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Hypothetisierungstagung 22.-24.2.05 1 Die Bedeutung des Hypothetischen in den Naturwissenschaften The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences Internationale Konferenz/ International Conference 22. - 24. Februar 2005 Tagungsort/ Place: Fürstenzimmer, Schloß Hohentübingen Gefördert durch/ Sponsored by: http://www.fritz-thyssen-stiftung.de/ Unterstützt und mitorganisiert von/ Supported and co-organized by: Archives Henri Poincaré http://www.univ-nancy2.fr/poincare Université Nancy 2 Kurzfassungen/ Abstracts The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences – Abstracts 2 Andreas Bartels (Bonn) no claims about their actual objects, but only [email protected] serve to guide investigation. They are a rich Hypotheticity and Realism and precious expedient. in Duhem and Popper My historical aim is to show the continuity between Poincaré’s epistemology As a result of Popper´s philosophy on the and of Vaihinger’s conception of simulation: philosophy of science, hypotheticity and in order to solve certain problems, or to realism are not considered mutually discover new facts or new laws, the scientist inconsistent. But, as Pierre Duhem´s work has to behave “as if” certain facts or states of reminds us, the compatibility of hypotheticity things existed, that is, to simulate their and realism is by no means self-evident. existence. The following problem will guide Duhem sharply distinguishes between two my presentation: how is it possible to reach ways of knowing about natural phenomena: truth (in the sense or understanding of our two On the one hand, mechanical models, which authors) through falsity (that is by assuming lend themselves to visualization, are held to facts that one knows are not real, or are even represent the “hidden causes” of phenomena impossible)? and thereby to “explain” them. On the other hand, theories give us hypothetical mecha- Nadine de Courtenay (Paris) nisms, which have a purely descriptive status. [email protected] Thus for Duhem, hypotheticity and realism On Assumptions in Boltzmann’s concerning scientific theories must exclude “Principles of Mechanics” each other. Reassessing Popper´s concept of “hypotheticity”, the talk aims to identify the The first chapter of Boltzmann’s Principles of conceptual changes that finally made Mechanics counts, at the turn of the 19th and philosophers of science think that 20th century, amongst the most decided and hypotheticity and realism are compatible. argued statements of the hypothetical character of science. After sketching Christophe Bouriau (Nancy) Boltzmann’s opening views on the [email protected] indispensability of hypothesis, I will examine The Role of the “As If” in the Natural how they contribute to shaping his Sciences : Vaihinger and Poincaré presentation of mechanics. I will contrast his choice to start from Starting from the analyses of Vaihinger and seven “assumptions” with the axiomatic style Poincaré, I want to bring out the decisive role adopted in Hertz’ Mechanics and discuss to of what could be called “working hypotheses” what extent a parallel can be drawn, as was in the natural sciences. In adopting a suggested at the time, between this original hypothesis like this one proceeds as if mode of presentation and the place granted to something existed, without assuming that it assumptions in Meinong’s analysis of actually exists. Hypotheses in the strict sense, knowledge. Turning to the content of in contrast, always have the pretension to Boltzmann’s assumptions, in particular to the truth. one dealing with velocity, I will show how For Vaihinger and Poincaré, the limit they bring out a new understanding of the of an hypothesis in the strict sense, resides in nature of hypothesis and, thus, of the its pretension to explanation : it relies on the conception of scientific activity in general. principle of causality which, for our two authors, is an eminently dubious principle. Working hypotheses, on the other hand, make The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences – Abstracts 3 Moritz Epple (Frankfurt am Main) always several possible scientific theories that [email protected] fit the same evidence, but that contradict one Felix Hausdorff’s “Considered Empiricism” another. Confirmation holism is often combined with semantic holism: the meaning Felix Hausdorff, it seems, turned to research of theoretical terms is not fixed by the in set theory, the field of his main empirical evidence, but consists in inferential mathematical achievements, for philosophical relations among these terms. Furthermore, reasons. In the late 1890’s, he engaged in a semantic holism implies that there is no clear- radical critique of contemporary metaphysical cut distinction between theoretical terms and beliefs in the possibility of ascertaining observational terms. ‘absolute’ structures of time and space. In Against this background, the aim of order to frame his arguments in his main this paper is to argue for two claims: (1) The philosophical monograph, the Chaos in underdetermination thesis together with kosmischer Auslese of 1897, he drew on semantic holism implies that all scientific notions of Cantorian set theory which he had knowledge is hypothetical. In particular, the learned immediately before completing his notion of a final, universal and true theory book. cannot be conceived within this framework. The paper will explore Hausdorff’s Consequently, it cannot be claimed that our arguments in some detail. It will outline how current theories approach such a final theory his critique of metaphysics led him to and that they possess a certain degree of formulate a ‘considered’ version of verisimilitude in comparison to such a theory. empiricism—an empiricism which is aware (2) The underdetermination thesis together that it is necessary in the sciences to use with semantic holism does not prevent a notions (such as time and space but many rational comparison between contradicting others as well) which can be made precise theories of the same domain that were mathematically, but not uniquely. According developed in the history of science or that are to Hausdorff, empirical evidence always put forward at the same time. Such a leaves room for different mathematical comparison can in principle lead to singling conceptions of time, space, etc.; critical out one particular theory as our best candidate mathematical analysis is needed to delineate for a true theory of a given domain at a given the spectrum of possible mathematizations in time. In this case, it is reasonable to adopt a each case. In this way, the conceptual basis of realistic attitude towards such a theory as a empirical science always retains hypothetical whole. This is a pragmatic, hypothetical elements. Examples of such an analysis can realism—in short, a version of Popperian be found in Hausdorff’s lecture course on realism deprived of the idea of approaching a “Time and Space” of 1903/4. Hausdorff’s final theory. ‘considered’ empiricism will briefly be compared to Poincare’s conventionalist views Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy) and to the later views of the early Vienna [email protected] circle (in particular, to Moritz Schlick’s). Hypotheses and Conventions: From Poincaré to Logical Empiricism. Michael Esfeld (Lausanne) [email protected] What can be the role of experience in Conjectural Realism determining and justifying scientific knowledge? Poincaré’s answer was highly Confirmation holism in the sense of the complex, but the main idea could be Duhem-Quine thesis implies an characterized as follows: the role of underdetermination thesis: empirical evidence experience is above all to guide us in the does not determine scientific theory. There are choice of conventions. Science is not simply The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences – Abstracts 4 worked up out of experience, but produces Holger Lyre (Bonn) itself the very ‘facts of science’ by working [email protected] them up linguistically and conceptually from Theory Underdetermination experience. No judgement is absolutely forced by Empirical Evidence? on us by the data. Indeed, experimental data force us to make a judgement relative to a The thesis of theory underdetermination given language. (TUD) asserts that no given body of empirical It was an important insight of data or evidence uniquely determines a scientists and philosophers at the end of the scientific theory—it is usually seen as one of 19th century that pure data can never actually the most powerful arguments against be reached in the framework of an empirical scientific realism, the doctrine that the approach. If this is right, the truth of theoretical terms in our best and mature statements is rather the expression of their scientific theories genuinely refer. In this adequacy regarding the choice of a scientific paper I shall critically examine the basis of system. This means that truth in science takes the TUD thesis, first by comparing it to and on a hypothetical character in principle. distinguishing it from neighboring theses such Now, if all languages could be as the Duhem-Quine holism thesis, the translated into each other, there would be a conventionality thesis and the problem of universal invariant. The conventional choice induction. Secondly, I shall ask the often of language was also only a matter of neglected question whether there really exist linguistics. If no language could be translated specifiable and convincing examples of the into another, we would have the most radical TUD thesis in modern
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