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Congressional Record—House H862 H862 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE January 23, 2007 wish for more like it in this, Vancouver’s from New York be removed from the 1701 was passed. Among other things, 150th year. list of cosponsors for H.R. 217. 1701 called for a U.N. peacekeeping f The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there force of up to 50,000 troops to assist the STATE OF THE UNION ROAD MAP objection to the request of the gen- Lebanese military to prevent tleman from New York? Hezbollah’s resurgence and rearma- (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked There was no objection. ment in southern Lebanon. and was given permission to address Unfortunately, these troops have not the House for 1 minute and to revise f stopped Syria and Iran from rearming and extend her remarks.) SPECIAL ORDERS Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Hezbollah, and Israel must watch as Speaker, in a few hours we will be lis- The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under this threat is re-emerging just miles tening to the President provide us with the Speaker’s announced policy of Jan- from its border. a road map for the State of the Union. uary 18, 2007, and under a previous Mr. Speaker, I submit for the RECORD I ask the President as he comes to this order of the House, the following Mem- this recent article that appeared in House and this place to recognize that bers will be recognized for 5 minutes Jane’s Defence Weekly. It details some we are in this together and we look for- each. of the problems Lebanese and U.N. ward to working together. f forces are having stopping the move- But it certainly should be part of the The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a ment of weapons across the Syrian- conscience of this body and of America previous order of the House, the gentle- Lebanese border. What is clear from that our soldiers remain in serious woman from North Carolina (Ms. FOXX) this article, and numerous other re- jeopardy, not because they have not is recognized for 5 minutes. ports, is that Hezbollah is rearming done their job, but because we have not (Ms. FOXX addressed the House. Her and gaining autonomy again in south- done ours. remarks will appear hereafter in the ern Lebanon. When soldiers can be dressed in semi- Extensions of Remarks.) Just last week in an interview, American uniforms and wage attacks Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, on unsuspecting U.S. military, we have f promised that Hezbollah would inten- a problem. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a sify its campaign to bring down the Mr. Speaker, I am asking for a seri- previous order of the House, the gen- Lebanese Government in the coming ous consideration of the cutting of tleman from California (Mr. GEORGE days and weeks. Israel and the United funds to this war in terms of its plus- MILLER) is recognized for 5 minutes. States cannot let this happen, and we up, a new direction, and a political dip- (Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California must support Israel’s right to defend lomatic approach allowing Iraq to pro- addressed the House. His remarks will itself before its civilians are indis- vide its own security with our tech- appear hereafter in the Extensions of criminately attacked once again. nical support. Remarks.) Over the years, we have watched as It is now time to celebrate the heroes f Israel has made unilateral concessions, of our military and to bring our sol- A TERRORIST GROUP REARMS withdrawing from Lebanon in 2000 and diers home. I look forward to the mes- withdrawing from Gaza in 2005, and sage on the State of the Union. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a each concession has resulted in grow- f previous order of the House, the gen- ing threats on its borders and attacks tleman from Texas (Mr. GENE GREEN) on its soldiers and citizens. ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER is recognized for 5 minutes. PRO TEMPORE After entering southern Lebanon to Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. battle Hezbollah militants last sum- The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Speaker, today in Lebanon, protesters mer, Israel again withdrew under LYNCH). After consultation among the are rioting, burning tires and cars, and United Nations Resolution 1701, passed Speaker and the majority and minority crippling Beirut to oppose the govern- sending international troops to south- leaders, and with their consent, the ment of Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad ern Lebanon with the promise that the Chair announces that, when the two Saniora. international troops would assist Leb- Houses meet tonight in joint session to The majority of the opposition comes anon’s military to prevent Hezbollah hear an address by the President of the from Hezbollah and its supporters seek- from rearming. United States, only the doors imme- ing more influence in Lebanon’s gov- Again, the promises of security made diately opposite the Speaker and those ernment. to Israel by the international commu- immediately to her left and right will At the same time, one of our close al- nity have not been fulfilled and be open. lies is forced to watch these riots as a Hezbollah is getting stronger. No one will be allowed on the floor of recurring threat is building on its bor- the House who does not have the privi- Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues ders. and the international community to lege of the floor of the House. Due to Last summer we watched as the ter- the large attendance that is antici- join me in looking for a solution to rorist group Hezbollah kidnapped two this situation. As a close ally, we pated, the rule regarding the privilege Israeli soldiers and killed eight others of the floor must be strictly enforced. should ensure Israel’s hands are not and began firing missiles into Israeli Children of Members will not be per- tied while this threat builds on its bor- cities intentionally targeting civilian mitted on the floor. The cooperation of der, and we should address this growing populations and infrastructure. all Members is requested. problem before Hezbollah again decides The practice of reserving seats prior This group was supplied by Syria and to attack Israeli soldiers and civilians. to the joint session by placard will not Iran for years, and built up stockpiles [From Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jan. 3, 2007] of weapons after Israel completely be allowed. Members may reserve their IRAN REPLENISHES HIZBULLAH’S ARMS withdrew from southern Lebanon in seats only by physical presence fol- INVENTORY lowing the security sweep of the Cham- 2000 in accordance with United Nations (By Robin Hughes) Security Council Resolution 425. ber. Some five months after UN Resolution 1701 Without prejudice to the possible re- Israel responded in self-defense and halted the conflict in south Lebanon between sumption of legislative business, the launched an offensive in southern Leb- Israel and the Islamic Resistance—the armed Chair will now recognize Members for anon to destroy the weapons caches wing of Shi’ite Party of God (Hizbullah), Iran Special Orders not beyond 5 p.m., at and Hezbollah’s bunkers. Fortunately, has replenished Hizbullah’s depleted stocks which time the Chair will declare the the Israeli Air Force was able to de- of surface-to-surface rockets and anti-tank House in recess. stroy many of the longer range rockets guided weapons (ATGWs). Hezbollah possessed, but thousands of Prior to the onset of the conflict on 12 f shorter-range rockets were indiscrimi- July, Western intelligence agencies esti- mated that Hizbullah had amassed an inven- REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER nately fired at Israeli towns and vil- AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 217 tory of some 12,000 rockets of various cali- lages. bres. During the conflict the Islamic Resist- Mr. SERRANO. Mr. Speaker, I ask After 2 months of fighting, United ance expended about 4,000 rockets, while its unanimous consent that Mr. CROWLEY Nations Security Council Resolution longer-range systems, namely the Iranian- VerDate Aug 31 2005 03:03 Jan 24, 2007 Jkt 059060 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\A23JA7.016 H23JAPT1 ccoleman on PROD1PC61 with HOUSE January 23, 2007 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H863 supplied 50 km range Fajr–3, the 70 km range (UNIFIL–2) are patrolling Lebanese waters pointment of the following Members of Fajr-S, the 125 km-range Zelzal 1 and 210 km- and inspecting ships approaching the coun- the House to the Select Intelligence range Zelzal 2 rocket systems were not em- try to prevent maritime smuggling. Oversight Panel of the Committee on ployed, having sustained considerable dam- A Western diplomatic source told Jane’s Appropriations: age as a result of Israel Air Force (IAF) that the Islamic Resistance—citing lessons strikes. learned in the early stages of the conflict Mr. HOLT, New Jersey, Chairman Hizbullah emerged from the conflict stra- where it lacked the means to contend with Mr. OBEY, Wisconsin tegically weaker, and, with the implementa- IAF operations—has specifically pressured Mr. MURTHA, Pennsylvania tion of Resolution 1701, lost its autonomy in Iran for ‘‘an array of more advanced weap- Mr. REYES, Texas south Lebanon. onry, including surface-to-air missile [SAM] Mr. DICKS, Washington A Western defence source told Jane’s that systems.’’ Mrs. LOWEY, New York Iran, with Syrian compliance, has now The source said that ‘‘following the supply Mr. CRAMER, Alabama ramped up deliveries of rockets, ATGWs and of an undisclosed quantity of Iranian-made Mr. SCHIFF, California other advanced systems in ‘‘an effort to re- Noor [reverse-engineered Chinese C802/YJ–2] habilitate Hizbullah’s military strength and radar-guided anti-ship cruise missiles and Mr.
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