Russia and the KRG

Russia’s Outreach to Iraqi : A Gambit for Energy Investments and Regional Status

Samuel Ramani As Russia’s resurgence in the continues and hones its position as a regional diplomatic arbiter, Russia’s partnership with the Kurdistan Regional Government will likely continue to strengthen in the months and years to come.

ussia’s relationship with have undergirded Moscow’s relationship would facilitate its secession from the Kurdistan Regional with the KRG. The principal thrust of . Ultimately, external pressure Government (KRG), the Russia–KRG relationship remains did not deter the KRG from pursuing the ruling body of economic, as Moscow values the lucrative energy sector deals with Russia. In RIraqi Kurdistan, has strengthened energy sector deals that are available in 2013, former KRG President Masoud considerably in recent years. The KRG-held territories. However, the met with Gazprom CEO Kremlin’s engagement with the Moscow–Erbil partnership is also Alexey Miller and Russian President KRG became a formal diplomatic growing in the security sphere, as in Moscow to build relationship in November 2007, when Russia views the KRG as an effective on the deals signed with Russia’s Russia established a consulate general bulwark against the resurgence of state-owned natural gas company the in Erbil. The Russia–KRG partnership the Islamic State (ISIS). In the longer previous year. strengthened further after Russian term, Russia hopes to leverage its close The reduction of the KRG’s energy company Gazprom signed relations with Iraq and the KRG to ease contracts with leading US oil an oil exploration contract with the tensions between the two parties. A companies, such as ExxonMobil KRG in 2012, and this cooperation breakthrough in this diplomatic arena, and Chevron, which scaled back allowed Moscow to balance positive which would bolster Russia’s status in their presence in Iraq in 2015 due to relations with both Iraq and the KRG. the Middle East, has proved elusive. security concerns, caused Barzani to Russia’s balancing act in Iraq reached Barring a drastic change in the pattern build on his 2013 visit and pull the its crescendo during the buildup to the of engagement between the KRG and KRG further into Russia’s economic September 2017 referendum, when regional actors, Russia will continue to orbit. While Gazprom and Lukoil Moscow did not condemn the KRG’s cautiously approach its outreach to the initially led Russia’s charge into the pursuit of independence from Iraq. KRG, in order to avoid antagonising the KRG’s oil industry, Rosneft soon region’s chief opponents of Kurdish emerged as the dominant player. independence: Turkey and . From February 2017 to June 2018, While Gazprom and Rosneft lent $3.5 billion to the KRG Lukoil initially led Russia’s Energy Sector in order to develop ’s Partnership with the KRG oil infrastructure. In October 2017, Russia’s charge into Rosneft announced its intention the KRG’s oil industry, As the KRG possesses as much as to develop five major oil blocs, as Rosneft soon emerged one-third of Iraq’s total oil reserves, tensions flared between Erbil and Russia has viewed a close relationship over Iraqi Kurdistan’s as the dominant player with the KRG as an effective facilitator controversial referendum. of stronger cooperation with Iraq in These deals resulted in a profound the energy sector. Initially, the KRG realignment of the KRG’s energy Although Russia’s influence in the was reticent about signing major export policy, but they were initially Middle East has increased greatly over energy contracts with Russia, as it viewed in Moscow and Erbil as a the past decade, due to its military possessed close ties with the US, and mutually beneficial transaction. The intervention in support of Syrian faced countervailing pressure from KRG had historically viewed Turkey President Bashar al-Assad and flexible the US, UK and Turkey, who feared as its most reliable trading partner diplomatic strategy, consistent interests that Russian contracts with the KRG and Rosneft’s intervention ensured

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President Vladimir Putin meets with then Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan Nechirvan Barzani at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum to discuss cooperation prospects between Rosneft and Iraqi Kurdistan. Courtesy of Kremlin.ru

that Iraqi Kurdistan’s economy would in response to the non-delivery of gateway to expanded great-power status stay afloat, even if Ankara had tried to 250,000 barrels of oil a day to the in the Middle East. halt oil imports from the KRG. From State Organization for Marketing Russia’s standpoint, the Rosneft deals of Oil, a financial crisis could strike installed Moscow as the dominant the KRG, restricting its utility as Since Russia–Turkey player in Iraqi Kurdistan’s gas sector, a Russian partner. This prospect, and stymied European efforts to combined with the underwhelming relations normalised in court the KRG as an energy exporter, performance of Rosneft in the KRG, late 2016, Moscow has which could dilute the continent’s should temper predictions of a major cautiously approached longstanding dependence on Russian Russian financial windfall from Iraqi its engagement with the gas. Kurdistan. In spite of these strategic benefits, KRG to avoid exacerbating the economic gains that Russia Russia’s Security and Counter- tensions with Ankara has accrued from its investment Terrorism Cooperation with the gambit in the KRG’s energy sector KRG remain uncertain. Rosneft’s oil bloc Iraq’s participation in investments have potentially tenuous Although security cooperation is intelligence-sharing efforts that foundations, as US oil companies of secondary importance to the supported Russia’s military intervention had withdrawn from these blocs in Russia–KRG partnership, the critical in Syria increased the imperative of December 2016 due to unexpectedly role of the Kurdish in Moscow contributing to the anti-ISIS low revenue potential, and only one defeating ISIS in Iraq shaped Moscow’s struggle in Iraq. The Russian foreign of Rosneft’s 2017 deals has generated relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. policy community viewed the 2014 oil revenue. Russia viewed ISIS’s rise in Iraq with transfer deal between Iraq and the KRG Political risks also jeopardise the great alarm due to its spillover into as a sign that Baghdad–Erbil tensions KRG’s ability to fulfil its obligations Syria and concerns that Moscow’s were easing due to the shared threat to Russia, as the KRG’s need to support for Bashar al-Assad would of ISIS, and that Iraqi Prime Minister pay back international loans, which make it a target of terrorist attacks, Haider Al-Abadi was less willing than his includes debt to Russia, has increased but also saw a contribution to the predecessor, Nouri Al-Maliki, to view tensions with the Iraqi government. campaign against ISIS as a potential cooperation with the KRG through a If Iraq were to cut the KRG’s budget, hostile sectarian lens. These assessments

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caused Russia to conclude that security its links with Erbil do not jeopardise carefully timed his October 2019 visit to cooperation with the KRG would be its partnership with Iraq. In April, Erbil to follow his trip to Baghdad. viewed in Iraq as a show of solidarity Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury In Russian media and policy against ISIS, instead of an attempt to Borisov announced that the presence discourse, the notion that Moscow antagonise Baghdad. of Russian companies in Iraq was on could leverage its close ties with Iraq and In December 2015, the KRG’s the rise, and Lukoil plans to increase its the KRG to facilitate dialogue between Interior Minister Karim Sinjari met investment stake in Iraq from $8 billion Baghdad and Erbil has gained attention. with Victor Simakov, the Russian charge to $45 billion. Russia also views Iraq as In a December 2018 policy briefing d’affaires in Erbil, to urge the Russian an increasingly important diplomatic for the Russian International Affairs military to bypass the KRG’s airspace partner, as Baghdad has indirectly Council, Dlawer Ala’Aladeen, the when conducting military strikes on supported Moscow’s efforts to President of the Middle East Research Syria. Simakov evaded the KRG’s encourage Saudi Arabia–Iran dialogue Institute in Erbil, noted Russia’s request by ambiguously pledging to and participated in the Nur Sultan interest in the stabilisation of Iraq and discuss the matter with other Russian negotiations on Syria as an observer. willingness to promote dialogue with all officials, but the first transfers of parties involved. Promoting an image light weaponry to the KRG for the as a dialogue facilitator benefits Russia’s anti-ISIS struggle were confirmed It is clear that status in the Middle East, as it has shortly after this meeting. These arms gained prestige by acting as a guardian transfers did not damage Russia’s Moscow views the of state sovereignty in Syria and would relations with Iraq, as Deputy Prime KRG as a potential like to transfer this image to new Minister Dmitry Rogozin discussed counterterrorism partner theatres, such as Iraq. The de-escalation anti-ISIS intelligence sharing with Iraqi of Iraq–KRG tensions from the brink officials in February 2016, and paved of war in late 2017 has prevented Russia the way for subsequent provisions of Given the expanding array of from converting these aspirations Russian military assistance to the KRG. interests that link Russia to Iraq, into tangible diplomatic involvement. In March 2016, Russia supplied five Moscow views Iraq’s expressions of However, a renewed political crisis over 23-mm ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns discontent with its outreach to the KRG the KRG’s status could implore Russia to Iraqi Kurdistan for use by the with consternation. Although the Iraqi to assume a more proactive diplomatic Peshmerga. government did not condemn Russia role that mirrors its rising involvement This shipment, while materially for its ambivalent attitude towards in Libya and on Gulf security. insignificant, was hailed by Fyodor the September 2017 referendum, rare Lukyanov, a prominent Moscow-based tensions in the Moscow–Baghdad The Regional Implications of commentator, as proof of Russia’s relationship surfaced in October 2018 Russia’s Engagement with the extensive connections and interests in when Iraq’s Ambassador to Russia KRG the Middle East, and a sign that Moscow Haidar Hadi decried the illegality of recognised the importance of the Russian investments in the KRG. Hadi The cardinal principle of Russia’s to the regional order. While the waning justified this statement by claiming diplomatic strategy in the Middle East is threat of ISIS in Iraq has not led Russia that Iraq’s constitution stipulated that to maintain positive diplomatic relations to reactivate its security cooperation the Iraqi government was the only with all major regional stakeholders. with the KRG in recent months, it is authority that could sign deals of this Therefore, Russia has carefully managed clear that Moscow views the KRG as kind. its relations with the KRG to avoid a potential counterterrorism partner. In order to assuage the Iraqi tensions with the leading opponents Given this assessment, Russia would government’s concerns, Russia has of Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence, likely align with the KRG authorities insisted that its engagement with the Turkey and Iran, and preserving these more closely during a future security KRG is compatible with and could two partnerships is at the forefront crisis, in order to guard its substantial ultimately assist the construction of a of Russia’s strategic thinking when investments in the region. stable Iraq. In October 2017, Russian Moscow engages with the KRG. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly As Turkey and the KRG have been Russia’s Desire to Act as a encouraged KRG–Iraq dialogue, historic partners, tensions between Diplomatic Bridge Between and appeased Baghdad by insisting Russia and the KRG have been Iraq and the KRG that Russia’s consulate in Erbil was a heightened when Moscow–Ankara second-order diplomatic installation. relations have been antagonistic. While Russia’s partnership with the Russian official statements have Immediately after Turkey–Russia KRG is undergirded by compelling emphasised Moscow’s willingness to relations collapsed over Ankara’s economic and security interests, support the harmonisation of interests decision to shootdown a Russian jet Moscow has carefully ensured that between the KRG and Iraq, and Lavrov over Syria in November 2015, the

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Russian Ministry of Defense alleged structure in Syria. As the prospect of in the Middle East continues and that oil tankers in ISIS-held territories Iraqi Kurdish independence has moved Moscow hones its position as a regional were passing from KRG-controlled away from the immediate horizon diplomatic arbiter, Russia’s partnership areas to reach Turkey. The KRG and Russia has steadfastly supported with the KRG will likely continue to emphatically reiterated Turkey’s denials the reunification of the entirety of strengthen in the months and years to of Russia’s allegations by emphasising Syria under Assad’s leadership, the come. the Peshmerga’s opposition to ISIS and likelihood of this spillover has dimmed claiming that pipelines and KRG tankers commensurately. Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate shipped oil to Turkey. On 13 December The recent improvement in at the Department of Politics and 2015, the KRG Representative in Russia, Iran–KRG relations, which has been International Relations at St Antony’s Aso Jangi Talabani, stated that Russia confirmed by a series of statements College, University of Oxford. was using Kurdish factions in Turkey from the KRG representative in Tehran and Syria as proxies against Ankara. since January 2018, makes it easier for The views expressed in this article are the Since Russia–Turkey relations Russia to balance its relations with author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI normalised in late 2016, Moscow has Iran and the KRG than ever before. In or any other institution. cautiously approached its engagement addition, the KRG’s resistance to the with the KRG to avoid exacerbating US maximum pressure policy against tensions with Ankara. As Nechirvan Iran favors Russian interests, as it gives Barzani, the current President of Iran a rare economic lifeline and Tehran the KRG, is in frequent dialogue lacks the capabilities to challenge with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Russia’s primacy in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Erdogan, Rosneft likely forged its deals energy sector. Nechirvan Barzani’s with Iraqi Kurdistan after consultations expression of solidarity with Ayatollah between the KRG and Turkey. Russia Ali Khamenei after the January 2 also ignored a request from the KRG to killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard protect the Syrian Kurds from Ankara’s Corps Quds Forces commander October 2019 Operation Peace Spring Qassem Soleimani will further reduce offensive and opted to cooperate with the risk of backlash from Iran over Turkey on the creation of a safe zone Russia’s engagement with the KRG. If in northern Syria. Moreover, Russia’s Iran–KRG relations tighten after position on Iraqi Kurdish autonomy is Soleimani’s death, Russia’s security much more ambiguous than the Soviet cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan could Union’s solidarity with commensurately expand, but Moscow during the 1960s, and Ankara is likely will likely distance itself from the KRG’s operating under the assumption that separatist ambitions at a time when Moscow does not wish to disrupt the Iraq’s stability is threatened by mass status quo by supporting the KRG’s protests and the use of Iraqi territory as independence. Given these checks a theatre for US–Iran hostilities. on Russian engagement with the KRG, a Russia–Turkey clash over A Look Ahead to Russia–KRG Iraqi Kurdistan has been averted, Relations in 2020 and Beyond even as Ankara grudgingly adapts to competition from Russia in the KRG’s Since 2016, Russia has managed oil sector. to expand its energy investments Much like Russia’s relationship and security cooperation with Iraqi with Turkey, it appears as if Moscow’s Kurdistan without damaging any of strengthening ties with the KRG have its other vital regional partnerships. not damaged Russia’s burgeoning Heading into 2020, Russia will likely partnership with Iran. In late 2017, continue expanding its engagement there were concerns that the divergent with the KRG, while preparing perspectives of Russia and Iran on itself to step up its involvement in Kurdish independence would spill Iraq–KRG dialogue facilitation efforts, over to Syria, and lead to greater if the Baghdad–Erbil dispute over oil Iran–Turkey cooperation against shipments continues to fester or if talks Kurdish autonomy, at a time when between both parties do not resume in Russia was still open to a federal a timely fashion. As Russia’s resurgence

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