liberty, stretch now less frequently expressed remarked in 1947, the United States “is a democracy and the rule of law enunci- in the United States and elsewhere state with purposes and ambitions simi- ated in the US National Security than they were in the past. The Pax lar to our own.” In their lifestyle choices Strategy could comfortably find a place Americana of the 1950s and 1960s and public policy preferences, Canadians in any statement of Canadian foreign seemed, in the view of many, to have invariably benchmark themselves and p o l i c y. The differences between been fatally weakened by the Vietnam their country against the United States. Canadian and US policies that emerge War, the oil crisis, and the onset of a on global political issues such as Iraq or long period of recession and high o other country resonates with Cuba are differences in tactics, not inflation. In the 1980s, the rise of N Canadians. US and Canadian st r a t e g y . While Canadians are much Japan prompted a vigorous debate societies may be diverging, as Michael less prone to military solutions and about the declining power of lack, in any case, the means for the United States. It would also If Canadian foreign policy reflects such solutions, there are few be a mistake to obsess about Canadian values and preferences, voices in Canada that support the strength and durability of then the basic principles of Baathist or Communist models the Empire and hope, as did of governance or would regret the 1995 Foreign Policy Review, Canadian foreign policy must the emergence of democratic that “new centres of influ- necessarily be closer to those of the government in those countries. ence…would replace the super- United States than any other The second factor is the power-centred world.” The country. The goals of global liberty, North American resourc e prime focus needs to be the endowment. The Canadian and challenges in managing rela- democracy and the rule of law US economies are complemen- tions with the Empire. enunciated in the US National ta r y. They enjoy the same com- It is a common and dan- Security Strategy could comfortably parative advantage in global gerous conceit of policy makers find a place in any statement of and domestic markets. They that they hold the sinews of face the same pain and gain of policy in their hands and may Canadian foreign policy. adjustment to the rapid changes mould them into the shape that satis- Adams contends in F i re and Ice: The in global trade and investment pat- fies their preferences. Humility is United States, Canada and the Myth of terns. There is a remarkable degree of called for. As former French foreign Converging Va l u e s, and many of the r e g u l a t o ry convergence and harmo- minister Hubert Védrine observes, the 250,000 Canadians who live in the nization between the two countries “foreign office is not the control tower New York area are homesick because across the whole of the interface for the government’s international Canadian values are different, as jour- between the private economy and pub- relations.” Canada’s relationship with nalist Michael Valpy asserts, but lic policy. Where differences exist, they the Empire is not the creation, still less Canadians’ choices are nevertheless lie in administration, not fundamental the creature, of Canadian foreign poli- set in the United States from fashions approach. Over the last 50 years, the cy. The relationship is defined by fac- and fads to public policy. The most Canadian economy has become pro- tors largely beyond the control of recent public policy example is the gressively more integrated into the US government and its most distinguish- commitment of the Martin govern- economy as the product of the push of ing characteristic is the narrow range ment to move some way toward the private economic forces and the pull of of manoeuvre available to the govern- US system of advise and consent for sustained Canadian efforts to open the ment to influence the relationship. the appointment of Supreme Court US market to Canadian goods and serv- The first factor is the nature of the judges, the heads of Crown corpora- ices. In neither country is there any sen- two countries that have emerged in tions, and others. timent that the government should North America. Both Canada and the More prosaically, if needs interfere in private business and invest- United States are settler societies, essen- a boost, aging British rock groups and ment decisions to change the logic of

POLICY OPTIONS 69 JUNE-JULY 2004 Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

re s o u r ces, geography and private choice States is responsive to our trade inter- some Canadians do, Canadian ratifica- that underpin economic integration. ests. There is no option available to tion of the Kyoto Accord in contrast to Canada to mitigate the security threats its rejection by the United States, or Canada, trade and investment arising from geography and human Canadian support for arms control in F relationships with other countries contact. The choice is whether to contrast to the US withdrawal from the will be important only at the margin enhance Canadian security through ballistic missile treaty, or Canadian and cannot substitute for the relation- more intense cooperation with the backing for UN family planning pro- ship with the United States. Whatever United States or to accept a higher grams as opposed to US hostility to opinion Canadians or their govern- degree of risk by reducing cooperation. them, is to celebrate the narcissism of ment harbour about US foreign policy, Seeking to assure Canadians by cooper- small differences. any attempt to devise a trade and ation with other countries or through investment policy to match the posing unilateral measures is not an option. t should be beyond debate that the and posturing of an independent for- The fourth factor is Canada’s exten- I task of Canadian foreign policy out- eign policy would bear a heavy eco- sive network of club memberships. weighing all others is to manage the rela- nomic cost. Any government that There is scarcely a multilateral or tionship with the United States. Forty years ago, scholar and former The vast range of informal arrangements, from the Smart official Doug LePan, Border Accord to shared intelligence and police cooperation, observed that Canadians naturally hanker after a recognize the security challenges arising from $2 billion in world where they could pur- daily trade in goods and services, 200 million annual sue more independent for- individual border crossings, and 30,000 daily truck crossings. eign, defence and economic policies without sacrificing implemented such a policy would be regional organization of which Canada any advantage from the close association hurled from office. is not an active member, and hardly with the United States, and added “if The third factor is the intersection an y , apart from the Commonwealth wishes were horses, Canadians would of security with geography in North and la Francophonie, in which the certainly ride off in all directions.” America. The common geography and most important member is not the Wishes are not policies, still less are they the intensity of cross-border human United States. Through its club mem- a substitute for strategic vision. Devising and commercial contact mean that berships, Canada has developed a long a strategy for the relationship should be Canadian and US security are indivisi- tradition of encouraging the broaden- the most urgent task of the Foreign ble. The formal security arrangements, ing and deepening of commitments to Policy Review. Twenty years ago, Brian embodied in the Permanent Joint Board constrain the sovereign choices of Mulroney came to office with a clear US of Defence and NORAD, recognize that states. In each, Canada has made com- st r a t e g y . Much criticized at the time, a the security threats from hostile powers mitments to policies and patterns of great deal was accomplished, from the are common to both countries. The vast behaviour that reflect the foreign policy Free Trade Agreement to the reduction of range of informal arrangements, from impulses emerging from the fundamen- acid rain emissions, combined with an the Smart Border Accord to shared tal interests of the country. Given the unprecedented degree of influence on intelligence and police cooperation, basic similarities between Canada and US decision-making. Throughout the recognize the security challenges aris- the United States, the policies advocat- Chrétien years, there was no discernible ing from $2 billion in daily trade in ed in these clubs by both originate in strategy to deal with the United States goods and services, 200 million annual the same conceptions of governance. In except a knee-jerk contrarianism. The individual border crossings, and 30,000 international economic and political result was drift in the relationship, gen- daily truck crossings. forums, there is often little to distin- erating growing criticism from both the guish Canadian and US positions. It is left, alarmed about the pace of integra- here is a false dichotomy drawn inconceivable that Canada would tion, and the right, anxious that the gov- T between Canadian trade interests express support in the G8 for non-dem- ernment had no strategy to harness the and US security interests. Taken to its ocratic governance, advocate in the UN fo r ces of integration to Canada’s benefit. logical conclusion, it would mean that the abuse of human rights or the sup- The United States is entitled to ask seri- Canadians are indifferent to US securi- pression of diversity and tolerance, or ous questions about the Canadian strat- ty challenges except to the extent that press the International Monetary Fund egy for the relationship. By the time that they impede trade flows. It also sug- and the World Bank to invest in cen- a renewed Bush or a Democratic admin- gests that Canadians are or should be trally planned economies. As in the case istration takes office in January 2005, ready to address US security interests of global political issues, the differences Canadian interests require that some only to the extent that the United are tactical, not strategic. To elevate, as coherent answers be offered.

70 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2004 Canada and the New American empire: asking the right questions

he malaise afflicting the manage- hyper power. During the Cold War , a devising a workable relationship with T ment of Canada-US relations safe anchorage in the Western alliance the United States would be to remove reflects a larger malaise in Canadian for- created opportunities for diplomatic multilateralism from its pedestal as the eign policy arising from a failure to initiatives that directly advanced prime means, often the end, of understand and act upon the funda- Canadian interests. For example, during Canadian foreign policy, and consign mental changes in the global environ- the Suez crisis in 1956, the Canadian it to its proper role as a useful tool in ment wrought by the end of the Cold initiative was driven by the need to heal certain circumstances. This will be War and September 11. Foreign policy the dangerous rift between Canada’s uncomfortable because it is inevitable has lost sight of its object and purpose closest partners, the United Kingdom that as the smaller partner in the rela- — the security and prosperity of the and the United States. Similarly, the tionship, Canada will find its influ- st a t e ’ s citizens — and has reverted to deployment of Canadian troops in ence on the United States greatest colonial preoccupations with sovereign- Cyprus in 1964 owed much to the when it plays in the game that the ty and independence. John Holmes’ threat to the NATO alliance arising United States wants to play. In circum- ob s e r vation 30 years ago of the “linger- from the prospect of war between stances such as post-war Iraq, where ing colonial mentality” of Canadian for- Greece and Tur k e y , and earned high the United States may be ready to eign policy seems as apposite today as it gratitude from the United States. As entertain a serious UN role, Canada was then. The outward manifestations Denis Stairs points out, during the Cold should be ready to cooperate. To insist, of this mentality are a reliance on pos- War , Canada could occasionally play however, as Canada did in the case of ture and declaration and an inability to some interesting transatlantic politics Iraq, that multilateral authority con- deploy hard instruments of foreign pol- as a member of the team. Those days veyed by the UN Security Council is a ic y . Critics like the journalist Andrew are gone. In the new environment, the condition precedent to action to Cohen document a sorry tale of the United States has little patience for defend national security, is a recipe for denuded military, reduced development alliance relationships or multilateral irrelevance. High-minded internation- assistance, and declining diplomatic institutions that pose an impediment to alism, such as the International re s o u r ces available to advance foreign the pursuit of US interests. Following Criminal Court, doggedly pursued by policy interests. The problem is, howev- September 11, the readiness of the Canada in the face of strong US oppo- er , deeper. The allocation of the necessary resource s Twenty years ago, Brian Mulroney came to office with a clear to restore the sharp end of US strategy. Much criticized at the time, a great deal was Canadian diplomacy accomplished, from the Free Trade Agreement to the reduction would avail the country little without a funda- of acid rain emissions, combined with an unprecedented mental reorientation of degree of influence on US decision-making. Throughout the policy back to the pursuit Chrétien years, there was no discernible strategy to deal with of Canadian interests. the United States except a knee-jerk contrarianism.

t seems to need repeating every gen- United States to make its interests sition, breeds cynicism and I eration that the Canadian relation- hostage to the preferences of other resentment toward Canada among US ship with the United States is an asset, countries is virtually zero. Whatever the decision makers. Nor can it be expect- not a liability. It is, moreover, the most current uneasiness in some parts of US ed that such initiatives, in the absence important constant in Canadian for- opinion about the wars in Iraq and of US support, will long endure. eign policy and the management of this Afghanistan, US foreign policy is likely relationship its most important task. No to be characterized by an aggressive, n its February 2004 Speech from the relationship with any other country has single-minded, America-first approach I Throne, the Martin government as much impact on the object and pur- for the foreseeable future. promised to undertake a comprehensive pose of foreign policy. If this reality has In this new environment, the uses foreign policy review. In the govern- been glaringly obvious to all but the of multilateralism, inside or outside me n t ’ s view, “Canadians want their purblind for the last quarter century at the UN, as a means to influence US co u n t r y to play a distinctive and inde- least, it has been cemented into place p o l i c y, are much diminished. No pendent role...They want to see by the end of the Cold War and the amount of revivalist chanting of the Ca n a d a ’ s place of pride and influence in consequences of September 11. virtues of multilateralism or hoping the world restored.” Such a review pres- The dissolution of Cold War ortho- that a Democratic president will set ents a rare opportunity to restore bal- doxies did more than destroy one aside US national interests for multi- ance and perspective to foreign policy superpower and make the other, happi- lateral action will return multilateral- and rid it of its lingering colonial men- ly our neighbour, the unchallenged ism to its glory days. A first step to ta l i t y . The best chance of producing a

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review that will guide Canadian foreign important world power and acknowl- affairs. It is time to take our place, meet policy is to ask the right questions about edged the United States as Canada’s our responsibilities, carry our weight.” the relationship with the United States. pre-eminent economic partner but its Fine words, if followed by bold deeds. Previous foreign policy reviews in recitation of the challenges and The journey to this new place should 1970, 1985, 1995, and 2003 share a opportunities facing Canada make no begin by asking the right question. common feature: they do not discuss mention of the relationship. The 2003 in any detail, still less do they offer dialogue managed to accord three Bill Dymond is senior executive fellow any guidance on, this relationship. paragraphs to the relationship, at the Centre for Trade Policy and Law The 1970 review acknowledged the reminding Canadians of its impor- at Carleton University and the conundrum of drawing economic tance, but unlike other themes on University of Ottawa. Michael Hart is benefit from the relationship, while which it sought views, it asked no the Simon Reisman Professor of Tr a d e being mindful of the constant danger questions about the relationship with Policy in the Norman Paterson School of it posed to sovereignty, independence the United States. This congenital I n t e rnational Affairs at Carleton and cultural identity. While it avoidance of the most important and University and a distinguished fellow of reviewed in some depth Canadian constant factor in Canadian foreign the Centre for Trade Policy and Law. relationships with Europe, Asia and policy needs to be overcome if the Both are former federal officials with Latin America, it had nothing to say new review is to be more influential extensive experience in dealing with about the United States. The 1985 than its predecessors in guiding for- trade and foreign policy issues. Their review similarly had no insights on eign policy. a rticle in the December-January P o l i c y the relationship except to highlight The Martin government wants for O p t i o n s, “The Potemkin Village of the implications for sovereignty and “Canada a role of pride and influence Canadian Foreign Policy,” has been independence of negotiating a bilater- in the world, where we speak with an nominated for a National Magazine al free trade agreement. The 1995 independent voice, bringing distinc- Aw a rd in the public policy category. m- review treated the United States as an tive Canadian values to international h a rt @ s y m p a t i c o . c a

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“THIS QUICK, CLEAR, FACT-PACKED...ARGUMENT CONVINCINGLY INVERTS CANADIAN CONVENTIONAL WISDOM.” —THE GAZETTE (MONTREAL)

“A SPLENDID POLEMIC.” —MACLEAN’S

72 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2004