ARMOR March-April 2005

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-05-2

Editor in Chief Features LTC DAVID R. MANNING 7 Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick Michaelis, Managing Editor and Major Geoffrey Norman CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 13 Preparing for the Realities of Killing the Enemy and Taking Ground Commandant by Captain Michael R. Nakonieczny MG TERRY L. TUCKER 18 Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq by Major Bill Benson and Captain Sean Nowlan ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 1109A 23 Israel’s Infl uence on Mounted Warfare Sixth Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by Major Jim Dunivan Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 26 Death Before Dismount: Transforming An Armor Company the authors and does not necessarily refl ect by Captain Michael Taylor and First Sergeant Stephen Krivitsky the offi cial Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other offi cial Army publications. 35 Winning with the People in Iraq by Captain Jason Pape Offi cial distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 39 Sustainment Operations and the Forward Operating Base cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron by Captain Jay Blakley head quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- 43 Home Station Observer Controller Training pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of by Major Bob Molinari the United States Army. In addition, Army li- braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for 47 Leadership and Command Philosophy armored, direct fi re, ground combat systems, by Brigadier General Philip Hanrahan organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies 53 Survey Feedback from the Force Drives by sending a request to the editor in chief. the Evolution of Initial Entry Training in 1st ATB Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Departments Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fi re ground combat 2 Contacts systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 3 Letters carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 4 Commander’s Hatch systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 5 Driver’s Seat any miscellaneous items of equipment which 6 From the Boresight Line armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C offi cers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/ regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. March-April 2005, Vol. CXIV, No. 2 USPS 467-970 Once More Unto the Breach

There continues to be an intense effort to reduce heavy armor and cav- on Mounted Warfare,” examines how this tiny country has provided the alry from our force despite the fact that the Future Combat System is greatest innovations in mounted warfare. years away from reality and many high-tech gadgets that are being Operation Iraqi Freedom has showcased the U.S. Army’s greatness. In- counted on are far from proven. Decisionmakers fail to realize that heavy stead of whining, hand wringing, and having a “poor me” attitude, our Ar- armor and cavalry win battles and we cannot solely rely on electronic my, specifically our great soldiers, have adapted to the war at hand. In packages to provide enemy information and thwart enemy attacks. His- their article, “Death Before Dismount: Transformation of an Armor Com- torical analysis proves that using tanks in urban operations in Western pany,” Captain Michael Taylor and First Sergeant Stephen Krivitsky, pro- Europe during World War II significantly reduced infantry casualties. vide a gripping analysis of how their unit successfully transformed and Tanks also played an important role in the U.S. Army recapturing Seoul adapted to the current operating environment. from the North Koreans in 1950, and in clearing North Vietnamese out of Hue in 1968. In his article, “Winning with the People in Iraq,” Captain Jason Pape discusses how his armor company adapted to the role of providing stability More recently, U.S. tanks led in the capture of Baghdad. We witnessed and support operations in Iraq. So far in this war, sheer force and attri- heavy armor rattle the windows of three-story buildings and wreak havoc tion haven’t won over the Iraqis and stopped the insurgency. It will take a on the city streets of Sadr City, An Najaf, and Kufa to defeat al-Sadr’s mi- combination of force, goodwill, and professionalism on our part, and for litia. If that doesn’t seal the deal, talk to soldiers who were on the ground the Iraqis themselves to take control of their country before a return to during these battles. They will proudly tell you tanks and Bradleys pro- normalcy will occur. vided the decisive force in defeating insurgents. Preparing for war in the past meant deploying to one of the Army’s com- This issue’s lead article, “Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler,” bat training centers to validate home station training; however, today, written by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick Michaelis, and that might not be necessarily true. Major Bob Molinari’s article, “Home Major Geoffrey Norman, describes the importance of tanks to the 1st Station Observer Controller Training,” outlines how your unit can train at Cavalry Division’s combat operations in the cities of Najaf and Baghdad home station with properly trained and equipped observer controllers to in overwhelming and defeating enemy forces — another excellent ar- assist in objectively preparing training exercises, providing meaningful ticle from soldiers who have experienced combat firsthand and under- feedback to small unit leaders, and tailoring field exercises. stand the capabilities and power of tanks in an urban environment. Living and operating in Iraq is not easy. Captain Jay Blakley is sold on Captain Michael Nakonieczny provides an extremely insightful piece on the idea that soldiers will work long hours and days on end if they are “Preparing for the Realities of Killing the Enemy and Taking Ground.” Na- taken care of. In his article, “Sustainment Operations and the Forward konieczny, a U.S. Marine, is blunt and to the point in explaining our mis- Operating Base,” Captain Blakley asserts that making quality of life a pri- sion as Soldiers and Marines. He reminds us that war is real and reality ority lets soldiers know leaders care. It allows soldiers to stay focused is costly. while fighting in a dangerous environment, and when they return to the FOB, they can relax and decompress after a day on the streets. In their article, “Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq,” Major William Benson and CPT Sean Nowlan land a direct hit with their assessment of In, “Leadership and Command Philosophy,” Brigadier General Philip Han- how military intelligence assets have failed in Iraq in performing their rahan reinforces the essential elements of excelling as a leader. He iden- mission of analyzing intelligence and information at the tactical level. tifies five basic, but important, leadership points he developed as a lead- They offer a plan to reorganize, retrain, and re-equip military intelligence er over the span of his career. assets to win in the contemporary operating environment. ARMOR continues to set the stage in promoting warfighting and tackling issues of great importance. We have received excellent articles from sol- Major Jim Dunivan and six of his Reserve Officers Training Corps cadets diers in the field who are doing the yeoman’s work for this nation. Con- had the unique experience of participating in the ultimate staff ride — tinue to support the Armor force by writing your thoughts and sharing traveling and exploring two of the most important battlefields in the Mid- your experience. dle East: the Golan Heights and Megiddo. His article, “Israel’s Influence – DRM

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

SANDRA R. RILEY PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0500501 DSN preﬁ x – 464- Points of Contact Commercial preﬁ x– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Ofﬁ ces U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC David R. Manning 4087 MG Terry L. Tucker 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 BG Albert Bryant Jr. 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Russell Gold 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Art Director Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 CSM George DeSario Jr. 4952 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editorial Assistant Kathy A. Johnson 2249 Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) E-mail: [email protected] CSM Otis Smith 7091 E-mail: [email protected] Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA) ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- Joe Hughes 5050 ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or E-mail: [email protected] printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, WordStar, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please indicate Experimentation and Analysis Directorate (ATZK-UAE) wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape captions to any il- COL Douglas L. Fletcher 7809 lustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we accept articles as e- E-mail: douglas.fl [email protected] mail or attachments at: Cavalry and Armor Proponency Offi ce (ATZK-CA) [email protected] COL Timothy R. Reese 1050 E-mail: [email protected] When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing ad- Offi ce, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) dress and daytime phone number. Aubrey Henley 5155 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only COL Marlin Levendoski 1315 one Army journal at a time. E-mail: [email protected] GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) will accept electronic graphic and photo fi les in no less than 300 dpi COL John M. Shay 7955 format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) E-mail: [email protected] If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of ex- cessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning elec- TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) tronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number COL Timothy D. Cherry 4009 above. E-mail: [email protected] ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE- Assistant TRADOC System Manager ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser vice, address chang- Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) es, and delivery problems, or for awards in formation, contact Con- TBA 3519 nie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-Mail: [email protected]; TBA (ATZK-TD) phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the 8247 Association through their website at www.usarmor-assn.org. UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, phone DSN 464-2249; com mercial: U.S. Army Armor School (502) 624-2249. Requests to be added to the offi cial distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Editor in Chief. NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) CSM Phillip D. Finerson 5150 EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, E-mail: phillip.fi [email protected] Bldg 1109A Sixth Avenue, Room 371, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine website COL Michael W. Alexander 7848 at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, COL James K. Greer 8736 training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 — March-April 2005 “Commander’s Hatch:” bat arms types pushing the envelope are stray- any authority. In other words, nothing but per- Call for Debate on Noncombat RSTA ing far beyond their areas of expertise while sonal opinions! Wasted effort! ignoring the realities of combat support and Dear ARMOR, service support. We need to keep armored cav- I have previously written letters concerning the flagrant conceptual flaws in brigade recon In his column, “Commander’s Hatch,” in the alry and we also need to reinforce the UEx with RSTA (actually MI) assets as they be- troops, Stryker recon squadrons, and light/ January-February 2005 issue of ARMOR, Ma- medium armor in general and I will not repeat jor General Terry Tucker asks for comments on come technically feasible. The two are not the same. them here. But it is plain that U.S. Army Train- the emerging theoretical concepts for noncom- ing and Doctrine Command centers are con- batant reconnaissance, surveillance, and tar- The deeper problem is that under the guise tinuing along a path of pushing personal opin- get acquisition (RSTA) formations replacing of “transformation” we are losing all doctrinal ions and preferences instead of clear doctri- conventional armored cavalry within the UEx. clarity. Too much effort is wasted creating new nal thinking and analysis. This does not bode The quick answer is: we need both cavalry terms, such as UA, UEx, UEy, and RSTA, rath- well for the future of Armor and the U.S. Army. er than actually resolving doctrinal issues. I and RSTA units, like we used to have. In this CHESTER A. KOJRO context, RSTA is military intelligence (MI). suggest that we no longer have any valid doctrine, since everything is in flux. As a specific LTC, U.S. Army, Retired In the early 1980s, there was a divisional MI example, consider the recently disapproved combat electronic warfare and intelligence bat- Stryker cavalry regiment. The 2d (Light) Ar- talion (CEWI). The CEWI acronym still ap- mored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) was to be Respectfully Disagreeing peared in the 1997 U.S. Army Field Manual transformed into a Stryker-equipped organiza- with MG Valcourt (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, tion. At the first blue ribbon panel (BRP) meet- though without definition. The 1992 FM 71-123, ing in October 2000, we could have used the Dear ARMOR, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms 3d (Heavy) ACR and the then current FM 17- In his article, “Joint Fires and Effects in the Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion, 95, Cavalry Operations, as baselines and sim- Heavy Brigade Combat Team,” in the January- Task Force, and Company Team, also in- ply swapped vehicles, mobile gun system for February 2005 issue of ARMOR, Major Gen- cludes the capability, though without the spe- Abrams, Stryker squad carrier for Bradley, eral Valcourt describes the changes to organi- cific CEWI title, on page 2-49: Stryker mortar for M106 mortar, and so on. zation and structure that the field artillery com- “The division’s task organization may allo- The first cut would be accomplished in a mat- munity is implementing in support of transfor- cate MI units to the brigade to collect signals ter of days, if not perhaps hours, and then the mation. While the majority of his article, espe- intelligence in support of the brigade. If GSRs detailed effort could focus on maintenance al- cially realizing the need for increased joint ter- [ground surveillance radar] are part of the MI location, ammunition units of supply, fuel con- minal attack controllers (JTACs) is of great unit, they are typically suballocated to subor- sumption, occupational skills revisions, and use, there are two points that require addition- dinate maneuver battalions. However, GSRs new equipment training schedules. But, the al thought: may sometimes be retained under brigade con- idea was rejected out of hand, and the effort First, the issue of where the company fire sup- trol.” degenerated into endless revisions of FM 17- 95 to accommodate Stryker and incorporate all port teams (FIST) and battalion effects coor- Once again, folks are “discovering fire” and of the new gee-whiz advanced command, con- dinator (ECCORD) are assigned. I respectful- are then amazed at their self-illumination. trol, communications, computers, intelligence, ly disagree with MG Valcourt’s statement that, C’mon guys, we’ve been there and done that, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) ca- “Where they ‘live’ is not the real issue.” I would only back then, MI never made the absurd pabilities. So (ignoring the ultimate disapprov- submit that one of the fundamental principles claim that it could substitute for ground recon al), after three and a half years we got an ad of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) is scouts and cavalry. The technology did not ex- hoc organizational structure, supporting ad where units “live.” Armor, infantry, and engi- ist then, nor does it exist today. But the com- hoc doctrine, which was never validated by neer communities have made commitments to ensure units “live” as they will deploy and fight by breaking one of their fundamental organizations — the pure armor mechanized infantry or engineer combat battalion. Assigning Army Announces Close Combat Badge field artillery personnel to the combined arms In response to requests from field commanders and after careful analysis, the U.S. Army battalion (CAB) or recon squadron, accom- announced a new badge for selected combat arms soldiers in combat arms brigades who plishes the same effect. engage in active ground combat. In the same way the squadron maintenance The Close Combat Badge (CCB) will provide special recognition to ground combat arms officer is responsible for training and certifying soldiers who are trained and employed in direct combat missions similar to Infantry and the troop maintenance teams assigned to the Special Forces, who will continue to be recognized for their ground-combat role with the cavalry troops in a division cavalry squadron, Combat Infantryman Badge. the HBCT ECOORD, battalion/squadron ECO- ORDs, and company FISTs can all train and The Army will award the CCB to armor, cavalry, combat engineer, and field artillery sol- certify collectively without breaking the funda- diers in military occupational specialties or corresponding officer branch/specialties rec- mental link to how they will deploy and fight. ognized as having a high probability to routinely engage in direct combat, and they must be While it is reasonable to expect the fires bat- assigned or attached to an Army unit of brigade or below that is purposefully organized to talion commander and command sergeant ma- routinely conduct close combat operations and engage in direct combat in accordance jor (CSM) to maintain a mentor-type relation- with existing rules and policy. ship with the artillerymen of the brigade, much like a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target The CCB will be presented only to eligible soldiers who are personally present and under acquisition (RSTA) squadron commander and fire while engaged in active ground combat, to close with and destroy the enemy with direct CSM mentor the mobile gun system (MGS) fires. platoons in a Stryker brigade combat team, The Army expects to release in March an administrative message outlining exact rules this mentorship should not effect the physical and regulations. The CCB should be available this fall through unit supply and also for pur- location of subordinate artillerymen. Perma- chase in military clothing sales stores. nently organizing, training, and equipping the HBCT the way it is expected to deploy and fight, (U.S. Army News Release, Army Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2005) Continued on Page 51

March-April 2005 — 3 Major General Terry L. Tucker Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center Dynamic Changes in the Armored Force

The Eagles’ 1970s hit, “Life in the Fast Other near-term issues have been decid- Lane,” has great applicability for the trans- ed: the UEx RSTA brigade has been re- forma tion of Army organizations and op- named as the battlefield surveillance bri- erational deployments concurrently be- gade (BFSB) and will not have a recon- ing sustained by the U.S. Army. The Chief naissance or security capability. Division of Staff of the Army (CSA) likened it to cavalry squadrons, as we know them, will “rebuilding an engine with the car still be eliminated and aviation assets current- a 15-week, combined armor and recon- running.” ly assigned to the division cavalry squad- naissance course. BOLC II and BOLC III will provide officers 21 weeks of training Transformation is in full swing: the 3d ron will be consolidated at UEx (division) level. to prepare young officers for platoon lead- Infantry Division has been transformed er positions. This is a good thing! into a four modular brigade structure and So what does this all mean to the armor The CSA’s bold decision to transform redeployed to the Middle East, and we branch’s long-term health? While there are have added four reconnaissance squad- the U.S. Army, while simultaneously man- significant implications for the branch, aging ongoing operational deployments, rons in the 101st Air Assault Division. the bottom line is that the mission sets The 4th Infantry and 10th Mountain Di- comes with a price. With an organization that have driven the need for armor and re- as large and dynamic as the Army, we visions are both in the midst of trans- connaissance forces will continue to sup- forming and the 25th Infantry and 1st Cav- can’t simply stop in place, reset, then report the need for a strong and viable ar- start; nor can we stop our training pro- alry Divisions are waiting in the wings mor force into the future. We will see a for FY06. Recently, the 2d Infantry Divi- grams, reset, and then begin training change from a tank-heavy branch (60 per- again. Needless to say, we’ll all be busy sion gained approval to transform its 1st cent to 40 percent) to a reconnaissance- Brigade within current resources begin- as we try to get all the right pieces in the heavy force (65 percent to 35 percent). right places to meet mission require- ning March 2005 and the 2d Brigade will Cor respondingly, we will see a significant redeploy from Iraq to Fort Carson. The ments today, while setting the stage for growth in the number of scouts, based on increased predictability in the future. 2d Cavalry Regiment has been relocated the addition of squadron-level reconnais- from Fort Polk to Fort Lewis, and will sance organizations in all modular bri- In the recently updated armor chapters transform to a Stryker brigade combat gades and we will grow approximately of Department of the Army (DA) Pam- team (SBCT) and the 11th Armored Cav- 3,000 additional scouts from our pre-mod- phlet (PAM) 600-3, Officer Development, alry Reg iment (ACR) will be fielded with ular structure. Simultaneously, we will re- and the ongoing update to DA PAM 600- M1A2SEP (system enhancement produce the number of tankers in the force 25, Enlisted Development, we have elim- gram) tanks and converted to a heavy bri- by about 1,000 as we transition to a heavy inated the term “branch qualification,” gade combat team (BCT). Over the next combined arms battalion force. We will which is a good change. Our professional 18 months, we will put armor officers and also see a significant increase in the num- development goal for future command- 19D scouts in reconnaissance squadrons ber of company commanders and first ers and first sergeants is providing a seat Fort Drum, Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, sergeants, as well as armor S3/XO posi- ries of operational and generating force and Fort Polk; and we will assign armor tions. The number of armor battalion and positions, supported by a quality officer Soldiers in a heavy BCT to Fort Bliss. brigade commands will also increase, as and noncommissioned officer education The bottom line is every maneuver bri- will the length of some operational com- program that develops well-rounded lead- gade in the Army, whether heavy, light mand tours from two to three years. ers — in other words, our goal is “branch or Stryker, will include armor officers, development” (the new term) not branch noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. At Fort Knox, we are transforming the qualification. However, warfighting re- A final decision on whether the U.S. Ar- Armor Training Center to meet the con- mains the core of our craft, and serving my will have 43 or 48 active component temporary operating environment de- in positions that enhance warfighting re- brigades has not been made — this will mands. We are replacing the Armor Offi- mains the “critical assignment” for armor have a significant impact on stationing cer Basic Course with the Basic Officer leaders at every grade level. and will impact the final “tally” of armor Leader Course (BOLC). At BOLC II, of- Hang on to your Stetson and keep your Soldiers. It also impacts the organization- ficers will receive basic combat and “how spurs firmly planted as we meet the fu- al structure of the 1st Armored and 1st In- to be an officer” training. Officers will ture head on. fantry Divisions, both potentially slated then attend their branch specific BOLC for FY07 transitions. III training. The Armor BOLC III will be FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!!

4 — March-April 2005 CSM George DeSario Jr. Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center OIF Highlights Bradley’s Versatility and Survivability

Employing critical warfighter systems, cess of the Bradley during military oper- such as the M1 Abrams and the Bradley ations in urban terrain. family of combat vehicles, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) clearly il- It was initially projected that seizing Baghdad would require weeks of pains- lustrates the important role these battle- While organizational structures will con- proven systems play in combat operations. taking house-to-house operations conducted by light infantry elements. The re- tinue to evolve over the coming months The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) has ality: this objective was accomplished and years, Bradley systems will retain, been an essential piece of equipment for across two furious April days by an ar- and potentially expand, their critical roles the U.S. Army for more than 20 years. mored strike delivered by combat units and missions —Armor was critical on During this time, the Bradley has under- armed with the firepower and surviv- yesterday’s battlefield, has proven effec- gone essential modifications; most no- ability of heavy armor. tive on today’s battlefield, and will be tably the M2A2 model used in Operation even more so critical on tomorrow’s bat- Desert Storm. The M2A2 demonstrated The Bradley provides an excellent sup- tlefield. port-by-fire vehicle for dismounts con- amazing flexibility on desert battlefields. Staff Sergeant Brian Flading, a 19D Op- Its lethality and survivability traits at the ducting door-to-door searches. When needed, the Bradley is an excellent door eration Iraqi Freedom veteran, remem- right time and place — maneuver and bers an incident when his platoon was speed, combined with tactical surprise opener in its own right. The variety and flexibility of its weapons systems have mortared one night in Balad. With the — proved its ability “to fight in the fourth new FLIR, the crew was able to see the dimension.” proven invaluable in the tight constraints of urban terrain. Armor is also a great in- enemy shooting the mortars. His crew The newest M3A3 BFV, refined with timidator. When platoons of BFVs and sent rounds downrange within three sec- field enhancement packages and systems tanks roll down an Iraqi street, it instills onds of the mortar shot! He recalls, “That upgrades, is currently employed in Iraq, fear in the enemy — he has seen first- day, I knew the Bradley was the best ve- where mortar attacks, roadside bombs, hand the firepower and survivability of hicle to have in Iraq. The awesome capa- rocket-propelled grenade, and small arms heavy armor. bility of the BFV was unleashed that attacks occur daily. The M3A3’s new and night!” improved sights allow crews to quickly Originally fielded in battalion scout pla- Staff Sergeant Michael Garvin, also a identify and dispose of threats. Heavy ar- toons, the M3A3s were subsequently re- 19D Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran, mor plating protects crews; the vehicle’s placed with high-mobility, mul tipurpose, sums up his experiences in Iraq, “The excellent mobility and pure size allow it wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). This move Bradley was a great help during raids and to go where other vehicles cannot go. The proved to be somewhat ineffective be- outer cordons. It gave us a bigger weap- BFV is also an effective casualty trans- cause scouts faced difficulty pro tecting ons system close-by. If we could not get port because it can roll into an unsecured themselves, which led to Bradleys being into a house or building, we drove the area and pick up wounded. The crew area pressed back into scouting, flank securi- Bradley through the door. The Bradley is has space to transport both the injured ty, and convoy escort roles. Because the the best vehicle we have today, it has soldier and attending medic, thus saving current enemy has proven to be elusive, saved my life, as well as the lives of my valuable time and lives. resourceful, and unpredictable, the BFV soldiers. From training to fighting, the has become the scout’s vehicle of choice Bradley has always been my choice.” The BFV proved to be reliable above to conduct a variety of missions. and beyond expectations throughout the SSG Flading and SSG Garvin served 3d Infantry Division’s historic 800-kilo- The Bradley continues to in corporate les- with the 1st Squadron, 10th U.S. Caval- meter advance across the brutal deserts of sons learned from the field to meet the ry, 4th Infantry Division in Iraq. They southern Iraq, with the division maintain- requirements and needs of Soldiers. Re- have served as BFV drivers, gunners, and ing above a 90-percent combat capabil- cent combat experiences have served to squad leaders and are currently Bradley ity due to the Bradley’s flexible full-spec- highlight the Bradley as a critical con- commanders, sections sergeants, and se- trum defense capabilities. The Bradley’s tributor to ongoing transformation think- nior scouts. I appreciate the expertise and performance was hardly a surprise to ing. One of the few certainties in an era of experiences these fine soldiers are will- those who know its capabilities. What uncertainty is that the Bradley will con- ing to share with the Armor Force. was surprising to many outside the Brad- tinue its service to the U.S. Army in sig- ley community was the demonstrated suc- nificant numbers well into the future. Iron Discipline and Standards!

March-April 2005 — 5 From the Boresight Line: AIMTEST: Bridging the Gap Between Simulators and Live Fire by Staff Sergeant Richard Smith

Over the past few years, training bud- gets have been cut substantially while readiness and operational requirements have increased. Units are expected to do more with less, creating serious problems for resource managers and trainers. Nowhere has this been more acutely felt than in armored combat units — Active and Re- serve Component armored forces have an urgent need for realistic and efficient subcaliber live-fire tank gunnery training for tank and armored vehicle crews to aug- ment full caliber tank gunnery training and qualification. Trainers must have the ability to assess tank crews’ weaknesses the range safety fans and noise levels are tion conducted by foreign armies. AIM- and provide viable training courses of ac- important in many countries due to re- TEST consistently proves to be more action to correct those weaknesses. There strictions near populated areas. curate, easier to install, operate, and main- is a solution: the advanced inbore marks- AIMTEST devices are available for all tain than any other device. manship training enhancement system for standard 105mm and 120mm main tank tanks (AIMTEST). AIMTEST is ready for live-fire opera- guns. AIMTEST can also be adapted to tions in less than 10 minutes. Due to the The AIMTEST .50-caliber tank inbore any vehicle cannon and can duplicate the fact that the AIMTEST does not intrude subcaliber device was developed in the ballistics of several types of standard can- on the fire control system, it is not likely mid 1980s by a team of tank noncommis- non ammunition in calibers from 73mm to damage any systems components. A sioned officers (NCOs) at the National to 120mm through the substitution of eas- tank crew removes the device from its case, Guard High Technology Center, Fort Dix, ily available .50-caliber ammunition types. completes installation in the vehicle, and New Jersey. Since the introduction of this The trajectory of .50-caliber M20 armor- begins firing; no other vehicle modifica- device, over 600 .50-caliber tank inbore piercing incendiary tracer (APIT) is an ex- tions are required. Once the vehicle crew devices have been purchased by the U.S. cellent match for 90 to 120mm cannons zeroes the AIMTEST and records the zero Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army Na- out to 1,500 meters (tracer burnout), and data, the crew can continuously install and tional Guard, NATO, and various allied is easily sufficient to exercise tank crews remove the inbore device to fire main gun armies. with standard half-scale or full-scale tar- ammunition then return to inbore firing There are many computerized gunnery gets. A range out to 2,000 meters (tracer without re-zeroing the AIMTEST. simulators in use by the military today that burnout) is achieved through using .50- provide a valuable piece of the training caliber M962 saboted light armor pene- Many units today are deploying and re- puzzle; however, no one would fly with a trator tracer (SLAPT) ammunition. deploying. Even during a deployment, pilot or take an armored vehicle crew to training continues, and AIMTEST should AIMTEST is the only U.S. manufactured be on every unit’s deployment checklist. war that has trained only with simulators. inbore device that is safety certified by AIMTEST bridges the gap between live- It can easily be deployed in the unit supply Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG), Mary- conex. AIMTEST can be used to keep the fire and gunnery simulators. When a tank land. The U.S. Army has tested the AIM- crew is on the range firing live bullets, tank crew’s gunnery skills sharp without TEST .50-caliber subcaliber gunnery de- wasting transport space that can be best this increases the crew’s combat mental- vices on four separate occasions. In 1987, ity and situational awareness. With AIM- used for other equipment. When the unit APG issued the first safety release for in- arrives at the deployment site, AIMTEST TEST, there is no compromise in train- bore use to the U.S. Army. In 1997, APG ing standards for the crew. All functions can be transported in a high-mobility, mul- conducted a comprehensive test on the tipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) performed during normal operational use AIMTEST in both the 105mm and the of the tank must be performed with AIM- from the unit’s supply location to its train- 120mm models. In 2001, APG conducting site. Up to eight AIMTEST devices, TEST. This reinforces realistic training ed tests to ensure AIMTEST will fire M962 standards and does not teach bad habits. along with ammo, can be transported in a SLAPT .50-caliber ammunition without HMMWV. The main gun’s normal firing circuit op- causing damage to the AIMTEST device erates the firing mechanism of AIMTEST or to the tank cannon. In 2002, the AIM- Today’s deployed forces need every de- and all main gun safeties are operational. TEST was again tested, this time as a 90- vice available to sustain their skills. The In addition, the range surface danger zone mm MK8 inbore for the Saudi Arabian AIMTEST allows units to maintain com- (SDZ) is reduced to 6,700 meters or less. National Guard. All tests were success- bat proficiency across the training spec- Noise is reduced to the small-arms level ful and APG issued safety releases to the trum while deployed in austere environ- due to the “muffling” effect of the main armor community. AIMTEST has been ments. AIMTEST does not replace main gun tube. As a result, the crew is subject- tested against inbore devices sold by oth- gun firing, but definitely enhances the ed to very low sound pressure levels. Both er countries, and has won every competi- training base.

6 — March-April 2005 Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler

by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick R. Michaelis, and Major Geoffrey A. Norman

“…tanks and mechanized Infantry face problems in con- explosive device (IED), the mortar, and the AK47 in an asym- fines of urban areas that place them at a severe disadvan- metric fashion, using the concrete valleys of the cityscape tage when operating alone. Only together can these forces to their advantage. accomplish their mission with minimal casualties...”1 This evolution in warfare is not a side note in history; it Task Force (TF) Baghdad’s adaptation to fighting in the is a fore shadowing of operations to come. The mass mi- urban canyons of Al Tharwa (Sadr City) and the cemeter- gration of humanity to cities and the inability of third-world ies of An Najaf has been both remarkable and significant. nations to keep abreast of basic city services relative to It has proven the reality of urban combat — we can win growth, breeds discontent. It is a harvesting ground for fun- and we can win decisively. damentalist ideologues. The new fight brings to light a cautionary message to the This article should serve as a note of concern to the force. force — be wary of eliminating or reducing the option of Eliminating or reducing heavy armor systems from inven- heavy armor; it has proven decisive and has been the criti- tory will remove valuable assets that prove decisive when cal enabler that allowed TF Baghdad to win every fight, moving from a maneuver war to a street war. everyday. The enemy we fight in streets and crypts is not Al Tharwa: The Sadr City Box connected by a vast suite of electronics packages; instead, they use proven kinetic techniques, such as the rocket-pro- During the April-June and August-October 2004 Shia up- pelled grenade (RPG), the command-detonated improvised rising of Muqtada Al Sadr’s militia in Al Tharwa (Sadr

March-April 2005 — 7 “The commander’s independent sight systems offset the protective measure of vehicles moving through the city with hatches fully closed. The second sight afforded another field of view, allowing the gunner to primarily observe enemy alleys. Instead of the commander being relegated to what the gunner was observing, or struggling to gain situational awareness through vision blocks, he became an integral part of the vehicle and patrol team by providing coverage of secondary enemy avenues of approach, oriented forward of the vehicle or toward the opposite flank vehicle’s immediate rooftops, providing high- angle coverage.”

tem enhancement package (SEP) tanks could not negotiate due to sheer width and obstacles such as disabled civilian vehicles and air-conditioning units. As these vehicles progressed throughout the city, the militia would attack their flanks, seek- City) and An Najaf, it became clear that the ultimate task orga- ing to disable them with IEDs, RPGs, and AK47s. nization of choice depended on the enemy threat. Patterns of em- U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06.11, Combined Arms Op- ployment of the combined arms team that both solidified and erations In Urban Terrain, Appendix C, states: “If isolated or challenged existing doctrine were also made clear. unsupported by infantry, armored vehicles are vulnerable to en- The grid-like pattern of Al Tharwa presented an interesting tac- emy hunter/killer teams firing light and medium antiarmor weap- tical challenge to the soldiers and leaders of 2d Battalion, 5th ons. Because of the abundance of cover and concealment in ur- (2-5) Cavalry Regiment (TF Lancer), 1st Brigade Combat Team, ban terrain, armored vehicle gunners may not be able to easily 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. As Muqtada’s militia identify enemy targets unless the commander exposes himself began actively attacking coalition forces, TF Lancer worked rap- to fire by opening his hatch or by infantrymen directing the idly to defeat the insurgent uprising while protecting its soldiers. gunner to the target.”2 As its primary avenue of approach, the enemy chose side street Initially, following standard doctrine, the task force moved alleys, which Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and M1A2 sys- throughout the city in column or staggered-column formations, assigning typical 360-degree sectors of fire to cover all enemy avenues of approach. However, with the vertical firing plat- forms of rooftops and the coordinated attacks on both flanks through use of alleys, the task force had to rapidly adapt to the Direction of Attack emerging enemy threat. 3-5 mph The task force quickly learned to move throughout the city in protected mode (buttoned up) and maximize the capability of the dual sights provided by the M1A2SEP, equipped with the gunner’s primary sight and the commander’s independent thermal viewer (CITV), and the M2/3A3 improved Bradley acquisition subsystem (IBAS) with the commander’s independent viewer (CIV). As shown in Figure 1, their refined movement-to-contact Alley formation resulted in a rolling battleship of armored vehicles in a “box” formation, moving in a deliberate, methodical progres- sion through the main streets of Al Tharwa, maximizing the protection of the armor packages.3 Success relied on the skill of the driver, the armor package of the M1A2 and the latest generation M2/3A3 and the dual sight capability afforded by the vehicle Vehicle Distance: METT-TC Alley (Alley to Alley) upgrades. Moving buttoned up in a pure mechanized/armor formation, the combat patrol would reposition at the release point into a rect- angular formation of at least six armored vehicles. Moving vehicles parallel to each other created an artificial set of interior Street lines to protect the exposed flank of the opposite vehicle and allow a full three-dimensional, 360-degree coverage of the constantly shifting battlespace.

= M1A2SEP = M2A3 The commander’s independent sight systems offset the protec- Figure 1 tive measure of vehicles moving through the city with hatches fully closed. The second sight afforded another field of view, al-

8 — March-April 2005 Direct Fire Plan 12 lowing the gunner to primarily observe enemy alleys. Instead of Direction of Travel the commander being relegated to what the gunner was observ- 12 O’clock ing, or struggling to gain situational awareness through vision blocks, he became an integral part of the vehicle and patrol team

D D E by providing coverage of secondary enemy avenues of approach, IE I oriented forward of the vehicle or toward the opposite flank vehicle’s immediate rooftops, providing high-angle coverage. See Alley Figure 2.

High Moving block by block, the patrol would travel at extremely 9 High 3 slow speeds to allow for acquisition of targets in the alleyways and proper handoff to subsequent vehicle gunners. Although not quite a ‘steady platform’ for the Bradley, the standard engagement was less than 200 meters — the proximity to targets al- Alley lowed for successful coax engagements. The CIV and CITV were used to scan opposite rooftops, or forward and to the flanks of the gunner’s primary sector to allow immediate target handoff.

Drivers keyed off the front left vehicle for rate of movement and Street worked as integral members of the team to identify targets, maintain proper dispersion, and move to predetermined locations. At 6 short halts, drivers would establish a point of domination by immediately moving to overwatch the closest alley, which was the = M1A2SEP = M2A3 most likely enemy avenue of approach. Figure 2 = Main Gun = CITV/CIV

“Armored forces can deliver devastating fires, are fully protected against antipersonnel mines, fragments, and small arms, and have excellent mobility along unblocked routes.” 4 clear fires for 25mm and battalion commanders to clear fires for 120mm. The success of the box in attriting enemy forces in Al Tharwa was causal to the armor packages of the M1-series tank and lat- “Armored vehicles can move mounted infantrymen rapidly to est generation Bradley. This capability allowed absorption of points where, together, they can dominate and isolate the cor- the enemy’s primary weapons system (IED), and protected in- doned area.” 5 fantry dismounts that spent many hours traveling in the backs of Bradleys, enslaved to the squad leader display to maintain situational awareness. This same technique, used with lighter skinned In war, bad things happen. The enemy objective in both Al Thar- vehicles, would not have been effective in achieving the task wa and An Najaf was to disable a vehicle and exploit it for an force’s objectives during movement to contact due to asymmet- information operations success. Moving through the streets of ric advantages the enemy retains by fighting on their turf. Baghdad, it was inevitable that a vehicle would become disabled, leading to specific battle drills within the task force. The As always, the enemy has a vote and began adapting to the suc- remaining vehicles in the box would move to provide a wall of cessful employment of the Sadr City box. They began to move steel around the disabled vehicle; infantrymen would dismount increasingly toward using IEDs to disable vehicles and subse- from the backs of the M2s to cover deadspace, either by tying quently cause a catastrophic kill by using RPGs and mortars. into the adjacent vehicles or occupying by force a strongpoint This prompted the task force to adopt a heavier stance in the position. M88s, escorted by a quick reaction force (QRF) pa- lead elements, stressing the use of the M1A2SEP to lead each trol, would move rapidly to the disabled vehicle and begin ex- combat patrol. The tank, with its armor package, could take the traction. The screen established by the initial patrol would pro- brunt of the effect of IEDs laid throughout the route. In some tect the M88 crew as they extracted the vehicle. cases, crews could identify detonation wires running from hid- den IEDs through global positioning systems (GPS) and CITV. Once identified, the crews could ‘disable’ the IED by destroy- “Decentralized armor support greatly increases a small ining the detonation wires with direct fire or by directly firing at fantry unit’s combat power. However, dispersed vehicles can- the IED’s point of placement. Stripping all unnecessary equip- not be easily and quickly concentrated.” 6 ment from the bustle rack and moving buttoned up allowed follow-on Bradleys to service targets that succeeded in climbing on top of tanks or getting within their deadspace. An Najaf: The Combined Arms Patrol Because of the close range of engagements in the city, the primary weapons system on both the tank and Bradley became the In An Najaf, the terrain dictated different tactics while fighting the same enemy. What remained constant was the overwhelming coax, normally zeroed at about 200 meters. Recon by fire of sus- the pected IED locations was authorized, but leaders always remained domination of the armor/mechanized combination as enabler cognizant of collateral damage through positive identification to support the decisiveness of the mission. of targets. Because of the desire to minimize collateral damage, In August, elements from the 2d Brigade Combat Team (Black- a check in the system for using 25mm and 120mm was devel- jack) and the 3d Brigade Combat Team (Greywolf), 1st Cavalry oped by the task force, which forced company commanders to Division, rapidly moved south of Baghdad to An Najaf and

March-April 2005 — 9 IEDs, mines, and RPGs, to mortars and snip- = M1A2SEP ers. The Bradleys would protect the flank and elevated shots against the tank, and the M1114 = M2A3 provided local and rear security for lead vehicles using its M240 machine gun. Dismounted sol-

DOA = M1114 diers from the Bradley and M1114 would dis- perse to the flanks of the section to elimi- = Dismounted nate enemy attempting to get into blind spots of Infantry the armored systems. Due to the restrictiveness = Main Gun of the cemetery’s tomb stones, mausoleums, and support buildings, maintaining visual contact = CITV/CIV with friendly forces was extremely difficult, re- = M240 MG quiring crews to maintain voice contact to keep vehicles and dismounted movement synchronized. Situational awareness was also critical in the clearance of fires, as both 120mm mortar and 155mm artillery were employed. See Figure 3. At times, narrow trails forced the tank to move to a flank, based on traversing limitations, and al- Figure 3 low the Bradley to engage and service targets. To Cemetery Structures mitigate risk to the tank, the infantry would move to the tank’s flank to prevent the enemy from mounting from the rear. If infantry were committed or unavailable, a sniper was emplaced to fought the Muqtada’s militia on different terrain. Task Force 1st overwatch the tank, providing the same protection and early Battalion, 5th (1-5) Cavalry Regiment, 2d Brigade Combat Team, warning. The final option was to use the M2A3’s CIV to cover 1st Cavalry Division, faced unique challenges as narrow paral- the tank’s position. lel trails through the cemetery and old city of An Najaf forced Like units in Al Tharwa, Task Force 1-5 Cavalry generally fought units to attack with multiple, section-sized elements along adja- buttoned up. The propensity for Muqtada’s militia to engage cent trails, which were often separated from mutual support. through sniper fire or by dropping hand grenades on crews from above, forced this tactic. This tactic also allowed overwatch ve- A combined arms section became the preferred maneuver ele- hicles to engage targets that moved within the vehicle’s dead- ment. The section normally included a tank and Bradley attack- space to its immediate front. ing abreast, trailed by an M1114. The tank often advanced slight- ly ahead of the Bradley to absorb the initial energy of enemy am- Without the armor protection afforded by the tank and latest bushes. These ambushes and enemy engagements ranged from generation Bradley, Task Force 1-5 Cavalry’s ability to achieve

“Because of the close range of engagements in the city, the primary weapons system on both the tank and Bradley became the coax, normally zeroed at about 200 meters. Recon by fire of suspected IED locations was authorized, but leaders always remained cognizant of collateral damage through positive identification of targets. Because of the desire to minimize collateral damage, a check in the system for using 25mm and 120mm was developed by the task force, which forced company commanders to clear fires for 25mm and battalion commanders to clear fires for 120mm.” decisive success in An Najaf would have been characterized by higher casualties and a longer campaign. Used in conjunction with a combined arms dismounted infantry team, the tank and Bradley, having devastating effects on Muqtada militia largely attributed to the protection afforded by their armor packages, forced the enemy’s hand and led to capitulation by Muqtada al Sadr.

“Due to the length of the tank main gun, the turret will not ro- tate if a solid object is encountered.” 7 DOA: Lane C DOA: Lane D DOA: Lane DOA: LaneA DOA: LaneB Southern An Najaf: The Lane Attack Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th (2-7) Cavalry Regiment, attached to the 39th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, was assigned to the southern sector of An Najaf, which was characterized by a narrow, residential grid-like road network that, un- like Task Force 2-5 Cavalry in Al Tharwa, prevented full lateral traversing of the M1A2SEP’s main gun. C Company, Task Force 3d Battalion, 8th (3-8) Cavalry Regi- ment, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, attached to Task Force 2-7 Cavalry, developed the ‘lane attack’ approach to application of armor in urban environments that character- Infantry ized the unit’s area of operations. To maximize the capabilities Reserve of the armor packages and the independent sights, the unit created section level lanes or directions of attack. Vehicles would move to “points of domination” (the intersections) to maximize • Points of Domination / Advantage: the ability to traverse the turret and use the CITV. The first tank Intersection would orient low, forward, and to an unprotected flank. The sec- = M1A2SEP ond tank would be two blocks back, clearing forward and high • Note how each version of employment over the lead tank. The CITV would cover an unprotected flank of Armor in UO is a battle to create = M1114 and rear. One block over, on a parallel street, would be a second standoff, security and interior lines = Main Gun section-level direction of attack that would be occupied by a = CITV/CIV wing tank section. This lateral dispersion of forces in extremely Figure 4 canalized terrain created a set of interior lines that afforded lateral security. Up to two platoons would be put on line, along four lanes, with infantry (in M1114s) in a reserve role behind the center echelon tank sections. See Figure 4. ages — enemy forces will exploit what they perceive as weaknesses. Units must take this into consideration when occupying or creating a positional advantage. “Because of the complex terrain, defending forces can rapid- Independent sights 8 . We no longer have the standoff envisioned ly occupy and defend from a position of strength.” in fighting a war on the plains of Europe. Instead, we fight a dirty, close fight against an asymmetric threat that uses crude weapons. It drives units to move through the urban landscape but- Observation and Examination toned up. The CITV and the CIV give back to the vehicle and Whether fighting enemy forces on home turf, on a commercial unit commanders capabilities lost by operating in this posture. or residential grid pattern such as in Al Tharwa or southern An Units must train to conduct entire operations with hatches closed. Najaf, or on irregular patterns of the cemetery or old city of Points of domination. Vehicles, sections, and units move to and northern An Najaf, leaders can benefit by observing and exam- occupy positional points of domination (or advantage), normal- ining these three separate units and their invaluable successes: ly an intersection, where they can best take advantage of the ca- Adaptable leadership. Throughout each experience, our lead- pabilities afforded by the M1A2 and latest generation M2/3A3 ers consistently and rapidly adapted to enemy tactics and main- armor package (with enablers), the dual sights, and weapons sys- tained the initiative. Although there are similar doctrinal threads tems. in the employment of the combined arms team in each instance, Create standoff. Create reaction time to allow servicing of tar- it is the development and implementation of an emerging set of gets. In some cases, that ‘standoff’ is a function of location (see tactics and techniques in direct relation to enemy employment points of domination). In other cases, it is a function of speed. that led to its defeat. Slowing movement allows time for acquisition, drawing out enemy forces, and servicing targets in the close confines of the ur- Confidence in equipment. Current armor packages, the M1A2 ban landscape. SEP and the latest generation M2/3A3 (with enablers) can take the brunt of enemy weapons systems. They can survive first con- Create interior lines. Offensive and defensive box formations tact, which is critical to tactical success. However, there is a create conditions to maximize the capability of the dual sights small risk associated with employment of current armor pack- by eliminating the need to secure a flank, which is protected by

March-April 2005 — 11 the vehicle to the unobserved flank. This further offsets the MG Peter W. Chiarelli is currently serving as commanding general, 1st enemy’s propensity to execute simultaneous attacks from mul- Cavalry Division and Task Force Baghdad, Camp Al Taheer, Iraq. He re- tiple surface and elevated avenues of approach. ceived a B.S. from Seattle University, an M.P.A. from the University of Washington, and an M.A. from the United States Naval War College. His We must continue the debate about the relevancy of armor. military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer It would be wise to listen to some of our own doctrine when Advanced Course, the United States Naval Command and Staff College, examining future combat systems. The trend is clear; the and National War College. He has served in various command and staff hardest place to fight and win — in the city — will dominate positions, to include commander, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 9th Infantry Di- vision, Fort Lewis, WA; G3 (Operations), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, future U.S. Army operations. We cannot rely solely on a suite TX; Deputy G3 (Operations) and Director for Plans, Training and Mobiliza- of electronics packages to offset the brunt of an enemy at- tion, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX; commander, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Divi- tack, which will be characterized by crude but effective weap- sion, Fort Lewis; executive officer to the Supreme Allied Com mander Eu- ons and an inherent terrain advantage due to the complexity rope, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium; assistant of the city fight. The solution is good planning, the resolve of division commander (support), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood; and direc- leadership, and the confidence that the equipment they fight tor, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of in will protect our soldiers. The critical enabler is lethal and Staff, G3, United States Army, Washington, DC. survivable M1 and M2/3 armored packages, coupled with in- MAJ Patrick Michaelis is currently serving as battle command officer, 1st creased situational awareness afforded by an independent com- Cavalry Division and Task Force Baghdad, Camp Al Tahreer, Iraq. He re- mander’s sight. These systems must remain in our inventory ceived a B.A. from Texas A&M University and an M.P.A. from Harvard Uni- for immediate employment by deployed forces. Our tanks and versity. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Ar- Bradleys must not diminish in numbers but become more ca- mor Officer Advanced Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Scout Platoon pable through continuous upgrades that protect our soldiers Leaders Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Airborne and allow them to dominate the unseen, often unnoticed en- School, Air Assault School, and Ranger School. He has served in various emy force that lurks in the shadows of alleys. command and staff positions, to include assistant professor, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; S4, A Troop commander, and headquarters and headquarters troop commander, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 4th (1-4) Notes Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany; tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and troop XO, 1-4 Cavalry, Schweinfurt and Bosnia. 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 28 February 2002, Appendix C. MAJ Geoffrey Norman is currently serving as course manager, Armor Cap- 2Ibid. tains Career Course, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, KY, and recently returned from service with 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st 3The box formation is not new to the first team. In 1993, then Major General Wesley Clark introduced and trained the box formation as the division commander. He contended it offered Cavalry Division, Baghdad, Iraq. He received a B.S. from the United States the same advantages in the open terrain of the National Training Center in fighting an enemy Military Academy. His military education includes Combined Arms and Ser- that were used the wadis and IV lines to engage attacking forces from a position of advan- vices Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic tage. Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. 4 FM 3-06.11, Appendix C. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include small 5Ibid. group instructor, Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox; observer con- 6Ibid. troller, Cobra Team, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; troop com- 7Ibid. mander, A Troop, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Camp Garry Owen, Korea; 8U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06, Urban Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, tank platoon leader and battalion S4, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regi- Washington, D.C., 1 June 2003, p. 6-5. ment, Fort Hood, Texas.

“Due to the restrictiveness of the cemetery’s tombstones, mausoleums, and support buildings, maintaining visual contact with friendly forces was extremely difficult, requiring crews to maintain voice contact to keep vehicles and dismounted movement synchronized. Situational awareness was also critical in the clearance of fires, as both 120mm mortar and 155mm artillery were employed.” Preparing for the Realities of Killing the Enemy and Taking Ground

by Captain Michael R. Nakonieczny, U.S. Marine Corps

A combat arms officer’s duty is to kill “A combat officer must also expect that have they witnessed violent death. These and train subordinates to kill. This is a some men under his command will be same officers were raised in a society that blunt, hard, and honest statement. All com- killed. The manuals teach that an officer rightly condemns the killing of another bat officers, regardless of service, are ex- can expect to lose a certain percentage of human as barbaric and indecent. Their mis- pected to lead subordinates in situations men on any particular action. The ca- sion is to take ground and kill the enemy, where death and mass carnage are ram- sualties will be 5 percent, 20 percent, or yet studies show that only two percent of pant. 50 percent, and military strategies are de- the population is predisposed to kill with To assist the officer in accomplishing veloped on the basis of men killed. To out hesitation or remorse. These facts are this mission, doctrine was created to guide the small unit commander, however, those scientifically proven and still most com- him in the employment of military assets. will not be percentages but faces and bat arms officers receive very little, if any, Using this doctrine and through field names of men who cannot be forgotten type of lecture or class exposing them to exercises, officers develop tactics, tech- in a lifetime. The young officer must re- these harsh realities. Even military insti- niques, and procedures that are used in alize that the losses among his men will tutions that teach these courses, such as battle. Through this process and the rein- already have been factored into strategic the 10-week-long U.S. Marine Corp’s In- forcement that occurs through training, planning. Even if the officer does his job fantry Officer’s Course (IOC) with its the “skill to kill” is taught and continual- perfectly, he will lose men. He will make classes on killology, are not always suc- ly reinforced. Most combat arms officers mistakes that will kill men. He will lead cessful in overriding 22 years of societal and their units show a general proficien- his men out to face the enemy knowing conditioning that killing is wrong. Evi- cy in this skill and are prepared to use it full well some will die. That is his job. dence of this is seen in William Manches- Some combat officers will not be able to ter’s Goodbye Darkness: when the Nation calls on them to do so. assume such responsibility for very long. It can therefore be argued that our mili- Others will handle it well. To increase his “I shot him with a .45 and I felt remorse tary training is successful in instilling the chances of success on the battlefield, the and shame. I can remember whispering skills to kill. young officer must understand that he foolishly ‘I’m sorry’ and then just throw- Unfortunately, there are other aspects of will lose men, and other aspects of the ing up … I threw up all over myself. It combat that are all too often overlooked. dark side of combat before the shooting was a betrayal of what I have been taught since a child.”2 These aspects include the “will to kill” starts.”1 and other unpleasant aspects best de- As Dave Grossman describes in his book, scribed through the following quote from Even with the Global War on Terrorism, On Killing, this is the equivalent of “a Brigadier General Downing’s article, “The a large portion of the U.S. military’s offi- world of virgins studying sex, and they Dark Side of Command:” cer corps have not been in combat, nor got nothing to go on but porno movies.”3

March-April 2005 — 13 This leads to the conclusion that combat As part of an officer’s entry level train- exposing senior and post-command cap- arms officers, although well indoctrinat- ing, he must be taught to understand the tains to such material truly is coming up ed with the skills to kill, are not trained “essence of the military is that to be a a day late and a dollar short. Platoon and to deal with the guilt associated with kill- good leader, you must truly love (in a de- company commanders are far more like- ing and the guilt associated with watch- tached fashion) your men, and then you ly to directly order men into harm’s way ing those you command killed. must be willing to kill (or at least give than are senior staff officers. Furthermore, the orders that will result in the deaths of) to company grade officers, the men they The True Burden of Command that of what you love. The paradox of war order into combat are not merely face- is that those leaders who are most will- less members of a regiment or division, Prior to instilling the will to kill in his sub- ing to endanger that which they love can they are men they live and work with ev- ordinates, the combat arms officer must be the ones who are the most liable to eryday. These captains and lieutenants first be prepared to deal with the reper- have formed a bond and mutual respect cussions of leading men into combat. In win, and therefore most likely to protect their men.”4 with their men and it is these faces that doing so, he must realize that the burden leaders remember for the rest of their lives. of killing and watching the men he leads It is also imperative that officers study Countless hours are spent teaching new die will weigh heavily on any officer who and become intimately familiar with the officers basic troop leading procedures, commands in combat. One only has to complex and often contrasting emotions operational risk management, and other look into the eyes of a veteran of past wars they will feel when commanding in com- processes, while relatively none are spent to see this truth. Memories of war are bat. The best way is to learn from com- on familiarizing or preparing for the emo- heavy burdens for veterans to carry for a manders who have gone before us and tions he must endure when his decisions lifetime. who have dealt with these feelings. This is are paid for by the blood of his men. The methods a man uses to deal with done through attending professional mil- that burden will be derived from the way itary education seminars with former com- Developing Warrior Ethos in which he was raised, the influences on manders who are willing to discuss such and the Will to Kill his life, and the genetic disposition he has topics or through the diligent reading of Ideally, to familiarize a warrior with the prior to going to combat. Although some military books whose authors speak of sights, sounds, and confusion of combat, men will handle this reality better than such emotions. Furthermore, books such you would place him in that environment others, it is a failure of our officer train- as On Killing, Acts of War, and The Face and force him to experience these factors. ing and indoctrination process that offi- of Battle should be mandatory reading Those who prove psychologically predis- cers are not taught about the emotions for newly commissioned officers.5 Once posed to excel under such rigorous cir- they endure when leading men to death. read, discussions should be conducted cumstances would be retained in combat They are not familiarized with success- with senior officers to reinforce poignant arms related military operational special- ful methods of confronting and ultimate- facts. There are military schools that issue ties (MOS). Until the Global War on Ter- ly dealing with these emotions. the above-listed books to instructors, but rorism was launched, this type of trial by

“The young officer must realize that the losses among his men will already have been factored into strategic planning. Even if the officer does his job perfectly, he will lose men. He will make mistakes that will kill men. He will lead his men out to face the enemy knowing full well some will die. That is his job. Some combat officers will not be able to assume such responsibility for very long.” fire was the exception vice the norm. Even with conflicts waging in both Iraq and Af ghanistan, the number of U.S. forces who have not experienced combat still outnumbers those who have. Fortunate- ly, combat arms units have means available to replicate and introduce men to the fear, anxiety, and adrenaline associated with closing with and destroying the enemy. Methods of doing this include forcing their men to “fight” an opponent via grappling, boxing, bayonet training, and others, such as the Marine Corps’ martial arts program. Scientific studies have proven that humans feel a plethora of emotions prior to engaging in any sort of combat. It has also been proven that the anxiety felt prior to combat greatly exceeds that which is felt during combat. For example, John Dollard studied 300 American “Prior to instilling the will to kill in his sub ordinates, the combat arms officer must first be prepared veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, to deal with the repercussions of leading men into combat. In doing so, he must realize that the which fought in the Spanish Civil War. burden of killing and watching the men he leads die will weigh heavily on any officer who com- Seventy-one percent of them admitted to mands in combat. One only has to look into the eyes of a veteran of past wars to see this truth. being afraid before action. Only 15 per- Memories of war are heavy burdens for veterans to carry for a lifetime.” cent remembered being frightened during battle. These emotions and feelings are a result of the fight or flight instincts, which are common in all animals, to ining forced to fight engagement after en- them by authority, be it the proximity of clude humans, and are similar to what an gagement, two things happened. First, the authority figure, the respect for the athlete feels prior to participating in the their capabilities increased, greatly en- authority figure, or the legitimacy the au- “big game.” hancing their confidence. This confidence thority figure plays in a human taking ac- transformed into a warrior spirit that was tion to severely hurt or kill another. Only In no way does this article compare the not only evident in the ring, but in field through understanding the roles authori- level of anxiety and pressure associated exercises against other units. They truly ty plays in enabling a warrior to kill, can with controlled competition to that of go- looked forward to the next “bout,” be it a leader train and motivate his men to do ing to combat and destroying the enemy. against another Marine or another unit. so. It is implied, however, that the emotions Second, they learned to mask their fears. In Grossman’s On Killing, the author ex- a warrior feels prior to engaging in a con- Regardless if it is your first boxing match trolled combative engagement with an- plains that combat arms officers must un- or your one-hundredth, everyone feels derstand other aspects of killing: “men in other warrior are to a much lesser extent anxious and nervous before competing to what a warrior will feel prior to engag- combat are usually motivated to fight not in front of peers and subordinates. How- by ideology, or hate, or fear, but by group ing in combat. Forcing men to face and ever, the Marines learned to mask these deal with these emotions is even more im- pressures and processes involving regard fears. As mentioned above, fear and anx- for their comrades, respect for their lead- portant if one takes into consideration that iety have been scientifically proven to an increasing number have never been in ers, concern for their own reputation with have a specific effect on humans. Although both, and an urge to contribute to the suc- a fist fight or a situation that has caused the levels they will experience in war will 6 them to fear for their lives. They are un- cess of the group.” Men will kill if and be much greater than experienced in peace- when they respect their leaders and have accustomed to dealing with and manag- time, the familiarization and warrior ethos ing fear. By teaching them the basic fun- developed a sense of camaraderie through derived from such training is essential in adverse training and other circumstanc- damentals of hand-to-hand combat and preparing for that experience. then requiring them to fight an adversary es. It is the commander’s job to not only ensure his troops are well trained, but that (of ten times a peer), they are forced to be- Understanding the Enabling Factors come familiar with their body’s nervous he serves as a morale compass to his sub- reactions. Repetition builds familiarity; To train and motivate men to kill others ordinates and fosters in them a sense of familiarity results in force of habit. in combat, it is important to understand team so committed to one another that factors that enable men to kill despite be- they will refuse to let one another down. Teaching close combat skills has also ing socially and, more often than not, psy- proven to greatly increase confidence. As chology adverse to killing. While at IOC, Guilt Associated With Killing a company commander, my Marines en- young Marine infantry officers learn of “The magnitude of the trauma associat- gaged in Marine Corps martial arts train- Stanley Milgram’s controversial experi- ed with killing became particularly ap- ing three times a week. It was amazing to ment in the 1960s where, under the right parent to me in an interview with Paul, a watch their confidence and fighting abil- conditions, his subjects would induce VFW post commander and sergeant of ities increase at a rapid rate. Marines en- what they believed to be a lethal shock (ac- the 101st Airborne in Bastogne in World gaging in their first combative exercise tually a placebo) to someone they had nev- War II. He talked freely about his ex- were often timid and unsure of them- er met. This experiment proved the experiences and about the comrades who selves. Over a period of time, and after be- treme extent to the demands placed on had been killed, but when I asked about

March-April 2005 — 15 his own kills, he stated that usually you fantrymen engaged the enemy with di- on and cried … There was so much blood couldn’t be sure who it was that did the rect fire. Due to changes in conditioning … I vomited … and I cried … I can re- killing. Then tears welled up in Paul’s eyes and training, the U.S. military has prov- member whispering foolishly, I’m sor- and after a long pause he said, ‘But the en that over 90 percent of the infantry- ry.”8 The feeling of remorse is compound- one time I was sure,’ and then his sen- men engaged in combat during the war in ed when a member of a servicemen’s unit tence was stopped by a little sob, and pain Vietnam returned fire on the enemy. This has been killed or wounded; yet they lived racked the face of this old gentleman. ‘It is testament to the success of instilling and are excited and euphoric. still hurts, after all these years?’ I asked the skills to kill. However, the emotions Not all servicemen will feel this averse in wonder. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘all these years.’ after the engagement has ended and the 7 to killing. Many will deny these emotions And he would not speak of it again.” killing is done must be addressed. and eventually become hardened. How- A combat leader who instills the skill Excitement is the first emotion most of- ever, whether the killer denies this re- and will to kill then has the morale obli- ten felt after battle — you have success- morse, deals with it, or is overwhelmed gation to ensure his subordinates are pre- fully accomplished your mission and you by it, it is always present. As combat arms pared to deal with the guilt associated are still alive. This excitement can be seen officers, we must realize that our men will with killing. This can prove to be a di- in a statement taken by a CNN reporter feel remorse and offer them a means by lemma if that combat leader has never of a U.S. Marine in a video clip excerpt which to manage and overcome. had to deal with such feelings. However, after his unit had killed a number of in- The final emotion felt after a personal just as a leader that has never been in surgents in Iraq: “The guys are dead now kill is one of rationalization and accep- combat must train his unit to shoot, move, you know? … but it was a good feeling, tance. This phase is sometimes a lifelong and communicate in battle, he must also you’re like hell ya, let’s do it again.” process, which may never be completed. train them to deal with the repercussions This exhilaration is often quickly over- Here, the warrior attempts to overcome they will feel after closing with and de- come by remorse. This is often caused his remorse by justifying why he killed stroying the enemy. by the sense of identification or empathy the enemy. This may include thoughts, In preparing men to deal with this guilt, for the humanity of their victims and the such as “it was him or me,” or “I killed an officer must understand the response fact that you have done what society has the enemy to save the lives of my friends.” stages to personally killing in combat, deemed wrong. For instance, the follow- It is during this phase that a commander which include the concern about killing, ing quote was made as a soldier’s imme- needs to understand that he can take ac- the actual kill, exhilaration, remorse, ratio- diate response to his first combat experi- tions to ensure his men are prepared to nalization, and acceptance. During World ence: “My experience was one of revul- deal with each phase. It is imperative War II, only 15 to 20 percent of U.S. in- sion and disgust … I dropped my weap- that a warrior knows why he will feel ex-

“Men will kill if and when they respect their leaders and have developed a sense of camaraderie through adverse training and other circumstances. It is the commander’s job to not only ensure his troops are well trained, but that he serves as a morale compass to his subordinates and fosters in them a sense of team so committed to one another that they will refuse to let one another down.” hilarated after killing the enemy. It is not because he is blood thirsty, it is because he is still alive, he has affirmed that he can do his job as a warrior and has erased some of the uncertainty he experienced prior to his first battle. Finally, by killing the enemy, he has insured that his friends will not be killed. The warrior must also know about the immediate and often deep remorse he will feel after he kills and must realize that this is a normal reaction. The need for this understanding is not only for personal well-being, but is instrumental to mission accomplishment. Just as an attacking force can reach its culminating point, so too can the human body. Fol- lowing the immense “high,” associated with surviving a firefight, comes an equal- ly intense “down.” Fatigue sets in as the “Ideally, to familiarize a warrior with the sights, sounds, and confusion of combat, you would place body goes from being extremely tense to him in that environment and force him to experience these factors. Those who prove psychologi- relaxed. The euphoria of survival is often cally predisposed to excel under such rigorous circumstances would be retained in combat arms overtaken by the remorse and realization related military operational specialties (MOS). Until the Global War on Terrorism was launched, of what happened. During this time, the this type of trial by fire was the exception vice the norm. Even with conflicts waging in both Iraq warrior and his unit are most vulnerable and Af ghanistan, the number of U.S. forces who have not experienced combat still outnumbers to a counterattack. Warriors must be aware those who have.” of this phenomenon and be prepared to fight through the natural reaction to focus inward. By identifying that this oc- It is our job as combat arms officers to experience when the battle is over and curs prior to going into battle, you have accomplish the mission regardless of our reflections begin. taken the first step as a commander to losses. Mission undoubtedly comes first. protect your men from making the same However, a close second is ensuring the mistake. welfare of those we lead and the task of Finally, a leader must never forget the making sure they are trained to not only positive effect he can have on his men by win the battle, but also survive it. Our doc- Notes ensuring them that they did the right thing trine, technology, and tactics, techniques, 1Brigadier General Downing, “The Dark Side of Command,” after engaging and killing the enemy. and procedures provide us with superior- The Washington Post, 16 August 1987, pp. D1-D2. The affirmation of what they did, “you ity over our enemies that is unmatched in 2William Manchester, Goodbye Darkness; A Memoir of the did well today, you saved a lot of lives,” warfare’s history. This superiority ensures Pacific War, Back Bay Books, 12 April 2002. 3David Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of will serve young men well as they begin the ultimate in troop welfare leading up Learning to Kill in War and Society, Little, Brown and Compa- to justify their actions. It is this positive to and through the battle — the training ny, 1 November 1996. reinforcement that just may be what a and opportunity to survive. In today’s en- 4Ibid. warrior needs to come to terms with the vironment, the officer corps must under- 5Ibid; Richard Holmes, Acts of War: Behavior of Men in Bat- harsh realities of combat, taking ground, stand the human factors involved in kill- tle, Free Press, 4 August 1989; and John Keegan, The Face of and killing the enemy. ing the enemy and taking ground. We must Battle, Penguin Books, Reprint Edition, 1 July 1995. 6Grossman, On Killing. stiffen our resolve to make tough and bold 7 Mission First; Warriors Always choices that may cost men their lives, but Ibid. 8Ibid. “Killing comes with a price, and soci- will ultimately accomplish the mission 9 ety must learn that their soldiers will have and ensure the survival of the rest of the Ibid. to spend the rest of their lives living with unit. 9 what they have done.” Finally, we must take the time to pass CPT Michael Nakonieczny is currently serving as commanding officer, A Company, 3d Light Countless dollars are spent and military this information to the men who will do Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Al Anbar, schools are devoted to engrain the skill the preponderance of killing. Talking about Iraq. He received a B.S. from the University of to kill. Statistics from Vietnam regarding killing is not politically correct. It is a California at Davis. His military education in- the number of infantrymen who engaged brutal subject that encompasses topics cludes Armor Captains Career Course, Platoon the enemy while in contact, and the re- that have been labeled taboo by our soci- Leaders Course, Infantry Officer Course, Cav- sults of our most recent military engage- ety. However, as warriors who defend our alry Leaders Course, and Light Armored Vehi- ments show the U.S. military is in fact society, we must not only talk about these cle Leaders Course. He has served in various very well indoctrinated with the skills to emotions and topics, we must understand command and staff positions, to include XO, kill. Regardless of our most recent mili- them and teach our subordinates to un- Company H, Marine Security Guard Battalion, Frankfurt, Germany; commanding officer, Weap- tary successes, we cannot rest on our lau- derstand them as well. Through this pro- ons Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnais- rels. There is a higher price to be paid cess, we will not only arm and instill the sance Battalion, Camp Pendleton, CA; and pla- for military victory than dying or being warrior with the skill and will to kill, we toon commander, Company C, 1st Light Ar- wounded — the effects of combat will will arm him with the support and tools mored Reconnaissance Battalion, Camp Pend- change those that waged it forever. needed to deal with the emotions he will leton.

March-April 2005 — 17 Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq

by Major Bill Benson and Captain Sean Nowlan

At 0800 hours, three individuals with battalion S3, who issues a warning order fantry company, a headquarters compa- information about a known terrorist cell (WARNO) to the maneuver element con- ny (scout and mortar platoons), a separate approach an access gate at a U.S. conducting the raid. Once the order is given, infantry platoon, a howitzer battery, an trolled base. Four of their relatives had the battalion S2 will accompany the unit engineer platoon, and a civil affairs team. been detained at a traffic control point to assist with questioning detainees on The task force later lost the howitzer bat- three days prior and they want to trade the objective, identifying critical infor- tery, separate infantry platoon, and engi- information for the release of their rela- mation/evidence on the objective, and ad- neer platoon. The infantry company was tives. There is no counterintelligence (CI) vising the command element on ground. detached from December 2003 through team at battalion level, so the battalion Once the detainees and contraband are February 2004. S2 has to gather information. The S2 will secure, they move back to the forward op- The battalion’s AOR was approximate- take information from all three individu- erating base (FOB). It is now 0300 hours; ly 800 square kilometers and was split by als separately. The S2 must determine if six people are in the battalion holding fa- Highway 1, the primary north-south main their stories are legitimate by comparing cility with valuable information — at 0800 supply route (MSR) in Iraq. The main pop- their stories with the four detainees’ sto- hours, there will be others at the gate to ulation center is the Tarmiyah district, an ries, attack pattern analysis, and past hu- give information. The cycle will continue. outer, agrarian suburb of the Baghdad gov- man intelligence (HUMINT) reporting. Military intelligence assets organized, ernate with an estimated population of The detainees are key because they can equipped, and trained to win a conven- 150,000. The AOR also includes an area validate the information given by the three tional, linear war are failing to provide south of the Balad airfield, which belongs walk-ups. If the detainees were processed battalions with the analyzed intelligence to the Salah Din governate. With the ex- according to division, the battalion could and information needed to conduct ef- ception of Highway 1 and a few paved not validate their stories. fective combat and stability operations in roads, irrigation canals and dirt roads, The detainees confirm the three walk-up Iraq. This article discusses the shortcom- which become nearly impassible during stories after four hours of questioning. ings of tactical intelligence that one bat- wet weather, dominate the area. The area The battalion S2 uses attack pattern anal- talion task force encountered during Op- is host to homes and farms belonging to ysis in questioning to validate their re- eration Iraqi Freedom and provides rec- a large number of high-ranking Ba’ath- ports — the source should know details ommendations on organizing, equipping, ists, including Chemical Ali and others of attacks if their information is valid. and training tactical level military intelli- directly related to the former dictator. The The battalion S2 now attempts to pin- gence assets. population is highly tribal and generally point the location of the objective area. Task Force 1st Battalion, 68th (1-68) Ar- unwilling to work with the coalition, un- He can use the source to take him there mor, was operating north of Baghdad as less coerced by money, force, or shame. or the source can pinpoint the location part of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. During the task force’s deployment, not on a map, imagery, or pictures. Once the On 25 June 2003, the task force first one local leader came forward with rele- location is pinpointed, the battalion S2 moved south from Tuz, Iraq, into its cur- vant information about enemy attackers. plans the operation. He plans and pro- rent area of responsibility (AOR), and was The enemy conducted over 250 attacks duces products in conjunction with the made up of two armor companies, one in- in the area of operations from 26 June

18 — March-April 2005 through March 2004. These included mor- telligence analyst, and one 19Z50 S2 non- teria, so everything is important. Initial- tar and rocket attacks on forward operat- commissioned officer in charge (NCO- ly, the S2 shop was tracking everything ing bases, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) IC). A total of five specialists, with stan- from traffic patterns to electrical black- and small-arms ambushes, and impro- dard intelligence analyst qualifications, outs, flares, light usage, and various oth- vised explosive device (IED) attacks. In are authorized to do the same exact job er factors. The data became overwhelm- addition to attacks on coalition forces, as specialists at brigade, division, and ing and unmanageable. Eventually, the attackers have targeted contractors, po- corps levels — except the battalion must requirements were narrowed down to 29 lice, local leaders, and Iraqi Civil Defense be more detailed and responsive. tasks; the seven most important ones are Corps (ICDC) soldiers. shown in Figure 1. Tasks are listed by duty According to the MTOE, 1-68 Armor’s position and responsibility (POC); how- The task force’s primary tactical mis- S2 shop was 100 percent strength at all ever, limited manpower dictated every sions include raids, cordon and searches, times. The S2 shop was also assigned one sol dier being capable of performing ev- area security, route security, area and route all-source analysis system (ASAS) com- ery task. The military occupational spe- reconnaissance, and mounted/dismount- puter, which was limited because there cialty (MOS) on the far right of the chart ed ambushes. The task force detained over was no conduit between battalion and is appropriate for the task. Six of the sev- 700 enemy fighters and killed or wound- brigade until seven months into opera- en most important daily tasks were not ed unknown numbers. The task force al- tions. Like most conventional battalions, within any MOS field assigned to the bat- so rebuilt schools, completed irrigation 1-68 Armor’s brigade had no analysis and talion S2 shop; however, we performed projects, reformed the local government control equipment (ACE), which result- these tasks daily. (firing a host of city councilmen, mayors, ed in extremely limited capability to ac- ministry workers, and police), and recruit- cess or leverage division- and national- The S2 shop spent less than 50 percent ed and trained local police, as well as 180 level assets. All of these assets were used of its time doing analysis because the spe- ICDC soldiers. and maintained elsewhere in theater. cified and implied tasks required of the battalion S2 shop in the current threat en- The Battalion S2 Shop The task force started with relatively lit- vironment go far beyond its capabilities The standard modified table of organi- tle information and what was available and resources. The battalion S2 shop must zation and equipment (MTOE) for an ar- was on a macro level and not very help- provide continuous intelligence and mis- mor battalion’s intelligence section is one ful. The S2 shop created databases, which sion analysis to support combat and sta- 35D captain, one 35D second lieutenant would help determine enemy disposition, bility operations 24 hours a day, seven who serves as the battalion intelligence composition, and strength in the AOR. In days a week for up to a year. It must do center coordinator (BICC), one 96B30 se- the stability and support operations envi- this without traditionally available prod- nior intelligence analyst, one 96B10 in- ronment, it is very difficult to define cri- ucts, such as doctrinal templates and off-

# TASK POC FREQ REMARKS MOS 1) The S2 was on every single raid as the subject matter S2 D Only one DIV directed mission and three BDE missions were S2 expert to advise commanders and expedite combat 35D executed in the SASO ENV; nearly all actionable intelligence 35D decisions on the ground. was produced at the BN level 2) Produce a packet for each detainee, with multiple S2 D DIV and BDE intelligence shops do not process detainees. All 97E & 95B sworn statements, pictures, evidence, a Coalition 35D written work is done at BN and the detainees are handed over Provisional Authority worksheet, inventories of all to DIV MPs. personal items, and any targeting (linkage) that should accompany the detainee — roughly a minimum two- hour process for each detainee. 3) Interrogate or tactically question all detainees and S2 D DIV and BDE S2 shops are not in the middle of the battle and 97E civilians on the battlefields who may have been 35D have HUMINT and interrogation teams assigned to deal with involved with an attack or have information of value. these issues. 4) Run source/contact information for over 50 different S2 D BDE and DIV S2 shops rarely talk to sources because they 97B contacts ranging from former Iraqi intelligence agents, 35D have HUMINT TMs for that. Battalions have no organic high-ranking Ba’ath party officials, general officers, HUMINT. YOU CANNOT TURN AWAY INFORMATION IF YOU sheiks, government officials, and numerous other WANT TO SAVE LIVES. 95% of all HUMINT is lost because civilians. no one is there to collect it at the source (BN).

5) Maintain and update a black/white/grey list and BICC D Black/white/grey lists are developed from bottom up. 99% of 97B HUMINT database. 35D the names at BN level will be derived from HUMINT at BN level and below. BDE and DIV black lists will be derived from the bottom and the top. 99% of your BN targets will come from a BN Blacklist. 6) Maintain a detainee holding facilitate that could accom- NCOIC D BDE and DIV S2 shops do not have to worry about detaining 95B (MP) modate detainees 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with 19Z50 anyone. All of these specified and implied tasks are handled at food, water, shelter, and medical care if necessary. the BN level. 7) Ensure all seized propaganda, paperwork, and any SNR D BDE and DIV S2 sections do not understand the value of 97L & 97B other relevant written information was translated and ANALYST seized propaganda or documents nor are they involved in the analyzed in a timely manner. 96B30 processing. Valuable information is being thrown away or bypassed because of lack of assets at lower. Only someone with an intimate understanding of their AO could identify what is important. Figure 1

March-April 2005 — 19 Detainee Handling One of the most time-consuming tasks of the S2 shop in Iraq is processing detainees. This task should not be underes- timated. Processing detainees in a short time (the standard is 24 hours) is a daunting task under any circumstances. In Iraq, where all information and sources are suspect, familial/tribal ties and loyalties seem ubiquitous and exact locations of targets and identification papers are rarely available — simply determining the accuracy of names is a challenge. Challenges of detainee processing, taken from actual experiences during 1-68 Armor’s deployment, include scenarios such as: “One of the most time-consuming tasks of the S2 shop in Iraq • is processing detainees. This task should not be underestimat- An informant gives the battalion S2 in- ed. Processing detainees in a short time (the standard is 24 formation about an alleged attack cell. hours) is a daunting task under any circumstances.” The informant provides names and locations of the personnel. A raid is conducted. All named individuals (four) are present on the objective and are detained, the-shelf enemy courses of action and tac- diers, contractors, known informants, and along with two additional personnel (adult tics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). other government agency representatives males), but no weapons or contraband to show up for scheduled and unscheduled equipment is found. There are no tactical pauses for battal- appointments, interviews, and briefings. ions in Iraq and no chance for the S2 shop These myriad sources all have different • Several independent sources identify to get ahead on its tasks. The current threat priorities and agendas and all want to a leader/supporter of anticoalition forc- situation is that dynamic. Compounding talk to the battalion S2, civil affairs rep- es. A raid is conducted and the target is de- this problem is the fact that most/all of resentative, battalion S3, or commander. tained, along with three of the targets sons, the actionable intelligence used to plan Bottom line, if the person has potential in- two brothers, and several local Sheiks operations will come from within the bat- telligence (and many actually do) the lack who were meeting at the target’s house talion. Expecting to receive useable ene- of resourcing and mission requirements at the time of the raid. No weapons or con- my situation template (SITTEMP) or de- drives the S2 to become the primary col- traband were found. tailed intelligence from higher headquarters about targets inside a battalion’s AOR lector for the battalion. The challenges of • Three Iraqis are engaged while at- is futile. Battalion AORs are too diverse managing interpreters, separating com- tempting to set up an RPG ambush, one and brigade AORs are too large to expect peting ethnic and religious factions, and is wounded. They abandon their weap- this type of help and detail from higher deconflicting informers with legitimate se- ons and egress the area. The blood trail is headquarters. Occasionally, national-lev- curity concerns are daunting. It was not followed to a house, which contains the el assets will provide some actionable in- unusual for 1-68 Armor to have three to wounded Iraqi and five other individu- telligence, but this information is incor- four different informers or sources a day als. One is an old man. It is unclear who rect as often as it is correct. For example, arriving to deliver information. Occasion- the two companions of the wounded Iraqi if another government agency sends you ally, the information collected required are and if the others found in the house intelligence but does not want to be in- immediate action. are accomplices or simply in the wrong volved in the operation or exploit the de- Being the de facto proponent for infor- place at the wrong time. No weapons or tainees, the intelligence is most likely sus- mation collection in theater, the battalion contraband are found. The wounded in- pect. Cooperation between battalion S2 S2 shop is also the principal manager of dividual claims to have been shot mis- shops sharing boundaries is not unusual, the many intelligence assets employed at takenly by coalition forces while he was but again, this is most often done battal- the tactical level. Assets that must be man- work ing in his fields. ion to battalion. aged include attached or operational con- • Two men are stopped during a mount- In addition to the traditional role of an- trol (OPCON) tactical HUMINT teams ed patrol. They are found to be carrying alyzing information and creating/refining (THT), tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, diagrams of an improvised rocket launch- products in support of operations, the bat- mobile interrogation teams (MIT), coun- er. One is clearly more involved, refuses talion S2 shop is also the primary collec- terintelligence teams, psychological op- to speak and is belligerent. The second tor for the battalion. This is a change from erations, and ground surveillance radar. seems weak, confused, and more likely to Each of these collection assets must be in- talk. convention al intelligence gathering, which tegrated into the battalion’s collection plan takes place above the battalion level and and S2 personnel serve as subject-matter Under current standard operating pro- filters down. While every soldier and lead- experts for the battalion in terms of syn- cedures, these individuals are required to er who comes in contact with Iraqis is a chronizing these assets, ensuring they are be sent higher within 24 hours. But do the potential information collector, it is the properly utilized. Subsequently, the tradi- circumstances surrounding each case war- battalion S2 shop that must collect, sort, tional role of analyzing information and rant these individuals serving time in pris- analyze, link, and package this informa- creating/refining products in sup port of op- on, or do some of them have information tion into useable intelligence. erations becomes secondary. The S2 shop that could be used by the detaining unit On any given day, it is not unusual for will spend 80 percent of its time handling to build link diagrams and develop the local civilians, Sheiks, police, ICDC sol- HUMINT sources and detainees. intelligence picture in the AOR? Clearly,

20 — March-April 2005 each case is different, but none of the in- understanding and overburdened brigade- yond useful significance. Despite attempts dividuals in the above scenarios have and division-level interrogation teams, to have the THT attached to the task force much potential to provide nationally sig- guarantee information will never be ex- and/or focus its reconnaissance priorities, nificant intelligence. That fact, coupled ploited timely. it continued to operate on its own time- with the existing truth that battalions do line and agenda. not receive intelligence from detainees Obviously, battalions are not prepared to sent higher, argues for a more robust in- hold detainees for an extended time, nor Typically, the THT operating in 1-68 Ar- terrogation/investigation capability at the should they. Empowered battalions with mor’s AOR spent three to four hours a day battalion level. Not only would this alle- a more robust and experienced intelli- (including travel time), two to three days viate the large number of “innocent” Iraq- gence section could certainly help allevi- a week, developing information. For the is being sent to coalition prison, but also ate overcrowded and overburdened deten- final four months of the deployment, the allow maneuver battalions with vested tion systems, and conducting interroga- THT did not come to the task force’s AOR in terest to develop much-needed intelli- tion immediately after detention and as because of maintenance and security con- gence in an effort to reduce attacks and close to the alleged incident as possible cerns. This experience may not be typi- defeat the enemy. It would further serve has been proven more effective. cal, but the capabilities imbedded in a THT are too valuable to not be used more to increase the power of the local battal- Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) ion commander in relation to local Sheiks efficiently. Since tactical information and and civic leaders because the decision to As currently configured, THTs canvas intelligence collection occurs almost ex- detain or set free would lie with the indi- Iraq to answer priority intelligence re- clusively at the task force level, the THT vidual (the commander) most connected quirements (PIR) and gather information should work for the task force command- to the area. for brigade and higher headquarters. They er. This will allow the THT to be avail- are required to make units aware of when able to develop intelligence when walk- As highlighted by recent revelations from and where they will be operating within ups arrive, following enemy engagements, Abu Grahib prison, every detainee has po- their AORs; however, this occurs with or during actions on the objective. Be- tential strategic relevance based on the per- vary ing degrees of success. In the case of cause the team is imbedded in the task ception of their treatment, as well as their 1-68 Armor, on more than one occasion, force, its security is inherent and it has guilt or innocence. The detainee-screen- a THT operating in the task force’s AOR the opportunity to circulate throughout ing scenario outlined below will further came under direct fire without the task the battle during normal task force oper- highlight the necessity and importance force’s tactical operations center having ations, as well as participate in planned of the battalion S2 shop’s ability to make any idea a team was operating in the area. operations and detainee questioning. The recommendations to the battalion com- On other occasions, the THT spent hours bot tom line is every battalion task force mander regarding who is detained and questioning sources and gathering infor- needs the capabilities a THT brings to who is released. The battalion command- mation that was either already known to the battlefield. The amount of HUMINT er should be able to face a detainee’s fam- the task force S2, was irrelevant, or be- reporting received at bat talion and below ily and feel comfortable about de- is insurmountable compared to the taining their relative. The reason minimum number of HUMINT should not be, “we didn’t have time teams operating in theater. All of to figure it out so we sent him up.” this information is lost daily due The only way to accomplish this is to the lack of training and assets at through interrogating, screening, battalion level. To fully ex ploit all or tactically questioning detainees. HUMINT reports, a 97B must be Screening (tactically questioning) at battalion level. each detainee requires at least two hours per detainee. This is just to Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT) get basic screening data and infor- The MIT is a useful asset that mation. A detainee packet is com- brings a much-needed capability to pleted if the detainee is found to be deployed battalions. Unfortunate- of higher intelligence value or in- ly, there are too few teams in the- volved in terrorist activity, which ater and because of their scarcity, can take up to three hours, depend- they are rarely found below brigade ing on available evidence. An in- level. When they are pushed down complete packet often means a de- to battalion, their usefulness is lim- tainee is refused for processing by ited because battalion AORs are too higher headquarters. If the intel- diverse for one team to be “read in ligence is immediate and action- on.” In 1-68 Armor’s case, much of able, the detainee is of much more the information/intelligence gath- value to the battalion in their AOR. ered was based on personal rela- The detainee can be used to posi- tionships built over time, coupled tively identify terrorists, safe hous- with a reputation of fairness and the es, weap ons caches, and various demonstrated ability/willingness to other areas of interest that could be go after targets regardless of social a value to the battalion. All of this status. An interrogation cell (with is time-consuming and becomes a mature interrogator) incorporat- impossible when detainees are sent “In addition to the traditional role of analyzing information and created into the existing battalion S2 ing/refining products in support of operations, the battalion S2 shop to higher headquarters. The Iraqi’s is also the primary collector for the battalion, which is a change from section is necessary, if the intelli- ingrained ability to resist routine conventional intelligence gathering that takes place above the battal- gence picture in Iraq is to improve questioning, coupled with a lack of ion level and filters down.” and much of the burden reduced

March-April 2005 — 21 from the existing, ineffective interroga- tify and kill the attackers. Again, the ad (TOE) change to properly man a battal- tion process. hoc relationship and (apparently) insuffi- ion S2 shop for success, not just in Iraq cient training of a military intelligence but anywhere in the contemporary oper- Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles asset resulted in the ineffective employ- ating environment. 1-68 Armor used tactical unmanned aer- ment of this asset. If troop strength trade In the contemporary operating environ- ial vehicles (TUAV) extensively during offs must be made, adding more MITs at ment, tactical-level intelligence has stra- Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unfortunately, the expense of GSR teams would certain- tegic relevance, and tactical-level en gage- for the times it was used, it provided no ly pay immediate dividends. The actual ments with strategic importance will con- actionable information or intelligence. GSR could be given to scout platoons to tinue to be won or lost at the task force During one event, the TUAV transmitted use when appropriate. level and below. To better support maneu- a grid over 1,000 meters away from the Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) ver task force commanders, military in- actual target it was observing (1,000m is telligence assets must be reorganized, re- a significant distance in an urban envi- 1-68 Armor had a PSYOPs team attached trained and, in some instances, reequipped. ronment), and the operators had a diffi- for the duration of the deployment. From Increasing manpower in the battalion S2 cult time identifying the transmitted pic- the task force’s perspective, this is one shop under the current unit of action ture. Because of a lack of confidence in military intelligence asset that was used MTOE is a step in the right direction; the picture being sent, no forces were sent to its fullest capacity. The three-man PSY- however, the correct skill identifiers and to counter the threat, and the event was OPs team regularly performed human rank/maturity need to be included. The over by the time the situation became and signal collection, information opera- U.S. Army must recognize that in the cur- clear. The bottom line is a UAV is useful tions production and broadcast, and prod- rent environment, with the proliferation of in fixed-site surveillance, tied to a specif- uct translation. The team was represent- technology to lower and lower levels, ac- ic trigger or decision point. It is less use- ed at all scheduled targeting meetings and tionable intelligence/information with stra- ful in an area reconnaissance role, and was attached to the battalion’s main ef- tegic relevance uses the bottom-up pro- practically useless in tracking or follow- fort company for the majority of the de- cess and is not generated by cen tralized ing an escaping or evading enemy. Op- ployment. The PSYOPS team was used so and stove-piped assets. The intelligence erators, who cannot identify unfamiliar aggressively that its vehicle was repeat- community will continue to be limited terrain or the operational significance of edly damaged from accidents and ene my and severely challenged until focus is what they are looking at, cause UAVs to attacks. The PSYOPs team was the most placed where it needs to be — battalion be ineffective. Training UAV teams at the responsive external military intelligence level. The military intelligence commu- battalion level would increase this effec- asset the task force employed. The fact nity’s challenge is to transform quickly tiveness. that it was attached to the task force for or risk a slide toward irrelevance at the the duration of the deployment was criti- tactical level. Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) cal to its effectiveness. The terrain, coupled with the reality of a battlefield with busy civilian traffic, Restructuring the Battalion S2 Shop made GSR less than effective. Often, these To maximize the exploitation of intelli- MAJ Bill Benson is currently serving as XO, teams were simply used as static obser- gence in theater and make the troops-to- 1st Battalion, 68th Armor, 3d Brigade Combat vation posts. One such team operating in tasks more manageable, the battalion S2 Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. the task force’s AOR performed this job shop should have similar capabilities of He received a B.A. from the University of New well until it made contact with the ene- brigade and division. As shown in Figure Hampshire and a M.A. from Tennessee Tech- nological University. His military education in- my. Once in contact, the team quickly shot 1, soldiers without the proper MOS or cludes the U.S. Army Command and General its basic load, received a casualty, and training performed six of the seven criti- Staff College, the Infantry Officer Advanced evacuated the area, leaving the quick re- cal tasks. Figure 2 reflects a recommend- Course, and the Armor Officer Basic Course. action force and arriving aircraft to iden- ed table of organization and equipment He has served in various command and staff positions, including S3, 1st Battalion, 68th Ar- mor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th ID, Iraq; team chief, 2d Squadron, 278th Armored Job Title Rank MOS Duty Description Number of PER Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee Army National Intelligence Officer (S2) CPT 35D Primary Intelligence Officer 1 Guard, Knoxville, TN; troop commander, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; and NCOIC MSG 19Z50 NCOIC 1 scout and tank platoon leader, 1st Squadron, S2X 1LT 35D Manages HUMINT database 2 (Day and Night) 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX.

BICC 2LT 35D S2 Assistant 2 (Day and Night) CPT Sean Nowlan is currently serving as com- Human Intelligence ENL 97E BN interrogator 2 (Day and Night) mander, A Company, Special Troops Battalion, Collector (Interrogator) Fort Carson, CO. He received a B.A. from Au- Translator ENL/CIV 97L/CIV Translate 2 (Day and Night) burn University. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the Mili- CI team SSG/SFC 97B Collect HUMINT 2 (Day and Night) tary Intelligence Career Course. He has served Imagery Analyst SPC 96D Produce & analyze imagery 2 (Day and Night) in various command and staff positions, including battalion S2, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor, 3d Senior Analyst SSG/SFC 96B Senior Enlisted Analyst 1 Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Analyst SPC 96B Asst to Senior Analyst 2 (Day and Night) Fort Carson and Iraq; battalion S3 Air, 1st Bat- talion, 508th Airborne Brigade Combat Team Analyst SPC 96B Database Manager 2 (Day and Night) (ABCT), Vicenza, Italy; company XO, A Com- TOTAL 19 pany, 1st Battalion, 508th ABCT, Vicenza; and platoon leader, C Company, 1st Battalion, 508th Figure 2 ABCT, Vicenza.

22 — March-April 2005 Israel’s Influence on Mounted Warfare by Major Jim Dunivan

It is a known fact that the home of mount- staff rides within their course of instruc- nary study, which included two days of ed warfare is located at Fort Knox, Ken- tion to incorporate military history and lecture at Tel Aviv University by distin- tucky. However, if one poses a question lessons learned into their curricula. Such guished professors of Israeli and military about the birthplace of mounted warfare, exploits are normally conducted at a lo- history. The fact that most of these profes- responses range from silent thought to cation in close proximity to the campus sors had fought in some or all of the Arab- varied suggestions. Rarely, though, will due to ease and funding, but a generous Israeli wars was an added bonus. Their anyone think to mention Israel, which is grant from the University Middle East academic and military experience dem- arguably both the birthplace of mounted Studies Committee allowed us to broad- onstrates that Israel is indeed a crucible of warfare and the great battle lab for mod- en our focus for an unforgettable staff ride mounted warfare, highlighting the roots ern innovations in mounted warfare. experience. of mounted warfare at Megiddo, the Arab- I recently lead a group of six cadets from Our main objectives for the staff ride Israeli War of 1973, and the ongoing con- the Arkansas State University’s Reserve were Megiddo and the Golan Heights flict between Israelis and Palestinians. Officers Training Corps program on a area, which highlight the beginning and Megiddo is the alleged “jewel in the staff ride to Israel to visit this great birth- evo lution of mounted warfare. The count- crown” of biblical archaeology. Rising place and battle lab. Commissioning pro- less battles that were fought in these lo- above the most important land route in grams across the country regularly use cations were the focus of our prelimi- the ancient Near East, the strategic city “Israel’s success with their tanks and air force during the 1967 and 1973 wars changed that model and the tankers of the Israeli Armored Corps became some of the most feared and respected practitioners of armored warfare to be emulated by all.”

dominated international traffic for over 6,000 years, from ca. 7,000 B.C.E. through to biblical times.1 The very location of Me- giddo within the fertile plain of Jezreel and the surrounding restricted terrain, makes this area a likely battleground. This ground indeed is the site of epic battles that decided the fate of western Asia. It was here in the year 1469 B.C.E. that the Egyptian Pharaoh Thutmose III led 10,000 men in a rapid and unexpected march against rebel Palestinian chieftains. Ad- All of these battles highlight the impor- tankers of the Israeli Armored Corps be- vancing in a concave formation, Thut- tance of terrain, intelligence, firepower, came some of the most feared and re- mose’s army enveloped the rebels and mobility, shock effect, and lines of com- spected practitioners of armored warfare severed their lines of communication with munication, which remain unchanged to be emulated by all.10 since the beginning of the history of war.7 fortress Megiddo. Being the first great bat- Following the quagmire of Vietnam and tle in recorded history, it is the first battle Clearly, as in all military history there are lessons to be learned from all of the focusing on the Soviet threat in Europe, known to be conducted in accordance with Americans in particular wanted to see the recognized principles of war. In addi- Megiddo battles that are applicable even to today’s armored force. Agility, dislo- what the 1973 war in the Middle East had tion, this battle is arguably the beginning to teach about the likely scope of future of mounted warfare, as during this battle cating the enemy, bringing strength to bear against enemy weaknesses, use of terrain, wars. American armor generals, such as the Egyptians revolutionized the chariot Major General Donn A. Starry, arrived in that enabled mobility, shock action, fire- audacity, and perseverance are just a few of the elements of leadership, training, and Israel shortly after the war to walk the power from its archers, and a degree of battlefields and confer with Israeli col- force protection.2 tactics that one could derive from these battles and apply to the modern noncon- leagues. What they found were tank bat- There would be many more battles at tiguous battlefield. As one history profes- tles of “unprecedented intensity” caused Megiddo after Thutmose’s victory in his sor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, stated, not only by the high number of tanks in- “golden chariot.” On this same plain, the “never mistake primitive for unsophisti- volved, but also by the lethality of weap- Israelites overcame the supremacy of the cated.”8 While means and methods may ons with extended range and improved ac- Canaanite charioteers and Gideon am- change, the endstate of battlefield victo- curacy. Of particular note was the com- bushed the plundering camel-borne no- ry should be the forethought of every U.S. bined tank loss of the Arab and Israeli mads from Midian.3 Fighting on foot Army leader, and one should not under- forces in the first week of the war, which against a mounted force, Gideon knew his estimate what the knowledge of history exceeded the entire U.S. Army’s tank in- only chance for victory was to surprise can contribute to contemporary opera- ventory in Europe. This and other obser- the enemy at night while they were dis- tions. vations would play a major role in revis- mounted. In a well-coordinated attack ing U.S. Army doctrine and reshaping the with a small force, Gideon and his cho- While these early battles of mounted war- American armored corps.11 sen 300 men caused so much panic with- fare in Israel demonstrate their utility for in the Midians that they attacked each According to General Starry, the Arab- study, it was the study of the Arab-Israeli Israeli War of 1973 provided “a fortu- other and fled.4 In 609 B.C.E., Pharoah War of 1973 that truly changed U.S. Ar- itous field trial of useful concepts” for Necho easily defeated a Jewish army un- my doctrine. Known both as the Yom Kip- strategy, operational concepts, tactics, der Josiah in the biblical battle of Arma- pur War and the Ramadan War, this war organizations, equipment, and training.12 geddon. On 16 April 1799, there was a bat- had much more significance than what tle between 1,500 French against 25,000 For example, the average engagement one would normally attribute to a rela- range for tanks during World War II was Turks where the French held their enemy tively brief and limited regional conflict. at bay until relieved by a cavalry charge 750 yards; whereas, Israeli tanks were This is primarily because opposing forc- engaging the enemy from 2,000 to 3,000 led by Napoleon Bonaparte. In May 1918, es were equipped by the United States British cavalry under Field Marshall Ed- yards and more in 1973. This war also and Soviet Union superpowers, and each highlighted the proliferation of anti-tank mund Allenby defeated Turkish forces side was interested in assessing the ef- encamped on the plain as his cavalry at- missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. fectiveness and limitations of their weap- The effects on U.S. armor training varied tacked through the same pass as Thut- 9 ons, technology, and tactics. After World from using terrain and sagger drills to new mose III.5 In the First Arab-Israeli War of War II, most global conflicts, such as Viet- ideas for tank gunnery doctrine such as 1947-1949, this area was again a battle- nam, were guerrilla-style wars where the the desirability of opening fire first and at field as Israeli Defense Forces from the assault rifle was the dominant weapon on long range.13 Golani and Carmeli brigades counterat- the battlefield. Israel’s success with their tacked to regain the initiative from invad- tanks and air force during the 1967 and The lessons of the 1973 war brought ing Iraqi forces.6 1973 wars changed that model and the forth another significant change to the

24 — March-April 2005 U.S. Army, and a revision of the U.S. Ar- to be a first-class fighting vehicle in Leb- themselves to die as free men rather than my’s operations field manual. The oper- anon during 1982.16 Serving as a main suffer enslavement. Today, cadets of the ations manual that appeared in 1976 was battle tank and a platform for carrying in- Israeli Armored Corps receive their com- largely written by General William E. De- fantry within the protection of its armor, missions on Masada as they vow to fight Puy and deeply rooted to the lethality and while equipped with a 60mm mortar, the for their country and freedom at any cost. combined arms success demonstrated dur- Merkava is an excellent demonstration Many, such as the tankers who gave their ing the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Perhaps of a combined arms oriented combat lives during the 1973 war, have already even overemphasizing the lessons of the vehicle that can effective ly perform in paid that price. war, DePuy would advocate a doctrine various environments. Israeli expertise To think that one has nothing to learn vi- of “active defense” as the way to win the regarding tanks in urban terrain has par- cariously through the experiences of oth- first battle against the expected Soviet ticular value for our own tactics, tech- 14 ers, especially when the stakes are as high horde in Europe. While fortunately this niques, and procedures, as we continue as human life or national survival, is an doctrine would not be tested on the bat- operations in similar environments. attitude that probably deserves some re- tlefield, it was emotionally debated with- More than the equipment and method- flection here at home as we continue to in the Army as a new renaissance of mil- ology, though, is the morale of the Israe- fight the Global War on Terrorism. The itary thought prevailed. li soldier and citizen. The people are successes of our operations in Afghani- friendly and very proud of their nation. stan and the “shock and awe” demonstrat- In this atmosphere of debate and change, Everyone, men and women, serves a man- ed by the “thunder run” to Baghdad are another version of the operations manual datory period in the armed forces so they commendable and noteworthy. However, appeared in 1982 under the new U.S. Ar- do not take their security, freedom, or much remains to be done as our Nation my Training and Doctrine com mander, land for granted. This is evident upon ar- remains at war and redefines the role of who coincidentally was Gen eral Donn riving at the airport and is reinforced at its Army and armored force during trans- Starry. While Starry had assisted DePuy every location you visit within Israel. formation. Each of us must continue to in developing active defense and drew Even many of their television shows, a do our part, and our senior leaders have similar lessons from the 1973 Arab-Is- more substantive version of reality tele- charged us with answering the call to raeli War, his experience as a corps com- vision, highlight the rigorous training and arms. Colonel Kevin Benson sums things mander in Germany and the team of mil- pride of their armed forces. up very well in the May-June 2004 issue itary intellectuals he assembled led to of ARMOR. “We are living in an age where the development of AirLand Battle doc- Masada, a striking symbol of this pride, it is easier to denigrate than offer con- trine to emphasize operational maneu- is a fortress that towers above the Judean 15 structive criticism. We are also an Army ver. This doctrine would be validated on Desert. It was here in 73 A.D. that Jew- at war and must temper our debates for the battlefields of Kuwait and Iraq during ish rebels made their last stand against the greater need of the service.”17 As we Operation Desert Storm, and even to day, Roman legions that laid siege to the fortress for approximately seven months. Fi- continue this debate, an eye to the past continues to influence military thought can clearly be balanced against the pro- and op erations during yet another period nally, after building a ramp of sand and of intellectual wrangling over transfor- rock, the Romans breached the fortress mation. only to find that the rebels had killed Continued on Page 50 As we debate and pursue our own vision of the objective force and its capabilities, it is interesting to note the Israeli Defense Force’s achievement. Isra- el’s own tank design of the Merkava, which ironical- ly means “chariot” in the Hebrew language, proved

“Israel’s own tank design of the Merkava, which ironi- cally means “chariot” in the Hebrew language, proved to be a first-class fighting vehicle in Lebanon during 1982. Serving as a main battle tank and a platform for carrying infantry within the protection of its armor, while equipped with a 60mm mortar, the Merkava is an excellent demonstration of a combined arms oriented combat vehicle that can ef fec- tively perform in various environments.”

March-April 2005 — 25 Death Before Dismount: Tran by Captain Michael Taylor and First Sergeant Stephen Krivitsky

At 0400 hours and under three percent illumination, a pla- mal AN/PAS13s and AN/PVS7Bs. The team is concealed in toon of 19 soldiers, accompanied by an interpreter, with the ghillie suits and marked with Budd lights; they report nega- com pany command and control (C2) and psychological op- tive contact — no movement on the objective. erations team attached, departs base camp to conduct a dis- The remainder of the company, mounted in high-mobility mounted raid. The dismounts move using night vision and mul tipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), is staged on the ground command pointer infrared (IR) lasers to guide their base camp prepared to move. The dismounted platoon paus- point man. The soldiers communicate using PRC-119 man- es just short of the objective and coordinates with the sniper pack single-channel ground and air radio systems (SINC- team by radio; negative contact — still no movement. The GARS) and integrated communications security (ICOM) company HMMWV element is ordered to start point (SP). The squad radios with headsets. The company fire support team dismounted platoon then moves in, establishing a base of fire (FIST), located at an observation post (OP) east of the tar- and setting the inner cordon; negative contact — no move- get house, overwatches the sniper team and objective with a ment — surprise is achieved. The HMMWVs quickly move 13-power magnification thermal command launch unit (CLU) into the objective area and set the outer cordon to protect the sight. search teams. The company sniper team, inserted hours earlier, is set, over- 0500 hours: the company cordon is set; negative contact — watching the target house with 10-power magnification ther- no movement on the objective — surprise is maintained. The

26 sforming An Armor Company

dismounted platoon’s first assault team (four-man stack) a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher and warheads moves to the entry point. GO! The number four man breach- are found! es the door and the assault team quickly enters the house, Within seven minutes of conducting actions on the objec- clearing the first room. The lights are on, night vision is not tive, an armor team moves into an adjacent objective area needed, the soldiers use M68s to scan with both eyes open with M1A1 tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to be- and quickly identify targets. The team moves to the second gin their mission. The primary target’s home phone rings room and repeats the process, catching the primary target as and the company interpreter answers. The caller quickly he begins moving to a cabinet to secure an AK47. The pri- identifies himself and warns the primary target by name to mary target is detained. “get out now, the Americans are coming!” The interpreter The assault team continues to clear the house, room by room, thanks the caller and hangs up. Further questioning of the and secures additional detainees. The platoon’s security team detainees identifies the caller’s location; the dismounted quickly follows the assault team into the house and secures platoon moves in and detains the caller. The house and ob- each cleared room and the detainees. The detainees are seg- jective area search continues; security is maintained. The regated, secured, and questioning begins — identities are mission nets the primary target and his associates, a small confirmed. A simultaneous thorough search of the house weapons cache, and intel documents — all with zero casu- and objective area begins with AN/PSS11 metal detectors — alties. Mission accomplished!

27 This was Cobra Company in the spring of 2004. No longer an — all requiring additional skill sets unfamiliar to armor crew- outfit full of typical 19Ks, it has been transformed over the past men. As missions were added, the company turned to subject- nine months from a tank company of 74 soldiers manning 14 matter experts, doctrine, Center for Army Lessons Learned M1A1s, conducting armor-only missions, into a new organiza- (CALL), fellow infantry companies, and local Special Forces tion that adapted to its environment. Today’s Cobra Company soldiers for TTP and training. has 85 soldiers in three line platoons manning one M1A1 tank and 15 HMMWVs (a mix of M1114 and M1025). These sol- We immediately identified the need for all soldiers to operate diers conduct armor, cavalry, and infantry missions and fight on the ground as part of a dismounted element. Combined arms mounted and dismounted, similar to the dragoons of the 16th is key, and creating and developing this dismounted element century, who fought as light cavalrymen on attack and as dis- and ensuring all soldiers were trained to fill this role, were crit- mounted infantrymen in defense. ical to the company’s success. During this transformation, we identified that most 19Ks needed additional basic infantry train- Cobra Company was alerted in July 2003 to deploy in support ing to operate with confidence as a dismount in a fire team and of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cobra Company turned in its 14 squad. The requirement for additional individual soldier train- M1A1 tanks at Fort Riley, Kansas, and quickly trained on M1025 ing was evident when we began to train platoons to conduct dis- HMMWVs, along with a company from the Bounty Hunters of mounted operations. 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, and one company from the Iron Rang- ers of 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. The company then deployed Every soldier receives limited basic infantry training during ini- in early September 2003. tial entry training, the amount of training must be increased to ensure soldiers are confident riflemen. This training deficiency is Once on the ground in Kuwait, the soldiers drew their new an Armywide issue and the effects are seen and felt in Iraq, mounts, the M1025 and M1114 vehicles, and began movement where every soldier is a potential dismount. Soldiers must be pro- into the task force’s area of responsibility, only a short six weeks vided the basic skills to operate as riflemen during initial entry after notification of the deployment. On the first day outside the training, with focus on rifle marksmanship and fire and maneu- base camp, during a right-seat ride in mid-September, Cobra ver at team and squad levels. Leaders are obligated to ensure sol- Com pany made contact with an insurgent complex ambush — diers build these basic skills during home station and institution- improvised explosive devices (IEDs), RPGs, and small-arms fire. al training to ensure they are always ready to fight. The fight began. The company focused on dismounted infantry operations, room- The company’s training, personnel, equipment, and tactics, tech- clearing procedures, and sniper operations. We began repetitive niques and procedures (TTP) continually evolved over the next training to create confidence in weapons, tactics, fellow soldiers, nine months as missions and the enemy changed. The company and leaders. Training lanes were created on the FOB by platoons served as the task force’s light wheeled force, conducting mis- to execute dismounted formations, movement techniques, and sions, such as quick reaction force (QRF), convoy escort, cor- battle drills, along with dismounted cordon, room-clearing (tape dons, and route reconnaissance. As the battlefield changed, ad- house) procedures, and search techniques. Leaders conducted ditional missions of raids, searches, route clearance, key terrain classes, developed standard operating procedures (SOPs), war- security, counterreconnaissance/area denial, counter-mor tar op- gamed, rehearsed, rehearsed, and rehearsed. Four-man stack erations, company forward operating base (FOB), sniper/OP room-clearing rehearsals were conducted several times prior to operations, and dismounted patrols were added. The lessons raids and searches. Training continued as we added additional learned throughout these nine months were invaluable. equipment and soldiers. We developed TTP and SOPs for new Training tools, such as manpack radios, squad radios with headsets, small- arms optics, and metal detectors. Soldiers also focused on indi- In an environment with zero defect and no chance to “re-key,” vidual weapons training to include day and night fire, using new we quickly began training soldiers to accomplish new missions optics to gain and maintain confidence. Personnel Unit manning was the second challenge the company had to manage. Three weaknesses were identified in the typical tank, now truck, platoon: no medic, no forward observer, and no dedicated dismounted element.

“Every soldier receives limited basic infantry training during ini tial entry training, but this training must be increased to ensure soldiers are confident riflemen. This training deficiency is an Armywide issue and the effects are seen and felt in Iraq, where every soldier is a potential dismount. Soldiers must be provided the basic skills to operate as riflemen during initial entry training, with focus on rifle marksmanship and fire and maneuver at team and squad levels.”

28 — March-April 2005 “The minimum crew requirement to maneuver four gun trucks is 12 soldiers, eight if the trucks are stationary, maintaining security, and only move during an emergency. This allows for one dedicated four-man dismounted team if the platoon is maneuvering. Using only one team assumed too much risk, so the goal became to create one squad-sized organic element per platoon.”

Medic. We addressed the medic issue first. Separate platoon- Additional challenges became apparent while conducting com- level operations increased and each platoon was widely dispersed pany-level missions when the medics and fire support team within the task force’s area of operations. This fact drove the were task organized and we began using snipers from the head- need to attach a medic to each line platoon to provide immedi- quarters platoon. The medics remained with the platoons to pro- ate medical support. The company medic team was task organized. vide immediate aid. If only two platoons were needed during a One medic was attached to each line platoon to provide on-site company mission, the third platoon medic accompanied the first medical support and create a team by working closely with their sergeant to conduct aid and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). If platoon. The medics also provided a readily available subject-mat- three platoons were required, a fourth medic from the medical ter expert to maintain soldier proficiency. Integrating medics in- platoon was added under the operational control (OPCON) of to each platoon ultimately saved lives over the past nine months. the company first sergeant. Forward observers. We task organized the fire support team The fire support officer (FSO) was added to the commander’s as forward observers (FOs) within the three line platoons. This vehicle to integrate fires. The FSO used the task force net to call improved fire support at the platoon level by allowing the pla- for fire while the commander fought on the company net. When toon leader and platoon sergeant to focus solely on C2 and ma- missions required the maneuver of the entire company and close neuver while FOs executed the call for fire. The attached FOs air support (CAS) was likely, the FIST was consolidated to man worked closely with their platoons, integrating fire support into its gun truck and accompany the commander. the platoon leaders’ maneuver, and providing a ready subject- Sniper operations were conducted by using headquarters per- matter expert to maintain soldier proficiency. If fires were need- sonnel to create two teams. Simultaneous company-level and snip- ed, FOs could switch the truck’s second radio to the task force er operations were accomplished by using mechanics to fill in for fires net, leaving platoon leaders free to maneuver platoons. the command crews (drivers and loaders) and company trains. Dismounts: Finally, each platoon required a dismounted ele- To alleviate all three manpower shortages in the future, the head- ment not organic to a tank platoon. An armor platoon consists quarters platoon should include seven additional soldiers — four of 16 soldiers. The minimum crew requirement to maneuver to serve as dedicated sniper teams, one to serve as a headquar- four gun trucks is 12 soldiers, eight if the trucks are stationary, ters medic to assist the first sergeant, and two additional soldiers maintaining security, and only move during an emergency. This to man the FIST truck with the fire support officer, allowing FOs allows for one dedicated four-man dismounted team if the pla- to remain with their platoons. toon is maneuvering. Using only one team assumed too much risk, so the goal became to create one squad-sized organic ele- Equipment ment per platoon. We built this squad by adding one more sol- Equipment was the third challenge. Most of the tools required dier to each platoon, in addition to the medic and forward ob- and provided by a typical infantry or cavalry modified table of server. Our goal remains to add an additional soldier per pla- organization and equipment (MTOE) were not readily available toon to increase the line platoon’s strength to a total of 20 sol- in the tank company’s MTOE. These infantry/cavalry tools in- diers. Each platoon then identified a truck commander to lead clude M68 close combat optics (red dot sights), backup iron the squad. The platoon leader typically led the squad on all sights, M4/M16 rail systems, IR lasers and spotlights (PAQ4Cs planned patrols and raids. This squad enabled each platoon to con- and PEQ2As), additional night vision goggles (NVGs), SureFire duct patrols, OPs, room clearing, and then maneuver with both spotlights, M203s, and M16 rifles. All of these tools provide pre- mounted and dismounted elements if contact was made. cision fire during both day and night.

March-April 2005 — 29 Prior to deployment, the company was issued additional M16A2 equipped with four .50-caliber machine guns mounted on MK93 rifles, shotguns, M240B machine guns, .50-caliber machine guns, heavy machine gun mounting systems and four M240Bs that are and PAS13s. Upon arrival in Kuwait, the company was issued used mainly by the dismounts. The headquarters carries two .50- 12 M1114 trucks prior to movement into Iraq. Through months calibers and two M240Bs, with one mounted on an M6 pintle of hard work and persistence, the company, task force, and bri- mount in the first sergeant’s M998 truck. The first sergeant and gade filled most equipment requirements such as additional ra- maintenance M113s also carry a .50-caliber, along with the sup- dios, gun shields, HMMWV kevlar blankets, M203s, rail sys- ply and maintenance M923 five-ton trucks. tems, and personal weapons optics. The optimal organization would have each line platoon mount- Vehicles: Currently, the company is equipped with 15 gun trucks ing two M240Bs, one .50-caliber, and one MK19 machine gun (M1025/1114) and now only one M1A1 tank. The three line pla- on the four gun trucks. The MK19 40mm grenade launcher is toons use the M1114 uparmored HMMWVs, which have prov- very effective in open terrain, as well as behind berms or on en to be more survivable than the typical M998/1025 trucks due rooftops, as we have seen with the task force scouts and fellow to their improved armor package. Each line platoon has four gun motorized infantry company. The M249 squad automatic weap- trucks and the headquarters has three trucks (commander, XO, on (SAW) would also fit well in place of the dismount M240B and FIST). The FIST truck is used only on company missions due machine guns. to FOs being task organized with line platoons. The tank sees oc- Personal weapons consist of M4 carbines and M16A2 rifles. casional use at the company FOB or on security missions. Prior to deployment, the company fielded 14 M16A2s (includ- The company trains consist of three M113A2s, two M998 ing headquarters and headquarters company weapons) and 33 HMMWVs, and three M923 trucks. The M113s transport the M4 carbines for a total of 47 weapons spread over 81 MTOE first sergeant, maintenance team, and medics when armor is soldiers. In this environment, every soldier must be equipped to needed. Through experience, we have identified that M113s have fight dismounted and must have a rifle or carbine to be effec- limited use due to their reduced top speed, weight (pontoon tive. Currently, the company has 76 weapons for 85 soldiers bridges), and our current task organization of personnel. The with the goal of every soldier carrying a rifle or carbine. Each three 5-ton trucks are used by supply and maintenance. During M4 is equipped with the M4 rail adapter system, which allows a typical company mission, the trains will consist of one M998 soldiers to mount IR lasers and spotlights. We currently have cargo HMMWV prepared to carry casualties or enemy prison- one for each of the 32 M4s. There are no rail systems available ers of war (EPWs) and may include an M923 to carry addition- for the M16A2. In the future, every M4 and M16 should have a al class I and V, seized weapons, equipment, and EPWs. The rail system to mount equipment. maintenance team is prepared to move with the first sergeant in Additional personal weapons include the M500 shotgun, M9 the second M998 HMMWV. pistol, M203 grenade launcher, and the M14 sniper rifle. The Weapons: Line platoon crew served weapons consist of M2HB M500 shotgun is carried on dismounted patrols and each pla- .50-caliber flexes and M240B machine guns. Each platoon is toon is equipped with one or two. The M9 pistol has seen little

“Currently the company is equipped with 15 gun trucks (M1025/1114) and now only one M1A1 tank. The three line platoons use the M1114 uparmored HMMWVs, which have proven to be more survivable than the typical M998/1025 trucks due to their improved armor package.” use, but is carried by all gunners and truck commanders. Two handheld thermal viewer. This small thermal viewer is useful M203 40mm grenade launchers have been added to the compa- during dismounted patrols only. It provides a thermal capability ny to equip each platoon with one system. An additional M203 of 75 to 100 meters on the move. When stationary, the patrol per platoon and per sniper team is the goal. The M14 sniper ri- switches to the PAS13 to increase thermal range and magnifica- fle is used by the two sniper teams in conjunction with a 10- tion. Currently, the company sniper teams use a daylight scope power daylight Leopold scope or a heavy thermal PAS13, and with a PAS13 during the night. The PAS13 can be mounted on is paired with a 32-power spotting scope. the M14 rifle, but the rail system initially provided with the In the future, the M249 SAW should replace the two dismount M14 did not support the weight properly. The preferred sight M240Bs. The M249 SAW provides a lightweight automatic weap- for the M14 is the 8.5-power AN/PVS10. This sight is a must on with small-arms capability, rather than the medium caliber for any sniper team and is critical to ensure the sniper can place M240B, and is best used in the military operations in urban ter- accurate fires during limited visibility. rain (MOUT) environment to mitigate effects of larger caliber Communications: Building the communications architecture machine gun fires. The SAW is easy to carry and can also be for the company created its own challenges. The company de- mounted on the weapons station of the gun trucks. ployed with the radios and systems required to operate the MTOE- Optics for rifles, carbines, and machine guns make soldiers le- assigned vehicles. The dismounted requirements were not tak- thal during both day and night. Almost every soldier in the com- en into account until later. Currently, each platoon is equipped pany who carries a rifle or carbine is equipped with either the with two AN/PRC-119 manpack systems with one dedicated PAQ4C or PEQ2A IR laser, which is mounted on the M4 rail sys- 1523E model all-source imagery processor (ASIP) radio for each tem or to the top of the M16A2 rifle. These IR lasers allow sol- dismounted squad. The ASIP radios are perfect for dismounted diers to target, illuminate, and accurately hit a target while us- patrols due to their small size and weight. One 1523D radio can ing night vision goggles. The PEQ2A also has an IR spotlight, be pulled from a truck as needed to create a second manpack which can assist in illuminating rooms and areas during low il- system for multiple OPs or elements. The line platoons also lumination. The PEQ2A should also be mounted on all dismount carry five ICOM squad radios with two boom microphone head- M240Bs (at least two per platoon). sets and three locally purchased walkman-type earpieces. The ICOM is the primary radio used during patrols and the head- All M4 carbines mount the M68 close combat optic (CCO), a sets allow for noise discipline during OPs and raids. The com- backup iron sight, and a SureFire spotlight. The M68 allows sol- mander and executive officer each carry one to monitor dis- diers to scan with both eyes open and then accurately fire dur- mounts during raids, route clearance, patrols, and contact. Nine ing close combat by placing the red dot on the target. When the ICOMs with headsets is the goal for a platoon, allocating one CCO fails, the backup iron sight is available for use. The M68 per truck (four), team leader (two), patrol leader, point man, and can also be mounted in place of the handle on the M16A4 or on trail man. the rail system of an M16A2. SureFire spotlights have proven to be effective during house and vehicle searches. Every line pla- Miscellaneous equipment: Additional useful equipment in- toon soldier should be equipped with one. SureFires can also be cludes PAS13 and ICOM battery recharging stations, HMMWV mounted on the M16 with tape or straps if a rail system is not towbars, HMMWV towropes, AN/PSS11 metal detectors, 12- available. ton hydraulic jacks, tire ramps, and picket pounders. HMMWV towbars and towropes are carried by all platoons to conduct self- Additional daylight optics that have proven useful include the recovery and the ropes are used when time is critical or when AN/PVS6 mini eye-safe laser infrared observation set (MELIOS) under fire. The metal detector is used to locate caches during for the fire support team. The company has one MELIOS, which raids, cordons, and searches. The 12-ton hydraulic jack was used is currently rotated by the three platoon FOs, depending on who in place of heavy scissor jacks until they began to arrive through is more likely to call for fire during a platoon mission. All three the supply system. The jacks are used in combination with the line platoon FOs must be provided with one AN/PVS6 MELIOS tire ramp, which was made to elevate the truck. The crew drives to assist with fire support. Also, in the future, each M240B or the flat tire onto the ramp, which lifts the truck just high enough M249SAW should be equipped with a 3-power machine gun op- to place the jack and jack plate beneath. tic (MGO), which provides more accurate fire during daylight. Picket pounders are used to breach during raids and bolt cut- Night vision: Night vision is critical to mission success and ters assist with entry. All trucks carry a litter to facilitate platoon each soldier and platoon must be properly equipped to operate extraction of wounded personnel. Every soldier carries Budd in limited visibility. The company currently fields 51 sets of lights to mark their positions during limited visibility. The IR PVS7B/D for 85 soldiers. Each platoon fields up to 14 sets of strobe is also used to mark OP positions for friendly ground and PVS7s for 19 soldiers, with the goal of one set per line soldier. air units. AN/PVS14s are every soldier’s choice because they provide mon- ocular vision and an increased depth perception. In the future, If possible, obtain the SINCGARS ear bud system, which fa- each truck commander, driver, and gunner should be provided cilitates gunner and truck commanders monitoring the C2 nets with PVS14s and every line platoon soldier must have a set of during offensive operations. The ear bud system also allows the NVGs. dismounted radio operator to move hands free. Each platoon Thermal sights combined with NVGs have proven extremely should be provided with two per truck and two for the dismount- effective during limited visibility. Each truck mounts one AN/ ed radio operator for a total of 40 for the company. Creating an PAS13 heavy sight on its M2HB or M240B, which provides a intercom system for the M1025/1114 truck may be a solution to 3.3-power and 10-power narrow field of view (NFOV) thermal this communications challenge. image. Line platoons also have two medium thermal sights, Platoon and company leaders should be equipped with the blue which are a wider field of view at 2-power and 3.3-power. They force tracker (BFT) to increase situational awareness with real can be mounted on the dismount M240Bs, used in OPs, or car- time operational information. Typically, a platoon operates as an ried during dismounted patrol missions. Gunners wear PVS7s independent task force asset, rather than under company con- and switch to thermals during operations. This allows gunners trol, so the BFT better facilitates C2 at the task-force level for to identify friendly forces marked by IR Budd lights, chem- clearing fires, deconflicting direct fire, and rapid response of lights, or strobes. Each platoon is also equipped with a 1-power the QRF. Each platoon should be permanently outfitted with one

March-April 2005 — 31 countermeasures system as a force protection measure. This de- ver does assume some risk, depending on the age of the data. vice is used for route clearance and convoy escort, protecting Buildings may have been constructed or canals built that block dismounted as well as mounted soldiers. routes to an objective. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery can counter the risks of using outdated imagery. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Knowing the people, the enemy, and terrain is a must. A typi- TTP also evolved as the fight continued. Every mission was a cal battalion’s AO is so large that it necessitates breaking up the learning experience as we continued to develop TTP. task force AO into company AOs. If executed, this allows each Intelligence: Enemy pattern analysis and dissemination at the company to become more effective by gaining knowledge of company level is based on products provided by the battalion S2. the area and becoming familiar with specific areas, the terrain, The battalion S2 disseminates recent enemy actions down to the people, leaders, police, public facilities, businesses, and culture. company level, weekly and monthly, through the event matrix Over the course of three months, the company conducted a coun- and a map, diagramming the locations of enemy events. By us- terreconnaissance mission to secure a highway. The soldiers met ing these two documents, company leaders develop intelligence with local families, highway police, and vendors in the area the preparation of the battlefield (IPB) at the company level. Hav- road passed through, which improved the soldiers’ ability to ing a complete picture of enemy activities along main supply identify who did not belong and facilitate information flow. The routes (MSRs) and in the areas of operation (AO) enables com- company used countless dismounted patrols to gain intimate pany leaders to identify or template areas that the enemy is us- knowledge of the area, which was passed on to the task force. ing for ambushes and IED emplacement. Leaders can then plan This familiarity enabled soldiers to pick up on details that an un- movement techniques or formations to defeat the templated en- familiar unit might overlook. Our regular presence also encour- emy. Producing both documents monthly allows company lead- aged people to talk and provide information. ers to better see trends and identify where and when enemy ac- Aviation: Using aviation during ground operations creates a tivity has occurred. combination that the enemy is not well prepared to counter. FM communications and marking techniques are a must for air- Satellite imagery has improved our ability to visualize the bat- ground operations. Dropping aviation to the company frequen- tlefield and plan operations. Conducting IPB and executing mis- cy during contact or operations allows the company command- sions using imagery has made C2 and maneuver easier for ever to directly communicate and coordinate efforts. Aviation, in ery leader who has a copy. Using satellite imagery for maneu- conjunction with a mounted reconnaissance, adds a new dimension that the enemy must face and increases the task force’s ability to detect possible ambushes and IEDs. Aviation can also be used as an air reconnaissance and QRF element to escort convoys. Combined-arms operations work — air and ground forces are a powerful combination. In the future, a task force should have a close relationship with an aviation unit to provide dedicated air support. Signals: Each platoon requires a set of pyrotechnics and visual signals. We have developed a company SOP for signals to use in the event FM and squad radios fail. Soldiers are marked with an IR chemlight, Budd light, or glint tape to mitigate fratricide during limited visibility. Vehicle missions and load plans: Each truck platoon must always be prepared to execute any mission while in sector including traffic control points (TCPs), cache searches, house searches, EPW processing, limited visibility operations, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Each vehicle in the platoon is assigned specific missions and carries required equipment. Equipment and supplies that a truck platoon carries include slave cables; spare tires on frames, mounted at the rear of the truck commander’s side of the truck; batteries; petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products; ice chests; a fifth VS17 panel for marking landing zones; a digital camera for capturing images of EPWs, IEDs, and caches; two lensatic compasses per truck; a class V basic load; and a class VIII medical load.

“In the future, the M249 SAW should replace the two dismount M240Bs. The M249 SAW provides a lightweight automatic weap on with small-arms capability, rather than the medium caliber M240B, and is best used in the military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) environment to mitigate effects of larger caliber machine gun fires. The SAW is easy to carry and can also be mounted on the weapons station of the gun trucks.”

32 — March-April 2005 “When a platoon makes contact with an IED, the section outside the kill sack stops and sets security. If the platoon identifies the triggerman, they engage. All trucks scan for additional IEDs before moving through the area. A section maneuvers to a flank and dismounts a team to search for trigger devices, wires, and residue from the IED. The platoon is prepared to search houses for the triggerman, gain intelligence on enemy activity, or use metal detectors to search for nearby caches.”

React to contact: Actions on contact have evolved to meet en- mounted elements or a combination of dismounted and mount- emy TTPs for IEDs, direct fire, or a complex ambush, which in- ed elements, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and cludes an IED and a direct-fire attack. During direct fire con- civilians to increase security and the likelihood of IED detec- tact, the platoon returns fire, moves out of the kill sack, sets a tion. Both techniques use vehicle or handheld optics to observe base of fire, and maneuvers on a flank to destroy the enemy. from a distance, while searching for signs of an IED. The FOs are prepared to call for fire or CAS. Each section is prepared to dismount and maneuver in restricted terrain. Dismounts have the ability to detect telltale signs of a camou- flaged IED better than mounted elements. Mounted elements When a platoon makes contact with an IED, the section outside may bypass a dug-in IED on a route multiple times due to the the kill sack stops and sets security. If the platoon identifies the enemy’s ability to camouflage the position and speed of mount- triggerman, they engage. All trucks scan for additional IEDs be- ed elements. Dismounts can also maneuver in restricted terrain fore moving through the area. A section maneuvers to a flank along the flanks of a route, ensuring standoff and concealment and dismounts a team to search for trigger devices, wires, and from enemy observation to minimize an IED ambush. Dismounts residue from the IED. The platoon is prepared to search houses in open terrain require additional security on the flanks to pre- for the triggerman, gain intelligence on enemy activity, or use vent detonating an IED. Using binoculars and an overwatch el- metal detectors to search for nearby caches. If the IED was dis- ement increases the ability of the reconnaissance patrol to de- covered before detonation, the platoon then secures the area tect potential IEDs and/or triggermen. Employing snipers, M1s around the IED and searches for a potential triggerman until an or M2s with optics, or a truck-mounted element with binoculars, explosive ordnance disposal unit arrives. All personnel main- are options to overwatch a patrol and mitigate the use of a trig- tain 360-degree security during the battle drill while searching german. for secondary IEDs or a possible ambush. Employing HMMWV gun trucks as overwatch and flank se- Complex ambushes force a platoon to fight in two directions. curity, in concert with the dismounted reconnaissance element, A typical ambush includes IEDs and small-arms and RPG fire is a technique that has been very effective. Using a vee-platoon from one or both sides of the road. The enemy also places a sec- or company formation to clear an entire route has proven ex- ond IED further down the road in the direction of travel where tremely successful. The platoon uses two trucks at the base of a convoy may stop, following the ambush in an effort to hit a the vee, providing overwatch for dismounted teams, and two stationary target. The platoon reacts to contact with fire, maneu- trucks forward on the flanks, searching for triggermen. The dis- vers to flank, and destroys the enemy. The enemy prefers to hit mounted teams move off road on the flanks, clearing the danger and run and rarely stands and fights, so the platoon has to quick- areas. Maneuvering the reconnaissance off road is highly recom- ly react, fix the enemy, then complete their destruction. mended to create standoff from the actual IED. Another technique is to conduct route clearance only along routes or danger Route clearance: IED detection and route clearance are best zones where IEDs are most likely, such as culverts, bridges, ca- con ducted off route and looking in from a flank to avoid an am- nals, guard rails, road signs, and soft sand or dirt in the median bush or kill zone. Route clearance can be conducted with dis- or along the roadside. The route clearance unit must continu-

March-April 2005 — 33 ously change time and composition of the force, such as mount- diers conduct vehicle and personnel searches with the section ed, fire teams, snipers, and armor, to prevent creating a pattern. leader commanding and controlling the TCP. Two soldiers man Adding a countermeasures system (one per line platoon) to the the crew served weapons and provide security, while the final reconnaissance may mitigate the use of remote-detonated IEDs. soldier guides traffic. Once an IED is discovered, the platoon executes the IED con- The soldiers of Cobra Company have completed transforma- tact SOP. tion during the crucible of combat and can fight and win in any Cordon and search: Due to our unique organization, we have situation. Throughout this deployment, the company’s training, developed a battle drill to conduct a company cordon and search. personnel, equipment, and TTP have continued to evolve. The One line platoon of 19 personnel with an interpreter (with or soldiers have continued to learn under combat conditions and without M1114s) moves to the objective, establishes the inner have become proficient in the skills required to accomplish cordon, and then conducts the house search. A second truck pla- their missions. The transformation of Cobra from a tank com- toon sets the external cordon to protect the search platoon. The pany to a light and highly mobile motorized armor company goal is to simultaneously set the outer and inner cordons to pre- would have been impossible without the unwavering courage of vent the target from escaping. The headquarters element sup- its soldiers and their refusal to let down their comrades in the ports the mission and consists of the commander’s truck, FIST face of the enemy. A soldier’s courage to fight day after day in truck (optional), the XO’s truck, and the first sergeant’s M998 the face of mounting casualties is the essence of the American truck, which is used for EPW and CASEVAC. Speed and sur- soldier and the stuff of legends. The American soldier will ac- prise is of the essence — more vehicles are not necessarily bet- complish any mission, no matter the challenges, and will al- ter. Platoons rehearse these drills to ensure every soldier knows ways find a way to win. his task and purpose. We, as leaders, have the privilege to be entrusted with the most IPB for this type of mission must identify routes and enemy dis- precious resource America has to offer — its young men and mounted avenues of approach out of the target area. The key to women. Army leaders at all levels must ensure every soldier is success is to set the cordon and deny the targets an escape route. properly equipped and trained to become lethal on the battle- Use HMMWVs to provide speed and ease of maneuver in city field. This lethality will potentially reduce casualties and in- streets. Limit the number of vehicles to minimize congestion at crease unit effectiveness. This lethality may make the enemy the objective area. Only take transport for inner cordon teams think twice about attacking a convoy. and gun trucks for the external cordon and headquarters. For The Army is focused on improving technology, combined with each raid or search, assign an interrogation team to assist the the necessity of accomplishing more with less. The soldier will company. Designate an EPW collection and interrogation point. employ that technology and accomplish the mission with less. This allows the search platoon to focus on security and search. To do this, every soldier must be equipped with a rifle or car- The inner cordon and search platoon moves, mounted or dis- bine, along with assorted day and night sights complete with a mounted, to the objective, sets at an objective rally point, dis- set of night vision goggles. Soldiers must be trained to use this mounts, and moves the platoon to cordon the house. One three- equipment beginning with initial entry training and reinforced to four-man team sets the inner cordon, a second four-man team at all levels of military education, to include home station and serves as an assault team, and a third three- to four-man team, ac- repetitive training. Finally, the soldier must also be trained on companied by an interpreter, serves as the security element. The basic small-unit tactics. assault team executes the four-man stack once the house is iso- On the current battlefield, every soldier is a potential dismount lated and the outer cordon is set. Once the first room is cleared, — they must be equipped and prepared to kill the enemy at all the security team, with the interpreter, follows the assault team times. They must have the reflexes, developed through years of into the house to secure EPWs and rooms and begin question- training, to survive and win. It is our obligation as leaders to en- ing. The platoon’s trucks move as necessary to improve security. sure soldiers are prepared to fight and win in any situation and The outer cordon platoon establishes positions to block move- in any war. ment in and out of the search area and protects the search platoon — nothing moves in or out without approval. Weapons ori- entation, control status, observation, and discipline are critical. The commander is in the vicinity with the search platoon and CPT Mike Taylor is currently commanding headquarters and headquar- the XO and first sergeant are near the cordon platoon. The com- ters company, 1st Battalion, 34th (1-34) Armor, 1st Brigade Combat Team, mander can dismount and use a manpack with his loader as se- Camp Manhattan, Iraq, and Fort Riley, KS. He received a B.S. from East- curity and a radio operator. The first ser geant is prepared to ern Illinois University. His military education includes the U.S. Army Com- mand and General Staff College, the Armor Captains Career Course, move to conduct CASEVAC or set at the EPW collection point Airborne School, and the Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served to load detainees and weapons from any caches. Once the in various command and staff positions, including commander, C Com- search is complete, the company collapses with the search pla- pany, Task Force 1-34 Armor, Camp Manhattan, Iraq; Task Force S3 air, toon moving first, followed by the cordon platoon. 1-34 Armor, Fort Riley, and Camp Manhattan, Iraq; assistant brigade S3 Plans, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley; Traffic control points: All platoons are prepared to establish commander, headquarters and headquarters troop, 3d Squadron, 16th a TCP during day or night. The preferred method is to create the Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; and troop XO, E Troop, 1st Squadron, TCP with wire and spike strips. The platoon TCP kit contains 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox. four spotlights, two small TCP signs, four rolls of wire, four reflective triangles or orange cones, and a minimum of one spike 1SG Stephen Krivitsky is currently assigned to the 2d Region Reserve strip. Spike strips provide the ability to slow vehicles if they Officer Training Corps, Penn State University, Pennsylvania. His military cross the wire barrier. The platoon establishes an overwatch el- education includes Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course; M1A1 Master Gunner Course, and Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course. ement to chase down vehicles and provide additional security, He has served in various positions, to include first sergeant, C Compa- and remaining trucks establish the search area. Personnel are ny, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Di- dispersed to minimize damage from vehicle-borne IEDs. The vision (Mechanized), Fort Riley, KS; master gunner, U.S. Army Europe, TCP is marked with signs, reflective triangles, and strobe lights 7th Army Training Command, Grafenwoehr, Germany; and platoon ser- or chemlights; wire or spike strips protect the soldiers. Six sol- geant, D Company, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor, Fort Carson, CO.

34 — March-April 2005 Winning with the People in Iraq by Captain Jason M. Pape

While there are no generalizations that staging, onward movement, and integra- Baghdad as one of the safest areas in Iraq. work everywhere in Iraq, no tactics, tech- tion (RSOI) in Kuwait, as the coalition We had not trained for this mission. We niques, and procedures (TTPs) that will swept toward Baghdad, we realized our prepared almost exclusively for combat ensure success in all situations, we must likely role was changing from combat to operations. We were not equipped with agree that winning over the people in urban operations and stability and sup- much in the way of emerging technolo- Iraq will ultimately determine success or port operations. But we had not prepared gy. We left home with little more than our failure. Given the brutal history of Iraq, for stability and support operations! standard MTOE equipment and none of the nature of its religious and political in- We took every opportunity to train sol- the essential supplies now required for op- surgency, and the significant rifts between diers in the unfamiliar tasks associated erations in Iraq. cultures, this war cannot be won through with military operations in urban terrain Ultimately, strong NCO leadership, ba- attrition. (MOUT) and stability and support opera- sic soldier discipline, training the basics, tions. We relied heavily on the experience and enduring American resolve kept us Success in Iraq of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) alive and brought us all home. Most units What does an armor company, equipped who served in Kosovo and Bosnia. We can cite these same qualities; did we do according to its standard modified table also had to change our mindset. Soldiers, something different to determine our suc- of organization and equipment (MTOE), who were trained, rehearsed and mental- cess or was Kadimiyah simply a differ- do when deployed under alert conditions ly prepared to defeat the enemy through ent place, destined to be stable and safe? to Iraq, immediately following a tradition- overwhelming firepower and mounted I dare not venture a guess on this. None al maneuver train-up and a National Train- maneuver, do not readily accept the role of us should accept an inevitable end in ing Center (NTC) rotation, with the mis- of peacemakers. No longer judged on the our mission in Iraq. Never rest on your sion of relieving part of 3d Infantry Divi- attrition we cause against the enemy, the laurels, relishing your assignment in a sion to begin combat, stability, and sup- ground we gain, or the objectives we se- safe part of Iraq, for nothing is certain port operations in Baghdad, Iraq? Adapt cure, we must learn the language of sta- here. At the same time, never give up on and overcome. bility and support operations. What de- peace in an area, submitting to a battle of Company B, 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, fines success? Before we could think attrition with no hope of pacifism. “Wolfpack,” of the 3d Brigade Combat about that too much, we were in Kadimi- Team, 1st Armored Division, deployed yah, on the northern edge of Baghdad, re- Winning Hearts and Minds lieving 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Bri- from Fort Riley, Kansas, separate from its gade, 3d Infantry Division, of responsi- When we relieved 2d Battalion, 69th Ar- brigade and division, prepared to fight the bility for the area. mor, we realized they had set us up for suc- ground offensive. And we were ready! cess in Kadimiyah. We inherited many Our sister battalion, 2d Battalion, 70th By all accounts, we were successful in strong relationships and programs from Armor, was already in theater supporting Kadimiyah. We maintained the third most them. We learned quickly that our most the 101st Airborne Division from Fort important holy site in Iraq, the religious difficult task would be tempering Iraqis’ Campbell, Kentucky, and we were eager epicenter for Shia in Baghdad, the most new sense of freedom with good order to catch up to them. During reception, significant avenue in and out of northern and discipline while avoiding the same

March-April 2005 — 35 “We took every opportunity to train soldiers in the unfamiliar tasks associated with military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and stability and support operations. We relied heavily on the experience of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who served in Kosovo and Bosnia. We also had to change our mindset. Soldiers, who were trained, rehearsed and mentally prepared to defeat the enemy through overwhelming firepower and mounted maneuver, do not readily accept the role of peacemakers.”

Most important was the impression our soldiers gave during operations. Iraqis watched everything we did! Some watched to observe our methods and establish patterns that they would use against us. Most watched to learn who we are on a person- cruelty and violence they knew from Sad- How do you strike fear in the hearts of al level, which forced us to be aware of: dam. Iraqis regularly told us that a heavy your enemies and kindle respect in the • Soldier discipline. Soldiers who were hand could only govern their people. They people you are trying to protect? The key attacked directly in our area were gener- encouraged us to use violence and power is to quickly adapt your presence to your ally doing something wrong. A lapse in to manage the people. We knew this was situation. We concentrated heavily on uniform standard, relaxed security, or in- a shortsighted answer. Much like abused ramping down following any significant appropriate activity preempted many at- and neglected children, they needed to action, such as a direct fire engagement, tacks. Soldiers, who appeared disciplined, grow to respect authority, not for fear, but an apprehension, or a public confronta- prepared, and vigilant often dissuaded an because that authority represents free- tion. Something as simple as a smile, a attack, prompting the enemy to find a soft- doms and provisions. But like abused chil- wave, and a piece of candy to a nearby er target. dren, they viewed our threats with dis- child can break the Iraqis’ perceived im- dain, knowing we would never resort to age of you as a conqueror and oppressor. • Soldier professionalism. Not all Iraq- the same tactics they were conditioned to Word Gets Around is know English but most know our pro- by Saddam. fanity. Iraqis also have a strong sense of Our first efforts were directed toward pride. Soldiers conducting themselves We knew that we must learn how to pres- those injured during the war. While Kad- pro fessionally, treating Iraqis with digni- ent different faces, depending on the au- imiyah is primarily Shia and urban, it is ty and respect, doing their duty rather than dience and situation. We must be capable bordered by Sha’at a Taji, a rural Sunni showing personal aggression will earn of quickly escalating force to overwhelm suburb to the north. The Iraqi army used points with Iraqis. Once they realize you the enemy, prepared to avoid or counter the area to hide artillery during the war are after criminals or insurgents, good an attack without sustaining casualties, and several high-ranking regime leaders Iraqis will support you, assist you, and while doing something as peaceful as hand- lived there; thus, it saw heavy aerial bom- even detain the suspect for you. If they ing out candy to children outside a school. bardment. As we patrolled the area, we perceive abuse of power, you will encoun- We must exude power, survivability, and routinely stopped to treat people who were ter resistance. Our brigade motto was, “Be readily lethal capability while inviting sup- accidentally injured by coalition attacks. polite, be professional, and be prepared porters, fans, and people who would co- Our medics treated a small girl, seriously to kill!” operate with us to defeat our enemies. By burned by air strikes that hit her house; a no means was this easy. man and his son who lost their legs to • Animosity. Iraqis watch the way we cluster bombs that landed on their farm; conduct business. Do we take pleasure in British forces and U.S. Marines were roughing up people? Do we target indis- right about perceptions. The British not- and an old man who was shot through his Achilles tendon. We tried to avoid be- criminately, as if all Iraqis are the ene- ed that when you carry loaded weapons my? We must target specifically, to de- at the ready, you have eliminated much com ing a visiting clinic, reinforcing the fact that local medical facilities were ful- feat current insurgents without creating of your escalation of force; your choices new ones. for escalation quickly narrow to lethal ly func tional, getting involved only when force. The Marines noted the U.S. Army’s we felt responsible. Word does get around. My most trusted defensive, possibly antagonistic appear- Early on, we decided children were crit- translator, a Sunni, told me about a friend ance in wearing full protective gear. Rath- ical to our success in winning over the of his from Aadamiyah. Aadamiyah was er than argue if they were right and we people. First, they provided a good gauge one of Saddam’s most favored neighbor- were wrong, it is possible to wear full in- to the local sentiment. If children did not hoods with some of the strongest opposi- dividual body armor (IBA) and Kevlar, wave or smile, chances were their parents tion to coalition forces. His friend came patrol with weapons in red status, and held contempt for us. If they waved and across a U.S. soldier, intimidating and maintain an offensive stance to protect smiled, it meant we were headed in the unfriendly in his words. Because of the the force, while presenting approachable, right direction — if we could win their language barrier and some misunderstood benevolent, and liberating images to the favor, it would be that much more diffi- glances, the Iraqi mistook him for an en- Iraqis. cult for their parents to resent or resist us. emy. Then the Iraqi saw this same soldier

36 — March-April 2005 buy some candy from a store and hand it Leading the Leaders ships with them, and guiding them down out to nearby children. The Iraq thought, Will the real Sheikh please step forward? the right path: “maybe these guys are not all that bad.” In the power vacuum that followed the • Find out who the real community lead- Trust Somebody dissolution of the Ba’ath party, religious, ers are and win their support. Religious tribal, and political leaders scrambled to Trust in Iraq is difficult. As our brigade leaders, tribal leaders, businessmen, and secure their parts of community influ- government officials will determine your commander often told us: “The story of ence. Coalition forces, naïve about the po- the turtle and the scorpion presents a good success. Type-A personalities (you and I) tential power of tribes and religion in Iraq, cannot win Iraq with brute force. example of trust in Iraq. The scorpion were caught off guard by this fact in many needs to cross the river, but cannot swim. instances. Some were duped into allianc- • Real Sheikhs and Imams will not come He asks a turtle preparing to swim if he es with frauds. Others dismissed the le- can ride across the river on his back. The to you directly. If they show up at your gitimacy of these groups altogether and forward operating base, they are middle turtle agrees, if the scorpion promises he went it alone. While U.S. forces struggled will not sting him halfway across the management, maybe. Real Sheikhs and to grasp the situation, Imams, Sheikhs, Imams already have enough power that river. The scorpion insists he will not, be- and Hawasem (looters) grabbed proper- cause if he does, they will both drown. they need not come begging and borrow- ty, money, and influence wherever the ing. You must go and find them. The turtle agrees to help the scorpion fallen regime left it accessible. cross the river. Halfway across the river, • Tribes are like mafia. While friend- the scorpion stings the turtle. With its Coalition forces responded by recover- ship and loyalty play a part in dealings, last breath, the turtle asks ‘why?’ The scor- ing as much as they could, but was then Sheikhs ultimately respect power and au- pion responds simply, ‘welcome to the left holding the reins on Iraq. From the thority. Deal with them on the basis of Middle East.’” very beginning, our goal was to make authority, yours and theirs. Iraqis responsible for Iraq. So how do we Before you jump to conclusions about give Iraq back to the Iraqis? Without writ- • Regardless of what we think of reli- Iraqis’ values, ask yourself if you would ing a book on this, here are some tips on gious and tribal influence in Iraq, it mat- trust us if you were an Iraqi. Many sol- identifying leaders, cultivating relation- ters to Iraqis. diers stumble into thinking Iraqis are inherently fallible, more so than us, responsible for everything that has befall- en them. This comes from the frustration of seeing a country looted, destroyed, and polluted from within, and working to repair infrastructure faster than “they” can tear down. It comes from deceit, decep- tion, and friendly pretenses followed by deadly attacks, followed by local igno- rance of the attackers. But again, try to see things from their perspective. You do not have to affirm their beliefs, just understand their situations and circumstances so you may effectively counter the issues. Consider this: • Iraq was one of the wealthiest, most modern and westernized Arab countries in the 1980s. Twelve years of embargo later, they are a third-world nation in most respects. • We have waged war twice in their country, recently. Whether you call it invasion or liberation, we killed a lot of their people. • Iraqis are convinced we are in bed with “We knew that we must learn Israel, the war on terrorism is a veiled at- how to present different faces, tack on Islam, and we really came for their depending on the audience and situation. We must be capable of oil. quickly escalating force to over- Understanding these obstacles to Iraqi whelm the enemy, prepared to trust is the first step. Now, ask yourself if avoid or counter an attack with- you trust the Iraqis. How can we expect out sustaining casualties, while them to trust us if we do not trust them? doing something as peaceful as handing out candy to children out- In most cases, they do not even trust them- side a school. We must exude selves or each other. Bottom line: trust power, survivability, and readily somebody, not everybody! Accept risk lethal capability while inviting sup- and trust somebody. It is the only way porters, fans, and people who you will know what is really going on in would cooperate with us to de- your area. feat our enemies.”

March-April 2005 — 37 “The more you can empower subordinate leaders to build rapport within the community, the better. This requires face-to-face interaction with people from all walks of life, in as many parts of your area as the threat permits. Platoon leaders and pla toon sergeants play an integral role in expanding your unit’s influence to the people on the street. They provide exposure to local community leaders and neighborhoods, while administrators and high-level leaders keep company leaders occupied.”

pairs. Use psychological operations to hear what people are saying and get your message (explanation) out. • Not promising anything! Do not allow room for Iraqis to infer a promise. • Targeting precisely. You will develop targets at the company level based on hu- • • man intelligence (HUMINT) you receive Do not ever cross the line between hos- Assigning areas to individuals, much directly. You cannot affect targets as- pitality and bribery. Even when inten- like additional duty areas. Make people signed by higher; you must simply ex- tions seem harmless, if you accept large responsible for facilities such as schools, ecute them. Know that your target can be gratuities, you will be indebted, possibly hospitals, electricity, sewage, and sanita- off. Receiving targets with incorrect ad- leveraged. During the regime, everything tion. dresses and ten-digit grids is not uncom- in Iraq could be bought; Americans lead • Encouraging subordinate leaders to mon and requires reorganizing and shift- by example in their personal integrity and adopt a neighborhood, learn as much as ing to the cor rect target at a moment’s sense of righteousness. they can about the area, and build ties notice. When you hit the wrong target, • If you are a leader of an area, find the with the local people. you must decide if you will use immedi- most influential person in that area and • ate HUMINT to find the right target. If make him your partner. Remain neutral Assigning an information (recon) ob- you put information on the street and and weary; avoid taking sides and losing jective in every mission. Require leaders cannot immediately exploit the target, you your objectivity. But you need someone to record routes they took, significant have shown your hand. We traditionally you can trust to bounce issues and ideas events, personal contacts made, and in- accepted this risk, immediately working formation gathered. It may be something the area to correct our target information. against, someone who will candidly tell as simple as “find out what they use that you what public perception is, and some- building for,” or “who is shooting at night • Learning how to tactically question. one who will support you with their peo- Learn how to differentiate between sin- ple. in that area.” • gle-source HUMINT, source reliability, • Work with Iraqi security and police Allowing your soldiers to become part source motivation, and time sensitivity. forces. Do not do their job for them; but of an Iraqi family. They will appreciate Understand that 90 percent of the reports do not separate them completely from their role in Iraq much more if they can you receive are dated and lost their val- your mission. Your presence lends power get to know the people they are tasked to ue, falsified to watch your reaction or set and authority to their activities; their pres- protect. you up, rumor, or simply fabricated to ence adds legitimacy to yours. bring harm to a rival Iraqi. Beware the ur- When Things Go Bad • gent report from an unknown person; it Be prepared to dissolve relationships Mistakes will be made. You will arrest could be a trap or a trick. Keep the source and/or fire people who fail to hold up their with you. end of the bargain. the wrong guy, an innocent guy, or break down the door of someone harmless. You Training to Do It Again will experience collateral damage, vehi- Decentralized Operations cle accidents, perhaps even accidental en- The following training ideas can help The more you can empower subordi- gagements that result in innocent Iraqi you prepare for deployment to Iraq. Some nate leaders to build rapport within the deaths. Your ability to handle these situ- are contingent on support from higher- community, the better. This requires face- ations will be just as critical as avoiding level commands, but worth fighting for: to-face interaction with people from all them. Manage these issues separately by: • Determine as early as possible if your walks of life, in as many parts of your • Determining what system is in place unit is going to Iraq. When you know you area as the threat permits. Platoon lead- are, fight to tailor your training to Iraq. ers and platoon sergeants play an inte- to compensate people, if you make a mistake. The claims system is clogged with The traditional NTC train-up does not do gral role in expanding your unit’s influ- it. ence to the people on the street. They pro- vehicle damages, fraudulent attempts to vide exposure to local community lead- recover money, and frivolous suits for • Train tactical questioning. You are not ers and neighborhoods, while adminis- war damages. Prioritize and track claims allowed to interrogate; do not ever say trators and high-level leaders keep com- that are important to community rela- you did. Tactical questioning skills will en- pany leaders occupied. As much as pos- tions. able you to develop your own HUMINT. sible, integrate rapport building into your • Integrating civil affairs personnel and daily operations by: the unit’s claims officer to expedite re- Continued on Page 42

38 — March-April 2005 Sustainment Operations and the Forward Operating Base

by Captain Jay Blakley

Most battalions in Iraq regard the for- kota soldier killed during Operation Iraqi ary. Two 10-foot concrete walls protect- ward operating base (FOB) as home, ref- Freedom. ed the remainder of the FOB with barbed uge, and safe haven. More importantly, Prior to being liberated by coalition forc- wire and concertina wire reinforcing vul- FOBs allow maneuver commanders to nerable areas. sus tain and protect forces while remain- es, the FOB was one of Iraq’s many mil- ing within zones of operation. The FOB itary compounds serving Saddam’s re- Threat assessments analyzed individu- has four distinct functions and activities gime as a defense and military intelli- als and groups that continued to fight co- — security, facility maintenance and gence headquarters. With ample space, an alition forces. Local and national groups, construction, quality of life, and tradi- existing infrastructure, and an ideal loca- such as former regime loyalists (FRL), tional com bat service support (CSS) option, it was the logical choice for a bat- religious extremists, al-Qaeda fighters, erations. talion FOB. Before handing over reigns whabi, criminals, and various other oppor- to Dakota, 2-69 Armor spent approximate- tunists posed the greatest threat. Identi- By mid-April 2003, “major ground com- ly a month on the FOB. 1-13 Armor began fying the enemy and understanding how bat operations” were coming to a close the process of making Camp Hunte home he might attack the FOB proved to be in Iraq. Units, such as 2d Battalion, 69th for the next year, and its headquarters and challenging. In addition, the asymmetri- (2-69) Armor, 3d Infantry Division, es- headquarters company (HHC) assumed cal environment forced us to consider ev- tablished FOBs as they transitioned from control of Camp Hunte with a specific mis- ery possible threat and conceivable course maneuver to urban operations. At the end sion to provide continuous security and of action. Significant attention was given of April, 1st Battalion, 13th (1-13) Armor maintenance of Camp Hunte (Dakota’s to analyzing weapons and methods of at- (Dakota), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st FOB) and provide the battalion a safe and tack the enemy might use, regardless of Armored Division, conducted a relief in secure area to conduct combat, stability, whom the enemy was. The most likely place with 2-69 Armor. The relief in place and support operations. threats were: rocket-propelled grenade included assuming responsibility of FOB (RPG) attacks; coordinated mounted at- operations. The new Dakota FOB was nes- Security tack; improvised explosive devices (IEDs) tled between the Baghdad city of Kadha- The first order of business was security. or vehicle-borne explosive devices; dis- myia and the Tigris River. Later in the Camp Hunte was well protected with the mounted attacks; mortar/indirect fires; un- year, it was named “Camp Hunte” after Tigris River providing natural barriers authorized access; surveillance; and drive- the late Specialist Simeon Hunte, a Da- covering over half of the camp’s bound- by shootings.

March-April 2005 — 39 “Camp Hunte contained more than 100 buildings, which ranged from completely gutted or destroyed to relatively intact and inhabitable. Before the United States occupied the area, loot ers had stripped all the buildings of doors, windows, electrical fixtures, wiring, and plumbing.”

attacks individually, we learned several valuable lessons: • NCO leadership is critical to the disciplined conduct of guard force operations. • Daily guard mount, training, and inspec- tions make effective security operations pos sible. • Tactical vignettes used at the squad level to rehearse individual soldier actions provide an understanding of the threat, rules of engagement (ROE), and actions on contact. (Soldiers must understand Vignettes were developed and used as responsibility; identified threats early to ROE in detail, and more often than not, enemy templates to create a security and defeat enemy forces prior to attacks; main- the decision to engage a target rests with guard force to defeat specific threats. A se- tained significant combat power forward the individual soldier and not the leader, curity force usually included 30 soldiers, to defend FOB; and modified and changed and soldiers must understand when ROE two interpreters, five vehicles (including force protection measures to break pre- “allows” them to engage and when they one M1A1), and four crew-served weap- dictable patterns in operations. “should” engage.) ons. The majority of security forces were • Continuous improvement of security arrayed at the four gates covering access Eleven months of combat operations positions and varying guard routines help points to Camp Hunte. Additionally, rov- proved that initial assessments were ac- defeat enemy surveillance efforts. (Do not ing patrols and a quick reaction force curate. Camp Hunte was attacked with become predictable to enemy surveillance, (QRF) allowed for complete coverage and mor tars on 87 occasions, small-arms at- never be satisfied, and continue to im- flexibility in repositioning combat pow- tacks on 148 occasions, RPG attacks on prove force protection measures.) er. To establish and sustain a secure camp, 60 occasions, and IEDs emplaced in the • Retain enough combat power to re- we trained ready and alert soldiers to par- vicinity of the FOB on five occasions. spond to specific threats in the vicinity of ticipate in security missions; created depth However, the enemy neither gained entry the FOB. in gate construction and layout to deny to the FOB nor penetrated security. De- • enemy access; provided continuous as- spite constant attacks, we did not lose Create depth to security through em- sessments and improvements to overall any soldiers and just a few were wound- placing physical barriers, patrolling for- security; aggressively patrolled areas of ed while on the FOB. In assessing these ward positions, and positioning security forces. • Non-modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), such as inspection mirrors, convex security mirrors, metal- detecting wands, and handheld radios, are required. • If concrete buildings are available, use them to house soldiers. (Mortar rounds do little damage to reinforced concrete as opposed to sheet-metal buildings.)

“The first sergeant selected and supervised teams of skilled civilian electricians, plumbers, and engineers to create an FOB public works (FPW) department. Selecting and hiring local civilian technicians and workers proved invaluable for sustainment operations. We salvaged fourteen 12-ton central air conditioner units and purchased 53 window units, which provided air conditioning to the entire task force. In addition, we acquired electricity by tapping into the Baghdad electric grid and repairing a large turbine generator, “big blue,” for backup power.”

40 — March-April 2005 “Medical support was provided by our medical platoon. Each line company was task organized with three medics and an M113 for internal medical support. The forward aid station (FAS) and main aid station (MAS) were collocated in a troop medical clinic (TMC). Normal sick call hours were established to deal with routine care.”

Facility Maintenance and Construction ashes and rubble of destroyed Iraqi facil- cating resources and setting work priori- Site selection for a unit’s FOB may be ities. Work priorities were established and ties. Early identification of skilled and the most important decision a command- resources identified. The first sergeant trustworthy civilians will save time and er will make as the unit transitions from se lected and supervised teams of skilled money. Creating a small team of skilled combat to stability and support operations. civilian electricians, plumbers, and en- salary paid civilian workers is less expen- Consideration must be given to force pro- gineers to create an FOB public works sive and more productive than contract- tection, facility conditions, available re- (FPW) department. Selecting and hiring ing small projects. Hiring local laborers sources for repair, distance from zone of local civilian technicians and workers adds to the credibility of U.S. forces with- operation, and the need to maintain a pres- proved invaluable for sustainment opera- in the local population. Do your best to ence in zone. Each consideration must be tions. We salvaged fourteen 12-ton cen- build redundancy in all systems. analyzed and weighed against opposing tral air conditioner units and purchased considerations. For example, a command- 53 window units, which provided air con- Quality of Life er must examine both the potential costs ditioning to the entire task force. In addi- When a soldier has his mind on things, and benefits for each course of action to tion, we acquired electricity by tapping such as laundry, showers, sleeping, eat- make decisions such as whether to estab- into the Baghdad electric grid and repairing, and calling home, is he ready fight? lish an FOB 40 to 50 kilometers away in ing a large turbine generator, “big blue,” Is he ready to patrol a dangerous street in an existing facility that needs little repair for backup power. Huryia if he hasn’t talked to his wife in and is relatively secure or select an FOB Running water was provided to all 800 30 days and is only thinking about home? within the zone that needs repairs while soldiers of the task force by rebuilding a Quality of life has as much an impact on sacrificing security. looted and destroyed pump station capa- sustainment operations as does mainte- ble of providing 100,000 gallons of wa- nance and security. For the Dakotas, the decision was al- ter per day. The existing pump house was ready made. Camp Hunte was in zone, With some creative ideas and hard work, flooded, looted, and initially believed to we took care of our soldiers and provid- con siderably secure, and already pos- be beyond repair. With a little engineer- sessed repairable facilities. Camp Hunte ed a relatively high standard of living. ing experience and resilient Iraqi help, The availability of running water greatly contained more than 100 buildings, which we bypassed the chlorine gas filtration ranged from completely gutted or de- improved each soldier’s quality of life. system, rebuilt circuit boards, replaced Showers were installed in the majority of stroyed to relatively intact and inhabit- four large pumps, and repaired miles of able. Before the United States occupied buildings, and if running water was not pipe. Nearly every day for two months we possible in a building, then a shower trail- the area, looters had stripped all the build- rewired electrical panels, replaced pumps ings of doors, windows, electrical fix- er was positioned directly outside the and test pipes, and pieced the pump sta- building. Every soldier had the oppor- tures, wiring, and plumbing. As 2-69 Ar- tion together. Only then did we tackle the mor occupied the FOB, looters were seen tunity to shower daily and had several task of repairing hundreds of broken wa- options for laundry. With running water running away carrying toilets on their ter lines. heads. available, they could wash clothes by hand Along the way, we learned that one se- and air dry on the clothesline. As an al- Regardless, it was time to dig in and nior NCO should be identified as FOB ternative, soldiers could drop off laundry make the FOB home. Responsibility to non commissioned officer in charge (NCO- through a quartermaster-type laundry ser- provide basic services, such as running IC) or “mayor.” In our case, the HHC first vice monitored by the supply sergeant. water, electricity, garbage, sewer, air con- sergeant fit the bill. The position requires We also allowed a local business to set ditioning, and heating, fell to HHC. The some advanced mechanical and electri- up a laundry service on the camp. Sever- first sergeant took on the awesome re- cal engineering skills. The selected “may- al local vendors were allowed to set up sponsibility of building an FOB out of the or” must have the unit’s support in allo- small shops to sell items such as pack-

March-April 2005 — 41 Winning from Page 38 FOB continued from previous page These skills also assist in normal encoun- aged foods, souvenirs, sodas, and mov- In a traditional style, the daily LOGPAC ters, which helps determine the validity ies. One specific vendor repaired, filled, was the bread and butter of HHC. Trav- of what people tell you and why. and maintained a swimming pool at no eling with large convoys 30 kilometers • Train with media! expense to the unit in exchange for allow- to the BSA through the streets and high- ing him to set up a small shop. ways of Baghdad could prove difficult at • Learn Arabic. Iraqis admire soldiers times. It was extremely important to en- who take the time to learn a little Arabic. The dining facility (DFAC) building be- • came the center for morale, welfare, and sure the LOGPAC was armed and ready Train more at lower levels. Most op- recreational (MWR) activities. Funds were to respond to contact. We task organized erations in Iraq occur at the section level. used to buy free weights, televisions, and the support platoon with four additional Platoon leaders or platoon sergeants led a stereo system to build a large gym. The up-armored high-mobility, multipurpose their sections daily, while company lead- battalion chapel and a game room with wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) armed with ers conducted their own coordination. billiards and ping-pong tables were also .50-caliber machine guns and trained and • qualified gunners in the platoon. Every Train soldiers to integrate other forc- located in the DFAC building. Eventual- es. Psychological operations, military ly, soldiers had access to internet and tele- supply truck in the LOGPAC rolled with a .50 caliber in a ring mount. Our LOGPAC working dogs, civil affairs, aviation, and phones in three separate buildings. Two Iraqi security forces became habitual at- local vendors were allowed to set up “in- looked more like a combat patrol and less like a logistics element. Daily threat brief- tachments in Iraq. ternet cafes” at modest prices, as well as • Train combative. Restraints and sub- the U.S. Army-contracted internet ser- ings, detailed convoy briefings, and good leadership enabled safe and effective LOG- mission holds leave options in escalation vice. Outside, numerous volleyball courts of force, prior to using deadly force. and basketball courts were constructed. PAC operations. Twice a month, the battalion adjutant co- Medical support was provided by our Many times, Iraqis told us that we were ordinated a visit from the finance com- medical platoon. Each line company was the real Muslims. They were amazed by pany to provide soldiers with casual pay. task organized with three medics and an our generosity, righteousness, integrity, A large civilian bus was turned into a mo- M113 for internal medical support. The and discipline. They only saw this if they bile post exchange (PX) that made daily forward aid station (FAS) and main aid let down their guard enough to see through rounds to each unit on the FOB. station (MAS) were collocated in a troop the foreign invader. Iraqis are both proud and ashamed of their nation, their people, The ration cycle for the entire 12 months medical clinic (TMC). Normal sick call hours were established to deal with rou- and their history. They contradicted them- was A-M-A. While the majority of units selves constantly with stories of Iraqi be- received contracted class I support from tine care. The medics maintained a medical QRF to respond to any serious injury trayal, Muslim pride and virtue, wishes for Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR), we Saddam’s return to restore order, praise cooked hot meals and fed our soldiers. A in zone or medical evacuation needed. A concrete helipad capable of hosting four for newfound freedoms and amenities, renovated Iraqi mess served our needs. In hatred for other religious groups, and re- addition to normal rations, we supplement- UH60s was constructed to support aerial evacuation. The medical platoon leader lationships that have upended every bit ed meals by requesting support from our of bigotry they knew. The people can be division logistics resupply point (LRP). resourced an additional front-line ambulance (FLA) that served as the primary won over. Former Fedayeen soldiers have Soldiers will work long hours and days medical transport and QRF. come to our side to fight against their on end if they are taken care of. Making former friends simply because they saw quality of life a priority lets our soldiers No matter how much you plan, each day firsthand how readily the Americans help know we care. It allows soldiers to stay will present new challenges for HHC lead- Iraqis. The cynic might say this demon- focused while fighting in a dangerous en- ers. Daily review of priorities and threat strates just how the Iraqis sway in their vironment, and when they return to the assessments will assist in preparing for the loyalties, that you cannot ever trust them. FOB, they can relax and decompress af- inevitable fragmentary order, so remain Only time will tell. ter a day on the streets. focused on the number one priority of force protection and allow your leaders to excel in an extremely demanding environ- Traditional Combat Service Support ment. The Dakotas never failed to sup- CPT Jason Pape is currently serving as troop While securing and repairing the FOB port soldiers and always accomplished commander, H Troop, 1st Cavalry, 3d Brigade and improving the quality of life for sol- their mission. Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Ri- diers, HHC still had its doctrinal mission ley, KS. He received a B.S. from Michigan State University. His military education includes the to support the task force. As a “legacy Armor Officers Career Course, the Combined force” unit, we had a robust organic sup- Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Offi- port structure. Our deployed strength was CPT Jay Blakley is currently serving as caval- cers Basic Course, Airborne School, and the 302 soldiers. This included 15 cooks, 54 ry and infantry team trainer, 2d Battalion, 351st Scout Platoon Leaders Course. He has served support platoon soldiers, 27 medics, 15 Infantry Regiment, Camp Blanding, FL. He was in various command and staff positions, to in- -30 level mechanics as a maintenance sup- commissioned as an Armor officer from the clude commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, port team, and all MTOE property. Un like U.S. Army Officer Candidate School in 1995. 13th Armor (Wolfpack), 3d Brigade Combat the new Force XXI units using “supply He has served in various command and staff Team, 1st Armored Division, throughout its de- point distribution,” we were self-support- positions, to include commander, headquarters ployment to Iraq; battalion maintenance officer ed. HHC remained on the FOB with all and headquarters company, 1st Battalion, 13th and S3 Air, 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, Fort Ri- Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored ley, KS; commander, headquarters and head- the combat trains. Every day, for 350 days, Division, Fort Riley, KS; S3 air, 1st Battalion, quarters detachment, Combat Support Coor- we organized the trains and convoyed to 41st Infantry, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st dination Team, Taegu, South Korea; and tank the brigade support area (BSA) as a lo- Armored Division, Fort Riley, KS; and S3 air platoon leader, scout platoon leader, S3 air, gistics package (LOGPAC). Class I, II, and commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, and tank company XO, 2d Battalion, 69th Ar- III, IV, VIII, and IX, as well as mail, was 13th Armor, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Ar- mor, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Ben- pulled forward from the BSA. mored Division, Fort Riley, KS. ning, GA.

42 — March-April 2005 Home Station Observer Controller Training by Major Bob Molinari

The U.S. Army, while in the midst of professional after action reviews (AARs); cess, ROE to be enforced, and key events fight ing a war, is simultaneously conduct- and act as an additional set of safety eyes specific OCs must attend, such as platoon/ ing a substantial transformation process. during training. These are the baseline re- company operations orders (OPORDs), As such, not all units preparing to deploy quirements; many more responsibilities rehearsals, and various meetings. The OC into areas of responsibility (AORs) will exist on the path to becoming an effective team should be provided with all appro- have the time or opportunity to rely on OC. priate unit tactical standing operating pro- combat training center (CTC) rotations to cedures (TACSOPS), and understand unit validate home station training prior to mis- A prepared and motivated team of OCs standards for routine operations such as sion readiness exercises. As a result, home- at all command and key staff levels is as MILES boresighting and pre-live fire station training has become a matter of vital a training resource as land, ammu- checks. Care must be made in selecting great importance for deployment prepa- nition, multiple integrated laser engage- individual OCs based on their skill sets rations. ment systems (MILES), and opposing and experiences, as well as knowledge of forces (OPFOR). training equipment employment. As a rel- Home station training must include prop- evant side note, if MILES is to be used, erly trained and equipped observer con- Training Successful OCs brigade and battalion S3s should sched- trollers (OCs). As an essential training re- The first step in preparing the OC team ule daily MILES contact teams to ex- source and asset, OCs assist units in ob- is a certification process to ensure OC change information and troubleshoot de- jectively approaching training exercises, teams formally understand their exact du- ficiencies with MILES equipment. provide meaningful feedback to small- ties and do not rely strictly on individual unit leaders, and tailor field exercises to CTC experiences. OC teams must be pro- An initial meeting to gather data and set focus on mission critical collective tasks. vided with appropriate doctrinal manu- some ground rules between the unit and Commanders and staffs must plan in ad- als to ensure their comments are not sole- the OC team is required. This meeting fa- vance to train and equip OCs to success- ly based on personal tactics, techniques, cilitates mutual understanding of the train- fully prepare units for combat. ing exercise and takes the form of a train- and procedures (TTP). A doctrinal review ing schedule review, to include location OCs are not limited to force-on-force will not make them experts, but added to of the training area, mission essential task lane training or field training exercises; their personal experiences at the squad, lists (METL) to be executed, and areas in they can provide vital feedback in live- platoon, company, and battle staff lev- which the training unit requires OC atten- fire as well as command post exercises. els, will make them a value-added train- tion. Counterpart interviews provide an The OC team must be tailored and fo- ing resource. Internet resources are ex- opportunity for OCs and unit counterparts cused on the needs of the unit training. cellent tools to assist OC preparation. The to become acquainted; establish a mutu- The appropriate environment of open and U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons al understanding of the ROE, equipment, honest communications is essential to Learned (CALL) provides an exception- personnel issues, and unit strength and maximizing every moment of the train- al website for lessons learned, as well weaknesses; and further refine areas for ing event. as updates on the latest in-theater TTP. Companycommand.com also has excel- OC focus. Most importantly, the unit es- OCs have four primary purposes: repli- lent lessons learned from recent combat tablishes areas to which they expect OCs cate battlefield effects and limit the amount experiences. to focus AAR comments. These initial of artificiality during training; enforce meetings better prepare OC teams to iden- rules of engagement (ROE); provide feed- OC certification must include collective tify cause and effect in unit successes and back to the unit through participative and training on standards for the AAR pro- challenges. These steps are intended to not feel as if it is being eval- ers feel is most important. The best units uated or graded. The OC readily admit challenges and misunder- must be aware of his role standings, versus denying training short- as a training resource and comings and seeing the event as a test. remind the unit that he is The OC is responsible for gauging the there to assist it in becom- climate of the AAR and using intuition ing bet ter at a few essential and interpersonal skills to determine how METL tasks. Good OCs ask to approach what may be sensitive, per- the right questions at the sonal, or contested observed is sues. right time and demonstrate their need to assist the unit In addition to relationships with the unit, in performance improve- timing is important to home station OCs. ment. Better OCs subtly di- OCs quickly become unwelcome by de- rect the unit to ask the right manding answers on arrival or at the questions then discover their wrong time, or by remaining with the unit own answers. The best OCs continuously. Units require time alone to accomplish both these tasks develop plans and struggle through inter- while being transparent to nal challenges. The OC will also need the training process. Instead breaks to remain effective. The OC must of constantly con ducting not supplant the chain of command and become an adjunct higher headquarters unit interrogations to find available to approve requests, or be viewed necessary data, they observe as an extension of the inspector general the unit from a dis tance, re- to ensure standards are met. However, the lying on instinct to validate OC must know how to balance times that analysis. he needs to be available to provide ad- The OC possesses impor- vice or counsel to the unit. tant training advantages. He can observe while not un- Events, such as OPORDs, rehearsals, der the pressures of train- and planning sessions, will almost always ing, such as time constraints require OC presence; however, making “The OC team should be provided with all appropriate unit tac- and personnel and equip- oneself available at less-than-frantic times tical standing operating procedures (TACSOPS), and under- ment challenges. As already to offer suggestions will benefit the OC- stand unit standards for routine operations such as MILES bore- mentioned, he should have unit relationship. With his knowledge of sighting and pre-live fire checks. Care must be made in select- both the blue forces (BLUFOR) and OP- ing individual OCs based on their skill sets and experiences, readily available appropri- FOR plans, the OC develops his own time- as well as knowledge of training equipment employment.” ate doctrinal references, as line to attend events. The OC tracks the well as a wealth of TTPs to unit’s timeline for the next 24 to 48 hours provide feedback. The OC to provide a template for his timeline. will have situational aware- Finally, a closeout meeting toward the provide the minimal information an OC ness of the OPFOR plan to develop an end of the training period for any last- needs for success. However, nothing re- early estimate of cause-and-effect obser- minute or potential changes to the plan, places the relationship the individual OC vations in the post-mission AAR. Subor- as well as establishing a plan for the unit establishes with his assigned unit. dinate OCs at squad, platoon, and com- to contact the OC if necessary, is recom- pany levels must provide critical obser- mended. Essential Skills: vations and trends for consolidated feed- Interpersonal and Timing back. Equipping the OC Team One of the most critical issues that must The single most important point that OCs Fundamental planning of OC equipment be addressed is the relationship between must portray to assigned units is the pri- should center on providing the same ca- OCs and their training counterparts. This mary goal of collective improvement. All pabilities the training unit has, without the relationship must always, obviously, re- too often, OCs fall victim to frustration combat power. Thus, consideration must main professional — a coach, teacher, and lose perspective due to hostile or neg- be made for command and control (C2), and mentor — but an effective OC must ative relationships with the training unit. logistics, transportation, training equip- become a temporary part of the unit. Units False perceptions on the unit’s behalf or, ment, and individual items. that perceive the OC has an ally in pre- worse yet, super egos portrayed by the OC serve only to impede training. OC teams must have the ability to mon- paring for war (versus a doctrinal micro- itor the unit’s primary FM frequencies. scope intended to criticize unit shortcom- The OC’s proficiency to react and inter- Also, OC teams must have a dedicated in- ings) will be more receptive to training act with training units is more apparent ternal net to share observations and data comments and more honest with feed- during AARs. The AAR facilitator must exchanges. OCs at task-force level must back and information. The unit will de- strike a balance and remain flexible dur- have communications with OPFOR com- fault to hiding less and keeping OCs ining AARs by adapting the AAR to indi- mand ers or representatives. As most units formed more. vidual comments, while maintaining fo- execute battle update briefs prior to mis- The OC can only be successful by main- cus and keeping the discussion on track. sion start, the OC team should have a pre- taining a positive, here-for-you attitude, Though the OC has a set of issues that he battle update with company and specialty which highlights areas that need greater feels are most substantive to the unit’s attachments proving observations, chang- attention but always focuses on the unit’s per for mance, he must be willing to amend es to combat power, and significant is- achievements. The training unit should those issues to what collective unit lead- sues and predictive analysis on where the

44 — March-April 2005 unit will succeed and be challenged during units. Safety risk is made when assum- written comments to capture unit key ing execution. The pre-battle brief needs ing all officers or noncommissioned of- leader observations. A technique for this to be in a predetermined, fixed format for ficers can safely operate vehicles under type of AAR is to inject a doctrinal lead- efficiency, and should be a two-way ex- less-than-optimal conditions. Exposing er-teach to remind the unit of applicable change of information, rather than a data BLUFOR positions must be avoided by U.S. Army doctrine that was directly rel- dump up the OC chain. The pre-battle parking HMMWVs on prominent terrain. evant to the mission’s outcome. brief should include OPFOR changes, The OC must also plan ahead when dis- key battlefield operating systems (BOS) mounting to keep a secure tactical pos- Another type of AAR is for the OC to issues, and any necessary guidance from ture. prepare the AAR and then turn it over to senior OCs. OC teams also need a fixed the unit leader. This AAR process pays format to execute post-mission summa- AARs: Applying the Past great training observation dividends, as ries, which include sustains and improves Directly to the Future the commander or leader knows his unit’s for trend analysis from company and staff Effective AAR execution is the hall- strengths and weaknesses. However, cau- observers. Nested AAR timelines for all mark of an OC’s duties and responsibili- tion must be taken for using this type of levels (platoon through brigade), tempo- ties. For formal AARs, one technique is to AAR because the commander must be rary suspension of battlefield effects for conduct an immediate “hotwash” AAR properly prepared to cover all necessary AARs, and status of remaining obstacles when completing a training lane or at events. The OC remains the best AAR fa- in sector, as well as casualty evacuation mission change. This hotwash establish- cilitator as he maintains an unbiased and (CASEVAC) and nuclear, biological, and es the basis for the two or three issues neutral position. chemical (NBC) training continuation that will be the focus of the AAR. The The final and most formal AAR is the through the AAR process must also be formal AAR cannot cover everything con- instrumented type, which involves audio- directed to OCs at the post-battle brief. cerning the mission; there is simply not visual equipment and products that bet- To minimize OC friction, OPFOR, BLU- enough time. ter portray time-space relative to the unit, FOR, and OC information must have a and is the best technique used to focus nexus at an established OC C2 node. There are several types of AARs execut- group thought, as well as review close- ed at CTCs, which can be used at home to-actual execution details and status. At Training leaders need to allocate re- station training. Counterpart AARs are a home station, this could be in a GP me- sources to establish an OC white cell, or post-mission, free-flow conversation be- dium tent with generator, expando-van, facility, for C2 of the training event. This tween OC and counterpart, which attempt or any fixed site with power sources. Data C2 node captures OC observations, tracks to capture the critical elements that ef- and observations from OC teams must events for the training scenario, collects fected mission preparation and execu- be provided further out to prepare this data from various BOS elements to be tion. OCs must develop a running, infor- particular AAR — the high standard is documented for future AARs, and serves mal plan of the agenda for this type of achieved only through substantial resource as a fixed meeting site for OCs, as well AAR to maintain focus on the two or and time investment. This does not mean as a facility for formal unit AARs. This fa- three issues that need to be sustained or that instrumented AARs are solely re- cility should be well separated from unit improved for the next mission. served for battalion and brigade levels. C2 nodes to maintain fidelity of the bat- “Hummer-top” AARs are next in for- Platoons and companies benefit just as tlefield. mality on the scale of AAR types. They much from instrumented AARs, but need Individual OCs must be equipped with include: a posted agenda, AAR rules, and to be scheduled as mid- or final-training items such as dry erase whiteboards with markers, terrain model kits that replicate unit vehicles and/or per sonnel, and communications equipment for both mounted and dismounted OCs. Though varying techniques exist, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) provide OCs an increased battlefield mobility to observe unit activities. In addition to AAR tools and transportation, logistics support of the OC team must not be overlooked or assumed. OC sustainment packages must not be a distracter to unit training and should be executed out of sight and sound from BLUFOR and OP- FOR tactical operations. While addressing the issue of OC tactical posture, OC teams must exercise the same tactical level as the training unit. This minimizes chances for OCs to compromise the unit due to lack of camouflage, noise, or light discipline. Consid- “One of the most critical issues that must address is the relationship between OCs and their train- erations by brigade and battalion S3s must ing counterparts. This relationship must always, obviously, remain professional — a coach, teacher, be made for OC driver certification un- and mentor — but an effective OC must become a temporary part of the unit. Units that perceive der various conditions, which include no the OC has an ally in preparing for war (versus a doctrinal microscope intend ed to criticize unit illumination, rough terrain, and maneu- shortcomings) will be more receptive to training comments and more honest with feedback and in- vering safely and tactically around train- formation. The unit will default to hiding less and keeping OCs informed more.”

March-April 2005 — 45 collective solutions. The OC must focus participants on what exactly happened, why it happened, and what can be done to sustain or fix it for the next mission (whether training or combat). The standard must be to avoid differentiating between how the unit performs the mission during training versus how the unit will execute the mission during combat. Both must be the same or the training is artificial. Each AAR participant should identify one task he is going to fix and how he will fix it at his level. The AAR con- cludes with knowledge of the next mission or training event, discussing safety observations/trends/considerations, and finally, the unit leader provides final comments on the training event. The OC team should consolidate overall training observations for the unit at “The final and most formal AAR is the instrumented type, which involves audio-visual equipment the completion of training. This should and products that better portray time-space relative to the unit, and is the best technique used include unit successes and challenges at to focus group thought, as well as review close-to-actual execution details and status. At home all levels and doctrinal references with station, this could be in a GP medium tent with generator, expando-van, or any fixed site with OC TTPs for the unit to review and con- power sources.” sider in adjusting TACSOPS or preparing for future training. Final AARs at all levels focus on improving existing SOPs event summaries. As a closing consider- shortcomings. Recommended issues may or creating new ones to ensure soldiers un- ation, OCs make training more mean- include: precombat checks/precombat in- derstand their part in tactical operations. ingful to the unit by capturing photo- spections, such as boresighting, packing graphs of soldiers in action. This allows lists, or soldier load; graphics as part of Serving as an OC can be one of the most the unit to better reflect, visualize, and planning/execution; rehearsals; OPORD; rewarding experiences a soldier can have. take pride in the training conducted. logistics; time management; knowledge/ It affords the OC an opportunity to watch employment of ROE; actions on contact; and learn from mistakes and accomplish- While effective AARs ensure all lessons actions on the objective; integration of ments and puts more tools in his profes- learned are recognized and addressed by mounted/dismounted forces; echeloning sional kit bag. Simultaneously, the train- the unit, they must not be exceedingly fires; and transition from movement to ing unit benefits from a neutral set of eyes long. Part of the art of being an OC is fa- maneuver. and a better understanding of collective cilitating and controlling the AAR discus- planning and execution. Brigade and bat- sion. A good gauge for how much a unit An awesome way to start a great AAR talion S3s that plan to properly prepare derives from the AAR is realizing the unit- is for the OC team to recognize soldiers and equip OCs take home station train- to-OC talking ratio. The best AARs find who distinguished themselves during the ing to a higher level in preparing for com- the OC facilitating conversations through mission and set an example for others. bat operations. leading questions, controlling time, and The AAR starts off with an agenda and encouraging participation. The goal should rules. The rules establish an environment be for the OC to talk only about 25 per- where all members state what went wrong cent of the time, while the unit uses the ma- or right, while remaining worry free of MAJ Bob Molinari is currently a student at the jority of time for comment. OCs should making personal attacks. The rules should School of Advanced Military Sciences (SAMS), not use an AAR as a monologue because also stipulate that the AAR belongs to Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.S. from they retain an almost perfect situational the unit and the unit will be rewarded for the United States Military Academy, an M.B.A from Embry Riddle, and an M.A. from the Na- awareness of the training event that just their contributions. Finally, emphasis in val War College. His military education in- occurred. OCs guide the discussion based the rules should be made to individual cludes Command and Naval Staff College, Ar- on observations in collaboration with the par ticipants taking notes, lest hard earned mor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Ad- commander’s post-AAR hotwash and an training lessons be lost. Next, the OC vanced Course, Ranger School, Jumpmaster, added emphasis on recent relevant com- AAR facilitator should review the train- Pathfinder, and Scout Platoon Leader. He has bat lessons learned from sources such as ing event briefly from beginning to end served in various command and staff posi- the CALL website. Simultaneously, the to refresh recent memories. tions, including light infantry company trainer OC must curtail or redirect irrelevant con- and maintenance trainer, Operations Group versations or discussions that do not di- The OPFOR mission and execution is S1, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; important in allowing units to realize what tank company commander, B Company, 3d rectly impact the training topic at hand. Battalion, 69th Armor (3-69 Armor), 3d Infantry Do not allow units to blame higher head- they did or did not know about their adversary. An effective technique is to have Division (3ID), Fort Stewart, GA; commander, quarters for training shortcomings. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3- unit must focus on what it can fix at its the enemy commander available to brief 69 Armor, 3ID, Fort Stewart; and tank platoon level. his version of the battle. The OC then leader, scout platoon leader, and support pla- moves to discuss the two or three major toon leader, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st The AAR should focus on two or three areas on which the AAR will focus. Ma- Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. Appreciation major issues that contribute to the cause jor AAR issues must allocate time for is given to Major Scott Powers and Colonel and effect of mission accomplishment of AAR participants to comment and debate Kevin Benson for input to this article.

46 — March-April 2005 Leadership and Command Philosophy by Brigadier General Philip L. Hanrahan

A leader must develop a leadership phi- years ago, the focus on families was not there with your soldiers doing physical losophy. Such a philosophy applies to both as serious as it is today. If any attention training (PT) and leading from the front. noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and was paid to families, it was lip service. As For leaders, the standard is not the mini- of ficers. In theory, this philosophy should a second lieutenant, resources were not a mum; the standard should be to strive for apply to all our actions as leaders wheth- great concern. We operated under the na- a “max” on each event of the APFT. On a er or not we are in a command position. A ive assumption that “the Army will not related note — you can meet the standard leader is privileged to lead and command let us run out of money.” Today, we know for height and weight if you can pass the and his philosophy guides his actions and this is not the case and training opportu- tape test; however, the goal for leaders conduct and provides a philosophy and nities are often driven or limited by re- should be to make the table weight and guidance for the entire organization and source availability. not the tape weight. Training with your its soldiers. Each leadership philosophy applies to soldiers should not be limited to PT; lead- Individual leader philosophies tend to all lead ers, regardless if they are Active ers should strive to be technical and tac- evolve over time as leaders move through Duty, Army Reserve, or National Guard. tical experts in their chosen fields, wheth- their military careers and serve at differ- In today’s Army, many of us will serve in er administrative or artillery. ent command levels. A leader should also two or more of these components during “Expert” qualification with individual realize that over time the Army evolves as the course of our military careers. weapons or as a member of a tank or Brad- society evolves. However, the core of our ley crew should be the standard for lead- philosophy should remain the same and Lead by Example ers. As leaders advance in rank and expe- be “refined” as time passes. Leading by example appears to be a sim- rience, their technical- and tactical-ex- As a young second lieutenant leading a ple concept, but is more complex than re- pert areas evolve as the nature of assign- tank platoon, my philosophy was simple. alized. Leading by example involves ev- ments change and leader’s role evolves. It consisted of three points: lead by exam- ery aspect of a leader’s actions, whether However, the critical point remains that ple; accomplish the mission; and take care officer or NCO, and begins with a leader’s leaders should master the elements of each of soldiers. Today my philosophy of lead- physical appearance such as a standard assignment in which they serve — some- ership and command has evolved to five haircut, proper uniform wear, and mili- times this expertise comes from attend- points: lead by example; accomplish the tary courtesies. When a soldier is not meeting an institutional school and other times mission by training and maintaining to ing standards regarding military courte- through self-study and the “school of hard standards; take care of soldiers and their sies or proper uniform wear, leaders have knocks.” families; conserve resources; and have the obligation to make on-the-spot cor- Leaders set the standard of dedication to fun. rections. the job, to the unit, and to the soldiers A quarter-century ago, having fun was Leaders should participate in physical with whom they serve and work. Lead- not a specific consideration. A tank pla- fitness training and test with their soldiers. ers put in the time to get the job done and toon leader’s assignment, by its very na- Leaders should always try to “max” the done to standard. For example, when a ture, was a fun job, while at the same time Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) — if National Guard or Army Reserve soldier frustrating and challenging. Twenty-five that’s just not realistic any more, be out assumes a leader position, they do the

March-April 2005 — 47 resources; and curriculum. The Army has established schools and courses to teach soldiers how to present effective instruction; however, it a leader’s responsibility to identify instructors and students well in advance of training and provide resources (time and materials) to ensure classes are taught to standard. Training is too important not to train to standard. Leaders need to attend training, both to learn what is being taught and to ensure it is taught correctly, “by the book,” and to standard. Following training, an after action report (AAR) is critical. An AAR review reveals what went right, what went wrong, and determines areas in which the unit could improve. Writing down AAR results, placing them in a file, and reviewing them “Leaders should participate in physical fitness training and test with their soldiers. Leaders should al- immediately before the next training cy- ways try to “max” the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) — if that’s just not realistic any more, be out cle will help units avoid making the same there with your soldiers doing physical training (PT) and leading from the front. For leaders, the standard is not the minimum; the standard should be to strive for a “max” on each event of the APFT.” mistakes. The same applies to maintenance training — we either fail to train or do not plish the mission by training train to standard. Technical manuals out- and maintaining to standard. line how to safely operate and maintain Mission accomplishment de- all types of equipment ranging from pro- pends on how well soldiers tective masks to Blackhawk helicop- know their “craft.” No one is ters. Not only do leaders have to make born knowing how to operate time on the training schedule to perform a Bradley Fighting Vehicle or maintenance, they need to be involved how to zero an M16A2 rifle. with the training, whether it’s at the mo- These are learned skills, and tor pool, arms room, or nuclear, biolog- the training begins during ba- ical, or chemical (NBC) cage. Leaders sic training, participation in have to get their hands dirty as well — the Reserve Officers Training equipment must be maintained or the unit “No one is born knowing how to operate a Bradley Fighting Corps, or on enrollment in a cannot train. Vehicle or how to zero an M16A2 rifle. These are learned military academy. The Army Accidents will happen during training skills, and the training begins dur ing basic training, participa- bases its training on tasks, con- — we train skills that involve risk and tion in the Reserve Officers Training Corps, or on enrollment ditions, and standards. in a military academy. The Ar my bases its training on tasks, danger. For example, if we are going to conditions, and standards.” Once we complete our basic fight at night, we have to train at night; if military training, too often we we are going to fight in an NBC environ- cut corners during training and ment, we have to train in an NBC envi- job regardless of whether or not there is “bend” the standard. How many times ronment. Leaders have an obligation to money to pay them for the duty. In other have we not had the correct type or amount conduct a risk assessment before and dur- words, it is not just a two-day-a-month, of training aids, the correct student-ining training to identify risks associated two-weeks-in-the-summer assignment. structor ratio, or enough time? Everyone with training and take necessary mea- wants to get through daily training, so we sures to minimize risk, while simultane- In an ideal world, leaders are the first to ously maintaining realistic and valuable arrive at work in the morning (or on drill cut corners and save time in the short run, but cost lives in the long run. training. These measures could range weekend) and the last to leave in the eve- from conducting safety briefings and in- ning. Leaders set the standard in conduct The biggest problem in the training area creasing leader supervision to adding while on and off duty. Leaders must not is that we do not assign classes far enough safety officers and assistant instructors. do improper things and should avoid the in advance for the instructor and alternate appearance of impropriety. Even if some- instructor (yes, we should always have an Take Care of Soldiers and Families thing is technically “legal” or “correct,” alternate instructor) to prepare for class, The Army spends a lot of time and mon- soldiers may perceive it as wrong. Some- and often lack resources for instructors to ey recruiting soldiers. Taking care of sol- times, these things are easier said than properly prepare the class or block of in- diers begins before they report to their done, but our real moral fiber is tested by struction. These missing resources range first duty assignment. It begins with spon- what we do when no one is watching. from a shortage of manuals to a lack of soring the soldier and his family. New training areas or ammunition. soldiers should get sponsorship letters Accomplish the Mission by Training signed by the company commander and and Maintaining to Standard The Army has done a great job in preparing programs of instruction (POIs) and first sergeant as soon as they are identi- The next component of the leadership lesson plans that outline the task, condi- fied as being assigned to the unit. If pos- and command philosophy is to accom- tions, and standards for training; required sible, selected sponsors should live close

48 — March-April 2005 “Not only do leaders have to make time on the training schedule to perform maintenance, they need to be involved with the training, whether it’s at the motor pool, arms room, or nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) cage. Leaders have to get their hands dirty as well — equipment must be maintained or the unit cannot train.”

to the new soldier and be of similar age deserving soldiers are an- and marital status. The sponsor should other way that we as lead- contact the new soldier before drill or be- ers take care of soldiers. fore the soldier reports to the unit and Leaders also have an obli- make sure the soldier knows where to go gation to provide soldiers and what time to report to the unit. The meaningful and challeng- sponsor should make sure the soldier coming training so they have the “When we talk about conserving resources, we are not just talk- pletes inprocessing during the first drill. skills and confidence to sur- ing about money. Time, soldiers, ammunition, and training areas are all resources that we should conserve. Good detailed ad- Each member of the company chain of vive on the battlefield and vanced planning and following the Army’s training system and command should meet and talk with the win America’s wars and procedures help us plan and execute good training and save time. new soldier. During the new soldier’s first conflicts. Providing soldiers Properly managing time, training areas, and soldiers will con- formation, he should be introduced to the with necessary resources to serve these resources and improve unit readiness and morale.” unit — it is during this first day that the train, including ammo, ve- soldier will draw his first impression of hicles, and training areas, the unit. goes a long way in taking care of soldiers. Conserve Resources One of the most central ways to take care Leaders are responsible for taking care As leaders, the idea of resource conser- of soldiers is through formal and infor- of families, which begins with the com- vation does not enter into our thought pro- mal counseling and mentoring. This pro- mander and first sergeant interviewing the cess. For too long, soldiers and leaders cess begins with the commander and first soldier during inprocessing. Leaders need have assumed that we can spend all the sergeant interviewing the soldier during to learn about the soldier’s family during money we have and go back to higher inprocessing and should continue period- this interview, not just the family mem- headquarters for more because “the Army ically during the soldier’s career. In most bers’ names and ages, but also their hob- will not let us run out of money.” Year af- cases, this is one area in which leaders bies, interests, and special needs. Ensure ter year, especially during the end of the can and must improve. All too often, we family members have identification cards fiscal year, there is suddenly more mon- only counsel soldiers when they do some- and access to military medical care. Brief- ey than we can spend. We schedule work- thing wrong or fail to do something they ings and access to the judge advocate gen- shops, meetings, conferences, buy sup- should have done. Soldiers need to know eral for wills and powers of attorney are plies, computers, and other equipment just what is expected of them and leaders have a part of taking care of families and sol- to use up the money. “Use it or loose it” an obligation to keep them informed on diers. Family members need to be made is the implied message. In large measure, how they are doing — before they are aware of their privileges and benefits, as this situation comes about because we given a formal evaluation report. Lead- well as unit activities. A unit newsletter have been “good stewards” of our money ers have a tendency to overlook the ne- can accomplish this, provided it actually for the first three quarters of the year. cessity to both positively and negatively gets delivered to the spouse and not just Spending 50 percent of our financial re- counsel soldiers. to the soldier. Family day activities are sources during the fourth quarter is not another way to get this information to the best way to run an organization. Taking care of soldiers continues every- families. Holiday meals and din ing-ins are day thereafter until the soldier retires from other ways to get families involved. An When we talk about conserving resourc- the Army. Feeding soldiers and making active family readiness group can be a es, we are not just talking about money. sure they have billets is but a small piece real “force multiplier” in this area. Time, soldiers, ammunition, and training of the puzzle. Getting the soldier paid areas are all resources that we should con- timely is another critical element of this The old saying is true, “we enlist soldiers serve. Good detailed advanced planning process. Recognizing the soldier for pos- and we reenlist families.” Leaders have and following the Army’s training sys- itive accomplishments through a fair and to take care of soldiers and their families, tem and procedures help us plan and ex- active awards program is another aspect if we are to establish and maintain suc- ecute good training and save time. Prop- of this process. Timely promotions for cessful units. erly managing time, training areas, and

March-April 2005 — 49 Israel’s from Page 25 soldiers will conserve these resources and icate of commendation printed on a lap- verbial fear of preparing to fight improve unit readiness and morale. top computer is enough to award a job the last war. We can and should well done. Having a plaque in the com- look to past examples and recent Supply accountability and discipline are pany or battalion headquarters building also a part of conserving resources. If we trends in mounted war fare, such as for the top junior enlisted soldier, NCO, those provided by Israel, as we do not maintain good equipment records and company grade officer. Establish a (and maintain that equipment), we may continue to become the Army of “top gun” program for your best Bradley tomorrow. not have equipment with which to train or tank crew. Making training fun is one and, in some instances, be forced to pur- area where leaders are limited only by chase replacement equipment. We have to their creativity. A variety of physical protect our training environment and train- training activities will have a positive im- Notes ing areas. For example, oil spills have to pact on morale, such as a company run- 1Information at http://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/ be avoided; however, when they do oc- ning in uniform, in formation, with the archaeology/megiddo/introduction.html, accessed Jan- cur, they must be promptly cleaned up uary 2004. American flag and unit colors out front 2 and reported. Streams in training areas Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern as part of a local 10K race will make you, Land Warfare, New York, Routledge, 1990, p. 7. can not be polluted, and we cannot take 3 your unit, and spectators hold their heads Werner Keller, The Bible as History, New York, home cactuses from desert training sites. Bantam Books, 1982, pp. 187 and 215. a little higher, not to mention the fact 4Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, Battles of If training areas are not cared for, there is that such activities also have recruiting always the possibility of losing the privi- the Bible, New York, Random House, 1978, pp. 55- potential and help increase community 56. lege to train in some areas. Keep in mind awareness of the Army. 5Keller, p. 215. that violating environmental statutes can 6Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Is- result in fines and penalties. All of us need to keep our sense of hu- raeli Wars 1947-1974, Garden City, NJ, Military mor (or to develop one). When things are Book Club, 1978, p. 51. Resource management is the responsi- 7Bellamy, p. 8. not going so well, sometimes a joke will 8 bility of leaders at all levels. As soldiers, Dr. Christopher Gabel, lecture at the Military His- break the stress and tension, which al- tory Instructor Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Janu- we are also taxpayers and should be con- lows us to refocus in the right direction. ary 2004. cerned that the military is using its re- 9Dupuy, p. 584. Remember, when it stops being fun, sol- 10 sources wisely. During the planning pro- diers will stop being soldiers. It is not Tom Donnelly and Sean Naylor, Clash of Chari- cess, consider resources to ensure train- ots: The Great Tank Battles, New York, Berkley just money that motivates soldiers; it is Books, 1996, p. 210. ing is conducted to standard in the most 11 camaraderie, meaningful training, and a Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The effective and cost-efficient fashion. Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East, positive, caring environment that moti- New York, Schocken Books, 2004, pp. 508-509. Have Fun vates soldiers to do their best for their 12General Donn A. Starry, “To Change an Army,” unit, their country, and themselves. It is Military Review, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1983, p. All work and no play is not the way to our job as leaders to establish and main- 6. run a unit. This is certainly not to say that tain such an environment, and humor 13Rabinovich, p. 509. being a soldier is a game or a joke. What and fun are vital components of such an 14Robert M. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: soldiers do is deadly serious. They do not The Evolution of Operational Warfare, Lawrence, environment. KS, University of Kansas Press, 2004, pp. 255-262. “play war” or “play army” on the week- 15 ends, or “go to summer camp.” Soldiers Many, if not most, leaders already have Ibid. developed their own leadership and com- 16Citino, p. 185. are trained to do America’s business. It is 17Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson, “Thoughts on Re- a tough, demanding, and deadly business. mand philosophies, and many of the above structuring Army Brigades,” ARMOR, May-June However, it is important to work hard and elements are implicit, if not explicit, parts 2004, p. 23. play hard — soldiers are volunteers, they of such philosophies. For leaders who do joined the Army for various reasons, and not have a philosophy of leadership, I hope have their own reasons for staying. If as- this article provides a framework to help MAJ Jim Dunivan is currently a student signments are not “fun,” soldiers will not you develop a philosophy. For those lead- at the Irish Command and General Staff stay in the Army. “Fun” does not mean the ers who have leadership philosophies, per- College, Curragh Camp, Newbridge, assignment is not tough or demanding. haps this article will help you refine your CO Kildare, Ireland. He received a B.S. In fact, tough training is fun. When sol- philosophy. from the U.S. Military Academy and an diers train to do the job they enlisted for M.A. from Arkansas State University. His military education includes the Ar- and the training is done well, that train- mor Officers Advanced Course, the ing is fun. Soldiers may complain how BG Philip L. Hanrahan is currently serving as Com bined Arms and Services Staff cold, wet, and miserable they are, but commanding general, 90th Regional Support School, and the Armor Officers Basic when the training is done, these shared Group, San Antonio, TX. He received a B.A. Course. He has served in various com- “war stories” build moral and esprit de and a J.D. from Washington and Lee University mand and staff positions, including as- corps. and an M.A. from the United States Army War sistant professor of military science, Ar- College. His military education includes Armor kansas State University, Reserve Offi- Training can be fun by incorporating in- Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced cer Training Corps Program, Jones- dividual, squad, or crew competition, such Course, U.S. Army Command and General boro, AR; small group instructor, Armor as disassembling and reassembling weap- Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, ons the quickest, which cook can prepare He has served in various command and staff KY; assistant TRADOC Systems Man- the best dessert, or which company has positions, including assistant division com- ager for Training, Force XXI Battle Com- mander - support, 95th Division (IT), Oklaho- mand Brigade and Below, Fort Knox; the highest average APFT score. These ma City, OK; commander, 1st Brigade, 100th are easy competitions to set up and easy commander, B Troop, 3d Squadron, 8th Division, Lexington, KY; commander, 3d Squad- Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; and tank pla- ways to build morale. Award trophies, ron, 397th Cavalry, Corbin, KY; and command- toon leader and XO, 1st Battalion, 34th gift certificates, or maybe even a savings er, 2d Squadron, 302d Cavalry, Georgetown, Armor, Fort Riley, KS. bond to the winners. Sometimes a certif- KY.

50 — March-April 2005 LETTERS from Page 3 is among the greatest strengths of our trans- perform when the time comes. Stress this to 20 armored carriers (halftrack), two cargo formation. all your soldiers. Be prepared to do everything trucks with trailers, three Jeeps, while fully pre- you have been trained to do competently, im- pared to accept attached platoons of tanks The second issue is the brigade mortar pla- mediately, and without hesitation. Your own or and tank destroyers if available. toons being consolidated with the fires battal- someone else’s life may depend on it. ion. While the fires battalion could easily ac- CHESTER A. KOJRO commodate the span of command, control, and Soldiers must be mentally prepared to over- LTC, U.S. Army, Retired resupply requirements associated with a con- come fear and anxiety, to face adversity day solidation, this seems to directly contradict after day. Two days earlier, I was in the same Former Commander Believes Aviation what the HBCT was designed to do. The CAB M1114 when two 155mm rounds were deto- is organized to train, deploy, and fight with nated a few feet from the passenger side door Should Be Left to the Air Force minimal task organization or additional assets that I was sitting on the other side of. The blast Dear ARMOR, required. The mortars are a critical part of that went straight up. Proper training and prepa- equation. MG Valcourt is correct in his view of ration allowed us to react to the ambush, exit I read, “Transformation: A Commander’s Per- the mortars as “sacred.” They are an integral the kill zone, and effectively return fire against spective,” by LTC Jeffrey Sanderson, in your part of the battalion and are personally con- the enemy. Your soldiers must be mentally pre- January-February 2005 issue, with approval, nected to those they support. It is this person- pared to face adversity day after day and to moving enthusiastically from topic to topic: Fo- al connection and sense of responsibility that overcome fear and anxiety. TRAIN AS YOU cus on Warfighting, Not Housekeeping; Train- drives mortar crews to place effective fires FIGHT, FIGHT AS YOU TRAIN! If you are not, ing Safety to a Higher Live-Fire Standard; De- just a little faster. Again, creating conditions start right now. veloping Flexible and Adaptive Leaders; and where we train and “live” in our fighting forma- Transforming Institutions. And, the last topic, tions is the most preferred option. PETE MUCCIARONE Transforming Institutions, caused me to pause. MAJ, U.S. Army His solution of collapsing the branches so he MG Valcourt’s article highlights some of the can select “Captain Jones to command an in- great changes his branch is making to sup- fantry company, a tank company, or even a port transformation. While there may be room Commander’s Perspective field artillery battery” sounds like a cavalry for discussion, his opening and closing state- on Stryker Is Off the Mark troop commander serving in the Army of the ments could not be truer: Armor, Infantry, and 1960s in three cavalry units: airborne, 2/17th Artillery are a team. Dear ARMOR, Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Camp- DAVID A. MEYER My compliments on much of LTC Jeffrey San- bell (1965-1966); air, A Troop, 7/17th Air Cav- MAJ, U.S. Army derson’s article,“ Transformation: A Command- alry, Vietnam (1967-1968); and 1/2d Armored er’s Perspective,” from the January-February Cavalry Regiment, Germany (1968-1970). This 2005 issue of ARMOR, concerning his obser- type of multiple-skill-set leader was in the cav- Train As You Fight, Fight As You Train! vations on warfighting focus, training safety, alry that I remember in the 1960s. The solution is simple: more cavalry troops with a mix of Dear ARMOR, and development of flexible and adaptive leaders. However, his suggestions on collapsing tanks; Bradleys for scouts and infantry squads; On 10 January 2005, while patrolling in Sa- the branches and specialization by type of organize mortars and engineers; and extend marra, my M1114 was struck by an impro- unit are widely off the mark, especially his per- the training time for lieutenants and captains vised explosive device (IED). The IED was a spective on Stryker. who lead cavalry troops in future fights. command-detonated 155mm artillery round lying beside the road. The round detonated There may very well be three unit of action I was troubled by LTC Sanderson’s cursory between my up-armored high-mobility, multi- (UA) organizations — heavy, Stryker and light view of aviation. One sentence, “The critical purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and a infantry — but there are only two types of component of Army aviation somehow fits into Nissan pickup truck carrying Iraqi army sol- maneuver forces, “heavy” and “light,” formerly this model, and with some mental energy, we diers. Both vehicles were within ten meters ei- known as “armor/mechanized” and “light in- can figure it out.” From my perspective, and ther side of the blast origin. Two Iraqi army fantry,” respectively. Conceptually, doctrinally, having served as a ground commander and soldiers were killed and one wounded. A frag- operationally, and tactically, Stryker is simply aviation commander as aero-scout platoon ment, weighing approximately two pounds, another platform for mechanized infantry, just com mander (OH-6A), as an armored cavalry struck the windshield directly in front of my like the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the troop commander, a heavy lift (CH-54) platoon face. The impact knocked my hands off of the M113 armored personnel carrier, and the ar- commander, an air ambulance medevac com- steering wheel and stuck glass frags in my mored halftrack. mander (UH-1H), a combat aviation battalion face. The gunner was riding low between his commander, and a brigade commander with side shields and had his helmet gouged. Stryker UA’s claim to being an interim ver- aviation, engineer, maintenance, combat sup- sion of Future Combat System (FCS) applies port, and supply and service battalions, the Because of the up-armored HMMWV, I am only so far as its communications architecture ground commander just doesn’t understand able to write this letter. Because of eye protec- is concerned. All legacy systems, such as the the critical component of Army aviation. It re- tion, I am able to see the keyboard. Because Abrams, Bradley, and M113, will operate side quires too much mental energy. My simple so- of proper training, I was able to function after by side with the Stryker. As advanced digital lution is to transfer all U.S. Army aviators and the blast and exit the kill zone, positioning the capabilities migrate into these legacy units, their magnificent flying machines to the U.S. vehicle to cover recovery operations. The oth- Stryker’s uniqueness is already vanishing. Air Force. Rucker Air Force Base sounds good er soldiers in the vehicle and behind us ren- to me. I like simple solutions, which is why I am The supposed complexity of the Stryker com- dered first aid, returned small arms fire, and a country lawyer in a three-lawyer county in pany organizationally and conceptually differs evacuated the casualties and damaged equip- Kansas. ment. little from its World War II counterpart, the halftrack-equipped armored infantry rifle com- CHARLES R. RAYL It is our responsibility as officers and senior pany. The 1943 company had three infantry COL, U.S. Army, Retired noncommissioned officers to ensure we have platoons, each with three rifle squads, a light done everything in our power to properly train, machine gun squad, and a 60mm mortar equip, and lead subordinates. No detail is too squad. The company also had an antitank pla- New Equipment Is Definitely minor. No training is unimportant. That same toon of three gun squads, as well as a head- a Combat Multiplier day, a major used combat lifesaver skills to quarters section, maintenance section, and ad- Dear ARMOR, keep a wounded soldier alive. A staff sergeant min/mess/supply section. That gave the com- coordinated a quick reaction force over the ra- pany commander nine rifle squads, three ma- This is in response to CPT Francis Park’s dio. A captain operated a .50-caliber machine chine gun squads, three mortar squads, and article, “Advanced Infantry Optics and Their gun. You never know what job you will have to three antitank gun squads divvied up among Future in Armor,” in the January-February 2005

March-April 2005 — 51 issue of ARMOR. CPT Park hits the nail right training we did, we used during our year in tour in Iraq, we finally received PAS-13s, more on the head regarding cavalry and armor units Iraq. PEQ-2As, surefire tactical lights, and a much- using this new equipment. Based on my own needed borelight laser. We were finally able to experiences, one major issue with fielding and I later discovered that my platoon had M145 properly neutral zero the PEQ-2As and the using this equipment has been leaders in the machine gun optics (MGO), M68 reflective M68s. The borelight provides a neutral zero armor community. The “I’m-not-infantry” men- sights (aimpoint) — a.k.a., close combat op- and removes shooter error, and even with dot tality has run amok in this community for a long tics. My noncommissioned officers were unfa- sights, eye relief, both the distance and angle time. Many times in the past, I was told I did miliar with the optics; apparently, the former at which you look through the sight, is a factor. not need such equipment because it was too platoon sergeant had no interest in using the There are no “zero ranges” in combat, and expensive or because I wasn’t infantry. I spent new equipment. He assumed the main gun simply put, if you use it properly, you will al- the majority of my time in light and airborne optics would be broken or damaged by the ways hit the lethal zone. Once all weapons units, so I understood the importance of marks- soldiers, so they were not used. The armorer were neutral zeroed, they were night tested at manship, especially when dismounted. was told not to let anyone know the optics the small arms range on our forward operating were even in the armsroom. When I discov- base — my platoon loved the new equipment. I was an armor task force scout platoon ser- ered them, I immediately scheduled a range geant when my battalion deployed to Iraq. Pri- and took the platoon out to train. I worked with While deployed, I was able to obtain and or to my platoon’s deployment, I went online the platoon on M68s. Many soldiers were un- print chapters of FM 3-22.9. That, along with a and got information so that I could get a few comfortable and did not completely grasp the good friend who was a first sergeant observer advanced combat optical gun sights (ACOGS), concept of how they were to be used. U.S. controller at the Joint Readiness Training Cen- AN/PAS-13 thermal weapons sights, backup Army Field Manual (FM) 3-22.9, Rifle Marks- ter, enabled me to design a marksmanship iron sights (BIS), and some other equipment manship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4, and M4 training program, based on the one used by that would increase our chances of success. I Carbine, was not yet available, so it took the the 75th Ranger Regiment, to improve marks- was told that the ACOGS and PAS-13s were platoon members time to get up to speed. The manship skills. FM 3-22.9 is excellent; it gives too expensive and as far as the BIS, my re- M68s that were not used by my platoon mem- detailed info on all the new equipment cur- quest was “lost.” Later, my platoon was of- bers began popping up on other weapons in rently in use. Leaders need to get smart on fered the opportunity to do some military op- the battalion. If my platoon was not thoroughly new equipment and do a little homework be- erations in urban terrain (MOUT) training with trained on them, then I knew others were not fore introducing it to platoons. a team from the 10th Special Forces Group. — they just thought the M68s looked cool on The “death-before-dismount” mentality is a My commander told me that MOUT was not the M4. on my mission essential task list (METL) and thing of the past and soldiers in our communi- that he saw no real need for my platoon to do A week before we deployed, my platoon re- ty, whether scout or tanker, need to under- this training. The battalion commander told me ceived six PEQ-2A laser-aiming devices. Great stand that the battlefield of today and tomor- that I would never clear a building for him; that equipment, but there were no manuals includ- row may not be linear, as they were historical- is why the infantry is attached to our task force. ed and the infantry companies had already ly. The new equipment is definitely a combat I trained my platoon on close-quarters marks- sent their equipment, so it was difficult to neu- multiplier. So the sooner we get more senior manship reflexive fire and any other tasks that tral zero or obtain a true zero with the M68s, leaders to realize soldiers need these new were not historically organic to scouts. All the as well as the PEQ-2As. Near the end of our items, they can begin to work the issue of ob- taining more ammunition, to include more firing tables in small arms programs. One way to elevate the ammo issue is to rely heavily on dry firing to build muscle memory, which can be done anytime, anywhere. Solid muscle mem- The New Cavalry Leaders Course ory is key to becoming proficient shooters. Great article Captain Park; hopefully, it will ig- The challenges of the U.S. Army’s force provided with the in-depth knowledge of nite a spark and get leaders in our community modular redesign are upon us and we reconnaissance and security, as applied to focus on other aspects of warfighting. are addressing necessary changes with to the new reconnaissance squadrons JEROME DINGLE the grim, professional determination of found in the heavy BCT, Infantry BCT, and SFC, U.S. Army an Ar my at war. Our Army’s efforts to Stryker BCT. The CLC accomplishes its make units of action (UA) a reality have learning objectives through challenging demanded fun damental shifts in our think- practical exercises that test and hone stu- USMC Vietnam Tankers Association ing about how brigade combat teams dents’ understanding of the latest doc- To Hold 2005 Reunion in August (BCT) are organized and how they are trine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; expected to fight. The role of Cavalry has organizations; missions; capabilities; and The U.S. Marine Corps Vietnam Tankers As- not been spared this reexamination. One limitations of reconnaissance, surveil- sociation will hold its 2005 reunion from 17 of the latest efforts to ensure the officer lance, and target acquisition (RSTA) and August to 21 August 2005 at the Doubletree education system at Fort Knox remains reconnaissance squadrons. Hotel Philadelphia, 237 South Broad Street. current and relevant is the Armor School’s For room reservations, call (215) 893-1600. The Armor School at Fort Knox encour- recent redesign of the Cavalry Leaders Points of contact for the reunion are Dick Car- ages CLC enrollment for all officers serv- Course (CLC). ey (508) 477-5957, e-mail: usmcvta@comcast. ing in armor, infantry, field artillery, engi- net or John Wear (215) 794-9052, e-mail: john As we change our force structure, we neer, aviation, military intelligence, and [email protected] must also reconfigure assumptions about signal corps branches. Officers in these who should attend the CLC. The com- branches should attend CLC to prepare bined arms philosophy that underpins for assignments in support of RSTA and the logic behind creating these units of cavalry organizations. Attendance at CLC 4th Infantry Division Association action demands that all officers, regard- is currently open to any graduate of any To Hold National Reunion in July less of branch, assigned to BCT (UA) officer career course ranking in the grades planning staffs or reconnaissance squad- of first lieutenant (promotable) through The National 4th Infantry (IVY) Division As- rons within these brigades, should un- major. Enrollment is available through the sociation will hold its national reunion from derstand reconnaissance and security Ar my Training Requirements and Re- 17-23 July 2005. For more information, please operations. Leaders who attend CLC are sources System. contact Gregory Rollinger, 8891 Aviary Path R-66, Inver Grove Heights, MN 55077; or visit www. 4thinfantry.org.

52 — March-April 2005 Survey Feedback from the Force Drives the Evolution of Initial Entry Training in 1st ATB

Commander Command Sergeant Major COL James K. Greer CSM David L. Morris

As professional soldiers and warriors, diers now deal with media, civilians on it is our duty to keep track of ongoing op- the battlefield, and improvised explosive erations and assess how the contempo- de vices (IEDs). They live in a forward rary operational environment (COE) im- operating base and wear body armor dur- pacts training. In the past year, we have ing training. Many of these initiatives worked hard to develop new and rele- have come directly from armor and cav- vant programs of instruction (POIs) for alry leaders who want to help better pre- 19D and 19K one-station unit training pare new soldiers for battle. (OSUT). Feedback from commanders in the field and incoming cadre continue The road ahead. Over the next twelve to be our most vital resource for train- months, we will fully incorporate the ing development. Incorporating War rior Warrior Tasks and Drills into 19D and Tasks and Drills into basic combat train- 19K OSUT, which will increase weap- ing and OSUT guide our efforts as we to-hand combat to Army comba tives. ons proficiency by allowing all IET sol- continue to shape initial entry training Through the use of unused buildings, diers to fire the M240B, M249, M2 .50- (IET) in support of our Ar my at war. the brigade has created an urban oper- caliber, and MK19 using the AN/PVS- 4, AN/TVS-5, AN/PAS-13, AN/ PEQ-2, Annual Field Surveys. ations site to train all soldiers on dis- The 1st Armor mounted operations. We have added and AN/PAG-4, as the equip ment be- Training Brigade (ATB) conducts an- wrecked civilian vehicles to the Ad- comes available for train ing. In Febru- nual field surveys to gain empirical data vanced Driving Course to enhance driv- ary 2005, all OSUT units began execut- and conduct trend analysis on its trainer proficiency in restrictive terrain. ing a convoy live fire exercise. The 19D ing effectiveness. This year, for the first OSUT executes the con voy live fire ex- time, the annual field surveys on the per- The most significant change to the 19D ercise with M1025s, M998s, and M923s formance of new 19D and 19K soldiers OSUT POI eliminates the Scout Skills (five tons). are available online only. These sur veys Tests (SSTs) and replaces them with provide the Armor School and the 1st Field Training Exercises (FTXs), which Implementing the weapons immersion ATB with vital feedback from command- include tactical driv ing for both the program, is suing Soldiers In Training ers in the field so that we can enhance Bradley and high-mobility, multipurpose per sonal weapons for weeks at a time, training realism and relevancy to the wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), and in- will give new scouts and tankers great- COE. Our mission is to provide the force creased call for fire and land navigation er weapons familiarity and confidence. with highly trained, intelligent, and com- training. We also adapted the 19K OSUT Newly improved first aid train ing allows bat-ready soldiers. The critical surveys POI to include firing the M4 carbine soldiers to arrive at units already trained can be found at the links below. Please and M9 pistol from the hatches of the in chest decompression. Unexploded ord- take the time to pro vide us with thought- Abrams, increased com bat patrolling dur- nance and IED training will continue to ful and accurate feedback. We need your ing two additional FTXs, and add ed ad- be trained during dismounted IED lanes, help to better train the soldiers you will ditional en gagements with the loader’s and incorporated into mounted opera- receive. M240. tions, drivers training, and FTXs. Training initiatives over the past 12 We are focusing on redesigning the con- Please send any additional comments months. Over the past 12 months, 1st ditions of each training task to reflect to Mr. Jeffrey Cathcart, Training Tech- ATB has redesigned 19D and 19K OSUT the COE. Gone are the days of the sterile nician, S3, 1st Armor Training Brigade with new training tasks to maintain rel- testing station — today’s troopers and at [email protected]. evancy, incorporated urban operations tank ers are tested while they conduct training, and transitioned from hand- multiple tasks in a field environment. Sol- SOLDIERS OF STEEL!

Leader Field Survey Links 19D10 OSUT https://secure.armyqualityjobsurveys.com/copies/index.asp?survey=ENL_19D_OSUT_Feb05 19K10 OSUT https://secure.armyqualityjobsurveys.com/copies/index.asp?survey=ENL_19K_OSUT_Feb05

You can also visit the 1st Armor Training Brigade website at the link below and select “19D OSUT” or “19K OSUT” under the “Field Surveys” section http://www.knox.army.mil/school/1atb/

March-April 2005 — 53 PB 17-05-2 PIN: 080659-000

ARMOR The Professional Development Bulletin Periodicals Postage of the Armor Branch Paid at Louisville, KY U.S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARM Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210