ARMOR, January-February 1991 Edition

For the second straight time in as many Was the M48 or the M113 a proven years, we begin a new calendar year with tlefield workhorse in 1965? Did most US. forces deployed abroad under condi- talion or company commanders in Vie1 tions of imminent hostility. For those who like have combat experience? The answer i! to find lessons learned, there is a gigantic now, obvious. We have nearly ah one there -- mostly for those who thought entered a major conflict the same wa you could fold up the Army like a tent and with new, untested leaders and equipn put it in storage until the next camping trip. Somehow, American soldiers and leaders learn quickly and get optimum There has been a lot of talk about readi- out of any piece of equipment from hell ness. (See p. 45 for clarification on USR.) to tanks. And some would have everyone believe that we could be in for real trouble because our Korea was the exception. While we battalion and company commanders have proven equipment and leaders, the tent no combat experience, and our equipment is been folded and put in storage. largely untested in battle. Let's look at the record, after which we can formulate the answer, "So what?" Compare the U.S. Army at the start of with the Army in 1917, 1940, or 1965 In 1918, Rockenbach and Patton and Brett you should see an Army that stands I led the first Tank Corps into battle, essential- and shoulders above those others in qt ly on an OJT footing. No combat-tested of equipment, training, and organization equipment here. an all-volunteer force that has enjoy( good decade of plentiful resourcing to r Did the first Sherman tanks we gave the it what it is today. The equipment is the British to use in North Africa have a combat in world, and our tactical unit leaders track record? Nope. Was Creighton Abrams had the best training possible, short of a a hardened veteran of mobile, armored com- combat. bat when he led the 37th Tank Battalion into battle in Europe? Nope. Nor were many of And don't worry about our reservists his contemporaries or subordinates. The guardsmen. Never before have they bee whole concept of mobile, armored warfare highly trained and deployed so quickly. was new to us in 1940, and the TOES were changed several times during the war to reflect new equipment and lessons learned. Just keep the ammo and chow coming. New equipment training took place near or on the front lines.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official: CARL E. WON0 THOMAS F. SIKORA General, United States Army Brigadier General, United States Army Chief of Staff The Adjutant General ARMOR I The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB- 17-91 - 1

Editor-in-Chief Features MAJOR PATRICK J. COONEY 8 Defeating the Iraqis Managing Editor by Colonel Wallace Franz, USA, Ret. JON T. CLEMENS 10 Obstacle Breaching Techniques Commandant by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Ret. MG THOMAS C. FOLEY 14 Tactical Unit Pre-Combat Inspections by Captain (P) James L. Boling ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 18 Making Light Forces More Flexible and Responsive Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. Disclaimer: The information contained in by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Rozman ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the 21 Cavalry in the Defense: A Historical Vignette official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it by Captain Douglas W. Dunklin change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 26 Tank Destroyers in WWll Official distribution is limited to one copy for each heavy brigade headquarters, armored by First Lieutenant John A. Nag1 cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- 32 The Armored Gun System Debate: quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- Let It Begin Before It Is Too Late quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- by Lieutenant Colonel James Etchechuty pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HCl DA and 35 The French Armor Corps: A Branch in Transition MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for ar- In a Changing Army mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or- by Major Timothy Decker ganizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by 42 Combat Service Support in the Task Force Scout Platoon sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief. Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only by Captain Timothy Flanagan those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency in- 45 Unit Status Reporting: A Broken System? cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat by The Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 47 In Memory: Major Charles E. Griffihs systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use Departments exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 128, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19series enlisted 2 Letters 17 Armor Conference soldiers; and information concerning the train- ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armor 2 Contacts 48 Bustle Rack and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregi- 5 Commander’s Hatch 52 Books ment level and below, to include Threat units at 7 Driver’s Seat those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Second-class official mail postage paid ai Fori Knox, KY, and additional maillng offices. Postmastoter: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, AmATSEAM, Fori Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restridlon: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. January-February 1991, Vol. C No. 1 USPS 487-970 ~ ~ A Worthy Cause into law on November 6, 1986, authorizing Monument Committee stili needs about Is Slipping Away establishment of a memorial to honor the half of the $400,000 price tag - a cheap United States Armored Force. "The price by monument standards. Dear Sir: memorial shall commemorate the excep- tional professionalism of the members of To say that donations from industry What if a halfcentury of Armor Force his- the American Armored Force and their ef- have been disappointing, is to severely un- tory and development went unrecog- forts to maintain peace worldwide." derstate the record. And now, with dwin- nized? What if someone decided to build dling defense contracts, that situation is a monument to our valorous Armored For- Such would seem to be a worthy cause not likely to improve. So, it falls to us ces in our nation's Capital, and nobody deserving support of the thousands who then, to our pride in having served, to our cared? How do these ideas sit with you? sewed from the very beglnning of the Ar- memories of comrades, to raise this They are soon to be facts unless we take mored Force in 1940 to today. monument to their deeds in four wars. action now. And time is against us. The Congressional The monument, on the "Avenue of authorization expires in about a year. Do After a tremendous volume and a few Heroes" in Washington, D.C., was to be we really want to sit idly and watch this years of liaison work by several in- dedicated on November 11, 1990. But it happen? Or do we want to jump up and dividuals, the Congress passed H.R. 4378 did not happen. The Armored Forces say, "Count me in!"?

(Note: Fort Knox Defense Switch Network (DSN) prefix is 464. Commercial prefix is Area DIRECTORY - Points of Contact Code 502-624-m).

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL

Editor-in-Chief Commandant (ATZK-CG) Major Patrick J. Cooney 2249 MG Thomas C. Foley 2121 Managing Editor Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG James L. Noles 7555 Editorial Assistant Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC) Vivian Thompson 2610 Production Assistant COL Donald E. Appler 1050 Mary Hager 2610 Command Sergeant Major Contributing Artist CSM Jake Fryer 4952 SPC Jody Harmon 2610 Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA) COL James R. Joy 8346 MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR A'ITN: ATSB-AM, Fort Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS) KIIOX. KY 40121-5210. COL J. W. Thurman 5855 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and ac- Weapons Dept. (ATSB-WP) curacy in editing. manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, COL George R. Wallace 111 1055 either typed or printed out in near-letterquality printer mode. Directorate of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-TD) Stories can also be accepted on 5-1/4" floppy disks in Microsoft LTC Craig S. Harju, Sr. 7250 WORD, MultiMate, Wordperfect. Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please include a printout). Please tape captions to any illustrations Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD) submitted. COL Edward A. Bryla 5050 NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School (ATZK-NC) PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS Report delivery problems or CSM John J. Beck 5150 changes of address to Ms. Connie Bright, circulation manager. Director, Reserve Component Spt (ATZK-RC) (502)942-8624. COL Eduard Yates 1351 UNIT DISTRIBUTION Report delivery problems or chan- Directorate of Total Armor Force ges of address to Ms. Mary Hager. DSN 464-2610 commercial: Readiness (ATZK-'IF) (502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free subscription list COL Dennis H. Long 7809 should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief. TEXCOM Armor & Engineer Board(CSTE-TAR-X) ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK COL Dan E. Deter 7850 (The Armor Hotline is a 24-hOiIr service to provide assistance with TRADOC Sys Mgr for Tank Systems (ATSB-TS) questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equip- COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955 ment of the Armor Fome.)

2 ARMOR - January-February 1991 Each of us must consider what is at driver skill. During turns, increasing power sights were mounted in the periscope and stake here - the opportunity to raise an application was needed to avoid risk of gave a wide field of vision but lacked mag- Armored Force monument in our Nation's throwing a track. This was also true of the nification and accuracy. capital. There won't be another oppor- M4 Medium. tunity. We must move now - next year is Every man in Ordnance, including the too late! Then came the M4 Medium. The only CG, should have been required to change real improvements Ordnance made were a broken volute spring in the bogie What can you do to help? Contact the the 360-degree gun-mounted turret and suspension system. I am sure they would Armored Force Monument Committee seating the driver next to the transmis- have devised a different suspension sys- through Cot. (Ret.) Duke Wolf, 210 East sion, rather than astraddle it. But hey, that tem very quickly. Running on a broken Fairfax St. Apt. 500, Falls Church, VA was appreciated by all of us. spring could mean a thrown track be- 22046-2908 (703-532-0776) cause of loss of track tension. Let me tell you a few things I remember THOMAS C. FOLEY about the M4 Medium. Our nine-cylinder, General Omar Bradley, in his book "A Maj. Gen., USA air-cooled, dual-ignition, radial engines Soldier's Story" tells about our tanks on had to be operated above 1200 RPM or pages 322 and 323. He relates General WWll Armor: Another View spark plug fouling would cause missing. Eisenhower's comments about the failure Have you ever been in combat with a nine- of the 76mm replacement for the 75s and Dear Sir: cylinder engine hitting on five? It causes a about Ordnance's touting of the 76. Brad- degree of anxiety, I assure you. The en- ley goes on to state: "For the remainder of Wwll tanks were appreciably less than gine had a governor set at 3200 RPM and the war our tank superiority evolved the success that is portrayed in the article you can use your imagination about how primarily from a superiority in number by Konrad F. Schreier Jr. in your Sep-Oct we felt about those. To change the 18 rather than the quality of the tanks sent 1990 issue. spark plugs required an agile mechanic to into battle." lower the major part of his body head first From July 1942 to January 1945, I was into the engine compartment to reach the Compared to the German Mark V Pan- the maintenance officer of G Company, bottom spark plugs. Yes, we did it more ther, our M4 Medium was lacking in every 33rd Armor, 3rd Armored Division, a than once, chancing small arms fire from category. medium tank company. The TO called for the enemy infantry. At about 325 HP, that three platoons of five tanks each, and one engine, with the limited RPM range, was a W.H.F. SAIA, P.E. for the CO and one for me, a total of 17. real dog for a 33-tOn M4. Midland, Mich. My maintenance sergeant was T/Sgt Bow- den Lafayette "Pappy" Henderson, whose Remember that in the hedgerow service was continuous from WWI. Pappy "Bocage" country of Normandy, we Record Needs to be taught me how to "road test" every vehicle measured progress in terms of yards per Set Straight in the company each month. My tank ex- day many days. This meant a lot of en- perience was first-line, from use them to gine idling and very slow speeds, all of Dear Sir: fix them. which caused spark plug fouling. I wonder how the new M1 MBT will perform in Publication of the Konrad F. Schreier, The M3 Medium should never have got- close infantry support at idle 90% of the Jr., article "American Tanks Meet the Test" ten to the design stage with its 75-mm time and first gear the rest of the time. in the September-October 1990 issue gun, having only about a 25-degree What, no first gear? merits comment on a few significant traverse. The Field Artillery ROTC at Pur- items. due University taught that the 25-degree Exhaust elbows were tightened against axle traverse on the Model 1895 French a gasket between the cylinder heads and First of all, concerning the M3 General 75mm eccentric screw, breech block box- the elbow. Exhaust leaking often caused Lee and General Grant Medium Tanks. trail, towed pieces was so serious a fault the gasket to blow, and the elbow flanges The British did not like the 37-mm turret that the design was no longer used. Sure- to warp. Upon tightening the nut on the on the M3 when it was initially designed, ly, Ordnance was aware of this. stud in the cylinder head, it was common as they considered it too crowded and for the stud to fail in tension and require lacking in space for the mounting of a M3 Medium drivers sat front center, with replacement, which was a nasty job on radio. American policy was to mount the their legs astraddle the transmission. Oil the lower cylinders. There were many first radio in the tank hull, while the British temperatures in the transmission during echelon maintenance problems on the preferred a turret-mounted set. As a conse- Mohave Desert training made the drivers radial engines that made them unsuited quence, the British came up with a turret appreciate frequent relief. for tanks. with a bustle for the radio and more room Engine starting procedures required turn- for the crewmen. They named the M3 M3 Medium engines were nine-cylinder, ing the engine over five revolutions by Medium with this turret the General Grant. air-cooled, dual-ignition, and used high-oc- revolving the hand crank 55 revolutions to This particular version was not used by tane "airplane gas." Vapor lock was a very avoid "hydrostatic lock." Batteries were lo- US. forces. The British named the M3 common problem. The air cleaners were cated under the turret and replacement of used by the US. forces with the original too small, and excessive dirt was ingested the steel battery box cover could be excit- US. turret the General Lee, and the during dusty conditions. ing if you dropped the cover against the British did use the General Lee as well as battery terminals. the General Grant. The M3s used by the Front drive on the M3 Medium resulted Gyrostabilizers on the 75s were almost US. forces were never "Grants," as used in a "pulled track," which required high impossible to keep in operation. The gun throughout the article.

ARMOR - January-February 1991 3 On page 29, a short paragraph men- thinner armor, the M36B1 proved nothing "Armor Support in Low- to Mid-Intensity tions track connectors and grousers as if the M36 had not already proved. Conflict" emphasizes, once again, the they were the same items. This is not the Mr. Schreier wrote that the M4A3E2 As- Army's inability to come up with a decent case. The problem discussed was the nar- sault Tank version of the Sherman never Armored Gun System. The LAV with a 75- row Sherman track and the flotation it accumulated a combat record. Only 254 mm ARES cannon would fit the bill nicely, provided as the weight of the tank was in- were manufactured in JuneJuly 1944, but but it doesn't seem to appeal to the creased. An interim solution was to they were highly successful in combat. If powers that be. replace the standard track end connectors available, they normally led in the attack "Give Me a Heavy-Light" points out the with extended end connectors (some- over suitable ground or in the cities due same theme as noted above: the need for times called duckbills) along the full to their heavier armor. Some were con- light recon elements in any scenario. The length of the track to increase the width of verted in Europe to take the 76-mm gun light wheels could do the mission here the track and as a result, the flotation. The in place of the 75-mm originally employed. also. grousers on the tank track attacked another problem - that of traction. The I hope you do not consider the above Had Saddam Hussein moved into Saudi smooth rubber block tracks did not mere nitpicking, but the record needs to Arabia before the 82d got in place, or provide sufficient traction in certain terrain be set straight for armor people to read. through the 82d, the political leadership conditions, so relatively sharp edged steel Some of us were not there in World War II would have been faced with some terrible grousers were fitted transversely across with these vehicles as some of us were. choices, and the Army would have been the track at four-track-link intervals. They Comments in addition to these could be left with no good answers as to why it has were fastened by pins and a screw to the made about this article as well as the pre- no means to protect light forces with or- standard end connectors, but did not ex- vious one, mainly of a less significant na- ganic light armor. It would have been em- tend the width of the track. Extending ture. barrassing for the Army leadership, but below the track as it traveled over the fatal to the members of the 82d who were ground, they provided a greatly increased LEO D. JOHNS killed by the Iraqi combat arm of decision. traction, or grip. COL, USA, Retired We were very lucky in August 1990; I Midlothian, Va. doubt we'll be lucky if Kim I1 Sung Two different type horizontal volute decides to reunite Korea, if the U.S. is spring suspensions (HVSS) were tested in Off -t he-Shelf Solutions decisively engaged in the Persian Gulf, 1943. The second was tested on four pilot and the North Koreans follow Larry models of the Sherman - M4E8, Dear Sir: Bond's novel Red Phoenix and launch an M4A1E8, M4A2E8, and M4A3E8. Ten addi- attack three weeks after the Gulf goes hot. tional were then installed on ten more Your September-October 1990 issue pilots, all M4A3E8s. The suspension used had several very interesting articles that LARRY A. ALTERSITZ three dual-wheel bogies per track with cen- go to the heart of the current Persian Gulf MAJ(P), FA, NJARNG terguided, 23-inch-wide tracks. In March crisis. New Jersey Military Academy 1944, the HVSS was released to produc- Sea Girt, N.J. tion for all tanks of the M4 series. "A New Day for Armor or the Last Glim- the pilot tanks carried the E8 designation - mer of Sunset?" pointed out the need to "A Rock to Lean On ..." - the production tanks carried their stand- have mobile armored forces available to ard series number such as M4, M4A1, back up the quick reaction forces of the Dear Sir: M4A3, etc. The 76-mm gun first appeared Army. Light armor is desperately needed, in production tanks in the M4A1 in preferably wheeled light armor that is am- Late in the afternoon of 28 September January 1944, before the HVSS was phibious, reducing dependence on bridg- 1990 at MacDill AFB, Florida, a soft rain released for production. Thus, the state- ing equipment. LAV-type vehicles with the fell on a retirement ceremony. Perhaps it ment the M4A3E8 Sherman was intro- 75-mm ARES gun, standard LAVs, and was the Lord weeping; most assuredly St. duced in early 1943 with the 76-mm can- Panhard M11 VBLs would make a potent George wept because one of our greatest not be factual. The M4A3 (76-mm) force for both firepower and scouting mis- cavalrymen took off his spurs and dis- wIHVSS appeared in March 1944 - and it sions for a light unit. These are off-the- mounted his steed for the last time. was a standard series model, not an shelf items that could be in place within Major General Joe Lutz, a distinguished M4A3E8 experimental vehicle. months, if the decision could be made to cavalryman and the developer of all the utilize them. good that is now in our Special Operating Mr. Schreier stated that the M36B1 90- Forces, retired. He was the ideal soldier to mm Gun Motor Carriage mounted a spe- "Making a Case for Brigade Reconnais lead our Special Operating Forces cial open-top 90-mm gun turret on a sance Elements" also points out the need through some trying periods, and he led slightly modified M4A3E8 Sherman, and for such vehicles, especially the Mlls. them well. Strong men wept at his retire- proved the Sherman could have been The M11 is a small, three-man, am- ment. Grizzled NCOs who would look armed with a 90-mm gun. In fact, the phibious, lightly-armored, NBC-protected comfortable wrestling with crocodiles or M36B1 was the turret of the M36 on a vehicle that would be ideal for scouts in bears had eyes brimming with tears. Joe I __L ___a_ I_ I_-_ 1______. standard M4A3 tank hull. was built be- any organization, light or heavy. It canI - __ It he-- LUIZ was a rocK 10 lean on Tor generadic Ins- - cause sufficient numbers of the M36 90- equipped to defend itself and is ablt! to of soldiers, and these warriors knew it. He mm Gun Motor Carriage were not avail- carry sensor systems (tank thermal sights- was a warrior's warrior. able to meet the demand, and was rated starlight scopes, large binoculars, sound Joe Lutz was a natural, probabljI' the . Substitute Standard. Because the M36 .=A-a" .. .. . - .. . . amplifiers, laser rangefinders, etc.) that tinest leader ot men mat I nave ever seen. was a new turret on the MlOA1 Gun Motor tend the area of coverage for a brigade Carriage, which was a Sherman hull with commander. Continued on Page 50 4 ARMOR - January-February 7997 MG Thomas C. Foley Commanding General US. Army Armor Center

Desert Shield Deployment Rivals Patton’s Rush to the Bulge

Who would have thought a year Bastogne. This decisive move, spear- the least. I don’t know another army ago that well over half of our active headed by the 4th Armored Di- that could accomplish this. component Armor Force would vision’s battalions such as Creighton It says a lot about the soundness now be in Southwest Asia? This is Abrams’ 37th Tank Battalion and of our combined arms doctrine, our astounding, and what makes it so Albin Irzyk‘s 8th Tank Battalion, outstanding equipment and or- remarkable is not just the mag- broke the back of the German at- ganizations, our quality soldiers, our nitude of the force involved, but tack. tough and realistic training, and our how quickly we were able to dis- very competent leadership. We are engage, turn, and move our power- This Third Army operation has intensely proud of what we are wit- ful armored formations. I predict rightly long since become a much nessing. We know that, as long as historians will be writing about his studied classic in the art and there is an Army, that Army will great feat of arms for years to come, science of command and staff work continue to look to its Armor comparing it with a very famous in mobile armored warfare. But the branch for bold, courageous leaders operation conducted 46 years ago turn and move by our forces from with the superior mobility and this past December. CONUS, and especially those from agility of mind who thrive on rapid U.S. Army Europe, is equally im- response to unexpected challenge. pressive. To suddenly disengage a Recall, in December of 1944, it modern armored corps, with all of Just as in the victory in the Battle was General George Patton who its support, from the myriad and of the Bulge and just as in defied conventional wisdom by turn- very diverse activities associated DESERT SHIELD, Armor will al- ing .his army 90 degrees and then with a forward deployed army, and ways answer the call. swiftly racing to relieve the en- move it quickly to port and into a circled lOlst Airborne Division in distant theater, is remarkable to say Forge the Thunderbolt!

ARMOR - January-February 7997 5 Armor-Cavalry Units Deployed Operation Desert Shield

1st Armored Division

1-1 Cav

1st Briaade 1-37 Armor U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY LINDA L. SLUDER

2d Briaade 1st Cavalry Division 24th Infantry Division 1-35 Armor 2-70 Armor 1-7 Cavalry 24 Cavalry 4-70 Armor 1st Briaade 1st Briaade 3d Briaade 3-32 Armor 3-69 Armor 3-35 Armor 2-8 Cavalry 2d Briaade 2d Armored Division 2d Briaade 1-64 Armor 1-32 Armor 4-64 Armor 1st Briaade 1-5 Cavalry 1-67 Armor 1-8 Cavalry 197th Infantry Brigade 3-67 Armor (WWP) 1st Infantry Division (M) 3d Armored Division 2-69 Armor 14Cavalry . D/4 Cavalry 4-7 Cavalry 1st Briaade 82d Airborne Division 1st Briaade 1-34 Armor 1-73 Armor 4-32 Armor 2-34 Armor 1-17 Cavalry 2d Briaade 2d Briaade 3-8 Cavalry 3-37 Armor 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment 4-8 Cavalry 4-37 Armor 1st Squadron 2d Squadron 3d Briaade 3d Infantry Division (M) 3d Squadron 2-67 Armor 4th Squadron 4-67 Armor 3d Briaade 4-66 Armor 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment 2d Armored Division (FWD) 8th Infantry Division 1st Squadron 3d Briaade 2d Squadron 2-66 Armor 1st Briaade 3d Squadron 3-66 Armor 4-34 Armor 4th Squadron

6 ARMOR - January-February 7997 The Force by CSM Jake Fryer, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

Just this morning, I was looking at my calendar, and realized I was late Force Reduction Actions Desert Shield Impact in writing my article for the Driver's Seat. A lot of ideas flashed through 0 Reduce accessions 0 Continue Accessions 0 Restrict retention my mind on what to write about. 0 Expand Voluntary Release 0 Voluntary Release suspended There are so many great things hap- 0 Expand involuntary programs 0 Slow down involuntary programs pening in the Armor Force today. 0 Can do indefinitely But the most important issue is the 0 Allow soldiers in 0 Accept overstrength in the CMF inactivating units to separate 0 Morale future of the armor enlisted force. I 0 National Commitment reached for my phone and issued an OPORD to Sergeant Major Greg Merder, who works in the Direc- torate of Total Armor Force Readi- Saudi Arabia. Our deployment, promotions will probably slow sig- ness, Personnel Proponency Divi- along with projections of casualties nificantly. This is because promo- sion. Together we have put this ar- if hostilities do break out, caused us tion targets are based on authoriza- ticle together. to take actions to ensure the robust- tions at least a full fiscal year out, ness of CMF 19. while our inventory remains quite If you have been keeping up with high. But when the dust settles, the the Army force structure chan- .Stop-Loss - In late August 1990, overall promotion opportunity and geslcuts through the news media, the Army ordered Stop-Loss action opportunity to serve in our key the situation looks foggy, and the fu- into effect. Stop loss is mandated by leadership positions will again be ture seems unclear. law when the president orders very healthy. The responsibility is mobilization of Reserve Forces. on us as armor leaders to, first, iden- We are going through a lot of Stop-Loss suspended all voluntary ti@ and separate through involun- changes: Voluntary Release Pro- release programs, including early tary means those soldiers who are gram, DESERT SHIELD, and Stop- separation programs. poor performers; and second, make Loss. How will this all impact on maximum effort to identify and con- our soldiers? Let's look at each one .Force Reductions - While all of tinue to encourage our best soldiers of these actions. these actions are taking place, the to stay in armor. They need to un- Army will still drawn down in size, derstand that the situation will stabi- .Voluntary Release - In May of as required by the budget. The lize soon and they still will have last year, the Army established a Armor Force will go from 26K to super opportunities to pursue duty voluntary 90-day early separation around 15K by 1996. as platoon sergeant, first sergeant, program. It was to help the Army and sergeant major. Good soldiers make personnel and force structure .Conflicts - On one hand, we will hang on through the tough reductions as required by the have force reductions; on the other, times if they are strong, concerned, budget and Congress. we have to maintain robustness in and caring leaders, and are offered the CMF to support DESERT tough, challenging, and rewarding .DESERT SHIELD - On 2 SHIELD. duties. Armor has both: leaders to August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait mentor and inspire our young sol- and the United States sent troops What does this all mean to the diers, and the challenges that keep and equipment to support the Saudi armor soldier? What it means is motivated soldiers thirsting for government. Armor units, along that for the next year or two, the more. with the other combat arms, are the professional development situation core of our United States forces in will be very cloudy. In particular, "Forge the Thunderbolt!"

~~~ ~~ ~ ARMOR - January-February 7997 7

~~ ~ Defeati n g t he Ira q is Saddam's Troops Are Not Ready For a War of Maneuver

by Colonel Wallace Franz (USA, Ret.)

A militaj victory gives the nation- and thousands of tanks and artillery mance in the 1973 Arab-Israeli Wi al command authority the oppor- pieces. This army has the battle ex- They do not do well at mob tunity to successfully terminate a perience of the eight-year war with mechanized warfare because tl conflict. Victory in battle, in a cam- Iran and such statements as "Iraq's calls for an ability to think rapid paign or even in a war, cannot in battle-seasoned armored units" ap- to improvise in the heat of batt and of itself achieve the objectives pear in the news. There seems to be and the willingness of junior office set by the country's leadership. The little doubt on the part of most to take responsibility or ma Vietnam war is an example of that analysts that the United States and decisions on the spot. Officers a fact. The many U.S. victories did its allies could defeat Saddam's reluctant to take action without ( not lead to achieving the goals set army. The question seems to be, ders. The elimination of Iraqi ( by several U.S. governments. States- how long would it take, and what ficers who think independently, manship must take the oppor- casualties would the United States who disagree with Saddam, co tunities presented by victory on the suffer? Some have put the casualty tinued during the war with Irs battlefield to achieve its objectives figure at 30,OOO or more. While it is The officers corps has suffered and end a war. The nature of the a cardinal sin in military planning to number of purges over the years victory in also critical. A victory underestimate your enemy, it is im- Saddam has cemented his control with high casualties, a long, drawn- portant not to overestimate your the army. On the other hand, in t out campaign, a particularly destruc- enemy and thus eliminate some vi- defense, fighting from prepar tive campaign, all can make it dif- able options. There is a tendency in positions, Iraqi troops have do ficult to achieve the required politi- some circles to overestimate the well. Their army has been mold 'cal results in spite of apparent capabilities of the Iraqi military, by its eight years of fighting a war military success. It is the job of a and, therefore, its ability to cause position, tied to fortifications ai country's armed forces to provide casualties to U.S. forces. A close communication nets, against a lo its government with the kind of look at such important factors such tech enemy. military success that will aid in as combat experience, equipment, achieving the political objectives of and leadership will put the Iraqi In spite of its large number the government. military capabilities in proper tanks, many of which are obsole perspective. the Iraqi Army is not experienc If it turns out that the objectives in handling mechanized forces set by the U.S. government in the The Iraqi Army does not have a mobile operations requiring exte Persian Gulf can only be achieved record of military success. It at- sive maneuver. If it comes to a fi~ through military action, then the tacked an unprepared Iranian Army in the desert, they will face a sit1 0peratio.n must be swift and not in 1980 and lost most of its early tion they have not had to face sin produce a large number of casual- gains by 1982. It spent the next six their costly experience against t ties. Certainly the time will come years defending itself against human Israelis in 1973. The United Stal when the force ratio in the region wave assaults conducted by an un- will have air superiority, fire sui will favor the anti-Saddam alliance. professional Revolutionary Iranian riority, and high-tech intelligen Army. In spite of the fact that it systems, all supporting an A~I Can the United States and its al- usually had air superiority and fire trained and equipped for mob lies conduct such a campaign superiority, it suffered a number of warfare. This is not to say the Ir; .r . .. *r. .. *. t against the Iraqi Army in and about aereats, sucn as Menran,. Knorram- Army is a paper tiger. It nas Kuwait? shah, and the Majoon Islands. It strengths and weaknesses. 'I Much has been made in the has lost about 80,000 troops as point is to take advantage of thc popular press of the military prisoners. Iraqi forces received low weaknesses and use U.S. strengl capability of Saddam Hussein's marks from Israeli. Svrian and Jor- against them. For instance, I I. army, an army of one million men, danian officers for their perfor- Gnited States must not attempt

~~ 8 ARMOR - January-February 7991 British trooas suffered few Casualties in deseit war of maneuver against the Italians fight a war of position requiring (the 6th Australian Division later ficers were politically appointed. costly assaults on prepared defen- replaced 4th Indian Division). This The command system was ses. Israeli Major General Chaim same force was employed against ponderous; operations were con- Herzog, in discussing the lessons four different Italian troop con- ducted in a sluggish manner. The learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli centrations: Sidi Barrani, Bardia, army had a defensive mentality. The War, points out the need to avoid Tobruk, and Beda Fomm. Within Italians, when faced with the unex- tactical attacks on strongly held two months, two British divisions pected, such as threats to their lines Arab defensive positions. He advo- had advanced 500 miles and of communications, tended to panic, cates an indirect operational ap- defeated an army of ten Italian then break and lose cohesion. proach that allows an army trained divisions. In doing so, they suffered in mobile warfare to use its about 2,000 casualties, but captured It can be seen from this example strength. In other words, make the 130,000 enemy soldiers, nearly 400 that an army that has mastered the enemy tight your kind of war. Keep tanks, and over 800 guns. The Royal handling of mechanized forces in the initiative, and make the enemy Air Force achieved air superiority mobile operations, given the right react to your maneuvers. and destroyed 150 enemy aircraft. circumstances, can quickly defeat a The RAF allowed O’Connor’s small defensively-oriented army without History is full of examples of suc- army to maneuver free from air at- suffering excessive casualties. cessful campaigns that were com- tacks and enemy aerial observation. Employ maneuver to achieve local pleted quickly and with little cost. superiority over a portion of the One of these examples can give an The reasons for the British vic- enemy army, destroy its cohesion, idea of what might be accomplished tories were many. At the tactical and then move to destroy another in a conflict involving opposing for- level, they had the Matilda infantry part of that army. This process ces having many of the characteris- tank, very heavily armored for that works especially well against an tics discussed above. Early in period of WWII. Italian tanks were enemy tied to its defensive positions. WWII, the British and Italian ar- lightly armored, and much of their mies were involved in a winter equipment was obsolete. At the This is just the type victory re- desert campaign in Libya and operational level, the British Army quired in Kuwait in order to give Egypt. On 13 September 1940, the was completely mechanized, while the United States and its Allies the Italian Tenth Army began its in- the Italian Army was not. This, com- opportunity to achieve their stated vasion of Egypt. A force of about bined with the air superiority objectives. 80,000 men advanced 60 miles to achieved by the RAF, gave the Sidi Barrani. The Italians, under British freedom of maneuver on a General Graziani, occupied Sidi grand scale. In addition, the Royal Colonel Wallace Franz, a Barrani three days after crossing Navy controlled the sea off the combat veteran of Korea and the Egyptian border. The Italians coast of western Libya. Vietnam, retired in 1984 after then began to construct a series of five years on the faculty of the defensive camps and to build up General OConnor was aggressive, U.S. Army War College, where their administrative resources and flexible, and commanded from the he was Director of Combat communications. No effort was front. The forces employed were Theory. He holds a bach- made to advance any farther. On small enough to be controlled by elor’s degree in history from the night of 7 December 1940, the the British command system. Later, Stanford University and a British, under General O’Connor, in this theater of war, they had dif- masters from the University of attacked the fortified positions ficulty controlling larger (corps- South Carolina. Commis- south of Sidi Barrani from their size) mechanized forces in mobile sioned in Infantry in 1951, he rear. O’Connor’s army of 30,000 operations against the Germans. is also a graduate of the consisted of the 7th Armored The Italian Army suffered from C&GSC and the U.S. Army Division and the 4th Indian Division poor leadership; many of the of- War College. ARMOR - January-February 1991 9 Behind a smoke screen, an Is- raeli assault team moves into action to attack an obstacle belt. The Merkava tank pushes 0bstacle Breaching Tee hn iq ues a mineroller. The M3 halftrack carries a Viper line charge, and the NAGMASHOT engineer vehicle, a converted Centurion, by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel (IDF, Retired) carries the combat engineers and their equipment.

Linear defenses based on the launching sites, protected water, mobile reserve to be used when the Soviet "triple-decker'' concept rely fuel and ammunition dumps, defender wishes to make his on physical obstacles, mutual fire military roads, and communication decisive move. The Iraqi linear support, and pre-planned kill zones trenches. defense consists of three rigid and fire traps, all aimed to delay, (static) lines of defense, integrated stop, or prevent the attacker from The Iraqi linear defense concept into a complex which includes tacti- breaking through the defense com- relies on the Soviet basic doctrine, cal (mobile) and operational re- plex. but was modified by Arab armies serves, as well as semi-mobile anti- during the Middle East wars with tank elements distributed through- Most of the obstacles in a desert refinements not seen elsewhere. out the system. The forward line of environment are man-made, using The Iraqis nearly perfected this con- defense stretches close to the large-scale engineering effort to cept during the Iraq-Iran war. In FEBA, while the entire complex is achieve maximum effect. The Iraqi the desert-oriented linear defense, guarded up front by a series of Army has spent the past few months there are at least three defensive defended outposts, tasked to estab- erecting substantial defenses along belts, each contributing to the lish contact, engage enemy pati ' the Kuwaiti-Saudi borders. Saddam defense complex in its own way to and act as alerting forces to Hussein has recruited most of his achieve high attrition rates while en- enemy force approach. earth-moving resources to under- gaging the attacker's best units - take a massive fortification build- namely the assaulting forces, which The forward line of defense is up, creating obstacles, earth berms are normally elite formations - manned by infantry brigades, each turned into fortresses, ramps for with the defender's least effective occupying an area of 16-24 square elevated tank positions, antitank units deployed forward, while his kilometers along Four to six weapon sites, artillery and rocket own elite formations create the kilometers of front line. Usually, in-

10 ARMOR - January-February 7997 ~ Pitas, with their inherent elevation advantage, con- trol the normally flat fantry brigades are deployed with tacker to advance or break through desert terrain with excel- two infantry battalions positioned after he has penetrated the forward lent observation and fire forward, the third about four defense zone. cover. Ramps and fir- kilometers to the rear. The first line ing positions for tanks, is held by three companies, In the intermediate zone, tactical ATGMs, mortars, and deployed in company or platoon armored reserves are located under- automatic weapons are strongpoints known as "pitas," cover in dugouts to protect them dug on the embankment. named after the round, flat loaves from artillery and air attack. Typical of bread common in the Middle countermobility obstacles will be East. anchored on a massive natural or ditions, while on regular combined manmade obstacle, such as sand arms exercises in all types of ter- dunes, lava beds, cliffs, gullies, rain. The IDF requested dedicated Arab forces invented the pita pipelines, or built-up areas. These equipment for obstacle clearing, strongpoint and refined the Soviet obstacles are three-dimensional, and a special design component in defense concept of linear, in-depth combining vertical antitank ditches the ordnance corps became respon- trench systems because they were and embankments. Minefields are sible to develop specialist engineer- not easy to construct in desert con- layered in stretches 80-100 meters ing equipment for combat use. Is- ditions. Shifting sands and soft wide, scattered with mixed antitank raeli defense industries produced trench walls required constant and antipersonnel mines 20-40 the hardware according to these strengthening. The pita concept meters deep. On the perimeter are design concepts, which are currently solves this problem, providing not the main horizontal obstacles, with foremost in the world. only a suitable fortified defensive trenches, barbed wire fences, and stronghold, but also elevated firing dragon teeth, acting mainly as An effective integration of assault positions not normally available in nuisances. engineers in tactical combat units is the desert. The pita strongpoint is one of the basic elements of suc- constructed by bulldozers, which The Israeli Army has faced Arab- cess. The IDF integrates such ele- scrape the topmost soil layer from originated defense systems since the ments into its combined arms teams inside and outside to form a cir- early 1960s, first with the Soviet at the tactical level. Inclusion of cular berm up to five meters high. linear trench system, and later - counter-obstacle elements in for- since the 1973 war - with the pita- ward echelons provides the attack- type fortified stronghold belts. Con- ing units with the capability to at- Unlike the traditional trench sys- tinous practice, training, and tack in multiple lanes through tem, such berms are excellent weapons development have yielded minefields and across antitank obstacles to vehicle movement and some unique offensive tactical con- ditches, crush through defenses, and act as effective firing platforms for cepts, practiced successfully in the bring the battle right into the enemy all types of weapons. Pitas, with 1967 and 1973 wars. The IDF position. The IDF also allocated in- their inherent elevation advantage, learned that well trained, balanced, dividual obstacle and mine breach- control the normally flat desert ter- combined arms combat teams can ing devices to its tanks, which are rain with excellent observation and breach these defense belts. Backed all fitted to receive these devices. fire. Ramps and firing positions for by continous and well placed artil- Some are refined versions of the tanks, ATGMs, mortars, and lery barrages firing HE and smoke Soviet KMT4 and PT55 attachments automatic weapons are dug on the shells, the assault teams combined adapted to fit IDF tanks of all embankment. Semi-circular trench elite infantry and accompanying types. Mine rollers can be replaced lines for communications and pro- tanks, preceded by dedicated as- by company light aid detachments, tected movement are dug on the sault and mine-breaching equip- working with field equipment, if ridge line. ment. These teams could breach damaged by exploding mines. Israeli even the strongest defenses. defense industries also developed In the empty area between strong- special cleared lane marking sys- holds, the brigade prepares a com- Since the mid-l960s, all first tems to provide follow-on forces plex of antitank barriers, well echelon troops in the IDF practice with a clearly visible path, both day protected themselves and situated a special breakthrough doctrine in and night. The Viper rocket- in kill-zones, where it expects the at- day, night, and adverse weather con- launched line charge system is in- ARMOR - January-February 1991 11 Wheeled assault bridge is pushed across a trench by an M60 tank. This bridge can be at- tached to any tank, so the unit does not depend on heavy, dedicated bridgelayer tanks. The tank attached assault bridges are in- expensive and can be left on location for long periods, if required stalled on an M3 halftrack and uses short burn rockets to deploy the line charge across the minefield. Once on the ground, the Viper is detonated, clearing a narrow lane through the obstacle. To ensure the flow of forces thiough the obstacle, the initial breaches created by track- width mine plows or Vipers must be wheeled assault bridge can be designed along the lines of the Is- widened. This is the task for the pushed across the trench by tanks. raeli devices. combat engineer units, which use This bridge can attach to any tank, either explosive charges or manual so the unit does not depend on The current track-width mine- mine clearing: still a time-consum- heavy, dedicated bridgelayer tanks, rollers are adaptable to both M60 ing process. Israel developed spe- which are few in numbers and ex- and M1 tanks. A track-width mine cial explosive charges for the widen- pensive. The tank attached assault plow is in the inventory now, and a ing of cleared lanes. bridges are inexpensive and can be full-width, lightweight plow is in left on location for long periods, if development. These devices go after Once the assault troops have required for follow-on forces. the mine, not its fuse. The mine is negotiated the minefields, they must Bridgelayer tanks are not only ex- physically removed from its place overcome the antitank ditch and its pensive, but operate by elevating and can be detonated by other embankment. To cross this steep the bridge, making them vulnerable means. However, as cleared track- obstacle requires special techni- targets, a lesson proved during the width lanes are used by follow-up ques, similar to those once prac- Syrian assault on the "Valley of vehicles, they tend to become ticed in the medieval era. Infantry- Tears" on the Golan in 1973. deeper. As the bellies of following trained combat engineers secure the tanks get closer to the uncleared far side of the ditch. They also carry ground, they may set off pressure special, lightweight assault bridge Dozer tanks and heavy bulldozers mines or destroy lane markers. Full- ladders, which enable them to are also allocated to assault units width mine plows overcome this negotiate the steep walls. Light- and provide instant support. They deficiency, and no skip zones weight assault bridges for tanks are can quickly fill an antitank ditch, remain uncleared. After rollers also distributed to forward units. breach the embankment, and detect mines, explosive breaching Tanks drag the bridges and push penetrate the steep walls of a pita systems are used to save time. The them across the obstacle to bridge fortification. The American Army is explosive systems destroy about 95 the antitank ditches in a few also developing a line of dedicated percent of the mines by pressing minutes. A faster and lighter obstacle breaching systems, some down on their fuses with overpres-

12 ARMOR - January-February 1991 sure, neutralizing others by pushing The SPZ-2 is a metal-framed cable across the minefield. Its detonation them out of the lane. To remove the connected to an anchor that is fired clears lanes of up to 180 meters remaining mines, the U.S. Army has across the detected minefield. Once long and six to eight meters wide. developed an explosive system, the the anchor sticks fast, the explosive M58Al/A3 (MICLIC). Each charge charges are connected to the cable An improved version is mounted can clear about 100 meters into the end, which is winched across at the on a special tracked vehicle capable minefield. The 1,750 pound charge, rate of 200 meters per hour, and of launching two simultaneous hoses pulled by a rocket mounted on the then detonated. The SPZ-4 is a under fire. The device shoots 75- M353 trailer, is connected to the cable assembly that a tank can push, meter hoses in sequence, advancing firing trailer by a 60-meter tether. It or if using a roller or plow assem- after each launch. The new model clears a lane about 14 meters by 100 bly, towed across and detonated by has the capacity to straighten the meters. the tank crew. An explosive-filled, hoses before firing, thus increasing rocket-fired line in a boat-shaped the detonation effect. The explosive Catapulted fuel-air explosives can container can be used by the T-55 hoses are fired by rockets mounted also be extremely effective, creating with KMT plow, known to be in ser- at the rear of the vehicle. However, lanes of 20 x 240 meters when firing vice with the Polish Army. the device does have problems. If their entire load. These devices also launched over terrain covered with have a standoff capacity of 100 The Soviet mine clearing techni- shrubbery, fences, or electrical meters. The U.S. Army now has a que uses KMT tanks, at the rate of wires, all of which prevent the hose new lane-marking system (CLAMS) one per platoon of three, in forward from lying directly on the ground, for day and night use. Using a spe- breakthrough regiments. Deploy- the blast effect is considerably cial dispenser, it can carry 150 ment normally requires 10-15 reduced. luminescent marker candles, which minutes with trained crews. The nor- are used in conjunction with breach- mal procedure calls for the rapid ad- The multinational forces deployed ing and mine proofing efforts, mark- vance of KMT-fitted tanks moving in Saudi Arabia will have to equip ing the centerline of cleared lanes. directly into the obstacle. If time al- and train thoroughly in the use of Depending on the chemlite used, lows, engineer scouts will recon- dedicated obstacle breaching equip- the candles remain effective from 30 noiter the danger zone and mark ment and its tactical aspects before minutes to 24 hours. lane entrances. Mine breaching is any attempt to go on the offensive. the direct responsibility of the The Soviets have designed and ground commander and not an en- developed a wide array of obstacle gineer task. The number of lanes to clearing devices, which rate among be cleared depends on the tactical the best in the world today. They situation. Normally, for a battalion, have, apart from the Israelis, the six to eight lanes will be cleared. It Lieutenant Colonel David widest experience in using their is common practice to develop two Eshel, IDF, Retired, is senior designs. The Soviet systems include of these lanes into six- to eight- defense advisor to Eshel tank-mounted mine-clearing devices meter-wide lanes for the passage of Dramit Ltd. publications. He and explosive charges of wide wheeled traffic, but this is the is a graduate of the French variety. responsibility of the engineer unit at- Armor School at Saumur tached. The widening process uses and a former lecturer at the The typical tank-mounted mine explosive charges placed under IDF Command and Staff Col- clearing devices, suitable for all cover of a smoke screen, with sap- lege. He served many years tanks in service, include the KMT4 pers moving forward under cover of as a career officer with the and KMT5 which weigh 7.5 tons. supporting fires from tanks and Israeli Defense Forces, in- The PT55 (for the T-55) weighs a BMPs. cluding combat duty in tank ton less. The KMT, moving at up to and signal units. His recent 12 kph, can survive heavy explosions A new mine clearing device has book, Chariots of the and clear 73-81-cm lanes with each been introduced recently and is Desert, is a combat history roller. At night, a special, luminous usually found in engineer units at of the Israeli Armored tape-laying device can mark the division level. Designated the M- corps. swept lane. 1979, it projects an explosive hose

ARMOR - January-February 1991 13 I Tactical Unit Pre-Combat Inspections by Captain (P) James L. Boling

It has often been said that, 'The unwarranted, and bear no after all combat preparations are men do best what the commander resemblance to what will actually complete. Units in combat will rare- checks." While this trite statement take place in combat operations. I ly have the luxury of time required seems to indicate an unduly pes- absolutely agree that commanders for a formal pre-combat inspection. simistic view of subordinate profes- (and other leaders) inspect their Moreover, such an inspection is sel- sionalism, it does have real merit in areas of responsibilities. I just think dom warranted when subordinates that it highlights the commander's that what is checked and how it's are competent, diligent, and profes-. responsibility to inspect his unit. checked will be quite a bit different sional. This responsibility is most common- from the motor pool show-and-tell. ly manifested in the unit pre-combat Most soldiers and their NCOs will inspection. A pre-combat inspection (PCI) is take positive action to maintain an inspection conducted by a unit their equipment and prepare to The phrase 'pre-combat inspec- commander or leader to determine fight. During these preparations, tion" conjures up images of polished the force's readiness to execute its tank commanders, squad leaders, vehicles, dress-right dress, in the assigned tactical missions. These in- platoon leaders, and platoon ser- motor pool, with troops spitshined spections may be formal or informal geants will routinely make the same at parade rest in front of their im- and may be announced or unan- exacting rigorous inspections of maculate war machines while the nounced. Formal inspections are al- their men and equipment that the battalion or brigade commander ways announced. All leaders and commander would repeat. There- troops the lie to check for valve commanders make some type of fore, formal PCIs are almost never stem caps, correct tire pressure, PCI of their units. conducted during combat opera- Code-of-Conduct cards, and other tions, including during assembly important "stuff.' This image of the Formal PCIs are the commander's area occupation when preparation pre-combat inspection persists be- meticulous inspection of all areas for combat takes place. cause many units still conduct these within the unit. Formal inspections all-day witch hunts in the name of consume an extraordinary amount Informal PCIs are the com- readiness. It is my firm opinion that of time and preclude "working in- mander's inspection of particular such inspections discover little of spections" because troops are stand- areas, activities, or units of special 'value, exact a toll on morale that is ing down waiting to be inspected interest or concern to him. The in-

ARMOR - January-February 1991 formal PCI resembles a series of do when the unit is in combat and With lack of time, and without the deliberate spot checks of key items. dispersed over a wide area. Per- same level of expertise in certain The areas inspected and the sonal leadership here means "show- technical matters as subordinates or method and depth of the inspection ing the flag," talking with soldiers, staff members, the commander will may vary from unit to unit, or even demonstrating a sincere and lasting habitually delegate some checks to from vehicle to vehicle, at the com- concern for the welfare of the men his subordinates. Such delegation mander's discretion. under his command, and infusing ensures adequate coverage of key his confidence and spirit into the items, aligns the experts with their The commander's experience, in- unit. specialties, and frees the com- depth knowledge of his unit and its mander to devote his own time to in- equipment, and his estimation of Last, in the informal PCI, the com- spect vital areas, spend more time the current status of the sub-ele- mander and his staff or other subor- with soldiers, become more fully in- ments under his command will dic- dinates are physically at the assem- volved in troop leading procedures, tate the particular details of the in- bly area while activities take place - or conduct personal reconnaissance spection. For example, the com- a "working inspection." This allows and coordination. The delegation mander may spend more time and them to take positive action to ex- and execution of PCI tasks must not look in greater depth at units newly pedite actions, fii problems, and set interfere with troop leading proce- task organized with his command or standards as the need arises, not dures by removing too many subor- those units in which officer replace- after the fact. . dinate leaders and staff members ments are new to combat. Units from tactical planning. Brigade and that experience habitual shortcom- To be most efficient and effective, battalion commanders should avoid ings will deserve more of the com- PCIs must be planned. Planning the allowing subordinate leaders to trail mander's time. He may designate PCI does not imply formal inspec- behind them in ever-growing num- one or more staff members or the tions or rigid adherence to bers during the inspection, as is executive officer to check certain schedules. PCI planning is the sum- common in peacetime. items. At company level, the com- mation of the commander's estimate mander may use the XO, first ser- and decision concerning what will When, and what specific items will geant, or master gunner for this pur- be checked, who will check it, when be checked is keyed to both what is pose. it will be checked, and in what se- being checked and who is checking quence it will be checked. it. The sequence and duration of as- The informal PCI serves several sembly area activities is typically . purposes. First, and obviously, it al- Generally, those points that mean known to the command. Ideally, sub- lows the commander to personally, the difference between mission suc- ordinate units should be inspected or through his subordinates, check cess or failure, and those points that when they are relatively inactive or to ensure that actions are taken in serve as indicators of maintenance, stationary. For example, an inspec- accordance with his decisions and readiness, or morale trends within tion of Company "B," which coin- applicable SOPS or standards. Also, the units, will be checked. Ideally, cides with the company's Level I11 it allows the commander the oppor- given enough time, everything in the rehearsal, may not yield the sort of tunity physically to determine the unit would be checked. However, results the battalion commander readiness of the unit from a subjec- with the general scarcity of time in desires. On the other hand, some in- tive viewpoint. The commander's combat and the other competing spections are oriented on activities, knowledge of and experience with demands on leaders' time during not units. For example, if the bat- soldiers allows him to accurately as- combat preparation, the com- talion S4 wants to ensure that the sess the intangible elements of com- mander must prioritize what to battalion maintenance platoon is bat power, such as cohesion, check. providing adequate support to the morale, and esprit, that are not mechanized infantry company, he reflected in formatted reports and The number and competence of must obviously arrive for his spot briefings. subordinate leaders or staff mem- check while the maintenance bers available to assist the com- platoon is working with the unit. This process of checking also mander in his inspections also in- However, when time is truly short, enables the commander to exercise fluence what will be checked. Ob- leaders and staff members must in- personal leadership - something viously, with more individuals to do spect as the opportunity presents it- which he cannot easily or normally the checking, more can be checked. self, even if it is not the best time to do so. The execution of combat units. At the TOC, the brigade com- The battalion commander's inspec- preparations must never be delayed mander can observe the battalion's tion is a balance between units, or artificially sequenced to "fit" the staff planning and coordination and equipment, and men. He inspects PCI time planning. The surest way speak with staff members. His im- the companies and platoons under to avoid this is to make all PCIs un- pression of the efficiency, cohesion, his command by inspecting equip- announced. and competence of the staff is ment and personnel and observing probably indicative of the battalion assembly area activities, including Brigade Pre-Combat Inspections as a whole. This is because the plan- rehearsals. The battalion com- ning and preparation for tactical mander physically spot checks The brigade commander is limited operations is a clear predictor of selected equipment and vehicles in in his ability to inspect the brigade battlefield success. Moreover, a visit the battalion. Because men are due to lack of time and lack of to the TOC allows the brigade com- directly connected to these pieces detailed technical knowledge con- mander to determine whether or of equipment and vehicles, any such cerning all units and activities not his instructions, intent, and inspection is also a personnel in- within the brigade. Time is probably priorities are being carried out. TO spection. Like the brigade com- the most limiting aspect of these and from the battalion TOC, the mander, he concentrates on those restrictions. The physical dispersion commander should make a sincere units and officers who warrant the of the units within the brigade mag- effort to meet and talk with soldiers. time and effort invested. The bat- nifies the criticality of time because This, too, is an inspection, which talion commander should attempt movement between units consumes together with his impression of the to inspect each company and spe- much of what little time is available TOC, allows the commander to as- cial platoon in the battalion, includ- to the commander. The brigade sess the battalion's intangible ele- ing attachments. The battalion com- commander must account for these ments of combat power. mander must also inspect his own limitations by prioritizing his inspec- combat vehicle with the level of tions and making full use of his staff. detail equal to any other vehicle Battalion Pre-Combat commander in the battalion. The In prioritizing what to inspect, the Inspections battalion commander should make brigade commander focuses on a special effort to inspect, visit with, units, not equipment. The brigade Like the brigade commander, the and rehearse with the company he staff may be assigned inspection of battalion commander is restricted in will maneuver with in combat. units or activities within their respec- what he can inspect. However, the tive areas of expertise. The brigade battalion commander has less travel Company Pre-Combat XO, as 2IC, may assist the com- between units and has fewer dif- Inspections mander inspecting units, but he will ferent types of units and equipment probably be required to devote his with which to contend. The bat- Ideally, the company commander entire efforts to staff coordination talion commander has a distinct ad- inspects every vehicle, major and planning - especially when vantage in that most of the com- weapons system, and soldier in his time is scarce. In selecting units for panies in the battalion are usually unit, including attachments and CS his own inspection, the brigade com- those assigned to his battalion. The assets that will maneuver with the mander is guided by his knowledge constant relationship between the company. His inspection is as of the brigade's units, judgment, ex- battalion commander and the com- thorough and painstaking as time al- perience, and. time available. He panies and platoons under his com- lows. Lack of time may force the may invest more time and effort in mand allows him to make more commander to inspect fewer items those units whose combat perfor- rapid assessments of unit strengths than he would like. The XO, first mance is key to the upcoming opera- and weaknesses. This more detailed sergeant, and master gunner may as- tion or those which will constitute knowledge, coupled with his con- sist the commander in checking the brigade's main effort. stant personal contact with officers those items that he does not have and men, permits the battalion com- the time to adequately inspect him- Although the brigade commander mander to determine quickly what self. Subordinate leaders will also in- can and will inspect anything in the to inspect. Like the brigade com. spect their areas of responsibility. brigade that he wants, the most il- mander, he will frequently delegate However, no matter what other in- luminating inspections are probably inspection tasks to staff, XO, or ser. spections take place, or who con- the battalion TOCs of inspected geant major. ducts them, the commander will still

16 ARMOR - Januaty-February 1991 inspect each vehicle and soldier in tool at his disposal to encourage Captain (P) James L. the unit. Regardless of time avail- and invigorate the spirit, morale, Boling was commissioned in able, his inspection must be a hands- and confidence of the officers and Armor in 1979 from ROTC on physical inspection. A "troop the men under his command. Without and served in the Oregon Na- line" cursory cheerleading approach the company commander's personal tional Guard as a tank to this inspection is totally unsatis- direction and leadership, the stan- platoon leader. He entered factory, fails to set the proper tone, dards of performance and profes- active duty in 1980 and and will not adequately prepare the sionalism will probably be set by in- served in Germany as a tank unit for the experience of combat. experienced junior officers. platoon leader, tank com- The commander's intimate pany XO, and infantry bat- knowledge of the men and in- I began this article with an old saw talion scout platoon leader. dividual vehicles and equipment about men doing best what the com- His subsequent CONUS as- under his command allows him to mander checked, and I'll conclude signments have included zero-in on specific leaders and with another hoary chestnut - tank company command, pieces of equipment whose "Train the way you'll fight." The tank battalion S3 air, and strengths and weaknesses he knows Army's renewed emphasis on war- AOAC small group instruc- in detail. fighting skills has breathed life into tor. He was the Distin- this expression, but the resuscitation guished Honor Graduate of The company commander should effort hasn't seemed to reach the his AOAC class in 1987, and inspect, by platoons, one vehicle at pre-combat inspection yet. Combat graduated with honors from a time with the platoon leader. He on the modern battlefield will be both the U.S. Army Com- inspects his own and the XO's and chaotic, continuous, highly lethal, mand and General Staff Col- the first sergeant's vehicles. He may and executed at an incredible lege and the USAF Battle inspect a certain item on each tempo. It will present our tactical Staff Course. At the time he vehicle, such as boresight or fluid unit leaders with unprecedented wrote this article, he was as- levels, and/or he may vary inspected leadership challenges, especially signed to the Advanced Tac- items and check two or three items lack of time and resources. These tics and Doctrine Branch, from each category of drive train, modern combat leaders must be Command and Staff Depart- trackbuspension, weapons, commo, able to access rapidly and accurate- ment, U.S. Army Armor . and NBC. The commander must ly the readiness of their personnel School. also inspect individual equipment and equipment, and, at the same and weapons. Deficiencies are cor- time, exploit every opportunity to in- rected immediately. The com- fuse their spirit, determination, and bodied by realistic pre-combat in- mander must set and enforce the will to succeed into their com- spections is one step toward meet- standards of the company. The com- mands. Mastering the leadership, inn these challenges on tomorrow's I mander employs every leadership technical, and tactical skills em- battlefield.

1991 Armor Conference Schedule of Events 7 May 1991 Armor Association General Membership Meeting 0 Registration 0 Displays 0 Displays 0 Banquet 0 Retreat Ceremony 0 CG's Garden Party 9 May 1991 0 RegimentalAssemblies 0 Presentations 8 May 1991 0 Chief of Armor Address Closing Remarks 0 Late Registration 0 Welcome 10 May 1991 0 Keynote Address 0 0 Report to the Force BrigadeIRegimental Commanders ' Assembly

ARMOR - January-February 7991 17 Making Light Forces More Flexible and Responsive by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Roman

I MARINE LAVs IN PANAMA

these interests, having already the likelihood of the more extensive Introduction drawn their own conclusions on the military situation is remote, there- threat picture, are pressuring for fore, current military force levels "A leaner, meaner force, but very rapid and significant reduc- are not necessary. Consequently, smaller," means the smaller force tions of ground forces. planners can probably count on less has to cover more bases. If a size- force to respond to this potentially able portion of that force will be a Whatever the results of the wide range of threat environments. light force, how can this light force developing contest between prudent There is an implication that this compete effectively with heavy or sensibility and radical revision, force may be less standard in its motorized forces on the possible some policy factors are obtaining in- components than any standing force battlefields of the future? The creasingly clear definition. For ex- maintained by the United States in answer may be a system of tailored ample, we are learning that the the past. augmentation with light armored threat can be anything from a highly vehicles (LAVs). sophisticated, massive force that can effectively field the full In such an emerging environment, spectrum of military capabilities several obvious questions about Background and sustain them, to small forces of force structure are worth asking. If varying levels of military capability ground force must respond more What is the threat, and more im- and organization, such as the frequently to threats at the median portant, what is the ground force regular army of a small Third or lower end of the conflict the nation must sustain to meet it? World nation, to a body controlled spectrum, e.g., organizations that National-level planners are strug- by opposition political or criminal have limited capabilities, is an Army glig with threat assessment, force interests. Depending on infrastruc- oriented on heavy force imperatives design, and force levels that make ture, commitment and tactical and valid? sense in an environment that seems operational skill, even smaller for- to change by the minute. The more ces have demonstrated a disturbing Conversely, can the nation afford reflective concerned citizen proba- ability to tie up large quantities of to swing its emphasis to a cheaper bly prays for resulting policy that ground force when national policy light force orientation? Is a more will be sensible and prudent. But has dictated a response with U.S. prudent policy to continue to main- what might be characterized as the troops. tain a force that can reasonably "Post Cold War Policy Maelstrom'' respond to threats across the has produced interests calling for a Additionally, the immediate con- spectrum? If the answer to the last far more radical approach. Some of ventional wisdom seems to say that question is yes, how can such a

18 ARMOR - January-February 7991 If, with this smaller total Army force structure we find the Army committed against a more intense threat, how do we quickly and efficiently augment the heavy component from existing force structure?

force be managed on reduced apparently disparate force elements Therefore, existing light forces may resources? of heavy and light into force teams have to fill the void. that can work efficiently toward mis- The assumption of this article is sion accomplishment. Light forces, as organized, can cer- that the Army will have to be or- tainly fill some force needs on the ganized and equipped to respond Light forces are the most flexible, high-intensity battlefield, such as ter- across the entire war and threat strategically mobile and economical rain denial and rear area security. spectrum well into the 21st century. of the force elements when substan- However, if a nonlinear battlefield The article will focus on an or- tial and sustained ground holding predominates, the light force con- ganizational and equipment ap- forces are required. However, tribution will be limited by its in- proach for light force that offers a numerous studies of the military es- herent weaknesses in protection, or- means to create an integrated, tablishments of many developing na- ganic mobility, and heavy direct and flexible, sustainable, and deadly tions indicate the capability to field, indirect weapons. Army on any battlefield against any among other things, armored forces threat and on relatively economical of multi-battalion size with at least To examine another situation, terms. It discusses the augmentation 105-mm main-gun equivalents and what if the light force component is of light forces with Light Armored modern fire control. When this committed to a Third World contin- Vehicles (LAYS). aspect is combined with the con- gency? As the most strategically tinued need to maintain some deployable part of the Iorce against An Approach to a Flexible credible level of heavy force to meet lesser threat capabilities, this deploy- and Responsive Ground Force alliance obligations in the more in- ment is valid. But, what if the force tense battle environments but, must face a threat that has substan- In describing a force approach, I within a smaller force structure, an tial heavy force elements? As noted, propose to do so from the perspec- indication of possible force solu- this is a real possibility. Our tive of an adaptation from the basic tions begins to emerge. reduced heavy force structure, and force components of ground force most probably reduced strategic as we know it today. Essentially, the The solution takes shape through deployment assets, will make exist- Army organizes three types of two questions. First, if.a significant ing heavy force elements unrespon- ground force elements; heavy, light, portion of a smaller Army will be of sive, and rapidly deployable light and Special Operations Forces a light configuration that may re- forces vulnerable on introduction (SOF). Integrated into these ele- quire "heavying up," based on neces- into the theater of operations. ments in greater (traditional sary tailoring to the type threat to maneuver such as heavy and light) be encountered, what is the Because the Army can reasonably to lesser (SOF and aviation) mechanism that allows responsive expect either of these situations to degrees are combat, combat sup adjustment? And, if with this occur, how does it solve the port, and combat service support. smaller total Army force structure problem? we find the Army committed Additionally, the trend toward against a more intense threat, how Light forces are the most respon- developing warfighting concepts do we quickly and efficiently aug- sive type of force structure for con- that package these components into ment the heavy component from ex- tingency operations, but they lack integrated combined arms forces of isting force structure? both tactical and operational heavy, light, SOF, and aviation is mobility and the firepower critical well advanced. As previously noted, In proposing a solution, we must for some missions. How could they the Army must probably respond to keep in mind that the heavy force is gain needed mobility and the surviv- an array of threats. This require- the most challenging type of ground able, mobile, heavy support and as- ment has challenged Army planners force to train, sustain, and continual- sault weapons they need? and developers to produce effective ly modernize. With a reduced force systems of organization, command structure, there may be significant A start at a solution is to attack and control, equipment and training lag time in generating heavy force the mobility and lethality dimen- that assure a smooth meshing of the individual and unit replacements. sions. We would need to add suffi- ARMOR - January-February 1991 19 cient ground mobility to the light Several alternatives come to mind. Even if the light force were aug- force so that it could augment a One might be to pre-position sets of mented with wheeled carriers and heavy force or compete with threat vehicles, while providing a company weapon systems, its employment heavy forces. This mobility would set for training at the home stations would still orient on terrain suited have to be controlled by the light of light units scheduled to reinforce. to light force strengths - broken force element and be integrated When scheduled to deploy to loca- terrain or built-up areas. This force with its tactical organization and tions without pre-positioned equip- would not be employed properly if methods. Giving the force its own ment, a light force would keep its used as a mounted assault arm. means of mobility would not add to vehicle sets ready to deploy and use the burden of existing aviation and training sets for necessary sustain- This approach, which assumes that ground transportation units and ment and refresher training. the Army will retain a mobile heavy would not become unavailable when force component, uses wheeled sys- extremes of weather denied flight or Certainly, other options - such as tems as a means of bridging the road movement. Another require- permanent motorized organization compatibility gaps - tactical and ment is that the added mobility and - could be considered, but my operational - of light forces, first firepower would have to lend itself choice in this article is to emphasize in the mobility area, second, in the to rapid movement on existing air light force orientation with the op- lethality and other system areas. and sealift. tion of augmenting its capabilities The concept still views light force as when the mission requires. light force. Finally, we have to add this mobility and firepower without com- Wheeled armor can also provide promising the essential character of expanded fuepower in the heavy en- the light force. vironment. Vehicles are available to carry automatic cannons, heavy mor- LTC Tom Rozman is current- A reasonable solution may be tars, assault guns (currently up to ly assigned as chief, Concepts available, one that has been develop- 105mm), and enhanced command and Strategies Division, Collec- ing and improving over the years. and control equipment, as deemed tive Training Directorate, Of- There is now available a whole fiscally supportable and operational- fice of the Deputy Chief of array of wheeled armored chassis, ly necessary. It is important to note, Staff for Training, U.S. Army ranging from nine to 15 tons, that however, that more sophisticated Training and Doctrine Com- are capable of providing crews and systems need permanently or- mand. Previously, he served infantry some level of protection ganized and trained soldiers to on the Armored Family of against fragmentation and small employ these systems. This impacts Vehicles Task Force, Depart- arms and, with proper use of on the force structure equation and ment of the Army; as chief, G- covered or concealed routes, threatens to compromise the stream- 3 Training Resources, 1st Ar- heavier weapons. Though such lined organization of the light force. mored Division, U.S. Army vehicles are not designed for heavy Simply to add a wheeled, light ar- Europe; executive officer, 1 st assault, they could provide respon- mored carrier for the light force Battalion (Mech), 46th In- sive and effective tactical and opera- would provide a relatively economi- fantry, and 2d Battalion tional mobility that allows the light cal solution to tactical and opera- (Mech), 6th Infantry; and com- force movement to terrain where it tional mobility in the heavy environ- mander, Company A, 1st Bat- can best use its capabilities. Newer ment. The wheeled systems are talion (Mech), 58th Infantry. systems, such as the eight-wheeled somewhat easier to train and main- He has also served as infantry light armored vehicle (LAV), can tain than tracked systems. Tactical platoon leader in Korea, and S- provide excellent tactical mobility training, too, would be simplified if 3 Air of an infantry battalion at and superior operational mobility light forces used these vehicles Fort Benning. LTC Rozman is on road nets, yet cost far less than primarily to "beat" threat into posi- a 1970 graduate of USMA, light tracked systems. tion or to quickly withdraw from and holds an MBA from the position. Light forces would con- University of Massachusetts. .ganizational tinue to stress their "stock in traden He is a 1983 graduate of the ild a light - holding ground. Given these Army Command and General IUIGG gain LIUS upaudity without limitations, the training burden Staff College. compromising its nature? should be manageable.

20 ARMOR - January-February 1991 The Germans then began their assault under the eerie Cavalry in the Defense: artificial moonlight caused by bouncing the beams of A Historical Vignette searchlights off the low cloud cover. by Captain Douglas W. Dunklin

On 16 December 1944, German recon troops, an assault gun troop, half-tracks, five jeeps, and one 2-1/2 forces launched Hitler’s last major a light tank company, and a head- ton truck. The troop, when fully offensive on the Western Front quarters and service troop. The manned, had 145 men, 29 in each through the Ardennes Forest, in cavalry recon troops, A, B, and C, line platoon. I what has come to be known as the each had a headquarters section Battle of the Bulge. Troop C, 18th with maintenance, supply, and mess The assault gun troop, Troop E, Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, teams, and three recon platoons. was equipped with eight self- was to play a critical part on the Each platoon was equipped with propelled 75-mm howitzers, and first day of the battle in one of the three M8 armored cars in the ar- Company F had 17 M5 light tanks, weakest areas of the battlefield - mored car section, and six jeeps in organized into three platoons of five the Losheim Gap. the scout section. Armament in- tanks each and a headquarters sec- cluded three 60-mm mortars, three tion. Although the table of organiza- The 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance .30-caliber machine guns, and the tion called for a fourth recon troop, Squadron, Mechanized (CRS), com- SO-caliber anti-aircraft and .30- Troop D, neither the 18th CRS or manded by LTC William F. Damon, caliber coax machine guns and 37- the 32d was organized with one. Jr., along with the 32d CRS, was as- mm cannon on the M8 armored car. signed to the 14th Cavalry Group. It The headquarters section was Troop C, with the rest of the 18th, was organized into three cavalry equipped with two M8s, four M3A1 arrived on the continent shortly

ARMOR - January-February 1991 21 KREWINKEL e:

ANDLER

after the Normandy landings and for refilling and refitting these [18th at. this point and sent south to the participated in a few minor actions and 26th VolksGrenadier] divisions other end of the Schnee Eifel at the in France. On 19 October 1944, the before they move elsewere.''2 division's far right flank. 18th was detached from the 14th Cav Group and attached to the 2d The 28th CRS occupied former in- Troop C occupied Village Infantry Division in the Ardennes. fantry defensive positions in the strongpoints in the center of the At this time, the Ardennes was con- Losheim Gap, on the far left flank gap, 1st Platoon in the village of sidered by the Americans to be a of the 2d ID, which was also the Afst, 2d Platoon in Krewinkel, and rest and recuperation area. Hot boundary between the VIII Corps 3d Platoon in Weckerath. The troop showers, beds, the USO, coffee and and the V Corps' 99th Infantry headquarters was also located in doughnuts were available only a few Division. This gap is 'a valley ap- Weckerath. Each platoon had well- short miles from the front. New proximately seven kilometers wide, concealed dug-in ' positions east of units were being sent here for initial formed by the headwaters of the its respective village with extensive combat blooding, because the ac- Our River, and is between the barbed-wire obstacles to the front. tion was negligible compared to the Schnee Eifel to the southeast and Because the cavalry troop was rest of the front, and tired veteran the Honsfelder Wald to the north. designed for mobile reconnaissance units were sent here for rest and The Schnee Eifel is a large, densely and not a static defense, the refit. Because of the types of enemy forested ridgeline running northeast heaviest weapons available were the units American forces :-:&:-ll-. *- ..-.-*L-.--+ D...-...... , ,c .I., "_.. vrnld.4- -nnhLa msn~tvhLh *,,PIP facing, the Allies belie xed that the *strictive terrain and the road net- dismounted and placed in the fox- Germans were doing tl he same. The work, any mechanized attacks from holes and dug-in positions. The 1st 106th Infantry Division G2 report the east were canalized either north and 2nd Platoons' fields of fire ex-

ic nr cnuth ~ 4 "It nrnh- nf 8chnp.p.I Eifd Trnnn tended_. nut-. .. on 13 December statec, -. -_ -- the_------r ------1500__ meters to the Roth- able that the enemy uses this sector B was detached from the squadron Losheim road, which was good be-

22 ARMOR - January-February 7997

~~~~ ~ cause their longest range weapons villages of Berterath, Merlscheid, front line were really surprised. It is were the 37-mm gun on the ar- and Lanzerath, and gave a recon possible that the magnitude of the mored car with an accurate point platoon to 2d Platoon, Troop C, imminent onslaught escaped them, range of lo00 meters; and the SO- and two recon platoons to Troop A but the increased activity, at least in caliber machine gun, with a range of in Rob. He then spent the next few the vicinity of the Losheim Gap, 1600 meters. The snow, heavy at days feverishly planning a delaying should have been a dead giveaway. times, also limited visibility to two action back to Manderfeld, and The 106th Infantry Division G2 miles. Third Platoon could see gave the 32d CRS instructions to reports for the period immediately about the same distance into the vil- reinforce should the Germans at- preceding the attack show a lages of Krewinkel to the northeast tack. Unfortunately, his plan was dramatic increase in aggressive and Roth to the southeast. not ready until the night of the 15th, enemy patrolling and a significant and was supposed to be given out increase in vehicular movement. In The villages of Roth and on the 16th - the day of the Ger- fact, on the 14th of December, the Kobscheid were occupied by Troop man assault. He also attempted 106th reported this vehicle move- A, and Company F occupied the defensive coordination with the ment to V Corps, but the informa- town of Manderfeld along with the 106th Infantry headquarters, but to tion was considered unreliable and squadron headquarters. Troop E little avail? was ignored due to the 106th being deployed its assault guns along the a new and inexperienced unit. The ridgeline to the west of Manderfeld. Meanwhile, on the other side of 106th had actually correctly iden- There was a gap of almost two the lines, the German plan had the tified the 2d Panzer Division kilometers between Troop A in boundary between the 6th Panzer moving into the area. Roth and 3d Platoon, Troop C in Army in the north and the 5th Pan- Weckerath, and a gap of 2.5 zer Army in the south running be- The 1st platoon leader of Troop kilometers between 1st Platoon and tween Troop C's 2d and 3d Platoon C, 2LT Max Crawford, took an the 99th Infantry Division to the positions. The 3d Parachute eight-man patrol to Allmuthen on north. This was patrolled at regular Division (nine battalions of infantry) the night of the 15th with the inten- intervals by the 18th CRS. would lead the attack in the north, tion of ambushing the enemy to cap- followed by the 1st SS Panzer ture a prisoner. What actually hap- On 11 December, the 106th In- "Liebstandarte" Division, a veteran pened was that the small American fantry Division, a green outfit that unit of about 130 tanks. The lead patrol ran into a large 30-man Ger- had just completed a miserable element of this division was man patrol. Although 2LT Craw- march to the front through the Kampfgruppe Peiper, a task force ford's patrol managed to get away worst winter in 50 years, replaced of 72 MkIV and MkV tanks, 25 as- unwounded, the enemy took one of the 2d Infantry Division. Their sol- sault guns, and 4OOO troops. On the his men. Second Lieutenant Craw- diers were frozen and exhausted as right flank of the 5th Panzer Army's ford reported to the squadron S2 they took the positions vacated by advance, there were two regiments during the patrol debrief that he the 2d Infantry. On the same day, of the 18th VolksGrenadier Division had never seen such a large enemy the 14th Cav Group headquarters (two battalions of infantry each) presence in the town.4 moved into Manderfeld and as- with one company of tank sumed control of the gap. COL destroyers and one company of as- The German patrolling gained Mark Devine, the group com- sault guns attached. Following be- them valuable insight about the mander, immediately realized how hind was a tank unit, the Fuehrer American defenses. The Germans thin his defense was spread, and al- Begleit Brigade. All these units quickly identified the two-kilometer though he had Company A, 820th would face the meager forces in the gap between Weckerath and Roth, Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed Losheim Gap. and the German command made three-inch guns), his 32d CRS was plans to exploit it, as they indeed still detached from him and was 25 Although it is widely held that the later did. What is almost amazing is miles to the rear in Vielsalm. COL sudden German offensive was a that the 106th Infantry had detected Devine placed most of the antitank complete surprise to the Allies, one these patrols between the two vil- company in the northern gap in the has to wonder if the troops on the lages and yet apparently did not at-

ARMOR - January-February 1991 As the Germans were pulling back to regroup again, one called out "Take ten - we 'I1 be right back!" First Lieutenant Ferrens replied "We'll be B waiting, you son-of-a-bitch!" tach any significance to them. school, and repelled another heavy VolksGrenadier Division began to Regardless of who knew what, at German assault, in which 50 enemy assault the platoon. They were 0530 on 16 December, the Germans got into the town, just before O600. stopped at the wire and driven back began their attack with a massive ar- As the Germans were pulling back by machine-gun fire, mortars, and tillery barrage that knocked-out to regroup again, one called out accurate American artillery fires. most of the wire communications in Take ten - we'll be right back!" Two German companies attempted the 18th CRS's sector. The Ger- First Lieutenant Ferrens replied, to flank the platoon's positions, mans then began their assault under 'We'll be waiting, you son-of-a- using the woodline to the south, to the eerie artificial moonlight caused bitch!'l6 The cavalrymen of 2d get into Weckerath in the platoon's by bouncing the beams of Platoon had killed between 150 and rear. The 20 or so men in the troop searchlights off the low cloud cover. 300 enemy in their fight, and 1st headquarters, which was in the In the 1st and 2d Platoon positions Platoon in Afst killed 30. During town, held them off with small arms just east of Afst and Krewinkel, the this lull, the troop executive officer, fire until a platoon of light tanks, cavalrymen were brushing off the 1LT Aubrey Mills, arrived in dispatched from Manderfeld by the dirt from the artillery when they Krewinkel in a half-track loaded squadron commander, arrived at sighted the lead shock companies of with ammunition. He then moved 0930 and stopped the attempted the 3d Parachute Division. The on to resupply the platoon in Afst, enemy infiltration. enemy was advancing on the two vil- and was killed by a stray bullet as lages in "columns of four."' They he began to return to the troop com- The defense in the rest of the were marching unconcernedly, talk- mand post. squadron sector did not fare quite ing and singing as if they were only so well. Troop A's platoons in Roth on manuevers. Apparently they did At 0600, the area took another were quickly surrounded and even- not see the platoon's positions until massive artillery barrage, the troops tually overrun, and the Germans it was too late. The 2d Platoon in Krewinkel counting over a made good use of the gap between leader, 1LT Kenneth Ferrens, al- hundred rounds of various calibers Roth and Weckerath. At 1100 lowed the enemy to approach to landing in their village alone. The troops in 3d Platoon observed and within 20 meters of the barbed wire prep fire was followed by another reported an enemy formation of 15 before he gave the command to fire. heavy German assault, which was "tanks," most likely assault guns, and The German columns disintegrated finally beaten back. By late morn- a battalion of infantry moving south- under the withering fire, survivors ing, only two Americans in the two west toward Auw. The light tanks running in panic. The 2d Platoon northern platoons had been and artillery fired on them, but had had also waited until the last mo- wounded, and the XO was the only little effect. ment, and had the same results. The death. It was obvious, however, that Germans regrouped and advanced the villages of Afst and Krewinkel Earlier, at 0930, COL Devine had again, but this time were more could not continue to be so for- given orders for the 32d CRS to cautious, dispersed, and came in tunate and were in great danger of begin movement toward Mander- waves. Even though the defenders being overrun. feld; it arrived at Manderfeld about fought well, the weight of the attack 1100 and began deploying to the forced them out of their positions The 3d Platoon, just east of Weck- west of the village. At noon, he or- and back into the villages, where erath, also had excellent dug-in posi- dered the 18th CRS to withdraw to they also had well prepared posi- tions with barbed wire to the front. Manderfeld, but as the forces in tions. The 2d Platoon in Krewinkel Shortly after the attack began in the Roth had been overwhelmed, and fought from a stone church and north, lead troops of the 18th those in Kobschied could not dis-

24 ARMOR - January-February 1991 They were alert in their positions when the attack began, and engage, Troop A was unable to com- the platoon -leaders' except for the puny 37mm on the ar- ply. Third Platoon of Troop C, with decisions to hold their mored cars, that could defend two tanks from the light tank fire until the enemy against the German tanks. As it platoon in the lead, moved out of was extremely close was, they fought hard and delayed Weckerath with two M8 armored apparently demoral- the enemy for a few hours, giving cars, its jeeps, and various vehicles ized the initial German the higher commanders some from the troop headquarters. Be- attack at Afst and desperately needed time. cause of the fact that no time had Kre winkel. been available during the fight to warm the vehicles' engines, the oil feld. The group deployed to a in the crankcases and transmissions ridgeline west of the town and estab- Notes were still congealed by the extreme lished hasty defensive positions cold. The retreat from the village from Holzheim to Andler. Task 'Table of Organization 2-27, Cavalry was made with "guns blazing"' at Force Mayes delayed back along Reconnaissance Troop, of Cavalry Recon- the agonizingly slow speed of 10 to the Losheim-Manderfeld-Holzheim naissance Squadron, Mechanized, 1943. 15-miles-per-hour, with German in- road, and reached Holzheim at 2106th Infantry Division After-action fantry firing on the column the en- dusk. Reports, December 1944 to March 1945; tire way. Miraculously, the caval- G-2 Periodic Report 13 Dec 44. rymen suffered no injuries. They As a cavalry reconnaissance unit, 'Peter Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive had also escaped the village just in Troop C, along with the rest of the (New York: Macmillan Co., 1971), p. 120. time, for no sooner had they 18th CRS, was not designed to con- 4Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for withdrawn than the village was com- duct a deliberate defense, but TrumDets (New York: William Morrow and pletely destroyed by artillery. The rather for fast-moving, mobile recon- Co., Inc., 1985), p. 96. 1st and 2d Platoons withdrew from naissance. Even so, it performed 'Elstob, p. 130. Afst and Krewinkel at 1240 without remarkably well because the dis- 'MacDonald, p. 106. incident. Second Lieutenant Craw- ciplined soldiers constructed well 'lbid., p. 109. ford was the last man out of town, concealed positions with good fields 8Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of firing a bazooka at a German as- of fire, integrating wire obstacles the Bulae. U.S. Ar mv IN World War 11, sault gun pursuing the column. The into their plan. They were alert in (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing trail elements reported hundreds of their positions when the attack Office, 1965), p. 149. infantry moving into the towns. began, and the platoon leaders' These were the lead elements of 1st decisions to hold their fire until the SS Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe enemy was extremely close ap- Peiper, whose commander had parently demoralized the initial Ger- Captain Douglas W. grown tired of waiting for the 3d man attack at Afst and Krewinkel. Dunklin graduated from Parachute Division to break Even though they greatly outnum- North Georgia College with through the American defenses. bered the Americans there, the Ger- a BA in Political Science mans were unwillliig to press the and was commissioned as Troop C arrived in Manderfeld fight and, therefore, slowed the at- an Armor officer in 1984. relatively intact, and at 1400 was tack of the following tank task force. He has served as a tank formed, along with Troop E, into a platoon leader at Fort task force commanded by MAJ J.L. The cavalrymen held out as long Hood, Texas; as a tank Mayes, which counterattacked to a as they did against such overwhelm- company XO and battalion road junction one mile north of ing odds with just their small arms S3 air in Germany. A Manderfeld.8 Although the because they were only faced with graduate of the Armor Of- counterattack was stopped, Troop dismounted infantry. If, however, ficer Advanced Course at E inflicted heavy casualties on the the Ge&ans had attacked with Ft. Knox, he is currently as- enemy. This gained time for the their armor in the lead, it could signed to the 24th Infantry squadron and group headquarters have -been much worse for the Division at Ft. Stewart, Ga. to begin withdrawing from Mander- Americans as they had no weapons,

ARMOR - January-February 1991 25 Tank Destroyers in WWII

Sent to war in vulnerable vehicles, tank destroyer crewman sometimes triumphed in spite of their flawed doctrine...

...Bravery and a big gun made the difference. by First Lieutenant John A. Nag1 -

By the time of Ninth Army's offen- sive on the Roer Plain in November 1944, 2d Armored Division tankers had learned how to fight German Panther and Tiger tanks with their M4 Shermans. They knew that the 13-inch long, low-velocity shells they fired from their 75-mm guns would not penetrate the thick frontal armor of Panthers and Tigers at any range, but would do damage only to the sides and rear of their heavier opponents. Sherman tankers, there- fore, attacked by platoons, captur- ing the enemy's attention with one platoon and maneuvering around to the enemy's rear with another. The only vehicle that could take on Pan- thers with any certainty of success An MlG VVVIVCIIIII, LIIW iiiuai IIUIIICIUUS was the. M36 "Slugger" tank US. tank destroyer, was under-armored, destroyer, armed with a 90-mm gun, outgunned, and too often used as a tank. but very lightly armored and without overhead protection for its from both sides pinned down the in- ineffective against the heavier Ger- gunners. fantry and created a true tank- man tanks. One Sherman fired 14 against-tank battle. It went poorly rounds before seeing any effect on a Shortly after dawn on November for the Americans. Tiger. When some of the American 17, 1944, the 1st and 2d Battalions companies were down to three or of the 67th Armored Regiment The German tanks commanded four tanks, the battalion com- were drawn up on a slope outside the high ground, and sloping terrain Puffendorf, ready to attack towar d around the American position made Gereonsweiler. Suddenly, '20 to 30 it impossible for the Shermans to n--.L--- --A rp: -C cL- -.-*--- ranintxs iiliu iigcia---- VI LUG vc~cidl maneuver around to their rear. 9th Panzer Division attacked the Worst of all, the Sherman's 75- and Shermans. Strong artillery support 76-mm guns were almost completely

26 ARM01

I medium and 19 light tanks and suf- "Our Ordnance Department needs the European Theater of Opera- fered more than 350 combat casual- to get on the ball."' tions during the Second World War, ties in the day's action. comprising 56 separate tank The story of why American tanks destroyer battalions, 13 group head- An Armor School report on the were outgunned at Puffendorf and quarters, and one brigade head- battle ascribed the holdup at Puffen- had to call on tank destroyers to quarters.2 One Tank Destroyer dorf, described as "the biggest tank drive off the German tanks is close- Group and eight battalions saw ser- battle in 2d Armored experience," ly wound up with the history of the vice in the Pacific, and tank to "the inferiority of our tanks in Tank Destroyer Corps. Their units destroyers also served in North guns, armor, and maneuverability." now only a memory, tank destroyer Africa. However, barely a year after One tanker, interviewed two days personnel accounted for roughly six the end of hostilities in Europe, all after the battle, was more explicit: percent of the four field armies in tank destroyer battalions were deac-

ARMOR - January-February 1991 27 tivated, and the weapons system was This debate in many ways echoed other tanks, but the procediire is cost- never again employed by the U.S. the debate of the First World War ly. Tltere is no reason wliy antitank Army.3 over whether tanks should be used gins, slipported by infantry, caririot at- in an infantry support role or as a tack tanks jiist as irifanv, supported Although tank destroyers are no tactical weapon in their own right. by artillery, have attacked infantry in more, the story of how and why they The debate had been won by the in- the past. Certain& it is poor economy were developed and deployed, and fantry support argument, leading in to iise a $35,000 itiediiini tank to why tank destroyers were discon- 1920 to an amendment to the Na- destroy another tank when the job tinued, has important lessons to tional Defense Act, which abolished can be done by a gut costing a frac- offer Army leaders of today. These the independent Tank Corps and as- tion as ;tiiicli. lessons include the necessity for in- signed all tanks to the Infantry. The tegral antitank capability in infantry belief that tanks existed only "to It was with this philosophy that units at all levels; the imperative of facilitate the uninterrupted advance General McNair established the emphasizing combined arms opera- of the rifleman in the attack," in the Tank Destroyer Center at Fort tions in training for the battlefield, words of a 1922 field manual, im- Meade on 1 December 1941. The and the need for doctrine to iden- plied that. tanks could also be mission of the tank destroyers was tify and exploit the weaknesses of stopped by depriving them of their to engage and destroy enemy threat forces. Finally, and most im- infantry support. This under- armor, thus permitting. American portant, the history of tank standing of the usefulness of tanks tanks to focus on what General destroyers in the Second World in land warfare persisted long after McNair considered their primary War stands as a stirring example of the blitzkrieg's success had proven role: exploiting breakthroughs and the courage and resourcefulness of it to be incorrect. destroying enemy rear areas. This the American soldier who overcame tactical doctrine required a power- imperfect doctrine and outmatched Antitank assets, like tanks them- fully armed and very mobile gun car- vehicles to fight to Victory. selves, remained under the control riage; the mobility requirement and of the Infantry far longer than ex- demand for a low-cost system Creation of the perience indicated they should. It meant that the tank destroyer would Tank Destroyer Corps was not until the autumn of 1940 have to be lightly armored. This that infantry regiments in a division necessitated a unique doctrine. A tank is easy prey for artillery of received an antitank company, all calibres. which, together with the antitank Tank destroyers were intended to -General Liidendorff, 1918 guns in division artillery, gave the defeat enemy tanks attacking en division 68 antitank guns. (The masse. They were to be held in The success of Germany's French Army had been destroyed division or corps reserve until such blitzkrieg doctrine in overrunning by Panzers, with 58 antitank guns in an armored thrust was identified. Poland and France in 1939 and a division.) General George Mar- Once the direction of the enemy at- 1940 forced a reappraisal of the con- shall demanded more emphasis on tack was identified, the tank cepts that had governed tank antitank warfare than the infantry destroyers would deploy 'to posi- defense since the first appearance was willing to provide, and estab- tions previously prepared along like- of the weapons during the First lished a planning branch to take ly avenues of approach and ambush World War. There were two schools charge of antitank warfare on 15 the attacking columns. Under no cir- of thought on how to defend against May 1941. It fell under the control cumstances were the tank de- tanks: of LTG Lesley J. McNair, General stroyers to engage in head-to-head Headquarters chief of staff, who "slugging matches" with tanks, nor 0 "Meet fue with fire" by attacking firmly believed that special antitank be split up into smaller than bat- tanks with other tanks supported by units were the best way to defeat talion-sized units and parcelled out close air support. tanks. On July 21,1941, he argued: to front-line infantry units; their light armor would not allow such 0Defeat an armor attack with the Decisive actioii against a tank at- missic traditional infantryhrtillery team, tack calls for a coilriterattack in the supported with an armored force, same general inaruier as against the The news or benerai Kommel's but primarily by use of specially or- older fontis of attack. A coiiriterat- success in the African desert with ganized antitank units. tack may, of coiirse, be delivered by the 88-mm antiaircraft gun against

~~ 28 ARMOR - January-February 7997 British armor reinforced this un- tried doctrine. This information 'lconvinced Army Ground Force planners... that the proper adversary of the tank was the antitank gun rather than another tank, a convic- tion that to some extent hindered Ordnance in developing a more powerful tank than the Sherman."

While the doctrine may have been successful against a pure armored Because of their much more advanced torslon bar suspension, the later M18 "Hellcat"TDs attack, the belief that the Germans were the fastest tracked armored vehicles to be used in WWII. The open-top turret and very would attack in this way was er- skimpy armored protection made them vulnerable, and their 76-mm guns lacked punch. roneous at the beginning of the war - and became increasingly incor- ing good 360' visibility, would inch gun it replaced, but was sub- rect as the war dragged on, and the present no danger to the crew. The stantially lighter, allowing the Allies moved over to the offensive. fact that actual employment of the removal of a heavy counterweight The Germans had suffered huge tank destroyers tended to be in which had hung on the rear of the tank losses in the invasion of the direct infantry support meant that M10 turret. It offered more ammuni- Soviet Union by the time American tank destroyer crews were sadly un- tion storage at the cost of less forces engaged them, and the protected in combat. armor protection for its crew. strategic bombing offensive took a heavy toll on German tank produc- There were originally three types The most successful tank tion. An officer who fought with the of tank destroyer battalions: light destroyer was the M36 "Slugger" tank destroyers in Europe, Major towed, light self-propelled, and with a 90-mm main gun. It was the Ralph W. Lag, explains how heavy self-propelled. The light bat- only American system capable of doctrine changed in the field: talions were equipped with the 37- defeating Panther and Tiger tanks mm gun, which soon proved far too at long range. However, like all of In view of the wdiiction of the size light to defeat even the smallest the tank destroyers, the M36 of- of the attacking ground fome, it was threat tanks, and in 1942, the Army fered inadequate armor protection no longer necessary to eitiploy the moved entirely to the heavy self- for its crews, and was vulnerable to tank destroyer battalion in mass with propelled gun, which was a French artillery airbursts and small arms its trentendoiis firepower... llierefore, 75-mm mounted on a half-track. tire. it was generally decided that the tank The poor automotive performance destroyers should fiintislt close an- and high silhouette of this system Trial By Fire titank support to the front-line tinits? led the Army to create the first truly successful tank destroyer, the M10 The concept of antitank defense, The vehicles of the tank destroyer "Wolverine" armed with a three-inch which had dominated American battalions made this a very risky gun. Half of the tank destroyer bat- military thought in the 1930s and operation. talions were equipped with the was reinforced by American percep- towed M5 three-inch gun in 1943, tions of the German blitzkrieg Wolverines, Hellcats, but the poor performance of the through France, gained additional and Slugged towed gun in offensive operations support during the early fighting in led to its early demise. North Africa. Because American Doctrine dictated that the tank and, to a lesser extent, British tanks destroyer "shoot and scoot" from a The M10 was unable to penetrate were poorly armed in comparison distance and not engage in close heavy German armor. Its projected to the German tanks of that era combat with heavy forces. It, there- replacement, the M18 "Hellcat," (the British Army upgunned the 75- fore, needed a large main gun and armed with a 76-mm gun, made its mm Sherman to a 17-pounder, light armor protection. Because it first appearance in January of 1944. which was far more capable than would not be closely engaged with The 76-mm gun had identical armor- the American version), antitank the infantry, an open turret, allow- piercing characteristics as the three- guns had more success against the

ARMOR - January-February 1991 The Ma,because of its 90-mm gun, was often misused as a main battle tank, evaluation of the enemy coupled in artillery airbursts against the tank despite its lack of crew protection. with very limited experience in fight- destroyers. ing his tanks provided no reason to change doctrine."6 Although losses were heavy when- German armor than did the tanks. ever the tank destroyers were At the Battle of Kidney Ridge on 27 When the Normandy battles employed in the front lines in direct October 1942, in the southern por- showed the 90-mm gun of the M36 support of armor and infantry for;' tion of the Alamein position, the 2d to be the only weapon capable of ces, commanders had no choice; Battalion of the Rifle Brigade had dealing with heavy German armor, nothing else could defeat the Ger- great success against the German demand from the front lines for. the man armor. In the tank battles of tanks with its six-pounder guns. The tank destroyer increased dramatical- the Roer Plain in November 1944, lesson learned by the American ly. More than 1400 of the 90-mm the three battalions of Sherman Army was not that the tanks needed tank destroyers were produced by tanks in the 67th Armored Regi- more firepower, but that infantry the end of 1944. However, they ment killed only five Panthers. The with tank destroyers could defeat ar- were used not in the role for which 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion as- mored attacks. they were intended, but as main bat- signed to the 67th Armor claimed tle tanks in their own right. 15.l The result was unfortunate for the soldiers who fought in the Tank destroyer crews suffered The Legacy of European Theater. "During 1944 heavy casualties as a result. Crews the Tank Destroyers and 1945 American soldiers found improvised turret covers ranging their weapons inadequate to deal from canvas shelter halves to deflect When officers of the European with German tanks. The reason for hand grenades, to a folding steel Theater of Operations studied their this was a combination of two fac- top, which was standardized in combat experience after the war, tors: doctrine and knowledge of the August 1945; nothing but a fully-ar- they noted that tank destroyers enemy. Doctrine dictated that mored top, however, would have were almost never used in the role American tanks should not be protected the crews against the that doctrine assigned to them, but armed to fight other tanks. A poor preferred German tactic of calling instead fought in frontline units

30 ARMOR - January-February 7997 where they suffered from inade- fuel requirements and very limited diers who fought in the "can quate armor protection. These of- strategic mobility; if main battle openers" of the Second World War ficers believed that a tank with a tanks are not already in position will again be repaid - in spades. heavy main gun could better per- when needed, it is extremely dif- form the mission of the tank ficult to transport them to trouble Notes destroyer, and therefore recom- spots quickly. This is likely to be- mended that "tank destroyers as a come more and not less of a 'Linda Mayo, The Ordnance Deoart- separate arm be discontinued."' problem as the spectrum of conflict ment: On Beachhead and Battlefront, shifts away from Europe toward (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Still, the American experience more distant trouble spots. Military History, U.S. Army, 1968), pp. 322- with tank destroyers was hardly an 326. unprofitable one. As Captain Mur- This description of tank destroyers *Or. Christopher R. Gabel, "Seek, Strike, ray A. Louis pointed out in in action may provide a model for and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer ARMOR Magazine in 1%5, "A num- how simiiar weapons systems could Doctrine in World War Two," Leavenworth ber of the lessons learned from? the be employed in future conflict: PaDers #12, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: history of the tank destroyers are Combat Studies Institute, 1985), p. 52. now official doctrine - especially In the offensive against tanks, TDs 'Gabel, p. 65. 4 the cross-attachment of relatively relied on mobility and lieaiy Mayo, p. 33. small armor units with mechanized firepower to offset the disadvantage 'Major Ralph W. lang, "Tank Destroyer infantry and armored cavalry to af- of their light protective annor. lliey Development," Armored Cavalrv Journal ford antitank protection and violent operated on the offensive in conjiinc- 56:4 (July-August 1947), p. 31. offensive power against enemy tion with heavy annor and were titil- 'Charles M. Baiiy, Faint Praise: armor and fortified strong point^."^ ized to nipplenient the speed and American Tanks and Tank Destrovers firepower of the slower but more Durina World War ii, (Hamden, Ct Ar- In 1962, ARMOR asked its reader- heavily annored vehicles. lliey were chon Books, 1983), p. 142. ship if tank destroyers should be particularly adapted to this role when 'Mayo, p. 327. returned to active service. First soggy terrain would not siippoH the 8Baily, p. 139. Lieutenant George G. Chapman ar- weighty tank. llte TD veliicle, with 'Captain Murray A Louis, 'Seek, Strike, gued that they should not, pointing less groiind pressure, could maneuver and Destroy: Tank Destroyers in the out that the main battle tank could tlirotigli friendly tinits, oiitnianewer- ETO," ARMOR 745 (September-October perform all of the missions re- ing hostile aniior as well, tising this 1965), p. 26. quired: "attack, defend, retrograde, capability to attain an advantageous 'OlLT George G. Chapman, "Tank destroy any known tank in the position, acconiplisli its fire mission, Destroyers," ARMOR, 722 (March-April world, be utilized for screening and and move to the flank or rear for 1963), p. 3. reconnaissance missions, and fight another strike. l1Major William F. Jackson et. al., and survive on the atomic bat- EmDiovment of Four Tank Destrover Bat- tlefield." Because the tank destroyer Many of the lessons of the talions in the ETQ, (Fort Knox, Ky.: AOAC could perform only a fraction of American experience with tank Staff Study, May 1950), p. 126. these tasks, 'We should not expend destroyers have already been incor- our production capabilities on a porated; the necessity for all Army limited fighting vehicle that can per- combat forces to possess an integral First Lieutenant John A. form only half the mission."" antitank capability, for example, has Nag1 is a 1988 graduate of been recognized and largely met. the Military Academy However, since the early lWs, The lesson that tanks must be able U.S. and received a Master's both the capabilities of armored to defeat threat tanks has also been Degree in International Rela- vehicles and the threat which the learned, if at great cost. U.S. Army must confront have tions from Oxford Univer- A graduate of the changed dramatically. While the If tank destroyers serve as models sity. AOBC and the Airborne main battle tank remains an ex- for the development and employ- tremely capable weapons system, it ment of future light armored sys- School, he is currently as- signed to the First Cavalry pays for that capability with heavy tems, then the sacrifices of the sol- Division at Fort Hood, Texas. ARMOR - January-February 7997 31 Despite the hype and glitz, the questions that brought the earlier AGS development program to an inglorious termination are still un- answered. Do we really know what we want?

The Armored Gun System Debate: Let It Begin Before It Is Too Late

by Lieutenant Colonel James Etchechury Next to qualification gunnery, it going to take advantage of recent provide us a warning and a guide seems that nothing gets an armor technological developments in MBT for the road ahead. soldier more excited than a display systems, or buy off the shelf? Does or demonstration of a new combat buying off the shelf imply higher life Today's AGS program has all the vehicle. That was the case at Fort cycle costs? What about training urgency of the M1 program in 1977, Bra= during the AGS Rodeo in support? Embedded training is a but nowhere near the same July 1990. The event attracted repre- proven concept, but is it required or user/developer/political support. In sentative systems from prospective desired? How about maintenance those dark days, we were changing developers only recently frustrated support? Will we, use BIT? Can a our orientation from counterinsur- by the Army's cancellation of the NonDevelopmental Item (NDI) ac- gency to conventional defense of promising and much needed re- quisition strategy be modified to in- NATO. The equipment we had was placement for the Sheridan. The dis- clude a Preplanned Product Im- a full generation behind the Soviets plays reflected industry's work com- provement Program (PIP) to meet because of the investment in Viet- pleted in the earlier development ef- these requirements? These are is- nam. The great marriage of require- fort as well as efforts to meet sues in which the user community ments with the Germans (the MBT- similar requirements from both on needs to get involved, not just with 70 program) had ended in amicable and offshore.' It seems as though a few officers secreted away in a but irreconcilable divorce. The con- the Sheridan was well suited for the special task force, but in open dis- tinuation (XM-803) was recognized motorpool at Fort Bra% but cussion in the media, inARMOR.2 as an economic and technological missed the mark when put to the failure. A special task force, formed test in JUST CAUSE, and now This is not goinp to be the classic under the wing of the Armor DESERT SHIELD. The marginal research, development, and acquisi- Center commander, defined the performance and lessons learned in tion program studied at Defense new main battle tank and the con- these deployments, and some harsh Systems Management College text in which trade-offs needed for memories of Vietnam, have brought (DSMC). It has all the urgency that design flexibility could be made! home the urgency of the replace- recent combat experience and in- Today, we are trying to short-circuit ment requirement. creased public awareness bring. the requirements process with a Re- quired Operational Capability Despite the hype and glitz, the Let's not kid ourselves about in- (ROC), modified from a previously questions that brought the earlier creased public awareness; it failed effort. No special task force AGS development program to an in- generates micromanagement by the has been organized to scrub those glorious termination are still un- congressional staff, which is already requirements, to analyze the pre- answered. Do we really know what making itself felt. Restrictive lan- vious acquisition strategy to identify we want? Are we looking for a tank guage has been written into the causes of failure, or to generate a killer that can support infantry or FY91 authorization bills that re- solid proponent. The parallel to the are we looking for an infantry sup- quires the Army to give more atten- continuation of the MBT-70 as the port vehicle that can kill tanks? Are tion to AGS procurement, specifical- XM-803 is clear. Starting down this they the same? Do we really want to ly to use a modified NDI approach path without a good analytical basis drop it out of airplanes, or is air- to acquisition? similar language is or comprehensive acquisition strat- landing a suitable operational likely to appear in the appropria- egy is potentially a prelude to capability? Have we considered the tions bills. Nevertheless, the paral- another failure. We need to replace marginal costs for this capability lels to the early days of the M1 the Sheridan, but the "anything is and its marginal utility? Are we program are striking, and should better, just buy it nownS approach 32 ARMOR - January-Febmary 1991 The AGS: recommended by some authors will only cause an endless series of Past Solutions Powerful Guns, Little Armor problems for the acquisition staff - and the soldiers who get the equip- ment.

What lessons should we draw from the XM-803 cancellation and the successful transition to the Ml? If we are to short-circuit the process, the entire Armor; Infantry, and ac- OMOS SPAT The ONTOS mounted six 106-mm recoilless rifles (RCLRs) on an open, tracked quisition community must get in- chassis. The gun system offered a lot of punch and its low recoil forces permitted a volved. Bold efforts are never quiet- light, mobile chassis, but RCLR backblast signature compromised survivability. The ly executed in the back rooms. They SPAT (Self-Propelled Anti Tank) vehicle mounted a powerful 90-mm cannon, but like are public and boisterous; witness the ONTOS, it left its crew vulnerable to artillery airbursts. the raucous debate that accom- panied the M1 through every step New Concepts: Better Protection, Bigger Guns, of the acquisition process. We want And a Choice of Tracks Wheels the AGS badly, and I fear we will or get it just that way if we don’t speak Millions in government and industry funds out. have been spent on meeting the need for more deployable firepower. The solutions ranae from conventional turretted liaht What is this thing called an Ar- tanks to the pedestalgun, autoloaded mored Gun System? The words con- I TeledynelGDLS, and from tracks to wheels. jure up a mental picture of the FMC‘s CCVI Sturmgeschutz assault gun, the Jagdpanther antitank gun, the Self- Propelled Antitank Weapon (SPAT), and the ONTOS (6 x 106- mm recoilless rifle). But the Sheridan is too lightly armored to TeledynelGDLS The IAV 105 be considered an assault gun. Is it a tank destroyer? I refuse to use the bastardized official acronym, dare I branch! While this may not seem a .The ROC: Is airdrop a use the term light tank? Which of significant threat now, I can remem- reasonable requirement? A combat these roles will the replacement for ber the tank versus missile debate imperative? Or a desirable perfor- the Sheridan fill? With the many that threatened to displace our mance characteristic? The lessons potential wheeled and tracked com- tanks with ITVs, and earlier cavalry learned’ in JUST CAUSE indicate binations available, the weighting of TOES that included Sheridans it is quicker to get the Sheridans in the requirements will be critical. where tanks are currently issued. action if they are air-landed rather Consider the difficulty of comparing Will this drive us to a wheeled ver- than air-dropped. The deployment the relative merits of the TCM/ sion to maintain a distinction at the in DESERT SHIELD seems to be GDLS (a front-engined, pedestal cost of the tactical mobility of a met by the airland capability. If gun, tracked) version with the LAV track? these are typical of the battles we 105 (a prototype being developed We must ensure all the players in will fight in the future, why are we by the Marine Corps). the acquisition process understand ask-ing for more capability? Have that the AGS is not a substitute for we considered the impact of this re- History teaches us that the more a the main battle tank. At the same quirement on the acquisition combat vehicle looks like a tank, the time, the proposed creation in the strategy? How much are we willing more likely it is to be used like a light force structure of the light to pay for this capability? tank and in that comparison to cavalry regiment’ will need explana- .Sunk Costs: Industry has made come up wanting in mission perfor- tion, lest all cavalry regiments be- significant investments in mance. The tank destroyers of come light forces. Here are just a prototypes. (FMC invested $26 mil- WWII looked and were employed few additional issues’ that I think lion in the CCVL. Teledyne in- so like tanks that they destroyed the are worth public debate: vested $16 million in the ARMOR - January-February 1991 33 TCM/GDJS AGS candidate. I can- have a very low density Army-wide. Notes not guess at the total investment if If we total the Sheridans at Fort all potential candidates are in- Bra% Fort Knox, and the NTC, 'Lopez, Ramon, "U.S. Army Dusts Off there are just about as many AGS,' International Defense Review, cluded.) The Marines are investing 911990, pp. 997-9. $50 million in LAV 105. The Army Sheridans as there will be AGSs if %?ADOC Pamphlet 70-2. Material Ac- invested $30 million in vetronics the full complement is purchased to auisition Handbook, HQ, US. Army since the last major combat vehicle support all the light divisions. Until TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, Va., 9 September deployment. How can we leverage recently, the Army did tlot train any 1980, pp. 14.1 - 14.25. these investments into a highly crew or maintenance support func- 3National Defense Authorization Act for capable system with lowest develop- tions for the Sheridan at Fort Knox Fiscal Year 1991, S.2884. U.S. Govern- or Aberdeen. (The U.S. Army ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., ment cost? We can't afford to let 1990, p. 4. these investments slip away. Armor School will begin Sheridan 4Kelly, Orr, Kina of the Killina Zone, @TheSchedule: The schedule an- training in early 1991. For details W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1989, nounced at the AGS Rodeo and in about the course, see Bustle Rack, pp. 90-94. discussions with interested parties is page 51.) 5Bruno, Thomas A. and Broom, John T., keyed to user requirements: First "A New Day for Armor or the Last Glim- Unit Equipped (FUE) FY 94. The mer of Sunset?," ARMOR, September-& M1 took seven years to get the first My list is not intended to be com- tober 1990, p. 8. plete, but to remind the Armor com- 'Baily, Charles M., Faint Praise: unit on the ground for operational American Tanks and Tank Destrovers in testing. That unit was dedicated to munity that if the user doesn't com- m,Archon Books, 1983, p. 139. the test, not part of our expedition- municate, the product is developed 7Armor: Balanced Force for the Future, ary force. How will this affect the ac- in a relative vacuum, and the USAARMC White Paper, Ft. Knox, Ky., quisition process? Can we reasona- civilian decision makers do not p. 19. bly expect our expeditionary forces reythe good ideas from the 'Acauisition Strateav Guide, Defense to maintain their readiness while bad. In the foreseeable future of Systems Management College, Ft. Bel- supporting operational testing? Will constrained and micromanaged bud- voir, Va., July 1984, Chap. 5. the FUE drive out candidates who gets, we will never again have the gHammond, Kevin J. and Sherman, Frank, "Sheridans in Panama," ARMOR, do not have warm production lines luxury of "normal" development March-April 1990, pp. 6-15. and leave us with a technologically processes. As a result, the user '%mster, Harley K., Jr., "Recoilless outdated system? needs to be vocal, to get involved in Rifles: Lightweight Firepower for Army support and dissent, and more visi- Light Forces," Armed Forces Journal Inter- eEconomics: What is the national bly in the process. The user is every national, October 1990, pp. 76-78. This ar- economic outlook? Do we believe tanker from private to colonel who ticle is cited as an example. that, during a recession the has fought a Sheridan from Viet- "Beverage, Harold G., "Armor Support in Low- to Mid-Intensity Conflict, ARMOR American public and its elected rep nam to Saudi Arabia. They must September-October 1990, p. 15. resentatives will allow a billion dol- speak out in the pages of ARMOR lar procurement to go offshore? and the other journals that are avail- Does this limit the competition un- able. Broad-based user discussion fairly? What alternatives are avail- creates the correct tradeoff atmos- LTC James Etchechury was able? phere and allows the decision- commissioned in Armor in makers to put their decisions into 1970. He has served in Armor 0 Compatibility: Are the offshore focus. Those decision-makers will units in FRG and CONUS. candidates compatible with our be the engineers on the Source Recent assignments include S3, training and logistic support struc- Selection Board (SSEB), the Army 1-73 Armor, and commander, 1- ture? By going NDI, are we getting and DoD accountants and auditors 63 Armor, Ft. Irwin, Calif.; and a cheap procurement with inflated (who know little of tanks), and the director, Test Operations, life-cycle costs? I've heard some dis- congressional staff (who know too Space and Naval Warfare Sys- paraging remarks about the pur- much). They read these journals to tems Command, Washington, chase of the Thyssen Henschel understand us. The discussion of D.C. He is a graduate of the Fuchs (Fox) that indicate we have AGS has started with one opinion Defense Systems Management some things to learn about that "the Sheridan will meet the College, a member of th-e nrriiy*---** provisioning and training support needs of the commander."" Let's Acquisition Corps, and mrrent- for NDI. hear from the other users, now! The ly attends the Industrial College more these influential people read, of the Armed Forces, a't which 91 licitinn 0Support: What is the training the better they will understand us, he is researching acc,uIDIIIvII support concept? This vehicle will and the better they will support us. strategy issues. I 34 ARM0 - January-February 7997 The French Armor Corps: A Branch in Transition In a Changing Army

by MajorTimothy R. Decker The Armor and Cavalry Branch will experience some of the most profound changes of any element of the French Army, changes that will touch every aspect of its organization, materiel, doctrine, and training.

HarTqo rL France's new AMX Leclerc MBT 07 NOV. 90' When it begins fielding the Multi- the AU F1 155-mm howitzer. A the French Army, changes that will ple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) force structure reorganization is cur- touch every aspect of its organiza- in 1990-1991, the French Army will rently in process with the eliia- tion, materiel, doctrine, and train- start a period of unprecedented tion of one corps headquarters, the ing. The descendants of Ney, force modernization. The decade of creation of the Franco-German bri- Lyautey, and Leclerc are fiercely the 1990s will bring the same gade, and the transition from six to proud of their heritage and tradi- tremendous change to the French three military regions within metro- tions. Horsemanship is considered Army that the 1980s brought to the politan France. an integral part of a cavalry officer's U.S. Army. In addition to the training, and every regiment has its MLRS, France will field the Aux- The Armor and Cavalry Branch sulk d'liortneiir (room of honor) Leclerc main battle tank, the Hades will experience some of the most that traces the unit's history, cam- missile, and continue the fielding of profound changes of any element of paigns, and heroes. Nevertheless,

ARMOR - January-February 7997 35 The AMX-30 Series: France's Current MBT

the Armor Corps and its leaders are

firmly focused on the present ' and the future. It is a branch in transi- tion in a rapidly changing army.

With a strength of 27,000 person- nel - 2,250 officers, 5,700 NCOs, and 18,500 soldiers - the Armor Corps represents approximately 11 percent of the French Army. Or- ganized around a core of profes- sional officers and NCOs, the branch contains 250 officers, 700 NCOs, and 16,000 soldiers perform- ing their one-year national service as draftees. The 19 tank and 13 light armor regiments are divided among two corps, eight armored divisions, and the Force d'Actioit Rapide (FAR - Rapid Action Force). (The Armor Corps also counts an air- borne reconnaissance regiment, the 1jrellte Reginrent de Dragons MX-30B's low-light TVcamera is on the right side of the turret. Paraclttitistes, among its units. This is a unique, combined arms, strategic asset employed by the First French Light Armor: French Army, and it is beyond the A Preference for Wheeled Vehicles scope of this article.)

To date, France's main battle tank is still the AMX-30B or -30B2. In service since the late lWs, it is comparable to the U.S. M60A1, par- ticularly in the "B" configuration. It has a 105-mm rifled main gun, coin- cidence rangefmder, manual trans- mission, and no passive night vision devices. The "B2," though based on the same hull and turret as the "B," is considerably more modern, having an automated fire control sys- tem and a "semiautomatic" transmis- sion.

Some AMX-30B2s are equipped with a low-light television camera for limited visibility firing, much like the passive version of the M60A1. A At right, the ERC wheeled armored very few AMX-30B2s are equipped vehicle, equipped with the "Castor" thermal sight; in with 90-mm gun.

36 ARMOR - January-February 1991 New Artillery System And a New Light Vehicle For French Forces

Recent additions to the French Army include the VBL, above, which meets similar roles and mis- sions as the US. HMMWV, and the AU F1 self- propelled 155mm artillery system, at left.

this configuration the tank is some- wheeled, armored, NBC-protected, have much the same effect that the what similar to the U.S. M60A3. amphibious vehicle that is replacing Block I11 had on the U.S. Army. the World War 11-era jeeps. Like Light armor vehicles, found in the High Mobility Multipurpose The AMX-Leclerc will have a 1500- corps reconnaissance regiments, in Wheeled Vehicle, the VBL has mul- horsepower "hyperbar" engine, an the armor regiments of motorized tiple possible configurations; in ar- automatic transmission with six for- infantry divisions, and in the FAR, mored cavalry units it carries the ward and two reverse speeds, a 120- are the AMX-lORC, the ERC-90 Milan antitank missile system. mm smoothbore gun, a fully- 'Saguie," the VAB-HOT 'antitank automated fire control system, a sta- missile carrier, and the VBL. The AMX-Leclerc bilized turret, an automatic loader, Main Battle Tank a databus, and a battlefield manage- The AMX-1ORC has a 105-mm ment system. The tank com- low-pressure cannon, and the ERC- For a variety of reasons, France mander's stabilized viewer can 90 is equipped with a 90-mm gun. did not modernize its main battle rotate 360 degrees and has a day Both vehicles fire a multitude of tank fleet in the late 1970s and early and a passive night channel. The munitions, including an armor-pierc- 1980s, as did the U.S. and Germany. gunner's sight will have a day and a ing, fin-stabilized, discarding This will change with the introduc- thermal channel for limited visibility SABOT (APFSDS) round. tion of the AMX-Leclerc main battle firing. The tank commander will be tank in late 1991. At an estimated able to acquire targets and hand The four-wheeled VAB-HOT cost of 28 million French francs per them over to the gunner at the push (Velziciile de I'At*arzt Blinde - "For- tank, or approximately 5 million of a button to align the gunner's ward Armor Vehicle") is equipped 1990 dollars, it is the most am- sight with his viewer. The tank com- to fire the HOT antitank missile. bitious, costly, conventional modern- mander will also be able to The HOT'S 4000-meter range and ization effort in the history of the automatically align the main gun at wire guidance system make this French Army. The first third-genera- the 6 or 12 o'clock position in rela- vehicle comparable to the U.S. tion main battle tank, the Leclerc tion to the hull. M901 ITV. has significant implications for doctrine, individual and unit train- Compared to the U.S. MlAl or The VBL (Velziarle Leger Blinde - ing, and force structure. For the the German Leopard 11, the AMX- "Light Armor Vehicle") is a four- French Army, the AMX-Leclerc will Leclerc represents several sig-

ARMOR - January-February 1991 37 nificant advances. First, it will be how to capitalize on the tank‘s the first Western main battle tank to shoot-on-the-move and night vision

’ have an automatic loader and a capabilities, for it feels that these three-man crew. The automatic characteristics will revolutionize loader, which can load a round armor employment when combined every four seconds, permits the tank with the Systeiiie Bfonnatiqie View through the “Castor”thermal sight on to engage six targets per minute. Regiiiientaire command and control the French AMX-BOB. Second, the databus system repre- system (SIR-Regimental Automated sents a .significant advance in rela- System.) Pronounced “ser,”this sys- French Army operates on the con- tion to second-generation tanks lie tem is similar in concept to the U.S. ventional battlefield. the Ml/MlAl or the Leopard 11. Battlefield Management System. The Leclerc’s electronic components The SIR will have a variety of The Armor and Cavalry Instruc- will be connected to the databus, capabilities that will aid the com- tion Center, located at Carpiagne in eliminating the multitude of cables mander and his staff to plan opera- southern France, will be the AMX- and connections found in the tions and logistics, and to produce Leclerc fielding site. Units will come MlMlAl’s turret and hull. Com- and transmit orders to superior and to the center to draw their tanks, un- ponents will exchange data via the subordinate units. Still in its dergo training, and then depart for

, databus, thus speeding the transfer developmental stage, the SIR shows their home garrison with the new of information and improving sys- great promise, as a command and equipment, much in the same tem reliability. Third, the Leclerc’s control tool. fashion as U.S. units go to the Com- battlefield management system will bined Arms Training Center at Vil- automatically transmit and receive The French Army views the AMX- seck, Germany, for New Equipment tactical and logistical information Leclerc. as the centerpiece of the Training. Individual training will via a burst-transmission, frequency- modem battlefield, but it recognizes change due to the reduction in crew hopping radio. that the tank will fight in a com- size from four to three personnel bined arms environment involving and the tank‘s greatly increased The tank commander will constant- infantry, engineers, artillery, and at- capabilities. The French Army is ly have his tank‘s position and logis- tack helicopters. The Armor and studying the necessary aptitude tical status at his fingertips. By Cavalry Studies and Experimenta- level for an AMX-Leclerc crewmen, designating a target with the laser tions Bureau and the French Army for it is certain that the tank’s rangefinder, he will know its grid Staff are working to describe how sophistication will require soldiers coordinates, greatly increasing the combat, combat support, and com- to have a higher overall level than is accuracy of a call for fire or a spot bat service support units will currently demanded of an AMX- report. Tanks will transmit informa- operate together on the battlefield. 30B/B2 crewman. tion to one another and to higher To this end, armor-infantry coopera- headquarters, and receive orders tion is being scrutinized, with the Currently, a French tank regiment via the tank commanders’s monitor possible redefinition of mechanized contains either 70 or 52 tanks, screens, thereby simplifying com- infantry‘s role, at least until it has a depending on its division’s organiza- mand and control at all levels. combat vehicle that permits it to tion. (Figure 1) If the unit is in a fight “alongside”the Leclerc on the division that has two tank regi- The Armor and Cavalry Branch heavy, conventional battlefield. The ments, its 70 tanks are distributed Studies and Experimentations Armor and Cavalry Branch is on among four fourrplatoon squadrons. Bureau, located at the Armor and the leading edge of the French Tank units belonging to divisions Cavalry School at Saumur, is Army’s evolving employment that have three armor regiments charged with writing doctrine for doctrine because AMX-Leclerc- have 52 tanks divided among three the AMX-Leclerc. Because it repre- equipped units will be the first to four-platoon squadrons. (A sents such a drastic departure from gain experience as part of an in- squadron is the equivalent of a U.S. its predecessors, many questions tegrated command and control sys- company.) will have to be answered after units tem linking combat, combat sup- have gained practical experience port, and combat service support Though the tank regiment’s struc- with the tank, and doctrine will units to synchronize all arms and ture will change with the AMX- remain in draft until the mid-to-late services. The lessons they learn will Leclerc’s arrival, the final decision 1990s. The bureau is scrutinizing helD to define how the entire concerning its organization has not 38 ARMOR - January-February 1991 for a Leclerc squadron will have Regiment three platoons, rather than the cur- [H 2-REQMENT DMSlON rent four.

Armor Cavalry's Changing Role

2 AMXeoW French tankers are not the only members of the French Armor Corps who are dealing with change. In 1988-89, the Armor and Cavalry Inspector General directed a re- evaluation of armor cavalry doc- HQ trine. This re-evaluation originated I in part from the anticipation that Fig. 1A French forces would be engaged in 1 AMxeOB/B2 4 AMX-30B/B2 a European conflict in a second- echelon role, therefore giving a French corps commander access to AMX-3OB/B all allied intelligence-gathering sys- tems. The commander would also Regiment profit from information gathered by IN 3-REmDIW the ground and airborne sensors that the French Army will field within the next decade, such as an airborne surveillance radar. The corps reconnaissance regiment I would therefore not need to deploy 50 to 80 kilometers forward of the main body to gain contact and to in- Fig. 1B form the corps commander of the enemy's location, strength, and axes HC) of advance. I I

t AMX-182 4 AMX-30B/B2 Furthermore, the AMX-lORC, though armed with a 105-mm can- Current AMX-30 Regimenta Organizations non capable of firing an AF'FSDS round, is not suited well for head-to- head combat with the latest Soviet yet been made. Figure 2 shows the and the squadron groups would or Warsaw Pact tanks. Thus, the candidate organization for the fight independently. Two regiments, French Army is no longer con- Leclerc regiment. The concept is a the 503erlle Regiment de Chars de vinced that an enemy so equipped radical change from current or- Combat and the 4emc Regiliteitt de could be countered by French ganizations, for the unit is divided Dragons began testing this structure armor cavalry units alone. Neverthe- into two @-tank squadron groups. at Camp Mourmelon in eastern less, the agility and firepower of a France in September. If, for unit formed from armor cavalry ele- During peacetime, the regiment whatever reason, the 80-tank regi- ments and the corps attack helicop- would regroup administrative and ment is not adopted for the AMX- ter regiment make it able to counter logistics functions to save infrastruc- Leclerc, the "fallback organization an airborne or airmobile threat ture and personnel costs. In war- could be a 52-tank regiment consist- posed along a flank or in the corps time, the regimental commander, a ing of four 13-tank squadrons. rear area by BMDs, BMPs, or older full colonel, would move to division Regardless of the decision concern- Warsaw Pact tanks. Therefore, it is headquarters to advise the division ing the regiment's organization, a more and more unlikely that a corps commander on armor employment, squadron's structure will change, reconnaissance regiment would ARMOR - January-February 1991 39 deploy its squadrons far to the front of the corps main body to perform classic ground reconnaissance mis- --- sions. French doctrine has already changed to reflect reconnaissance by fire as a supplement to informa- tion gathered by ground-based and airborne sensors, and the role of the armor cavalry will be to prepare engagements, maintain contact be- HQ tween allied units, intervene to I I - 4 VAB counter airborne threats to rear 1 AMX UxLERc 4 AMX LECLERC PROTECIlON PLATOON areas, temporarily block a penetra- tion, or counterattack by fire. At the Fig. 2 Provisional 80-Tank same time, the units will continue to LECLERC Regiment Organization gather information for the corps commander. fantry, artillery, and combat en- within the next year. Unit com- Armor cavalry's name reflects its gineer units. Because there was no manders will no longer have to changing battlefield role. For many written doctrine for how a light adapt doctrine written for the corps years, it was known as "CLB - armor unit should operate in such reconnaissance regiment or the Casalerie Legere Blirtdee, or Light an environment, unit commanders armor regiment of a motorized in- Armor Cavalry. As their role adapted existing armor cavalry fantry division to an intervention evolved, units became known as doctrine to their situations as best mission as part of a combined arms RCM - Roue, Canon, Missile, or. they could. Recognizing that this is task force. "Wheel, Cannon, Missile" regiments, a less-than-ideal solution to the light armor units have yet to receive problem, the Armor and Cavalry Conclusion an official name, but the term Re@- Studies and Experimentations matts de "RSr' - Recoititaissartce, Bureau is filling the doctrinal void What does the future hold for the Surete, et Iitten~ention,or "Recon- for intervention armor units with a French Armor and Cavalry? naissance, Security, and Interven- series of manuals describing how Change. Unit structure will change. tion" Regiments is frequently used they fight as part of a combined How tank regiments fight will to describe the role of these or- arms task force that must intervene evolve. Commanders will have to be ganizations. overseas. adept at using an automated com- mand and control system. Tanks Light armor units are an integral Light armor units in the FAR have will have more firepower and be part of France's rapid deployment what is, in effect, a double mission. faster, more sophisticated, and force, the FAR. Units such as the They perform many of the classic more survivable. Crews will be ler Re@ittertt Etraitger de Cavalene armor-cavalry missions, such as smaller. Cavalry will do more than (1st Foreign Legion Cavalry Regi- reconnaissance and surveillance, just reconnaissance. Light armor, ment), the let Regirttent de Hussar& and have a direct-fire combat mis- rapid deployment units will have Paracltutistes (1st Hussar Parachute sion as part of the combined arms new doctrine to absorb and apply. Regiment), and the ler Regintent team. In many ways, these units per- d'lltfanterie de Chars de Marine (1st form the same missions as our The forecast holds change, but not Marine Infantry Tank Regiment) regimental cavalry squadrons. The upheaval, for French cavalrymen, have deployed to such countries as manuals describing how armor units for they are already preparing for Gabon, the Central African function as part of a groupement the future. By the time the first Republic, and Chad as part of a d'intervention (intervention group, serial AMX-Leclerc leaves the as- task force combining armor, in- or task force) will be published sembly line in late 1991, decisions

40 ARMOR - January-February 1991 This French Army VAB 4x4 is a 120-mm towed mortar crew vehicle. phrase "change of mission" is so ~~ common to cavalrymen that it is al- Major Timothy R. Decker is concerning the regimental organiza- most a cliche. French cavalry regi- a 1976 USMA graduate. He tion will have long since been made. ments are already applying doctrine has served as tank platoon How a Leclerc-equipped unit will that was little more than a concept leader, CS company XO, fight will not be defined completely, a year ago. and heavy mortar platoon but the draft doctrine will exist to leader in 1-77 Armor, Fort use as a starting point. Whether known as CLB, RCM, or Carson, Colo.; as aide to RSI makes little difference to these the deputy commanding A system for training individual units, for they have never stopped general, U.S. Army Recruit- crewmen and units will be in place looking for better ways to ac- ing Command, Ft. Sheridan, at the Armor and Cavalry Instruc- complish their mission. 111,; and as BMO, S3 Air, and tion Center well before the first Mi tank company com- squadron reports for new equip- The spirit that rode with the units mander in 2-5 Cav, 2-67 ment training. Tanks, though more at Austerlitz is far from dead. Firm- Armor, and 3-66 Armor, Ft. powerful, sophisticated, and surviv- ly rooted in their proud history and Hood, Texas. He was an able, are still a known quantity in heritage, the descendants of Ney, NTC maneuver analyst at many ways. Getting the optimum in- Lyautey, and Leclerc are prepared CALL, Combined Arms Train- dividual and unit performance from to meet today and tomorrow's chal- ing Activity, Ft. Leavenworth, a given weapon system is a never en- lenge with esprit and elan. Par St. Kan.; and recently served as ding effort for any army, whether Geoees, V7ve la Cavalerie!. the U.S. Army Armor Center the system is the MlA2 Abrams or Liaison Officer to the French the AMX-Leclerc. Armor and Cavalry School in Notes Samur, France. He is current- Cavalry, whether French or 'Gerard Turbe, "France's tight Ar- ly attending the U.S. Army American, has always prided itself moured Cavalry: A Radical Change in Command and General Staff on its adaptability and its accep- Operafinal Concept." International College at Ft. Leavenworth. tance of new challenges, and the Defense Review, December 1989.

ARMOR - January-February 1991 41 Combat Service Support I lI in the lI

Task Force Scout Platoon I by Captain Timothy Flanagan 1. "All Yankee eletitertts, this is realized that tite platooit of T-64s roll- darkness; this is when the scout Yankee 25, erecute phase CMRL.IEl ing rip his flank itad come tltroiiglt platoon does the majority of its oiit." Tlte scout platoon leader tite sector that Bravo section sltoiild work. All of these conditions and looked down at itis map. Tlte jive have been covering. Tlte last littering obligations make it extremely dif- Bradleys lefr woiild soon head oiit of Itis ritoiith was the battalion ficult to conduct normal LOGPAC toward the battalion's flank. It itad coiiiiiiartder's call sign sliorited into a operations. Notice, I said difficult. I been a long night and art evert longer itarid mike. did not use the word impossible. two weeks, but his platoort had per- fonited well. Tlte battalion coiii- The lieutenant reached over and The first method of CSS to the iitartder was pleased with the intel- hit the snooze button on his alarm scout platoon is to make the scouts ligence gathering of the platoon. Now clock. "Damn, why can't I dream responsible for their own supply it was time to observe the ortlyprob- about girls like everybody else,'' he functions. The platoon sergeant able ritecltanized cotiitterattack route thought. As he rolled out of bed would coordinate for the platoon's onto the task force's newly acquired and stumbled into the bathroom, he needs, and be responsible to ensure position. Once again, the radio began to think about his nightmare. that the LOGPAC is met, dis- crackled to life. Tliis time it was tlte Maybe his platoon sergeant was tributed, and returned to the Logis- Bravo sectioit leader. His wingritan right. Although certainly not as tics Release Point (LRP). The disad- had no fiiel, arid he was nirutirig on glamorous as planning patrols, vantages to this method are obvious. fiimes. llte lieiitertartt shook Itis head providing for combat service sup- The platoon sergeant is so involved arid swore, "Wty is this Itappeitirtg?" port operations for the platoon is in the resupply process that the Yesterday, one of his inert "died be- vital if they are to survive in a com- platoon would have to operate one came of poor iitedical evacuation bat environment. vehicle short for extended periods procedures. Todayl tlte problem of time (FM 17-98, p. 7-2). centered on a lack of fiiel. Resupply FMs 17-98 and 71-2 combined of Class IX parts also seemed to be a with a little common sense, offer The second method involves pig- constant rtigittritare. several solutions to our nightmare- gybacking on one of the com- plagued platoon leader. Whether or pany/team CSS assets in the task Altltoiigli aiccessfiil so far, the not the task force scout platoon con- force. Naturally, the LOGPAC that scout was filled with ail empty feeling tains Bradleys, an M113/901 mix, or the company/team picks up must inside. "We accoritplislt tire mission, the new HMMWV configuration, its have been coordinated in advance. but we lose liten and eqri@iteitt for mission and organization usually Adequate supplies of all classes stripid reasons," lie muttered. He cause headaches for the task force's must be assured. The scout platoon tltoiigltt back to tlte itiiitteroris train- logistics planners. must have priority when it arrives at ing aercises tltroiiglt wlticlt lie itad the LOGPAC location. This way it taken Itis platoon. In the siitall area The scout platoon has no organic can continue its mission without in wlticlt tltq trained at Itorire sta- CSS assets. It usually operates to delay. The main advantages of this tion, tite platoon sergeant itever had the front of the task force along a method are that the scout platoon problems acquiring their supplies. screen line instead of occupying sergeant does not have to act like a part of the task force assembly area. unit first sergeant and accompany Finally, the vehicle Itircited to a halt Scouts live by the motto, "First out, the LOGPAC, and the support on tite new screen line. Uitfomiitate- last in." Additionally, for security platoon does not have to prepare a ly, itis vehicle was not the first one reasons, most units conduct their separate supply package. The main there. bitmediately tite platoort leader resupply operations during hours of disadvantage to this plan is that the

42 ARMOR - January-February 7997

~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ scouts must conduct resupply opera- and where the scouts will be resup- vehicles as frequently as possible, tions at the same time as the rest of plied. If the battalion is in a transi- the scouts should also carry addi- the task force. This may not be tion to an offensive operation, it is tional class 111. feasible during some missions (Fh4 imperative that the scouts get resup- 71-2, p. 7-17). plied as quickly as possible. This re- .A.iimunition requirements may quires that the LOGPAC is ready also pose problems. If the first ser- The last method I will examine, to go as soon as the area in which geant has a HMMWV instead of a and one that was extremely success- the scouts are operating is secure. truck, the resupply of TOW mis- ful for a unit from Fort Polk during siles, large amounts of machine gun a 1988 National Training Center The scout’s LOGPAC cannot sit ammunition, and replacement rotation, is to dedicate a LOGPAC in the field trains with the rest of Stinger missiles may be hampered to the scout platoon. The HHC first the task force’s CSS assets. It must due to lack of space. sergeant controls this element. This be as far forward as is safely pos- is a time-consuming process for the sible. One location that works well To obtain the proper balance be- HHC first sergeant. However, the al- is the CTCP. When the tactical tween the extra water cans, spare ternatives leave much to be desired. situation permits, the first sergeant ammunition, replacement parts, and By establishing a dedicated LOG- can go forward and conduct resupp- food, is difficult. Allocate additional PAC with the HHC first sergeant in ly operations. assets for large loads or schedule a charge, the scouts will have every second resupply. Do not forget to opportunity to conduct resupply Resupply during the defense plan for personal demand items and operations (Fh4 17-98, p. 7-2). presents several challenges. Posi- medical material. tions may be compromised as The first step in this process is a vehicles pull off the screen line to The distance between the scout habitual working relationship with resupply during daylight hours. Dis- platoon and the UMCP precludes the battalion’s S2 section. The dis- mounted observation posts can help scout vehicles from returning to the tance that the scout platoon normal- alleviate this concern. If CSS opera- UMCP for minor repairs. This ly operates from the rest of the task tions are attempted during hours of coupled with the absence of main- force makes reporting to the Com- darkness, the platoon reduces its tenance personnel in the platoon re- bat Trains Command Post (CTCP) readiness at the exact time enemy quires the vehicle crew to be profi- via the admidog net virtually im- reconnaissance elements are most cient in vehicle preventive main- possible. It is much easier and prac- likely to operate. By shifting posi- tenance. If possible, attach a tical for the scout platoon sergeant tion forward of the task force’s mechanic to the platoon to fur and to report the platoon’s supply needs defenses during periods of limited diagnose problems. Another solu- to the S2 section. The S2 section visibility, the platoon increases the tion is to have a mechanic come for- then relays that information to the chance of becoming the victim of ward with the first sergeant at LOG- CTCP. If the S2, after conferring fratricide. Unless the vehicles be- PAC time. Once PMCS is com- with the S3, realizes the scouts may come low on class 111, avoid resupp- plete, the LOGPAC can carry the need additional supplies for future ly during dedicated defensive opera- 2404s to the BMO. The implementa- operations (i.e. smokepots, chem- tions. tion of the HMMWV scout platoon lights, breaching assets, etc.) he can should ease the mechanical burden order those materials sent with the Before the arrival of the first ser- on the scouts. HMMWVs are next scout LOGPAC. geant to the LOGPAC location, the generally more reliable than tracked scout platoon sergeant must ensure vehicles. that the area is secure. An area for The platoon leader and the class I11 operations must also be The most difficult aspect of CSS platoon sergeant must decide when identified. The conduct of the LOG- for the scout platoon is medical is the best time to resupply. Natural- PAC is similar to that run by com- treatment and evacuation of ly, the S2, and particularly the S3, pany/teams, but there are several wounded soldiers. The first step in will have to approve that decision. areas that should receive special em- this process is disease prevention. It is not the S4 who decides when phasis. In addition to topping off all Each squad leader ensures that his

ARMOR - January-February 7997 43 his casualty. The second option is to head to the nearest aid station. This situation requires an on-the-spot decision by the platoon sergeant. If this is an attack, but the task force has not crossed the LD/LC, or the soldiers eat properly and drink platoon sergeant on evacuation of a task force is defending, evacuate the enough fluids. Soldiers must bathe wounded soldier. casualty to a predetermined point at and change clothes regularly. Pay which an ambulance is waiting. All particular care to those soldiers A plan for evacuation must exist of this requires rehearsals by the who patrol frequently. Trench foot, before mission execution. The logis- medical ambulance crews and the immersion foot, and frostbite can tical planners in the battalion must scout platoon. Once again, the task neutralize soldiers as quickly as an be aware not only of the main force S2 must inform the rest of the AK-47. maneuver unit’s portion of the task force that friendly elements are operation, but also of the scouts’ reentering the lines. The second step in medical CSS is operations. They must pay close at- to train combat lifesavers. Each tention to the times the scouts will This is not a glamorous subject. vehicle should have a scout trained conduct missions so they can have We seldom discuss it. To figure out as a combat lifesaver. With the medical personnel standing by if the best way to gather the equipment and supplies available in needed. info+rmation the battalion com- his medical bag, he can begin to sta- mander needs is, and should be, the bilize the soldier and treat initial in- Given the distance a scout platoon number one priority of any scout juries. Hopefully, he can prevent can operate in front of the task platoon leader. However, if the as- the wounded soldier from going force, it is’ unreasonable to expect sets to accomplish that mission are into shock. an ambulance to come completely not available because of a failure to forward to evacuate a scout casual- plan proper combat service support, The next level is the attachment of ty. The actual conduct of the evacua- all the training and wargaming in a medic to the platoon sergeant’s tion varies, depending on what the the world will not have any effect. track. The distance between the task and the scout platoon are scout platoon and nearest aid sta- doing. If possible, the platoon ser- tion necessitates the assignment of a geant, with a medic on his vehicle, Captain Timothy Flanagan is 94B to the platoon. This attachment should extract the wounded soldier a 1986 graduate of the U.S. should be habitual to inspire the and move toward friendly lines. If Military Academy. He has confidence of the scouts in “their” conducting an offensive operation, served as a tank platoon medic. The medic’s extensive train- and the rest of the task force has al- leader, scout platoon leader, ing is a necessity and not a luxury in ready crossed the LD/LC, the and company XO in the 5th a task force scout platoon. In addi- platoon sergeant has two options. ID (Mech). A graduate of tion to conducting routine sick call The first one is to head to the AOB, AOAC, and JOMC, he and administering first aid, he is the nearest ambulance exchange point is currently assigned to the advisor to the platoon leader and or pre-designated point to drop off 2d ID in Korea. I I 44 ARMOR - January-February 1991 Unit Status Reporting: A Broken System?

by The Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness

Division G3,23d AD Can this unit perform its combat status possible ((2-1). Each unit is mission? The obvious answer is no. expected to be at the highest level "I can't believe titis tasking," said However, any battalion in the Army possible after considering each tlte G-3, "how are we supposed to could get caught in the same situa- unit's contingency requirements and have oiir own tank battalions per- tion as 1-10 Armor. Loopholes that the resources available to the unit. fonit orgartizatiortal iitairitertaitce exist in the Unit Status Report Commanders at higher levels are ex- when we have orders to detach a bat- (USR) system allow the above situa- pected to use the status report to talion niairiteitaiice platoon for dirty tion to exist. Those loopholes allow realign or requisition resources, in southwest Asia?" a unit to cover its problems with a within their ability, to allow subor- thick smokescreen. dinate units to maximize their "I don't know, si," said the plaits of- status.3 For example, it may be per- ficer. "Z giess soritebodv over there is At the same time, the commander fectly acceptable for a Reserve Com- in bad shape. To caritpowid oiir can go beyond the mere surface con- ponent unit to have a rating of C-3, probleiit, we've got orib one battalion tent of the report and into much when its only contingency is to rein- that cart siipport the requireiitcrit with greater depth to provide the true force Europe at D+W. The as- the eqriipiiieitt requested. Oiir latest status of his unit. The strength of sumption is that this unit will have status report shows 1-10 Aniior is the the USR exists in the flexibility it its shortcomings ftved before deploy- only iiriit in the division C-I for provides to the commander to ment. eqriipriierit on hand arid equipiiieiit report and highlight unit strengths readiness." and weaknesses. The system will not Many users and compilers of the work, however, if a commander's USR state that the system is "Well, Z giess it's tlteiii. Go ahead only concern is to paint a rosy pic- broken! The system does have and make it happen." ture of his unit, to check another shortcomings, but it is workable. block and move on to the next mile- The system does not expect perfec- Battalion HQ, 1-10 Armor: stone. To make the system work, it tion, which is a misconception held must be used wisely. by some users of the report.

"Do yoii see titis tasking?" the bat- t Another problem of the system is talion coritritander gasped. "lltree The purpose of the USR is to that AR 220-1, the regulatory guide HMMWVs, 12 deiice-aiid-a-lia@, provide a single document to all to USR, is a tedious document. The two five-tons arid the five-toti wreck- command levels that reflects a unit's Department of the Army Inspector er, the HEMMT wrecker, seven as, status in selected areas at a point in General has recommended a arid foiir 113sl We can't do this at time? The report is designed to rewrite of this document! In the all. We are sltort or rton-operable on measure unit readiness in selected meantime, a careful reading of the every single one of these items acept areas of personnel, equipment, and AR, with good questions to a sub- for tlte five-torts."' training resources. The USR is not ject matter expert (higher head- intended to be an all inclusive reflec- quarters, someone who has "How are we going to qlaiirt titis to tion of a unit's complete readiness prepared it before, etc.) should division sir?" asked tlte S3. "lliey are or status. It is intended to identify clear any problems of under- going to want to know why we didn't problem areas, which can be standing with the regulation. say soriietliirtg sooner. '' analyzed on a broader level by the appropriate support chain using its The biggest problems with the "Why slioiild we have said soiiie- own documentation channels (Le., a USR system are the numerous titirig, almost all of that eqriipiiierit is personnel issue could be examined loopholes, which can be used to con- ERC-B. Besides, oiir tanks cart get in greater depth using SIDPERS). ceal problems, or reveal problems where they are going arid kill the bad that are not required for submission giys. ntat seerits more iriiportaitt to All -units are not expected to (i.e. comments on equipment which me." report the highest level of unit is ERC B or C). In the case of the

ARMOR - January-February 1991 45 USR, it is best to err on the side of because the unit is C-1 statistically. USR to serve as back-up documen- too much information, so that all There is no specific mention of an tation to the actual DA Form 2715- shortcomings are reported. individual line problem except on R (Unit Status Report). These sup- the appropriate comment card, and plements range from commanders' Each of the major areas of the an "accidentallt omission of that line cover letters to a monthly DA Form report has its own peculiar from the card would keep the 2406 (Materiel Condition Status loophole. Though commonly used, problem from being raised at all. Report). If vital explanatory infor- they only serve as a hindrance to mation is included in the supplemen- solving a unit's problems. In the per- Equipment readiness can also fit tary material, but not the 2715 itself, sonnel area, for example, some of through a loophole with a rather that vital information will never the largest deviations occur in the simple paperwork shuffle. In many reach levels above the MACOM. MOS qualified area. One of the MTOEs similar items of equipment The supplements will be stripped easiest ways to lay a good have different ERC classifications away at the MACOM for electronic smokescreen on this portion of the (i.e. three of an item may be ERC transmission of the 2715 data. The report is to count an MTOE-re- A and two of the same item may be key is to remember if there is some- quired slot as being filled by an ERC B). If one of the pieces of thing important to say, say it on the MOS-qualified person only because equipment that by MTOE is ERC 2715. a warm body occupies the position. A becomes non-mission capable, An example of this would be to say maintenance personnel could report Now, the question is probably com- an MOS requirement for an intel- that one of the ERC B items is ing ,"How do I make USR work for ligence analyst is being filled and down and avoid making it a USR me?" The simplest way to answer met by an armor crewman working issue altogether. Similarly, if two that question is to tell everything. in the position. In fact, the unit major components are down for dif- The best way that a commander can should report an MOS shortage for ferent sub-components (i.e. a tank accurately portray his unit's true an intel analyst. down for a radio and another for a status is through written comments machinegun), those same main- on the supplementary cards. The The equipment areas show the tenance people could report that statistics of the two cover pages al- most common reporting abuses. one major component is down for most never hit the target and fully The non-reportable line (NRLIN) two sub-components. explain a unit's problems. system is the biggest culprit. This system, in a one-two punch, clas- The last and easiest area to abuse For that reason, it is imperative sifies some equipment as ERC B or through loopholes is training. This that the commander spell out in the C, which means that a unit does not area is easy to abuse because it has comments sections exactly what is have to report it, and it allows some a very loose statistical base, and the wrong and what needs to be done ERC A equipment to go un- ratings assigned in this area are sub- to fm the problem. That way a USR reported because a MACOM has jective judgments. It would be easy reader has no doubt where a unit determined that the item in ques- for a commander to equivocate in stands and what needs to be done tion should not. be reported for any the training area and get lost in to resolve identified problem areas. of a number of reasons (most com- shades of giay instead of making a As an illustration of "telling it all," monly because a piece of equip- clear distinction. let's examine some examples. As a ment required on an MTOE has base assumption, we will assume all not been fielded). Because of the The last several paragraphs have areas are statistically C-1, and we NRLIN system, large quantities of demonstrated not how to beat the will use the case of 1-10 Armor. equipment can go unnoticed on the system, but have illustrated some USR because there is no require- ways that the system is abused, ment to report these items (all of a sometimes quite inadvertently. The Old 1-10 AR READY Card-Corn- tank battalion's recovery assets, for learning point is that the USR re- rnents example, are ERC B). quires careful, thoughtful prepara- tion. This iiriit is rated Cl. Sortie ERC B The large number of ERC A items equip sliortages are of coricent birt mr I-. .I that a unit may have (most tank bat- I nere is one mal, separate area iiriaer corimi. talions have approximately 80-90 that may cause a lack of communica- ERC A lines) will also allow a unit tion in the USR system, especially Old 1-10 AR ESRATERRAT C:ol m- with a small number of lines that above the MACOM level. Many ments hAAPnhAC nc C..h,.-X-dn L..A are C-4 (lowest level of readiness) IVL~LWIVIJ vi JUUUI uiiiatL iiGau- to have those C-4 lines go unnoticed quarters require supplements to the None

46 ARMOR - January-February 1991 Major Charles E. Griffiths, 1933-1 990 New 1-10 AR REASN Card-Com- The USR system can work. It can The staffs of ARMOR and the ments be tedious and it has its shortcom- United States Armor Association an- ings, but for right now, it is the only nounce with deep regret and sym- I haw downgraded to C2. Shortage system that we have. Users of the pathy the death of Major (Ret.) Char- of M35A2 tnicks and NMC of USR system at all levels need to les E. Griffiths, 57, secretary- MK!I recorwy vehicles keep Mairtt remember that ratings on the USR treasurer of the US. Armor Associa- Plt front pefonitirig mission. lltese should not equate to someone's tion, on December 6, 1990. items ERC B but keep this BN frorit ability to do the job, but should be stistaiitirtg operatioris. Require irii- used as an indicator of legitimate After enlisting in 1950. he served ntediate fill of required tnicks artd problems with which a unit needs with the 7th ID in Japan and par- pails issiie for NMC M8MI. help to perform its mission. ticipated in the lnchon landing in Korea. He later served in the Panama Canal Zone, with the 3d In- New 1-10 AR ESRATBRRAT Commanders and USR preparers fantry Honor Guard at Fort Myer, Comments need to use the comments portions Va., and he was NCOIC at Blair of supplementary cards freely to House. the Presidential Guest house. ESRAE Shortage of ERC B fully explain any questionable M35A2 tnicks critical!v Itantpas BN problem areas. It is only with a com- He was commissioned in Infantry Mairtt Plt. Require iiitiitediate fill of plete, accurate assessment that through OCS in 1960. Later, at Fort tnicks to perform niaint ritission. USR auditors can help subordinate Knox, he commanded a Leadership units. The system isn't broken, it Training Company for officers from newly emerging African nations. ERRAT Slow piisit of ertgiites, just needs some understanding and road wheels artd boom cables for careful use. In Vietnam, where he survived two ERC B MSMI recoveT vehicles helicopter crashes, Griffiths com- prevents BN fiont being capable of manded a company of the 196th perfonitirtg aity recoven'. Need irit- Notes Light Infantry Brigade and served mediate resiipply of these items to ac- as S3 Air. On a second tour, he was coiitplisii ntissioit. 'FKSM 71-8 Close Combat Heavy (CCH) senior advisory group officer to the Maneuver Organizations, Ft. Knox, Ky., An LOC district. His decorations in- February 1989, G14 - G16. And what would the conversation clude the Bronze Star (2d OLC), Purple Heart (1st OLC), Air Medal, at Division G-3 have sounded like 2AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, and the Army Commendation had they seen the new cards? Let's Washington, D.C., 30 August 1988, p. 3. Medal. listen: "Well Bob, how about tagging 31bid. 1-10 AR for this tasking to slice a Griffiths retired from active duty in maintenance platoon to southwest 4We would commend to a USR user's 1970. In 1974, he began a 16-year Asia," said the G-3. reading: Department of the Army Inspec- career as Secretary-Treasurer of the tor General Special Inspection Report: U.S. Armor Association, running its Readiness Reporting Systems (WS),July day-today business. Services were "Sir, I don't see how we can have 1989. tt is an FOUO report, which you on 14 December at the Main Post them do the job right now. They've may be able to obtain from your local IG. selectively downgraded to C-2 be- Chapel, Fort Knox, followed by cause some of their critical main- burial in Radcliff. tenance equipment is either short or Though his last year was broken," said the plans officer. dominated by pain and the suffer- The Directorate of Total Armor ing brought on by chemotherapy, "Okay, we need to get the G-4 on Force Readiness (DTAFR) audits he never complained or despaired getting their equipment problems USR reports for all Active and in his fate. He only showed the in- fvred ASAP. We've got a little Reserve Component Armor/ dominable spirit that remains his flexibility time on that tasking, and Cavalry units. We will assist in legacy. if we cannot get them fmed by then, the solution of problems you have listed in your report. You 1-11 He leaves behind his wife, Mary; we'll look at using AR or 1-14 can reach us at AV 464-TANK (24 AR instead. his son, Charles II, his daughter, hour recording) or at AV 464- Julianne; and many, many com- "Sounds like the problem is going 7752/7114 (commercial prefix is radeskarms. The Armor Force will to get fvred and nobody's head is (502) 624-). miss him. going to roll.

ARMOR - January-February 1991 47 The Bustle Rack/I Excellence in Armor (EIA) - MOI/Video Distributed

The Excellence in Armor - Memorandum battalion or squadron has not received a worldwide is underway. Active Com- of Instruction (EIA-Mol) was distributed copy of the ElA-MOI, please notify the ponent units should check with their learn- worldwide to all active and reserve com- Directorate of Total Armor Force Readi- ing centers, and Reserve Component ponent units. The EIA-MOI provides ness at Fort Knox. units should check with their Readiness detailed instructions and information on Group or Army HQs for this valuable EIA the EIA Program and should make run- Production of the EIA video is complete, informational and teaching tool. The ap- ning a unit-level program easier. If your and distribution to learning centers proximate running time of the EIA video is

Combined Arms Tactical Training Center

The Combined Arms Tactical Training 0 Conduct Command Field Exercises Additionally, there is a videotape .being Center (CATTC) is an innovative use of (CFX), or Fire Coordination Exercises made on CATTC. A will discuss the simulations technology to enhance and using both manned simulators and facility and how to schedule its use. It augment the ability to conduct mounted SAFOR. will be available from local TASC tactical training. CATTC uses Simula- facilities in Fy 91. tions Networking (SIMNET) equipment 0Exercise up to a tank-heavy bat- to build a fully interactive combined talion task force in manned simulators In the near future, the Armor Center arms battlefield. This battlefield be- against a SAFOR enemy. will provide other features to enhance comes a major training area for multi- training at CATTC echelon training exercises. Training at .Exercise a "pure" tank battalion or a CATTC focuses on the tasks of com- tank-heavy task force in a CFX. Two bat- oObserver/controller teams for up to mand and control, tactical movement, talions can execute a CFX controlled by and the synchronization of direct and in- a brigade TOC. direct fires, up to the battalion level. .Conduct up to company level force- Currently, CATTC provides a battalion on-force exercises in manned simulators the following capabilities: for tank and mechanized infantry com- panies and cavalry troops. In the force- 041 M1 tank simulators on-force exercises, each force will ap- 016 Bradley Fighting Vehicle pear to the other as "enemy" vehicles (T- simulators 72 tanks and BMP-1 INS)while appear- 02 Battalion TOCs and 2 battalion ing as friendly vehicles to themselves. ALOCs with personal computer work sta- cially when resourbs are limited. Train- tions to control combat support and ing at CATTC can prepare a unit to get combat service support operations. CATTC has vast potential as a task the maximum benefits from scheduled 0 1 Brigade TOC force training tool. The facility permits 'field training exercises by providing a 0 4 Semiautomated Forces (SAFOR) the unit to practice collective mounted aflexible training system to the unit stations. Each station controls up to 60 combat skills in a stressful environment Ibefore deployment and as a sustain- vehicles. and conduct indepth after action Iment training tool. 0 1 Observer/controller "Stealth" station reviews. Although CATTC is a part-task trainer, a user's guide is available which The 12th Cavalry Regiment operates This equipment gives the commander describes the system and the tasks best 1CATTC as part of its mission to support a wide range of training options. He can: suited for training at CATTC. The unit ithe Armor School. For more information develops its own exercises based on Ion the use of this facility as a unit 0Pfactlce battle drills, conduct tank its METL, then conducts the training. 1trainer, contact the Chief, CATTC at tactical tables, and conduct situational These exercises may be repeated or IDefense Switch Network (DSN) 464-

training exercises (STX) for a single col- moved to different terrain with little 1415714257, or commercial (502) 624- lective task or related tasks and drills. problem. 41 5714257. 1I 48 ARMOR - January-February 1991 23 minutes. The EIA video is a great Personnel Actions Center. After duty North Main Street, Copperas Cove, Tex. visual aid that can be used for officer or hours, students will report to the SDO. 76522 (phone: 800-234-9313). noncommissioned officer professional development classes, platoon classes, or Incoming students are urged to call the Big Red One companyltroop classes. Take advantage Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Of- of what the video offers. fice in order to reserve billeting. The The Society of the First Division (Big phone numbers are Defense System Net- Red One), which is composed of men There Is no requirement for specialized work (formerly AUTOVON) 464-3138/3943, who served in World War I, World War II, unit-level EIA training; however, proper commercial (502) 624-3138/3943. Incom- Vietnam, and in peacetime, will hold its use of EIA soldiers could enhance the ing students should also be aware that 73d annual reunion from 10-14 July 1991 unit's performance and combat effective- transportation is not provided from the in San Jose, Calif. ness. EIA soldiers can assist unit master BOQ/BEQ to the training sites. Those stu- gunners, teach platoon sergeant or dents arriving at Fort Knox without POVs For more Information, please contact Ar- platoon-level classes, or can be used as should arrange for the proper authoriza- thur L. Chaitt, Executive Director, 5 primary trainers for UCOFT and individual tion for either a rental car or cab fare on Montgomery Avenue, Philadelphia, Penn. soldier skills. The only requirements for a their DD Form 1610, "Request for 19118, (phone 215-836-4841). unit-level EIA Program is the estab- Authorization for TDY Travel of DOD Per- lishment of a unit roster listing EIA sol- sonnel." diers: screening soldiers' performance to ensure they meet or maintain the EIA Further information can be obtained standards; and setting up document for- from S3, 5th Squadron, 12th Cavalry, DSN mats to ease enrollments, disenrollments, 464-7334/6258 or commercial (502) 624- New Sheridan waivers, and Level II testing. 733416258, Certification The current SQT standard for EIA enroll- Crews Score 1,000 Course ment is still in effect. All units will be Points at Grafenwoehr notified of changes to the EIA enrollment Beginning early in 1991, the U.S. standards as the Army phases out the Congratulations to the following 3d Ar- Army Armor School at Fort Knox, SQT and Introduces the SDT. If you need mored Division crews for scoring a perfect Ky., will teach a one-week M551 additional information on the EIA 1,OOO on Tank Table Vlll at Grafenwoehr Sheridan course. The course will Program, contact the Directorate of Total in October: focus on gunnery and maintenance Armor Force Readiness Personnel - tasks. The course objective is to Proponency Division, Fort Knox, Ky. C23, Co. C, 3d Bn, 8th Cav familiarize the student with critical 40121-5000, DSN 464-5155/3188 or com- C14, Co. C, 2d Bn, 67th Armor warfighting skills necessary for re- mercial (502) 624-5155/3188. The Excel- HQ85, HHC, 4th Bn, 8th Cav placements to 3-73 Armor. lence in Armor Program A Total Armor - A66, A, 4th Bn, 7th Cav Force Program. Co. A26, Co. A, 4th Bn, 7th Cav The course is targeted at Active or 822, Co. B, 4th Bn, 7th Cav Reserve Component officers, NCOs, Military Motorcycle Training 823, Co. B, 4th Bn, 7th Cav and enlisted soldiers on Department of the Army assignment instructions As proponent for military motorcycle to an M551 unit who have been as- (MILMO) training, the Armor School is con- Reunions signed to non-tank duties or who ducting task analysis and developing have never been trained on the Pols for MILMO operators. We are trying The 214th Annual Washington area Sheridan. to obtain information on all aspects of Armor Ball will be held Saturday, 9 MILMO operation - safety, maintenance, February 1991, at the Bolling Air Force The course will cover crew stations and especially tactics, techniques, and Base Officers' Club, Washington, D.C. and duties, employment of gunnery procedures. If you have any training Master of ceremonies will be MG Thomas skills, turret troubleshooting, crew materials, please forward copies to: Com- C. Foley, Commander, US. Army Armor maintenance, driving, and weapons. mandant, USAARMS, ATTN: ATSB-TDT- Center and Fort Knox. MILMO, Ft. Knox, Ky. 40121. The projected date for the first For further information, please contact: class is 4 February 1991. To mini- CPT Brad May, U.S. Total Army mize student waiting time, the TC3/SC3: PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPCOPE-R, 200 school will conduct one class each Notes for Incoming Students Stovall Street, Alexandria, Va. 223324414 month. (phone: commercial 703-325-9696 or DSN Incoming students for the M1 Tank Com- 221 -9696). For mote Information contact mander's Certification and Scout Com- CPT(P) Gold, Course Development mander's Certification Courses have been 1st Cavalry Divison Division, Directorate of Training and confused on where to report. Students for Doctrine, U.S. Army Armor School, both courses should report to Head- The 44th annual 1st Cavalry Division ATTN: ATSB-TDC, Ft. Knox, Ky. quarters, 5th Squadron, 12th Cavalry, reunion-will be held 3-7 July 1991 at the 40121 (phone: DSN 464-5652/4415 Bldg 1467A, Third Ave. During normal Killeen Sheraton Hotel in Killeen, Tex. For or commerical (502)624-5652/4415). duty hours, students should report to the more information contact Bob Lltle, 302

ARMOR - January-February 1991 49 Soldiers wanted to serve and work for this Armored Force Must Push CPT Michael Kozlik, is cause for some great leader. He was a legend in his own for Light Tank positive comments among staff members time, known for taking care of and lwing of the 149th Brigade, 35th ID (M), KYARNG. his troopers. He had physical courage in Dear Sir: abundance: however, his strongest point In a recent division-level CPX, our was that he possessed moral courage to This letter is in response to the article in brigade had the opportunity to organize a a degree seldom found in our leaders, the September-October 1990 issue, junior or senior. He was a rare leader, the brigade recon company "out-of-hide" and "Armor Support in Low- to Mid-Intensity employ it in an offensive mission. The most selfless of soldiers, absolutely loyal Conflict," by First Sergeant H.G. Beverage. to our nation, Army, and to our mag- CPX was driven by the JESS system on European terrain, and involved our nificent soldiers. This brief but poignant article again sur- brigade making an attack against an faces the issue of the need for strategists, Major General Joe Lutz has gone to enemy that had broken contact. The force developers, and research and recon company advanced 15 to 20 kms OCS, as my command sergeant major development communities to focus on the ahead of the main body, and within the would say, on the civilian streets. The development and fielding of a light ar- limitations of the simulation system, it civilian world's gain is the U.S. Army's mored tank, to replace or augment the ex- loss. He is gone but not forgotten by the gave adequate information on what lay isting M551A1 Sheridan. Using the current ahead. The mission was an ideal one, be- thousands of soldiers he touched in 35 world situation as a "lesson learned," the years of great service to our nation. cause the battalions had no recon mis- need for a greater number of light tanks sions at their level, and the axis of ad- to deploy rapidly is obvious. THOMAS H. TAlT vance was narrow for a brigade. The JESS system generated a speclal unit MG, Cavalry Had Saddam Hussein attacked the ini- Ft. Lewis. Wash. counter that represented our recon com- tial forces in Saudi Arabia, there is no pany - a unique organization composed doubt in my mind a total rout of those LigM Armored Force Debate of our three organic battalion scout light forces would have resulted. Only a vi- platoons (J series MTOE), a combat en- able and substantial deterrent force com- gineer platoon, and an MP platoon. Dear Sir: posed largely of armored vehicles could deter such aggression. As it stands now, The article by LTC Thomas A. Bruno in CPT Kozlik did a good job of describing the U.S. Army is only capable of deploy- various organizations for the brigade the September-October issue of ARMOR ing one battalion of armored vehicles is directly on target! The Mounted Com- recon company, and I want to offer our within 18 to 72 hours of an initial mobiliza- CPX example as yet another possibility. bat Arm of Decision must move decisively tion. Thus there is a need for a light rapid- now to ensure the critical role of armored While we had to "rob" our battalions of ly deployed tank with the ability to defeat their scout platoons, this would not be the forces into the next century. The discus- a medium tank threat. sions, debates, tests, and proposals cur- case with our "ideal solution" for the recon company. It would be similarly equipped rently under consideration for the light The M551A1 is not a panacea for an k- armor forces are not substantially different with M113s, but without M901s presently mored Force, or the Army for that matter, found in our battalion scout platoons. This than those considered 10 years ago when that expects to have the flexibility to meet I served as a second lieutenant in the 4- is a realistic approach to a Reserve Com- and defeat any opponent in a low- to mid- ponent solution in fielding equipment for 68th Armor, now 3-73d Armor at Fort intensity conflict. The M551A1 as a stop- Bragg. The same M551 Sheridans are still a new organization; it would be highly un- gap measure is fine, but not the answer likely that division brigades in the ARNG in service, awaiting long overdue replace- to the need for a light tank with the ability ment by a newer technology Armored force structure could expect HMMWVs or to defeat heavier armored vehicles. LAVs as brigade recon assets. In the ab- Gun System. The low prioritization of the The Armored Force must take the lead AGS, falling year after year below the fund- sence of anti-armor capability, such a and be the proponent agent to push for recon company should have the support ing cut line, has come home to haunt our funding and development of a light tank. branch and the rapidly deployable light capabilii to receive habitual attachment We must also ensure that top leaders, of a GSR section, MP platoon, or engineer forces. The recent deployments of the 3- both military and civilian, understand the 73d Armor to Panama and Saudi Arabia platoon. This would give it the capability possible grave consequences if this most for a wider range of missions. validate LTC Bruno's comments and high- needed weapon system is not integrated light the need for swift action to bring the into the combined arms equation. light armored forces into alignment with However it is organized or equipped, these considerations should come after changing global scenarios. In the Com- ROBERT F. CONWAY, JR. mander's Hatch of the same issue, MG the mission list is completed for the recon CPT, Armor company. Although I basically agree with Foley states that it is time to "lighten the FRG force so that it is more deployable in a the time and space guidelines set out by strategic sense." The call is out. Build, or- CPT Kozlik, I think that the mission list ganize, and field the light armored force considerations should start at the rear of now! Brigade Recon Tried in CPX the divisional armored cavalry squadron, or other covering force units. If we are FREDERICK C. HELLWG Dear Sir: going to borrow doctrinal recon frontages CPT. Armor and depths from the Soviet example, then University of South Carolina The recent article in the September-- we might as well determine where the Army ROTC new rewn wrripariy 111s iriiu iiiu u.a. Columbia. S.C. Brigade Reconnaissance E!ements" by echelonment of recon and scout units. In 50 ARMOR - January-February 1991 my example above, a lightly armed recon Force, Lieutenantl," and while I concur Lease authorities of the time, for whom company was formed, because fighting with most of the points made about lead- Colonel Green was an agent. for information was not one of its mis- ing and caring for one's soldiers, I must sions. heartily disagree with the recommenda- The only other Information which I have tion to attend Ranger School above all of Colonel Green is that he was an Finally, there is the possibility of filling else. ordnance expert, perhaps of that corps; this brigade recon void without fielding a was a veteran of the Royal Tank Corps in new unit or changing the mission and In this day of limited resources (money) World War One; and was born in Sydney, equipment of existing units. This method the young armor officer would be better Australia. involves creating a temDorary unit, as was utilized attending the Motor Officer done in our computerized CPX model. Course. He must be thoroughly RUSSELL MILES This would involve adding company-level knowledgeable not only about tactics and 14 Black Street missions to the brigade S2 section and doctrine, but in the maintenance of his Watsonia VIC 3087 the battalion scout platoons. An assistant "mount," as well. Australia S2 officer becomes the "recon mission commander" by using the M113 assigned Ranger training is fine, but let's get the to the brigade HHC, plus a crew from the priorities straight. Perhaps LTC Helena Corrections brigade TOC. This would become the has spent too much time with the "snake- recon company command vehicle. The eaters" and not enough time in the motor Errors in sources, errors in interpreting recon "platoons" would come together by pool. In my almost 12 years as an armor sources, and typographical problems pulling two of the M113s from each bat- officer (four on active duty), I've had little plagued our history of the 2d Armored talion scout platoon, along with one each occasion to meet armor officers who were Division in the July-August issue, notably scout section leader as the NCOIC. The tabbed; the few I have run into only on the succession of commanders who scout platoon leader and platoon ser- remembered being tired and huvgry. led the division during WWII. In response geants remain with their battalions, keep- to several reader letters, we are publish- ing their M901s and one M113 for bat- The best armor officers were those who ing the following corrected chronology: talion-level scouting missions. The bat- were maintenance oriented. If your vehicle talion missions would have to be reduced doesn't work properly, you can't do your in scope, of course, for the same reason job, and you might as well join the light in- 2d Armored Division that the brigade commander orders his fantry. In that instance, of course, the WWll Commanders recon company to "fall in." Ranger tab fits right in. MG Charles L. Scott Jul40-Jan 41 The new temporary unit, consisting of The leadership and performance under - MG George S. Patton Jan 41-Feb 42 seven M113s, would operate for a limited stress training that LTC Helena demands - MG Willis D. Crittenberger Feb 42Jul time period, with very specific mission his lieutenants receive 'should be coming - 42 guidance. Its existence would be mission from the company and battalion com- MG Ernest N. Harmon Aug 42-Apr 43 dependent, and also directly dependent manders, as well as from the new - MG Hugh J. Gaffey May 43-Apr 44 upon the number and frequency of lieutenant's platoon sergeant. - MG Edward H. Brooks Apr 44-Sep 44 LOGPACs that could be provided by the - MG Ernest N. Harmon Sep &Jan 45 brigade HHC. EDWARD D. BOHNE - MG Isaac D. White Jan 45-May 45 CPT, Armor, USAR - MG John H. Collier May 45-Aug 45 I will conclude at this point, because it is 3/335, 85th Division (Tng) - MG John M. Devine - Aug 45-VE-Day not my purpose to offer even a potential Alton, 111. solution to the existing need for divisional COL Calvin Hosmer, now retired, also brigade recon assets. I have only stated noted that the 2d Armored Division's 2d some of the Ideas that have been circulat- Research Query Squadron, 1st Cavalry, which went to Viet- ing around my own staff. It is hoped that nam in mid-1967, joined the 4th ID, not future discussion of this topic, and more Dear Sir: the 1st Cav Division. COL Hosmer, who articles such as CPT Kozlik's piece, will was the XO at the time, added, "We didn't lead to a solution very quickly. I am writing seeking assistance with get our air cavalry troop until the following some research I am undertaking into the year. Also, individuals who served with the OTIS W. FOX, JR. Australian Cruiser Tank, which was squadron in Vietnam are authorized to MAJ, Armor, KYARNG developed during World War Two. wear the 2d Armored Division patch on 149th Me S3, the right shoulder Louisville, Ky. ..." I am particularly interested in finding out Harry F. Miller, a WWll Armor vet from more about a certain Colonel Green of the Seattle, also wrote to correct a caption on Put Priority on Maintenance, United States Army, who visited Australia page 31 of the September-October issue. Not Ranger School in early 1943 regarding the Cruiser Tank The flamethrowing Sherman tank at the Project. I believe that he would not have top of the page is an Army tank of the Dear Sir: been an Armor officer, but I am hoping 713th Tank Battalion. "I realize that the that some of your readers may have an Marines get an awful lot of publicity, but I have just finished reading LTC idea df where I can find more, and let's not give them any for free," writes Helena's article, "Welcome to Our Task knowledge of the workings of the Lend Miller. ARMOR - January-February 1991 51 New Single-Volume History Of World War II Focuses on the Big Picture

I At right, General hnhorver briefs paralmop prior to D-Day.

Struggle for Survival: The His- Parker's work is an excellent start point Sabotage efforts were not as effective as tory of the Second World War, by for anyone seeking to understand the his- the Germans had hoped, however, thanks tory of the second great world war and as to the FBI and unreliable saboteurs. R.A.C. Parker. Oxford University Press, such deserves a place on the shelves of New York. 1989.328 pages. professional soldiers. Upon reading FBI counterintelligence operations Parker, soldiers will be able, with con- receive equal treatment in Breuer's book. R.AC. Parker's little book is quite surpris- fidence, to turn to more narrow accounts The author describes the difficulties and ing - surprising because it is difficult to of the war and so eventually reach a clear ultimate triumphs of the special agents imagine a need for a single volume his- understanding of the military history of who tracked down the Nazi spies, some tory of World War II. But, Parker delivers a World War II. of whom were very discreet. Perhaps the first-class narrative account of the war most important FBI counterintelligence vic- which encompasses the decisive events LTC GREG FONTENOT tory was the penetration of a Nazi com- of the war from the perspective of social, Cdr, 2-34 Armor munications station in New York. The G- political, economic, and military factors. Ft. Riley, Kan. men then used the radio station to iden- Parker avoids the typically British tify German agents and distort their prejudice, which simply stated, asserts Hitler's Undercover War, The reports to Abwehr Headquarters (a major that British brains and American brawn Nazi Espionage Invasion of the German spy agency) by passing on un- won the war. Parker is even-handed in his classified or erroneous information. This by William Breuer. St. Martin's treatment of American military and U.S.A. ruse eventually led to the arrest and con- diplomatic efforts. Press, New York. 1989. $19.95.368 pages. viction of about 30 German agents.

Those expecting an overview of the Hitler's Undercover War tells the story of One theme in this book deserved more great campaigns of the war will be disap- Germany's spy campaign against the explicit treatment. Early in the spy in- pointed. Parker's analysis is from the United States during the 19209 through vasion, Breuer observed that the FBI won strategic level, and generally he is more in- the Second World War. The author traces a 'turf battle" with the intelligence agen; terested in the battlefield outcomes of the early triumphs of German (later, Nazi) cies of the Armed Forces over who should diplomatic, economic, and strategic policy espionage in post-Great War America, a run American counterintelligence. The than in the battlefield events themselves. period he describes as a "spy's paradise," author does not detail these struggles, Parker is at his best when analyzing through the 19309 when a gradually leaving the FBI's rise to preeminence in economic factors and decisions that awakening U.S.A. became more aware of spy-catching a story that remains to be decisively affected production. German the threat and its own precarious position told. and Allied decisions on tank production in a turbulent world. J. Edgar Hoover and and German miscalculations assured, to a his FBI agents are the heroes of this piece Finally, one mmes away fr om Hitler's large extent, Allied superiority of numbers as they uncover Nazi spy rings through Undercover War wondering just how if not quality in tank production. Parker is careful investigation, bluffs, and oc- much the Nazis got in return for all their equally effective in his analysis of the ef- casionally, by accident. espionage efforts. This is not tr.n UV....v."U,rl-tunnlr,, fects of German and Allied bombing cam- the danger to America's secrets an'a in-'- paigns on production and morale on the Nazi spy activities during these years fell dustrial capacity, for Breuer certainly home fronts. into three broad categories: collecting in- makes clear that the threat was real. One Finally, Parker reviews effectively the formation, spreading disinformation, and wonders, however, why Hitler's spie s did dynamics of the respective alliances. conducting sabotage. Some of America's -not significantly alter the course oIf the -?-...I lrltel- Clearly, the Western Allies and Russia, mast--. imwrtantr- militarv contractors war. Eventuallv. an effective counter despite their differences, wove together a yielded up their secrets before an FBI ligence campaign, coupled with increased system that enabled them to fight with counterintelligence counteroffensive, com- security, helped limit the spies' abilities to considerable unity of effort at the strategic bined with better security, clamped down collect information. But, why could Ger- level. The Axis powers, on the other hand, on German infiltrators. Disinformation ac- man agents not provide information to never reached anything like the consen- tivities, conducted mainly through the Ger- help Hitler win his war? lt may well be sus the Allies achieved. While this is no man-American Bund. promoted that the German conduct of the

icnlatinnict vie-~ in the I1 S bv castino Hit- esaianaaer. war-. carrid-. .. - - within.. . . it. the.. . . seeds- .. . . surprise, Mr. Parker does render the .--.-..-...-. -.-. -I v -- -. .-= .. .__ .. processes at work understandable. ler's Germany in a favorable light. of its own destruction. Hitler's spy ap-

52 ARMOR - January-February 1991 paratus, like his military, was a loose con- affects the design in regard to weight and ghanistan to fight Soviet oppression but federation of competing agencies, pur- size elements. It also impacts on the lack decided he could do more for freedom by posely underfunded, poorly staffed, and of durability of the tank for training pur- serving as a reporter and bringing news given poor quality personnel. The entire poses. The endurance of a tank in combat of the Afghan struggle to the Western spy effort remained uncoordinated be- is not relevant, because it is likely to get press. cause of the Fuhrer's fear of too much hit and destroyed before it would "wear power aggregated in one organization. out." However, the T-80 is not designed to Traveling by truck, horse, motorcycle, endure years of rigorous training hours, donkey, and foot through various guerilla Hitler's Undercover War is based on and therefore, severe constraints must be strongholds, Afghan militia-held areas, secondary sources supplemented by placed on the tank for training use. and past Soviet garrisons, the author declassified FBI reports. Most of the inci- describes his travels and his encounters dents recounted in the book have been The book is a good refresher on how with the Afghan freedom fighters. The written about elsewhere. However, the Soviets fight on the tactical level. It descriptions of his various stops at times Breuer's crisp, curt writing style makes also gives insight into overall aspects of became tedious and boring, and I almost the narrative flow smoothly as he takes the Soviet military machine and how it felt relieved when we finally got to Herat. the reader on a fast-paced trip through would function in a high-intensity conflict. the German underground in America. This The author's main interest was to see book is rich in anecdotes and incidents, The Soviet Union is fixated on World what damage had been done to the city but short on analysis of the spy war be- War iI and, from that experience, con- and what had happened in the 24 Hoot tween the U.S. and Nazi Germany. tinues to try to develop the ultimate uprising. 24 Hoot was the beginning of Anyone interested in the real world of blitzkrieg machine. The author points out the current struggle. Through interviews espionage will enjoy reading this book. that the next battlefield will be lethal, and with several Afghans, the author gives a determined in a matter of minutes. The reasonably good accounting of the upris- ROBERT E. KELLS, JR. author is able to describe, in succinct ing. Captain, USAR detail, the weaknesses of the Soviet Parsonsburg, Md. military such as ethnic strife, no NCO This book was easy to read but really Corps, lack of training time, and specific said very little about the overall conduct design problems in hardware. These in- of the war itself. It does give an overview Red Thrust by Steven J. Zaloga. herent weaknesses are recognized by the but little detail. R also provides a Christian Soviets and they realize how these with an insight to the Moslem religion and Presidio Press, Novato, Calif. $18.95. 258 problems reflect shortcomings in tactical way of life. Perhaps the most impressive pages. prowess. Mr. Zaloga describes how they fact brought out by the author was that are continuing to pursue measures to the introduction of the Stinger antiaircraft Is the Cold War in Europe over? If so, compensate for them and what may be missile changed the balance of power in then why read a book on the most unlike- done in the future. favor of the guerillas. ly war? The author admits even he has a hard time coming up with a scenario that This work gives a good perspective, a The epilogue, which was written some would spark a classic NATO vs. Warsaw current insight and a review into our old four years after the trip provides the Pact confrontation. But the point of the nemesis, the Soviet war machine. It is well- author's views on the conflict. In short, it book was not to discuss the likelihood of researched, with a good bibliography, and was the strength of the Afghan people World War 111, but a vehicle used to give the story is lively reading in the vein of more than any other factor that gave an appraisal of the current Soviet warfight- most techno-novels on the military. them victory. In addition to being a jour- ing capabilities. Even though a classic nalist, the author is also an award-winning American-Soviet confrontation seems un- G.F. MILBURN photographer, but the section of photos likely, it is entirely possible that we will en- CPT, USMC was rather sparse and very poor. Overall, I counter Soviet weaponry, tactics, and ad- Ft. Knox, Ky. think the book would have accomplished visors in future Third World conflicts. more if it had been published in 1987 Dust of the Saints by Radek while the conflict was still in progress. Each chapter starts with an interwoven Since the Soviets pulled out in 1989, this scenario of a central front battle and iso- Sikorski, Paragon House, New York. 1990. book is anticlimatic. lates a small part of the'battlefield to em- $19.95. phasize a certain aspect of the combined The book is reasonably priced, easy to arms concept. There is a chapter on Several centuries ago, Khaja Ghaltan, a read, and very interesting, but for Armor motorized infantry, armor, artillery, attack popular Herati Saint crossed the moun- officers, I think their time would be better helicopters, fighter aircraft, special forces, tains of Afghanistan and looked at the city spent on some other work. The book and chemical warfare. After the scenario, below and said "Behold the Dust of the should be read by anyone doing in-depth the author gives an indepth analysis into Saints." The city of Herat has been called research on the Afghan War, but for that particular aspect from the Soviet this by its inhabitants since then. This general content only. perspective. The analysis includes train- book covers the author's 102-day trip ing, development of hardware, and its ap- from Pakistan through war-torn Afghanis- WILLIAM L. HOWARD plication. For example, Mr. Zaloga ex- tan of 1986 to the city of Herat. LTC, Armor plains that placing a ceiling on tank The au!hor, a Polish Catholic refugee in USAR, Retired production costs of the T-80 tank directly England, had considered going to Af- Largo, Fla.

ARMOR - January-February 7997 53