UN (Christopher Herwig) Rebel armies attempted to gain control of capital city of during civil war Lessons from ’s Success Thoughts on Leadership, the Process of Peace, Security, and Justice

By John W. Blaney

he ending in 2003 of the 14-year civil war in Liberia and the subsequent progress made there is a 21st-century success story not only for Liberians, but also for Africa, the United TNations (UN), the United States, and many others. Over 250,000 people lost their lives during this struggle, with great suffering endured elsewhere in West Africa as well. Economically and socially, the country of Liberia, historically long renowned as sub-Saharan Africa’s shining example, was decimated by this conflict and by rampant mismanagement and corruption. Today, Liberia still has serious problems, but under the leadership of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf,

John W. Blaney was U.S. Ambassador to Liberia from 2002 to 2005. He currently works with Deloitte Consulting, which commissioned him to write this article to promote thought leadership in this area. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily represent those of Deloitte Consulting.

PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 101 impressive progress continues. There is stabil- After all, they held the port of Monrovia, leav- ity, basic living standards are up, children go to ing the rest of the capital increasingly under school, development assistance projects blos- siege. With almost 1 million people starving som from many quarters, new Liberian secu- inside the city, and Taylor’s forces weakening, rity institutions are matriculating, and even they could see military victory within reach. private sector investment is responding with The rebels’ intent was not just to see Taylor additional badly needed jobs. How was Liberia relinquish power, but also to take Monrovia, afforded the priceless opportunity of becoming seize power, and sack the city in the best 12th- one of the greatest turnaround stories of the century meaning of the word. Taylor had been 21st century? pressed militarily and diplomatically to leave This article will not attempt to tell the Liberia, which he eventually agreed to do as entire fascinating story of ending the war and long as an international peacekeeping force was winning the peace in Liberia; that would take brought into the country. a book. Rather, the purpose is to glean lessons Taylor’s departure, however, would not by learned from this success—that is, insights that itself stop the war or cancel the other objec- may prove useful elsewhere, albeit each conflict tives of the rebels. A bloodbath of retribu- is unique. tion could ensue, with hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons caught in the The Situation middle of the fighting. Of course, Taylor’s By 2003, Liberia had been ruled autocrati- forces would have to fight on, and there was cally by warlord President Charles G. Taylor a distinct possibility that the two rebel armies since his questionable election in 1997. Since might begin fighting one another for power. Taylor is presently on trial for war crimes at Finally, West African peacekeepers who had The Hague, it is inappropriate to dwell upon arrived recently (Economic Community him or his role. Suffice it to say that by early of West African States Mission in Liberia 2003, two different rebel movements and their [ECOMIL]) were likely to become combatants, armies—Liberians United for Reconciliation as had happened when West African peace- and Democracy (LURD), and the smaller keepers intervened several years earlier (as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia—con- Economic Community of West African States trolled most of the country. Taylor’s forces Monitoring Group). made forays into the interior and held the capital, Monrovia, as well as the second big- Analysis gest city, Buchanan. Liberia offers valuable insights into con- By July 2003, the civil war was quickly flict management and moving chaotic situa- escalating. The international ceasefire agree- tions toward stability as well as building the ment was again in tatters, and negotiation of institutions of security and justice. In 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Liberia was not, as is often stated, a classic was bogged down in . Moreover, both peacekeeping operation (if there is such a rebel combatant parties, especially their military thing). Peace did not initiate sequentially commanders in the field, opposed and threat- with an internationally negotiated ceasefire ened any outside peacekeeper interventions. and peace agreement followed by a complex

102 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 peacekeeping mission. Rather, by mid-2003, land”—that is, between Taylor’s forces and the baseline situation was increasingly chaotic those of LURD—in order to conclude a deal and violent, and not just a complex situation with General Sheriff. In this fashion, diplomacy with peacekeepers permissively deployed. In not only stopped the fighting, but also enabled fact, the actions of a very few outsiders still the permissive entry of ECOMIL as peacekeep- left on the ground were designed to try to ers, not as combatants. move the situation away from an abyss and The point here is not that what was done back into some sort of complex mess that in Liberia was better or worse than in other would permit peacekeepers. cases, but that there is no iron-clad template Those of us there were successful in that that fits all circumstances; there is no certain undertaking, but the reason this part of the sequence, no perfect universal blend of defense, actual story of Liberia is important is that it development, and diplomacy, and no stable for- relates directly to the first analytic point. We mula to pursue security and justice. must understand what kind of situation we are facing, and then adapt our strategy, sequenc- ing, and leadership style appropriately. This is peace did not initiate sequentially with hardly a new thought, but it is a critical one an internationally negotiated ceasefire that is missed constantly. As Sun Tzu wrote, and peace agreement followed by a “Do not repeat the tactics which have gained complex peacekeeping mission you one victory, but let your methods be regu- lated by the infinite variety of circumstances.”1 Although these thoughts from about 500 BCE This commonsensical observation is often are obviously about war, they also apply to the resisted. After leaving Liberia in mid-2005, I pursuit of peace, including how to prioritize was drawn to study other difficult situations, and balance making progress with security such as Iraq and Afghanistan. During my long and justice even when there are simultaneous absence from the United States, a plethora of pressing needs in other sectors. studies, manuals, and guides had been written For example, in Liberia the alleged peace- on how to conduct antiterrorist, counterinsur- keeping maxim that security must precede all else gency, and complex stability operations, and did not really hold. It was a blend of diplomacy, how to create “fusion” among all U.S. agen- peacemaking, and some deception that ended cies and partners for maximum impact, and that war on the battlefield, long before any so forth. Most of these works were produced ground was secured by friendly forces, and before in response to continuing violence and other the CPA was concluded on August 18, 2003. problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most all Breaking with the political leadership of of these and others that followed are quite LURD, General Mohamed Sheriff negotiated thoughtful and well done. Of course, many on the battlefield the terms of LURD’s cease- of them struggle mightily with security and fire, its pullback, and the permissive entry and justice issues, and with the inclusion of indig- interpositional placement of the ECOMIL enous peoples. peacekeepers. A few U.S. and West African But there is a problem: while these works negotiators repeatedly passed through “no-man’s and case studies are excellent stimuli, they will

PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 103 never substitute for creative but disciplined am extrapolating from their theory to help thinking and leadership, as some of them imply. explain our success in Liberia, an application A personal anecdote may illustrate this assertion. that Snowden and Boone did not address and I was recently at the CIA—that would may not condone. To oversimplify, the char- be the Culinary Institute of America. I had acteristics of a chaotic situation (without an epiphany when watching a master chef clear cause and effect relationships) call for work. While seemingly all chefs love cook- stronger, more immediate action. Less chaotic books, great chefs do not use them when cre- but still complex or complicated situations ating new masterpieces. It must be similar for are best managed by group methodologies competent leaders who face crises, especially and wider communication or by expertise. those actually on the ground. In other words, Although they wrote “A Leader’s Framework there are not now, and will never be, strategic for Decision Making” after the events of 2003, cookbooks adequate for handling each new cri- the model they presented screamed Liberia in sis, though historical knowledge and analytic many respects.2 stimulus from them will certainly help. Insofar To reiterate, the objective in mid-2003 as security and justice go, there will never be Liberia was to move the situation out of chaos one sequential relationship or recipe that will and into something still complex but more serve universally. manageable. To that end, before the CPA, diplomacy moved first and decisively on the ground to disengage the LURD from Taylor’s the objective in mid-2003 Liberia was forces by getting them to cease fire, pull back to move the situation out of chaos and several miles, free up the port and food for the into something still complex but starving multitudes, and permissively allow more manageable non-Liberian African (ECOMIL) peacekeep- ers to be placed between Taylor’s forces and the main rebel army to the north of Monrovia, and What is less relative and absolutely criti- between Taylor’s forces and the Movement for cal, however, is the ability to recognize accu- Democracy in Liberia, the other rebel army, to rately how complex the situation at hand is, the south. and how to adjust one’s leadership approach. Not understanding the complexity of a situa- Toward Networking tion, and not appropriately adjusting to it, usu- The months until UN peacekeepers began ally results in failure in establishing reasonable to arrive in October 2003 proved difficult on security and justice regimes and relationships, the ground. There were many serious ceasefire among other things. violations, which both ECOMIL and the U.S. If Sun Tzu seems too archaic, more Embassy had to stamp out. But even then, as contemporary treatments of the relation- the situation changed, the Embassy began to ships between complexity and leadership alter its style of leadership as it sought to reen- can be found. See, for example, the works gage as many foreign and indigenous groups of David Snowden and Mary Boone and the as it could to help keep the war stopped. For Welsh Cynefin school of thought. Again, I example, as other evacuated foreign embassy

104 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 staff and nongovernmental organizations and programmatic approach should change trickled back into Liberia, we quickly helped with it. In the immediate postwar period, U.S. them integrate back into postconflict stabili- Embassy Liberia, in order to help keep the tran- zation efforts and restarted informal contact sition moving further from chaos and war to groups. There were Liberians who helped as complexity and peacekeeping, sought to repop- well. Most famously, there were a number of ulate the universe of parties who would push Liberian women’s peace groups, none of which for peace in a variety of ways. In other words, were key players perhaps, but all of which we began to move toward a web-building/web- helped promote peace in different ways and based approach to advance the peace process at different times. and counter constant attempts by “opponent ECOMIL was commanded by a brave webs” composed of those dedicated to return- Nigerian general, Fetus Okonkwo. It success- ing Liberia to war and chaos. And there was no fully spearheaded peacemaking and peace- shortage of them. keeping efforts in Liberia. The U.S. Marine Of course, while we helped stop the war Expeditionary Unit not only did a great job and hung on for a while, steady progress only supporting the West Africans and the U.S. came after another and soon dominant member Embassy, but also briefly deployed a few hundred of the “web of peace” arrived—the much larger Marines on the ground. follow-on force of UN peacekeepers and others, As mediator of the Liberia Peace Process, brilliantly led by General Jacques Klein. Nigerian General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s In sum, in the postconflict period, we leadership was remarkable throughout and fun- helped build up or rebuild multilateral, nongov- damental to success, and he came back repeat- ernmental, and Liberian webs, and encouraged edly to Monrovia during the postconflict period these groups to probe and push carefully into to keep the lid on violence. Then, too, there the grey of a complex and still simmering situ- was the indefatigable role of the International ation, gradually achieving greater stability. The Contact Group, led ably by the European group approach was also able to absorb failures Commission and Ghana. and shocks better, usually without risking the African heads of state not only opened a situation moving back to war. path for the departure of Taylor from Liberia, In fact, there is another fine theoreti- but also pushed strongly for the peace process cal work on this area of thought, Governing at many points. And, of course, the dialogue by Network, by William Eggers and Stephen with all the former combatant parties was Goldsmith, which has valuable insights on bet- intense in the postconflict period, as were ter handling complex situations via networks.3 exchanges with the successor governments Again, this work is extrapolated ex post facto to Taylor’s (that is, the brief government of to apply to the different situation of Liberia in President Moses Blah, followed by the Interim order to better explain and map the successful Government led by ). The media route taken there. were also engaged constantly. The message is clear. Once each tipping Maintaining Momentum point is achieved, and the situation and its Just as Liberia’s evolving chaotic baseline characteristics begin to change, the leadership situation required changing our leadership

PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 105 approach, it also largely dictated how security The DDRR program in Liberia disarmed and justice had to be approached as just part and demobilized over 109,000 combatants, who of the conundrum of a postwar collapsed state. surrendered tens of thousands of AK–47s, over 7 What we faced on the ground was grim. An million rounds of ammunition, and thousands of article appeared in The Economist in late 2002 rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machineguns, about Liberia, forecasting it as the world’s worst and crew-served weapons. The UN also moved country for 2003.4 It was, indeed, a horrible year to remove and dispose of loose ordnance and in Liberia. at least address the sealing of Liberia’s difficult It would be hard to convey the devastation borders. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of of Liberia after a 14-year civil war and the cor- internally displaced Liberians and refugees were rupt patrimonial systems of governance prac- returned home. ticed during and before that time. Where, then, Detractors argue that the UN started to start? the DDRR program in Liberia too quickly on Although there is no certain sequence, December 7, 2003, before enough UN peace- perhaps in many terrible situations like this keepers were present. Indeed, there were serious one, the place to start is with the people riots at Camp Schefflin for the next 10 days, themselves, and giving them hope. Even while and this initial effort was shut down. But these being hit by mortars and small arms fire, we events illustrate prior points about pushing out plotted out what should be done sequentially of chaos and into something more manageable. and simultaneously once the fighting stopped. On the ground, the dynamic was simple: either There were so many things to do: things that start to disarm the warring factions very soon, or had to be launched alongside humanitarian risk a quick return to war. The riots, by the way, assistance and essential services—simply to were planned attempts to overwhelm the UN, start to revive a dead state. either to create instability or to get more money, Security and justice reform were huge in or both, and would have happened whenever this kind of postconflict calculus. In Liberia, the DDRR program kicked off. What critics miss, but General Klein and the group approach was also able to I did not, is that starting the DDRR program absorb failures and shocks better, usually quickly kept the combatants, who still had intact chains of command, focused on mate- without risking the situation moving rial gain rather than on coup attempts or on back to war restarting general conflicts. In other words, while a tactical setback, starting disarmament the UN led the way in developing and tailor- and demobilization was, strategically, the cor- ing a disarmament, demobilization, reintegra- rect thing to do. By doing so, the forces of peace tion, and rehabilitation (DDRR) program. It retained critical momentum and the capacity to would take far too long to explain all the UN, shape the future. Furthermore, many thousands bilateral, and multilateral programs involved, of weapons were collected during that initial but in general, a successful DDRR program was disarmament outing. absolutely central for security, reconstruction, I encouraged General Klein to take this and overall progress. course of action and believe it was the correct

106 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 one. The lesson here is especially important. U.S. Congress, but thankfully bipartisan support When actually shutting down conflicts and emerged among powerful Members of Congress. reducing chaos, we must keep the tempo of Senators John Warner, Hillary Clinton, John events in our favor, sometimes by acting boldly McCain, and others championed Liberia’s cause even when unsure of what is going to happen in this area and supported other types of badly in response to what we do. Rarely can we afford needed assistance. to simply sit tight and wait to see what happens The corrupted police force that operated next. Success is gained by keeping tempo on our during the Taylor years was largely left intact side. Failure is often guaranteed by robotically after the war. Had it remained, it would have following some inflexible, linear list of things to posed a threat to peace and to the entire recon- do in nonlinear, chaotic situations. struction and recovery effort. So initially, the Another Sun Tzu quotation about the United States placed even greater priority on importance of momentum would be appropri- creating a good police force than on build- ate, because controlling momentum and the ing Liberia’s army. However, Washington also importance of assessing and adapting to situ- ational complexity are themes lost in today’s initially, the United States placed even discourse. It is dismaying to see in contemporary times only more and more strategic cookbooks greater priority on creating a good police with simplistic linear graphs moving from con- force than on building Liberia’s army flict to peace. became heavily involved in the construction of Security Institutions a new small but capable army for Liberia, utiliz- Given the chaotic starting place of Liberia ing a private sector contractor. in 2003, it is easier to see the importance of In the case of the army, the UN was careful building the country a new police force and to slowly wind down the existing force struc- new armed forces, and getting a new start on ture, which was part of the CPA. But the lon- rebuilding its devastated judicial system and the ger term objective was always to create a new rule of law. The collapse and chaos of the war, smaller, apolitical, and professional force that combined with the long-term rot of corruption, would respect the rule of law and human rights. had deeply compromised Liberia’s security and This effort is still under way. justice institutions. In sum, there was ample justification for A rather balanced multilateral approach rebuilding the police and military from the to donor funding was maintained throughout ground up, with much change of personnel this period; however, this was not the case for based on competitive entry and background rebuilding Liberia’s police force or its army. The checks. It has been and will be critical for sta- United States financed most of the rebuilding of bility and justice in Liberia, especially after the the police force that was implemented through UN mission leaves, as it must some day. the UN. In general, financing support for foreign Justice and Legitimacy security forces is unpopular among the parlia- The postwar starting point on justice was ments of the world, sometimes including the also dismal due to chaos and long-term rot.

PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 107 Ghanaian soldier patrols as part of Mission in Liberia UN (Christopher Herwig)

Justice was for sale during the Taylor years and basically dispensed under a patrimonial system. There had been no genuine systemic rule of law for years. There was a desperate need for a spring cleaning, but there was also the necessity to maintain a clear line of political legitimacy throughout the postwar transitional reform process. Much of the answer for both issues, building justice anew and maintaining legitimacy, resided in ensuring that the CPA-mandated election was held as stipulated in 2005, but many opposed that for various reasons. From the outset, I was questioned in some quarters about supporting Vice President Blah as the successor to Taylor. However, his appointment to that office, and then his brief time as President, took place in accordance with the constitution of Liberia, and provided a linkage of legitimacy and an orderly transition until an interim head of government could be appointed in accordance with the CPA. Serious objections and challenges to holding the presidential election on time in 2005 came from several quarters. Some senior statesmen and respected figures in Liberia suggested national conventions and a rewriting of Liberia’s constitution before any election. Such a process would likely have taken many years. Meanwhile, some interim government officials moved strongly to stop or at least to postpone the 2005 elections. Of course, that would have prolonged their time in office as unelected officials. There were also other sinister reasons why some sought postponement. My position remained clear in 2003, 2004, and 2005: nothing should be allowed to stop or postpone the 2005 elections from occurring on

108 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 time, or the freedom and rights of the Liberian greater stability, institutional rebirth, economic people would be seriously jeopardized. Before stabilization, and much more. leaving Liberia, all these threats were overcome, All of this prompted both cheers and and a free and fair election was held on time. jeers, including charges that I was at times a Today, there is absolutely no doubt who is the bully or acting as a proconsul. Frankly, that is legitimate head of state in Liberia. not important. The U.S. Embassy’s leadership The general lesson here is to be sensitive approach and actions were not determined to the issue of legitimacy in postconflict states centrally by my personality, but rather varied undergoing transitions of power, elected or with the perception of what was required to otherwise. In truth, there were indeed some best deal with a changing situation, which reasons why election postponement seemed moved back and forth from chaotic and des- somewhat logical in Liberia, as there may seem perate to more stable at times. It must be added to be in other cases. But for whatever reason, that then–Secretary of State Colin Powell there is a terrible risk incurred once a coun- “kept my back” and was our staunchest ally try leaps into a political void where no one throughout, artfully parrying distant critics at has clear title as head of state and is acknowl- home who sought to interfere with our work edged as in charge. Political legitimacy and and foil triumph. justice must be thought through as a whole, as a simultaneous equation, or serious stability and other problems could arise. control of momentum during the peace The sequencing of all the elements of a suc- process must be carefully considered and cessful peace process will differ by case, with a usually retained key variable being the complexity of the situa- tion at hand and the corresponding leadership and policy approach that must be tailored to fit. The donor approach to security and justice Control of momentum during the peace pro- could not be one of gentle surgery because the cess must also be carefully considered and usu- baseline situation was so grave. As the situa- ally retained. In the case of Liberia, ending the tion gradually improves, however, security and war in 2003, and keeping it stopped, initially justice are becoming more and more the respon- required some flamboyant, nondemocratic, and sibility of Liberians. unusual actions (that is, to end chaos). Keeping Did we do it all correctly in Liberia? the election on track also called for repeated Nonsense. Is there much left for all par- strong and sometimes unilateral methods, as ties to do in order to shore up success in did the related issue of ensuring that political Liberia? Absolutely. But consider, if for only legitimacy remained intact. a moment, where things stood in Liberia in Whenever the situation calmed down and 2003, and where things stand today—and moved from chaos to mere complexity, how- smile. PRISM ever, a unilateral leadership role was shunned in favor of networking and inclusiveness. These Notes groups, mostly in turn led by the UN and the 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles International Contact Group, slowly achieved (London: Luzac and Co., 1910), 28.

PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 109 2 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review (November 2007). 3 Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers, Governing by Network (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 4 “The World’s Worst: Liberia,” The World in 2003, report published by The Economist, November 2002.

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