Naval War College Review

Volume 74 Number 2 Spring 2021 Article 12

2021

Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Mediterranean Convoy War, November 1941–March 1942

Fabio De Ninno

Vincent P. O’Hara

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation De Ninno, Fabio and O’Hara, Vincent P. (2021) "Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Mediterranean Convoy War, November 1941–March 1942," Naval War College Review: Vol. 74 : No. 2 , Article 12. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/12

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. De166 Ninno NAVAL and WAR O’Hara: COLLEGE Six REVIEWVictories: North Africa, Malta, and the Mediterranean Convoy

ethical, moral, individual, societal, attacks against British convoys dem- and policy issues surrounding AI. It is onstrates that ULTRA did not affect the the book’s discussion of the enduring operations significantly. The argument nature of these issues that will be of is captious, since possessing intelligence value and greatest significance to does not mean necessarily that it is the national-security community. possible for one to attack; that possibility was reduced severely for Britain in the THOMAS CULORA latter three of the “six victories.” How- ever, when the British had the means, as during the operations of Force K, ULTRA allowed them to maximize the effective- ness of their limited forces, which were Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Medi- numerically inferior to the enemy’s terranean Convoy War, November 1941–March 1942, by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, MD: Na- and had fewer bases available to them val Institute Press, 2019. 322 pages. $34.95. in the central Mediterranean. Finally, the British ratio of success for attacked In his latest book, Vincent P. O’Hara convoys was better than that of the Axis. adds to his previous works on the Mediterranean during World War Six Victories also puts great emphasis II by analyzing the period between on the consequences of the three Italian November 1941 and March 1942. He victories. The destruction of Force K considers six decisive actions that ended a nightmare period for the Italian changed the tide of the naval war in convoys, while Alexandria allowed the the Middle Sea, three of which went Axis to achieve preeminence in the in favor of the British (the actions of central Mediterranean. The pinnacle Force K, the battle of Cape Bon, and the was the second Sirte battle, defined as an first battle of Sirte [Sidra]) and three Italian victory—correctly reversing the in favor of the Italians (Alexandria, the judgment of some British naval histori- loss of Force K, and second Sirte). ans. Also, according to O’Hara, the battle proved that the Italian surface fleet was a The author’s detailed narrative reminds credible deterrent, discouraging further the reader that the Mediterranean British attempts to resupply Malta (p. war was one of naval attrition around 254). Yet while the author’s conclusion the sea-lanes crossing the theater. that second Sirte was an Axis victory is An essential question in Six Victories persuasive as far as the destruction of the is the influence of intelligence on enemy convoy goes, it is not so with re- naval operations. According to O’Hara, spect to its consequences. The action did while ULTRA provided critical data on not discourage further British attempts many occasions, information often to resupply Malta; instead, it encouraged was untimely and was offset by Italian the Royal Navy to think that light surface counterintelligence. O’Hara’s thesis is forces were sufficient to meet the Italian not entirely new; Italy’s leading scholar fleet, preparing the way for the disaster working on ULTRA, Alberto Santoni, of HARPOON-VIGOROUS in June 1942. reached similar conclusions in his 1981 Here the major shortcoming of study Il vero traditore, which is not the book becomes apparent: not among the author’s references. O’Hara putting the Italian actions into the claims that the higher ratio of Axis

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 12 BOOK REVIEWS 167

broader context of the Mediterranean Italian victories, could not stop air and naval war. If that war’s object was submarine attacks against Axis con- communications, the Germans voys, Britain’s primary weapons against achieved the majority of the tactical enemy communications, which indeed successes that produced operational regained their momentum when Ger- and strategic consequences. Even man airpower shifted from the central according to O’Hara’s data, 82 percent Mediterranean to assist Rommel. of Allied losses during the period of In conclusion, O’Hara’s book offers a Six Victories resulted from German detailed reconstruction of the naval actions (p. 259). Second Sirte is a actions described, deserving credit clear example of this; the delay the for proving that the effectiveness of Italian surface forces imposed was the Italian navy at a tactical level was not decisive, because it was German better than Anglo-American studies aircraft that sank the enemy ships. usually have acknowledged. Less Despite this, O’Hara concludes that convincing is the analysis of the the three Italian victories led to operational and strategic consequences Axis maritime control of the central of the six “victories,” owing to an over- Mediterranean up to November 1942, emphasis on surface warfare, which broken only by the coming of Ameri- was only a part—and possibly not the can naval reinforcements (p. 257). most important one—of the Mediter- This conclusion is not convincing. ranean naval scenario in 1941–42. First, it seems to confound surface Readers searching this book for lessons predominance with maritime control. relevant to modern antiaccess warfare During summer–fall 1942, intelligence, will need to bear this in mind. air, and underwater predominance— FABIO DE NINNO critical elements of maritime control during World War II—were in the hands of the British, enabling them to disrupt Axis communications despite enemy surface predominance. Second, On War and Politics: The Battlefield inside Wash- this trend already was emerging ington’s Beltway, by Arnold L. Punaro, with Da- during the first period considered vid Poyer. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, by Six Victories (fall 1941). Current 2016. 249 pages. $29.95. Anglo-American and Italian scholarly On War and Politics is a remarkable work agrees that the increased security autobiography. It explores the life of Axis transports during early 1942 and professional careers of Arnold L. depended on the decline of Malta as an Punaro, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve operative base, itself caused by increas- (USMCR) major general and congres- ing German air attacks. O’Hara seems sional insider; it also is a remarkable unable to shake this argument, because portrayal of the day-to-day workings he only identifies a chronological con- of Congress and the Pentagon, so it nection in the improved situation of will appeal to a broad range of readers the Axis convoys after the three Italian interested in national-security affairs. victories (p. 127), possibly mistaking Punaro spent over thirty-five years as correlation for causation. Surface a USMCR officer and worked closely preponderance, the main result of the with the chairman of the Senate Armed https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/12 2