BRITISH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT From Suez to the Falklands and the present day

EDWARD HAMPSHIRE ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM TOOBY NEW VANGUARD 277 BRITISH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS From Suez to the Falklands and the present day

EDWARD HAMPSHIRE ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM TOOBY CONTENTS

BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE 4

LANDING CRAFT AND HELICOPTERS 8 • Large • Medium landing craft • Small landing craft • Army landing craft • Helicopters

LST 3 AND LSH(S) CLASSES 12

COMMANDO CARRIER CONVERSIONS: ALBION, 16 BULWARK AND HERMES

FEARLESS CLASS 18

SIR LANCELOT CLASS, SIR GALAHAD (II), SIR LAMARAK 21 AND SIR CARADOC

HMS OCEAN 25

BAY CLASS AND LOGISTICS SHIPS 28

ALBION CLASS 32

OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS 33 • The • The Cold War and ‘End of Empire’: 1957–82 • The Falklands campaign • The late Cold War and after: 1982–2018

DISPOSAL AND FATES 45

BIBLIOGRAPHY 47

INDEX 48 BRITISH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS

From Suez to the Falklands and the present day

BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

During World War II the developed an enormous amphibious capability, including hundreds of landing ships and thousands of landing craft, as well as an increasingly experienced and well-trained group of servicemen to operate these vessels. Starting with the Torch landings in North Africa in 1942 and culminating in the invasion of France in operations Neptune and Dragoon in June and August 1944, these forces, operating alongside the US, were instrumental in enabling the defeat of Germany in Europe. Allied amphibious operations in East Asia were also crucial in defeating the Japanese. With the end of the war, Britain’s amphibious capability was run down alongside much of the rest of the . Most of the amphibious ships had either been operated under Lend-Lease with the US, so were returned to the US between 1945 and 1946, or had been converted from merchant ships, so were converted back to civilian use. As it became clear that a long- term confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies was developing in the 1940s, amphibious forces were not considered a key priority. Most resources and attention were given to anti- forces to counter the significant Soviet submarine threat, and modern jet-capable aircraft

HMS Reggio, an LST 3 modified as an assault landing with davits for six LCA landing craft, enters harbour in the mid-1950s. (Imperial War Museum FL 5486)

4 carrier battle-groups able to gain control of the seas and strike at Soviet naval and land targets. The of 1950–53 demonstrated to the US government the continuing importance of amphibious forces in providing flanking attacks in land campaigns and, in the case of the landings at Inchon, even to change the course of a conflict. From this point onwards the United States began to invest heavily in both its Marine Corps and its specialized amphibious vessels. The Royal Navy was aware of these developments, but did not devote significant resources to renewing its much-shrunken World War II-era amphibious fleet. Port Said in Egypt immediately However, a low level of active operational capability began to be recreated following the ill-fated British– through the establishment of an Amphibious Warfare based in French assault to take control of the Suez Canal. The amphibious Malta in 1952. force, including LSTs, LCTs In the early 1950s, the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability largely and in gunfire remained focused on a number of British or Canadian-built Mark 3 Landing support roles, can be seen in Ships, Tank, or LST 3s, and smaller landing craft, all of which had been the distance. (Imperial War Museum MH 23509) built between 1944 and 1946. However, technology was beginning to change how amphibious assaults would be undertaken. Ship-based helicopters could now transport assault troops to their landing zones extremely rapidly, whilst the threat from new fast meant that amphibious forces would need to be much quicker than the 10–13 knots that the existing LST 3s could manage. A Chiefs of Staff working party in 1954 recommended that amphibious warfare would have a role in raiding operations during wartime, with exercises being undertaken up to battalion level, and some training for brigade-level assaults. The would lead on this form of specialist warfare, as general training across the Army would no longer be required. These recommendations were accepted by the Chiefs and some incremental steps were taken to improve the amphibious capability. Four LST 3s were converted into assault landing ships, carrying a number of small landing craft on davits, and in July 1956 proposals were put forward for what would later be known as a ‘commando carrier’, based ‘East of Suez’, to enable helicopter amphibious assault. The 1956 Suez Crisis was a foreign policy disaster for the United Kingdom: it demonstrated the UK’s financial and political dependence on the United States, and resulted in a humiliating withdrawal from what had been a successful amphibious operation. However, the landings at Suez, which enabled a combined British, French and Israeli force to defeat Egyptian land and air forces, demonstrated the utility of helicopter amphibious assault and the need for new specialized assault ships to provide the speed and flexibility necessary to make successful landings. In addition, following the 1957 Defence Review, the Royal Navy under Lord Mountbatten’s leadership had

5 managed to forge a role for itself in an environment seemingly dominated by possible nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union. The Royal Navy would provide intervention forces to support the ‘withdrawal from Empire’ east of the Suez Canal, and to fight or deter ‘cold’ and ‘warm’ wars as Soviet influence percolated into some former European colonies and the Soviet Navy began to venture beyond its traditional local waters. A crucial part of this intervention force would be an enhanced amphibious capability that took advantage of the latest developments in doctrinal thinking. This therefore led to the first great renewal of British amphibious forces after World War II: helicopter-capable ‘commando carriers’ were created from converting the two aircraft carriers Albion and Bulwark, and to provide the ‘East of Suez’ amphibious force, two new Fearless-class Landing Platforms, Dock (LPDs) and a range of new landing craft would be built. In addition Landing Ships, Logistics (LSLs) of the Sir Lancelot class were built to transport equipment worldwide and provide second-line support for amphibious landings. From the late 1950s through to the 1970s, Britain’s armed forces were involved in a series of ‘bush-fire’ wars as the United Kingdom withdrew from its empire, and the Royal Marines and Royal Navy’s amphibious forces were often heavily involved. Naval support was provided for long-running counter-insurgencies in Malaya, Borneo and Aden. Naval forces were also used to pre-empt and deter possible conflicts, such as the use of naval and amphibious forces in Lebanon in 1958 and in Kuwait in 1961. However, the increasing cost of retaining a large sophisticated military based and operating worldwide forced a series of defence economies on the Ministry of Defence. These included the cancellation of planned strike carriers, which would amongst other things have provided the air superiority necessary for the ‘East of Suez’ amphibious forces to undertake their intervention role. Further economies focused on equipment that could have provided credible worldwide capabilities, and pushed the government into accepting that the large-scale ‘East of Suez’ role was no longer affordable. In 1967 it was finally announced that the British military presence east of the Suez Canal would be withdrawn by 1975 (this was later speeded up to 1971). Major bases in Singapore and the would be closed, and only a small residual force consisting of a handful of and would be needed after the withdrawal. Despite performing important duties during the confrontation with the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland as part of Operation Motorman in 1972, the amphibious forces now seemed to lack a major military role. The existing capability was initially repurposed to provide support to the weak ‘flanks’ of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean and in Norway. It was the NATO Mediterranean theatre that provided the justification for converting another , HMS Hermes, into a commando carrier (replacing Albion), but increasingly the focus turned to the Norwegian northern flank. The 1975 Defence Review further shrank the Royal Navy’s sphere of operations, stating that Bulwark would be withdrawn without replacement, a move that announced the end of permanent British naval forces in the Mediterranean. Fearless and Intrepid would operate through to the late 1980s but would not be replaced either. After this point, the Royal Marines would be transported to Norway by means that had not yet been determined – possibly by airlift on chartered civilian aircraft, with roll-on roll-off ferries transporting their military equipment.

6 The 1981 Defence Review initially threatened to speed up the withdrawal of the two LPDs to 1982 and 1984 respectively, even though no practical answer to the question of how the Royal Marines would get to Norway had yet been provided. Intensive lobbying by the United States against the planned cuts to the Navy as a whole, resulted in the then-Defence Secretary, Sir John Nott, offering to keep Fearless and Intrepid in service for some more years.1 This decision to retain the two ships was publicly announced a few weeks before the Argentinians invaded the in the South Atlantic. The view from the cockpit The impact of the Falklands conflict, in which the Navy’s assault ships of a Sea King helicopter as were crucial in ensuring success, was to confirm the long-term survival of she lands on HMS Hermes in 1983 during NATO exercises the amphibious force. It was subsequently announced that the two LPDs in the Norwegian fjords. would stay in service into the mid-1990s and studies began on an ‘aviation (Bye for now/ Wikimedia support ship’ (essentially a new commando carrier to replace Hermes) Commons/ CC-BY-SA-4.0) and the eventual replacements for Fearless and Intrepid. However, it was clear that amphibious warfare remained a relatively low priority for the Ministry of Defence: studies into modernization and replacement began to stretch many years ahead, with no orders being placed. In the meantime the two LPDs soldiered on but were increasingly showing their age. HMS Hermes, which had had a dual anti-submarine role since her conversion, and in 1980 had been given the ability to operate Harriers, was withdrawn from service in 1984. Her commando carrier role was not immediately replaced. In 1990, just as the Cold War was coming to an end, the Ministry of Defence announced that it hoped to order the aviation support ship in the near future, but defence economies resulting from the collapse of the Soviet threat meant that the order was not finally placed until 1993. Invitations to tender for replacements for the LPDs were announced in 1994. The order of the new commando carrier, HMS Ocean, belatedly marked the second great renewal of the amphibious force. British armed forces, after defence reductions as part of a ‘peace dividend’, began to reorient themselves towards a range of ‘liberal intervention’ roles: peacekeeping and peace enforcement in order to end or prevent bloody (and increasingly publicly visible) civil wars and insurgencies across the world. In the words of the then-Defence Secretary George Robertson, the UK ‘must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us’. The ability to insert and sustain troops worldwide was now extremely important, and amphibious forces and logistical ships would be one of the main means to do this. Not only was a new commando carrier under construction and two new LPDs on order (HMS Albion and Bulwark) but new logistics ships were chartered,

1 Churchill Archives: Nott papers, NOTT 4/8ii

7 and replacements for the Sir Lancelot-class, the much more capable Bay-class, were also ordered. These new forces were deployed to a range of conflicts and exercises worldwide in the 2000s, and perhaps the apogee of this force’s prominence was in the 2010s. The earlier generation of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers was being paid off but their replacements would not be in service for some years. As a result, Ocean, Albion and Bulwark became the largest fighting ships in the surface fleet, serving as the fleet flagship in rotation. With the arrival of the first new strike carrier into service in The recently commissioned 2018, the 20-year-old HMS Ocean was decommissioned, but the rest of the HMS Bulwark in 2006, having amphibious force remains a crucial part of the United Kingdom’s current returned from evacuating worldwide power projection capability. British nationals from Beirut following an intensification of Hezbollah attacks in Lebanon, Abbreviations and terminology an example of the types of NATO abbreviations for amphibious vessels have been commonly used since World War II; these are set below operations conducted by such Abbreviation Designation vessels in the post-Cold War LCA Landing Craft, Assault world. (© Ministry of Defence, LCAC Landing Craft, Air Cushion licensed under the Open Government Licence v1.0) LCL Landing Craft, Logistic LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized LCP Landing Craft, Personnel LCT Landing Craft, Tank LCU Landing Craft, Utility LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel LPD Landing Ship, Personnel, Dock (later known in UK as Landing Platform, Dock) LPH Landing Ship, Personnel, Helicopter (later known in UK as Landing Platform, Helicopter) LSD(A) Landing Ship, Dock, Auxiliary LSH(S) Landing Ship, Headquarters, Small LSL Landing Ship, Logistic HMS Parapet, one of the more active LCTs in the Royal Navy LST Landing Ship, Tank in the 1950s: based in home LST(A) Landing Ship, Tank, Assault waters, she was deployed to LST(C) Landing Ship, Tank, Landing Craft Carrier the eastern Mediterranean in LST(Q) Landing Ship, Tank, Communications the summer of 1956 to take LVT Landing Vehicle, Tracked part in the Suez operation. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed RCL Ramped Craft, Logistic under the Open Government Licence v.1.0) LANDING CRAFT AND HELICOPTERS The main means by which amphibious deliver troops to the shore is via landing craft or support helicopter. These are described first and then the book will review each class of ship in turn, followed by a final section reviewing their operational service from 1956. In the tables of ships’ particulars, displacement is given in tons and dimensions in metres (in the order length/beam/draught).

Large landing craft The largest landing craft were the LCTs: developed in the first years of World War II to transport tanks to shore, they

8 had the ability to ensure that significant amounts of armour could get to the beaches quickly to support assaulting troops. They were of great importance in many of the landings of the war, and in the Suez operations a number of the few active craft helped supplement the LSTs. However, unlike LSTs they did not have an ocean-going capability so were less flexible in their deployment in the post-war years. The LCT Mk 8s were not directly replaced when they were retired from service in the mid-1960s.

Type Names/ In service Displacement (tons)/ Propulsion Amphibious Foxtrot 8, one of HMS Fearless’ Numbers capacity Dimensions (metres) LCVP small landing craft in the LCT 4 LCT 404 and 407 1942–60 620 full load, 2x diesel 6x Churchill early 1970s. This photograph (with Rhine 57.1/11.8/0.9 engines, 10 tanks emphasizes the small size Squadron), 15 knots. Range: of these craft. They were others on loan 2,140 miles relatively fast and would lead at 10 knots amphibious assaults, placing LCT 8 Bastion, Buttress, 1945–67 1,037 full load, 4x diesel 5x the very first troops ashore. Citadel, 70.4/11.9/1.2 engines, 12 tanks Counterguard, knots. Range: (Open Government Licence Parapet, Portcullis, 3,060 miles v.1.0) Rampart, Redoubt, at 12 knots Sallyport plus 17 others on loan or in reserve

Medium landing craft These landing craft, which specialize in transporting vehicles and stores ashore, are designed to be transported to the landing area in larger ships, either in the well decks of dock landing ships (Fearless, Bay and Albion classes) or the davits of some specialist landing ships (LST(C)s). In the 1970s LCMs were designated LCUs to emphasize their flexibility and to conform with US naming practice. LCACs (hovercraft), which were introduced in the 1990s, also operate from the well-decks of LPDs but generally carry troops and have limited cargo capacity.

Type Names/ In service Displacement Propulsion Amphibious Numbers (tons)/ capacity Dimensions (metres) LCM 7 46 craft in 1956 1945–64 63 loaded, 2x diesel or 1x jeep or 1x 17.6/5.0/1.1 steam engines, Sherman tank 8.5–12.5 knots LCM 9 L 3507, L 3508, 1963–2009 158 full load, 2x diesels, 10.5 1x Main Battle knots Tank (MBT) or 70 L 700–L 711 27.5/6.8/1.4 tons of vehicles/ stores LCU 9 (R) L 713–L 715 1986–2009 170 loaded, 2x diesels, 9 1x MBT or 70 tons 26.1/6.4/0.4 knots of vehicles/stores LCU 10 L 1001–L 1010 1999– 240 full load 2x diesels, bow 1x MBT or 4x (renumbered thruster, 8 vehicles or 120 30/7/1.7 L 9730–L 9739) knots troops LCAC(L): C 21–C 24 1993–2012 6.8 full load, 1x diesel, 33 16 troops or 2 11/4.6/ – knots tons Griffon 2000 TDX(M) LCAC: C 21–C 24 2010– 10.6 standard 1x diesel, 16 troops or 2.4 Griffon 2400 40–50 knots tons 12.6/6.8/ TD(M)

9 Small landing craft LCAs (redesignated LCVPs in the 1960s) had higher speed, primarily carried personnel and would generally place the very first troops ashore at the start of an assault. They would be transported on davits on LST(A)s, dock landing ships and commando carriers. In addition, the Navy operated a number of LCPs (small and slow utility landing craft) and a number of amphibious vehicles, including LVTs and six-wheeled DUKWs. These are not summarized below and were withdrawn from service in the 1960s.

Type Names/ Numbers In Displacement Propulsion Amphibious service (tons)/ capacity Dimensions (metres) LCA 1 211 craft in 1956 (many 1944–64 14 tons loaded 2 diesels, 8.5 35 troops in reserve or on loan) 12.5/3.2/0.6 knots LCA 2/ L 101–L 136 1955–86 16 tons loaded 2 diesels, 8 35 troops LCVP 1 knots 13.1/3.2/0.6 LCVP 2 L 137–L 150 1967–86 16 tons loaded 2 diesels, 10 35 troops knots 13.1/3.1/0.7 LCVP 3 L 151–L 158 1975–86 16 tons loaded 2 diesels, 10 35 troops knots 13.1/3.1/0.7 LCVP 4 L 8031, L 8401–L 8420, 1986–2009 16 tons loaded 2 diesels, 18 35 troops L 8619–L 8622 knots 13.4/3.3/0.8 LCVP 5 L 9473, L 9673–L 9692, 1995– 25 full load 2 diesels, 2 35 troops, plus L 9707–L 9708 waterjets, 25 2 tons of 15.5/4.2/0.9 (renumbered L 0202– knots equipment L 0205, L 0338–L 0356)

Army landing craft Through the Cold War the Army operated its own LCTs and smaller landing craft, which it replaced with LCLs of the Ardennes class (1,600 tons full load, two ships in service from 1977) and smaller RCLs of the Arromanches class (290 tons full load, nine ships in service from 1981 onwards). These were primarily used for the routine transport of equipment and personnel in the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Hong Kong. Five RCLs remain in Army service today.

A Griffon 2400 air cushion landing craft (LCAC). With an operational speed of 40 knots, such assault hovercraft are nearly twice as fast as current LCVPs, but only have half the troop capacity. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

10 Helicopters The early development of helicopters in naval service is described in the text accompanying plate F. Following the use of naval Whirlwind helicopters to transport troops as part of the initial assault on Port Said during the Suez Crisis in 1956, the utility of helicopter amphibious assault had been clearly demonstrated, and plans to adapt smaller carriers as helicopter- carrying commando carriers were approved. The commando support helicopter had come of age. In 1958 the first Royal Marine Commando squadron (848) was raised in Malta, equipped with US-built HAS 22 Whirlwinds. These were soon replaced by British-built HAS 7s and in 1960 848 Squadron was embarked on HMS Bulwark, the first British A Whirlwind helicopter commando carrier. By the early 1960s the Whirlwind was replaced by the taking off from the light more powerful and larger Wessex, the Sikorsky S-58, again built under carrier HMS Ocean during the Suez operation in 1956. license by Westland. It had a troop-carrying capacity of 15 or could carry a The Whirlwind was the first load of up to 4,000lb. By the end of 1964 there were four specialized Royal helicopter in British service Marine Commando squadrons: 845, 846, 847 and 848, all operating Wessex that could carry meaningful helicopters, the last Whirlwind having been withdrawn that year. numbers of equipped troops. (US Navy) The Sikorsky SH-3A Sea King helicopter was introduced into US Navy service in the early 1960s. As previously, a British variant was developed under license by Westland and first flew in 1969; it became the backbone of the Navy’s anti-submarine helicopter force during the 1970s. It was not until 1979 that the commando variant (the HC 4) first entered service, replacing the Wessex in the front-line role by the late 1980s. The Sea King HC 4 had seating capacity for 28 troops or could carry a load of 6,000lb or more. The Sea King was eventually succeeded by the Merlin helicopter from 2016. By this time, due to internal alterations to the Sea Kings and additional equipment carried by marines, the helicopters could carry only 12 fully equipped Royal Marines. The Merlins were transferred from the RAF

The Wessex HU 5, introduced in the early 1960s, remained the backbone of the commando helicopter force until the mid- 1980s. (Photo by Ken Griffiths/ Wikimedia Commons/ Public domain)

11 The Sea King Mk 4 remained the Royal Marines’ main troop transport helicopter for over 30 years, only being withdrawn in the mid-2010s. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

and are being modified from Mk 3 standard as part of their transfer to the commando helicopter force. In addition, HMS Ocean was modified in 2004–05 to operate the RAF Chinook large helicopter and the Army Apache ground-attack helicopter. The Commando helicopter force has also included small utility helicopters for reconnaissance and ground support, initially as the Air Squadron, and from 1995 as 847 Squadron. These have included the utility/land versions of the Sioux, Scout, Gazelle, Lynx and currently the Wildcat AH1.

Type Carrying capacity Engine In front- Squadrons line service operating Whirlwind HAS 21 Max 10 troops Wright R-1900-3 1952–56 848 Whirlwind HAS 22 Max 10 troops Wright R-1900-3 1954–59 845, 848 Whirlwind HAS 7 Max 10 troops Alvis Leonides 1957–64 845, 846, 847, 848 Wessex HAS 1 Max 15 troops Napier Gazelle 1962–65 845 or 4,000lb Wessex HU 5 Max 15 troops 2x Bristol 1964–88 845, 846, 847, 848 Siddeley Gnome or 4,000lb Sea King HC 4 Max 28 troops 2x Rolls-Royce 1979–2018 845, 846, 848 Gnome or 6,000lb Merlin HC 3/3A Max 24 troops + 3x Rolls-Royce 2016– 845, 846 4 tons underslung RTM-322

LST 3 AND LSH(S) CLASSES Design development The concept of the Landing Ship, Tank derived from Winston Churchill’s order for ships that could land tanks on a beach anywhere in the world. The very first such vessels were converted shallow-draft oilers, and three faster ships of the Boxer class (LST 1) were also built under Lend-Lease in the United States. Both of these designs featured bow doors that opened to reveal a ramp that would take vehicles directly onto the beach. The

12 next step was to develop a design for mass production to enable the expected large-scale amphibious landings to retake Western Europe. Designated LST 2, these were also built under Lend-Lease derived from an initial UK concept. Over a thousand were built, serving in both the US Navy and the Royal Navy. The RN-manned vessels were returned to the US after the war under their Lend-Lease contract terms. In 1943 a modified version of the LST 2 was ordered for construction in British and Canadian yards. There were a number of differences between this new design (LST 3) and their predecessors. British yards did not have the capability to construct ships by welding, so the LST 3 was riveted instead, whilst the diesels used in the earlier vessels were not HMS Messina in 1957. Messina available, so use was made of engines originally planned for frigates. In and her sister Narvik were addition, they were able to transport and operate pontoon causeways to completed as LCM carriers: they were able to transport provide more flexibility for offloading, had a different bow structure and a these landing craft on the ship’s vehicle ramp between the tank deck and the upper deck rather than a lift. upper deck, but could only deploy them unloaded, which LST 3 LSH(S) limited their tactical usefulness in an initial assault. (© Ministry Displacement 4,980 tons full load 2,106 tons full load of Defence, licensed under the Dimensions 105.9/16.8/1.4 (fwd), 3.6 (aft) 91.7/11.0/3.4( fwd) Open Government Licence Amphibious 2x LCA, 500 tons vehicles, 178 troops (298 Command facilities, HF radio transmitters v.1.0) capacity at overload) Armament 4x 40mm, 4x 20mm; 3x 40mm, 4x 20 mm; or 8x 20mm depth charge racks and throwers Propulsion 2x shafts steam, 13 knots 2x shafts steam, 19.5 knots Complement 115 127

Construction programme A total of 116 ships were ordered in 1943 and 1944, with 45 to be built in the United Kingdom and the rest in Canada. Many of the ships were cancelled whilst under construction, leaving a total of 62 completed and in naval service by the end of 1945. During construction, two ships (later Ben Nevis and Ben Lomond) were modified to act as communications ships, sacrificing all their vehicle capacity, whilst two more (later Messina and Narvik) were modified as LCM carriers, able to take up to seven LCM (3)s or LCM (7)s on their upper deck. After the war seven LST 3s were quickly transferred to the , whilst others were transferred to the Ministry of Transport. In 1947 most of the surviving ships received names. In 1953 the ownership of the Army LSTs had transferred to the Ministry of Transport, who leased them to Frank Bustard and Sons, who in turn operated them under a contract to provide equipment transport services to the Army. By December 1956 a total of 19 LST 3s were still in service with the Royal Navy, with another 19 leased to Frank Bustard and Sons operating as commercial cross-Channel roll-on/ roll-off ferries.

13 Type Owner/operator Names (pendants) LST 3 Admiralty Anzio (L3003), Dieppe (L 3016), Vaagso (L 3017), Lofoten (L 3027), Chaser (L 3029), LST 3031, Puncher (L 3036), Ravager (L 3505), Reggio (L 3511), Salerno (L 3513), Stalker (L 3515), Striker (L 3516), Suvla (L 3518), Tracker (L 3522), Zeebrugge (L 3532) LST(Q) Admiralty Ben Nevis (L 3101), Ben Lomond (L 3102) LST(C) Admiralty Messina (L 3043), Narvik (L 3044) LST 3 Government-owned, Charles Macleod, Evan Gibb, Frederick Clover, Humphrey Gale, Maxwell operated by Brander, Reginald Kerr, Snowden Smith, commercial contractors for the Army LST 3 Government-owned, Empire Baltic, Empire Cedric, Empire Celtic, Empire Curlew, Empire Cymric, operated Empire Doric, Empire Fulmar, Empire Gaelic, Empire Gannet, Empire Grebe, commercially as Empire Guillemot, Empire Gull, Empire Kittiwake, Empire Nordic, Empire roll-on/roll-off ferries Petrel, Empire Puffin, Empire Shearwater, Empire Skua, Empire Tern

In-service modifications Four vessels were to have been converted into anti-aircraft firing ships from 1948 but three were sold commercially and the last, LST 3031, was never converted, staying in low readiness reserve for many years pending a conversion that never came. Between 1952 and 1960 Reggio, Striker, Anzio and Messina were converted to LST(A) standard. The details of this conversion are set out in plate A.

Pendant Name Builder Commissioned Paid off for Recommissioned conversion L 3511 Reggio Davie Shipbuilding 14/9/45 4/52 18/7/52 L 3516 Striker Yarrow (Victoria) 10/7/45 5/1/53 17/4/53 L 3003 Anzio Vickers (Tyne) 30/11/45 11/54 24/6/55 L 3043 Messina Scotts 14/8/45 9/59 18/3/60

HMS STRIKER AND HMS BULWARK A 1. HMS Striker, pictured here, was one of four vessels converted into an LST(A) landing ship. With the decommissioning of all the landing ships capable of launching significant numbers of LCAs at the end of World War II, the Royal Navy lacked any means of transporting these vital spearhead craft into a landing zone. Converting some of the LST 3-class vessels to LST(A) standard, carrying eight LCAs each, had been planned as far back as the late 1940s. In fact, the naming policy for the LST 3 class also reflected this: vessels given ‘-er’ names like Puncher and Charger were originally earmarked for conversion. However, funds were not initially forthcoming, and as a result many fewer conversions took place and much later than planned. The vessels had accommodation for 260 men on the tank deck, significantly reducing their vehicle-carrying capacity, so they still needed to be accompanied by ordinary LSTs to land equipment. The LST(A)s proved vital in the amphibious operations at Suez in 1956 and Kuwait in 1961, and Striker herself was present at both, carrying commandos for the initial assault forces on either occasion. 2. HMS Bulwark was the Royal Navy’s first Helicopter Assault Ship or ‘commando carrier’. She was a light that would soon be too small to operate the latest carrier-borne aircraft, and was paid off for conversion in December 1958. Converting Bulwark involved the replacement of her catapults and arrestor wires, and the reorganization of her flight deck to incorporate six helicopter spots. Her hangar was modified to accommodate 16 Whirlwind helicopters and some of the 600 Royal Marine commandos that could now be embarked for amphibious operations. On davits aft of the island on either side, four LCAs were carried, to provide a supplementary sea assault capability and to transport heavy stores ashore. Her radar fit was also modernized, including the Type 960 air search radar. Bulwark’s sister ship, HMS Albion, followed and appeared in 1962 with a similar conversion, although her troop-carrying capacity was greater, she was equipped with the more capable Wessex helicopter and she had the new Type 965 air search radar.

14 1 2

15 Many of the vessels were stiffened to take larger tanks (such as Centurions) on the main tank deck, and were partly ‘arcticized’ and ‘tropicalized’ to enable more effective operation in the extreme cold or heat. Lofoten, after a number of years as an accommodation ship, was modified as a helicopter support ship in 1964, undertaking helicopter training until a purpose-built vessel (RFA Engadine) was completed. Lofoten was in this role for only three years, with her landing craft removed, bow door plated up and her upper deck turned into a flight deck, before being laid up in 1967.

HMS Striker was the second Meon and Waveney: small headquarters ships vessel to be converted into an Towards the end of World War II there was a requirement for small assault LST. Such vessels were headquarters ships to lead limited or minor landings, primarily in the Far the only means of launching sufficient numbers of LCAs to East. Six River-class frigates were earmarked for conversion. The first to spearhead an assault until the be completed, Nith, was sold to Egypt in 1948. Waveney and Meon were commando carriers and LPDs converted next, both completing in 1945. Three further conversions were arrived in service in the 1960s. cancelled (Exe, Ettrick and Chelmer) in September 1945. The ships lost (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government most of their armament in return for multiple communications arrays and Licence v.1.0) a dedicated operations room for an amphibious staff. Meon and Waveney provided the Navy with its sole dedicated amphibious command capability until the 1960s.

COMMANDO CARRIER CONVERSIONS: ALBION, HMS Meon in September 1959. Converted from a , BULWARK AND HERMES she sacrificed most of her armament for command and communications facilities. The Design development whip antennae for the latter As early as 1948 the United States Marine Corps had used a wartime escort can be seen mostly clustered carrier, the USS Palau, as a primitive commando carrier operating five around her mainmast. (© helicopters to transport troops ashore in an exercise simulating an amphibious Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government landing with what was termed ‘vertical envelopment’. Helicopters had the Licence v.1.0) advantage of being able to deliver troops from the sea at much greater speed than landing craft, and of operating from ships sitting ‘over the horizon’ and therefore much less vulnerable to coastal artillery. In 1956 the USS Thetis Bay completed her conversion into the first LPH, whilst the use of helicopters flying from Ocean and Theseus at Suez demonstrated the utility of helicopter assault. Even before the Suez operation, the Royal Navy had set out its plans for a future navy that included a permanent task group in Singapore based around an aircraft carrier and a commando carrier. The first Royal Navy ship to convert to a

16 commando carrier was HMS Bulwark; the details of this conversion are set out in plate A. She was followed by her sister ship HMS Albion, and then in 1970 HMS Hermes also began conversion to commando carrier, the details of which are set out in plate B.

Bulwark 1960 Albion 1962 Hermes 1973 Displacement (full load) 27,730 tons 27,800 tons 29,000 tons Dimensions (m) 224.8/39.3/8.2 224.6/40.5/8.2 226.8/46.9/8.2 Amphibious capacity 600 troops 738 troops 803 troops Armament 1x 40mm Mk 6 4x 40mm Mk 5 2x GWS 22B 10x 40mm Mk 5 2x 40mm Mk 9 Sensors and systems Radar: Types 960, Radar: Types 965, 983, Command system: CAAIS 982M, 983, 293Q, 978 293Q, 978 Radar: Types 957, 965Q, Sonar: Type 149 Sonar: Types 149, 181 993, 978 Sonar: Types 184, 185, 195, 2015 Propulsion 76,000hp, 27.25 knots 76,000hp, 27.25 knots 75,100hp, 28.6 knots Complement 1,495 1,535 1,168

Conversion programme

The very earliest plans for an amphibious force included proposals for four commando carriers and four dock landing ships, but this was clearly over- ambitious and it was soon accepted that two or three commando carriers would have to be sufficient in a navy that was in the midst of a series of major procurement programmes to replace worn-out wartime ships and equipment. Plans to convert the remaining sister of Albion and Bulwark, Centaur, were postponed and finally cancelled in 1966. Hermes, as stated above, was a one-off conversion to a hybrid commando carrier/ASW (anti- submarine warfare) carrier. This photograph shows HMS Bulwark in January 1960, Pendant Name Builder Commissioned Paid off for Recommissioned conversion having just completed her conversion to the Navy’s first R 08 Bulwark 4/11/54 12/58 19/1/60 commando carrier. Note the R 07 Albion 26/5/54 1/61 1/8/62 lack of deck markings and R 12 Hermes Vickers (Barrow) 18/11/59 10/70 18/8/73 aircraft. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0) In-service modifications Bulwark was refitted in 1963–64, which brought her troop-carrying capabilities up to Albion’s standards, but which also removed her Type 960 and 983 radars. Her armament was reduced to four 40mm guns. Albion also had her Type 978 removed by 1973, but otherwise did not receive major changes during her career as a commando carrier. Hermes was refitted again, completing in 1976, which further emphasized her ASW role but kept a residual ability to act as a commando carrier (the landing craft on davits remained). Hermes emerged from refit in 1981 as a stop-gap ‘Harrier carrier’ complete with a ‘Ski Jump’ ramp to aid Harrier

17 HMS Hermes in the company of the frigate HMS Broadsword in 1982. The large ‘ski jump’ take-off ramp is prominent at the bows of the ship. (US Department of Defense)

take-off. Her commando role remained in a residual capacity but her prime role was now task group air defence and ASW command.

FEARLESS CLASS

Design development The dock landing ship (or LSD) had initially been seen as one of the more eccentric of landing ship designs of World War II: they were self-powered floating docks that by taking on sea-water ballast would sink sufficiently to fill a large well-deck running the length of the vessel. Within the well-deck would be landing craft – large enough to carry tanks – that would emerge from a stern door in the rear of the ship, and then proceed to the assault beaches. Four LSDs were delivered for the Royal Navy from US yards, whilst the US Navy operated another twenty-three for themselves. The four British vessels were returned to the United States after the war when the Lend-Lease agreements ended. During World War II the LST became the predominant way of landing armour and equipment, but during the Korean War the US LSDs came into their own. The LSDs were ideal for rapid landings of relatively small quantities of equipment and vehicles, and their traditional bow form meant that they could reach the higher speeds needed to evade submarines and reach landing areas quicker. The US Navy therefore began a programme of new

HMS HERMES B Hermes was a slightly larger half-sister of Bulwark and Albion, the first commando carriers, but by the mid-1960s she was also considered too small to operate the most modern jet aircraft, and with the planned withdrawal from fixed-wing aviation underway following the 1966 Defence Review, her long-term future was in doubt. Hermes’ conversion, effectively as a replacement for Albion, was partly justified on the basis of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean rather than the Far East. She was converted into a combined anti-submarine and commando carrier, so she operated both anti-submarine and troop-lift helicopters. The ASW focus meant that Hermes had a more sophisticated sonar suite and a command system that enabled her to co-ordinate an ASW force in a NATO environment. As with her half-sisters, her fixed-wing aircraft-handling facilities were removed, and troop accommodation and four landing craft on davits were added. The Type 965 air search radar was fitted above the bridge in place of the bulky Type 984, which was no longer considered necessary for the types of operations she would now conduct. Her Seacat air defence missile systems were retained, on sponsons either side of the upper hull. Hermes operated anti- submarine Wessex and later Sea King helicopters and Wessex commando helicopters. In this illustration Wessex commando helicopters are on the flight deck.

18 19 LSDs, which were then followed by LPDs: essentially LSDs with smaller docks but more space for accommodating assault troops, stores and equipment, now operating alongside the new LPHs. British thinking had been moving in the same direction, and in 1958 design work for a British LPD began. The development and details of the Fearless LPD design are set out in the text to plate C.

HMS Eastway, one of the Fearless 1966 original LSDs, built in the Displacement 12,120 tons full load United States under lend-lease Dimensions (m) 158.5/24.4/8.4 (mean) for the United Kingdom. She Amphibious capacity 4x LCM (9), 4x LCA (2) was returned to the USA after the war, but provided the 15 tanks, 47 lorries concept behind the core of the 394 troops (754 at overload) Royal Navy’s amphibious forces Armament 4x Seacat over the last half-century – the 2x 40mm Fearless- and Albion-class LPDs. Sensors and electronics Radar: Types 993 and 978 (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Propulsion 2x turbines, 2x shafts, 21 knots Licence v.1.0) Complement 533

Construction programme Two ships, Fearless and Intrepid, were ordered in 1962. Original planning work in the 1950s had proposed four such vessels, but only two were planned HMS Fearless as commissioned in 1965. She and her sister were and built in the 1960s. described as ‘assault ’ in contemporary naval annuals, Pendant Name Builder Laid down Launched Commissioned emphasizing their command L 10 Fearless Harland and Wolff 25/7/62 19/12/63 25/11/65 facilities and size. (© Ministry L 11 Intrepid John Brown 19/12/62 25/6/64 11/3/67 of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

In-service modifications Intrepid was fitted with the Royal Navy’s first satellite communications terminal (Type 5 terminal for Skynet) in 1970. Following refits in the 1980s, the vessels received the Type 994 surface search radar in place of the Type 993. In a refit which completed in 1990, two Seacat on Fearless were replaced by Phalanx, the Type 978 navigation radar with Type 1006, and Seagnat and Marconi Mentor A electronic countermeasures were fitted, as was the Plessey Nautis M tactical command system. As the Seacat system was withdrawn from the fleet in the mid-1990s, the remaining two Seacat launchers were also removed.

20 HMS Fearless towards the end of her career in 1996. The forward Seacat launchers have been replaced by 40mm guns and the after Seacats by Vulcan Phalanx systems with their prominent white-domed guidance radars. (US Navy)

SIR LANCELOT CLASS, SIR GALAHAD (II), SIR LAMARAK AND SIR CARADOC

Design development Sir Lancelot was the prototype vessel, ordered by the Ministry of Transport for the War Office, replacing the seven LSTs used by the Army for the routine transport of armour, but also having the ability to act as ‘follow-up ships’ in amphibious landings. Compared to her LST 3 predecessors Sir Lancelot had a stern loading ramp in addition to a bow ramp, air-conditioned accommodation, the ability to operate military pontoons and helicopter flight decks. A year after Sir Lancelot entered service, a further five vessels were ordered to a slightly modified design. Sir Galahad and later ships had more powerful cranes, two flight decks capable of operating helicopters and different diesel engines.

Sir Lancelot 1963 Sir Galahad (i) 1966 Displacement 5,550 tons full load 5,674 tons full load Dimensions (m) 125.6/18.0/3.6 125.6/18.0/3.9 Amphibious capacity 340 troops (534 at overload) RFA Sir Geraint in 1970 having recently been transferred to the 16 tanks, 34 mixed vehicles, 150 tons stores/ammunition . Her three Armament 2x 40mm large cranes for loading stores Sensors Navigation radars and equipment are prominent Propulsion 2x Denny/Sulzer diesels, 17 knots 2x Mirrlees diesels, in this photograph. (© Ministry 17 knots of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence Complement 68 68 v.1.0)

Following the loss of the first Sir Galahad at Bluff Cove during the Falklands conflict, a new vessel of the same name was ordered to a lengthened and modified design. As temporary replacements for Sir Tristram whilst she was rebuilt and for the new Sir Galahad whilst under construction, two commercial roll-on/roll-off ferries, Sir Lamarak and Sir Caradoc, were chartered.

21 C HMS FEARLESS, 1970 This cutaway plate shows HMS Fearless in the early 1970s. Her origins lay nearly 15 years before: in the late-1950s the Royal Navy needed to replace its own ageing LST fleet and provide its new commando carriers, HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion, with supporting vessels able to land heavy equipment and stores. Initially a new LCT type was considered, but the proposed speed of 20 knots proved impractical. In 1958, after considering both LST and LSD options, the latter was chosen as being faster and providing greater value for money. The design that was developed was based on the US Raleigh-class LPD concept, which adapted the wartime LSD concept but with additional troop accommodation – and with some significant differences. The Royal Navy’s amphibious capability and resources were much smaller than those of the US Navy: its own vessels would have to do much more on a single hull. A new dedicated amphibious to replace the converted frigate HMS Meon could not be afforded, so the British LPDs would also have the command facilities necessary to plan, manage and command an amphibious assault. This meant the installing of additional accommodation space for a naval amphibious commander at commodore rank plus his staff, a dedicated assault operations room placed alongside the ship’s own naval operations room, two bridges for the ship – one atop the other in an arrangement similar to the contemporary County-class guided missile destroyers – and an unusually wide range of communications systems. As built, this totalled 13 high frequency and nine ultra- high frequency systems, such a high concentration that there was a significant radiation risk, thus placing parts of the ship’s upper deck out of bounds to the crew. The ships also included four LCAs on davits abreast the main superstructure, allowing for the more rapid deployment of small troop-carrying craft if necessary. Fearless had four storage spaces: the tank deck (7,280 square feet, 50 tons weight limit), a half deck (4,460 square feet, 15 tons), the lower vehicle deck (3,320 square feet, 15 tons) and the forward half of the flight deck (6,200 square feet, 8.5 tons), all of which were connected by 20-degree ramps. As built, with her complement of landing craft, she could discharge all her transported vehicles and troops 8 miles to shore in 14 hours (at 1 mile offshore she could discharge them in three and a half hours). Although she did not have a hangar for helicopters, Fearless could refuel and maintain four Wessex V helicopters on a four-week deployment.

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1. LCM 9 landing craft 5. Flying control position (‘Flyco’) 10. LCVP 1 landing craft 2. Wooden baffles in dock (protecting 6. Aft Seacat air defence missile launchers 11. Upper vehicle (tank) deck dock walls) 7. Type 993 surveillance radar 12. Lower vehicle deck 3. Flight deck 8. Type 978 navigation radar 13. Flight deck entrance to vehicle decks 4. Wessex HU 5 commando helicopter 9. 40mm gun on starboard bridge wing 14. Floodable dock

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23 Sir Galahad (ii) Sir Lamarak Sir Caradoc 1987 Displacement 8,570 tons full load 5,230 tons full load 5,980 tons full load Dimensions (m) 140.5/19.5/4.3 108.3/21.1/5 124/16.5/5 Amphibious capacity 343 troops (537 overload) (292,000 cubic feet (not known) cargo capacity) Armament 2x 40mm, 3x 20mm – – Sensors Radar: Type 1006 Navigation radars Navigation radars Decoys: Plessey Shield Racal CANE command system Propulsion 2x Mirrlees diesels, 2x Lindholmen/ 2x Normo 5-cyl Pielstick diesels, 18 diesels, 18 knots knots 16 knots Complement 49 24 24

Construction programme All the ships in the class were initially operated by the Atlantic Steamship Navigation Company until 1970, when they were taken over by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.

Pendant Name Builder Laid down Launched Commissioned L 3029 Sir Lancelot Fairfield 3/62 6/63 1/64 L 3005 Sir Galahad Stephens 2/65 19/4/66 17/12/66 L 3027 Sir Geraint Stephens 6/65 26/1/67 12/7/67 L 3004 Sir Bedivere Hawthorn Leslie 10/65 20/7/66 18/5/67 L 3505 Sir Tristram Hawthorn Leslie 2/66 12/12/66 14/9/67 L 3036 Sir Percivale Hawthorn Leslie 4/66 4/10/67 23/3/68 L 3005 Sir Galahad (ii) Swan Hunter 12/5/85 13/12/86 25/11/87

RFA Sir Geraint seen from the stern. The high superstructure aft supported the helicopter deck and covered the stern loading ramp. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

24 Pendant Name Completed Chartered Commissioned L 3532 Sir Lamarak (ex Lakespan 1972 14/1/83 26/3/83 Ontario, ex Lady Catherine) L 3522 Sir Caradoc (ex Grey Master) 1973 14/1/83 26/3/83

In-service modifications Following the the surviving ships of this class (aside from the two chartered vessels) were gradually armed with Corvus missile decoy ‘chaff’ launchers and a light armament of two 20mm guns. Two ships of the class were modified substantially: the first, RFA Sir Tristram, following considerable damage at Bluff Cove during the Falklands conflict. Sir Tristram returned to the United Kingdom in June 1983 for repairs and modification. She was lengthened by 10 metres, which made her forward flight deck Chinook-capable, a new bridge structure was added, as were new radars and electronics. The work was completed on 9 October 1985. The second, RFA Sir Bedivere, was modernized as part of a Service Life Extension Programme (‘SLEP’); this is described in plate D.

Sir Tristram 1985 Sir Bedivere 1998 Displacement 5,800 tons full load 6,700 tons full load Dimensions (m) 135.8/17.7/4.0 137.5/18.2/4 Amphibious 328 troops, 352 troops, capacity 15 MBTs, 40 mixed vehicles 12 Challenger tanks or 56 Land Rovers, 20 containers Armament 4x 20mm 2x 20mm Sensors Navigation Type 1007 navigation Propulsion 2x Mirrlees diesels, 2x Wartsila diesels, RFA Sir Bedivere following 17 knots 17 knots her Service Life Extension Complement 56 60 Programme (‘SLEP’). She was lengthened, her propulsion and much of her equipment replaced and her aft helicopter landing area cut down by one deck. (Franco Atirador/ HMS OCEAN Wikimedia Commons/ CCBY-SA-3.0) Design development Following the conversion of Hermes, it was clear that new-build commando carriers would be needed by the late 1970s and early 1980s to replace Bulwark and Hermes herself. Design work concentrated on an austere single- screw ship built to commercial standards, but following the 1975 Defence Review the planned ships were cancelled. Seven years later, the Falklands conflict demonstrated the continuing need for a dedicated commando carrier, and with the retirement of Hermes in 1984, it was clear that using the Invincible-class aircraft carriers in this role could only be a stop gap, given their important anti-submarine and surface strike roles

25 in NATO. A new dedicated commando carrier would be needed. The development of the ship that became HMS Ocean is summarized in the text accompanying plate D.

Ocean 1998 Displacement 21,758 tons full load Dimensions (m) 203.4/34/6.6 Amphibious capacity 972 troops, including 303 overload 4x LCVP Mk 4, 2x Griffon, 40 vehicles and equipment for a commando unit Armament 8x 20mm (4x twin) 3x Phalanx 12x Sea King and 6x Lynx (later Apache) helicopters Sensors Radar: Type 996, Type 1007 ESM: DLJ, Sea Gnat, DLH Combat data system: ADAWS 2000, Link 11, 14 Propulsion 2x Crossley diesels, 19 knots Complement 265 plus 180 aircrew

Construction programme Much of the early design work on Ocean had been undertaken in partnership with Swan Hunter, but in the event Vickers’ Barrow yard won the contract, with the hull being built under sub-contract at Kvaerner’s Govan yard.

RFA SIR BEDIVERE AND HMS OCEAN D 1. RFA Sir Bedivere, shown here, was unique in her class in undergoing a major modernization after nearly 30 years of service. In 1992, with the ships of the Sir Lancelot class already 25 years old, it was announced that the three remaining unmodified vessels (Sir Geraint, Sir Bedivere and Sir Percivale – Sir Lancelot had been sold in 1989) would receive SLEP refits to extend their operational lives. This would involve new machinery, a new bridge structure and mast, a cut-down flight deck aft and increased length to make the vessels Chinook-capable. Sir Bedivere was the first vessel to enter the SLEP in December 1994, completing in January 1998. The SLEP overran significantly and the costs were higher than expected. As a result, the remaining SLEPs were cancelled and new- build ships were ordered instead: the Bay class. After ten years operating in this modified form, Sir Bedivere was sold to the Brazilian navy and is still active today, half a century after her completion. 2. HMS Ocean’s origins lay in the lessons learnt from the Falklands conflict. The landings at San Carlos had shown that a commando carrier, with its rapid helicopter assault capacity, was sorely needed to supplement the LPDs. From 1983 staff work began on a new LPH. When it was decided to convert the roll-on/roll-off ship Contender Bezant to the Navy’s new aviation (RFA Argus), it had initially been hoped to convert her sister ship, Contender Argent, as an aviation support ship that could undertake the commando carrier role. This did not occur, but a series of studies were then commissioned to assess the requirements for replacing the ageing amphibious force. Aside from two LPDs and four replacement LSLs, the studies also recommended two Aviation Support Ships, in effect, commando carriers. At this stage, the requirement was set for each ASS to embark 12 commando helicopters, six light helicopters, 800 troops and four LCVPs. Initially an unfeasible cap of £110m was set for the price of each ship, and under this basis invitations to tender were sent out. Only two were received from shipbuilders and none met the necessary requirements. Further design work and some increases in the planned cost produced a design that was more viable, but was still built to commercial standards (which had implications for survivability if hit), and also the likelihood of additional through-life costs in areas such as engine maintenance. Eventually the new commando carrier was approved within the Ministry of Defence, and the order of a single ship was announced in May 1993. The planned cost was £189m, and the troop requirement was reduced to 500, with an additional 303 in overload conditions. The permanent capacity for 800 troops was fitted in a refit once Ocean had entered service. Ocean was armed with Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems to counter sea-skimming missiles, and is shown here with Apache helicopters on deck – she was modified to operate these helicopters from 2005.

26 1 2

27 Pendant Name Builder Laid down Launched Commissioned L 12 Ocean Vickers/Kvaerner 30/5/94 11/10/95 30/9/98

In-service modifications In 2001, after her first commission, Ocean was refitted with modified davits for the LCVPs after the original set had proved unsatisfactory; a bespoke Ramp Support Pontoon was also placed on the flight deck aft, which could be lowered into the water by the ship’s crane. Chine blisters were added below the davits in a further refit in 2002. In the same year the ship was fitted with the ADAWS 2000 3.1 tactical command system. In 2004–05 Ocean was fitted with the infrastructure to operate Apache helicopters, and the Bowman communications system was installed. By 2007 the Type 1008 surface search radar had replaced the Type 1007, Type 1016- 1017 IFF had been added and DLJ removed. In addition UAT Mod 1 and torpedo defence Type 2170 (US SLQ-25A) had been fitted. During 2012–14 Ocean undertook a major refit which saw the Type 996 radar replaced by Type 997, ADAWS replaced by DNA 2, the eight GAM-BO1 20mm guns replaced by four automated DS30M 30mm guns, and larger sponsons for the rear Phalanx fitted. In addition, new fire control and sewage systems were added. By 2014 Ocean’s standard ship’s company had expanded to 374, with a potential air group of 250.

BAY CLASS AND LOGISTICS SHIPS

Design development The Service Life Extension Programme (‘SLEP’) for the remaining ships of the Sir Lancelot class had ended up going significantly over budget, with only one vessel so updated before the Ministry of Defence decided to build new vessels instead. It had been calculated that new ships would cost around the same as the ‘SLEP’ but provide 25 years of service compared to 15. It was

HMS Ocean in 2011 during the Libya campaign when she operated Army Air Corps Apache attack helicopters, a capability she gained following a 2004–05 refit. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

28 RFA Mounts Bay in 2010 taking part in NATO’s Exercise Cold Response in Norway. Mexeflotes, which are floating pontoons that can be powered and used to unload equipment, are strapped to her hull amidships. (US Marine Corps)

assessed that five new ships would be needed and a modified version of the successful Dutch Rotterdam design was selected. Details of what became the Bay class are set out in the text accompanying Plate E.

Mounts Bay 2006 Displacement 16,160 tons full load Dimensions (m) 176/26.4/5.8 Amphibious capacity 356 troops 36 Challenger tanks or 150 vehicles plus 200 tons ammunition Armament 2x 30mm Sensors Navigation radars on E, F and I bands Propulsion 4x Wartsala generators, 2x steerable propulsors, 18 knots Complement 60

Construction programme Swan Hunter won the contract to construct the first two in the class, and BAE systems the final two. A fifth envisaged vessel was not ordered. Unfortunately Swan Hunter was unable to fulfil the contract successfully: the National Audit Office in a subsequent report stated that the firm had a new management with little military contract experience, that the detailed design was less advanced than envisaged and that the project was telescoped into too tight a time period when the third and fourth orders were placed. The contract with Swan Hunter was renegotiated and BAE staff were brought in to help the smaller shipyard, but by June 2005 Swan Hunter had to report that it could not fulfil the contract under the new terms. Largs Bay was completed by Swan Hunter, but Lyme Bay was towed for completion to BAE, who took over the management of the rest of the contract. Despite these problems, which resulted in the late delivery of the class and the sad exit of Swan Hunter from over 120 years of shipbuilding, the four Bay-class ships were capable and effective multipurpose vessels: they supplemented the LPDs and LPH in the amphibious assault role, significantly increased British sea logistics capability and could also undertake a range of other roles including that of to smaller vessels.

29 RFA Cardigan Bay in the in 2014. She has been fitted with a temporary hangar and two Vulcan Phalanx CIWS for missile defence. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

Pendant Name Builder Laid down Launched Commissioned L 3006 Largs Bay Swan Hunter 28/1/02 18/7/05 28/11/06 L 3007 Lyme Bay Swan Hunter 22/11/02 3/9/05 26/11/07 L 3008 Mounts Bay BAE Govan 25/8/02 9/4/04 13/7/06 L 3009 Cardigan Bay BAE Govan 13/10/03 8/4/05 18/12/06

In-service modifications Over their service careers, the Bay-class ships have had their capabilities gradually enhanced. Although Largs Bay was sold to Australia in 2011 (becoming HMAS Choules) following the outcome of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the remaining three ships were updated with Link 16 communications systems in 2013–14. In addition, one Bay-class has been routinely stationed in the Gulf as a Mine Counter Measures Support Ship, acting as a depot ship for the British mine warfare squadron. To fulfil this role the ship is temporarily equipped with two Phalanx systems, a temporary helicopter hangar plus the full range of stores and equipment necessary to support mine warfare vessels.

HMS ALBION AND RFA LARGS BAY E 1. HMS Albion was the first of two new LPDs for the Royal Navy, replacing Fearless and Intrepid. Albion and her sister, Bulwark, were fitted on completion with extensive command and control systems, including a 72-workstation Command Support System and an Integrated Communications System for internal communications. Vehicles are loaded on a ‘roll-on/roll-off’ basis, entering the ship from a forward vehicle loading ramp in the ship’s side (seen here in the up position: a vertical rectangle in the hull below the ship’s bridge), and then leaving via LCU in the ship’s floodable dock aft. The ship has a total of 500 metres’ lane length for military vehicles. The ship’s propulsion was also innovative, with four diesel generators powering two motors and a bow thruster, thus becoming the Royal Navy’s first integrated full electric propulsion ships. 2. RFA Largs Bay, shown here, was the first of four new LSD(A)s, procured to replace the Sir Lancelot class. Following the overrunning of the Sir Lancelot-class modernization, through-life cost assessments confirmed that building new vessels would be cheaper than continuing the modernization programme. A design based on the Dutch Navy’s Rotterdam class was then developed. Unlike the Sir Lancelot class, the new vessels would not be bow-door landing ships, but would have a medium-sized dock, with capacity for one LCU and the ability to operate two LCVPs in either the dock or from the deck aft. As auxiliaries, these vessels would not have the sophisticated sea and land command and control capability of LPDs, but they were a considerable step up in capability from their LSL predecessors and had the capacity to operate in a number of roles, including depot/support ship to smaller vessels.

30 1 2

31 Logistics ships Alongside the modernization of the Sir Lancelot class and the procurement of the Bay class, it was recognized that more basic logistics vessels would be needed to transport the equipment of the new Joint Rapid Deployment Force. After a short- lived experiment with chartering commercial roll-on/roll-off ships (RFA Sea Crusader from 1996 to 2003 and RFA Sea Centurion from 1998 to 2002), it was decided to operate six contractor- manned purpose-built vessels, two of which would be chartered commercially when not needed. Hurst Point, Hartland Point, Eddystone, MV Hartland Point loaded with Anvil Point, Longstone and Beachy Head entered service in 2002–03 under military equipment for the a contract awarded to AWSR Ltd until 2024. By early 2013 the last two Cougar 2012 exercise. These vessels had been removed from the logistic force, as they had been little used commercially manned vessels have significantly increased the in that role. Ministry of Defence’s on-call logistics capability. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence ALBION CLASS v.1.0) Design development Since the Falklands conflict, the government had agreed that the two existing assault ships should be replaced. However, by the time the Cold War had ended, despite much staff work and discussion no orders had been placed, an indicator perhaps of the level of priority given to amphibious warfare in the later Cold War. The end of the Cold War changed this and eventually two new assault ships were ordered, as part of the wider renaissance of amphibious warfare in the 1990s. The ships would have a similar amphibious capacity to their predecessors but would benefit from the latest technology, not least a sophisticated amphibious operations room, two Goalkeeper Close-in Weapon Systems and an extensive suite of electronic warfare systems.

HMS Bulwark taking part in the 2012 Cougar exercise in the Mediterranean. An LCVP is being lowered from its davits and vehicles and equipment can be seen stored on her flight deck. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

32 Albion 2004 Displacement 18,500 tons full load Dimensions (m) 176/28.9/7.1 Amphibious capacity 305 troops, or 710 troops (overload) 67 support vehicles 4x LCU or 2x LCAC, 4x LCVP Command system ADAWS 2000 Armament 2x 20mm 2x 30mm Goalkeeper Sensors Radar: Types 996, 1007, 1008, 1016/1017 IFF Electronic warfare: DLJ, DLH, Seagnat, UAT 1/4 Propulsion 4x generators, 2x motors, 2x shafts, 18 knots Complement 325

Construction programme The decision was formally taken in mid-1991 to replace both LPDs after nearly nine years of deliberation. Project definition studies had been completed by February 1994. Invitations to tender were issued in 1994 and only VSEL (later BAE Systems) made a bid. The contract was awarded on 18 July 1996.

Pendant Name Builder Laid down Launched Commissioned L 14 Albion BAE Barrow 22/5/98 9/3/01 19/6/03 L 15 Bulwark BAE Barrow 27/1/00 15/11/01 28/4/05

In-service modifications The ships’ davits for LCVPs had been replaced by 2008. Their tactical command systems had been updated by 2013, whilst their radars and electronic warfare suites had been replaced or updated during routine refits.

An LCU emerging from the OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS dock of HMS Albion. The LCU’s mast is in the process of being For the first 15 years following the end of World War II, most of the lifted to its full height. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed Royal Navy’s amphibious capability was kept in various levels of reserve under the Open Government or preservation, to be reactivated in the event of a crisis. The Combined Licence v.1.0) Operations Training Squadron and the Royal Marine Amphibious School operated some active landing vessels, and from 1952 an Amphibious Warfare Squadron was established. Operating from Malta, the squadron consisted of one LSH(S) and usually two LSTs with two LCTs.

The Suez Crisis In July 1956 the nationalist leader of Egypt, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, announced that the Suez Canal that linked the Mediterranean with the Red Sea (and therefore with the Indian Ocean)

33 would be nationalized and taken under the control of the Egyptian state. The offices and assets of the Suez Canal Company, an Anglo- French company which managed and owned the canal and in which the French and British governments both had shares, were seized. Very soon afterwards the British and French began to plan to regain control over this vital strategic sea route. There were insufficient forces in the Mediterranean to undertake the operation in a rapid coup de main. The organization of an amphibious assault to retake the Canal Zone took a number of months as ships and equipment were reactivated, readied and sent The LCT HMS Buttress off- to the theatre. Given US opposition to any military operation, the British and loading equipment at the French devised a ruse in order to provide ‘legitimating’ cover for the attack. fishing harbour of Port Said Israel, in a secret agreement with the British and French, would invade the during Operation Musketeer. (Imperial War Museum Sinai desert and the two European powers would then intervene, nominally MH 23500) to enforce peace between Israel and Egypt, but in reality to seize the Canal Zone and return it to the ownership of the Suez Canal Company. Initially a plan involving a four-division assault on Alexandria was approved, but this was rejected in favour of a three-division assault on Port Said at the entrance of the canal, which would be more manageable logistically and provide more flexibility for the operational commanders. The small amphibious squadron in Malta, which consisted only of the headquarters ship HMS Meon, two LSTs (Reggio and Striker) and two LCTs (Bastion and Redoubt), would clearly not be enough to land British forces, so a number of vessels in reserve were reactivated. Two LSTs and two LCTs held in reserve in Malta were brought back to active service (Anzio, Lofoten, Citadel and Portcullis), whilst a further four LSTs and five LCTs arrived from UK waters (Puncher, Salerno, Suvla and Ravager; Parapet, Counterguard, Sallyport, Buttress and Rampart). The seven LSTs chartered by Frank Bustard and Sons for cross-Channel ferry work were temporarily returned to military control, whilst the Army contributed all seven of its LSTs plus three LCTs. Thirty-seven LCAs were also taken out of reserve. Most ambitiously, two Colossus-class aircraft carriers, Theseus and Ocean, that were being used in secondary roles such as trooping and training, were rapidly repurposed as ‘commando carriers’ for helicopter assault. They received Whirlwind helicopters from 845 Squadron and the Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit (a joint Army/RAF unit). Each carrier also embarked considerable numbers of troops from the Royal Marines 3 Commando Brigade. The concept of helicopter assault was then extremely new: in July 1956 the United States had only just commissioned its first LPH, the USS Thetis Bay, converted from a wartime escort carrier. Limited trials had been undertaken by the Royal Navy in May 1955 using only two Whirlwinds and four smaller Dragonfly helicopters to land two platoons of 42 Commando, during Exercise Runaground near Gosport. What was now being devised was significantly larger, and much more ambitious. Initially it was planned that a helicopter assault, using 45 Commando in Whirlwinds from Ocean and Theseus, would be undertaken on two bridges at Raswa to the south of

34 Port Said, but given the limited number of helicopters available it was considered too risky. However, the use of helicopters remained in the Port Said assault plan but instead as part of the second wave, after troops landed by assault craft had secured a small bridgehead. On 29 October the Israelis, as planned, attacked Egyptian forces in Sinai. Britain and France then issued an ultimatum, threatening intervention if both forces did not cease fighting and withdraw from the Canal Zone. This was not accepted by the Egyptians, and what had been termed Operation Musketeer therefore began. British and French fleet carriers then began air attacks on Egyptian airfields, neutralizing the Egyptian air force by 2 November. Air Troop-carrying Whirlwind attacks then began to focus on military installations and the amphibious helicopters taking off from force moved into position. Political pressure at the forced HMS Theseus during Operation Musketeer. (Imperial War the military planners to advance the parachute assault by one day, with the Museum A 33640) British 3rd Parachute Battalion dropping at Gamil airfield and the battle- hardened French 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment dropping at Raswa on 5 November. These objectives were successfully taken, and the next day the amphibious assault began. The minesweeping force went in and successfully swept a passage to the landing area, and the British assault force, split into two columns led by Meon, headed to Port Said, whilst the French assault force headed to Port Fouad. Bombardment from large vessels such as and cruisers had been prohibited for political reasons, but just before dawn on the 6th, as the assault force approached, suppressing fire from four Royal Navy destroyers provided naval gunfire support. Behind the destroyers, Striker and Reggio carried 40 Commando whilst Suvla and Anzio carried 42 Commando. The destroyers then fanned out to the edges of the A Centurion tank disembarking landing zone and the LSTs began to offload their LCAs and LVTs with Royal from HMS Puncher at Port Said. Marines on board. The LSTs retreated to a safe distance as the small craft (Imperial War Museum A 33645) headed to the shoreline, with the destroyers continuing their naval gunfire support. 42 Commando landed on Green Beach and 40 Commando on Red Beach at 0645hrs, and they were followed 20 minutes later by four LCTs carrying 14 Centurion tanks towing their own ammunition supplies. There was some light resistance from Egyptian forces, which was soon dealt with, and the Marines and the tanks were landed without loss. The world’s first helicopter assault, employing 45 Commando, also took place after the initial landings: this is described in more detail in the commentary to Plate F. After the beach had been secured, 14 LSTs supported by landing craft began

35 unloading their military vehicles, stores, ammunition and additional troops, whilst the Marines began to fight towards their first-stage objectives: the port for 40 Commando, the south of the town to seal off exits for 42 Commando and the ‘Arab town’ for 45 Commando. The political pressure on the British and French governments was such that they ordered a ceasefire at midnight local time, with British forces having reached 23 miles south of Port Said by that time. Under severe US pressure, the British and French conceded to withdraw without conditions, resulting in a humiliation for the two European powers and a political victory for Nasser, who enhanced his credibility across the Arab world. Although the Suez operation was a costly political and strategic failure, Royal Navy Wessex helicopters it had demonstrated the effectiveness of modern amphibious operations, not establishing a landing zone least the helicopter assault undertaken by 45 Commando. in the Borneo jungle. It is in operations such as these that commando helicopter pilots The Cold War and ‘End of Empire’: 1957–82 earned their nicknames as Following the Suez Crisis, British amphibious warships were used heavily in ‘junglies’. (© Crown copyright: a range of ‘end of empire’ operations east of the Suez Canal. In 1958, after Imperial War Museum the overthrow of the pro-British regime in Iraq, fears of further revolutions GOV 14186) in other Arab monarchies resulted in Striker and Bastion sending troops to support King Idris of Libya, whilst Evan Gibb was involved in operations to reinforce Jordan from the Red Sea. The new rulers of Iraq began to revive old claims on the Sheikdom of Kuwait and as a result, the Amphibious Squadron was moved from Malta to the Persian Gulf in 1959. In June 1961 General Qasim openly reasserted these claims and the Kuwaitis requested British military support to deter what seemed to be an impending invasion. Meon, Striker, Empire Gull and later Bulwark were despatched and were able to

SUEZ HELICOPTER ASSAULT F This plate shows Whirlwind helicopters taking off from HMS Theseus to take part in the assault of Port Said during Operation Musketeer: the seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956. The helicopter began serious development towards the end of World War II, and its potential for naval anti-submarine work was recognised early. The first operational naval helicopter was the Dragonfly: too cramped to take the necessary sonar equipment, but able to undertake ferrying and search-and-rescue duties. The first helicopter large enough to undertake carrier-based anti-submarine work was the Whirlwind, a modified US Sikorsky S-55 (Whirlwind HAS 21) initially purchased direct from Sikorsky, but later built under license by the British firm Westland. The Whirlwind was also large enough to take ten fully equipped soldiers in her cabin, and on their operational introduction into 848 Squadron in 1953 were soon employed to ferry troops and evacuate casualties in counter- insurgency operations in Malaya with considerable success. The Royal Navy and Royal Marines also began to undertake experiments in using helicopters for amphibious assault, and in the planning for Musketeer, it was decided to include a helicopter assault from two small aircraft carriers, Ocean and Theseus. The ships were brought into the Mediterranean and after some scratch training exercises, the vessels, their recently embarked Whirlwind helicopters and the Marines of 45 Commando were made ready to lead the second- wave assault. Starting at 0810hrs, 22 helicopters flew in 425 men and 23 tons of stores from 9 miles offshore in only an hour-and-a-half. This quantity of personnel, delivered into combat in such a short time, was unprecedented and clearly demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of helicopter amphibious assault. Just as significantly, helicopters dramatically improved medical evacuation times for the wounded, and this became one of their key roles after the troops had been landed, evacuating a total of 96 casualties.

36 37 land 42 Commando in short order, with airlifted troops arriving some days later. The threatened attack never occurred, and Iraqi units that had been undertaking ‘exercises’ close to the border were withdrawn. British amphibious forces and Royal Marine commandos were used in a range of other operations in this period, including sending troops by helicopter to put down an incipient ‘barrack room’ rebellion by troops in newly independent Tanganyika, and undertake operations in Aden and Borneo. Following the government’s decision to withdraw from bases ‘East of Suez’, operations worldwide reduced after 1971, and there was an increasing focus on the use of amphibious forces to support NATO’s ‘flanks’ in Norway and the eastern Mediterranean. Bulwark, Hermes, Fearless and Intrepid took part in regular NATO Soldiers of the 2nd Scots exercises and deployments throughout the 1970s. Following the 1975 Guards embarking aboard Defence Review, the Royal Marines increasingly focused on the northern HMS Fearless at Gareloch in flank task of reinforcing Norwegian forces in the event of Soviet aggression. July 1972, prior to deployment to as part of Operation Closer to home, Fearless and Intrepid were deployed to Londonderry and Motorman. (© Ministry of Belfast to land troops as part of Operation Motorman, the actions to remove Defence, licensed under the Provisional IRA barricades and no-go areas in Roman Catholic areas of Open Government Licence those cities. v.1.0) The Falklands campaign On 2 April 1982, Argentine armed forces invaded and captured the Falkland Islands, a British Crown dependency in the South Atlantic Ocean, 7,800 miles from the United Kingdom. The islands had been claimed by the Argentine government for nearly 150 years, although its small population was of British descent and overwhelmingly favoured remaining a British dependency. The British government soon decided to send a naval task force to the South Atlantic, initially to place diplomatic pressure on the Argentines as negotiations took place, but also, if necessary, to retake the islands if the invaders refused to withdraw. The British instituted a maritime exclusion zone around the islands, and as the task force approached the islands, the ‘shooting war’ began. HMS Hermes was the task force flagship under Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, but was primarily used as an aircraft carrier and command ship during the conflict, her residual commando role not being directly utilized: Hermes was just too important to the success of the campaign to be risked in amphibious landings. The two assault ships, Fearless and Intrepid, as well as the Sir Lancelot-class LSLs, became the core of the amphibious group to retake the islands, supplemented by several ships taken up from trade. These ranged from the two ocean liners Canberra and Queen Elizabeth II, which acted as troopships, through to a number of roll-on/roll-off ferries used as stores and vehicle transports, and container ships converted to aircraft and vehicle transports, including the Atlantic Conveyor. As the British prepared for the landings, the torpedoing and sinking of the Argentine Belgrano on 2 May, followed by the loss of the British Sheffield to an Exocet anti-ship missile launched from a Super Étendard aircraft, demonstrated

38 the seriousness of the conflict for both sides. The sinking of the Belgrano effectively forced the Argentine Navy into its ports for the duration of the conflict, whilst the loss of the Sheffield highlighted the very real capabilities of the Argentine Air Force and naval air arm. San Carlos Bay on the west side of was chosen as the landing site for the amphibious force, which would bring ashore 40 and 42 Commandos Royal Marines and the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. Landing directly at the island’s capital, Port Stanley, was the option expected by the Argentines, as it would be the most direct route to the objective, but for the British it would have resulted in attacking the Argentines where they were strongest and where they were expected. The movement of the force from San Carlos to Port Stanley, across the inhospitable moorland terrain of the East Falkland, would be undertaken by helicopter and if necessary on foot. In the event, the loss of most of the helicopter lift capacity when the MV Atlantic Conveyor was hit by a further Exocet, meant that the transfer would be largely undertaken on foot as the Marines and Paras ‘yomped’ and ‘tabbed’ to Port Stanley. The Commander of the (naval) amphibious group, based on Fearless, was Commodore , who worked closely with Brigadier Julian Thompson RM, the commander of the (land) amphibious landing force. The amphibious group consisted of Fearless and Intrepid, five of the Sir Lancelot class, plus the troopship Canberra, three logistics ships (Norland, Elk and Europic Ferry) and the aircraft and equipment transport Atlantic Conveyor. They were supported by several Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, and were to be escorted to the landing site by the destroyer Antrim and six frigates. It had been planned that all three military units in the landing would be on board Canberra. However, there were fears in the United Kingdom that placing all the troops in one ship was too risky, and hours before the amphibious force was due to sail into San Carlos Bay, orders came from the UK to transfer 40 Commando to Fearless and 3 Para to Intrepid. Further uncertainty was provided by the inability to insert a special forces unit on Fanning Head, which dominated the entrance to the bay: as the SBS () unit approached under cover of darkness, torchlight was seen on the shore – an Argentine discovery that San Carlos Bay was the intended landing site was too serious a risk and the SBS unit returned. An elaborate decoy operation involving shore bombardment around the Port Stanley area, diversions at Darwin in the south

HMS Fearless in San Carlos Bay in the Falklands. This photograph emphasizes the open and exposed environment in which the amphibious forces in the bay found themselves during daylight. (Photo by Ken Griffiths/ Wikimedia Commons/ Public domain)

39 Soldiers from 2 Para disembark from one of Fearless’ LCUs at San Carlos Bay. (Photo by Fox Photos/Getty Images)

of East Falkland and a misinformation campaign all served to reinforce the impression that the impending landing would occur near Port Stanley. The landings were planned to begin under the cover of darkness at 0230hrs local time on 21 May. They occurred one hour later than scheduled due to a number of minor problems: faulty navigation equipment, ballast pump problems in Fearless and delays loading up some of the LCUs. An advance party of SBS landed and moved rapidly to Fanning Head to deal with the small Argentine unit based there. Surprise was achieved, the Argentines were quickly overwhelmed and most fled into the interior. After this, there followed the landing of the main force by landing craft, which is described in the commentary to Plate G.

FEARLESS IN SAN CARLOS BAY G In the very early hours of 21 May, under cover of darkness, Fearless’ LCUs and LCVPs carrying 40 Commando, and Intrepid’s LCUs carrying 2 Para, set off from the line of departure in at 0330hrs. They landed at Blue Beach near San Carlos settlement, halfway down San Carlos Water, without opposition and raised the Union Jack at the settlement, discovering 31 civilians. The LCUs then returned to Intrepid and Stromness to pick up 3 Para and 45 Commando. At 0700hrs, 3 Para landed at Green Beach near the smaller settlement of : they met desultory opposition from the small force of 40 Argentines there, who quickly fled. 45 Commando landed across San Carlos Water from Blue Beach on Red Beach at to no opposition. Whilst these second landings were in the process of taking place, an additional wave of logistics ships entered San Carlos Water to make ready to unload their cargos of stores, supplies and ammunition, via the LCUs, LCVPs and Mexeflote powered pontoons. At the same time the first Sea Harrier combat air patrol from the carriers was established, whilst RAF ground-attack Harriers had an early success in destroying an Argentine Chinook and Puma transport helicopter on the ground at Mount Kent west of Port Stanley, thus hampering any Argentine attempts to reinforce the landing area using helicopter transport. The Argentine Air Force, on hearing that the British were landing at San Carlos, launched their first air attack from the Rio Grande airfield at 0825hrs, arriving over San Carlos an hour later. The nine Daggers attacked and damaged two of the escorts: Antrim and Brilliant. Locally based Pucara aircraft also made attacks, as did follow-up waves of A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers over the rest of the day. The Argentines did not appear to have developed a coherent approach to their attacks – they focused on the warships that were attacking them whilst letting the vulnerable troopships, logistics ships and landing ships continue with their crucial role of transferring as many troops, stores and ammunition supplies ashore as quickly as possible. Canberra, in particular, had seemed a large vulnerable target but had not been hit once. This image shows Fearless and two of her LCUs in San Carlos Bay during a Skyhawk raid on the morning of 21 May. The landing craft are bringing supplies ashore as the attack occurs.

40 41 RFA Sir Tristram at Port Stanley in preparation for her return to the United Kingdom for rebuilding. The damage she suffered is evident in this photograph. (Photo by Ken Griffiths/ Wikimedia Commons/ Public domain)

After the first day, ten of the attacking Argentine aircraft had been downed, and on the other side of the balance sheet one escort, HMS Ardent, had been sunk after multiple bombings and four others were damaged, although all these were able to fight at various levels of capability. Most importantly, the amphibious landings had gone ahead successfully. Despite this, the offloading of supplies for the land forces was still necessary, but given the risks being run it was decided to move Canberra out, and for other vessels to land their cargos of stores and supplies at night-time. Over the following days, the materiel for the land force was successfully unloaded, with no losses of vessels within the San Carlos Bay area. On 24 May, however, a bombing run by Argentine Skyhawks did manage to hit Sir Bedivere, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad. In Sir Bedivere the bomb hit one of the forward cranes and then passed overboard without exploding. Sir Lancelot was hit by two bombs, both of which failed to explode and were defused five days later. Similarly, Sir Galahad was also hit by a bomb that failed to explode; it was also defused. There were no casualties in any of the attacks and damage caused was minor. Two brigades had been landed as part of the amphibious operations: 3 Commando Brigade and 5 Infantry Brigade. Whilst 3 Commando Brigade was to advance to Port Stanley in the east of East Falkland via a northern route, it was decided that 5 Infantry Brigade would advance by a southerly route. Because of issues of terrain, and to some extent the lack of fitness of some of the units in the latter brigade, it was decided that two of 5 Infantry Brigade’s battalions, 1st and 2nd Scots Guards, would go by sea to the small bays of Fitzroy and Bluff Cove on the south coast of East Falkland. There they would support another of the battalions, 2 Para, which after a bloody battle at the settlement of Goose Green had already advanced to Fitzroy using the sole remaining Chinook heavy-lift helicopter. Despite concerns about possible air and submarine attack, the operation to move the Scots and Welsh Guards went ahead as the only quick and effective way to link up the battalions in 5 Infantry Brigade. The Scots Guards were transported to Fitzroy in four LCUs, but the journey had been wet, lengthy and risky and it was decided to transport the Welsh Guards in Fearless and only unload them by LCU instead. Unfortunately difficulties in communications and misunderstandings meant that insufficient LCUs were available to unload the Welsh Guards quickly enough when they arrived

42 in Fearless. Two companies were unloaded and the other two returned to San Carlos in Fearless. It was then decided to transport the remaining two companies in the LSL Sir Galahad (another LSL, Sir Tristram, was already at Fitzroy unloading stores for 5 Infantry Brigade). Further poor communications meant that Sir Galahad arrived unexpectedly at Fitzroy, with only one LCU available to ferry them ashore. The initial plan was to take the men off at Fitzroy and march them the 15 miles to Bluff Cove, whilst Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram would take their stores to the cove. However, the Welsh Guards decided not to disembark most of their troops and instead to take them to Bluff Cove directly by ship with their stores, to save the march and out of frustration at the delays and logistical complications they had suffered so far. Unfortunately this increased the risk that these lightly armed auxiliary landing ships would be caught by an air attack: the Welsh Guards would be much more vulnerable at sea than dispersed and dug-in on land. When they finally got to Bluff Cove there was insufficient urgency in getting them off their vessels, and the attendant medical unit unloaded its equipment first whilst the Guards remained on board. This delay would prove fatal: Argentine land forces had seen the masts of the two ships at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove, and plans were laid for an air attack on the two ships. Dagger and Skyhawk strike aircraft were escorted by Mirage fighters, and while the Mirages were detected, the strike aircraft were not. The Daggers attacked and damaged the frigate , which had been engaged in naval gunfire support operations. The Skyhawks continued to Fitzroy and Bluff Cove and attacked Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, which had had only seconds’ warning of the approaching aircraft. Three bombs struck Sir Galahad and two Sir Tristram. Both ships were heavily damaged and were abandoned, Sir Galahad later sinking, but Sir Tristram was re-boarded after the fire had burnt itself out. Forty-nine soldiers and sailors were killed and a further 115 wounded, many suffering serious burns. Thirty-nine of the dead were Welsh Guardsmen. Three hours later another Skyhawk raid caught one of Fearless’ LCUs (F4) transporting stores in Choiseul Sound, 20 miles to the south-west of Bluff Cove. F4 was hit by a bomb and quickly sank with the loss of all of those on board. Despite the disaster at Bluff Cove, amphibious forces continued to unload stores and equipment to supply and support the Marines and Paras as they advanced across East Falkland. On 14 June, Argentine forces at Port Stanley surrendered following a British advance across the exposed interior of the island and tough engagements on the ridges leading to the capital of the islands. British amphibious forces had been utterly essential to the success of this short but hotly contested campaign: without them there would have been no way to land the troops needed to win the conflict.

The late Cold War and after: 1982–2018 The Falklands campaign had demonstrated the utility of the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability. However, in the realities of Cold War resource planning, the amphibious force was not a high priority. Hermes was decommissioned in 1984, whilst Fearless and Intrepid remained active – one in refit and reserve whilst the other was in commission – taking part in regular NATO exercises on the northern flank throughout the 1980s. With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the threat that had

43 dominated naval planning for the last 20 years had evaporated. The role of amphibious forces in supporting NATO’s northern flank in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack disappeared, but the new post-1991 world needed amphibious warships just as much, if not more, than the old one did. Of the two assault ships, Intrepid had no operational service after 1990 – providing a source of spares and equipment for her active sister. Fearless’ first commission after five years of reserve and refit was busy: she was initially held in readiness for deployment to the Gulf, but in the event was not required; she undertook deployments to Norway, the and the Mediterranean, being the first Royal Navy ship to visit the Crimea since 1947 and standing off Dubrovnik during the early stages of the siege of that city by Serb forces, in case an intervention or evacuation were ordered. In the 1990s the Cold War-era exercises in Norway gradually gave way to disaster relief exercises in places as diverse as Portland and Belize, and NATO intervention exercises in the Mediterranean, and in 1994, the last live firing of the Seacat missile system on a Royal Navy vessel. In the same year Fearless attended the 50th anniversary of the Normandy landings. Deployments and exercises in South-East Asia in 1997 were followed by a further visit to the Crimea in 1998. The hard-worked Fearless was finally joined by the first of the new generation of amphibious vessels in 1998. HMS Ocean had an eventful first five years in service: only a month after completion she undertook disaster relief in Nicaragua and Honduras following Hurricane Mitch, a year later she helped in the aftermath of an earthquake in the Turkish town of Duzce, and in May and June 2000 she was deployed to under Operation Palliser: initially to evacuate British citizens, but eventually to stabilize the government and prevent a rebel takeover of the capital. Ocean’s LCVPs undertook riverine patrols and she landed troops by helicopter and landing craft, keeping them supplied and supported during operations. She returned in November 2000 for Operation Stillman as a show of force to support the Sierra Leonean government. Unfortunately Fearless, which had been set to accompany Ocean, suffered a serious engine room fire and had to return to the United Kingdom: the 34-year-old vessel was showing her age. Fearless’ last major deployment before being withdrawn from service was on Exercise Saif Sarea II in the Gulf, accompanied by Ocean and the carrier Illustrious (in the LPH role) plus a number of LSLs: the largest Royal Navy deployment since the 1991 . Following the 9/11 attacks, planning began for operations in Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda. Illustrious operated off Pakistan as a training and launching point for Royal Marine commandos deployed to Afghanistan, whilst Ocean undertook maritime interdiction duties in the Gulf of Aden. Following the US decision to invade Iraq, Ocean and the carrier Ark Royal (also in the LPH role) were tasked with landing British troops on the Al Faw peninsula, to secure the vital oil platforms there. On the night of 20 March 2003 these two ships launched the first British helicopter assault operation since Suez, landing 40 Commando and 42 Commando against Iraqi opposition. The operation was a complete success: no British troops were killed by enemy fire but the Iraqis suffered over 150 deaths and 146 prisoners taken, and the oil platforms were captured largely undamaged. The next few years were less eventful for the British amphibious force: Ocean was joined in active service by Albion in 2004 and Bulwark in 2006, and between 2002 and 2008 the last of the Sir Lancelot class were withdrawn,

44 eventually to be replaced by the Bay-class LSD(A)s. In 2011, following an uprising against the Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi, the British, French and US governments agreed to intervene to protect the population of the city of Benghazi. The intervention eventually resulted in the overthrow of Gaddafi by rebel groups. Ocean and Albion, already in the Mediterranean conducting a series of exercises, were diverted to operations in Libya, under . Apache attack helicopters operating from Ocean undertook a series of strike operations to RFA Sir Galahad off-loading support rebels from June to September 2011: these involved strikes on land equipment and humanitarian targets to disrupt regime forces and attacks on fast coastal craft. supplies at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr in 2003. As the Invincible-class aircraft carriers were withdrawn from service, the (Photographer 2nd Class Bob larger amphibious vessels grew in prominence in the fleet: from 2010 Albion Houlihan/US Navy) acted as the fleet flagship, followed by Bulwark in 2011 and Ocean in 2015, with Albion again operating in this role from 2018. Since 2011 only one LPD has been in commissioned at a time, with Albion being in refit and reserve from 2011 to 2015 and Bulwark from 2015 to 2016. In 2012 Bulwark, accompanied by RFA Mounts Bay, co-ordinated the Navy’s operations in support of the Olympic Games, patrolling the Portland and Weymouth areas for sailing events; whilst Ocean acted as an armed forces base and accommodation ship in for the large numbers of servicemen and women brought into the capital to support the civilian authorities during the Olympics. In 2018 Ocean was decommissioned, the same year that the new strike carrier Queen Elizabeth joined the fleet, marking the end of a four- year period when amphibious vessels were the largest ships in the Navy. A new era for the Royal Navy had begun, but amphibious warships remained a significant part of the fleet with a unique ability to land troops and deliver force ashore. HMS Stalker, despite spending nearly her whole career as an immobile support ship, was DISPOSAL AND FATES the last of her class to survive. She is shown in July 2010 just before scrapping. (Geni/ Only those LSTs and LSH(S)s with significant post-1956 active service are Wikimedia Commons/ GFDL listed on the next page. The rest were scrapped between 1957 and 2010. CC-BY-SA)

45 Name Fate LST 3 AND LSH(S) CLASSES Anzio For disposal 1965. Sold 1970 Messina For disposal 1965. Broken up Spain 1980 Lofoten Laid up Rosyth 1967. Refit support ship to 1990 Reggio Sold for scrap 1960 Striker Paid off for scrapping 1966. Sold 1971 Empire Gull Decommissioned 19/10/78 Meon Disposal list 1965. Sold 1966 COMMANDO CARRIER CONVERSIONS Bulwark Disposal list 1/4/81. Towed for scrapping 4/84 Albion Paid off 2/3/73. Towed for scrapping 16/11/73 Hermes Placed in reserve 1984. Sold to India May 1986 FEARLESS CLASS Fearless Decommissioned 24/10/02. Sold for scrap 10/07 Intrepid Cannibalized to keep Fearless in service from 1990. Decommissioned 1999. Scrapped 2008 SIR LANCELOT CLASS Sir Lancelot Sold 1/6/89 commercially. Purchased by Singaporean Navy 1992 Sir Galahad (i) Bombed and sank at Bluff Cove, East Falkland 8/6/82 Sir Geraint Decommissioned 29/9/02 Sir Bedivere Decommissioned 17/4/08. Sold to Sir Tristram Decommissioned 20/1/06 Sir Percivale Decommissioned 2004 Sir Lamarak Returned to owners 20/1/86 Sir Caradoc Returned to owners 28/6/88 Sir Galahad (ii) Decommissioned 7/06. Sold to Brazil OCEAN CLASS Ocean Decommissioned 2018. Sold to Brazil BAY CLASS Largs Bay Purchase by Australia announced 4/11. Arrived Australia 12/11 LOGISTICS SHIPS Sea Crusader Returned to owners 7/8/03 Sea Centurion Returned to owners 27/8/02 Longstone Removed from Sealift force 2012 Beachy Head Removed from Sealift force 2012

RFA Empire Gull was an anomaly: she was the only commercially operated LST 3 to transfer, with the Sir Lancelot class, from charter to naval control and RFA manning in 1970. As a result she was the last to remain in active service, ferrying British Army vehicles and equipment from the United Kingdom to continental Europe until 1977. (© Ministry of Defence, licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0)

46 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Published sources Ballance, Theo, Squadrons and Aircraft of the , Air Britain (2016) Brown, D. K. and Moore, George, Rebuilding the Royal Navy, Chatham Publishing (2003) Clapp, Michael and Southby-Tailyour, Ewen, Amphibious Assault Falklands, Pen and Sword (1996) Everett-Heath, John, British Military Helicopters, Arms and Armour (1986) Freedman, Lawrence, Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2 Vols, Routledge (2005) Friedman, Norman, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, Naval Institute (2002) Janes’ Fighting Ships, Combat Fleets of the World, Navy News, various editions Johnstone-Bryden, Richard, HMS Ocean IV 1998–2018, Royal Navy (2018) Marriott, Leo, Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers 1945–90, Ian Allan (1985) McCart, Neil, Fearless and Intrepid, Fan Publications (2003) Moore, George, Building for Victory, World Ship Society (2003) Southby-Tailyour, Ewen, HMS Fearless: The Mighty Lion, Pen and Sword (2006) Southby-Tailyour, Ewen, Reasons in Writing, Leo Cooper (1993) Speller, Ian, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy 1945–56, Palgrave (2001) Speller, Ian (ed.), The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century, Frank Cass (2005)

Official publications Ministry of Defence, Statements on Defence Estimates, 1975 (Cmnd 5976), 1987 (Cm 101-I), 1988 (Cm 344-I), 1990 (Cm 1022-I); Strategic Defence Review, 1998 (Cm 3999), Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010 (Cm 7948) National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: The Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) project (HC 98-III Session 2007-2008), 30/11/07

Archival sources Churchill College, Cambridge: Sir John Nott papers, NOTT 4/8ii (interview HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid transcript) laid up at Portsmouth in 2006. (Photo by AlfvanBeem/ National Archives, Kew: ADM 187/69-188 – Admiralty ‘Pink List’, 1956–1975; Wikimedia Commons/ Public ADM 239/459, 550, 578-579, 795, 796, 824, 833 – Particulars of War domain) Vessels, 1958–1973; DEFE 10/943 – Operational Requirements Committee, 27/3/69, HMS Hermes National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: Ships’ Cover 960, New-build LPH, folios 3–5 Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth: Special M-Branch/DS5 Acquaints, various dates; ‘HM Ships Fearless and Intrepid’ May 1965, Ministry of Defence/ Navy Department pamphlet

47 INDEX

Aden 6, 38 Falklands conflict (1982) 7, 21, 25, D (26, 27), LVTs (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) 35 Afghanistan 44 38–43, 39, G (40, 41) Lyme Bay, RFA 29, 30 Albion, HMS 6, 6, 8, A (14, 15), 16–18, 17, Fearless, HMS 7, 9, 20, 20, 21, C (22, 23), 38, E (30, 31), 32–33, 33, 44, 45, 46 38, 39, 39, 40, 40, G (40, 41), 43, 44, 46, 47 Meon, HMS 16, 16, 34, 35, 36–38, 46 Albion class 9, 20, 32–33 Fearless class 6, 9, 18–20, 20, 46 Messina, HMS 13, 13, 14, 46 amphibious warfare 4–8 Mounts Bay, RFA 29, 30 Antrim, HMS 38, G (40, 41) Geraint, HMS 21 Anvil Point, MV 32 Narvik, HMS 13, 13 Anzio, HMS 14, 34, 35, 46 Hartland Point, MV 32, 32 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Ardennes class 10 helicopters 6, 7, 11, 11–12, 12, A (14, 15), 6, 29, 38, 43, 44 Ardent, HMS 42 B (18, 19), C (22, 23), D (26, 27), 28, 34–35, naval strategy 4–8 Ark Royal, HMS 44 35, 36, F (36, 37) Northern Ireland (1972) 6, 38, 38 Arromanches class 10 Hermes, HMS 6, 7, 17, 18, B (18, 19), 25, 38, Atlantic Conveyor, MV 38, 39 43, 46 Ocean, HMS 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 24–28, Hurst Point, MV 32 D (26, 27), 28, 34, F (36, 37), 44, 45, 46 , the 44 Operation Ellamy (2011) 45 Bastion, HMS 34, 36 Illustrious, HMS 44 Operation Motorman (1972) 6, 38 Bay class 8, 9, D (26, 27), 28–30, 45, 46 in-service modifications Operation Musketeer (1956) 34, 35, 35, Beachy Head, MV 32, 46 Albion-class 33 F (36, 37) Belgrano (Argentina) 38–39 Bay-class 30 Operation Palliser (2000) 44 Ben Lomond, SS 13 Commando Carrier Conversions 17–18 Operation Stillman (2000) 44 Ben Nevis, SS 13 Fearless-class 20 Borneo 6, 36, 38 HMS Ocean 28 Parapet, HMS 8, 34 Boxer class 12 LSH(S)-class 14–16 Portcullis, HMS 34 Brilliant, HMS G (40, 41) LST 3-class 14–16 Puncher, HMS 34, 35 Broadsword, HMS 18 Sir Lancelot-class 25 Bulwark, HMS 6–7, 8, 8, 11, A (14, 15), Intrepid, HMS 7, 20, 38, 43, 44, 46, 47 Queen Elizabeth II, SS 38 16–18, 17, 25, E (30, 31), 32, 32–33, 36–38, Falklands conflict (1982) 38, 39, G (40, 41) 44, 45, 46 Northern Ireland (1972) 38 Rampart, HMS 34 ‘bush-fire’ wars 6 Invincible class 25–26 Ravager, HMS 34 Buttress, HMS 34, 34 Iraq (2003) 44, 45 RCLs (Ramped Craft, Logistic) 10 Redoubt, HMS 34 Canberra, SS 38, 39, G (40, 41), 42 Jordan (1958) 36 Reggio, HMS 4, 14, 34, 35, 46 Cardigan Bay, RFA 30, 30 River class 16 Citadel, HMS 34 Korean War (1950-53) 5, 18 Colossus-class 34, 46 Kuwait (1961) 6, A (14, 15), 36–38 Salerno, HMS 34 Commando Carrier Conversions 16–18, 46 Sallyport, HMS 34 construction programme Largs Bay, RFA 29, 30, E (30, 31), 46 Sea Centurion, MV 46 Albion-class 33 LCACs (Landing Craft, Air Cushion) 9, 10 Sea Crusader, MV 46 Bay-class 29–30 LCAs (Landing Craft, Assault) 4, 10, Service Life Extension Programme (SLEP) Fearless-class 20 A (14, 15), 16, C (22, 23), 35 HMS Ocean 26–28 LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized) 9, 13, 13 25, D (26, 27), 28–29 LSH(S)-class 13–14 LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank) 8, 8–9, 33, 34, 34 Sheffield, HMS 38–39 LST 3-class 13–14 LCUs (Landing Craft, Utility) 9, E (30, 31), 33, Sierra Leone (2000) 44 Sir Lancelot-class 24–25 40, G (40, 41), 42, 43 Sir Bedivere, RFA 24, 25, 25, D (26, 27), 42, 46 conversion programme 17 LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) 9, 10, Sir Caradoc, RFA 21, 24, 25, 46 Counterguard, HMS 34 D (26, 27), E (30, 31), 32, G (40, 41) Sir Galahad, RFA 21, 24, 42, 43, 45, 46 Libya (1958) 36 Sir Geraint, RFA 24, 24, D (26, 27), 46 design development Libya (2011) 28, 45 Sir Lamarak, RFA 21, 24, 25, 46 Albion-class 32–33 Lofoten, HMS 16, 34, 46 Sir Lancelot, RFA 21, 42, 46 Bay-class 28–29 Logistics ships 32, 38, 46 Sir Lancelot class 6, 8, 21–25, D (26, 27), 28, Commando Carrier Conversions 16–17 Longstone, MV 32, 46 38, 44, 46 Fearless-class 18–20 LPDs (Landing Platform, Dock) 6, 7, 20, Sir Percivale, RFA 24, D (26, 27), 46 HMS Ocean 25–26 C (22, 23), E (30, 31) Sir Tristram, RFA 21, 24, 25, 42, 43, 46 LSH(S)-class 12–13 LPH (Landing Ship, Personnel, Helicopter) Stalker, HMS 45 LST 3-class 12–13 16, 20, D (26, 27) Striker, HMS 14, A (14, 15), 16, 34–38, 46 Sir Lancelot-class 21–24 LSDs (Landing Ship, Dock) 18–20, 20, Suez Crisis (1956) 5, 5–6, 8, 9, 11, 11, disaster relief operations 44 E (30, 31) A (14, 15), 16, 33–36, F (36, 37) LSH(S)-class (Landing Ship, Headquarters, Suvla, HMS 34, 35 Eastway, HMS 20 Small) 12–16, 33, 46 Eddystone, MV 32 LSLs (Landing Ships, Logistics) 6, 38 Theseus, HMS 16, 34, 35, F (36, 37) Empire Gull, RFA 36–38, 46, 46 LST 3-class (Landing Ship, Tank) 4, 5, 5, ‘end of empire’ operations 36–38 13–16, A (14, 15), 46 Waveney, HMS 16 Evan Gibb, HMS 36 LSTs (Landing Ship, Tanks) 10, 16, 33, 34 World War II (1939–45) 4, 18

48 OSPREY PUBLISHING Acknowledgements Bloomsbury Publishing Plc I would like to thank George Gelder, Lucy Rundle and John Hampshire for PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK their comments on drafts of this book, and my colleagues at the Naval 1385 Broadway, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA Historical Branch for their support and help. E-mail: [email protected] www.ospreypublishing.com The views and opinions expressed in this book are those of the author and should not be taken to represent those of Her Majesty’s Government, MOD, HM Armed Forces or any government agency. OSPREY is a trademark of Osprey Publishing Ltd

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