sign in sign up
<<
Home , Callicles, Cynicism (philosophy), Cynic epistles, Diogenes, Xeniades

, The Journal for Political Thought 35 (2018) 478-498 brill.com/polis

Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship

Christopher Paone Western Connecticut State University, 181 White St, Danbury, CT 06810, USA / Sacred Heart University, 5151 Park Ave, Fairfield, CT 06825, USA [email protected] / paonec@ sacredheart.edu

Abstract

Against the traditional reading of Cynic , this essay advances the thesis that ’ world citizenship is a positive claim supported by philosophi- cal argument and philosophical example. Evidence in favor of this thesis is a new interpretation of Diogenes’ syllogistic argument concerning law (nomos) (D.L. 6.72). Important to the argument are an understanding of Diogenes’ philanthropic character and his moral imperative to ‘re-stamp the currency’. Whereas understands his care as attached specially to , Diogenes’ philosophical mission and form of care attach not to his native Sinope but to all humanity. An important result is that Diogenes’ provides an ancient example of cosmopolitanism that is philan- thropic, minimalistic, experimental, and utopian.

Keywords

Diogenes of Sinope – Cynicism – cosmopolitanism – law – citizenship

1

When Diogenes of Sinope (hereafter Diogenes) was asked where he was from, he replied that he was a citizen of the world (kosmopolitēs) (D.L. 6.63, 6.72).1 But what does ‘citizen of the world’ mean for the Cynic philosopher infamous for his biting wit and contempt for ? Are there substantive - sophical commitments or argumentation supporting his self-identification

1 D.L. = R. D. Hicks (ed. and trans.), Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), [book number].[section number].

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/20512996-12340176Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 479 as world citizen? Or, is this one of his barbs aimed at mocking traditional Greek life? This essay advances the thesis that Diogenes’ world citizenship is a posi- tive claim supported by philosophical argument and philosophical example. Evidence in favor of this thesis includes a new interpretation of the controver- sial syllogistic argument concerning law (nomos) reported by Diogenes Laërtius (hereafter D.L.) and a consideration of Diogenes’ way of life as portrayed in the Cynic anecdotal tradition (D.L. 6.72). Important for both aspects of my argu- ment are an understanding of Diogenes’ philanthropic character and his moral imperative to ‘re-stamp the currency’, that is, the Cynic practice of ridding soci- ety of moral and political counterfeits (D.L. 6.20-1, 6.70-1).2 Briefly, I argue that Diogenes’ syllogistic argument shows an inconsistency in the ancient Greek understanding of law. The traditional ancient Greek view is that one becomes virtuous by living according to law (nomos) and its prescriptions, but the tradi- tionally ineluctably local understanding of law, according to Diogenes, draws one further from true law, namely, a Cynic life of in accordance with nature, to which he exhorts everyone.3 Hence, Diogenes, in Cynic fashion, intends to re-stamp law: Law is not conventional but natural, not local but universal. The true citizen belongs not to any one city but to the cosmos. So whereas Socrates, in whose footsteps Diogenes follows, understands his philo- sophical mission and form of care as attached specially to Athens, Diogenes’ philosophical mission and form of care attach not to his native Sinope but to all humanity.4 If my argument is correct, then Diogenes’ Cynicism provides an ancient example of cosmopolitan practice that is, as I conclude by attend- ing to his philosophic way of life, philanthropic, minimalistic, experimental, and utopian in character. In the following sections of the essay I will briefly

2 On the philanthropic character of Cynicism, see J. Moles, ‘“Honestius Quam Ambitiosius”? An Exploration of the Cynic’s Attitude to Moral Corruption in His Fellow Men’ in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 103 (1983), pp. 103-123, esp. pp. 113-6. On re-stamping the currency see R. B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds.), The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 8-9, 24-5 and W. Desmond, The Greek Praise of : Origins of Ancient Cynicism (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), pp. 16-7, p. 179n51. 3 On nomos, its meanings, and its subsequent opposition to phusis, see W. K. C. Guthrie, The (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 55ff. 4 See, for example, ’s , Crito or the Theaetetus with R. Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); G. Vlastos, ‘The Historical Socrates and ’ in M. Burnyeat (ed.), Socratic Studies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994). But see also E. Brown, ‘Socrates the Cosmopolitan’, Stanford : An Online Journal of Legal Perspectives, 1 (2000), pp. 74-87.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 480 Paone sketch some of the interpretative difficulties that face arguments concern- ing Cynicism and the meanings of cosmopolitanism (Section 2). Then, I will offer a new interpretation of Diogenes’ syllogistic argument in the context of Diogenes’ philosophic way of life (Section 3). Finally, I draw out several philo- sophical consequences of this new interpretation (Section 4).

2

As with nearly all the ancient Greek Cynic philosophers, the central diffi- culty for answering these questions is the dearth of reliable evidence. None of the writings attributed to Diogenes is extant. Like Socrates, he has become a literary figure, besides an historical one, and the two traditions, literary and historical, are thoroughly intermingled. The largest body of evidence for Diogenes is D.L.’s Lives of Eminent Philosophers, dating to the early half of the third century CE, over 500 years after Diogenes’ death (D.L. 6.20-81). D.L. offers many stories and sayings drawn from an anecdotal tradition, but it is not always clear how the sources, from which D.L. is working, intend to represent Diogenes. For example, some scholars argue that D.L.’s sources intend to show the Cynics as an important link in the succession from Socrates to the Stoics.5 If this evaluation is correct, then the most extensive source for the historical Diogenes may already be too contaminated with to catch sight of an accurate picture of what thinking and arguments, if any, Diogenes himself would have offered in favor of his claim to be a world citizen. There are also several other sources for the Cynics earlier than D.L., but these face similar difficulties. These sources are either Stoic philosophers (Musonius and ) and their students () or satirists intending to mock the Cynics of their own time (). Additionally, there are fifty-one pseudepigraphical letters attributed to Diogenes, some of which date to the late first century BCE, others as late as the second century CE. These letters would represent our earliest extant writings of the Cynics in their own words. Scholars have shown, however, that the letters are the product of mul- tiple authors, probably written at different times, and later collected together.6 Moreover, the letters attributed to Diogenes are accompanied by other letters

5 See P. A. Vander Waerdt, The Socratic Movement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 241ff. 6 See in particular the introduction to Malherbe’s edition and collection, including bibliogra- phy, in A. J. Malherbe (ed.), The : A Study Edition (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 1-5, 14-21.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 481 attributed to philosophers not typically considered Cynics but who articulate views sympathetic to Cynicism. Because of the uncertain origin and dating of these letters, it may be difficult to discern what thought may be authen- tic. Nevertheless, the letters at least adhere to the spirit of Diogenes and his Cynicism, if not to the letter. On the questions of Diogenes’ use of kosmopolitēs and the status of his world citizenship there are generally two scholarly fronts. On the first front, the scholarship is concerned with whether Diogenes’ world citizenship is negative or positive.7 In other words, ‘negative’ means that world citizenship is intended to deny or reject the usual obligations Greek citizens of the same city-state may have to one another, whereas ‘positive’ means that world citizenship has some additional content all of its own, whatever that content may be. If his world citizenship is negative, then his self-identification is a rejection of life in the typical ancient Greek city, and of the social and political duties attached to it, and nothing more than this rejection of traditional values. In other words, Diogenes is simply saying, ‘I am not one of you’. If his world citizenship is positive, then the rejection of the typical ancient Greek city may also imply the character of a life that bears with it other kinds of duties, perhaps even of the universalist character that some modern conceptions of cosmopolitan- ism advocate.

7 The typical negative interpretation is clearly paraphrased by P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism’ in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of (2014), http:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/ cosmopolitanism, §1.1: [T]he first philosopher in the West to give perfectly explicit expression to cosmopolitan- ism was the Socratically inspired Cynic Diogenes in the fourth century BCE…. By identifying himself not as a citizen of Sinope but as a citizen of the world, Diogenes apparently refused to agree that he owed special service to Sinope and the Sinopeans. So understood, ‘I am a citizen of the cosmos’ is a negative claim…. On the negative interpretation see principally D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century AD (London, UK: Methuen & Co., 1937), pp. 34-9; M.-O. Goulet- Cazé, ‘Un syllogism stoïcien sur la loi dans la doxographie de Diogène le Cynique’ in Rheinische Museum, 125 (1982), pp. 214-40, esp. pp. 228-31; G. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, 4 vols. (, IT: Bibliopolis, 1990), vol. 4, pp. 537-50; and M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 141-5. On the positive interpretation see R. Höistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Uppsala, SE: University of Uppsala Press, 1948), esp. p. 138ff.; J. Moles, ‘The Cynics and ’ in A. Laks and M. Schofield (eds.), and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and , Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 129-58; J. Moles, ‘Cynic Cosmopolitanism’ in R. B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, pp. 105-20; J. Moles, ‘The Cynics’ in C. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 415-34; P. R. Bosman, ‘Citizenship of the world – the Cynic way’, Phronimon, 8 (2007), pp. 25-38; and W. Desmond, Cynics (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2008), esp. pp. 202-7.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 482 Paone

On the second front, the scholarship is concerned with the degree to which the evidence for Diogenes’ world citizenship is already reinterpreted by Stoic intermediaries in order to represent him as a forebear of Stoicism.8 , a member of the Socratic circle, was said to be the teacher of Diogenes, who in turn was the teacher of Crates.9 Crates was the teacher of , the founder of Stoicism. Therefore, Diogenes represents an essential link in the Stoics’ claimed descent from Socrates. If this is so, the Stoics may have domesti- cated Diogenes’ character and his thought to fit their understanding of virtuous practice. Consequently, the portraits of Diogenes we now have may bear con- siderable Stoic influence, and as a result there may be little of Diogenes’ own thought remaining. Nevertheless, some Stoics approvingly describe Diogenes’ way of life as a short cut to virtue (D.L. 7.121; D.L. 6.104).10 For the purposes of this argument, I focus on the evidence from D.L., especially the doxography in 6.72, which derives from Diogenes’ .11 I will also avail myself of those works sympathetic to and in harmony with the spirit of the Cynic anecdotal tradition, particularly the letters of Ps.-Diogenes and of Ps.-Crates, Ps.-Lucian’s Cynic, and Dio Chrysostom’s orations. Two additional questions are due consideration here: First, what do we mean by ‘cosmopolitan’ in ? Second, what relation do these meanings have to those available to Diogenes in the fourth century CE? First, we may divide modern philosophical meanings of cosmopolitanism into roughly two theories: Moral cosmopolitanism and cultural cosmopolitanism.12 A moral cosmopolitan, on the one hand, is committed to helping others (roughly, treat- ing them justly and contributing to their well-) simply in virtue of their

8 Goulet-Cazé, ‘Un syllogism stoïcien’, p. 227ff. and J. Mansfeld, ‘Diogenes Laertius on Stoic Philosophy’, Elenchos, 7 (1986), pp. 297-382, esp. §§2-3, pp. 317-51. 9 Despite the later Cynic anecdotal tradition’s portrayal, Antisthenes was probably a philo- sophic inspiration for Diogenes rather than his teacher. See Dudley, A History of Cynicism, ch. 1 for the decisive argument against Antisthenes’ direct connection to Cynicism and more recently Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, vol. 4, pp. 223-34 and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, ‘Who was the First Dog?’ in R. B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, pp. 414-5. 10 On the two paths metaphor see V. Emeljanow, ‘A Note on the Cynic Short Cut to ’, Mnemosyne, 18 (1965), pp. 182-84; M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, L’Ascèse Cynique: Un commentaire de Diogène Laërce, VI. 70-71 (Paris, FR: Vrin, 1986); J. Mansfeld, ‘Diogenes Laertius’, p. 337ff. and J. Mansfeld, ‘Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé: L’Ascèse Cynique. Un commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI. 70-71’, The Classical Review, 38 (1988), pp. 162-3. 11 Like Bosman, ‘Citizenship’, p. 36n8, I find Moles’ argument for 6.72’s authenticity persua- sive, in Moles ‘Cynics and Politics’, pp. 130-7. 12 S. Scheffler, ‘Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism’, Utilitas, 11 (1999), pp. 255-76; P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism’; and K. A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: in a World of Strangers (New York, NY: Norton, 2007), pp. xiv-xvi.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 483 common humanity, as fellow world citizens, rather than any other local factor. Put another way, moral cosmopolitanism holds that we have moral obligations to all persons independently of our particular relations to them. A cultural cosmopolitan, on the other hand, is committed to the recognition of the dif- ferences among cultures and the role cultural plays in formation of identity and values. The two cosmopolitanisms are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as Appiah argues, they ‘intertwine’: Having moral concern for others implies a respect for their differences.13 Likewise, the two cosmopolitanisms share a focal meaning of ‘some community among all human ’.14 While Diogenes is credited with the invention of the word kosmopolitēs, a cosmopolitan sentiment for kinship with a wider human community than one’s own city may have its origins in the century preceding him. As Desmond aptly points out, several pre-Socratic philosophers, such as and , identify the heavens (ouranos) or the cosmos as their fatherlands (patris), and the sophists, as traveling educators, likewise take an interest in the diversity of human customs and laws.15 Even Socrates, as Brown argues, in generally eschewing the ordinary politics of the polis in favor of his dis- tinctive style of cross-examination, expresses a certain cosmopolitan ethic.16 It is in this context that Moles argues we should interpret Diogenes identi- fication as world citizen.17 This general tradition of cosmopolitan sentiment seems to share, at least in an imprecise way, modern cosmopolitanism’s focal meaning of ‘community among all human beings’. A cosmic community that transcends particular cities may share the universal concern of moral cosmo- politanism, and the broad interest in cultural variation may share cultural cosmopolitanism’s respect for difference. This relation in meanings is not wholly inappropriate given the long philosophical career of cosmopolitanism and especially since the modern conceptions share in a certain Diogenic suc- cession, at least in name, by way of the Stoics and Kant. Besides interpreting Diogenes against this earlier general tradition of cos- mopolitan sentiment, Moles also offers several other reasons to believe that Diogenes’ claim to be a world citizen is not merely negative but positive. With a certain Cynic flair and boldness, he calls them ‘proofs’.18 First, Diogenes does not say that he is ‘without a city’ (apolis) but that he is a ‘citizen of the world’

13 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, p. xv. 14 P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, §2. 15 Desmond, Cynics, pp. 203-4. 16 Brown, ‘Socrates’, pp. 75, 78-9. 17 Moles, ‘Cynic Cosmopolitanism’, p. 109. 18 Moles, ‘Cynic Cosmopolitanism’, pp. 109-10.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 484 Paone

(kosmopolitēs).19 He is claiming a wider loyalty rather than none at all. Second, as above, his claim belongs to a tradition in which the city (polis) and father- land (patris) are being ‘revalued’. Third, Diogenes should be understood in contrast to , his philosophical rival, who claims to be everywhere a stranger (xenos) (Xen. Mem. 2.1.13). Aristippus’ sentiment, according to Moles, is negative, truly belonging nowhere, whereas Diogenes’ is positive, belong- ing everywhere as a citizen. Fourth and fifth, Diogenes’ claim is intentionally paradoxical in two ways: Kosmos and polis are opposites – wide and narrow, universal and particular. The opposition is intended to confuse those who make assumptions about the meanings of these concepts. His claim is also paradoxical to the Cynic way of life: The Cynic is a harsh critic of conventional civic life but is also truly a citizen of the world. The deliberate paradoxes moti- vate revaluing these concepts and, of course, in Cynic terms. Turning in the next section to Diogenes’ syllogistic argument, my new inter- pretation of the argument also offers reasons in favor of believing Diogenes’ world citizenship is a positive claim. With Cynic flair, I could call it a sixth ‘proof’, which throws into relief yet another deliberate Diogenic paradox, that of disdaining a life in accordance with law and also extoling it.

3

To illuminate Diogenes’ world citizenship, I offer a new interpretation of the syllogistic argument concerning law (nomos) in D.L. 6.72. I call the argument syllogistic because while it appears to have the rough pattern of a syllogism, it is not clear if the conclusion validly follows from the premises. Moreover, Diogenes is rarely portrayed offering arguments in traditional philosophic fashion. D.L. does record a second syllogistic argument about friendship, and while it does feature in later Cynic writings – for example, The Cynic Epistles (Ps.-Diogenes Ep. 10) – to my , these two arguments are the only ones presented as formal syllogisms (D.L. 6.37). I begin with this syllogistic argument for two important reasons. First, if we are to attempt to draw philosophic conclusions from Diogenes, we should make a faith effort to take his argument seriously as an argument. Second, if those philosophic conclusions are to be instructive for our understanding of

19 Besides Moles, ‘Cynic Cosmopolitanism’, p. 109, others following him have made a similar observation: Desmond, Cynics, pp. 202-3; J. Sellars, ‘Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno’s Republic’, History of Political Thought, 28 (2007), pp. 1-29, pp. 4-5; and Bosman, ‘Citizenship’, pp. 29-30.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 485

Cynic world citizenship, then we are obliged to begin with an understanding of law because law and citizenship are tied up in ancient Greek thinking, at least since their development and expansion in the Archaic Age.20 The syllogistic argument concerning law relates two important ancient Greek concepts: law (nomos) and city (polis). Roughly, the traditional Greek understanding of nomos includes not only positive law but also the customs and conventions local to a particular Greek city. Hence, the nomoi of one polis will likely, but not necessarily, differ from those of others. A third con- cept, asteios, is also introduced. Literally, the word means whatever is ‘of the town’. The semantic scope, however, is considerable: from ‘civilized’ to ‘refined’, ‘polite’, or even ‘urbane’. The sense in this argument is likely intended to be pejo- rative.21 Asteios seems to have something of the connotation of self-important snobbery – although in a peculiar linguistic transformation, the Stoics later use the word as a synonym for spoudaios, ‘morally good’ or ‘morally serious’.22 The issue is whether law, city, and living as a citizen are all asteios. In the central passage of 6.72, D.L. appears to quote Diogenes. While it is possible that this is a direct quotation, it is impossible to say so with . The conjecture is that D.L. is paraphrasing a view attributed to Diogenes and inserting a quota- tion intended to support the paraphrase:

περί τε τοῦ νόμου ὅτι χωρὶς αὐτοῦ οὐχ οἷόν τε πολιτεύεσθαι· οὐ γάρ φησιν ἄνευ πόλεως ὄφελός τι εἶναι ἀστείου· ἀστεῖον δὲ ἡ πόλις· νόμου δὲ ἄνευ πόλεως οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἀστεῖον ἄρα ὁ νόμος. (D.L. 6.72)

And about the law, that apart from it, it’s not possible to live as a citizen: For [Diogenes] says, ‘Without a city there’s no benefit in what’s refined; and the city is refined. Without law there’s no benefit in a city. So, then, the law is refined’.23

20 T. R. Martin, : From Prehistoric to Hellenistic Times, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), pp. 65ff; cf. Hdt. 7.101ff. 21 Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, pp. 136-40. 22 Goulet-Cazé, ‘Un syllogism stoïcien’, p. 223ff. and Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, p. 136n3. 23 Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. There is some concern about how to construe the two instances of ἄνευ. The usual construal takes the succeeding genitive object rather than preceding. Call this the ‘natural translation’. I have preferred taking ἄνευ first with the succeeding genitive and then with the preceding genitive. Call this the ‘chiastic translation’. See Goulet-Cazé, ‘Un syllogism stoïcien’, pp. 221-3; Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, p. 140n7; and Moles, ‘Cynics and Politics’, p. 131, who all prefer the chiastic translation. The chiastic translation is preferred because the natural translation would, as Schofield suggests, produce a conclusion with different terms from what D.L.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 486 Paone

The paraphrased claim, which the quotation of Diogenes’ syllogistic argu- ment is intended to support, is: One cannot live as a citizen apart from law. In other words, law is a necessary condition of living as a citizen. The word for ‘liv- ing as a citizen’, politeuesthai, contains the concept of city and implies, first, that a citizen is a free person (eleutheros) and not a slave (doulos) and, second, that a citizen participates in the affairs of the city (politikos) and is not private (idiotēs). The claim on its own is plausible: Some form of legislation is required to protect and enable a free and active civic life. A third point with respect to politeuesthai is also worth considering here: Politeuesthai is middle voice and has the sense of one being involved in politically governing oneself, hence Hicks’ translation of ‘oukh hoion te politeuesthai’ as ‘it is impossible for society to exist’ or Moles’ as ‘it was impossible for there to be political government’.24 The argument, which is intended to support this claim – to paraphrase – says that there is some important and necessary relationship between enjoying the benefits of being refined (asteios), enjoying the benefits of the city, and law. The first premise is straightforward: Enjoying the benefits of refined life requires a city. This premise is underscored by the claim that the city is one of the kinds of things that is refined. In other words, good manners gets one nowhere out in the wilderness. Put another way, a city is a necessary condition of benefiting from a polite, mannered life, and – we might add – that this kind of life is precisely one, which Diogenes condemns as counterfeit and at which his moral and political example is intended to show as inconsistent (D.L. 6.20-1, 6.70-1). This inconsistency, as I will further elaborate below, involves mistakenly adopting desires that do not belong to nature. This inconsistency is most stark in the nomos-phusis dichotomy invoked by Plato’s (Pl. Grg. 491eff.).25 Callicles employs nature to justify freely gratifying any and every desire, but the source of such desires, including the pleasures of refinement, is not natural but conventional. The second premise is patterned after the first. The claim is that enjoying the benefits of the city requires law. In other words, law is a necessary condition of benefiting from a life in a city. If one lacks law, one cannot benefit from a life of the city. The conclusion of the syllogistic argument, however, does not seem to follow validly. The quotation ends, ‘So, then, the law is refined’. Schematically the syllogistic argument goes:

quotes here. Likewise Goulet-Cazé shows that ἄνευ is frequently written after its object. Moreover, her argument that ’s De legibus 2.5 reproduces the argument is decisive, it seems to me, in preferring the chiastic translation. 24 Moles, ‘Cynic and Politics’, p. 130. 25 A. A. Long, ‘The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics’, in B. R. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, pp. 28-46, pp. 34-5 and Desmond, Cynics, p. 150ff.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 487

(1) Enjoying the benefits of refined life requires a city, (1b) since a city is refined. (2) Enjoying the benefits of the city requires law. (3) So law is refined.26

Again, the connotation of ‘refined’ in both (1) and (3) is pejorative: The effete, weak, genteel, watered-down manners of traditional Greek moral and politi- cal life are asteioi, to which Diogenes and his followers opposed endurance (karteria), strength of will (enkrateia), hard work (), and strenuous prac- tice (askēsis) (D.L. 6.71; Ps.-Crates Epp. 12, 15). Both the polite life and the city are ‘refined’ in this sense. But the syllogistic argument entails only that

(3’) Enjoying the benefits of refined life requires law.

In other words, law is a necessary condition of refined life, but law is not also a sufficient condition of refined life. So while it is true that benefiting from a life of the city and of refinement requires law, a life in accordance with law is not necessarily refined. At least, that is a conclusion that follows validly from (1) and (2). D.L., however, quotes (3) ‘So law is refined’. (3) is true only if the city, besides being a necessary condition of the life of refinement, is also a nec- essary condition of law. Accordingly, if this additional premise were added, whatever kind of life is one of refinement (asteios) would also be of the city (polis) and of law (nomos). Hence, the category of asteios would be coextensive with the categories of polis and nomos – whatever belongs to one belongs to the others – provided the supplemental premise is added. Such a supplemen- tal premise, however, is not quoted here. Why does D.L. quote (3) and not (3’)? On the one hand, the mistake may belong to D.L. or one of his sources. He may have misquoted Diogenes or an error in a source, now lost to us, produces the misquotation. Or, it is possible that the syllogistic argument is not originally Diogenes’. D.L. may be assembling what looks like a traditional philosophical argument and inserting it where there was none originally. On the other hand, it may be that Diogenes did say or write (3) rather than (3’). If he did, it would not necessarily be surprising that Diogenes, wit that he was, is having a laugh at the expense of us who are trying to parse validity in an intentionally misleading, pseudo-argument – perhaps as a way of criticizing us for looking for moral and political aims in words rather

26 We should note here another reason to call the argument syllogistic: There is looseness in the middle proposition, moving from the ‘city’ to ‘enjoying the benefits of the city’.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 488 Paone than in hard work (ponos) and strenuous training (askēsis).27 Nevertheless, as I have argued above, if we are to examine seriously Diogenes’ way of life and philosophic practice, we should make a good faith effort to take seriously as an argument what he formulates as an argument. And so, lastly, it may be that Diogenes intends both (3) and (3’), and that the tension is purposefully designed to demonstrate a mistake in the traditional Greek understandings of these concepts, that is, Diogenes is re-stamping the currency – ridding us and his auditors of counterfeit moral and political coin. I defend this last explana- tion in my interpretation of the argument. In this last explanation Diogenes intends both the invalid conclusion quoted by D.L. and the valid entailed by the premises. To see why, consider the practical meaning of Diogenes’ audience accepting either the quoted con- clusion or the validly drawn inference:

(3) So law is refined. (3’) So enjoying the benefits of refined life requires law.

The auditors persuaded by the invalid conclusion (3) will recognize that law (nomos) must be refined and, consequently, will be motivated to view it with contempt. Recall from the discussion above that refinement is pejorative – soft, genteel, nothing one would wish to be. These same auditors are also the ones for whom the invalid conclusion goes unnoticed. On the traditional Greek understanding, the local customs, conventions, and mores belong to nomos – in short, the polite manners of refined life. Accordingly, these auditors come to recognize with the guidance of the Cynic teacher to reject the tyranny of custom as false and counterfeit to their tough, self-possessed, and free natures. The practical result, then, is a rejection of traditional nomos and a preference for the Cynic teaching and way of life. This way of life, I will argue below in section 4, reveals that one needs little to live successfully because it is a life in accordance with nature. The auditors who recognize the validly drawn inference (3’) will also see that (3) is a mistake. (3) mistakenly holds that the categories of asteios, polis, and nomos are coextensive. In order to recognize that (3’) follows from (1) and (2)

27 This explanation fits with the Diogenes’ moral and political performances as Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, interprets them. There are many examples of Diogenes’ wit in D.L. 6.20-81. D.L. 6.38-69 is nearly entirely a series of situations in which Diogenes is portrayed doing something peculiar in order to provoke a response from onlookers. He then retorts with a clever (often moralizing) one-liner. Here is one example: ‘Seeing a bad archer, he sat down beside the target with the words, “in order not to get hit”’ (D.L. 6.67, trans. Hicks).

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 489 whereas (3) does not, the auditor must understand what is consistent with (3’), what I will call the correlate of (3’), namely, that while it is true that a refined life requires law, it is not also true that living a life in accordance with law is necessarily refined. If this so, then there must be at least one way of life that is in accordance with law but is neither of the city nor of refinement. The prac- tical meaning of this recognition differs in only a small way from the auditors for whom the invalid conclusion goes unnoticed. While the former auditors do not hear the mistake, if they are persuaded and motivated by Diogenes’ teach- ing, then the practical result is their rejection of the traditional understanding of nomos. Similarly, while the latter auditors do hear the mistake, they too will be motivated to reject the traditional understanding of nomos. What is added by the recognition of (3’) and its correlate is the positive suggestion that there is a way of life that is in accordance with law but not refined. To see why this added recognition is important for Diogenes’ claim to be a citizen of the world (kosmopolitēs), let us return to the claim that the syllogistic argument is intended to support: ‘And about the law, that apart from it, it’s not possible to live as a citizen’ (D.L. 6.72). If Diogenes is a citizen of the world, then his life as citizen must be in accordance with law. But what law? The rec- ognition of (3), (3’), and its correlate points to the possibility of a way of life as a citizen that is in accordance with law but is not the effete politeness of refined life. And D.L. 6.72 makes clear what Diogenes has in mind: It is the law and citi- zenship belonging to the ‘only true commonwealth’, which is ‘in the cosmos’. D.L. reports this immediately after the syllogistic argument:

εὐγενείας δὲ καὶ δόξας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα διέπαιζε, προκοσμήματα κακίας εἶναι λέγων· μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ. (D.L. 6.72)

[Diogenes] would ridicule good birth and fame and all such distinctions, calling them showy ornaments of vice. The only true commonwealth was, he said, that which is as wide as the . (trans. Hicks)

‘Good birth’ (eugeneias) and ‘fame’ (doxas) are what belong to the conventional Greek understanding of law (nomos). They are mistakenly valued by one try- ing to live the refined life of the city (polis). But even those, who recognize the emptiness of convention, like the orators and sophists, fail to replace it with what is really valuable. For they surreptitiously reaffirm the instrumental of good birth and fame and what they can get them, namely, political power for acquiring more and more of those same refined pleasures. Cynic word- play here emphasizes the contrast. The ‘ornaments of vice’ are prokosmēmata, to which Diogenes contrasts his life of virtue, the source of which is ‘in the

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 490 Paone cosmos’, en kosmōi. Hence, Diogenes replaces these illusory values with a way of life in accordance with true law, the source of which is the ‘only true com- monwealth’ (monēn orthēn politeian), the cosmos itself. That is, Diogenes, in Cynic fashion, re-stamps law: Law is not conventional but natural, not local but universal. The true citizen belongs not to any one city but to the cosmos. Whereas Plato’s Callicles, as we have seen, employs nature to justify freely grat- ifying every desire, the source of such desires is not natural but conventional. Diogenes’ life of virtue, however, comports with universal , the tough, self-possessed, and free nature that he molds through hard work and strenuous practice (Giannantoni V B 382 = Stob. Flor. 2.31.87).28 The source of his values is nature. The refined life and the conventional law that supports it, thus, is counterfeit because it is opposed to nature. It is inconsistent because, while it correctly locates living successfully and freely as the goal, it fails to locate their source in nature. It mistakenly values unstable luxury over the stable simplicity of Cynic life. My interpretation so far shows that there are two conclusions to Diogenes’ syllogistic argument: an invalid conclusion quoted by D.L. (3) and a valid infer- ence drawn from the premises (3’). Diogenes’ auditors who understand only (3) are motivated to reject as counterfeit the traditional understanding of law and its ‘ornaments of vice’. The auditors who understand both (3) and (3’) also recognize what is consistent with (3’), that there is a life in accordance with law that is not to be rejected because this law belongs to ‘the only true common- , the one in the cosmos’. In other words, Diogenes’ syllogistic argument is part of his strategy to re-stamp the currency. It is another deliberate Diogenic paradox, which at once disdains the law of the polis but also revalues and appropriates law as the law of the kosmopolis. While Diogenes’ former auditors do recognize and reject what is counterfeit, they do not yet recognize, as the latter auditors do, the new face to be stamped onto the coin:

… ὄντως νόμισμα παραχαράττων, μηδὲν οὕτω τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ὡς τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν διδούς· τὸν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ βίου λέγων διεξάγειν ὅνπερ καὶ Ἡρακλῆς, μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων. (D.L. 6.71)

Indeed [Diogenes] re-stamped the currency, assigning not as much value to what’s according to law as to what’s according to nature; saying that this same stamp of life is one he drew from , since he preferred nothing more than freedom.

28 Diogenes’ fragmenta and testimonia are collected in Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, V B.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 491

This passage portrays Diogenes re-stamping the currency with the image of the life of Heracles. It precedes the section in which the syllogistic argument is quoted.29 Here Diogenes in both philosophical argument and in his philo- sophical way of life replaces the counterfeit understanding of law with nature (phusis). As I have indicated above, his technique here resembles the debates of the fifth-century sophists.30 Diogenes’ argument, however, differs from the sophists’ use of the nomos-phusis dichotomy. Sophists such as Antiphon or Plato’s Callicles used the local, conventional understanding of nomos to license the strongman to act according to whatever desires he may have – virtuous or vicious – that nature permits one to shed conventional restraints. Accordingly, they believed that since justice was merely conventional, it was a game played by fools without political power because, it seemed obvious to them, that if one had the power necessary to act with impunity, one would ignore conven- tional justice preferring gratification of more and more desires (pleonexia) (Pl. Grg. 491e, 508a). For Diogenes, this is a mistake: Nature does not show that one should behave pleonectically, playing the strongman so as to get what- ever one wishes. Rather, nature shows that one needs very little – indeed, the minimum – to live successfully, so long as one has strenuously practiced and endured hard work (Ps.-Lucian, Cynic 12, 15).31 Diogenes’ use of the dichotomy, in contrast with the sophists, is not unlike the Socratic investigations into the meanings of moral and political virtue. Diogenes saw that the traditional conceptual meaning of nomos extoled the heroic of popular Greek – courage, moderation, justice, wis- dom – but, at the same time, its practical results casuistically excused the abuse of political power (D.L. 6.28). So justice, for example, is indeed a virtue, but Diogenes showed that the virtuous should imitate Heracles, not the pre- scriptions of the orators and sophists. What those men found valuable – good birth, fame, and political power, the ‘ornaments of vice’ – are in fact worthless because they do not lead to a successful life (6.72). Indeed, they are never capa- ble of satisfying their desires and ultimately become slaves to them, whereas Diogenes’ philosophical and Heraclean life, in matching desire to nature’s min- imum, is free, self-sufficient, and thus successful (D.L. 6.66). And as we have seen, the conclusion of the passage quoted by D.L. unifies Diogenes’ syllogistic

29 On Diogenes’ treatment of Heracles see Höistad, Cynic Hero, ch. 1, esp. pp. 37-47. On the Cynic use of Heracles’ labors as moral exemplar more generally see Desmond, Cynics, pp. 153-4. 30 Long, ‘Socratic Tradition’, pp. 34-5. 31 Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. x and E. Brown, ‘Cynics’ in J. Warren and F. Sheffield (eds.), The Routledge Companion to (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), p. 403.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 492 Paone argument with his understanding of the cosmic city. In re-stamping the cur- rency, Diogenes shows that law is a wider category than Sinope or Athens or Corinth, that it entails a commitment to humanity and the natural world of the widest conceivable breadth, the cosmos, and that practicing the endurance of the Panhellenic hero Heracles leads to a self-sufficient and successful life. Indeed, Heracles is an attractive and fitting exemplar for the Cynic cosmo- politan.32 He is a foundational Greek hero belonging to many ancient Greek cities. His most famous deeds are his twelve labors. The early labors begin in the Argolid, but later labors take him far beyond the to , Thrace, the northern lands of the Amazons, the western Mediterranean, and the under- world. In traveling to and from the western Mediterranean for his later labors, he wanders throughout northern Africa and founds cities in Italy and Sicily. Heracles also instituted the Panhellenic Olympic games ‘because of his good will for Greece’ (di᾽ eunoian tēs Hellados) (Lys. 33.1).33 In the Hellenistic age, the Macedonian hegemons, among others, claimed descent from Heracles to justify their kinship among their new Greek subjects.34 Although well beyond the lifetime of Diogenes, as a testament to Heracles’ truly cosmopolitan tra- jectory, he is found depicted with his club and lionskin next to the Buddha in Gandharan art, at the crossroads of the Greek successor kingdoms and (late first century BCE/early first century CE).35

4

My argument has shown that Diogenes’ philosophical argument and philo- sophical example supports a positive interpretation of Cynic world citizenship. Diogenes re-stamps law as the law of the cosmos. He is a true citizen because he is free (eleutheros) and participates in the affairs of the true city (politikos), the commonwealth in the cosmos (politeian … tēn en kosmōi). In this essay’s final section I draw out the philosophical consequences of Diogenes’ view and

32 I thank Samuel Ortencio Flores for highlighting Heracles as a Panhellenic hero. For an overview of the Heracles myths see E. Stafford, Herakles (London, UK: Routledge, 2012), pp. 23ff., cf. the maps of Heracles’ labors, pp. xxii-xiii. 33 Stafford, Herakles, pp. 160-2. Cf. Höistad, Cynic Hero, p. 48 quotes Isoc. Orat. 5.114: Both Heracles’ philanthropia and eunoia are to be imitated. 34 Stafford, Herakles, p. 146ff. 35 I. Hsing and W. G. Crowell (trans.), ‘Heracles in the East: The Diffusion and Transformation of His Image in the Arts of Central Asia, India, and Medieval China’, Asia Major, Third Series, 18 (2005), pp. 103-54, esp. pp. 118-23, cf. Figure 22. Gandharan ‘Heracles’, p. 119.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 493 adduce evidence from the anecdotal tradition in order to show that Cynic cos- mopolitanism is philanthropic, minimalistic, experimental, and utopian.

4.1 Philanthropic To show how Diogenes practiced his cosmopolitanism and what a Cynic cosmopolitanism can teach us, we will need to understand how Diogenes and his Cynic followers lived. The Cynic way of life, as I have indicated, saw a necessary connection among taking on hard work (ponos) and strenuously practicing (askēsis) at virtue (aretē) so as to live self-sufficiently (autarkeia) and freely (eleutheria) (D.L. 6.70-71). Insofar as the Cynic’s needs are satisfied with less, because of her strict discipline, she consequently lives ever more freely. Diogenes discovered the success of self-sufficiency by observing self- sufficiency in nature (D.L. 6.28, 6.70) and recognized what truly belongs to human nature required habituating perception and judgment just as much as strength and fitness (D.L. 6.70-71). Besides virtue, freely speaking the (parrhēsia) too was important to a successfully way of life (D.L. 6.69). Consequently, Diogenes was committed to philosophical teaching. Unlike Socrates, however, whose philosophical mission and form of care was attached specially to Athens, Diogenes philosophical mission and form of care attach not to his native Sinope but to all humanity. For example, Dio Chrysostam por- trays Diogenes as a doctor traveling to where people are most ill:

[Diogenes] knew that the city [Corinth] attracted a great crowd of people owing to its harbours, its central location – and its supply of prostitutes. So he reasoned that, just as a good doctor goes where there are the most people to heal, a philosopher belongs where there are the most repro- bates, to expose their folly and correct their mistakes. (D. Chr. 8.5, trans. Dobbin)36

Moreover, Dio portrays Diogenes offering to cure people of the sicknesses of ignorance, cowardice, and intemperance, but no one will pay attention to him. If he had claimed to be a dentist, Diogenes laments, he would have a line of peo- ple asking him to pull out their rotten teeth, but since he is only a philosopher they care nothing for their rotten beliefs. (D. Chr. 8.7-8). The anecdotal tradition also portrays Diogenes reproaching people all across the Greek world, includ- ing Athens, Corinth, , , and Olympia (Ps.-Diogenes Epp. 8, 20, 30, 31; Plut. De tranq. anim. 20, 477c; D.L. 6.43). Contra Bosman, who claims that

36 R. Dobbin (ed. and trans.), The Cynic Philosophers: From Diogenes to (New York, NY: Penguin, 2012).

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 494 Paone

Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism is strictly individualistic, Diogenes’ philosophical way of life compels him to teach others and to a philosophical example for them.37 As Moles has documented, the tradition portrays Diogenes and his followers in numerous beneficent roles. Besides doctor, Diogenes is portrayed as teacher, watcher, ruler, even guardian angel, among others.38 Whereas he could have lived self-sufficiently and successfully outside of Greek life, as a hermit, the traditions surrounding Diogenes show that he chose to live among his fellow citizens of the world in order to speak the truth and correct error. His mission is, in other words, philanthropic.39

4.2 Minimalistic and Experimental Cynic cosmopolitanism is also minimalistic. By this I do not mean having only a weak claim on us. For example, a weak cosmopolitanism may admit cosmo- politan duties but not admit that they are overriding, that is, having moral and political priority over other duties. By minimalistic I mean that Cynic cosmo- politanism promotes the minimum as its moral and political standard.40 The minimum as standard means that Cynic philosophic practice will never admit more than what is required. Thus, the minimum becomes a moral and politi- cal imperative to reduce one’s footprint – to use a modern conception. Indeed, the minimum as moral and political imperative may also have an ecological sense. As both Bosman and Desmond have suggested, the Cynic world citi- zen’s loyalties may extend not only to other human beings but to animals and to nature.41 For example, Diogenes learns self-sufficiency not only from other people but also from animals. He abandons his drinking cup by observing a boy drinking from his hands, and he learns that he needs neither his own place to sleep nor luxuries by observing a mouse (Giannantoni V B 175 = Jer. Adv. Iovinian 2.14; D.L. 2.22). Of course, Diogenes also gladly adopts the name and behavior of the dog. To understand how the Cynics conceived of the minimum and their kinship with nature, consider the following ‘prayer’ from Ps.-Lucian’s Cynic:

I pray that I may have feet no different from horses’ hooves, as they say were those of Chiron, and that I myself may not need bedclothes any

37 Bosman, ‘Citizenship’, pp. 25, 34. 38 Moles, ‘“Honestius”’, p. 112n73 and Moles, ‘Cynics’, p. 422. 39 On Cynic philanthropia see Moles, ‘“Honestius”’, pp. 111-8. In the context of cosmopolitan practice, see Moles, ‘Cynics and Politics’, p. 140; Moles, ‘Cynic Cosmopolitanism’, pp. 114ff.; and Desmond, Cynics, pp. 202-3. 40 Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p. x. 41 Bosman, ‘Citizenship’, p. 34 and Desmond, Cynics, pp. 206-7.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 495

more than do the lions, nor expensive fare any more than do the dogs. But may I have for a bed to meet my needs the whole earth, may I con- sider the universe my house, and choose for food that which is easiest to procure. Gold and silver may I not need, neither I nor any of my friends. For from the desire for these grow up all men’s ills – civic strife, wars, con- spiracies and murders. All these have as their fountainhead the desire for more (epithumian tou pleinonos). But may this desire be far from us, and never may I reach out for more than my share, but be able to put up with less than my share. (Ps.-Lucian, Cynicus 15, trans. MacLeod)42

Within the Cynic’s ‘prayer’ is an argument concerning the minimum. First, the Cynic’s training is aimed at self-sufficiency. The Cynic’s goal is to be as an animal whose nature satisfies its needs without a desire for more or needs that cannot be met by one’s self. Second, the Cynic wishes to eliminate conventional limi- tations like what is a fitting home or fitting food and instead wishes for what nature provides – the whole cosmos as home and the simplest meals. Similarly, the Cynic wishes to eliminate conventional values – re-stamp the currency – lest he and his friends become subject to the worst human sickness – political unrest, wars, theft, murder, and so on – all of which are caused by ignoring the minimum nature prescribes and desiring more than what is required. In elimi- nating unnecessary desires, the Cynic becomes more authentically himself, having left behind the excrescence of what he is not, those desires prescribed by local, conventional values. Lastly, the Cynic relies on practicing justice – to take only his due – and disciplines himself to be able to endure with less than his due. Although the Cynic offers his way of life as a ‘prayer’, here is one plau- sible way we could formally reconstruct his minimalistic argument:

(1) A person is unhappy only if she gets less than what she desires. (2) The Cynic desires the least. (3) But there is no desire less than the least. (4) Hence, it is impossible for the Cynic to get less than what she desires (from 2 and 3), (5) and, thus, it is impossible for the Cynic to be unhappy (from 1 and 4).

Accordingly, the Cynic trains for self-sufficiency and, in so doing, removes desires for more than what is required. As what is necessary for her decreases, she makes more room for other persons (and other things of other natures)

42 M. D. MacLeod (ed. and trans.), ‘Pseudo-Lucian: The Cynic’ in Lucian, vol. 8. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 379-411.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 496 Paone to pursue what is required. But pursuit of the minimum requires constant training of both body and mind.43 Human nature does not immediately reveal what minima there are. As a result, the Cynic way of life is ascetic, but it is also experimental because the Cynic is always and continually testing herself to reach new minima. The anecdotal tradition portrays Diogenes testing himself by walking on hot sands in the summer, embracing cold stone statues in the winter, and even trying to eat raw meat (D.L. 6.23, 6.34).44 All of these tests are part of the regimen of strenuous practice toward a new minimum, the source of which is nature. This experimental character is striking, since it offers a perfectionist cosmo- politan practice that is not, as the Stoics will later suggest, tied to a foreordained good that cannot be otherwise. In other words, since the Cynic’s way of life is experimental, her cosmopolitan practice can be novel and revolutionary. In contrast, the Stoics offer only a modus vivendi: if you are a slave, the cosmos – best of all possible worlds – requires that you remain one. The Cynics’ practice, however, is potentially liberatory.

4.3 Utopian Finally, to conclude my argument, I will consider Cynic cosmopolitanism’s uto- pianism. The reason I turn to utopianism is that the Cynics must answer the free-rider problem, and they should, presumably, provide some practical under- standing of the Cynic cosmopolis. First, the free-rider problem seems to be a difficulty for Cynicism. It appears that Diogenes is able to live as a Cynic only if there are civic institutions and a civil society of non-Cynics producing the necessary for human life. The Cynics, I believe, are not in fact free-riders. The free-rider problem can be explained by the strategy that Diogenes used. In his efforts to rid people of counterfeit moral and political beliefs and values, his philosophic strategy is not to preach about a Cynic golden age. Ridicule, it seemed, got the better result. Hence, his particular way of life is part and

43 See Goulet-Cazé, L’Ascèse Cynique with Mansfeld, ‘Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé: L’Ascèse Cynique’. Goulet-Cazé argues that Diogenes’ Cynicism urges exercise of the body alone in order to achieve self-sufficiency and hence happiness. This practice con- trasts with the intellectualist ethics of Socrates. This suggestion, however, is not decisive. Habituation of the body through certain recommended activities and behaviors already implies a molding of habituation of attention and intellect. The converse is also true. Although commenting on , J. McDowell, ‘Two Sorts of ’ in Mind, Value, and (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 184n33 makes a similar claim with respect to habits of character and habits of intellect. Cf. Höistad, Cynic Hero, pp. 37-50. 44 These anecdotes have obvious resonances with Plato’s portrayal of Socrates, most notably ’ speech in the Symposium. See also Goulet-Cazé, L’Ascèse Cynique.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access Diogenes the Cynic on Law and World Citizenship 497 parcel of his philosophical mission. Moreover, Diogenes’ particular way of life is a model; it does not demand that everyone become copies of Diogenes. His particular philosophic and political strategy is to place himself at what appears to be the bottom of traditional hierarchies, although from Diogenes’ perspec- tive he is outside them, so as to demonstrate that even at the bottom one can live successfully, but he does not necessarily advocate that a life identical to his is appropriate for everyone nor that it is necessarily the only way to live suc- cessfully. We could imagine that due to his accepting the experimental nature of the Cynic way of life he would also accept that there are other experiments in living suited to other situations, places, persons, and even times. Hence, he describes himself as a choral leader who sings his note sharp so that rest of the chorus will sing in tune (D.L. 6.35). So not all are intended to become the dog, who begs and bites, as Diogenes does, but his example is intended to teach us what is virtuous, desirable, and choiceworthy. Although the Cynic student may likely miss the mark of Diogenes, in aiming high she does hit the mark of living freely and successfully. Lastly, there is evidence in the anecdotal tradition for what a Cynic cosmo- politan community might look like. In the anecdotal tradition there are several reports of Diogenes being sold into . D.L. records that the Corinthian bought Diogenes as tutor for his sons (D.L. 6.30ff.). This anecdote is of interest because while Diogenes is usually portrayed ridiculing or trying to convert others to the Cynic life, here Diogenes is molding young persons into fellow citizen. Hence, the teachings he imparts to his pupils are not the severe that Diogenes himself practiced – a barrel for a home, a coarse cloak for clothes, begging for food, and reproach and ridicule for those who put on airs (D.L. 6.22). Instead, once his pupils finished studying grammar and mathematics (mathēmata, ‘book learning’), Diogenes taught them horseback riding and hunting (D.L. 6.30). He also taught them to memorize passages of poetry, history, and his own writings (D.L. 6.31). He taught them to look after themselves and to be satisfied with plain food to eat and water to drink. Their hair was to be neat, their clothes simple, and feet bare (D.L. 6.31). When out of the house, they should be silent and mind their own business (D.L. 6.31). For their part, the sons respected Diogenes, although their slave, and admired him for his wisdom (D.L. 6.31). This life, while not Diogenes’ severe asceticism, is certainly disciplined and simple. If the sons of Xeniades do give us a por- trait of what the Cynic community looks like, then the Cynic citizens must live simple lives, desiring nothing beyond what is required. Such a commu- nity may look like the simple, just city described by Socrates in the Republic 2 (369bff.), where each person attends to her specialty and in doing her work lives well without unnecessary desires, such as Glaucon’s desire for symposia

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access 498 Paone that motivates Socrates’ complex and stratified Kallipolis.45 Although Glaucon ridicules the simple, just city as a ‘city of pigs’, Diogenes, I expect, given his affinity to animals and the natural world, would gladly accept it. This sugges- tion of the similarity between Socrates’ and Diogenes’ simple communities is fitting given Diogenes’ Socratic heritage. Indeed, Diogenes himself penned a Republic, one perhaps the sons of Xeniades memorized under the tutelage of Diogenes, and while that Republic is now lost, perhaps his understanding of a simple, just, and cosmopolitan community may yet still be found.

Acknowledgements

I thank my friends and colleagues Dennis Lunt, Samuel Ortencio Flores, and Antoine Leveque for their careful attention and comments during various stages of this research and writing. I also thank the anonymous reviewers, whose comments greatly improved the essay, and the participants and audi- ence of the 2016 Society for panel, on which I presented an earlier version of this argument.

45 See Desmond, Greek Praise of Poverty, p. 64-5 and S. Husson, La République de Diogene: Une cité en quête de la nature (Paris, FR: Vrin, 2010) with C. Gill, ‘Book Notes: Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (and Other Topics)’, , 56 (2011), pp. 313-4.

Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political ThoughtDownloaded from35 (2018) Brill.com10/01/2021 478-498 06:03:16PM via free access