SCHWERPUNKT

Putting together an issue el." Captain Michael Landers provides some of ARMOR has always detailed and workable techniques for platoon been a challenge, and this leaders who find themselves overwhelmed issue has been no differ- with information or the need to recall it. For ent. During each week, the young officer just starting out, this article we receive many excel- offers excellent advice. lent articles on mobile The argument of whether armored vehicles warfare. Our challenge is should travel on tracks or wheels has been in selecting the best and with us for many years. General Andre' most relevant ones. I believe that this issue Sciard, a distinguished combat veteran of contains some very good choices. WW 11, Algeria, and Indochina, offers us his Our cover story, "Bastogne: A Fascinating, ideas on the "Modern Use of Wheeled Ar- Obscure Vignette," by Brigadier General mored Vehicles." The article recognizes the Albin F. Irzyk, Ret., reveals a little-known, changing terrain of Europe, thediverse battle- but very interesting fact. Six days before the fields upon which armored forces may have to Germans encircled Bastogne, the 4th Ar- fight, and the growing "battlefields of the mored Division - which was later to break budgets" in Western nations. that enemy encirclement - actually had As promised in our last issue, we have forces inside the battered city and then was included a feature on "The St. George Award" ordered to withdraw. This story illustrates the that the U.S. Armor Association has imple- oftenchaotic natureof mobilewarfareandthe mented this year. Based on the responsesthat way that a fluid battlefield affects the leaders I have read from the armor and armored and commanders on it. cavalry commanders of the force, this pro- Glenn Johnston's article, "The 120-mm SP gram is going to be very active. In fact, I Mortar/Howitzer: Its Impact on NATO Rear understand that the Armor Association has Area Defense,"gives us a detailed view of this already received requests for the award. new Soviet weapon system and how it adds to Before I end this already-too-long column, I the capability of Soviet airborne units to dis- commend to you the Professional Thoughts rupt their opponent's command and control, section of this issue. It contains three excel- reserves, and service-support units. lent points of view on three very important This issue of ARMOR also includes the topics: reconnaissance skills training, mentor- second article on U.S. armored cavalry doc- ing, and command and control. trine: "The Armored Cavalry Regiment: Cata- The purposes of ARMOR are todisseminate lyst for Operational Success." With the publi- knowledge of the military arts ad sciences, cation of the new FM 100-5, comes increased with special attention to mobile, ground war- emphasis on the operational level of warfare. fare; to promote professional development of This article by Colonel Thomas White and the Armor Community Major John Rosenberger shows how the through an exchange of armored cavalry regiment fits into this very ideas, thoughts, and con- neglected aspect of AirLand Battle. cepts; and to preserveand Robin Fletcher concludes his "Trunnions foster the spirit and tradi- on the Move" with his recommendation for tions of Armor and Ar- the next generation of main battle tanks. mored Cavalry. We believe "'Creating the 'Gun-Over-Hull' Tank" is full of that this issue does that intriguing possibilities for tank design. It's well, and we hope you well worth your reading. believe so too. - GPR In "Management Methods at Platoon Lev- ~~ Magazine Staff FEATURES Editor-in-Chief MAJOR G. PATRICK RllTER 11 The Armored Cavalry Regiment: Managing Editor Catalyst for Operational Success JON T. CLEMENS by the Command & Staff Department, USAARMS Assistant Editor ROBERT E. ROGGE 16 The St. George Award Production Assistant 19 What Would You Do? VIVIAN THOMPSON Fighting With Degraded-Mode Gunnery Contributing Artist SFC ROBERT TORSRUD by the Weapons Department, USAARMS 20 The 120-mm SP Mortar/Howitzer: United States Army Armor School Its Impact on NATO Rear Area Defense Commandant by Glenn T. Johnston MG FREDERIC J. BROWN 24 Assistant Commandant Bastogne: A Fascinating, Obscure Vignette BG PAUL E. FUNK by Brigadier General Albin F. Irzyk, (Ret.) Deputy Assistant Commandant 32 COL CLAUDE L. CLARK Modern Use of Wheeled Armor Vehicles by General Andre' Sciard Chief of Staff COL RALPH R. WOLFE 35 Trunnions on the Move, Part II Command Sergeant Major Creating the "Gun-Over-Hull" Tank CSM JOHN M. STEPHENS by Robin Fletcher Maintenance COL G. L. THOMAS 41 Armor's Heritage: Command and Staff Lieutenant General Daniel Van Voorhis COL ROBERT D. HURLEY by Robert E. Rogge Weapons COL DAVID V. HARBACH 42 Management Methods at Platoon Level Training Group by Captain Michael D. Landers LTC JAMES L. KLUENDER NCO Academy/ DEPARTMENTS Drill Sergeant School CSM JAMES M. GREENWELL 2 Letters 48 Recognition Quiz Answers 5 Commander's Hatch 49 The Bustle Rack/ Evaluation and Standardization MR. CLAYTON E. SHANNON 8 Driver's Seat Armor Branch Notes 10 Recognition Quiz 50 Books Training and Doctrine Professional Thoughts 53 Armor Conference Agenda COL CLAUDE W. ABATE 44 48 Regimental Review Combat Developments COL ROBERT W. DeMONT ARMOR magazine (ISSN 0004-2420) is CORRESPONDENCE: Address all published bi-monthly by the U.S. Army correspondence to US. Army Armor Units Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road. Center, AlTN: ATSB-MAG. Fort Knox, Fort Knox. Kentucky 401 21. Unless Kentucky, 401 21. (Telephone: 2d Armor Training Brigade otherwise stated, material does not AUTOVON 464-2249/2610 or COL DOMINIC W. RUGGERIO represent policy, thinking, or endorse- commercial (502)624-2249/2610.) 1 st Armor Training Brigade ment by any agency of the U.S. Army. SECOND class postage paid at Fort COL ROBERT B. FRANKLIN, JR. Use of appropriated funds for printing of Knox, Kentucky and additional mailing this publication was approved by the De- office. 4th Training Brigade partment of the Army 6 January 1984. COL JOHN N. SLOAN ARMOR is not a copyrighted publication but may contain some articles which 194th Armored Brigade have been copyrighted by individual SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individual COL SAMUEL D. WILDER, JR. authors. Material which is not under subscriptions to ARMOR are available copyright may be reprinted if credit is through the U.S. Armor Association, given to ARMOR and the author. Post Off ice Box 607, Fort Knox, Directorate of Permission to reprint copyrighted materi- Kentucky 40121. Telephone Reserve Component Support al must be obtainrl from the author. (502)942-8624. ARMOR may be forwarded to military Domestic: $ 16.00 one year; $27.75 two Director years; $39.50 three years. Foreign: COL JAMES E. DIERICKX personnel whose change of address is caused by official orders (except at APO $23.50 one year; $36.75 two years. addresses) without payment of Single copies, $2.50. additional postage. The subscriber must March-April 1986 Vol XCV No. 2 notify the postmaster. VSPS 467-970 Our Thinkers Must Also Write Iwould like to thank Mr. Burniece for his Finally, Mr. Burniece's idea that the comments concerning my article. His let- West German Kanonenjadgpanzer-90 is Dear Sir, ter (On Soviet Tank Destroyers), however, an equivalent to the IT-122 and IT-130 is In his Professional Thought, "lmagina- seems to have missed its mark. The pri- questionable at best. How can this West tion: The Ultimate Force Multiplier," (pp. mary mission of Soviet self-propelled artil- German vehicle be considered an equiva- 46-48, Nov-Dec 1985) Captain Harry lery has never been in question. The lent to a vehicle that can (by desgin) carry Noyes suggests that "certain key innova- suggested "IT-1 52" tank destroyer would more or heavier armor than a main battle tors(shou1d)do nothing but sitaroundand have very little in common with the 2s-3 tank, fire 122-mm or 130-mm hyperve- think." Of course, that is not quite howitzer and the 25-5 self-propelled gun. locity APFSDS-T ammunition, and deliver enough; our futurists must also commit Perhaps a description of the "IT-1 52" (as extremely long-range indirect fire? Cer- their thoughts to writing, so that they may well as the IT-122 and IT-130's) mission tainly equivalent in name only. As far as compete in the marketplace of ideas. would clarify this point. the Swedish S-tank is concerned, the Wedo haveafewactivethinktanks.The As I suggested in the article, "T-64, IT- equivalency is not even present in the Command and General Staff College has 122, and IT-130: The Soviet Advantage," vehicle's name. begun an Advanced Military Studies Pro- the development of these earlier tank gram for selected officers to pursue re- destroyers was initiated by the require- JAMES M. WARFORD search and to write during a second year ment to defeat NATO heavy tanks. The CPT, Armor in the Fort Leavenworth resident course. Soviets had to react to the American FRG TRADOC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Doc- M103, the British Conqueror, and the trine oversees various study cells which "new" British Chieftain. The apparent address future Army and Air Force opera- balance achieved by the Soviets with the Don't Eliminate NBC Expertise tional concepts. The Army War College IT-122 and IT-130 was short-lived, how- Strategic Studies Institute looks at how ever. Soon they were faced by even more Dear Sir, world economic and political trends will effective and heavily armored western The November-December 1985 issue of affect military institutions. The Air Uni- tanks. The fielding of the American M1 ARMOR Magazine contained a letter by versityat Maxwell AFB and the Naval War Abrams, the British Challenger, and the Captain Dale Wilson concerning improving College at Newport have similar centers West German Leopard 2 main battle tanks the J-Series HHC by creating two separate for scholarship. Their periodicals, like caused a new problem for the Soviets. companies in its place, among otherthings. Armor, Military Review. and Parameters, Exactly what they would gain by fielding a Captain Wilson's ideas are not without are open to serious contributors. vehicle such as the "IT-1 52" would be a merit, and have provoked much thought, Captain Noyes is correct when he states tank destroyer that could engage NATO I'm sure. that "mandatory readings are no substi- antitank positions and vehicles at extreme I must take issue with one aspect of his tutefor ...self-motivated study." But Ithink ranges by accurate indirect fire; and upon proposal, however. Captain Wilson sug- that "duty time for supervised study" (in closing with NATO defensive positions, gests that the increased manning neces- units) is a questionable idea. Books, mag- start engaging the M1s and Challengers sary to accomplish his reorganization azines, paper, and pencil are very porta- (from beyond their maximum effective (seven additional personnel) can be made ble; theycan goto the field, on an airplane, range) with hypervelocity armor piercing up by eliminating the NBC NCO and field or be held handy inan officefora slowday. and large diameter HEAT-T ammunition. radio mechanic slots in the four line com- Any soldier can join the debates about The precedents for such large antitank panies, because they "would not be sorely future war, doctrine, and human nature. rounds have already been set with the missed". 152-mm APFSDS-T round of the joint The unit NBC NCO 54E has been a long- ROBERT P. FAIRCHILD American/West German MBT-7O/KPZ- awaitedevent. It isafactthattheadditional LTC, Armor, NYARNG 70 and XM803 prototype main battle duty position in the H-Series TOE was ARNG Coordinator, tanks. This two-fold capability is essential inadequate, at best. One of the best fea- Directorate of Reserve Component to the Soviets because of their great con- tures of the new J-Series TOE is the Support, Ft. Knox cern over the range and effectiveness of addition of a dedicated 54E at company NATO ATGMs. Once the softer-skinned level. Finally, DA has recognized that in antitankvehiclesareputout of action, the order to become proficient in NBC, units "IT-l52"(like the IT-122 and the IT-130) require this kind of primary MOS man- "Monster" 130-mm AT Round could then carry out its purpose-built mis- power. With the emphasison NBCdefense Confirmed sion: the destruction of NATO's special- that exists in today's environment, we can armored main battle tanks. hardly afford elimination of these critical Dear Sir, The suggested "IT-1 52" would solve positions. 1 am writing to offer both some new two problems for the Soviets: first, it Iwould suggest that Captain Wilson look information as well as some comments would ensure that all (or at least most) of at the J-Series unit NBC NCO position a bit with regard to the January-February 1986 the combat vehicles in a given unit were more as an asset, rather than one to be ARMOR Magazine letters column. based on thesamevehicle(i.e. theT-640r traded like a draft choice. First of all, the existence of a 130-mm T-72 main battle tank hull); second, it APFSDS-T antitank round, as suggested would also ensure that the antitank arm ALLAN B. QUIAT in the article, "T-64, IT-122, and IT-130: within the Soviet Army was at least keep- Captain (P), Infantry The Soviet Advantage," has been con- ing pace with the latest NATO main battle CA ARNG firmed. According to Military Technology tanks. Very little information is available Magazine, the round has been designed about the two earlier tank destroyers, let by a French company for an unnamed alone the suggested "IT-1 52." If such a Arab customer. The round has been la- vehicle is fielded by the Soviets, a move "We're Infantry, Sir" beled "the Monster" by the press. It may that would only be continuing a long- not be surprising to see a new Saudi established line of purpose-built tank de- Dear Sir, Arabianor Libyan main battletank(0rgun stroyers, the NATO armies will hopefully A minor correction to your Regimental mounting)carrying the M46 130-mmgun, discover it prior to initiating their fire Review item in the November-December capable of firing "the Monster." commands. issue: In the section on armor rotations set

2 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 for 1986, you state that "Two armor battal- "Grossen Panzer befehlswagen" (large and fight their unitson tomorrow's battle- ions from Fort Hood, TX, will rotate to armored command vehicles based on a field first, and worry about fighting their Germany... the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, PzKw Mk 111 chassis) had been produced tank second. The command and control 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Battalion, and the following versions were issued to that these men would exercise over their 41 st Infantry, 2d Armored Division..." the troops: units, if successful, would more than off- Though you clearly give unit designa- SdKFz266with FuG6and FuGS(wire- set any degradation in their own vehicle's tions, the 1/41 Infantry is not one of the less set 6 and 2). fighting capability. As an added bonus, two "armor" battalions. This might be nit- SdKFz267with FuG6and FuGB(wire- their vehicle would exactly resemble ev- picking to some, but as an ex-member and less set 6 and 8). eryother vehicle inthe unit, thus allowing a company commander in one of the first SdKFz 268 with FuG6 and FuG7 (wire- them to blend in with the rest of the Bradley-equipped INFANTRY battalions in less set 6 and 7). formation. The Germans tried it in World the U.S. Army, I feel we need to keep the Externally, these vehicles were iden- War II, and their record of successes from record straight ... tical (bothtoeach other andtoothertanks 1939 to 1942 was due in no small way to on the battlefield). Like the armored car the fact that their commanders had spe- MICHAEL T. ESSELMAN command variants, these vehicles carried cialized vehicles based on a tank chassis Captain (P), Infantry a distinctive loop aerial above the engine that allowed them to maneuver, fight, and Barbados. WI compartment, though this was replaced most importantly,leadfrom thefront with by the whip aerial in 1943. Armament was anonymity. an MG34. A dummy gun replaced the main armament (to accommodate a map THOMAS C. HOUSTON, II Armored C3 Vehicles - table, extra radio and extra operators). At 1LT, Armor Nothing New the start of the campaign in France in FRG 1940, there were 39 of these vehicles, Dear Sir, plus about 200 more based on the PzKw After reading Major Richard Geier's ar- Mk I & II chassis, with the tank divisions. Understanding the OMG ticle entitled "Battalion Command and Naturally, the absence of a main arma- Concept Control" (September-October ARMOR), ment restricted the use of these vehicles my immediate impression was that the on the battlefield, so fully operational Dear Sir, article was probably going to generate tanks were assigned as "wingmen" for Since the initial revelation in 1983 of some negative responses. Of course, I local security. German industry also be- the revamped Soviet "Mobile Group" didn't have to wait long to see a rebuttal, gan to produce command tanks with their concept, now labeled the "Operational as inthe next issueofARMOR(November- original armament retained, but these Maneuver Group" (OMG), a great deal of December, Captain Calvin R. Sayles wrote vehicles were certainly degraded in fight- speculation has been rendered on mission a fairly credible critique in his letter en- ing capability. Another example of this performance and capabilities of such titled, "Is the Command Tank a Non- trend from later in the war: several ver- units. In a large part, the earlydiscussions Fighter?" It is this letter that has caused sions of the Panther series weredelivered dealt with what could be readilydescribed me to take pen in hand and respond, as as armored command vehicles, which dif- as recognition of one more in a series of Captain Sayles brought up a point in the fered mainly in turret design. The loader Soviet "step evolutions" in their opera- first part of this letter that "frustrated" also served as a second wireless operator tionaldoctrine. More recently, however, it him, but I believe was exactly a point that and had a receiver and transmitter fitted seems a great deal of effort is being Major Geier was trying to emphasize. next to him on the right-hand turret wall. expended on what the OMG may or may Today, in the Armor Corps, leaders are The second antenna was fitted on the rear not do in thewayof equipmentandorgani- taught to "lead from the front ... set the of the turret roof, and 15 rounds were zation. Perhaps nowhere is this more example," and I agree with this entirely. taken from the tank's basic load, thus evident than in the Secretary of Defense's However, this concept is not new. From degrading its fighting capability (though report Soviet Military Power - 1985. It 1939 until 1942, the German armored not much; Panthers had a normal load of seems now is the time to consider both the divisions shockedthe world with astonish- 79 rounds). Two versions of the panzer- equipment side and the operational side ing victories, advancing hundredsof miles befehlswagen Panther were issued to of the OMG. and defeating enemies that were just as units, differing only in the types of radios As Soviet Military Power - 1985 re- well-equipped but nowhere near as orga- they carried. ports, the Soviets have recently nominally nized. One of the major reasons that this These command vehicles gave the Ger- organized two divisions into what are worked was the German command struc- man regimental and battalion command- considered to be a prototypical OMG or- ture emphasized the need for command- ers the ability to lead and fight their ganization. By comparison with a standard ers to lead from the front, so that exploita- formations right up in the front lines, and motor rifle division, these new organiza- tions could be developed faster. Also, the later versionsgave them a main gun to tions ostensiblyfield nearlytwice as much commanders at the front are more in defend themselves, if necessary. The fact in the way of heavy equipment: over 450 touch with what is happening, and from that they looked like other tanks in the tanks versus 255, over 600 APC/MICV that can make better decisions on what formation added to their protective value, versus 31 1, and more than 300 artillery course of action to take. as the opposing forces would not see the pieces and MLRS launchers compared Of course, there became a need for extra antenna arrangement at normal bat- with 166. As such, these divisions have commandersto havevehicles which could tlefield ranges. (This point is what "frus- been determined by DoD to be "...ideally maintain the same rate of advance as the trated" Captain Sayles too much; "The suited to act as an Operational Maneuver tanks, provide protection, and provide the commander has disguised his command Group (OMG), conducting high-speed, radios needed to control maneuver. What vehicle as a tank..."). large-scale raid and exploitation opera- did the German planners turn to? The Today, as in the past, specialized com- tions deep in an enemy's rear area." It is tank! Yes, that's right; a tank, specially mand vehicles for brigade and battalion here that the line is crossed between modified on the inside so that the battal- commanders have shown themselves to doctrine and equipment which leads to a ion and regimental commanders would be absolutely vital to the success of the reconsideration of the current concept of have the equipment they needed to fight Armor mission. If the Armor and Engineer these organizations. their units. I emphasize units, because the Board can design a tank that looks likeany COL Wontrucki (Polish Army), in a 1981 German high command realized that they other, does not have its fighting ability article in the Polish Ground Forces Re- needed commanders fighting with their degraded, and can allow brigade and bat- view, is credited with raising the issue of units on the battlefield, not tear-assing talion commanders to fight their unit, NATO operational concepts, and the prob- around the countryside as overpaid tank preat. But I think the kev point here is that lems the combination of positional and commanders. By 1938, the very first &e need these commanders to maneuver mobile defense-active defense-would

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 3 propose for a Warsaw Pact offensive seek- a future European confrontation. Agree- to assembling and maintaining a dense ing toeffect a breakthrough by amassing 6 mentscan and mostcertainlywill begiven grouping of forces inthe tactical defensive to 9:l odds against defending NATO for NATO's ability to dramatically affect zone. after which inertia sets in until forces. Then, noting that the U.S. Army the tactical operational abilityof the OMG senior command orders a counterattack. and Bundeswehr plans for active defense to accomplish its mission - not least By recognizing these critical features of generally called not for coordinating coun- through the application of tactical air as- active defense and the role they play, terattacks with superiorityof materiel and sets at the critical moment. (This is a especially in the case of the last point, the troops, but rather for maintaining a more factor recognized in the Eastern campasa course of operations planning and execu or less constant 1:2 or 1:3 force in the face problem of nearly overwhelming impact.) tion, a greater opportunity exists to avoid of each Warsaw Pact thrust, his conclu- But the concern remains that efforts on the pitfall of becoming altogether too en- sion was that the Eastern forces would be the part of NATO to understand the nature grossed in the "trees" of tactical data and continually slowed and drained of re- of the OMG concept are now being driven developments to the exclusion of the "for- sources and time without gaining the by the "mechanical" pursuit of attempting est" of operationaVstrategic action. momentum sought in the elusive break- to identify the OMG by TO&E organiza- through. Reinforcing this study was a tion, rather than by serious study into the JOSEPH R. BURNIECE separate paper prepared about the same means to evaluate - through MElT or Arlington, VA time for the Soviet Military History otherwise - the intentions of the Sovi- Journal by COL GEN Grinkevich, Chief of et/Warsaw Pact army(of four divisions)or the Main Staff of the Soviet Ground front (of two or more armies) commander We Have Experts on Forces. Grinkevich, through his study, to effect a breakthrough according to a 360-Degree Defense based on the significance of the Battle for very rigid and harshly defined timetable. Moscow, demonstrated thefeasibilityof a Thus, we findcontinued referenceto "find- Dear Sir, strategic defense against an attacker su- ing the (OMG) organization," the effort I read with much interest Captain perior in numbers employing blitzkrieg- apparently facilitated as defined by an Michael A. Deaton's article. "Fighting 360 style tactics. equipment base level twice that of the Degrees,"(see November-December 1985 From these and additional studies it is. standard Eastern motor rifle or tank di- ARMOR). clear that the intent of the Warsaw Pact vision. The Army already has a group of indi- debate concerning the employment of the Certainly the possibility here is that the viduals who have fought a war employing OMG may be reduced to a few basic size of the two above-mentioneddivisions all-around security and fields of fire. concerns at the operational level: may indeed be indicative of a Soviet inten- These men are the Vietnam combat First is the means to lever forward the tion to employ them in the role of OMG. veterans. main echeloned forces. The OMG would Conversely, noting the Soviet penchant During my service as a platoon leader in serve to facilitate the movement and ma- for and emphasis on camouflage and de- ETroop.2dSquadron.ofthe 11thACR.we nuever to breakthrough bythe main force. ception at every level, repeatedly proven operated out of troop defensive positions Second, the OMG would accomplish to be highly effective in campaign after that were designed to provide 360-degree this task by seeking a gap (Le., not a campaign in World War II, the real con- protection. Our reconnaissance-in-force breakthrough in the classic sense, but a cern is that NATO attention may be riveted missions and offensive sweeps also uti- mechanizedversion of infiltration) through to following the movements of these divi- lized formations and procedures designed which to enter the NATO rear area and/or sions to the exclusion of other "lower for the same purpose. to overrun airfields, communications cen- profile" divisions at normal equipment I recognize that the threat employs ters, nuclear weapon and storage sites levels. Specifically, the warning isthatthe much more armor than the forces we and choke points. OMG is not a ph ysical organization, but a faced in Vietnam (although there were Third, in so doing, the OMG permits a theoreticaloperationalconcept. By defini- tank battles in that war), but the principles greater number of NATO tactical forces to tion, any division (and by inference, any learned there by armor and cavalry com- be tied down prematurely, limiting their army at front level) may be designated an bat veterans could certainly be of use maneuver and restricting the possible OMG at any time plansand circumstances today. cases where NATO forces may shift ac- dictate. Orders would probably be issued, cording to the active defense method to per the German execution of planning for ALEXANDER J. SHOGAN blunt a Warsaw Pact penetration. This the 1944 Ardennes Offensive, by (couri- Major, Armor, USAR provides the additonal valuable contribu- ered) written means only. Advance notice tion of limiting the tendency of Soviet and of OMG mission status may be of such (Major ShoganS letter arrived on authen- Warsaw Pact forces to "bunch up" as short notice that a division currently in the tic 1 lth ACR stationery, with the oldAPO forward elements reduce their rate of line, at perhaps only 60 percent of normal San Francisco return address! I agree advance upon entering the NATO defense authorized establishment, could be so with him. ARMOR willbe more than hap- zone. designated as it located a suitable gap in py to consider stories on mobile warfare in 0 Fourth, in cutting through andseizing the NATO defense. a low intensity conflict environment and rear objectives, the OMG limits the num- It would seem then that the critical how armor/cavalry can work together ber of NATO opportunities to exploit tac- requirement for dealing with the OMG is with light infantry. Ed.) tical nuclear weapons(and in somecases, to study, among other factors, the critical chemical and biological, as and where shortcomings of the active defense con- applicable). cept. COL Wontrucki has already high- 0 Fifth, the OMG by the nature of strik- lighted a number of these concerns, in- ing through and moving in the rear areas, cluding by definition of active defense: will substantially adversely affect NATO It provides for only limited engineer 1985 Index Available planning for and movement of reserves preparation of defense positions, especial- and reinforcements. NATO maypotential- ly in the case of earthworks. ly lose the ability to mass for major coun- It requires decentralization of forces, The four-page subject and author teroffensives at the critical moments of potentially resulting in diffusion of effort index of stories in the 1985 issues of imminent Warsaw Pact breakthrough of with no clear definition of the main de- ARMOR will be available on request the defensive zone, thus turning a mar- fensive effort, since the latter is only after April 15. Be sure to include a ginal tacticaVoperationa1 development in- developed during the battle. return address in your letter. to a possible strategic victory for the It results in piecemeal commitmentof Eastern forces. reserves by NATO, leaving little or no Again, according to the Soviet Military opportunity to eliminate a break-in to the Power - ?985.the OMG is "ideally suit- defensive zone. ed" to deliver these five basic concepts in The "activeness" is generally limited 4 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 MG Frederic J. Brown Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Armor Assessment, Part II: Our Strength is Our People First and foremost, we are an Army of people. troopers in the 1st Armor Training Brigade. These Although the Armor-Cavalry force tends to focus on quality young people are provided more intensive equipment, equipment is useful only to the extent that training. They are, in fact, trained in some Skill Level it is fought by capable, motivated individuals. Our 20 tasks. They are sent to their units on the verge of first concern has been to ensure that we have selected being successful gunners. We have now provided over the most capable and that we can train them consis­ eight hundred to the Armor and Cavalry force. Our tent with their expectations as they strive to " be all present indications are that close to 100 percent of the they can be", and also consistent with the demands of young soldiers selected for accelerated promotion to the equipment. E-5 are, in fact, Excellence Track soldiers. We have been reviewing the accessioning policies, We are reinforcing this competence with the Tank both for initial entry and lateral entry, as we have been Commanders' Certification Test (TCCT I) which will building the noncommissioned officer component of be implemented across the force during FY 86. Essen­ the Armor force. First and foremost has been the tially, it is based upon an improved tank gunnery emphasis on the combat arms. We have joined the skills test to be administered by the chain of command Infantry branch in aggressive recruiting within our prior to service firing. All officers and noncommis­ Army itself and from the colleges through the ROTC sioned officers within the Armor and Cavalry force are programs and the Military Academy. expected to demonstrate their proficiency at least Although training spaces are not yet available, annually. Ranger training will be established as a prerequisite The TCCT II is a very rigorous, paper-based, annual for service in Cavalry. Capability is being built into MOS examination which will be provided to the chain the training base to support this. We have also been of command to test young soldiers who volunteer for it. reviewing the adequacy of our testing - both mental The intention is that success on TCCT II would result and physical testing. We are now working with the in early selection to E-6, service as a tank commander, Army Research Institute to establish suitable mea· and an invitation to Fort Knox to attend the Master sures of hand-eye coordination and visual acuity to Gunner's Course. better determine who the best armored vehicle fighters We see the master gunner occupying a critically will be. We are actively seeking the aggressive young important position in assuring quality performance to combat arms leader who has both the motivation and his relative commander at every echelon. We have the ability to command the tank or cavalry track. instituted the TCCT III as a bi-annual evaluation of master gunner proficiency. The first course was com­ Training Our People pleted at the Armor Center in the fall of 1985 with the This high-potential accession then needs to be de­ master gunners from III Corps CORTRAIN. Weintend veloped. We have fielded new technical and tactical to send our best young soldiers into the Master Gunner training programs within the Armor Center. It begins program early so that they can serve as master gun­ with the Excellence Track, whereby the chain of com· ners in the grade of E-6 or E-7, while also serving as mand selects up to 20 percent ofthe young tankers and platoon sergeants. Inthis way', we can further develop

March-April 1986 ------ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare------5 ..... A return to Knox for training should be a positive experience, a renewing experience ... " their professional ability for subsequent selection as first sergeants. Within several years, we hope that Leadership in Depth virtually all of our first sergeants will be former We believe that developing leadership in depth is an Excellence Track soldiers, successful on TCCT II, and essential responsibility, initially of the institution master gunners. They will have served for many solid (that is, the Home of Armor at Fort Knox, but primarily months on the tank or cavalry vehicle. of the chain of command in the field. The 2d Armor Training Brigade can set the standards for the force, Personnel Policy Initiatives and it does; but the real development which must occur As we worked to improve tactical and technical comes from the unit, in its officer and noncommis­ excellence, it became apparent that we needed to sioned officer development programs. That develop­ improve the tour length, particularly in the United ment also includes well-measured, quality training to States, for the noncommissioned officer corps. To do ensure that our leaders, and their soldiers, meet the this, we thoroughly scrubbed the TDA within the physical standards not just ofthe semi-annual APRT, CONUS Army and developed considerably more but the high standards required in both the training spaces for the Armor and Cavalry force to increase the area and the battlefield. turnaround time to Europe to periods comparable to Solid leadership is an integral part of a robust, that for infantrymen. This has almost been accom­ winning force. Our intention is that as we train in plished. We also looked at the numbers of positions peacetime we'll develop both noncommissioned officer across the Army for CMF 19 at the grade E-8 and E-9 and officer corps which are trained to exercise battle­ and discovered that there was inadequate promotion field responsibilities at least one level higher than flow. So we have increased the number of E-8 and E·9 their current position. We would hope, in fact, to get to positions, in particular, to develop a flow similar to two levels. that of the other arms. We hope for example, that the platoon sergeant who is an Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course Improving Officer Training graduate would be capable of commanding the tank Almost a decade ago, the Armor Officer Basic company or cavalry troop on the battlefield should the Course was improved to provide considerably more occasion demand. hands·on training for officers. This is being further This is a very similar approach to the depth that was enhanced, particularly with the institution of modular built into the Reichswehr in Germany after World War training experiences similar to what the officer will I, and it provided a base of excellence which was expect in the field. We are now in the process of multiplied manyfold during World War II. Greater extending this structured hands-on training to the depth will be required to survive during the initial Advanced Course, both for the active and reserve stages of the Air Land Battle which we hope to deter, components. The result will be officer training with and greater talent will also serve as a source of considerably more field experience than has been the expansion potential. case in the past. Lastly, we ha ve redesigned the former Lightning Brigade into the 2d Armor Training Bri­ Leading Forward, by Example gade (Leader Training). This unit is responsible for We at Knox have also focused on the essential providing intense two-week instructional experiences necessity of the combat arms leader leading forward. to officers and NCOs on tanks or cavalry vehicles. The leader must lead by example, whether it is in his The Tank Commander's Certification Course (TC3) technical knowledge and proficiency - the knowledge and the Scout Commander's Certification Course of maintenance services, for example - or his personal (SC3) have been designed to provide refresher or proficiency on the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer, to transition training on the equipment to which the commanding the first tank to qualify on Individual individual will be assigned at his unit. If you have been Tank Qualification. The end result is the same - away from the tank or cavalry force for two or more leaders leading forward by example, against a stan­ years, you will be scheduled to go through this training dard set by the Armor School. to ensure that you are fully technically proficient before you arrive at your new unit. The Armor School Role We intend to complement this with an Armor Com­ Fort Knox should play other roles in support to our mander's Course for active and reserve officers, offer· overall force. Knox should be the home of the branch. ing a very intense, two-week, hands-on, field tactical In the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, we leadership training period. In 1986, this instruction portray our rich battlefield heritage. In the Draper will be initiated at Fort Knox and, hopefully, at Gowen Trophy program we support excellence of leadership Field, Idaho in 1987. The instruction will be over­ across the armor and cavalry force. We also foresee watched by the 2d Armored Training Brigade, which is other vehicles to support the development and expan­ responsible not only to ensure tactical and technical sion of the regimental system. We at the Home of competence, but also training in leading and caring for Armor are pledged to the aggressive support of those armor and cavalry force officers and noncommis­ programs developed by the chain of command to sioned officers. reinforce the ethos and esprit of the mounted arm. A

6 ------ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare------March-ApriI1986 return to Knox for training should be a positive focused on improved command and control informa­ experience, a renewing experience. We look forward to tion, specifically the evolution of battlefield manage­ welcoming you back as you renew your proficiency as a ment systems. We are now engaged in a significant fighter and leader. effort to determine the information requirements so as We also see an obligation to set the standard in to take advantage ofthe microprocessor - how much, demonstrating how you can better care for your sol­ where, when, to what purpose? diers and their families. We have a range of programs This effort has been complemented by considerable underway to ensure a positive, developing environ­ testing in the Physiological and Psychological Effects ment here at Fort Knox, whether you are assigned or of NBC and Extended Operations on Crews (P2NBC2) merely passing through for instruction. If assigned to Study. This is the study of the ability to fight the tank an unaccompanied area, we are striving to make the in NBC conditions. We are doing other studies to larger Fort Knox area a place where you would want to develop more understanding of human performance leave your family. We see caring for the family ofthe under stress and ways that we can condition ourselves mounted arm as an integral aspect of the Home of to survive and prevail under these very difficult battle­ Armor, as applicable to the guardsmen or reservists as field conditions. it is for the active force. In the near future, we will begin evaluation, using development simulation networking (SIMNET). A re­ search facility will be established at Fort Knox to be The Man-Machine Interface used for evaluation of new doctrine, organization, Our last "people program" involves looking at the equipment, training, and, most critically, establishing design of our equipment so that it can be fought more "Man print" personnel factors to ensure that all that effectively and efficiently by motivated, capable sol­ we develop can be accomplished by average people. diers who may be dead tired, cold, and frightened. We These people programs are vitally important to the are reviewing performance data from Table VIII qual­ evolution of our force. We are pursuing them with ification at Grafenwoehr, as well as data from the particular vigor. National Training Center. At present, our efforts are Forge the Thunderbolt!

March-April 1986 ------ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare ------7 CSM John M. Stephens Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Developing, the 19D Scout

In the past few years, we have seen the Armor Force ilies because of the extreme personal and family adjust to many changes in both manning and doctrine. problems being caused. This new situation will also Until recently, however, those changes have had a help the units because now, stabilization may in fact devastating effect on the cavalry scout (MOS 19D). become a reality. Now, with the assistance of practically the entire Additionally, we have identified many 19D posi­ Army, we have been able to increase the size of armor. tions in TOEs that should be coded for Ranger qualifi­ New decisions concerning how we develop cavalry cation. These authorizations are now in effect. The scouts and manage their training and career progres­ duties of the scout squad leader require that he have sion will cause great improvement in what some many of the capabilities trained into the soldiers people have considered a neglected MOS. attending the Ranger Course. The opportunity for the A major change in 19D structure has been in the cavalry scout to attend the Ranger Course will not only grade of the Cavalry Squad Leader. For years, the increase his personal skills in leadership and scouting, Cavalry Squad Leader's grade was Sergeant E-5, and but will increase the commander's all-around recon­ hence, was one grade below his combat arms counter­ naissance capability. parts: the Infantry Squad Leader, the Armor Tank Cavalry assignments cover a multitude of different Commander, and the Artillery Gun Chief, who are all units: heavy divisions, light infantry divisions, air­ Staff Sergeants (E-6) . An even more intriguing fact is borne and air assault divisions, and the motorized that the Scout Squad Leader and the Scout Section division. Cavalry soldiers have the responsibility to be Sergeant had the same skill requirements, but were proficient on the M1l3AlIA2, the M901, the M3, the authorized different grades (The Section Sergeant M551, the HMMWV, etc. We have always expected him was, and remains, a StaffSergeant). I suppose that the to know the equipment when he arrived at our units, rationale was that it was easier to determine who was yet he may have not worked with it for the previous in charge! Now, the authorized grade for a Cavalry three years, or perhaps never at all! Now we have a Squad Leader is StaffSergeant (E-6). Who is in charge? way to provide refresher training for him. The senior man, of course! The point is that scout When a soldier moves from one station to another, or squad leaders were performing all the duties and had has been assigned outside his MOS, and is due to all the responsibilities of their combat arms counter­ return to cavalry duties, he first returns to Fort Knox to parts but were only authorized a rank of Sergeant (E­ be retrained and certified in the Scout Commander's 5). We've corrected that now. Certification Course (SC3). The recent SFC promotion list indicates the 19D Additionally, on-the-job training for the scout is a promotions have opened up: 125 noncommissioned load that the unit no longer has to carry. Those soldiers officers were selected for promotion on that list in MOS who are reclassified (voluntarily or involuntarily) into 19D. There were a number of reasons for the increased the 19D MOS will be trained at Fort Knox. They will number of promotions, but the major reason was the receive OSUT 19D and - depending on their rank increase in authorization. These increases were also -will be required to attend PLDC (if they have not identified in TDA positions: drill sergeants, recruiters, attended), TC3, or BNCOC. positions in the centers and schools, and elsewhere. The Excellence Track Program for 19D has been As the number ofauthorizations increased, the turn­ approved at Fort Knox. The following procedures will around time for CONUS-to-overseas assignments in­ be used to select these soldiers for cavalry: creased from 13-16 months to 24-30 months for ranks of • The OSUT unit will conduct a nomination board SP4 through SSG. This change will have a very to develop an Order of Merit List of nominees for the positive effect on our soldiers and their families. commander. The board will consist of, at a minimum: a Because of the short turn-around time of the past, our company/troop officer, the first sergeant, the senior Army was losing outstanding soldiers and their fam­ tank commander, and a senior drill sergeant.

8 ------ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare------March-April1986 "...The Excellence Track Program for 19D has been approved at Fort Knox..."

The company/troop commander will use the list to to an organization equipped with the M113 and M901, select soldiers for the EIA Program. The number of you will be evaluated on your proficiency with all soldiers selected will be determined by the number of weapons systems assigned to the vehicles as well as qualified soldiers on the OML and the unit's training the vehicles themselves. Soldiers assigned to Sher- capacity for the program (nominally, 20 percent of its idan, Bradley, or HMMWV, will be tested on their trainees). vehicles and weapons. The company/troop commander will also use the The Scout Commander's Certification Test 11 will be list to select soldiers to be recommended for accel- a written test for Excellence Soldiers and Master erated promotion to PVT (E-2) in the soldiers' eighth Gunner candidates. The test is a generic 19D examina- week of training. The commander may recommend up tion, and consists of Skill Level 3 and 4 subjects. The to 10 percent of his unit's PVT (E-1)trainee strength at test will be administered to an Excellence Track the eighth week for promotion to PVT (E-2).Promotion Soldier when recommended by his commander for authority to PVT (E-2), however, rests with the battal- early promotion to SSG (at the 4-year TIS point). The ion/squadron commander and may not be delegated. 19D Sergeant will have only one opportunity to take Selection for promotion to PFC will be made the exam. Upon notification of passing the test, the during the thirteenth week of the training cycle. NCO will be awarded 50 additional promotion points. Platoon sergeants will recommend those soldiers with There are other programs for the future that will the rank of PVT (E-2) who successfully complete the contribute to excellence in the 19D MOS. The Scout EIA Program and who have continued to demonstrate Commander's Certification Test I11 for D3 Master the ability to learn, personal motivation, leadership Gunners is one. SCCT I11 will give the Armor Force the potential, physical fitness, and technical proficiency. capability of maintaining a check system on all Mas- This program may also be used by TOE unit com- ter Gunners assigned to these positions. However, the manders to place outstanding soldiers in the Excel- effectiveness of the program is dependent on two lence Program. Procedures are outlined in Appendix A elements: the chain of support and the chain of com- of the Armor Enlisted Development Manual. mand. Another new program coming on line to increase the The noncommissioned officer must understand that proficiency of the 19D is the Scout Commander's his responsibilities must be executed to the highest of Certification Test. The Scout Commander's Certifica- standards. The support chain and the command chain tion Test I aligns 19D hands-on proficiency with the must understand those responsibilities and evaluate 19E's and 19K's Level I tests. It is an annual test them according to the high standards that are neces- designed to examine all leaders on the system or sary if we are to create a truly professional 19D systems to which they are assigned. If you are assigned Cavalry Scout Leader.

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March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 9 I The Armored Cavalry Regiment Catalyst for Operational Success

It has been said that “Without success or convert tactical success corps commander’s ability to seize cavalry, battle is a rather inele- into operational advantage. and retain the operational initia- gant affair.” Some would say Fundamentally, the success of the tive and concentrate overwhelming this is ample justification for corps depends on the soundness of combatpower against the enemy at having an armored cavalry reg- the corps commander’s campaign the decisive time and place. iment in the force structure. But plan, the accuracy of his intelli- as this article describes, the ar- gence, and the speed with which Provides Fresh Information mored cavalry regiment is the the corps creates and exploits op- The ability of the corps command- catalyst which turns the tenets portunities for decisive maneuver. er to seize and retain the operation- of our corps doctrine into a bat- In large measure, the corps’ success al initiative and concentrate over- tlefield capability. depends on the corps commander’s whelming combat power at the The operational concept of the sense of timing. This sense of tim- right time and place is predicated regiment stems from the corps’ re- ing is a bit intangible, but crucial to on having fresh information about quirements for reconnaissance and eventual victory. the enemy - his exact dispositions, security; so first, let’s review the size, composition, direction of move- operational concept of the corps. Operational Maneuver ment, and rate of advance. Acting A thorough appreciation of ma- sooner than the enemy, concentrat- The Corps Operational neuver is the key to understanding ing units at the right time and Concept the concept of AirLand Battle. Ma- place, keeping him continually off The corps is the focal point for neuver is the essence of our fighting balance, and disrupting his opera- fighting AirLand Battle. Within a doctrine. Maneuver, in the opera- tional timing, are primarily func- corps structure, we harness the tional sense, is the swift position- tions of having an accurate picture combat power of our army and ap- ing of combat units to attack the of the enemy’s dispositions and ac- ply it for decisive effect against our enemy’s rear, strike his flank, cut tivities sooner than he knows about enemies to achieve the goals of our his lines of communications, bog ours. Timing is everything. Victory strategy. The corps commander is him down in non-decisive areas, stems from it. Precise timing of the quarterback of the fighting fall on an isolated segment of his fires and operational maneuvers team. He is primarily in the bus- force, or elude his attack. Maneuver requires a fresh and accurate pic- iness of fighting “tomorrow’s bat- is the means to seize or retain the ture of the enemy’s current disposi- tles.” initiative. Maneuver is the means tions and operational initiatives. He looks forward in time and of concentrating overwhelming Concentration of units through anticipates where battles should be combat power at a decisive time maneuver is also predicated on the fought or where they should be and place. Maneuver is the means ability of divisions and brigades to avoided. to create and exploit tactical and move with precision within the He plans and executes simul- operational advantages. It is the corps area of operations. Conse- taneous battles in deep, close-in, means to fight outnumbered and quently, the corps commander must and rear operations. win. Only by retaining the ability also have current information He assures the corps is dis- and freedom to maneuver his bri- about terrain and trafficability posed and resourced to achieve the gades and divisions can the corps within his area of operations. These objective of the operational plan commander achieve the require- factors, more than any other, influ- and remains poised to exploit op- ments of our fighting doctrine. The ence his ability to maneuver divi- portunities created by tactical suc- basic doctrinal tenets of initiative, sions or brigades to the point of. cess or enemy mistakes. depth, agility, and synchronization decision or advantage. A corps He synchronizes the concentra- contribute to this end. Facilitating commander courts disaster without tion of units and logistical support operational maneuver is where the this kind of information.

of each battle to enhance the tac- armored cavalry regiment finds its I The corps commander has a wide tical success of his subordinate niche. variety of intelligence sources avail- units. able to him: military intelligence He influences the tactical suc- The Fundamental Role of the organizations, long-range surveil- cess of subordinate maneuver units Armored Cavalry Regiment lance units, artillery target acquisi- by fighting enemy follow-on forces, The armored cavalry regiment tion systems, air defense warning shifting the main effort, employing serves as a catalyst which trans- systems, Air Force and Army recon- corps-controlled combat and com- lates the concept of operational ma- naissance and surveillance air- bat support units, committing the neuver into a battlefield capability. craft, and strategic systems. How- corps reserve at the decisive time Performing reconnaissance and se- ever, these sources are focused pri- and place to assure operational curity, the regiment facilitates the marily on intelligence preparation

March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 11 m mI

Figure 1 of the battlefield (IPB). Collection impassable routes, blown bridges, Provides Time and Space efforts are predominantly oriented unfordable streams, contaminated The regiment provides time for well forward of the FLOT to identi- areas, refugee columns, and the en- the corps commander to assess the fy enemy activities or operational emy. The regiment can guide ma- situation, develop a course of ac- maneuvers which could affect the neuver units into engagements with tion, issue orders, and maneuver corps several days in the future. the enemy, assist in rapir‘ly mass- units. The regiment also provides This kind of intelligence informa- ing and dispersing maneuver units, space to maneuver brigades and tion is collated, analyzed, and dis- and monitor the movement of com- divisions by creating the flexibility seminated by the corps all-source bat support and combat service sup- to respond to unanticipated enemy intelligence center. Here is the port elements to support the main initiatives. Performing reconnais- point: This information is used pri- effort. sance and security operations at a marily to support planning of fu- distance from the corps’ main body, ture operations. It serves as a basis Preserves Combat Power the regiment provides the corps for the corps commander to dispose Performing security, the regi- commander time and space to syn- and concentrate his forces to meet ment carries out missions which chronize effectively maneuver with future combat requirements. While protect and preserve the combat supporting fires, and logistical sup- this type of intelligence is absolute- power of the corps until the corps port. ly necessary, it is not sufficient. commander determines where forc- The corps commander needs fresh es need to be concentrated and until An Economy of Force Option combat information during the ex- forces can be maneuvered into bat- A corps commander will prob- ecution of current battles to be pre- tle with the enemy. In offensive ably have to fight a bigger oppo- cise in his maneuvers and applica- operations, well in advance of the nent. Outnumbered in the macro, he tion of supporting fires. corps main body, the regiment pre- must be stronger in the micro at a Precise concentration of units vents premature deployment and decisive point. The only way he can and supporting fires during execu- attrition of the corps until it reach- do this is accept risk somewhere in tion of corps plans is predicated on es its operational objective, due to his area of operations. Organized having current information about the influences of terrain or enemy as a powerful, combined-arms team, the enemy and terrain. The primary forces. In defensive or retrograde the regiment provides the corps source of fresh information for the operations, the regiment provides commander an economy-of-forceop- corps commander is the armored early warning of enemy approach, tion to free other combat maneuver cavalry regiment (Figure 1). counters enemy ground reconnais- units in the corps for concentration Performing reconnaissance, the sance activities and effectively elsewhere in the area of operations. regiment confirms or refutes the screens the corps from ground ob- IPB collection effort. It tells the servation, and protects the corps corps commander what he needs to from surprise attacks and unanti- Disruption of the Enemy’s know to fight - the actual size and cipated engagements. Operational Timing composition of the enemy, his cur- Operating at a distance from the There is decisive benefit to dis- rent dispositions, where he’s strong, corps main body, the regiment de- rupting the operational plan of the where he’s weak, and where the velops the situation and, hence, enemy. The Soviets are rational application of superior combat prevents the corps from fighting at players who construct top-down, power could have a decisive effect. a disadvantage (e.g. unwarned, scientifically-based, and highly-de- The regiment shows the corps com- poorly deployed, not poised to tailed plans. Any disruption in the mander how and where to move his fight). In the process, the regiment execution of their plan will break forces despite conditions on the bat- permits the corps commander to see the tempo of their- operation and tlefield which stand in his way: opportunities and exploit them. dissipate their combat power before 12 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 "...Though offensive cover is a security operation, it primarily entails the performance of -@I=COVER reconnaissance..." it can be concentrated and applied in overwhelming strength against the corps at the time and place of their choosing. Disruption sets the stage and provides the corps com- mander an opportunity to seize or Ii retain the initiative. Deception at the operational level is a key ele- ment of the corps' disruption effort. The regiment is a central player in deception operations. It can easily be made to look like a division or portray a false combat operation in the form of a feint, demonstration, CORPS RESERVE or supporting attack. With this as a Figure 2 @ background, let's look in closer de- tail at the missions performed by the regiment in support of corps operations. do for the corps commander? forces, develop the situation, identi- The regiment, a versatile and fy tactical or operational resewes, Corps Offensive Operations powerful combined arms team, can provide for the uninterrupted for- The corps undertakes offensive perform several missions required ward movement of the main body, operations when the commander for operational success of the corps provide reaction time and maneu- sees an opportunity to take the in offensive operations. In terms of ver space, and prevent the prema- initiative or when a higher com- mission frequency, offensivecover ture deployment of the corps main mand orders an attack to be con- and flank guard operations will body. To achieve this purpose, the ducted. Within a corps offensive predominate. However, the regi- covering force deploys well-foi- scheme of maneuver, a variety of ment is also well-suited to defend or ward of the main body and pro- operations are usually conducted delay in an economy-of-force role, vides follow-on divisions-an oppor-- by subordinate maneuver units. to conduct a supporting attack, or tunity to change their direction of Some may perform a deep attack, a to perform deception operations if movement if necessary without suf- deliberate attack, a movement to the corps commander chooses. fering a loss of momentum. To cre- contact, a hasty attack, reconnais- Here's the important point: The ate the time and space necessary to sance in force, a spoiling attack, or regiment's versatility provides the alter the course or objectives of a raid. Others may conduct a feint, corps commander a lot of options. follow-on divisions, the regiment demonstration, or display in sup- When attacking, the corps com- operates independently, well out- port of corps deception operations. mander usually leads with the mini- side the range of supporting fires in Others perform security operations, mum necessary force to cover the the corps main body. such as screen, advance guard, corps advance. In most cases the If the corps assigns the covering flank guard, or offensive cover. nod will go to the regiment. Though force mission to a division, the reg- Others may defend in an economy offensive cover is a security opera- iment will usually be assigned a of force role to allow the corps tion, it primarily entails the per- flank guard mission for the corps. commander to concentrate combat formance of reconnaissance (Figure Flank guard is a security operation power elsewhere within his area of 2). The DurDose of the offensive whose purpose is to provide early

oDerations. What does the regimentI coverind foke is to find enemy warning of enemy approach, reac-

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 13 tion time and maneuver space, and prevent enemy ground observation and direct fire engagement of ele- ments of the corps main body (Figure 3). Flank guard is a complex opera- tion which requires performance of several missions simultaneously by subordinate units of the regiment. Zone reconnaissance is performed between the regiment’s route of ad- vance and the flank of the corps main body from the line of depar- ture to the objective. Upon enemy approach into the flank of the corps, the regiment screens, defends, de- lays, or attacks, if required to ac- complish the mission. Unlike in the covering force mission, however, the regiment normally remains within range of corps supporting Figure 3 fires in the main body. Corps Defensive Operations A corps defends when it is not possible to attack or to facilitatean offensive elsewhere in the theater of operations. Fundamentally, a de- fense is usually organized to defeat an enemy attack, but the underly- ing purpose is to create the oppor- tunity to change to the offensive. The basic concept for corps de- fense calls for simultaneous defeat of enemy first echelon units in the close-in fight and second echelon forces in deep operations, to disrupt enemy movement of units and fire support, break up the attacker’s BUL momentum, and disrupt, delay, and FlBA destroy command and control and logistical support operations in the enemy rear area. Since the corps will probably be outnumbered, the corps commander must attempt to engage isolated parts of the enemy force by operation within interior lines and striking at exposed ene- my forces at every opportunity. Within a typical defensive scheme of maneuver, subordinate maneuver units of the corps will perform a variety of missions. Some will de- fend in sector, some will delay. Others will attack or counterat- tack. Some will guard, some will cover. Some units will defend in an economy-of-force-roleto allow the corps commander to concentrate Figure 4 combat power somewhere else in his area of operations. Some may attack deeD into the tactical and

14 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 operational depth of the enemy’s zone of action. Others perform de- ception operations. What does the regiment do? In terms of frequency, defensive cover and defend in sector in an economy-of-force role are missions which the regiment will most often be tasked to perform. Defensive cover is a security operation (Fig- ure 4). As a covering force, the regiment deploys far enough for- ward of the main battle area (MBA) to protect the units from premature engagements and the concentrated s(I ,- fires of enemy medium range artil- x X lery forces. .? x The purpose of defensive cover is to slow the enemy’s advance, force him to deploy and begin an attack prematurely, dissipate his combat power, disrupt his operational tim- ing and synchronization, and iden- tify his main effort for the corps Figure 5 COWS RISIRVC commander. The regiment is expect- la-+- ed to defend - rather than delay to destroy the lead regiments - cause the premature commitment of sec- ond echelon forces, and disclose his drawal, and retirement. The regi- the corps are traditional. Others main effort. To create the time and ment is ideally suited to provide have evolved to satisfy the require- space necessary to achieve the pur- security for the corps as it moves ment of corps operations and Air- pose of this mission, the regiment away from the enemy; the regiment Land Battle doctrine. Others have deploys at least 20 kilometers for- protects the corps from enemy ex- evolved in response to changes in ward of the main battle area (MBA) ploitation and pursuit ventures. our enemy’s doctrine, operational (Figure 4). Defensive cover, delay, rear guard, concepts, and capabilities. The regi- If the corps commander believes and flank guard operations are the ment is a versatile combined arms he needs to generate a large opera- high frequency missions for the maneuver force which increases the tional reserve or concentrate his regiment during retrograde opera- corps commander’s options. It facil- maneuver forces in a particular sec- itates his ability to seize or retain tion of the MBA, he could task the tio%ommand and Control the operational initiative, achieve regiment to defend in sector in an Because of the corps command- depth and flexibility, retain agility, economy-of-forcerole. The regiment er’s pressing need for fresh infor- and synchronize the concentration is well-suited for this mission, and mation during the execution of his of units with supporting, fires and with some reinforcement, it can suc- plan, the regiment operates pre- logistical support. The regiment al- cessfully defend an enemy division- dominantly under his personal com- so facilitates the corps command- size zone of attack. If the regiment mand and reports to him directly. If er’s ability to preserve, and then is employed in this role, divisions the situation demands, the regi- concentrate overwhelming combat will normally provide their own ment may be placed temporarily power with precision where it will brigade-size covering force (Figure under the operational control of a produce victories. 5). subordinate division. In the next issue we will describe the operational concept for employ- Corps Retrograde The Regiment Today ment for the armored cavalry Operations Several of the roles and missions squadron of the heavy division. Retrograde operations are con- which the regiment performs for scouts Out! ducted by the corps when it is ne- cessary to move away from the ~-~~ ~ enemy to reposition forces on more This article, which reflects current doctrine. was prepared by the Cavalry favorable terrain, husband resour- Branch, Command and Staff Department of the Armor School. The article ces for future operations, gain time, was written by Major John D. Rosenberger and Colonel Thomas E. White of or avoid combat under unfavorable the Combined Arms Center. situations. The three types of retro- grade operations are-delay, with-

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 15 The St. Geo

Ed. Note: In our last issue, we an- nounced that the U.S.Armor Asso- ciation would be implementing an award program this year called “The Order of St. George.” This article gives more information on that program and shows why this famous knight was selected as the patron of all mounted warriors. For many years now, the Field Artillery Association has rewarded its premier “Redlegs” and civilian supporters with a special award: The Order of St. Barbara. Yet, for ,” over a thousand years there has human sacrifices werk’ then been one name that elicits visions drawn by lot. Oneday, the lot fell to of valor, dash, elan, and bravery. the king’s daughter. She was left in He has become known as the pa- the swamp to face the dragon, and tron of both the soldier in general, this is where St. George finds her The St. George medallion was designed and of cavalry and armored forces during his travels. In a fierce com- by Mark Irwin. the artist who recently specifically. He is St. George, the bat, George defeats the dragon but painted “The Centennial of Armor.” Dragon Killer. does not kill it. Instead, he ties the princess’ waistband around the The History dragon’s neck and has her lead it “he heroic and legendary image back to the city. There he promises the colors of the United States of Saint George defeating the drag- to slay the dragon if the people will Cavalry are the same. on exemplifies the mounted gallan- embrace the Christian faith. This Today, St. George still abides as try and righteous bravery that we they agree to do, and he kills the the patron of mounted warriors have come to associate with the dragon. throughout the world. The Italian horse-mounted knights of old. St. Later, of course, the dragon came Armor Force celebrates St. George’s George is the only saint who is to represent the embodiment of evil Day with battalion ceremonies. Sev- portrayed as fighting mounted, and hatred rather than an animal, eral years ago, the French Armor and his name is linked to famous but the moral remained. The her- Force also adopted St. George as its battles, military orders, and mount- oism and faith of St. George be- patron. Within the next year or so, ed warriors throughout the past. came bulwarks to all warriors. the West German Armor Forcemay We believe that the man who The association of St. George’s also adopt St. George as its pa- became known as St. George was name with the exploits of mounted tron. He is a common thread among born in about 280 AD in a region of warriors extends through the Cru- the Armor and Cavalry forces of what is now modem Greece. As a sades. In 1098, St. George was most of the NATO nations. His result of his personal bravery, this credited with a mystical appearance memory lives on today in the spirit man - then known as Nestor of and a resulting victory of the Cru- of the armored knight who helps Cappodocia -became a member of saders over the Saracens. His fame soldiers in need, who is the epitome the Roman Emperor Diocletian’s continued to spread through the of selfless service, and who is the personal bodyguard. In 303 AD, ages. archetypal mounted warrior. Diocletian issued an edict in Nico- One of the oldest and most noble demia, now a part of Turkey, that of knightly orders, the Order of the The Order of St. George ordered the destruction of all Chris- Garter, was founded in England in In keeping with this heroic order, tian churches, sacred writings and the 14th Century to honor St. the United States Armor Associa- books, and outlawing all Christians George. Its members were chosen tion will, this year, formally adopt who did not, on the surface at least, by the king and had to be of “gentle St. George as the Patron of the conform to paganry. birth, courageous and free from all United States Armor/Cavalry Upon seeing the edict, Nestor reproach.” Annual ceremonies are force. The Armor Association will tore it down. For his act and his conductedin St. George’s Chapel at serve as the sole manager for three refusal to abide by the pagan em- Windsor Castle on 23 April, St. awards of the St. George Medallion peror’s edict, Nestor was impris- George’s Day, and the knighting that not only recognizes service to oned, tortured, and executed. Early ceremony contains the phrase: “By the Armor/Cavalry Force, but also Christians changed Nestor’s name the Grace of God and Saint establishes demonstrable standards to George, and he became associ- George.” of professional excellence through- ated with bravery, dedication to Almost 50 years ago, in 1937, out the Armor/Cavalry Communi- faith, and decency. Pope Pious IX declared St. George ty. The legend of St. George’s defeat- as the Protector of the Italian Cav- “here are actually two levels of ing the dragon DerDetuates the alry. St. George’s colors are red and membership in the Armor Associa- mGht of the hounted warrior over white,_andit is no coincidence that tion’s St. George Program: The Or- 16 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 Order of Saint George (Silver and Gold Medallions)

Nominee .Nomination Procedures Approving Authority Armor Association Actions

Active and Reserve com- 1. Prepare a nomination packet consisting of a The approving authority 1. The Executive Director will review ponent military personnel detailed letter of justification and a fully com- for all accessions to the the nomination packet, prepare an ap- with an Armor chain of pleted order form. Order of Saint George ppropriate decision paper. and forward command. (regimental is the Commanding Gen- it to the Commanding General for deci- cavalry commander, divi- 2. Obtain the concurrence of the entire Armor eral. USAARMC. The sion. sional brigades, separate chain of command. Commanding General brigades). may approve, disapprove 2. Upon receipt of the Commanding 3. Forward the endorsed nomination packet ' or downgrade the nomi- General's decision, the Executive Direc- along with payment in advance ($20).to the Ex- nation to the Honorable tor will either prepare the award pack- ecutive Director, U.S. Armor Association. P.O. Order, as he deems ap- age and mail it IAW the instructions pro- Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 401 21. The packet should propriate. vided on the order form, or return the arrive at Ft. Knox MLTB weeks prior to the date packet and prepayment to the of presentation to allow for administrative han- nominator. dling and mailing time. Special mailing arrange- ments may be made with the Association staff, 3. The Association staff will pon the re- (502)942-8624, but postage costs will be borne cipient's name to the Order of Saint by the requestor. George master file. Active and Reserve com- 1. Same as procedure 1, personnel with an Ar- Same as for personnel Same as actions for personnel wah an ponent military personnel mor chain of command. with an Armor chain of Armor chain of command. without an Armor chain command. of command. 2. Same as procedure 3, personnel with an Ar- mor chain of command (except no endorsement required).

Active and Resew com- 1. Same as procedure 1. personnel with an Ar- The approving authority 1. Same as action 1, personnel with an ponent U.S. military and Armor chain of command. for nominations in this Armor chain of command. foreign military personnel category are identified in at USAARMC. 2. Obtain the concurrence of the USAARMC or Step 3 of the preceding 2. me Association's Secretary will pre- USAARMS chain of command. column. pare the award package and notify the nominator that it is ready for pick-up, or 3. Obtain the approval of the appropriate indi- return the nomination packet and pre- vidual indicated below: payment to the nominator.

Agency to which the 3. Same as action 3, personnel with an nominee is assigned Final concurring officer Armor chain of command.

USAARMS 26 Armor Tng Bde Mr or Deputy Asst Cmdt Armor & Engr Board President, AEB .. 4. Forward the approved nomination packet, along with payment in advance (520).to the Executive Director, U.S. Armor Associa- tion, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 401 21. The packet should arrive at the Association office NLT4 weeks prior to the desired date of presentation to al- low time for administrative handling.

Other (retired, civilian, 1. Same as procedure 1, personnel with an Arr The approving authority 1. Same as action 1, personnel without and foreign candidates, mor chain of command. for all nominations in this an Armor chain of command. regardless of stationing). category is the Com- 2. Same as procedure 4. personnel with an Ar- category is the Com- 2. Same as action 2, personnel without mor chain of command (except no endorsement manding General. an armor chain of command. required). USAARMC, or his desig- nated representative. 3. Same as action 3, personnel with an Armor chain of command.

der of St. George and the Honorable Army Armor Force or the Marine the Chief of Armor, who serves as Order of St. George. Corps Armor Forces. This Order is an officer of the Armor Associa- The Order of Saint George is the reserved for an elite few whose ca- tion, constitutes the basic awards most distinguished of the levels of reers have embodied the spirited package. Members of the Order of the military society. It recognizes dignity and sense of sacrifice and St. George are entitled to wear the the select few who stand above commitment epitomized by Saint Order's gold or silver medallions their brethren in the Honorable George. The quality of the contribu- (which accompany the awards Order. The specific criteria for ac- tions and the length of service package) with red and white neck- cession into the Order of Saint should govern the level of the award ribbon at all appropriate functions George is to have performed con- (Gold or Silver). A certificate veri- (e.g. social functions such as a St. spicuous, long-term service for, or fied by the Executive Director of the George dining-in or induction cere- on behalf, of the United States Armor Association, and signed by mony. an ArmorKavalry unit din-

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 17 Honorable Order of Saint George (Bronze Medallions)

Nominee Nomination Procedures Approving Authority Armor Association Actions

Active and Reserve com- 1. Prepare a nomination packet consisting of a The approving authority 1. The Association's Secretary will re- ponent military personnel detailed letter of justification and a fully com- for all accessions to the view the nomination packet for com- with an Armor chain of pleted order form. Honorable Order of pleteness. command (cavalry regi- Saint George is any mental commander, 2. Obtain the concurrence of the entire Armor Armor commander in 2. The Association's Secretary will pre- divisional brigades, chain of command. the field in the rank pare the award package and mail IAW separate brigades). of full colonel or the information provided on the order 3. Obtain approval of the approving authority. above. form, or return the packet and prepay- ment to the nominator. 4. Forward the endorsed nomination packet, along with payment in advance (520). to the 3. The Association staff will post the re- Exeuctive Director, US.Armor Association, cipient's name to the Honorable Order of P.O. Box 607. Ft. Knox, KY 40121. The Saint George master file. packet should arrive at Ft. Knox NLTB weeks prior to the desired date of presentation to allow for administrative handling and mailing time. Special mailing arrangements may be made with the Association staff. (502)942-8624.but postage costs will be borne by the requestor. Actii and Rarerve mm- 1. Same as procedure 1, personnel with an Ar- The approving authority 1. The Executive Director will review ponent military personnet' mor chain of command. for all nominations in this nomination packet, prepare an appropri- without an armor chain category is the Com- ate decision paper, and forward it to the of command (individuals. 2. Same as procedure 4, personnel with an Ar- manding General, Commanding General, or his designated separate troops and com- mor chain of command (except no endorsement USAARMC, or his desig- representative, for decision. panies). required). nated representative. 2. Upon return of the decision paper, the Association's Secretary will either pre- pare the award package and mail IAW the instructions provided on the order form or return the nomination packet and prepayment to the nominator. 3. Same as action 3, personnel with an Armor chain of command.

Active and Reserve mm- 1. Same as procedure 1, personnel with an Ar- The approving authority, 1. Same as action 1. personnel with an ponent U.S. military and Armor chain of command. for nominations in this Armor chain of command. foreign military personnel category is identified in at USAARMC. 2. Obtain the concurrence of the USAARMC or Step 3 of the precedins 2. The Association's Secretary will pre- USAARMS chain of command. column. pare the award package and notify the nominator that it is ready for pick-up, or 3. Obtain the approval of the appropriate indi- return the nomination packet and pre- vidual indicated below: payment to the nominator.

Agency to which the 3. Same as action 3. personnel with an nomine8 is assigned Final concurring officer Armor chain of command.

USAARMS 2d Armor Tng Bde Cdr or Deputy Asst Cmdt Armor & Engr Board President, AEB

4. Fomard the approved nomination packet. along with payment in advance (520). to the Executive Director, U.S. Armor Associa- tion, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121. The packet should arrive at ' the Association office NLT4 weeks prior to the desired date of presentation to al- low time for administrative handling. Other (retired. civilian. 1. Same as procedure 1, personnel with an Ar- The approving authority 1. Same as action 1, personnel without and foreign candidates, mor chain of command. for all nominations in this an Armor chain of command. regardless of stationing). category is the Com- 2. Same as procedure 4, personnel with an Ar- manding General, 2. Same as action 2. personnel without mor chain of command (except no endorsement USAARMC. or his desig- , an armor chain of command. required). nated representative. 3. Same as action 3. personnel with an Armor chain of command. ing-in, or party, etc.). promotion of Armor and Cavalry in Armor and Cavalry commanders The second level of the award is ways that stand out in the eyes of in the rank of full colonel and above The Honorable Order of St. George. the recipients' seniors, subordi- are responsible for ensuring that This award recognizes those indi- nates, and peers alike. A certificate the nomination of individuals for viduals who have demonstrated the similar to that given with the gold all awards are deserving and for highest standards of integrity and and silver medallions constitutes ensuring that the wearing of the moral character; displayed an out- the basic awards package of this award does not conflict with uni- standing degree of professional award also. Members of the Honor- form standardization guidelines. competence; served the United able Order of St. George are entitled Nomination procedures for these States Army Armor/Cavalry Force to wear the Order's bronze medal- awards are shown in the accom- and Marine Corps Armor with self- lion with red and white neck-ribbon panying tables. lessness; and contributed to the at all appropriate occasions. 18 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 What Would You Do? Fighting With Degraded-Mode Gunnery

This problem was prepared by Captain F. Galgano, instructor, Weapons Depart- ment, USAARMS.

Situation You are a member of Company A, 1st Battalion, 10th Armor, whichis equipped with the M1 Abrams tank. For the past two days the battalion has been defending from a battle position against the determined assault of a motorized rifle regi- ment. As a result of a series of violent engagements, the opposing regiment has been nearly shattered. The battalion has just occupied the well-prepared new battle positions and is now waiting for what is Situation 2 TIS. You imm-e3TateIy issue your expected to be the final lunge of the It is now several hours after you precision fire command. As your nearly exhausted enemy offensive. destroyed the T72s aud their com- gunner lases, the TIS symbology rades from what remained of the disappears, but the reticle remains. Situation 1 motorized rifle regiment. In front of The T72 is fully exposed. What You M1 is hull-down and well your position is the carnage from would you do? camouflaged. You are observing the last-ditch attempt of the failed Solution your assigned sector when two Red offensive. Initiative must now This is a most dangerous situa- T72s emerge from the woodline ap- be seized quickly, and your com- tion. Your gunner has already layed proximately 1900 meters to your pany is preparing to participate in center of mass of the T72 and lased. direct front. The T72s are moving a brigade-sized counterattack. You tell him to fire from the TIS, laterally across your position and Your tank’s fuel and ammo have NOW! You made this decision based do not see you. You report them to been replenished, but you still have on two facts. First, this tank is your platoon leader, and he in- no reticle in the GPS. However, going to destroy you if you don’t do structs you to engage and destroy. your laser is still functioning and is something fast. Second, a loss of You issue your fire command to the set for last return logic. The TIS is symbology does not mean that the gunner to engage the trailing tank. still operational. Your tank moves LRF has malfunctioned. Your laser Just before the gunner lases, the out, with a battlecarry of SABOT was still functioning and more Gunner’s Primary Sight (GPS) ret- with 1OOOm entered as your battle- than likely a correct range was icle disappears, but a range of 1910 sight range. As your tank moves indexed in the computer (you were meters appears in the symbology. along the side of a hill, a T72 using last return logic). An aside: A You rapidly determine that this is a emerges from some trees at about battlesight engagement will not legitimate malfunction of the GPS 1500 meters to your direct front and work with this situation. With reticle. The Thermal Imaging Sys- opens fire on you. The 125mm pro- 1OOOm in the computer and the tem (TIS) is in the Standby (STBY) jectile explodes to the right rear of target 1500 away, the round will position. What would you do? your tank. You are still using your strike short. Solution This is not a most dangerous situation. You instruct your gunner to switch the THERMAL MODE to ON from STBY and place the Filter (FLTR)/CLEAR/Shutter (SHTR) switch to SHTR, then continue the engagement using the TIS. Remem- ber the GPS reticle is produced in the Laser Rangefinder (LRF) and the TIS reticle is produced in the TIS Electronics Unit (EU). By switching to the TIS, as opposed to going to the Gunner’s Auxiliary Sight (GAS),you have still retained the advantage using the full fire

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 19 Two views of the mortar-howitzer variant of the BMD reveal points of difference: the longer hull, extra roadwheel, and new turret. View of top of the hull, at right, showsdriver'scentralposition in the hull. The author notes the asymmetric blister on left front of the turret, possibly part of the vehicle's fire control. The 120-mm SP Mortar/Howitzer: Its Impact on NATO Rear Area Defense

by Glenn T. Johnston curity and/or combat forces to de number of roadwheels, turret arma- Introduction stroy the airhead. There is often a ment, and mission. The following article examines deprecating attitude as to the ac- The stretched body and the addi- the threat presented to NATO rear tual threat presented by such an tion of a sixth roadwheel are remi- areas by the mechanized Soviet air- airborne unit. A common belief is niscent of the BMD command vari- borne force. It begins with the re- that the threat is tied to one loca- ant.3 The addition of a roadwheel cent observance of a 120-mm self- tion and that it can only move as when an indirect fire system is propelled mortar/howitzer (here- fast as the legs of its infantry. mounted on an infantry vehicle after called a 120-mm SP M/H) Events of the last five years have chassis can also be observed on the mounted on a BMD chassis. The proven that Soviet airborne capa- M-1974 122-mm SPH. When the So- weapon system is initially studied bilities far exceed this expectation. viets mounted the gun on a PT-76 as an end to itself. The weapon's In fact, the Soviet airborne BMD chassis they also added an addi- organization within its parent unit regiment is more mobile, has great- tional roadwheel.' These changes is examined, as well as probable er firepower, and is more heavily are evolutionary and reflect at- employment patterns. The results tempts to maintain mobility param- of the initial analysis are used as a eters when additional weight is springboard to gain an overview of Soviet Airborne Armor added to the armored vehicle. the threat. In this instance, the The turret, armament, and asso- threat is the mechanized Soviet air- armored than any of the combat ciated equipment are interesting in borne force in the NATO rear area. support or combat service support that they reflect the synthesis of units it can expect to encounter in several proven subsystems into a The Problem NATO rear areas. In addition to the previously unproved mortar/how- NATO commanders in central BMD infantry fighting vehicle itzer concept. The conical turret is Europe have long been familiar (IFV), NATO forces can expect a clearly not designed to protect the with the possibility of a Soviet air- number of other BMD variants to crew from high velocity, direct-fire borne assault into their corps and be in their rear areas. These will weapons. The lack of muzzlebrake, theater rear areas. Therefore, the include a stretched version of the fume extractor, or other howitzer- inclusion of the airborne threat has. BMD, the BMD-1979, which can be associated externals leads to the become an obligatory event listed' configured to carry two AGS-17 conclusion that the system has in many NATO exercises. A sce- automatic grenade launchers or a more in common with a mortar nario often portrays Soviet air- command vehicle version.' The than a howitzer. The external blis- borne forces seizing an airfield in most recent BMD variant has been ter on the left hand side of the turret preparation for a major airland op- observed in parade photos and is is reminiscent of a similar blister eration. The typical reaction of the configured as a 120-mm SP M/H.2 on the U.S. T-95tank which housed friendly force commander is to at- components of the OPTAR fire con- tempt to determine the extent of the trol unit. OPTAR gave the T-95 a enemy operation at the airfield. The 120-mm SP M/H fire control system based on a light Once the threat has been defined, The mortar variant differs from beam transmitterheceiver and an the commander will dispatch se- the basicinfantry vehicle in length, offset sighting system.5

~ 20 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 - mobile “shoot and scoot” tactics, the we mavon could Irapidly EO into and come out of action. Theoverall synergism of the position locator, fire control system, and automatic loader would be to allow the weap- on to fire as many rounds as possi- ble in a very short time, and for the vehicle to be gone when the inev- itable counterbattery fire amves. The above description dovetails neatly with the Soviet view of the firepower equation.15 Organization The introduction of the 120-mm Due to the change in mission Table 3 lists the probable char- SP M/H has apparently not de- from prime infantry mover to car- acteristics of the 122-mm SP M/H. creased the number of mortar tubes rier of a mortar/howitzer, the fol- in a battery. The current battery lowing characteristics which are Weapon System Capabilities organization for mortars in an air- tied to the BMD’s infantry mission The mounting of a 120-mm mor- borne regiment allows for six 120- would likely also change. If we as- tar/howitzer on a BMD chassis mm mortars. There is one mortar sume the mortar/howitzer crew to provides the Soviet airborne com- battery in support of each airborne number four, there will be a loss of mander with a dual purpose weap- battalion with an additional bat- four passengers and their associ- ons system capable of a high rate of tery located at the regimental level ated infantry equipment which fire and a mobility equal to that of in a BMD organization.lG This were on the BMD-l973.‘jThe lack of his mechanized airborne infantry. would give a BMD regiment a total an antitank missile launch rail The maximum range of the weapon of 24 120-mmmortars. seems to negate the carrying of may exceed nine kilometers when a There is no indication that a BMD Sagger missiles.7 The removal of rocket assisted projectile (RAP)is surveillance/target acquisition or the 73-mm gun would also delete used.13 The variety of ammunition fire direction center variant has the requirement to maintain a basic available provides an overmatch- been produced. However, the Sovi- load of 40 73-mm rounds.8 The total ing capability against several forms ets have provided such vehicles in weight reduction due to the ve- of defense mechanisms. The devel- their BMP organization, and it hicle’s change in mission would be opment in the West of “smart” 120- would be in character for them to do on the order of 1,050 lbs. If it were mm mortar rounds, which can sense the same if the 120-mm SP M/H assumed that this weight could and destroy armored vehicles, adds were to fire as a battery in the indi- serve as a sizing element for what another dimension to the threat rect role.17 the 120-mmSP M/H could carry as posed by the mortar. The burst ra- a basic load of ammunition, the dius of the 120-mm HE round and Logistic Support 1,050 lb would equal approximately the mortar’s ability to kill in dead- It is unknown how the BMD- thirty 120-mmrounds.9 space makes the weapon a natural equipped force is resupplied when it The remaining question is wheth- for the attack of antitank positions. is away from the airhead. Soviet er the vehicle is crewed by three or These qualities are appreciated by forces have never been famous for four personnel. While there is proba- the Soviet commander.14 their logistical infrastructure, and bly room for four people, the Soviets The capability of the weapon sys- it may be assumed that the mecha- have also been attempting to auto- tem is tremendously increased if nized force will carry as much of its mate as much of the firing sequence one assumes that the armored blis- own resupply as possible onboard as possible on weapons such as the ter, in conjunction with other ob- its individual vehicles. Aerial re- BMD, BMP, the M-1974 122-mm servables on the system’s turret, supply is always a possibility, but SPH, and various main battle contains an integrated fire control the air corridor security required tanks (MBV.10 The introduction of system. A ballistic computer in con- cannot be assured. If the resupply an automatic 82-mm mortar with a junction with an automated super- effort were to be mounted from the cyclic rate of 120 rounds per minute elevation mechanism could lead to airhead and shipped forward on has already been reported.” By way increased accuracy and precision resupply vehicles to a rendezvous, of substantiation, Viktor Suvorov in fire control. Supplemented by an the vehicles would have to run a claims that BMP battalions may be automatic loader, the fire control gauntlet of NATO forces. In all accompanied by self-propelledauto- subsystem would allow for a great- probability, the resupply of a for- matic mortars.12 In light of the er number of rounds to be fired, in a ward detached BMD element would above, it must be realized that the shorter period, with greater accura- be handled through overloading the BMD mortar/howitzer might em- cy, than before. The inclusion of a individual vehicles and by includ- ploy an automatic loader and could relative position locator in the sys- ing a number of pre-packed vehicles operate with a crew of three. Based tem would allow for a more sur- carrviner nothing but resurmlv with- on multide sources. and induction., vivable system. Employing highly in tGe Gechanizid force Gieif. March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 21 impact on Soviet tactics at the op- some means of performing these Methods of Employment erational 1evel.lS The 120-mm SP tactics when operating in NATO The high mobility of the vehicle M/H, with a mobility equal to the rear areas. If the Soviets can de- can be translated into a more sur- rest of the BMD force, has allowed termine a way by which our avail- vivable weapon system through its the Soviet mechanized airborne able forces for counterattack can be ability to perform shoot and scoot unit to operate away from the air- tied up or prevented from receiving missions. The overall mobility of head. The relatively minor devel- movement orders, the OMG will be the battery also provides a clue as opment of designing an indirect successful. to how the BMD force will receive support vehicle to accompany a its indirect fire support when it is mechanized force has tremendous The OMG Support Role outside the protective fires of the implications. of Airborne Mech Troops airhead. Let us assume that the Soviet By their very nature, airborne The Overall Threat attack has located several places units are expected to fight behind Soviet doctrine calls for the execu- where an OMG might be commit- enemy lines. In that environment, tion of offensive combat operations ted. On order, one of the OMGs they are open to attack from any throughout the depth and zone of smashes into a small section of the direction. Under these circum- the enemy defense. Speed, maneu- front, opens a breach in the NATO stances, it can be assumed that the ver, and massive firepower will be defense, and gains access to a high- mortar battery will remain in close employed to ensure the rapid disin- speed route into the NATO rear proximity to its supported elements. tegration of the enemy force. area. The Soviet commander knows While all airborne operations in- Once the attack has met with that a favorite NATO tactic will be volve a certain amount of risk, it success, the Soviet commander will to counterattack and cut off the would be beyond reason to separate search for promising areas of weak- OMG, after which the OMG will be the mortars from those vehicles ness. When found, the operational destroyed in detail. The way in which protect it from ground and maneuver group (OMG) will exploit which to stop, or weaken, the coun- air attack. Instead of firing from a that weakness, break through the terattack will be the insertion of hide position, it can be expected NATO defense, and drive for the airborne forces into the NATO rear that the guns will travel with the rear areas. The mission of the OMG within the same zone of action as maneuver force while firing from will commonly be to outflank, en- the OMG.22The Soviet mechanized short halts, or on the move, as the velope, and destroy the enemy forces airborne regiment has the full capa- situation allows. Individual guns in its zone of operation.20The key to bility to be dropped, or landed, in might be assigned in the direct-fire success for the OMG is speed and the enemy’s rear area. The enemy mode to support individual BMD firepower focused on one objective (NATO), already tied down across companies in order to suppress AT - unhinging the enemy defense. the forward line of troops (FLOT), defenses.18 The limited numbers of The most common conventional and penetrated by at least one rounds carried on board would con- response to the OMG is the timely OMG, would now need to turn its strain the rate of fire. counterattack with heavy forces attention toward a mechanized The conclusion reached is that drawn from other areas. With large force rampaging through its ser- the 120-mm SP M/H will travel as amounts of firepower, high mobil- vice support and command areas. an organic part of the mechanized ity, and good communications, such While the NATO commander airborne force. Due to the weapon’s a counterattack force could turn, if would attempt to block and destroy inablity to counter aerial attack, or not destroy, an OMG. The counter- this force, the Soviet mechanized close-in direct fires, the tubes will attack would not need to be aimed airborne commander would attempt operate within the protective range at the leading elements of the OMG to bypass all centers of resistance. of overlapping fires of the infantry rather, it would seek to strike the Once landed, the BMD battalion force. Limited supplies of ammuni- unprotected flanks of the enemy would either commence its mission tion will call for the conservation of penetration. immediately, or if follow-on forces fires. A common sense approach to The above defense against Soviet were to arrive, it would act to pro- this would be for the BMD force to breakthroughs was employed by. tect the DZ/LZ until other Soviet receive its indirect support from the the German Army on the Eastern security forces could be delivered. mortar/howitzer only when out of front in WW II.21 From this, the Once the mechanized airborne range of those guns at the airhead. Soviets learned that a mobile de- force is allowed to depart on its rear When within range of airhead artil- fense against a breakthrough was area mission, it would be like a fox lery, the 120-mm SP M/H will be only as good as the armored force in a hen house. Attacking various used in the direct fire role. that conducted it and the road net rear supply areas, nuclear delivery on which the counterattack force systems, and command areas, the Impact on Tactics was to travel. Through the effective BMD force would attempt to paralyze Having outlined the provisional use of partisans and airborne any response to its activities. With characteristics, performance pa- forces, the Russians were able to a top road speed of 85 km/hr, fully rameters, and methods of employ- either tie up German armored coun- amphibious, and having a ground ment of the 120-mm SP M/H, it is terattacks through diversionary ac- contact pressure far below many now relevant to show this vehicle’s tions, or block critical road junc- other armored vehicles, the BMD effect on the American soldier. Un- tions, and the Soviet breakthrough force would be difficult to stop. til now, the 120-mm SP M/H has was usually successful. Applying Much like a cavalry raid, the Soviet been examined as a system unto this idea to the use of the OMG airborne force would attempt to hit hard and move fast literallv out- itself. The mortar/howitzer will against NATO forces, we must as- - -.l --- now be examined as to its Dossible sume that the Soviets will emnlovr., running the ability of NATO forces

22 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 to report and track its movement. for use in the enemy’s rear. While mm SP M/H into Soviet airborne With combat trains overrun, com- the dangers of the first two forma- units. The indirect fire support of- munications in shambles, and re- tions are readily apparent, those of fered by this system allows the ports of enemy activity, both real the airborne mechanized force are BMD regiment to roam away from and false, pouring into NATO not. If NATO is to defeat the Sovi- the protective fires of the airhead. headquarters areas, the Soviets ets, it must first realize the increas- The NATO commander must be would present a threat much larger ing dimensions to which minor pen- prepared to repulse and destroy than it actually was.23 etrations and lodgements can grow armored formations at all levels The view from the NATO com- when not destroyed immediately.24 and locations within the NATO mander’s standpoint would be one The Soviets have designed a mul- zone of operations. It becomes clear of chaos. He would find himself in a ti-dimensional combat force that is that the mobility of Soviet mecha- dilemma calling for a timely deci- trained to take advantage of four nized forces has become almost as sion. However, any decision he dimensions. The fourth dimension, dangerous as the direct threat from made would lead to the success of at time, has always been a factor in their weapons. A future war may least one of the Soviet initiatives. war. However, with each increase turn into a situation with which To withdraw at the FLOT would in Soviet mobility, the riskinherent many commanders of the past felt give success to the Soviet command- in an opponent not making a timely comfortable. The battle now goes er at the front. To mobilize avail- decision increases exponentially. not to the strongest, nor to the most able forces in an attempt to cut off The delay in a decision atthe FLOT swift. Instead, paraphrasing Na- and destroy the OMG would leave a of one hour could cause the loss of than Bedford Forrest, it goes to the marauder in his rear and an air- 10-15 square kilometers. If the en- military force that get there “first- head growing by the hour. To at- emy is in the division rear, a loss of est with the mostest.” tack the BMD unit, or the airhead, one hour would give him access to This paper has attempted to shed would tie up forces required to stop up to 300 square kilometers. If loose some light on the potential of the the OMG. To attack all of the rear in the corps zone, he could go any- Soviet mechanized force in the air- area threats would lead to a diffu- where in a 2,700 square kilometer borne division. Althoughimperfect- sion of strength and eventual de- area. If dropped into the corps or ly understood, it presents a major feat of those counterattack forces. theater rear, his circular expansion threat in one mission area. Future Needing more time, in order to gain capabilities in one hour, if left studies need to be made in order to better intelligence as to the pri- alone, will be up to 20,000 square understand the synergistic effects mary Soviet threat, the commander kilometers, using BMDs. While sev- of various subsystems when em- would be under pressure to make eral intelligent things could be ployed as a coordinated whole in an any decision before he had no rear done to determine his location overall military operation. The left to protect. The NATO com- through terrain analysis or report- idea of the four dimensional battle mander finds himself faced with ing procedures, one senses the mag- needs to be addressed when evalu- making a “no win” decision, which nitude of the problem. ating future systems. Above all, the is the ultimate enemy goal. index of mobility of a combat unit The Soviets have worked hard at Conclusions and needs to be developed as a quanti- perfecting a mechanized infantry Recommendations tative expression and applied as a force for use in the assault, an The Soviet threat to the NATO factor in threat analysis. armored force for the breakthrough rear area has been greatly increased and pursuit, and an airborne force through the introduction of a 120-

Footnotes GLENN T. JOHNSTON is a ‘Jane’s Defense Weekly. 18 May 1985. pg. 13Baaedonthe averagerangeextension of a 1978 Distinguished Military 827. conventional Sovietround given rocket assist Graduate of St. Lawrence Zlnternutwnul Defense Review, 11/85. of 50 percent of the original range. University. He served for 3Defense Intelligence Agency, Warsaw I4Donnelly,C. N..,“Soviet Tactics for Over- three years with the 2d Ar- Pact Ground Forces Equipment Handbook: coming NATO Anti-Tank Defenses,” Inter- mored Cavalry Regiment as a Armored Fighting Vehicles, April 1980, pp. national Defense Reuiew, 7/1979, pg. 1102. platoon leader and assistant 3-10. 15Sidorenko,A. A., The Offensive,Moscow, ‘Bonds, Ray, Weapons of the Modern Soviet 1970, pp 23-24. operations officer with the Ground Forces, Arc0 Publishing, New York, I6Dye,Jonathon, D., Soviet BMD Equipped RegimentalS3. Healso served NY, 1981, pg. 64. Airborne Forces. US Army Russian Institute, with the 525th Militarylntelli- SWarford, James M., “The T-95 A Gamble 1979. gence Group in the XVlll Air- in High-Risk Technology,” ARMOR, Sep-Oct 17Wiener,1981, pg. 214. borne Corps All Source Intel- 1983, pg. 39. l*Villahermosa, 1984, pg. 14. ligence Center as an opera- GDIA, 1980. IsWest, Lowry A., Soviet Airborne Opera- tionsofficer. He isa graduate 7DIA, 1980. tions, US Army Russian Institute, 1980, pg. 2. BDIA, 1980. 20Dick, C.J., “Operational Maneuver of the Cavalry Officer‘s Basic 9Based on the weight of a 73-mm round Groups: A Closer Look,” International De. Course(M-55l)and the Mili- obtained in: The Armies of the Warsaw Pact fense Review, 6/1983. tary Intelligence Officer‘s Nations, Friedrich Wiener, Carl Ueberreuter 2’Department of the Army, German De- Advanced Course and is em- Publishers, Vienna, 1981, pg. 196. fense Tactics Against Russian Break- ployed by Bell Aerospace ‘OBonds, 1981, pp. 44-75. throughs, Washington DC, October 1951. Textron as an analyst of mili- 1lVillahermosa, Gilberto, “Soviet Envelop z2Dick,1983. tary operations. He is cur- ing Detachments,” ARMOR. 1984, Sep-Oct 23Bragger,Ronny B., Lessons Learned 1973 rently studying for an ad- pg. 15. Middle East War: A Soviet Perspective, US ~~SUVO~OV,Viktor, Inside the Soviet Army, Army Russian Institute, 1981, pp 4-5. vanced degree in computer- Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 2‘Department of the Army, 1951, pp. 3132. ized cartography. NY. 1982. DP. 71. March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 23 f

24 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 Bastogne: A Fascinating, Obscure Vignette

by Brigadier General Albin F. Irzyk, Ret.

Just before dark on the day after Christmas, 1944, elements of Gen- eral George s. Patton’s 4th Armored CCB, 4th Armored Division Moves to Bastogne Division, attacking from the south, succeeded in making contact with, “the beleagured, battered bastards of Bastogne.” The encircled lOlst Airborne Division had occupied the

critically vital Belgian town for II .*-- .-*C. i- several days, categorically refus- I ,. I c ; ing German demands for surren- BELGIUM HOUFFAUZE ,,; der. t The dramatic linkup of the two ,‘ forces, an emotional, historic mo- I ment, broke the seige of Bastogne Bastogm 0 ,*‘ 1 .e’ and was one of the great turning VAUX LE2 ROSIERES ,‘ points in the Battle of the Bulge. This legendary event has often been described in histories and bi- LUXEMBOURG ographies of World War 11, but there is a sub-plot to this story - a fascinating and exceptional story in itself, but one that is little known. It took the 4th Armored Division LUXEMBOURG five days of bitter, costly fighting to break the ring of German units encircling the lOlst, but only six days before, elements of this same 4th Armored Division had actually SAAR \ , been in Bastogne. In fact, during 1.LoutionofccB \ i’ their earlier movement into the 2. Biic.8th Tk Bn town, these forces had come within , one kilometer of the same spot where they would return, six days replacements, and even fire small in how we were doing, and his visit later, after heavy fighting. arms and tank guns. Spirits were raised the spirits of all of the troops. How could this be? How could high; such extended breaks in the But neither the troops nor Patton this happen? fighting were rare. himself realized the portentous The story now focuses on Combat events lying just ahead. Setting the Stage Command “B” (CCB) of the 4th To understand this enigma, one Armored Division, commanded by Rumors from the North must go back 18 days to 8 Decem- Brigadier General Holmes E. Da- Our first inkling that the rest ber, 1944, the day the 4th Armored ger, and its 8th Tank Battalion, period might be coming to an end Division was pulled back from which was my command. came late on December 16. Stories heavy fightingin the Maginot Line During the rest period, our com- began making the rounds that the for rest and refitting. The move to mand post was in Domnon Les enemy was counterattacking some- the rest area was not only welcome Dieuze, a tiny, muddy, wet, and where north of us. Spirits were im- but richly deserved. The men and depressing little French village mediately dampened, but the ru- vehicles of the division were ex- about 40 miles northeast of Nancy. mors spurred the men to complete hausted after incessant fighting Within three days, the town was the servicing and maintenance of during steady, heavy November littered with tank parts and equip- their vehicles, weapons and equip- rains. The weather, the enemy, and ment as the repairs continued. ment in case we had to move on the gummy mud had taken their Then the atmosphere brightened: short notice. toll of men and tracked vehicles. General Patton had stopped for a The speculation and uneasiness Now there would be time to pull visit. He arrived in his jeep with a ended abruptly at 1045 hours, De- worn engines.- break and reDair big grin and all his stars ablazin’. cember 18th. Combat Command tracks, service the weapons, train He was jolly, animated, interested “B” was placed on one-hour alert

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 25 We began our journey in dark- and told to be prepared to move ness and were to end it in darkness, north in anticipation of an enemy as night came upon us again. We attack into the XI1 Corps sector. traveled in blackout, with no idea of But the concern, uneasiness, and what lay ahead, reconciled to re- puzzlement returned when the alert ceiving enemy fire at almost any order was cancelled at 1700 that moment. day. Neufchateau, another milestone, Three and a half hours later, the came and went as we continued to alert was restored, this time with roll, still without enemy contact. firm instructions to be prepared to Again, we changed direction slight- move north to the I11 Corps sector ly and were soon moving northeast to assist in stopping a strong Ger- on the NeufchateadBastogne road, man counterattack. At 30 minutes enroute to Bastogne, another new after midnight, CCB was rolling. and unfamiliar town name. There was no information about the situation ahead or about the Bivouac in Belgium enemy. CCB’s orders were to move Near the village of Vaux Les to an area in the vicinity of Rosieres, we were at last told to stop Longwy, France, many miles to the for the night and find a bivouac north. The combat command had area. I selected a spot about two been relieved from XI1 Corps and kilometers east of the road. It was was now assigned to I11 Corps. now 2300. Combat Command “A” (CCA) was Except for brief halts, we had the next to move out, nine hours traveled unceasingly for over 22 behind CCB, along the same route. hours - half of one night, all day, Leading the odyssey north into and half of another night under the cold, black night was the 8th blackout conditions. Remarkably, Tank Battalion, cross-reinforced we had traveled 161 miles over fre- with the halftracks of the 10th quently difficult roads without maps Armored Infantry. One factor that and without confusion. Such en- made this move unique was the fact durance was a tribute to both men that the combat command had only and vehicles, and spoke well for the one map - and it was in the hands work we’d accomplished during the of General Dager. During our rapid recent rest period. Happily, there movements across France that sum- had been no enemy contact. mer and autumn, we had occasion- That evening, none of us realized ally run off of our combat maps and that we had been in the vanguard had to rely on Michelin road maps of what President Nixon, a Patton for direction. But for our tankers to admirer, later called the greatest be completely out of maps was a mass movement of men in the his- new experience, indeed. tory of warfare. Patton’s troops had At the head of CCB, my tank been poised to attack the Saar. He E- leading the way, we rolled mile then abandoned this plan and or- c after mile into the great unknown. I dered the major part of the 3d Army * -r was guided and directed by General to make a gigantic 90-degree wheel- - Dager in a variety of ways: he ing movement and then drive north -. radioed instructions from his jeep; at full speed. Involved in this spec- _- his staff relayed radio messages; he tacular achievement were probably rode alongside to shout directions a quarter of a million men and called and ordered me to send a at me in my turret; and at tricky thousands of vehicles operated in task force into Bastogne. intersections, he personally dis- damnable weather over often-icy I protested vehemently, remind- - mounted to point the way. roads. ing him that the situation up ahead The hours and miles passed, and Once we’d reached the bivouac was unclear, terribly confused, and ”. . Longwy loomed closer. The end was area, there was still no rest for that this was no time for a piece- tioni in sight. But then spirits were many of the weary. As soon as we meal commitment of my forces. dashed again as we reached Longwy closed into our positions, as ex- General Dager agreed wholeheart- intt?l hausted as some of the men were, and were waved on, rolling through edly. He said he had been having t 0 P‘ the city without slackening the we sent out strong patrols of light the same kind of tug of war that pace. Our tank guns were still tanks and armored infantry to pro- morning with General Middleton of pointed north, and now, for the first tect against enemy movements the VI11 Corps. General Middleton time in the war, we were in Bel- from the north. had ordered him to take CCB into gium. We reached and passed Bastogne and he had hotly resist- through Arlon, then changed direc- Task Force Ezell’s Mission ed, insisting that General Middle- tion to the northwest, with no The following morning, I was hit ton wait until General Gaffev ar- slackening- of speed or --purpose. by a thunderbolt: General Dager rived with the rest of the 4th Ar- - 26 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 mored Division. Middleton had tions, and render support, if so agreed not to commit the entire -ordered. combat command, but only after The task force moved northeast General Dager offered instead to on the Neufchateau/Bastogne Road and reached Bastogne without en- rode alongside to shout direc- send in a task force- I formed the task force - “A” countering any resistance or seeing It me in my turret, and at tricky Company, 8thTankBattalion; ‘‘C” any enemy troops. ctions, he personally dismounted Company of the 10th Armored In- Upon entering the town, Captain fantry Battalion; and &‘”’ Battery, Ezell was told to report for instruc- it the way ...” 22d Armored Field Artillery Battal- tions - not to General McAuliffe, ion - and placed my executive but to Colonel William Roberts, officer, Captain Bert P. Ezell, in commander of the 10th Armored command of what was to be called Division’s Combat Command “B”. Task Force Ezell. His mission was While these events were taking to report to General McAuliffe, place in Bastogne, I received a divi- commandingthe lOlst Airborne, to sion order to recall the task force at learn the situation, receive instruc- once. I reached Captain Ezell short-

~~~~~ ~ March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 27 ly after noon to tell him to return. He was, at that moment, receiving his instructions for employment from Colonel Roberts. Within a ”...Ironically, the battle at Chaumont was fought just short time, Task Force Ezell was on the road again. four kilometers east of the quiet bivouac area we’d occupied three days earlier.. .” Wide Tracks in the Road Sometime later, Ezell’s task force returned to our bivouac area with Ezell’s task force hauled back as 0 Why did CCB, a I11 Corps unit many more vehicles than it had much of the abandoned artillery whose original destination was the when it pulled out - and with a equipment as they could handle - vicinity of Longwy, continue on strange story to tell. trucks, jeeps, and artillery prime until it reached a position in the As the troops had moved away movers. The task force ran into no VI11 Corps sector, only nine kilo- from Bastogne, they had encoun- resistance the rest of the way back meters from Bastogne? tered an American 2%-ton truck in to the bivouac area. 0 Why did General Middleton of a ditch on the right side of the road. After Captain Ezell’s task force VI11 Corps seem to exert such an The truck was otherwise undam- returned, events continued to move “ownership” of CCB, a I11 Corps aged; the driver was still sitting swiftly. At 1400 on 20 December, unit? behind the wheel, but the top of his CCB was released from attachment 0 Why didn’t the rest of the 4th head had been blown off above the to VI11 Corps and reassigned to I11 Armored Division close up behind eyes, apparently by an armor-pierc- Corps, along with the rest of the CCB instead of leaving CCB near ing round. division. We were ordered to move Bastogne, by itself, while the rest of Moving a little further down the southwest to Neufchateau, then the division assembled well to the road beyond the ditched truck, the southeast to Leglise, arriving after rear in the Arlon/Longwy area? task force noticed two tank tracks dark. The next day, while at CCB Why was CCB’s Task Force running across the asphalt pave- headquarters, I received orders and Ezell recalled from Bastogne right ment, the largest tracks Captain details for the attack that was to after it amved, especially consider- Ezell had ever seen. They had to take place the following morning. ing how General Middleton had have been made by a German Pan- argued so strongly for its commit- ther or Tiger. We moved out from Leglise at ment? The task force moved out again 0430 so as to arrive at the initial Should higher commanders and after traveling a short distance point (IP) at 0600. The 8th Tank have exploited Task Force Ezell’s came upon another strange sight Battalion and the rest of CCB - rapid progress to Bastogne, once -about two battalions of U.S. artil- plus the 80th and 26th Infantry of they knew Task Force Ezell had lery stopped along the road. I11 Corps - would be part of the 4th entered the town without a fight The equipment seemed intact, Armored Division’s coordinated at- and returned? Shouldn’t Middleton but there was no sign of any Amer- tack. have been allowed to hold on to ican troops. Some of the vehicles The slow, costly, painful return to CCB and to use it to keep the Neuf- were still idling. Bastogne began. The following day, chateau-Bastogne highway open, It wasn’t clear whether the Amer- upon reaching Chaumont, the 8th perhaps preventing the encircle- ican artillery units had been at- Tank Battalion received one of the ment of the town? tacked and their positions overrun most powerful tank-led counterat- And once CCB had moved into or they had been “spooked” by the tacks of the war. Ironically, the its bivouac at Vaux les Rosieres, sight of German tanks crossing the battle at Chaumont was fought just shouldn’t the rest of the 4th Ar- road just to the north of them. But four kilometers east of the quiet mored Division have capitalized, from the evidence, there was no bivouac area we’d occupied three moving up to attack from the biv- question that a German force in days earlier. ouac location - only a short dis- strength had moved rapidly west The relief of the lOlst Airborne tance from Bastogne -rather than and had cut across the Neufcha- took five days, and by 28 December, consolidating for the attack further teau-Bastogne road just prior to the woods had been cleared of the south and then fighting their way Ezell’s return. Perhaps the Ger- enemy and all our positions had north again along the difficult mans had been moving so fast that been consolidated. When Captain forest axis from Arlon to the encir- following forces had not yet closed Ezell walked into the 8th Tank Bat- cled city? up on the vanguard. Ezell’s return talion command post at Assenois, trip could well have been a well- he was just one kilometer southeast timed fluke, but certainly, Ezell’s of where his unit had been eight *** unit had managed to slip through a days earlier as it rolled into Bas- gap in the enemy echelons driving togne. With the passage of years and the west. This must go down as one of Those of us who participated in publication of histories and mem- the most remarkable incidents of this operation could not help but oirs, some of those questions can the war, considering the bitterness note the many ironies and incon- now be answered, adding to the of the battle which was immediate- gruities. They raised many ques- fascination of this tiny, puzzling 1s develoDina.-- tions: episode.

28 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 telephone call, which operation he’d discussed with them earlier. Initially, as the Battle of the would be implemented. General Patton explained the Bulge was intensifying, General Later that same morning, Gen- events of the following day in his Patton met with General Bradley eral Patton met at Verdun with memoir, “War As I Knew It”: at his headquarters in Luxembourg General Eisenhower and a distin- “...The next morning, I ar- on 18 December. General Bradley guished gathering of higher com- rived at Bradley’s headquar- called off General Patton’s planned manders. All agreed that there ters in Luxembourg and found offensive into the Saar, thus mak- should be a counterattack at the that he had, without notify- ing units available to him. Without earliest possible moment and that ing me. detached Combat hesitation, General Patton told General Patton was the man for the Ctmmand “B” (Brigadier General Bradley that he would con- job. General H. E. Dager) of the centrate the 4th Armored Division General Patton told the group 4th Armored Division from in the vicinity of Longwy, would that he could attack with three di- Arlon to a position southwest pull the 80th Infantry Division out visions of the I11 Corps on 22 De- of Bastogne. Since the Com- of the line, and would get the 26th cember. A stronger force, he said, bat Command had not been I Infantry Division moving within would take several more days to engaged, I withdrew it to Ar- 24 hours. Later the same day he assemble and would forfeit sur- lo~~..” issued the order that got CCB mov- prise. Historian Martin Blumenson, in ing just after midnight. The group was astonished at his the second volume of “Patton Pa- General Patton met with his staff rapid response to the situation and pers’,, quotes from General Pat- at 0800 the next morning, Decem- was more than satisfied with the ton’s diary entry of that same day, ber 19, as CCB was already well on proposal. It should be emphasized December 20: its way to Longwy. His plan, he told that at the Verdun meeting on 19 “In the morning, I drove to the staff, was to strike due north December, in front of all of the Luxembourg, arriving at 0900. and hit the underbelly of the Ger- senior commanders, General Pat- Bradley had halted the 80th 1 man penetration where it would ton had pledged a three-division Division at Luxembourg and hurt. During the next hour, General counterattack with the entire 4th had also engaged one combat Patton and his staff planned, in Armored Division as the key divi- command of the 4th Armored outline. three distinct operations. sion in the Corps. With their agree- Division in the vicinity east of Arrangements were made for a sim- ment, he called his chief of staff to Bastogne without letting me ple code to indicate, with a brief imdement one of the three Dlans know. but I said nothin -E...” March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 29 SCALE : -5 rnl lorn,. '

(Patton was clearly wrong in his This map of the road network around Bastogne shows the route 4th Armored's diary entry when he placed the unit three combat commands took in relieving the city. Minor roads, many of them used "east" of Bastogne. according to the in the attack. are not shown in detail here. At left, a few days after the relief of the author. Apparently. his memoir was 101st Airborne Division, a smiling General Patton receives General Bradley's correct. Ed.) congratulations at Bradley's headquarters in Luxembourg. General Patton then drove to Ar- lon, to the headquarters of General already scattered and his armor, As the attack developed, CCB Middleton's troubled VI11 Corps for especially, had been badly piece- shouldered an extremely heavy a first-hand picture of the situation mealed. share of the 4th Armored fight, in the Bulge. When he arrived, he This employment simply would acting as the powerful left flank of found General Gaffey of the 4th have been more of the same. To I11 Corps all the way to the encir- Armored Division, General Paul of commit CCB into Bastogne would cled town. the 26th Infantry Division, and have been to lose it. In retrospect, General Dager's General Milliken of the I11 Corps General Gaffey obviously wanted resistance to committing CCB into already there. his Combat Command returned. Bastogne may have saved the unit. There is considerable speculation, With an attack in two days, he If he had not protested, CCB would and some differences of opinion of needed his division at full strength, have probably been in Bastogne what actually took place at that and the 4th Armored Division before General Patton was aware meeting. However, subsequent would have been severely handi- that it had been given away by events lead one easily into certain capped without CCB. General Bradley. assumptions. General Milliken also knew that It was fortunate, too, that Task General Middleton undoubtedly the key to his I11 Corps attack was Force Ezell had returned unscathed. was still anxious to send CCB into the 4th Armored. So at this meet- The loss of a tank company, an Bastogne behind Task Force Ezell, ing, he surely must have supported armored infantry company, and a and surely requested permission to General Gaffev's argumentY to have field artillery battery would have do so. Elements of his Corps were his CCB- -~ returkd.~ ~ weakened CCB considerably.

30 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 ment or event. Yet by knowing the story, some puzzling aspects of the l Battle of the Bulge are revealed, clarified, and enriched. We learn even more about how and why things happen in combat, and a great deal more about the men who make these things happen. Although I was a participant in much that happened there, I still find the story of Task Force Ezell most unusual and certainly fas- cinating. My purpose in writing about it is to share the episode with others and in doing so, dislodge it from its long-occupied perch of obscurity.

i“

BRIGADIER IERALAL- BIN F. IRZYK was commis- sioned in the Cavalry Re- serve after graduation from the University of Massachu- setts, Amherst, in 1940, and was called to active duty with the 3d US. Cavalry. After Patton’s brief service in the 10th Ar- Plan mored Division, he was reas- At the Verdun meeting, General specific, vulnerable objective. He signed to the 4th Armored Patton had committed himself to a jumped off from ground firmly in Division, then at Pine Camp, coordinated attack with three full his hands. His plans and execution New York, in August, 1942, divisions. The situation at Bas- were sound and professional. Un- and later in the Tennessee togne was confused and chaotic deterred by the panic around him, Maneuvers, the DesertTrain- and did not warrant a major com- he kept his eye on the ball. ing Center, and Camp Bowie, mitment at that time. It was not the Texas. In December, 1943, General Patton’s plan not only the division sailed for Europe, time to change plans, reinforce a broke the ring enclosing Bastogne, where it fought in five cam- failing situation, and risk having but destroyed the German penetra- paigns: Normandy, Northern major elements of the 4th Armored tion with his stroke north, elimina- France, the Ardennes, Rhine- committed prematurely. Once com- ting hundreds of enemy vehicles land, and Central Europe. In mitted to Bastogne, CCB would and thousands of troops. The rapid- December, 1944, when the have been caught up in the chaos ly organized and well-executed experiences in this storytook and confusion - perhaps never to counterattack snatched the momen- place, he had just assumed be retrieved. General Patton’s de- tum from the Germans and seized command of the 8th Tank cision was revealed when Task Battalion. He remained with the initiative. He had done what the 4th Armored Division Force Ezell was ordered out of Bas- he’d promised his commanders he during the postwar occupa- togne shortly after noon and CCB would do several days earlier, and tion of Germany, spending was ordered to move to the rear, while his plan had raised skeptical 44 months overseas before which it began to do by mid-after- eyebrows, he delivered. returning to the United States noon. In the eye of history, the story of in 1947. His long and illus- General Patton chose as his ul- Task Force Ezell is an extremely trious military career later timate course of action a well- minor episode in the Battle of the included service at numerous planned, well-coordinated, orderly Bulge and in the war. It had no CONUS stations, USAREUR, attack in strength toward a known, simificant imDact on anv engage- and the Pacific.

March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 31 The French Army has long been committed to wheeled armor vehicles, like these EBR armored cars seen here on maneuvers. Modern Use of Wheeled Armored Vehicles

by General Andre’ Sciard gun calibers and the use of lami- The author of this article is a vice- straints on the military budgets of nated armor for increased protec- president of the French Panhard Western countries force them to tion. For heavy tanks, tracks seem firm, a major supplier of wheeled maximize efficiency at the lowest to provide the optimum weight/ armor vehicles. possible cost. Further, concepts ground pressure ratio and, there- Despite the increase in the power, proposed by the U.S. Army’s Air- fore, the best cross-country mo- range, and accuracy of today’s Land Battle 2000 and exercised by bility. weapons, and despite the increase the Soviet Operational Maneuver The third results from current in efficiency of surface-to-surface Groups indicate the need for ar- habits. The large national military and air-to-surface antitank mis- mored protection for quick heli- training centers of Western coun- siles, the main battle tank (MBT), borne thrusts to the enemy’s rear tries have terrain that is unique. used in conjunction with the attack and protection in depth for one’s This terrain is typically muddy in helicopter, is the decisive offensive own rear. Wheeled armored vehi- winter, dusty in summer, and does weapon for ground combat. There cles are part of the solution to these not allow the cross-country travel are, however, many offensive and issues. of heavy vehicles, except those defensive operations that require equipped with tracks. This terrain armored vehicles, but not neces- The Historical Position provides an argument for military sarily the sophisticated and expen- of MBT officials who believe that tracked sive MBT. Historically, the MBT was devel- vehicles are the only option. Lower-cost wheeled armored ve- oped as the only combat vehicle hicles could be used for certain op- capable of combining firepower, Wheeled Vehicles erations, given the quality and protection, and cross-country mo- Reconsidered density of the road network sys- bility. MBTs became tracked vehi- There are several recent trends tems (particularly within the Euro- cles. that provide arguments for recon- pean Theater) and advances in As time passed, three factors sidering wheeled armored vehicles. technology. This would in turn have strengthened the reliance on Highway infrastructure: Most save the MBT for the critical jobs it the MBT. The first is residual. The industrial economies are oriented does best. Alternatives to the MBT WW I1 campaigns demonstrated the toward the maximum development should be considered for operations superiority of the tank, and people of highway infrastructures. Wheeled that do not involve frontal engage- are reluctant to question lessons vehicles are better than tracked ments of enemy MBTs, or assault of learned from history. vehicles for exploiting these infra- heavily fortified positions. The second comes from the trend structures. Only tires allow long Alternatives should be considered toward increasing the weight of distance travel at low cost and high also because current and future con- tanks because of the increase in speed.

32 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 "There are several recent - trends that provide arguments for reconsidering wheeled armored vehicles ..."

Larger guns on lighter vehi- cles: Lower turret silhouettes, low/ long recoil mechanisms for 90-, 105, and 120-mmguns, the development of lighter composite armor plat- ings, and the increase in the use of hydraulic suspensions now enable heavy-caliber guns to be mounted on light vehicles (15 to 20 tons). Realistic training: Training of modern units requires conducting maneuvers on more realistic ter- rain than military training centers. Emphasis on Rapid Deployment Forces in non-European scenarios has accelerated this trend. There are several features of At right, U.S. military police wheeled armored vehicles that dis- made wide use of wheeled tinguish them from MBTs. They Commando armored vehi- are more cost-efficient in terms of cles in Vietnam. purchase price and maintenance costs. Wheeled armored vehicles are multipurpose and can be used for conventional combat operations as well as for rapid deployment or antiguerilla warfare. Wheeled ar- Below, the French VBC-90 mored vehicles also have greater 6-wheel armored vehicle is primary and secondary road mo- one of many newer designs bility, easier maintenance, and capable of carrying large-cal- p;"' smaller crew requirements than iber gun despite their low MBTs. overall weight. The Combat Zone ofthe1990s Within the European Theater in the late 199Os, the air/ground of- fensive component of the Allied Forces is anticipated to be based on the MBT/attack helicopter team. It is planned that this team will in- clude up-to-date technologies and will be able to move and hit targets between 2,000 and 4,000 meters in less than five seconds during day and night, under any weather con- ditions. This team will be expensive and, therefore, used only in small quantities. The MBT in this team will be vulnerable because of its size. Likewise, the attack helicopter - whatever its speed and its low alti- tude capabilities - will be vulner- able to forward area air defense svstems. Both would be mime tar-

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 33 TheU.S. madewidespread useof wheeled armor during WII. which paid off during high- speed exploitations in Europe. The M8. at left, mounted a 37-mm gun. The heavier (26tons) Boarhound heawarmored car. seen below.. was -- r@Q designed for desert fighting, but too late. It was never produced in large quantities or used by U.S. troops.

World War I1 US Armored Cars

gets for a number of ground-to- needed by these highly mobile units L- ground, air-to-ground and ground- and would complement the MBT/ to-air weapons having an always- attack helicopter team. Wheeled increasing lethal power. Therefore, vehicles could provide screening it can be anticipated that offensive and reconnaissance forward of the actions of the MBT/attack helicop- MBT and on the flanks as well as ter team, which are aimed at the rear area protection against Soviet center of gravity of the hostile MBTs. forces, will be limited in terms of Further, wheeled armored vehi- space and time. The Middle East cles can be rapidly transported to conflicts of the past decade empha- distant points for intervention and size this point. peacekeeping operations. Wheeled Offensive actions, therefore, will vehicles are especially suited for have to be prepared and covered by urban environments where jeeps LIEUTENANT GENERAL highly mobile units to prevent slow- cannot provide the needed protec- ANDRE’J. F.SCIARDjoined ing down the main action. These tion and tracked vehicles cannot the Panhard firm in 1984 units should be capable of carrying provide the needed flexibility. after a long career in the out extensive reconnaissance opera- cavalry branch of the French tions well forward and into the rear Conclusion Army. His combat record in- of hostile forces, as demanded by In spite of history and habit, it cludes service as a tank pla- AirLand Battle 2000. seems that, under the pressure of toon commander during WW These highly mobile units should technical improvements, doctrinal II and as a squadron com- be able to “charge to reconnoiter”, changes, and budgetary con- mander in the Algerian and Indochina campaigns. He al- to use an old expression. These straints, the military is obliged to so served as commander of units would screen the battlefield reconsider some of the concepts of the French armor/cavalry and have features to protect them- employment of its ground forces. If school and of St. Cyr, the selves against an NBC threat and the MBT/attack helicopter team is French military academy in the presence of infiltrated or para- to be kept until the end of this western France, and he was chuted units behind friendly lines. century as the principal weapon of Army schools Commander at Wheeled armored vehicles under decision, it is important to include, Paris headquarters prior to 15 tons, capable of being transport- for the purpose of greater cost ef- his retirement. A graduate of ed by planes or helicopters, can ficiency, the maximum number of his nation’s National War Col- lege, he also holds a law provide forces with protection, fire- complementary wheeled vehicles. degree and served as com- power, mobility, flexibility, and in- By using existing products, the mander of the French 5th creased efficiency. Existing wheeled military can increase its combat Armor Brigade in the FRG in armored vehicles with 4-, 6-, or 8- capability without increasing its the mid-1970s. wheel drive have the caDabilities budgets.

34 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 Trunnions on the Move, Part 1’1 Creating the ’Gun-Over-Hull‘ Tank

by Robin Fletcher The previous article proposed that the gun trunnions should be re- moved further rearward and cen- tered over the vehicle’s hull. A va- riety of different gun mountings moved further rearward and cen- tralized over the vehicle’s hull. A variety of different gun mountings can be interposed between the tank gun and the hull of the vehicle, but those that hold the gun permanent- ly raised above the level of crew direct-view surveillance vision de- More “gun-in-hull“ than “gun-over-hull,” the Swedish S-Tank design was revolu- vices have been judged unsuitable tionary in its time. for the MBT and have been reject- liability of its remote operation, of ed. Acceptable gun mounting con- its automatic loading and of its figurations will be further reduced protection from attack from at least in number if all-around traverse is small arms fire and shell splinters. judged to be essential. This may require the develop- This concluding article examines ment of a new tank gun and am- developments which will have to be munition system specifically de- undertaken if these ‘gun-over-hull’ signed for this new situation, with configurations are to be created. a breech which is power-operated Finally, two different methods of and self-protecting and with its installing the gun on the Main Bat- center of gravity much further for- tle Tank in ‘gun-over-hull’ mount- ward. It has also been suggested nnoaei iiiusrrares me sweaisn uuca con- ings are sugg that the gun might be closed at its figuration with gun in raised position. rear end and divided at the front of If a wrong choice is made and the A New Gi the chamber so that parallel-sided, gun is wrongly configured, it could and Automaric Loaaing telescoped combustible-cased - in its conventional form - be rounds might be loaded rearward enclosed and counterweighted by The reasons for abandoning the into it. an armored box and placed in a conventional tank turret and mov- If this new gun system is to differ cleft turret above a hull roof that ing to gun-over-hull mountings are so fundamentally from current con- runs horizontally. This is far from to reduce the forward projection of ventional tank guns, a decision will being an ideal arrangement, al- the gun muzzle, which has now soon have to be taken as to whether though height can be reduced by become excessive, to improve the our next new tank gun should be inclining the suspension, but it mounting’s balance, to reduce its configured along conventional does allow the continued employ- rotational inertia, and to prevent lines, to be installed within a turret, ment of conventional tank guns the gun from intruding downwards or whether it should be designed to and may allow the extended use of below the ring and dividing the agree with the requirements of the existing hulls which are rear en- fighting compartment. Such gun- suggested new gun system because gined. And it is certainly possible over-hull mountings will place the it will be carried in gun-over-hull for a conventionally configured gun centrally over the hull - ac- mountings. The same projectiles tank gun to be installed in a rais- tually within the hull in the case of might be used and similar internal able gun mounting, although the the Swedish S Tank, in a shallow ballistics employed in both cases, result might not be as satisfactory cleft in the hull roof in the case of a but the configuration of the gun, as could be expected from the use of UDES-17 type vehicle, in the cen- and probably that of the ammuni- a “purpose built” gun system. tral cleft of a cleft turret, or finally, tion, will need to differ substantial- A gun configured to the new gun above the level of crew surveillance ly. There is thus a parting of the system could be forced into a con- vision devices when raised up on a ways in tank gun design, with a ventional turret, although the for- raisable gun mounting. decision having to be taken prior to ward location of its center of gravi- With the exception of the first of any design work being started, as ty would make this very difficult. these methods of gun mounting, to whether the MBT will continue The possibility does exist of using a the breech end of the gun will ex- to be turreted or whether it will divisible gun within an enclosed tend to the rear outside armor pro- adopt some form of gun-over-hull turret, allowing rounds to be loaded tection. raising-- problems of the re- mounting.~~~ ~ ~~~~ .~~~-- rearward directly into the chamber.

March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 35 This could even be looked upon as being an advance on the present method of loading conventionally turreted tank guns. These articles maintain that the conventional tank turret has reached the end of its development and that a change to gun-over-hull mountings is now needed. The gun and ammunition system is the key to this changeover and it can either delay or assist this revolution in gun mounting. Front Engined Hull If the gun is to be mounted cen- trally over the vehicle’s hull with- out front or rear projection, its The Swedish Bandkanon /A self-propelled artillery piece has movable rear idlers which center of gravity and trunnion posi- drop to stabilize the vehicle in firing position. Engine is in the front. tion will lie to the rear of the center of the vehicle, which suggests the the vehicle (e.g. Marder and the tate to the two principal turret crew adoption of a hull which is front- Swiss NKPz)~and possibly by su- stations and relieve the other two engined. And the rear of the gun perimposing a masking skin, kept crewmen. If this third man were -especially if the new gun system at ambient temperature, over the able to lie and sleep at full length in is adopted - must be able to swing front of the hull. the lower part of the fighting com- down to below ring level when the Unfortunately, the protection partment, or with his feet against gun is elevated, which again indi- which will be afforded to the crew- the rear entrance door, he would cates a front-engined vehicle. This men in the fighting compartment then be available to adopt a prone might even include the provision of by having the engine compartment position and take over the driving trailing rear idlers to lower the top at one side of the front of the vehicle function, using remote vision, run of the tracks at the rear of the will be compromised by the pres- should fire on the move become vehicle. This approach, in fact, was ence of the driver’s station at the necessary.6 In this way, increased used in the indirect-fire Swedish other side. This will take up part of survivability and extended endur- 155-mm SP Bandkanon IA1 which the width of the vehicle and inter- ance in ‘round-the-clock combat’ was built with a gun-over-hull lay- rupt the armored bulkhead separat- would be gained while removing out.2 These idlers could be locked ing the two compartments. The the driver from the front of the while firing to increase the ve- driver’s station in its present posi- vehicle. hicle’s stability. tion thus presents a problem to the The changeover from rear to front Allied to theee reasons, which tank designer. If it could be re- engine will not be welcomed by the stem directly from the adoption of moved, the engine compartment - engine designer. Over the years, gun-over-hull mountings, is a grow- particularly if the engine were to be he’s been able to install the engine ing conviction - now realized in mounted transversely - could ex- within comparatively thin armor the case of the Israeli Merkava tend from one hull sideplate to the which can easily be modified. A MBT -that a front-engined layout other and the bulkhead could re- front engine would have to be con- should be adopted so as to use the main intact so as to provide full fined within fixed hull dimensions engine compartment to provide ad: protection. and placed under heavy armor ditional protection, to allow rear The experimental MBT 70 relo- where conditions will be far more stowage of ammunition, and to cated the driver in a counter-ro- demanding. But 50-ton front en- provide an entrance door at the rear tating station in the turret of the gined test bed vehicles have been of the vehicle. A final argument in vehicle, but failed to produce a satis- constructed already - as witness favor of a front-engined layout is factory answer.‘ An alternative the VTF which started trials two that obsolescent MBT hulls could might be to provide driving facili- years ago in Germany.7 be easily converted into heavy ties to both turret crewmen, who APCs or self-propelled mountings would have an excellent view for- Suspension System once their life as gun tanks had ward over the front of the turret and Earlier, suspension control was been exhausted. could see directly rearward to re- discussed as one means of overcom- With a front-engine design, the verse the vehicle. Gun-over-hull ing the height penalty of first mov- increased heat at the front of the mounting will have eliminated for- ing the gun rearward over the ring vehicle might cause it to be spotted ward projection of the muzzle so the and then using contact between the by thermal detectors, and might turret can remain locked forward gun and the top run of the tracks to even interrupt its gun sighting by for driving. To improve endurance establish the position of the gun convection. This could be avoided in continuous operations,5 a third trunnions. As already mentioned, by circulating coolant to the rear of crew member will be needed to ro- this could be pursued to the ulti-

36 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 mate; at least with the vehicle sta- tionary, it would be possible - though not necessarily practical - to transfer all depression and eleva- tion to a controllable long-travel suspension system with a conse- quent simplification of the gun mounting. But the suspension has as its primary function the support of the vehicle during cross-country move- ment. Following the success of the hydrogas suspension of the British Challenger MBT, it is doubtful whether future tanks can afford to forego the use of similar systems. With more design effort being de- voted to the suspension to raise cross-country speeds, automatic KS. ELKE prototype drawing shows the vehicle’s raisable 75-mm automatic cannon variation of suspension porting in raised and lowered positions. Prototype was built on a Sheridan chassis. might be introduced to effect some done in a series of test bed vehicles raisable gun mounting and apply- degree of hull stabilization which with increasing degrees of sophisti- ing it to a cleft turret, to a traversa- would ease the task of stabilization cation until a fully stabilized system ble mounting of smaller diameter, at the gun mounting.8 This could be is finally created. or even to configurations based on extended as an ‘active’ and possi- vehicles of the casemate type. High- bly ‘forward-looking’ suspensions Gun Raising pressure hydraulics would be out- which might, again in the ultimate, The raisable gun has-so far only side the armor and the whole gun assume full responsibility for gun been used in the American ELKE mounting should be able to be lifted stabilization. But it would also sta- test bed vehicle, carrying an ARES off as a unit for repair or replace- bilize the crewmen and their vision 75-mm automatic cannon above a ment. It may be found beneficial to devices and can be compared with Sheridan hull. The Improved TOW arrange the three separate func- the possible stabilization of the up- Vehicle (ITV) raises a TOW launch- tions of elevation and depression, per part of an oscillating turret, er to fire from the protection of gun recoil, and gun raising in an which has already been mentioned. defilade, and ELKE has been de- unorthodox fashion, and some in- With ride and attitude control signed to do the same, but with a tegration may be possible between being two of the functions of the high-velocity kinetic energy gun. them. It must be remembered that suspension system, height control The variable geometry raisable the gun should be able to be fired would be the third, allowing the gun mounting was originally intro- without being raised from its fully vehicle to crouch down for best duced as a means of lowering the lowered position and should also be concealment or to rise up to move or height of the turret and reducing able to remain fully raised when to engage. But this function, as the overall height of the vehicle required to fire while moving. already noted, may not be able to be following the adoption of the gun- A development program for a achieved with sufficient rapidity to over-hull configuration. It is only raisable gun mounting might start be used during an engagement. The after this step has been taken that by raising and firing a tank gun target which the vehicle would pre- the full tactical value of such a from a fixed test stand and then sent when raised would remain system becomes apparent: the gun transferring the complete assem- large when compared to that of a being raised temporarily above bly to the turret ring of an existing raisable gun, which would reveal crew vision devices to display only tank hull to be fired tactically. With only its gun mounting. Although a minimum target for the shortest traveling, raising, and firing loads future control of the suspension time possible. This is the same transmitted directly to the hull will probably be exerted through a small target once assumed to be the through the raisable mounting, the hydrogas system, both at the halt sole prerogative of the overhead shell of the turret could then be and also while moving, it can be external gun. In contrast, the rais- constructed in canvas or in wood. applied immediately to existing able mounting exposes it without Only then would the design of a torsion bar or hybrid system for use any vehicle movement and with plate turret and automatic loading only at the halt or while moving only a momentary sacrifice of top system be undertaken. The same slowly.~O vision. The tactical advantages of raisable gun mounting should be It would be a mistake if work on the raisable gun are unique and able to be installed in a variety of suspension development were to most valuable. They soon oversha- different turrets, which may be slow down once hydrogas suspen- dow height reduction. which was either lightly or heavily armored. sion has been adopted. There is a , the original reason for its intro- If suspension inclination and gun clear need now to move on to in- duction. raising are rivals in the reduction clude at least control of the ve- There does not appear to be any of the height of gun-over-hull con- hicle’s attitude. This should be particular difficulty in designing-- a figurations - employing different March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 37 mentary. Both techniques should to the center line of the turret, offset- be further developed and both ting the gun. While the gun would streams of technology should then then be less well protected, there FIGURE 1. One of the author's two be made available for the creation should be not loss of accuracy from conceptual MBTs, this one has a con- of gun-over-hull mountings. such an arrangement. The shot ventional tank gun carried in a cleft would be out of the muzzle before turret with raisable mounting giving Asymmetry buffering and rotation of both tur- all-around traverse of both gun and ret and vehicle had time to take crewmen. So far, the gun has been con- place. The subsequent awkward sidered as being on the center line motion of the vehicle might be un- of the turret or the hull with crew- comfortable for the crewmen, and a types of variable geometry to men located on either side of it. This muzzle brake might be needed to achieve somewhat similar effects can be criticized for tending to pre- prevent a light vehicle from being - which should be preferred and sent a large target to enemy return moved round by recoil. should any combination of the two fire. But on the other hand, the rear If two crewmen were to be seated be attempted? Clearly the raisable of the gun is given good protection in tandem, one might be at the gun mounting is superior because against fire directed at it from a center of rotation of the turret of the small size and the small time considerable arc over the front of where he could drive from a counter- of exposure of its target, but sus- the vehicle. rotated crew station without diffi- pension control -particularly that However, an alternative approach culty. A small thick block of armor which can be used only at the halt is to seat the two crewmen in tan- would then give protection to both - could be comparatively simple dem on the same side of the gun crewmen and to a ready round and could act at least as a low-cost mounting (e.g., FMC Armored Gun magazine to their rear. An armor standby system. For instance, if a System) in which case they can be skirt might even be extended down- raisable gun mounting in a cleft better protected behind a reduced wards, within the turret ring, to turret were to fail in action, the gun width of frontal protection. But at provide increased protection, par- would remain in the lowered posi- the same time, they will lose the ticularly when firing over the sides tion but might then be laid onto advantage to be gained from the of the vehicle. targets in any direction by inclin- full duplication of their crew sta- Considerable emphasis has been ing the suspension. Should a mount- tions. This configuration might be placed in these articles on engag- ing of the UDES-17 type fail and modified by moving the gun off ing the enemy from behind a crest- remain lowered, the vehicle could center, as has already been done in line, since most of the vehicle will engage by means of its suspension the case of a number of cannon then be protected and only the vi- control but in one direction only. turrets,'l which would move the sion devices and the gun itself will Suspension control and gun rais- two crewmen towards the turret be exposed. But in the forests and ing are both able to reduce the center and give them more room. cities of Europe, the enemy is more height of the vehicle; they are The process could be carried further likely to have to be engaged around rivals, but they may also be comple- bv- moving- the two crewmen rieht- the comer of buildings and woods. 38 ARMOR:The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 This would suggest that guns might would avoid having to make a cleft be offset or even ‘outrigged’ from in the center of the turret, the gun the hull or the turret as they al- would then remain virtually unpro- FIGURE 2. The second proposal in- ready have been in a number of tected. And its lateral movement corporates a UDES-style lift-and-turn German experimental designs.12 It while being swung up to above the mounting for a divisible gun which would even be possible to envisage turret might be expected to attract must be raised to allow traversing. a vehicle which would follow the attentionthan ifithad The crew remains at fixed stations in lead already given by certain Ger- been vertically raised. the hull. man proposals for extendable mis- sile launchers and to have the gun Crewing Alternatives not only raised up to fire over cover but also moved over to one side or It can be argued that when firing down in the hull. Disenchantment the other to fire round a left-handed from a stationary position a gun with the overhead gun followed or right-handed comer. crew should traverse with their gun, later as the disadvantages of the There are, however, problems in since no attention to maneuvering loss of direct top vision were more this approach. The first is that their vehicle will then be required. clearly realized.13 Perhaps a solu- while a crestline provides cover But when moving rapidly cross- tion may be to accept the overhead both from view and also from fire, a country, they might be best advised gun for use in defensive positions wood or a building will not provide to continue to face in their direction while at the same time producing adequate protection from kinetic of travel, traversing only the gun MBTs as fully traversing de~igns.1~ energy antitank projectiles. A sec- when firing to a flank. In some But the situation changes yet ond problem will be surveillance. contradiction to this, a turreted ve- again when the potentials of raisa- Although sighting can be carried hicle is generally assumed to be the ble gun mountings are clearly un- out remotely, whether the gun is most suitable for a war of maneu- derstood. The use of a raisable gun raised or placed to one side, direct ver, while a limited traverse vehicle in a cleft turret confers advantages surveillance vision still requires is accepted for use in static posi- a conventionally turreted tank has the physical presence of a crew- tions, despite the fact that it may so far never possessed. The UDES- man. This can be provided at the have to traverse over large arcs as 17 configuration, which provides top of the vehicle, but cannot be the enemy closes and possibly pene- the gun with all round traverse provided at one side or the other trates the defense. when raised to above the level of over its tracks. The advent of the overhead ex- crew vision devices, could be con- Full implementation of firing ternal gun in the 1970s gave a new sidered in the MBT role. If all- round corners thus appears to be means of providing all around tra- around traverse for the MBT is improbable, although a raisable verse for the gun. This allowed a demanded, then casemate designs, gun might be swung down to one choice to be made between the crew including those with limited tra- side of the turret or the other and being “gun-oriented” and traversing verse, must be passed over and only might well be fired while it was in some form of turret and being two designs for the MBT remain. lowered. While such a system “hull-oriented” and being seated One will have the crew seated in a

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 39 cleft turret to face towards the tar- The lift-and-turn mounting of the get. The other will be based on the UDES-17 type vehicle (Fig. 2) is UDES-17 design, with the crewmen considerably more radical. It car- seated down in the hull. ries the gun on a raisable mounting In the UDES-17 case, the crew on a pedestal drum which does not will have to raise its gun before itself move up and down. The drum traversing while the cleft turret can would have both top and bottom traverse discreetly and then raise bearings and would contain a num- the gun. The fact that the gun of a ber of ready rounds. This design UDES-17 type vehicle cannot be uses a divisible gun system to ac- lowered while it remains traversed cept rounds loaded directly upwards detracts from the survivability of and rearwards to the chamber from that design. But this is counter- the drum. Although full all-around balanced by the fact that the ve- traverse will be available, reload- hicle is not divided into two quite ing may only be possible while the separate parts by the presence of a gun is within a 180-degree arc over turret traverse race and so should the front of the hull. be better able to withstand high These two vehicles are very dif- levels of attack. In effect, the com- ferent from the conventional main pactness and strength of the case- battle tank. They are front-en- mate type vehicle is carried for- gined, both for better protection ward into a design capable of all- and also to agree with the gun-over- around traverse. hull theme. And they raise their Two alternate designs for a fu- guns to gain the tactical advan- ture MBT are shown here (see tages that only such raisable gun Figures 1 and 2), based on draw- mountings can confer. One tries to ings which originally appeared in stay as close to the conventional as December 1984 in Soldat und Tech- possible and uses a more or less nik.15 conventional gun, while the second The turreted design (Fig. 1) ad- is deliberately more extreme in heres to the conventional as far as adopting a crew-in-hull layout and possible, employing a raisable gun also a divisible gun. in a cleft turret. It provides lateral protection for the breech of the gun Conclusions by twin bustles, each containing ready rounds. Twin loaders trans- These articles have been based fer rounds from the bustles and first on the rearward relocation and swing over to ram the rounds for- then on the vertical adjustment of ward into the gun. Driving is the gun trunnions of the main bat- normally from the turret top, with tle tank. Rearward relocation has the turret locked forward, although been first with respect to the turret a third crewman, resting in the ring and then, in a wider context, lower fighting compartment, can with respect to the top run of the take over driving should this be vehicle’s tracks. Height reduction required. will be effected either by inclina-

*Patrick Mercillon, “Meesier Auto-Indus- ROBIN FLETCHER was Footnotes trie,” Defence and Armament No. 33, Sep- commissioned in the West- tember 1984. minster Dragoons in 1941 ‘Christopher Foss, “Swedish 155-mm Band- gPeter Massey, “Active Suspension,” AR- and later served in the Spe- kanon l.A Self-propelled Gun,” Jane’s Ar- MOR, September-October 1979, p. 35. cial Operations Executiveand mour and Artillery, 1984-85, p. 460. loEric C. Ludvigsen, “South Korean Tank 2d Special Air Service Regi- ZR. M. Ogorkiewicz, “Merkava Mark 2,” Tested,” ARMY, May 1984, p. 77. ment. After the war, he at- llChristopherFoss,“FMC 25mm Oneman Znternational Defense Reuiew, March 1985, p. tended the technical staff of- 311. Turret for AIFV,” Jane’s Armour and Artil- 3Rudi Meller, “NKPz -The Swiss Tank for lery, 1984-85, p, 822. ficer’scourse at Shrivenham, the OS?," ZDR, July 1979, Special Series - I1 12Hans-RudolfLembcke, “A Tank of the spent two years on tank de- Armored Vehicles. Future in the Context of German Defense sign at Chobham, and re- ‘Walter J. Spielberger, “From Halftrack to Technology,” Krupp MaK Defense Journal turned to Shrivenham to lec- Leopard 2,” A History of the Krauss-Maffei No. 5, November 1980. tureon tank armament.After OrdnanceDepartment, 1979. I3BrigadierRichard Simpkin, “Room at the leaving the service, he raised 5Emanski and Scharfen, “Continuous Land Top,” ARMOR, January-February 1985, p. crops in Kenya and cattle in Combat Operations - Are We Only Half 18. Effective?” RUSI Journal, June 1978. “Wolfgang Flume, “The Combat Vehicle Ireland. Hisarticleson armor 6Robin Fletcher, “Crewing the Turreted Family of the Future,” Military Technology have been published inlnter- Tank,” ZDR, February 1983, p. 199. MZLTECH, April 1985, p. 76. national Defense Review, 7R~lfHilmes. “KAMPFPANZER - die 15RobinFletcher, “Die Hublafette-ein neues Soldat und Technik, TANK. Entwieklungen der Nachkriegszeit,” Soldat Konzept fur einen zukunftigen Panzer,” and other journals. Iunri T~rhnik.l9R4. Soldat und Technik. December 1984. D. 622. 40 ARMOR:The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 Armor’s Heritage Lieutenant General Daniel Van Voorhis

Daniel Van Voorhis was born in Zanesville, Ohio, in 1878 and died in Washington,D.C. in 1956, at the age of 77. In his military career, he was the key figure in the mechanization of the Army and the creation of the Armored Force as we know it today. LTG Daniel Van Voorhis During the 1920s and 1930s, “Billy” Mitchell, an Army Air Corps general, made national headlines as 3-day march was mostly a policy of fixit with spit and he expounded his vision of an air corps as a separate wire and press on. The successful completion of the branch of the nation’s defense forces. General Mitchell grueling marchproved Van Voorhis’determinationto was court-martialed for his vociferous efforts and succeed in the face of all odds - and it gave him retired soon after to private life. But his dream was valuable, first-hand experience in handling a mecha- realized early in WW 11 with the creation of the US. nized unit on the move. Army Air Force. The experimental Mechanized Force was disbanded General Mitchell was not alone in his “cry in the after a year, but it was with that force, under Van wilderness” for much-needed doctrinal and equipment Voorhis, that the basic concepts of mobile war were improvements for a specific branch of the armed formulated, concepts in which the tank replaced the forces. There was yet another band of officers-mostly horse. When the force was disbanded, Colonel Van horse cavalry officers at that - who were equally, but Voorhis led the cavalry portion to Fort Knox, KY, more quietly, at work to create what they foresaw as a where it was redesignated the “‘Detachmentfor Mech- vital need for the Army. They called for a mechanized anized Cavalry Regiment.” In 1933, this unit became force that would forever banish their treasured horses the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized). Three years to pasture. later, in 1936, the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) One such cavalry officer was Lieutenant General became the 7th Cavalry Brigade, Mechanized. The Daniel Van Voorhis,who was named “Grandfather of following year, Colonel Van Voorhis was transferred the Armored Force” by no less a personage than to Hawaii to serve as the chief of staff, Hawaiian General Creighton Abrams, the Army chief of staff Department. from 1972 to 1974. Van Voorhis began his military career in 1898 as a corporal in the 10th Pennsylvania VolunteerInfantry. Later that same year, he was appointed captain and sent to the Philippines where he tookpart in the War of Insurrection. Two years later, he was appointed a 2d Lieutenant, Cavalry, in the Regular Army. During WW I, Van Voorhis served as chief of staff, Port of Embarkation, Newport News, VA,and later as assistant chief ofpersonnel at the Base Section, Brest, France. Both of these positions were of a highly administrative nature and gave Van Voorhis a solid grounding in the intricacies of Army procedures. After the war, VanVoorhis served the officeof the in 1st Cav troops man ”combat cars” at Fort Knox in mid-19309.

Chief of Cavalry and in 1929, he graduated from the ~~ Army War College. In 1930, now a full colonel, Van When the 7th’Cavalry Brigade was formed, a new Voorhis was given command of the 12th Cavalry and insignia was created for it and in 1940 that insignia was selected by the Army chief ofstaff to command the (the track, the gun and the lightning bolt) was super- experimental Mechanized Force that was being or- imposed on the Armor Force shoulder patch to become ganized at Fort Eustis, VA, not far from Yorktown. the patch we know today. In 1931, the experimental Mechanized Force com- Van Voorhis returned to Fort Knox in 1937, and as a pleted a remarkable 300-mile road march from Fort brigadier general resumed command of 7th Cavalry Eustis to Fort Bragg, NC. Colonel Van Voorhis wrote Brigade, Mechanized. There he played a major role in to his daughter, Betty Bell, that the force had marched the formulation of the doctrine that guided the initial

11 9 miles the first day. 109 miles the second day and 76 effortsof the Armored Force when it was organized- in miles the third day, an outstanding feat for the times. 1940. The infant Mechanized Force was largely equipped In 1938, now a Major General, Van Voorhis took with badly-worn WW I vehicles and there had been command of V Corps Area and a year later, as a neither time nor opportunity to stabilize maintenance Lieutenant General, was transferred to Panama to routines ingarrison, let alone for a marching unit. Due command the Caribbean Defense Command. In 1941, to the chronic shortage of spares,~.___ maintenance . - on the he returned to V Corps Area and retired in 1942. March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 41 Management Methods at Platoon Level

by Captain Michael D. Landers

How does a platoon leader keep ideas are only some of the means I Although I cannot put a copy of track of the four areas of which all used to help me. I hope they help The NCO Guide into my book, it is leaders must keep track? Those you. also excellent reading. You may areas are leading, training, main- begin to better understand your taining, and caringfor the soldiers. Leading NCOs if you have read what they There are no school solutions to As in the other three areas, to have to read. After all, FM 22-100 managing them. There are no per- discuss leadership would take more defines military leadership as “a fect guidelines to follow. There are time, knowledge, and paper than I process by which a soldier influ- only the experiences of others from possess. A particular help to me in ences others to accomplish the mis- which to learn. managing this area was my sion,” and what better way to influ- These four simple areas can loom “brain.” I kept a “personal assets ence him than by learning what large when trying to find the meth- sheet” about every soldier in the makes him tick? ods, techniques, and aids to control platoon. Some of the information I A last little aid is the “quote of the them. To whittle these totem poles kept is naw included in a tank pla- day” or “saying of the day.” This is down to size can be difficult. Dur- toon leader’s notebook published an OCS staple I borrowed. It is also ing my brief Army career, I have by the Armor School. Ohter infor- very effective in transmitting a mes- come across several aids to help me mation I kept about each soldier is sage without ever saying it. If you manage these four areas. These are as follows: Height, weight, last think you are having a problem by no means the only methods APRT score, and next APRT date, with ethical dilemmas in the pla- available. Some are ones I thought birthday, number of days of accrued toon, a few quotes back-to-back on were original only to see them pop leave, weapons qualification score, ethics may break the ice for more up at a later date in one form or vehicles authorized to operate, effective communication. I posted a another. Some are merely an adap- home address and phone number, few of these quotes in the platoon tation of an old idea. Whatever the combat experience, any extra skill area. While I posted the quotes, case, they have worked for me, and (artist, woodworker, typist, etc.), several soldiers were able to dis- I would like to pass them along. and what he wanted to do if he cuss some personal matters private- Out of necessity, I developed sev- could not be a tanker. ly. Posting these quotes also forces eral techniques to manage leader- I realize the list could go on for- you to go into the platoon area: a ship, training, maintenance, and ever. Each of theseitems could easi- vital act in leadership. soldier care. My first company ly be located by contacting the or- commander had each platoon lead- derly room, maintenance platoon, Training er keep a notebook with the status and 53 section, but it would take Volumes have been written about of hulls, turrets, and fire control time. This page put everything to- training, and I only have one aid. systems for each tank in our respec- gether. For example, there are tive platoons. This notebook also numerous instances when you may contained a maintenance checklist, be told that a qualification range the platoon hand receipt, and two is being run by another unit and “...We took a Common or three training plans. Anything asked if you have anyone who needs else we wanted to put in our little to qualify. Instead of waiting until Skills Task, and made a black book was left up to us. When I you can have the platoon sergeant miniature self-test out of left this company to take over my find out, you already have the in- it ,, second tank platoon, I took my formation. This does a couple of ... book with me. My new commander things. First, you and your platoon promptly informed me my office sergeant have the same data, and was my tank and whatever I car- have already discussed who needs Preparation for common tasks test- ried with me. Hello again, little to qualify. Second, and most impor- ing is typically one of these areas black book. tantly, you don’t lose training time that is neglected until the last About this time, the four areas of with the platoon tracking down the minute. What I did, in conjunction which I spoke earlier were brought information. with my company commander, was to my attention. I reorganized my Another idea is to keep a copy of to develop my “task of the week” notebook into the four areas, and General Ulmer’s Notes on Building board. We took a Common Skills many of the ideas, techniques, and the Chain of Command at Unit Task, and made a miniature self- methods I will discuss later are all Level. Before The Armor School put test out of it. We posted the self-test in what I now call my “brain.” I call it into a pamphlet, I ran across a on Monday, and the company NCOs it that because it keeps track of copy and promptly put it in my would quiz their subordinates quantitative management and al- “brain.” You may not agree with throughout the week. This does lows me to concentrate on qualita- General Ulmer’s concepts, but they several things. First, it lets you tive management.- The following- are food for thought. - .. - monitor how often the bulletin 42 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 board is being looked at by check- ing the wear and tear on the test materials at the end of the week. Second, it gets the junior NCOs involved in training. After I devel- oped the first two or three quizzes and my tank commanders saw how it was done, I had them develop a few. My junior NCOs now had their chance to be innovative. You would be surprised how many times those sergeants madeothers look at what they had done. Having your tank commanders help gets that many more minds involved. Lastly, it covers the Common Tasks Test on a quarterly basis, and allows enough repetition to help your soldiers achieve higher scores. One task is map reading. My The Weekly, Monthly, and Quar- need them. It extends into other “task of the week” for map reading terly PMCS are divided into 10 areas. I also keep a list of soldiers consisted of a local map taped to equal days. These lists are checked who need BSEP and military the wall, a protractor, and a self- on corresponding days with the schools. It is important to make test posted next to the map. The CEOI, eliminating all doubt about sure deserving soldiers are given answers to the test would be indi- what is to be checked. Just like my the opportunities to further their vidually covered, allowing partial personnel assets sheet, this check- careers and education. testing throughout the week. list is also kept in my “brain.” By One last means of caring is leave having your tank commanders help time. Leave time is a big boost for Maintenance write this cyclic PMCS, you have morale and must be monitored. I Maintenance in a tank platoon is involved them in training and main- keep track of this on the personnel a “make or break” area. Several tenance in an important manner. assets sheet. I do this by checking questions about maintenance peri- Another technique is to make your the Leave and Earnings Statement odically arise. A key problem is gunners responsible for mainte- with the platoon sergeant. Soldiers maintenance in the field during nance checking. The purpose here who are accruing too much leave continuous operations, and the Na- is not to relieve the tank command- time are in danger of losing some of tional Training Center is an acid er from responsibility for mainte- it, and probably need a breather. test for this. One solution for con- nance, but to increase the gunner’s The “brain,” quote of the day, tinuous maintenance involves the responsibility. By assigning him to cyclic maintenance schedule, and cyclic use of the preventive main- check, he is developing the respon- other techniques I’ve discussed are tenance checks and services sibility he will need later. The tank only some of the methods I have (PMCS). The entire PMCS is brok- commander will still check his ve- used. Perhaps this article has en down into ten sections. The be- hicle’s maintenance, but now he pricked your curiosity and imagina- fore-operations PMCS and after- can teach and coach the gunner tion and will help you develop your operations PMCS are not divided. along the lines of leader and pre- own methods of managing the lead- The during-operations PMCS is not pare the gunner for his day in the ership, training, maintenance, and divided by days, but rather is brok- TC’s hatch. the caring for soldiers within your en into operational sections. The init. Caring for the Soldier tank commander, gunner, loader, CAPTAIN MICHAEL D. and driver each have these opera- What have you done for Joe E. LANDERS, commissioned tional sections posted in their re- Soldier today? Caring for our great- from Georgia Military Col- spective stations. All that is re- est asset is important in any unit. lege, Milledgeville, isa gradu- quired to fabricate these checklists In addition to the chain of com- ate of the Armor Officer Ba- is to type them in item-number se- mand, there are agencies at every sic Course and the Junior quence, and cover the page with installation to help soldiers and Officer Maintenance Course. acetate. In this way, while the ve- their families. Here is where my He served as a tank platoon little black book helps me tremen- leader in two platoons, as hicle is in operation, any new faults HHC XO. and as support pla- can be checked off with a grease dously. Under the CARING section toon leader in the 2d Battal- pencil, and can be recorded on the of my “brain,” I keep a list of all ion, 69th Armor, at Fort Ben- DA Form 2404 later. A critical point on-post agencies and phone num- ning. He wrote this article is to make sure you list the during- bers. This helps save time getting while a student in the Armor operations PMCS in item-number professional assistance to my sol- Officer Advanced Course. His sequence. By ensuring the list is by diers. writing earned him the Ar- item number, you get improved ac- Caring, however, is not limited to mor Association‘s Academic curacy on the vehicle’s DA Form agency locations and marrying Writing Excellence Award for AOAC 1-86. these agencies UD with soldiers who

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 43 '7 ~ . , I '. :;'-~ .' ;"', '\.;'-, ",

~ ~ ~

Cavalry in Perspective

With the modernization of the Army, cavalry scouts skills oriented on the need to close with and destroy the and infantrymen are being issued a new combat enemy. Only after OSUT training are selected llBs vehicle, the M2I3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). A given the M3 add-on which awards them the MOS of vast improvement over the M113-series vehicle which 11M. The focus of the course is oriented on prefire has been in use since the 1960s, the Bradley Fighting gunnery, target engagements, and BIFV-peculiar tac­ Vehicle will serve well past the turn ofthe century. tics. No reconnaissance tasks are programmed in their To train soldiers to man and operate this vehicle, the course. This add-on training philosophy is the funda­ most advanced of its kind, the Army is looking at the mental difference between the Armor Center and the best method for the leastcost. One method suggested is Infantry Center programs of instruction. Cavalry the consolidation on all BFV training at one post, training in the 1st Armor Training Brigade is evolu­ perhaps Fort Knox or Fort Benning, as an add-on skill tionary, yet remains focused on basic reconnaissance for 19D cavalry scouts and lIB infantrymen. While skills. During their initial training, cavalry scouts ­ this may consolidate and standardize training, and whether mounted in M113s or M3s - are taught have some effect on costs, it is not the best way to train vehicle maintenance and proper use of the vehicle cavalrymen in this weapon system. during tactical operations. The prelude to the cavalry For the past 40-plus years, since the mechanization field exercise begins in the 8th week of a 13-week of both the cavalry and infantry in World War II, both course. At this juncture, instruction is geared to the arms have shared a common mode of battlefield field exercise. The linchpin ofthe 19D reconnaissance mobility, from theM3 halftrack to the M113. Each arm program of instruction is the 5-day cavalry field trained at its own "home", the cavalry at Fort Knox, exercise which enables selected tasks to be executed in and the infantry at Fort Benning. Only now, with the a tactical environment. addition of more sophisticated weapon systems, is the With the increased number of M3s coming into the concept of one-post training being considered. inventory as a result of force modernization, it is The cavalry and infantry missions are distinctly logical to assume that the number of vehicles and different. The purpose of cavalry is to recon, using training units needed to train soldiers will increase. combat vehicles and aeroscout helicopters, and to find Looking to the future and the full implementation of and fix the enemy so that he can be destroyed by the the J-series TO&E, it would not be feasible to train all combined arms efforts ofarmor, infantry and artillery. infantrymen and cavalrymen on the M2/3 at either His vehicle is an integral partofhis mission, providing Fort Knox or Fort Benning. Obviously, a transition essential mobility. The infantry mission is to close course could be centralized at either location, but only with and destroy the enemy. The vehicle is the infan­ one center, Fort Benning, has a need for a Skill Level 1 tryman's method of moving to reach and seize the add-on course. As previously mentioned, the M3 course objective, its weapon systems providing additional at Fort Knox is a complete 19D Skill Level 1 recon­ firepower. To accomplish the mission, however, the naissance course, closely paralleling the M113 19D infantryman, in most situations, must dismount and course. The three-week CFV course is a Skill Level 1-3 fight on foot as he always has. course given to troopers enroute to a unit equipped The points of common mobility and divergent mis­ with the BFV. These troopers have already completed sions are best illustrated by the exploits of the British 19D reconnaissance training. Army in South Africa, 1899-1902. Initially using the traditional tactics of the period, the British - with We can discuss combined arms - and have, in fact cavalry and dismounted infantry - suffered serious implemented it - but the fact remains that each arm is defeats at the hand of the Boers, who had mounted different, and uses its weapons in a different way. To both scouts and riflemen. This mobility enabled the the mounted scout, the M16 is a secondary weapon; to Boers to fight on their own terms. It was only after the the infantryman, whether mounted or dismounted, it British mounted entire brigades of infantry that they is his primary weapon. Differing methods and philoso­ were able to defeat their opponents. Despite the move, phies cannot and should not be totally eliminated, due battle tactics remained essentially unchanged. Mount­ to the distinct missions of each arm. These differences ed infantry used the horse as transportation, dis­ in mission and concept need to be taught from the mounting to fight on foot. The cavalry retained its start, including the use and maintenance of the M3. traditional roles of reconnaissance, screening opera­ Parochialism is harmful when it is carried too far tions, and pursuit to cut off retreat. and one looks out for one's own "turf' at the expense of Technology has advanced in the past 80 years, but all else. Cooperation between the service schools is the basic concepts ofthe cavalry and infantry have not essential to solve problems of training and doctrine. changed. At Fort Benning, lIB infantrymen receive The Infantry Center (historically the proponent for basic infantry training, augmented with the antitank antitank weapons, including the TOW) and the Armor

44 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 Center (traditionally the proponent for turreted weap­ and screening missions. Essentially, cavalry missions on systems) are working together to synthesize stan­ have not changed at all; only the techniques have been dards for BFV gunnery. This cooperation is the op­ refined and horses replaced with more lethal and timum method of achieving the end result. sophisticated combat vehicles. As in the past, success In summary, the cavalry scout works independently, on the battlefield depends on each arm adapting its classifying bridges, calling for fire, clearing mine­ mobility to its own unique mission. fields, emplacing demolitions and conducting the tra­ JOHN B. WHITEHEAD III ditional yet current missions of route and zone recon­ LTC, Armor naissance, flank coordination, security operations Fort Knox, KY Company Level Mentoring

The process of taking brand new second lieutenants dumb in front of his boss. and turning them into experienced, capable company • His relationship with his platoon sergeant can be grade officers is a critical one. Yet surprisingly little positive or negative. A weak platoon sergeant may attention is paid to developing lieutenants once they cloud the new officer's comprehension of the way reach their unit. In many cases today, it occurs on a hit officers and NCOs should interface. or miss basis. • Finally, he is most likely alone, without any ofhis The responsibility of training new lieutenants in previous friends, and in a strange geographic locality, units falls clearly to the company commander. A often for only the second time. recent article in Infantry provides evidence that com­ As can be seen, the new lieutenant faces a demand­ manders and lieutenants have conflicting views on ing, complex, and (for him) uncharted environment. how well this critical task is being accomplished. Yet his morale is probably high, and as Colonel Mike Commanders have the perception that they provide Malone would describe him, he could be placed in the sufficient feedback , but lieutenants are almost uni­ "willing but unable" category. He is a clear slate upon versally critical of their commanders in this regard. which can be sketched the lines of professionalism or New lieutenants are often left to flounder on their own, scrawled the graffiti of ticket-punching careerism. All even though commanders have good intentions and depends on how the chalk is wielded. Poorly perform­ may believe they are giving enough guidance and ing lieutenants can be coached, guided and developed attention to their subordinate officers. When ques­ into meeting acceptable standards. Lieutenants who tioned, most commanders confirm that they had the perform acceptably from the beginning can be molded same problems when they were lieutenants. It is into outstanding officers. Some company commanders almost a parody of the vicious cycle of child abuse: the have been known to label less capable lieutenants as commander perpetuates the system under which he "hopeless" (most commanders win swear they had to was developed. put up with at least one). However, there is a danger in Why is the system apparently perpetuating itself? lumping good lieutenants with an initial poor per­ There are two reasons, from the commander's perspec­ formance in the hopeless category. The poorly per­ tive: That's the way he was trained and, secondly, he is forming lieutenant is the one who most desperately usually so busy with daily requirements that he requires development. Immediately classifying him as doesn't recognize the need to work with a system a "dud" is taking the easy way out. which doesn't usually have command emphasis. Obviously something more than just occasional From the lieutenant's perspective, examine some of performance counselling is needed. The concept of the difficulties that he faces: mentoring may prove to be at least a partial solution to • Not only is he new to the unit, he is new to the the problem. Mentoring/ coaching has been well re­ system. Even the simplest tradition, the most basic ceived at CAS", and is currently a subject ofhot debate task, and the regulations can be perplexing. Virtually in the Army. But what is a mentor? everything is being done for the first time. Webster's Ninth Collegiate defines it as "1 cap: a • Many tasks are taught only once in the basic friend of Odysseus entrusted with the education of course, or covered only minimally. Resource and time Odysseus' son Telemachus. 2a: a trusted counselor or constraints do not provide excess training time for the b: TUTOR, COACH." Another definition, used by a new officer. It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect a new recent survey of officers, explains mentor as "an older, officer to be fully proficient as he graduates from the more established member of an organization who basic course. establishes a personal relationship with a new mem­ • His self-esteem and confidence are continually ber, and actively assists the individual in a profes­ assaulted as he copes with the difficulty of being a sional way to become oriented to the organization and leader and a learner at the same time. to achieve within the organization." This definition is • He will likely be apprehensive of the "boss". fairly succinct and about on the mark for our purposes. Regardless of how often the commander tells him "the "Leaders as Mentors" in the July 1985 issue of only stupid question is the unasked one," he is unlikely Military Review dra ws on civilian management ideas to ask a fraction of those he has. No one likes to look and studies for one concept of mentoring, which

March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 45 stresses some of the longer lasting aspects. Addi­ variety to the training site. tionally, they cite the typical civilian age difference of • Ensure a healthy "command climate" is estab­ 8 -to 15 years between mentor and protoge', and voice lished, so that the new lieutenant under~tands he will concern over the lack of age differential between be allowed to make mistakes. The lack of such an company commanders and their subordinates, which atmosphere will kill any attempts at mentoring. The may hinder the mentoring effort. lieutenant must not be afraid of trying for fear of For military purposes, we need to acknowledge two failing. subcategories. Personal mentoring is more the one-on­ • Ensure that both you and your XO are good "role one relationship discussed in the traditional sense. models" for the new lieutenants. Whether or not they Command mentoring focuses on the development of accept you as such is up to them, but the example set one's immediate subordinates. At the company level, must be positive and consistent with the ideals you the age difference is not as critical as the experience verbally espouse. difference. The concept of command mentoring needs Further on up the chain, the battalion commander to be refined for implementation at company level. It can aid the effort by letting the company commanders cannot be a panacea; yet it can go a long way. know he holds them responsible for the development of Here are some specific ideas for developing subor­ their subordinate officers. As General Bruce C. Clarke dinates (mentoring): said, "An organization does well only those things the • Ensure that the new officer knows how he stands. boss checks or causes to be checked." This would Counsel him frequen tly, and, more importantly, coach certainly be additional motivation to commanders to him. The requirement for counselling via DA Form pay more than just lip service to the development of 67-8-1 is a step in the right direction, but more is their new officers. needed.The new lieutenant needs feedback often, both The battalion XO's role must be one of mentoring the positive and negative. Remember that one pat on the staff(since he is their rater). Ifdesired by the battalion back is worth 10 kicks in the pants. Don't assume he commander, he could be tasked with monitoring the can read your m:ind; he can't. Often an implied task companies' development programs by close coordina­ that would be obvious to a more experienced officer or tion with the company commanders. His non-threat­ NCO will not be recognized by the new lieutenant. ening position could help the company commanders • The new lieutenant needs to be constantly and better understand the battalion commander and pro­ increasingly "stretched" to act on his own, but based vide an unofficial, experienced source to assist them in on your guidance. Just as subordinate leaders need to evaluating and implementing their own programs. understand the "commander's intent" in an opera­ Finally, the most important aspect of mentoring­ tions order, new lieutenants need to understand the caring. As noted by others, mentoring is a two-way "commander's concept" of garrison duties. This will street. The mentor must care as a parent cares ­ assist his development by giving him a framework intently, realisticaHy, with an eye to the future of both around which to base his decisions. Supervision and the individual and the "family" (unit). He must be feedback will get him back on track or fine tune his willing to take the risk of disappointment and face the actions. They key is direct, positive, and active in­ reality of subordinate failure. On the other hand, the volvement by the commander, and not just letting the mentor may realize the satisfaction of seeing his new officer learn by his mistakes. Each commander's subordinate develop and mature. The company com­ duty is to develop each of his subordinate~ to be better mander must show genuine care in the development of than the commander himself. his subordinates. • The XO (or senior lieutenant) needs to be fully Command mentoring of subordinates is an idea involved. Heis in a non-threatening position and is the which is in desperate need of implementation. New perfect springboard for the new lieutenants' questions. officers deserve feedback, a meaningful Officer Pro­ Make it part of his formal duties and ensure he is not fessional Development Program at the company level, just passively assisting. There i~ every reason he and a healthy command climate in which they can should assist in mentoring the new officers. develop. Without command emphasi~ and acknow­ • Establish a company level Officer's Professional ledgement ofthe problem by commanders, the vicious Development Program that is more than just lifting cycle of poor officer development will not be broken. beers at the O-club. Practice, discus~ion, and training The chalk is in your hands. in technical and professional skills will be invaluable in giving the lieutenants a polish to their Basic Course GREGORY M. SMITH training. Make time to talk with subordinates. Sched­ CPT, Armor ule time to leave the company/ battalion area to ensure Fort Knox, Ky. the OPD training will be uninterrupted and to lend

Command' and Control

FC 71-6, Battalion and Brigade Command and Con­ been validated by units of the 194th Armored Brigade trol, was published as a joint effort by the Armor and ("Panzer Lehr") in the crucible ofcombat operations at Infantry Schools. The purpose of this field circular was Fort Irwin, the National Training Center (NTC). to provide the commander with methods and tech­ One command and control issue described in FC 71-6 niques to employ in exercising the critical battlefield concerns the most effective location ofthe FSO during function ofcommand and control. These methods have tactical operations. FC 71-6 shows the FSO colocated

46------ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare ------March-April 1986 with the commander in the commander's vehicle. This will be a more practical option for the commander when the command and control vehicle (C2V) is fielded with its enhancements. Many commanders believe that this is the best way to employ the FSO. In this location, he can provide the most timely and effective indirect fires in support of the commander's concept and intent. Two other issues raised in FC 71-6 are where the commander should position himself to control the battle most effectively, and from what type of vehicle he should command. NTC lessons learned indicate that the commander needs to position himself where he can best "see the battlefield" and where he can best bring the weight of his personality to bear on the outcome of the fight. Usually, that's well forward on the battlefield in a vehicle that's hardened to survive. FC 71-6 shows the commander in a tracked vehicle - a tank for Armor battalion commanders and a Bradley Fighting Vehicle for Infantry battalion commanders. This is not intended to dictate to the commander that this should be the only vehicle that he will ever use. While the survivability of the tank or BFV make them more suitable for the commander to use, the amount of time spent in a tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle equipped as a command and control vehicle is depen­ dent upon the situation presented to the individual commander. Below is a table that portrays the approximate amount oftime that commanders reported spending in their C2VS during one unit's NTC rotation. This table execution, and an extension to convert the vehicle to a clearly points out the operational necessity that com­ mini-CPo manders be proficient in leading from combat vehicles Other methods chosen by tank unit commanders forward on the battlefield. Company commanders included locating in an Ml13, and using a l!.l-ton tend to spend more time in their fighting vehicles vehicle while coordinating critical support issues in becuase they are more often closer to the FLOT than the rear (i.e., BSA or field trains). the battalion commander. The Armor School currently teaches the techniques and procedures discussed in FC 71-6 . Discussed are Percent of Time Commander Was in C2V * TOC organization, the role of key personnel, and techniques for effective C2, which include vehicle location Inf Bn Tank Bn Inf Co Tank Co marking, use of TIRs, standard load plans, and uni­ forms. Armor leaders are made aware that command is Front/or a very personal thing. The precise way that a com­ Near Front mander chooses to command and control - and most (TOC Forward) 93% 80% 91% 97% importantly, to infuse that critical ingredient of lead­ Rear Area ership - will be decided by what he knows is best for (Rear of TOC) 7% 20% 9% 3% his unit, based on experience. As always, the proper • The data were obtained from subjective self·evalution of tima and are probably application of METT-T - i.e., a thorough analysis of accurate plus-or-minus 10%. Of significance is thai commanders don't command mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time - applies. battles from the TOe or from 'A-ton vehicles. The commander's ability to "see" the battlefield and In applying the doctrinal principles outlined in FC infuse leadership is critical to the success of the unit. 71-6, the commander's tank or fighting vehicle must be The commander must survive in order to make deci­ configured to support his command and control re­ sions that will be key to winning in battIe. The quirements when he is operating forward. There is a enhanced survivability of the C2V will keep our ex­ recognized need to improve his command and control perienced leaders forward to influence the battle. capability without radically altering the configura­ Plans for configuration of the command and control tion of his vehicle. The Armor Center has configured vehicle (C2V) are tentatively scheduled to be available command vehicles of the 194th Armored Brigade to on or about 1 May 86 and can be obtained by sending a provide an expanded view of the battlefield, a map request to the Commandant, US Army Armor School, holder, enhanced communications, and the ability to 'ATSB·CD-ML, ATTN: CPT Robert E. Ransom, Fort collocate the commander and the FSO (or FSE), should Knox, KY 40121-5215, or by calling AUTOVON the commander so desire. This command and control 464-1750/ 7222. vehicle concept provides access to four FM radio nets with secure capability, a new intercom system to LTC ALAN G. VITTERS and monitor these nets as required by the commander, the CPT JAMES R. HARRISON introduction of a low-profile antenna to reduce vehicle Command and Staff Department signature, map holders to facilitate planning and US Army Armor School

March-April 1986 ------ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare------47 Leadership Does Pay Off 1-22 FA History Assistance Sought In 1985, the Army chose leadership as its theme and The 1st Battalion, 22d Field Artillery, assigned to 4th conducted an Army-wide Leadership Forum to select the Armored Division in WW II, is preparing an organizational Army's best leaders. history. The 1-22 was also assigned to the 4th Armored Leadership success stories were solicited from the field Division after WW II and later to the 1 st Armored Division. in four categories: enlisted, officer, civilian and organiza­ Any person having historical documents, photographs, tion. or organizational histories of the 1st and 4th ADs that The winner of the enlisted leadership category was would help in the compilation of the 1-22 history are asked SSGT Charles P. Waters, Company D, 1st Battalion, 32d to 'lend them to 1 LT Richard A. Lechowich, Unit Historian, Armor, 3d Armored Division, USAREUR. HQ 1-22 FA, APO New York 09070. Fire support informa­ Sergeant Waters, with the other leadership winners, tion is particularly sought. Personnel in USAREUR may were honored on 27 February at the Pentagon. Sergeant phone Nurenberg Military 2623-877/830. Waters' story is indeed one of leadership in all its aspects. He was assigned the worst tank and crew in his battalion and turned it into one of the best, according to his platoon leader, First Lieutenant Robert R. Naething. NTC History Is You - Write! Waters inherited the previous tank commander's slop­ The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, py bookkeeping and a delinquent crew tha.t repeatedly has begun researching its history, says Lieutenant failed inspections. The crew's tank gunnery scores were Colonel Gerard J . Monaghan, the Army Reserve officer among the lowest in the brigade when Sergeant Waters who is heading the project. took over. History is people and events, and people make events. If The sergeant began with a thorough inspection of the you ever served at Fort Irwin, or at any of its predecessors tank that resu Ited in a 1 2-page DA Form 2402 Request for - the Mojave Anti-Aircraft Range, Camp Irwin and the Repairs. He worked closely with the maintenance team Army Armor and Desert Training Center - or in any of the chief to ensure that every broken part was either fixed or multitude of units that trained there, you are invited to replaced and he trained every member of his crew in the contribute to Fort Irwin's history. proper maintenance procedures. If you have a Fort Irwin connection, send a post card'to Waters set high standards and accepted no compro­ the Public Affairs Office, AnN: Historian, NTC and Fort mises. His positive attitudes, determination and skills Irwin, Fort Irwin, CA 9231 0 , Include your name, address, have invoked a healthy spirit of competition among other phone number and your connection with Ft. Irwin. Also tank crews and have boosted morale in general in his unit. mention if you have any memorabilia or documents Since Waters took over the tank and its crew, they relating to Ft. Irwin. qualified as best tank in the brigade in gunnery, did well during Spearhead Victory, a training exercise, and have had a very successful ARTEP. Blackhorse Reunion Rescheduled In addition, Sergeant Waters' crew passed every task Due to unforeseen circumstances, it has been neces­ tested during inspect,ion and received the battalion's sary to change the dates of the reunion of the 11 th Distinguished Platoon Award. In the words of his platoon Armored Cavalry Regiment (BLACKHORSE). The reunion commander, Sergeant Waters "is typical of the thousands date has been changed from 9-10 to 16-17 May 1986 at of good soldiers in Europe who took last year's challenge Fort Knox, For reservations please contact the Secretary of Leadership and ran with it." (Bill Squires) P.O. Box 11, Fort Knox, KY 40121 (or call Well done, Staff Sergeant Watersl 502-624-2247).

Recognition Quiz Answers

1. M-109 Howitzer (U.S.). Crew, 6; weight, 4. BLG-60 (USSR). Crew, 2; weight, 33,500 kg (37 23,786 kg (25 tons); hull length, 6.256 m; width, 3.295 m; tons); chassis, T-54/ 55 tank; bridge capacity, 50 tons; height, 3,289 m; maximum road speed, 56 km/hr; maxi­ bridge width, 3 .2 m; bridge span, 21.6 m; bridge launch mum road range. 390 km; engine. Detroit Diesel Model' time, 3-5 minutes. 8V71 T, turbo-charged, liquid coo'led. 8-cylinder, 405 bhp; armament, 1 x 155-mm main gun, 1 x l'2.7-mm AA 5. ASU-57 (USSR). Crew, 3; weight, 3,350 kg (3.7 machinegun. tons) (air transportable); maximum road speed, 45 km / hr; maximum road range, 250 km; armament, 1 x 57-mm AT 2. ZSU-23-4 (USSR). Crew, 4. weight. 19,000 kg gun; engine, 4-cylinder, gasoline. 55 hp; maximum armor (21 tons); maximum road speed, 44 km / hr; maximum road (aluminum), 6-mm at 60 degree slope on front. range, 260 km; armament, 4 x 23-mm AZP-23 cannon; maximum elevation, +85 degrees; depression. -5 degrees. 6. ZSU-57 (USSR). Crew, 6; weight. 28,100 kg (31 360-degree traverse; rate of fire, 800-1,000 rpm per gun; tons); maximum road speed, 50 km/hr; maximum road maximum effective vertical range, 2,500 m. range, 595 km w/auxiliary fuel; armament, 2 x 57-mm S-68 cannon; maximum elevation, +85 degrees; depres­ 3. GAZ-47 also GT-S (USSR). Crew, 2; weight, sion, -5 degrees, 360-degree traverse; rate of fire, 70 rpm loaded, 4,600 kg (5 tons); length, 4.9 m; maximum road per gun (practical rate); maximum vertical range, 8,800 m . speed, 35-39 km/ hr; maximum road range, 725 km; engine, GAZ-61 or GAZ-47, 6-cylinder, gasoline, 85 hp; tracked. amphibious over-snow vehicle.

48 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 The Bustle Rack

"Armor Enlisted Professional Development" Circular Is Now Available Field Circular 21 -309, "Armor Enlisted Professional Development," should be on the required-to-read list of, every officer, NCO, and soldier in the Armor force. It provides guidance to individuals, commanders, and per- sonnel managers on how to develop and use Armor noncommissioned officers and is focused on increasing the effectiveness and professionalism of the Armor NCO. The new FC is not intended to replace Army regulations, nor to change the Enlisted Personnel Management Sys- tem. Rather, it complements both by addressing the philosophy of Armor in order to bring together informa- tion relevant to professional development and assign- Armed Forces Mobilization Conference ment of Armor NCOs. The fifth annual Industrial College of the Armed Forces Some 32,000 copies have been distributed to the field, Mobilization Conference will be held on May 22-23 at the with more available upon request by units. National Defense University, ICAF, Ft. McNair, Washing- The new circular covers such important personnel ton, D.C. The theme will be "The Future Role of Mobiliza- considerations as the Enlisted Personnel Management tion in National Security." Three subject areas will be System, the Armor professional development pattern, emphasized: National Security and Mobilization, Man- promotions, Enlisted Evaluation Reports, reclassifica- power Resources Management, and Industrial Resources tions, and the very important selection and promotion Management. Papers on these topics are invited. criteria for the OSUT/unit Excellence in Armor Program. For further information contact: Mobilization Confer- Additional copies are available by writing to Com- ence Committee, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, mandant, U.S. Army Armor School, AlTN: Proponency Washington, D.C. 2031 9-6000, or phone (202)475-1794, Office, ATZK-AR-P, Fort Knox, KY 401 21-51 87. AUTOVON 335-1794. Gowan Field Seeks Instructors The M60A3 New Equipment Training Team (NETT) at Applique Armor for M60s Tested Gowan Field, Idaho, is seeking senior armor instructors, The testing of applique armor for the M60A3 tank has armor instructors, a senior maintenance instructor and been underway at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, accord- additional maintenance instructors. The unit will be ing to the Combat Systems Test Activity (CSTA). transitioning Reserve and National Guard units from Applique - or "add-on" armor - is designed to give the earlier M60 and M48 equipment to the M60A3 TTS tank. tank increased protection against gun or missile rounds. The transition will be conducted at Gowan Field, near Aberdeen used three complete tank hulls and three bal- Boise. Interested parties are asked to get in touch with listic (stripped) hulls for the tests, using real and simulated Major Randall F. Williams, chief of the M60A3 NETT, or antiarmor munitions. Testing also included an assessment Master Sergeant Gregory C. Schwartz (AUTOVON: 941- of the vehicle's mobility performance with the added 5879/5882; Commercial: 208-385-5879/5882). A job weight of the applique armor. Thetesting culminates three announcement will be sent to prospective applicants. years' work by various Army Materiel Command agencies Mailing address for the unit is Gowan Field Training that developed the new armor. Center, NETT, P.O. Box 45, Boise, ID 83707-0045.

ROTC Assignments for Academic Year 1987-88 Armor Branch Notes ROTC Assistant PMS positionsfor academic year 1987- 88 will become available in September-October 1986. Functional Area Designation for Year Group 79 Officers who would like to be considered for ROTC duty Armor Branch has completed the designation of func- should contact their career manager at that time. Many of tional areas for Armor captains in year group 1979. the colleges and universities in the program require Results will be released through local MILPOs, the Army masters degrees prior to arrival. It is imperative that Times, and by calling Armor Branch. Designation re- officers who have received advanced degrees keep their quirements were made by projecting field grade strengths, Officer Record Brief up to date to assist in assignments. average attrition rates and desired utilization rates. These Armor Branch receives an annual allocation of schools requirements were then adjusted based on the size of the in accordancewith a prescribeddistributionplan. Officers 1979 year group, proponent preferences, and DCSPER who solicit individual schools must understand that just guidance. because an opening is anticipated does not mean that Career managers considered individual officer educa- Armor Branch will receive the allocation. Additionally, tion, training, experience, job performance and personal ROTC duty is a nominative process. Working through the preference. In accordancewith the implementation of the career manager is the best way to ensure an appropriate OPMS Study Group's recommendations, officers were assignment. not permittedto carrya branch as a second specialty(i.e., Points of contact at Armor Branch are CPT Benson or 91-Ordnance, 35-Military Intelligence, etc.) CPT Swan, AV 221 -9696/6340. - - .-. .- - - March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 49 New Patton Biography Paints the Personal Side

rected the American Tank Corps school at PAlTON: THE MAN BEHIND Langres and took his (304th) light tank brigade into action at St. Mihiel. Butwhen THE LEGEND, 1885-1945, by the tank corps was assimilated into the Martin Blumenson, William Morrow & infantry in 1920, a disgusted Patton re- Co., Inc., New York, 1985. 320 pages. turned to the cavalry. $17.95. Patton wasa commander, not a theoreti- cian, and the nascent American armored Perhaps no one is as qualified to write force and developing doctrine owed little the definitive biography of George S. Pat- to him. "No strategist or theorist," ob- ton, Jr., the justly-renowned American serves Blumenson. While Van Voorhis Armor commander, as is Martin Blumen- and Chaffee were struggling to develop son. A historian on Patton's Third Army the American armored force, and Euro- staff, author of numerous campaign pean thinkers were evolving the concepts studies, including Breakout and Pursuit. of armored warfare, Patton's influence and then editor of the two-volume Panon was only "indirect." His assignments took Papers, Blumenson brings to his subject him to Hawaii where "he went into his both intimate familiarity and professional midlife crisis, and turned sour." Bitter historical detachment. It must be empha- over professional frustrations, "he drank sized that this is a personal, not a military, too much and engaged in casual affairs." biography. Operations areonly brieflysum- Polo served as an outlet for his explosive marked, and scarcely analyzed or evalu- temperament. The author traces Patton's ated. Even the flavor of this colorful per- doctrinal development more specifically sonality is captured more in the Papers, in the Patton Papers than in this bi- few of whose delightfully pithy and pro- ography. Inthe former work, Patton finally fane comments have been incorporated. became "disenchanted" with the horse In this book, Blumenson concentrates on cavalry as a result of the 1940maneuvers, character study. while in the latter work the maneuvers A pensive Patton during the 1941 Though born near Los Angeles, his were "invaluab1e"and "brought him up to Louisiana maneuvers. father a successful lawyer, Patton's per- date" on mechanization. ceived heritage was that of his Virginia In command of the 2dArrnored Division incident the author says was "inconse- aristocratic military ancestors. This tradi- at Fort Benning, Patton energetically quential, even silly." tion, and his affluent family circum- stimulated the confidence and enthusi- Patton was denied command positions stances, generated a "sense of superior- asm of his men. He also cultivated the because of his intemperate remarks and ity," but also "a tinge of snobbery and press to capture public attention, "not conduct, yet his eloquent profanity and racism." It also drove him to suppress a only for his own glory but also for the aggressive leadership gained him the ar- sensitive natural temperament by foster- benefit of the Armored Force." (His at- dent support of his men. It was as com- ing the military virtues of leadership, tempt to design a tanker's uniform, how- manding general of Third Army, during bravery, and self-discipline. ever, was ridiculedas the "Green Hornet" the breakout from Normandy, that Patton Patton's personality manifested a des- and was discarded.) He continued, later in made his formidable reputation as an perate drive to excel, but also a hot temper his career, to successfully reinforce his armor leader. Blumenson feels Patton and erratic emotional behavior thatthreat- ability to garner publicity. "Blood and might have closed the Falaise-Argentan ened his accomplishments and reputa- guts" was his own phrase, and his im- gap, bagging two German field armies, but tion. Blumenson attributes this first trait maculate cavalry-style uniform, complete was prevented from doing so by Bradley to Patton's determination to master a mild with holstered pistols ("pearl-handled" in who-with Eisenhower and Montgomery dyslexia, a learning disorder he compen- this work), enhanced the warrior image. - had been "incapable of the flat-out sated for by intense study. Nonetheless, Patton was well-connected, and not above determination" necessary and "had even after a year at Virginia Military Insti- employing "high-powered flattery" to botched the encirclement." tute, it took Patton five years to graduate further his career. At the same time, his The ensuing campaigns nonetheless from West Point. The author also the- aggressive leadership and evident com- assured Patton's reputation as America's orizes that Patton's extremes of emotion mand competence justified the promo- greatestcombat leader in the ETO. He may resulted from head injuries in horse-rid- tions he received. indeed have been fulfilling a destiny and ing accidents, which may haveproduceda Blumenson does not detail the two believed himself a modern reincarnation subdural hematoma. a pool of blood press- "slapping incidents" in Sicily, but ex- of earlier warriors. The author mentions ing on the brain. plains Patton's outburst of "suppressed this in passing, as Patton's sensing the In any case, Patton aggressively pur- hysteria" as resultingfrom the stressesof Romans at Trier, "so sure of his previous sued a military career, while cultivating the campaign, which had brought him presence there," but does not dwell on social and political contacts in Washing- "close to exhaustion." The author does this. Describing the controversial Ham- ton. But he energetically created his own not relate Patton's feelings about ma- melburg raid, Blumenson accepts Pat- reputation as well, participating in the lingering versus combat fatigue, nor does ton's statement that he had not known for 1912 Stockholm Olympics and fearlessly he judge Patton's conduct. Patton's pen- sure his son-in-law was a POW there. attacking a Villista position in the 1916 chant for saying the wrong thing also got (The author does not defend the raid as a camoaian.- in Mexico. In WWI. Patton di- him into trouble at Knutsford, England, an tactical ruse. as he has elsewhere.) 50 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 Despite the casual reference to "extra- marital sorties" in Hawaii in the 1930s. Blumenson emphasizes Patton's great emotional dependence on his wife Bea- trice. Patton's other sexual exploits seem to come from the extremelycandid diaries of General Everett Hughes. Hughes was noted for being titillated by maliciousgos- sip, and Blumenson is patently uneasy about using him as a factual source. The war over, Patton's utilization of former Nazis in administrative positions and his contempt for war-displaced refu- gees (DPs) indicated again that, without a war, this warrior was an anachronism. In perceiving a Jewish-Communist conspira- cy, says Blumenson, Patton had become "delusional." Patton died in an automo- bile accident in December 1945, just at the right time, "before he could destroy his reputation by absurd ravings." Yet Blumenson remains sympathetic to the legendary Patton, perhaps even in awe of him. This biography investigates the personal forces that molded and drove the public Patton who, in spite of certain human failings, nonetheless lived up to An Encyclopedia Worth Reading the heroic image he hadcultivated. George C. Scott's acting in the film Patton. notes the author, was "a remarkably accurate Part 1, entitled "The Setting," of itself portrayal of the public figure." Used in makes the book worth your while. It is a VIETNAM WAR ALMANAC, by conjunction with the operational studies 26-page summary, with maps, of Viet- Harry G. Summers, Jr., Facts on Files nam's long history, its culture, its geo- and the Patton Papers, Blumenson's bi- Publications. 414 pages. $24.95. ography helps to round out the image of graphy. On reading it, one concludes that America's most famous armored com- our policy makers, our soldiers, our aca- mander. One's first impression of this book is demics, our editorial writers, and all the likely to be negative: "This is an encyclo- rest of us, approached the Vietnam War A. HARDING GANZ pedia. Even if the typography is fine and -and forthe mostpart,finished it-with- Associate Professor the pictures good, who wants to read an out the remotest idea of what we were Department of History encyclopedia?" getting into or had gotten into. Buy the Ohio State University at Newark Closer examination disoels the neaative- book, if only to read Part I. impression. Part II is-a chronology of our actions from 1959 thru 1975. Valuable for re- MANEUVER WARFARE HAND- This would save us from smart novices of searchers and students, for those who Lind's ilk who want to tell us how to fight, wore uniforms it is more. As you note the BOOK, by William S. Lind, Westview but who have never heard a hostile round 'date of an event you will say, "At that Press, Boulder, CO, 1985. 131 pages. or smelled death. time, I was at such-and-such," or, "doing $16.50. It delights me that Lind chose the Ma- so-and-so.*' For those who wish to keep rine Corps school system for reform vice their memory green, it is a high-nitrogen Bill Lind has assembled a superb bibli- the Army school system which teaches fertilizer. ography on maneuver tactics and he dis- FM 100-5. Unfortunately, he does not Part 111, which comprises three quarters plays a unique layman understanding of seem to understand that someone still has of the book, was the hard part to write. It the battlefield. His references to Rom- to assault, seize, and hold beachheads describes each major action, military or mel's book, lnfantry Attacks, first pub- and that it's a bloody business no matter political, each major organization or en- lished in 1937, are well-placed in his how you do it. Noticeably lacking in his tity, and sketches the principal military theoretical work. He weaves all the right short work is a full discussion of air and political personalities. To keep these buzzwords and outlines some excellent mobility and its impact on modern ma- descriptions objective and even-handed is lessons learned from historical examples. neuver warfare. Marine aviation in Viet- a mighty undertaking. Participants in the Such terms as auffragstaktik, augriffsziel, nam was noted for its ability in this in- war have strong opinions and deep felt blitzkrieg, schwerpunkt, as used by Rom- direct approach. I suggest that the Marine convictions. Was there ever a war in mel, Guderian, Deighton, Manstein, and Corps issue copies of lnfantry Attacks by which this was not true? Part 111 is not a other authors, are carefully translated, Rommel as mandatory study material to type of writing which produces a consen- explained, and sprinkled throughout the stay ahead of Lind's proposals. sus. Thus the veteran will probably find book. Bill Lind is obviously bright, well- I don't recommend this book for juniors the treatment of antiwar activists as bland, read, and his Maneuver Warfare Hand- without combat experience, but then Lind not to say benign. To help the reader book is well worth your study. seems to be one of the few, military or obtain a balanced view, the author ends This short work can be read easily in an civilian, brave enough to write and espouse most items with suggestions for further evening's sitting, but it is not worth a theory about tactical warfare - a sad reading. Here he attempts to balance writ- $16.50, or whatever bargain price you can commentary to us senior Army leaders. ings on one side of a controversy with get it for, to put in your professional Serious students of warfare will find those on the other side. library. However, it should be read. It this book disappointing. Few will read every item in Part 111. Yet, makes you realize that we professional leafing through, you will be surprised at soldiers should more carefully study our JOHN C. BAHNSEN how many you will read. The veteran will profession of arms and express our Brigadier General, USA surely read the actions in which he parti- cipated and will probably feel that the thoughts" in oublic writina- more often. Fort Hood, Texas March-April 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 51 - - -- - The Rernagen Bridge. shortly after its capture in 1945. STORMING HITLER'S RHINE. not going to collapse. The Allied armies Decisions which should have been The Allied Assault: February- would have to storm the Rhine. purely military were made under the influ- This book covers the two phases of this ence of these political considerations. The March 1945, William B. Breuer, St. operation, the move up to the Rhine and British wanted Montgomery to make an Martin's Press, NY, 1985. pages. 308 the actual crossings. The first phase was immediate armored thrust toward Berlin. $18.95. heavily colored by the internal squabbling The American position was that all the ~ ~~~~ of the Allies. America's preponderance of armies should move up to the Rhine be- After the heartbreaking struggle up men and materiel convinced her she fore any attempt to cross was made. The from the beaches of Normandy, and the should be the dominant partner of the clash between George Marshall and Alan euphoria of the breakout with the expec- alliance. England, nearly exhausted from Brooke over this point is used by Mr. tation of being home for Christmas, came six years of war, was desperately ma- Breuer to illustrate how easily strategic the near disaster of the Battle of the neuvering to remain a major power in the planning could be upset by personal and Bulge. It was obvious that Germany was postwar wor Id. political pettiness at this relatively late date. Of course, events made this ex- change meaninglessas Americans pushed Vietnam War Almanac (cont'd.) across the Rbine ahead of Montgomery. Mr. Breuer focuses his narrative on description gives the fight less than its well. The junior officers and noncommis- individual acts of bravery, stupidity, and due. Those who attained senior positions sioned officers did more than could be luck, from the acts of private soldiers to during the war will know many, if not expected, considering their brief training the dreams of general officers. Much of most, of the personalities sketched, and and limited experience. this detail comes from the German view- from time to time will detect an error. Unfortunately, Part 111 has no entry un- point, especially in his handling of the Manywho attained no senioritywhatever, der ROTATION and none under PERSON- capture of the Remagen bridge. At times, civilian or military, will have encountered NEL POLICY. Thus the author makes no the litany of names, ranks, units, and some of the individuals sketched and may mention of the one factor which impaired numbers overwhelms the story. The de- have strong opinions on others. When the military effectiveness above all others: scription of Operation Varsity, the air- sketch does not conform to these opin- individual rotation. Individual rotation borne assault across the Rhine, suffers ions, there is always the suggestion for meant that each small unit was in a from this in particular becauseof thescale further readings to find others' assess- constant state of flux with the longest- involved. Never before had two complete ments and, perhaps, what the individual serving and most experienced men al- airbornedivisions been flown into combat has to say for himself. ways leaving or just about to leave. Insti- at one time. Over 21 ,OOO men were car- Despite the diversity of the personali- tutional memory was destroyed. Unit co- ried by airplane and glider, then continu- ties and the brevity of the sketches, the hesion could be found onlywhere God had ouslysupplied. The logistics of this opera- author has done well. Repeatedly, one is granted the unit a most gifted junior lead- tion were mind-numbing. struck by a cogent comment such as his er. Any assessment of the Vietnam War This is a balanced account of the end of last sentence on Secretary of Defense which fails to mention this is woefully the European war. Mr. Breuer has used Robert S. McNamara, "...his strong em- remiss. incidents from the lives of individual sol- phasis on statistical indices of success The fact that we had military successes diers toadvancethe narrative. Sometimes and quantitative analysis in the decision- in Vietnam shows that bureaucratic inep- the recitation of namesgets in the way, or making process, and his belief that war titude is not enough to stifle our national a soldier's comments seem to be quoted should, in effect, be run like a corporation, militaryvirtues. In the end, militaryvirtue for no particular purpose. Still, the overall led to grave misrepresentation about the was overwhelmed by inadequate policy effect of the book is good. Storming Hit- nature of the war in Vietnam." combined with bureaucratic ineptitude. ler's Rhine would serve as a sound intro- From the author's statistics, his sketch- duction to this often neglected period. es, and hiscomments, one judges thatthe ANDREW P. O'MEARA American soldier fought ably in Vietnam. General (Ret.), USA MICHAEL RICKS His senior officers performed their duties Arlinoton.~--. VA Alton. Illinois

52 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1986 1986 Armor Conference Agenda

The 1986 Armor Conference will take place at Fort Knox on 13-15 May, with an additional day, May 16, devoted to Cavalry I issues. The U.S. Armor Association will also conduct a short business meeting during this period. The Armor Conference is an official event. Unit and agency representatives are authorized to attend in an official capacity; however, USAARMC cannot support TDY costs. Non-sponsored guests are also encouraged to attend.

Tentative Agenda Tuesday, May 13 5 0900-2200 Registration (Officers Club) 1300-1700 Displays 1600- 1700 Patton Museum Ceremony 1700-1730 Retreat Ceremony (in honor of 2 ACR 150th Anniversary 1800-1900 Chief of Armor Garden Party (Casual) 1930-2200 Buffet and Regimental Dinner Wednesday, May 14

0700-0800 Late Registration (Gaffey Hall Library) 0800-1100 Opening Remarks Keynote Address: GEN William R. Richardson, Close Combat Heavy - Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support 1100-1 145 Armor Association General Membership Meeting 1145-1 300 Executive Council Armor Association Luncheon 1300-1500 Close Combat Heavy - Needs 1500-1800 Demonstration/Displays 1900-2200 Armor Association Banquet - LTG Saint Uniform for the Conference is Army green short sleeve shirt speaker with no tie. Estimated costs are: BOO, $10 single, $6.50 double Thursday, May 15 per persodnight; guest house, $18.50 double, $20 triple per room/night (all guests may expect double billeting due to shortage of guest housing). Garden party cost is $7; buffet and 0800-1 1 45 Close Combat Heaw - Initiatives regimental dinner, $15; Armor Association banquet, $17; Chief (concurrent: Panels - Manning, Training, Developing, of Armor luncheon, $6.50; refreshment fee, $4. Supporting) Tickets for social functions will be sold only at registration. (concurrent: Demonstrations/Displays) On-post billets are limited and will be issued on a first-come, first-served basis. For on-post billeting, contact Unaccompanied 1200- 131 5 Chief of Armor Luncheon - GEN Sennewald, Personnel Housing Division (AV: 464-31 38/3943; Commercial: speaker 502-624-3138/3943). General officers will be billeted on-post, 1330-1530 Panel Reports if desired. Contact the Protocol Office, AV: 464-2744, 6951 or 1530-1545 Adjournment Remarks Commercial: 502-624-2744-6951. The schedule for Thursday, Friday, 16 May, has been dedicated to Cavalry issues, pro- 15 May, includes panel discussions. If you have issues which viding additional opportunity to focus on subjects of particular supporting panel sessions, please contact Captain Whitehead importance to Cavalry. (AV: 464-1441 /1050). POC for contractor displays is CPT Lacey (502) 624-5565/3962). Friday, May 16 Transportation to and from Standiford Field, Louisville, will be available on a limited basis. Use of rental cars is suggested. 0800-0815 Welcome (Gaffey Hall is within walking distance of BOQ.)Transportation to 081 5-0900 Cavalry in AirLand Battle and from lunch will be provided. 0900-1OOO Turning Concepts into Capability: Doctrine- Security clearance notifications for the conference should be Mission Training Plans-SOP received by the Directorate of Security, ATTN: ATZK-DS. prior to 1OOo-1100 The Reconnaissance/Counter Reconnais- registration, preferably before 1 May. Notifications for civilians sance Battle and DOD contract personnel should be submitted on written visit 1100-1200 Steel on Target - AbramdBradley Gunnery notification forms. Military personnel must ensure that their Update clearance is on their travel orders. POC is MSG Aker (AV: 464- 131 0- 1400 The Excellence Track - 19DA 9K in Recon 281 4/1425/7050; Commercial: 502-624-2814/1425/7050. 1400-1500 Ground/Air Cavalry The USAARMC project officer for the Armor Conference is CPT 1500-1600 Heavy/Division Cavalry Squadron Study Whitehead. 1600-1730 Cavalry Seminar

March-April 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 53 16th Armor

Strike Hard Lineage and Honors

I Constituted 1 July 1916 in the Regular Army as 16th Cavalry and organized at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Inactivated 12 November 1921 at Forts Sam Houston and McIntosh. Texas. Activated 15 June 1942 at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, as 16th Cavalry. Mechanized. Regiment broken up 22 December 1943 and its elements reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 16th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, and 16th and 19th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, Mechanized. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 16th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, converted and redesignated 1 May 1946 as Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 16th Constabulary Squadron, and assigned to 4th Constabulary Regiment. (Troops of 16th Constabulary Squadron constituted and activated 1 May 1946.) Reorganized and redesignated 10 February 1948 as Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Troop, 16th Constabulary Squadron. Relieved 1 February 1949 from assignment to 4th Constabulary Regiment and assigned to the United States Constabulary. Inactivated 27 November 1950 at Grafenwohr, Germany. Converted and redesignated 9 March 1951 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Armored Cavalry Group. (Troops of 16th Constabulary Squadron disbanded 9 March 1951.) Activated 1 April 1951 at Camp Cooke, California. Reorganized and redesignated 1 October 1953 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Armor Group. 16th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, Inactivated 10 February 1946 at Camp Hood, Texas. 19th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, inactivated 10 November 1945 at Camp Campbell, Kentucky. Reorganized 1 August 1946 at Fort Riley, Kansas, and redesig- nated as Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 19th Cavalry Group, Mechanized. (Troops of 19th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, absorbed in the reorganization on 1 August 1946.) Inactivated 6 November 1946 at Fort Riley, Kansas. Redesignated 2 January 1953 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 19th Armored Cavalry Group, and activated at Frankfurt, Germany. Redesignated 1 October 1953 as Headquarters and Head- quarters Company, 19th Armor Group. Inactivated 1 July 1955 in Europe. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16thArmor Group, 16th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 19th Armor Group, consolidated 2 July 1955; consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Armor Group. Former 16th Cavalry designated 1 March 1957as a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental System; concurrently. former troops withdrawn from 16th Armor Group and redesianated elements of the 16th Cavalw. 16thCavalry redesignated 26 March 1963 as 16th Symbolism Armo;(Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Arm& Group, inactivated 15 April 1968; concurrently, redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Armor). The was organized in Redesignated as 16th Cavalry, 2 September 1969. with Denonnel from the 3d. 6th. and 14th'Cavalry. which are represented I by the canton. (The standard is from the crest of the coat of arms for the Campaign Participation Credit 14th Cavalry; green was the color of the facings of the Mounted Rifles, now the 3d Cavalry; the embattled World War I1 partition line commemorates the first R hineland engagement of the 6th Cavalry when Central Europe it assaulted artillery in earthworks at Vietnam Williamsburg in 1862.) Defense The shield isyellow, thecavalry color; Counteroffensive the blue chevron is for the old blue Counteroffensive, Phase II uniform; the 16mullets (spur rowels) Counteroffensive, Phase 111 indicate the numerical designation Tat Counteroffensive and mounted service. The green bor- Counteroffensive, Phase IV der and the rattlesnake crest sym- Counteroffensive. Phase V bolize the birth and subsequent ser- Winter/Spring 1970 vice of the organization on the Mex- Sanctuary Counteroffensive ican border. The motto has a direct Counteroffensive, Phase VI1 reference to the crest. Distinctive Insignia Decorations The distinctive insignia is the shield and mono of the coat of arms. Meritorious Unit Citation, Vietnam 1965-1967