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THE WHITE HO GTON f}~H '' .· :-: ··-1'"" ~--: ·.·>·. •. <·'" ~ ..... ·; .... · ; 'f' ORIGINAL RETIRED TO SPECIAL DOCUMENTS FILE .. • Jimmy Carter has the Democratic Party in a serious dilemma. If they nominate him, they are stuck with a candidate who lacks the experience and temperament to be President and one who is widely distrusted by leaders of the Democratic Party, with considerable justification • ' .. ,I.~ .. tl;ley .. fa,tl:.,tq .. J;IQJ:'C!ing..t.e .. him,.. c;tf.t~r .. h.e .has .. been... so..... spe~t:ac\.llP..r.ly :·, ::. ..' ·.. • • • • •• • • • • 0 • • • • • • • : • • • .. • • successfu.l in the primaries, th~. ripple .throug_hput. the sou.th.. •. ,.· : "' .. •• .. • • ·' .. •• ·, ••• 0 • • • •• , • • ••••• :. • •. • • : • •• • • •• ~- • • • : • • • •• • • • ... • • • • • • • :- • •••• • • , :. • • • •• will cost them severely at the polls in November. It will be difficult to convince southerners that his regional origin did not cause them to gang up on him and snatch from him the nomination. Either outcome favors the immediate implementation of a strategy directed at Carter. There are other reasons to begin now with an anti-Carter strategy. HiS momentum must be broken because he as the Democratic nominee would be very difficult for any Republican to beat. With a Southerner leading the ticket, southern states cannot be counted on to abandon their traditional party. This bloc of electoral votes combined with the northern industrial states, which tend to favor any Democrat, will leave very little left for the Republican nominee. Moreover, a Carter Presidency would in the opinion of many Carter-watchers damage seriously the office. Barring a miraculous change in ~im, he can be counted on within three years to challenge Richard Nixon as one of the most unpopular ). .. Presidents in American history. The office and the country can ill-afford another blow to the Presidency. The system depends upon the adversaries of the candidate to make sure the people understand his weaknesses before they vote for him. It is up to Republicans to contribute to weeding our Carter if he is unqualified. As David Broder acknowledged in a recent column, the press has failed to convey to the American public the shortcomings of his qualifications. A brief review of Carter's political career may be instructive. He returned to his hometown of Plains in the early fifties after a ten-year career in the Navy following graduation from the Naval Academy. He won narrowly a legally conteste~ race for the State Senate in 1962 and served there until January, 1967. As a comparatively sophisticated senator from rural south Georgia, he captured more than his share of attention from the Atlanta media and was soon recognized as a man with political future. As an unusually strong partisan in a state where party loyal~y was on the wane after Senator Goldwater carried it in 1964 and the Johnson administration became increasingly unpopular, he considered a race against Bo Callaway for Congress, who was in his first and only term in the House of Representatives.· Some who knew Carter detected a special -..)- ' .. disdain for Callaway at the time. It.may sound farfetched that a mature person would be motivated by such considerations, but the combination of Callaway's West Point background, strong Republican advocacy, and silk stocking status may have caused the competitive adrenalin to flow of the peanut farmer Democrat from the Naval Academy. Developments in early 1966 caused Carter to enter the Gbvernor's race. Callaway had decided to leave his apparently safe Hop.s_e seat i,n fa~qr. of the cl:lap.ce of ,bec.oming Georgia's first Republican Governor since Reconstruction. In addition, a major void was created on the Democratic side when former Governor Ernie Vandiver withdrew on a claim of ill-health. There were several candidates in the race and Carter finished a stron~ third behind former Governor Ellis Arnall, who had the black vote, and Lester Maddox. Carter was a sensible alternative for moderate Democrats and geared his campaign accordingly. Maddox and Arnall gained positions in the run-off with less than 30 percent of the Democratic vote and Carter scored somewhere in the twenties coming very close. to overtaking Maddox, as the second place finisher. Parenthetically, Maddox won the run-off and the Atlanta papers, which supported Arnall, claimed that Republican cross­ overs, who thought that Maddox would be an easier target for Callaway, provided the margin of victory. After losing in 1966, Carter commenced a four year campaign for Governor and the nature of his peanut warehouse business permitted him to become virtually a full-time candidate. From the beginning, he had an uphill battle against former Governor Carl Sanders, who served from 1963 to 1967 and who was prohibited by law from succeeding himself. As a result of his progressive record as Governor and his support for the Great Society, Sander~ pre-empted the black/ ~· , ,~ .,~. ol' ,.., I , , ., .... 0 about 28. percent of the 1968 total. .This left .for Carter, . ......... .. ·' . · .... _ ...... · ·_·····~··-·-··· ' .. · •. ·:·:. ,.·-·.: ........ ·.... ··.·- ·: ,.· .. ·.... ·.~·. ··:··· _·. ·-·· Georgia's largest voting bloc, which was the 41 percent that /oted for Wallace in 1968. After running as a moderate in ~ . , . 1966, Carter was able to accomodate himself in order to reach these voters. While Sanders pursued his $100,000 a year plus law practice in Atlanta during 1967, 1968, and 1969, Carter was speaking in churches and to civic clubs and listening to the people. He told them what they wanted to hear and gained the support of leading s~okesmen for segregation in Georgia, who probably disliked Sanders more than they favored Carter. Be played to the emotions of people who distrust the Atlanta elite in the same manner that he plays to the emotions of people who distrust Washington today. His strategy paid and his victory in 1970 was an upset. It did not take long for the Wallace/Maddox element discover he did not berong to them and he lost his base of support, becoming a very unpopular ~overnor. He alienated . '• the state legislature and the consensus when he left office in 1974 was that he could not get elected sheriff in his home county. He apparently decided he was worthy of a presidential race after being exposed to Jackson, Humphrey and McGovern in 1972, concluding if they could bat in the Presidential league, he could. He spent considerable time during his : ·:'·· ·t·:· :··n, .~···" .l~~t .;t:w.<?. Y,E;;ar~.; ..in:.,off j..~~··. pl.Gtt.in.g,_. ;h_i:9 .. s.t;r:qt~-gy:·' t?-ng.., he... man~.uv,~re9-'. ::. ·."·.··.: • • • ; • 0 • 0 • • • • ... - • 0 0 • • •• • • • • . himself into the chairmanship of the. Democrats ".CarDpaign 7 4. .. •. : ......_..• , ·:···.. :· ··~ ·.:!., ·' .... ~ •·:~. • .•.;.; ...... · ..... _. ····.····.~·.. ,• · ..• ·'"./' •. ·.. ·.· .....·._,,· :... ·•·•·.· ·.· .• •• :. -·~··. :'·· 0 •• ·: • .·.. Committee." In this position, he began learning the ways of national politics. After leaving office in January, 1975, he became a full-time candidate for President and the rest is history. If one asks why he has been able to succeed in this year's race, the answers are varied. A combination of factors have worked in his favor: (1) He has been totally dedicated to winning the Presidency while other candidates have had distractions like protecting a Senate seat and running a Senate Committee. (2) He has perceived better than other candidates that less than 10 percent of the total population selects the nominee of both parties; has identified that narrow segment of gone after th'em maximizing his resources. I ·. (3) He was able to establish early respectability as a candidate by winning in New Hampshire and Florida. He accomplished this by pouring a disproportionate amount of time and resources into New Hampshire and he benefited in Florida because Florida was the time and the place for the National Democratic Party to rid itself of the Wallace nuisance, and ·he was the best man ':.~---~.. ··-~. :" ....... !·· ,~::. ~ ............:. :·:·~.:...... -~~:~~ .···1· .. :~~·~·::-\:_: .· .· . ·,.·:··. :·- _.._.,...·,. ..... -~ ·... ··.:_r.. ·.·••. -~ .}I":' .. -~ : .-·.-: ..• :... ·· .. _:._:..t!'··:. -:~ ·!:· .... : .· ......· .:··.. ·~ ··_:.._....... ···'\ :-=.·:.·.-· ... to accompl1sh 1t. ~ . _: . .. ...... .· .. '• '; . .. ·.· .. .. ·... ·.. ~ .. (4) The caliber of the opposition was weak and he was able to survive the process of elimination. :. ... 0 • • 0 • 0; •• Humphrey was crippled and could not