Thoughts on Leadership, the Process of Peace, Security, and Justice
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UN (Christopher Herwig) Rebel armies attempted to gain control of capital city of Monrovia during civil war Lessons from Liberia’s Success Thoughts on Leadership, the Process of Peace, Security, and Justice BY JOHN W. BLANEY he ending in 2003 of the 14-year civil war in Liberia and the subsequent progress made there is a 21st-century success story not only for Liberians, but also for Africa, the United TNations (UN), the United States, and many others. Over 250,000 people lost their lives during this struggle, with great suffering endured elsewhere in West Africa as well. Economically and socially, the country of Liberia, historically long renowned as sub-Saharan Africa’s shining example, was decimated by this conflict and by rampant mismanagement and corruption. Today, Liberia still has serious problems, but under the leadership of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, John W. Blaney was U.S. Ambassador to Liberia from 2002 to 2005. He currently works with Deloitte Consulting, which commissioned him to write this article to promote thought leadership in this area. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily represent those of Deloitte Consulting. PRISM 1, no. 2 FEATURES | 101 impressive progress continues. There is stabil- After all, they held the port of Monrovia, leav- ity, basic living standards are up, children go to ing the rest of the capital increasingly under school, development assistance projects blos- siege. With almost 1 million people starving som from many quarters, new Liberian secu- inside the city, and Taylor’s forces weakening, rity institutions are matriculating, and even they could see military victory within reach. private sector investment is responding with The rebels’ intent was not just to see Taylor additional badly needed jobs. How was Liberia relinquish power, but also to take Monrovia, afforded the priceless opportunity of becoming seize power, and sack the city in the best 12th- one of the greatest turnaround stories of the century meaning of the word. Taylor had been 21st century? pressed militarily and diplomatically to leave This article will not attempt to tell the Liberia, which he eventually agreed to do as entire fascinating story of ending the war and long as an international peacekeeping force was winning the peace in Liberia; that would take brought into the country. a book. Rather, the purpose is to glean lessons Taylor’s departure, however, would not by learned from this success—that is, insights that itself stop the war or cancel the other objec- may prove useful elsewhere, albeit each conflict tives of the rebels. A bloodbath of retribu- is unique. tion could ensue, with hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons caught in the The Situation middle of the fighting. Of course, Taylor’s By 2003, Liberia had been ruled autocrati- forces would have to fight on, and there was cally by warlord President Charles G. Taylor a distinct possibility that the two rebel armies since his questionable election in 1997. Since might begin fighting one another for power. Taylor is presently on trial for war crimes at Finally, West African peacekeepers who had The Hague, it is inappropriate to dwell upon arrived recently (Economic Community him or his role. Suffice it to say that by early of West African States Mission in Liberia 2003, two different rebel movements and their [ECOMIL]) were likely to become combatants, armies—Liberians United for Reconciliation as had happened when West African peace- and Democracy (LURD), and the smaller keepers intervened several years earlier (as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia—con- Economic Community of West African States trolled most of the country. Taylor’s forces Monitoring Group). made forays into the interior and held the capital, Monrovia, as well as the second big- Analysis gest city, Buchanan. Liberia offers valuable insights into con- By July 2003, the civil war was quickly flict management and moving chaotic situa- escalating. The international ceasefire agree- tions toward stability as well as building the ment was again in tatters, and negotiation of institutions of security and justice. In 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Liberia was not, as is often stated, a classic was bogged down in Ghana. Moreover, both peacekeeping operation (if there is such a rebel combatant parties, especially their military thing). Peace did not initiate sequentially commanders in the field, opposed and threat- with an internationally negotiated ceasefire ened any outside peacekeeper interventions. and peace agreement followed by a complex 102 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 2 peacekeeping mission. Rather, by mid-2003, land”—that is, between Taylor’s forces and the baseline situation was increasingly chaotic those of LURD—in order to conclude a deal and violent, and not just a complex situation with General Sheriff. In this fashion, diplomacy with peacekeepers permissively deployed. In not only stopped the fighting, but also enabled fact, the actions of a very few outsiders still the permissive entry of ECOMIL as peacekeep- left on the ground were designed to try to ers, not as combatants. move the situation away from an abyss and The point here is not that what was done back into some sort of complex mess that in Liberia was better or worse than in other would permit peacekeepers. cases, but that there is no iron-clad template Those of us there were successful in that that fits all circumstances; there is no certain undertaking, but the reason this part of the sequence, no perfect universal blend of defense, actual story of Liberia is important is that it development, and diplomacy, and no stable for- relates directly to the first analytic point. We mula to pursue security and justice. must understand what kind of situation we are facing, and then adapt our strategy, sequenc- ing, and leadership style appropriately. This is peace did not initiate sequentially with hardly a new thought, but it is a critical one an internationally negotiated ceasefire that is missed constantly. As Sun Tzu wrote, and peace agreement followed by a “Do not repeat the tactics which have gained complex peacekeeping mission you one victory, but let your methods be regu- lated by the infinite variety of circumstances.”1 Although these thoughts from about 500 BCE This commonsensical observation is often are obviously about war, they also apply to the resisted. After leaving Liberia in mid-2005, I pursuit of peace, including how to prioritize was drawn to study other difficult situations, and balance making progress with security such as Iraq and Afghanistan. During my long and justice even when there are simultaneous absence from the United States, a plethora of pressing needs in other sectors. studies, manuals, and guides had been written For example, in Liberia the alleged peace- on how to conduct antiterrorist, counterinsur- keeping maxim that security must precede all else gency, and complex stability operations, and did not really hold. It was a blend of diplomacy, how to create “fusion” among all U.S. agen- peacemaking, and some deception that ended cies and partners for maximum impact, and that war on the battlefield, long before any so forth. Most of these works were produced ground was secured by friendly forces, and before in response to continuing violence and other the CPA was concluded on August 18, 2003. problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most all Breaking with the political leadership of of these and others that followed are quite LURD, General Mohamed Sheriff negotiated thoughtful and well done. Of course, many on the battlefield the terms of LURD’s cease- of them struggle mightily with security and fire, its pullback, and the permissive entry and justice issues, and with the inclusion of indig- interpositional placement of the ECOMIL enous peoples. peacekeepers. A few U.S. and West African But there is a problem: while these works negotiators repeatedly passed through “no-man’s and case studies are excellent stimuli, they will PRISM 1, no. 2 FEATURES | 103 never substitute for creative but disciplined am extrapolating from their theory to help thinking and leadership, as some of them imply. explain our success in Liberia, an application A personal anecdote may illustrate this assertion. that Snowden and Boone did not address and I was recently at the CIA—that would may not condone. To oversimplify, the char- be the Culinary Institute of America. I had acteristics of a chaotic situation (without an epiphany when watching a master chef clear cause and effect relationships) call for work. While seemingly all chefs love cook- stronger, more immediate action. Less chaotic books, great chefs do not use them when cre- but still complex or complicated situations ating new masterpieces. It must be similar for are best managed by group methodologies competent leaders who face crises, especially and wider communication or by expertise. those actually on the ground. In other words, Although they wrote “A Leader’s Framework there are not now, and will never be, strategic for Decision Making” after the events of 2003, cookbooks adequate for handling each new cri- the model they presented screamed Liberia in sis, though historical knowledge and analytic many respects.2 stimulus from them will certainly help. Insofar To reiterate, the objective in mid-2003 as security and justice go, there will never be Liberia was to move the situation out of chaos one sequential relationship or recipe that will and into something still complex but more serve universally. manageable.