Coping with Complexity: Analyzing Cooperation and Coordination in Multiparty Mediation Processes
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International Negotiation 17 (2012) 265–293 brill.nl/iner Coping with Complexity: Analyzing Cooperation and Coordination in Multiparty Mediation Processes Siniša Vuković* Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands (E-mail: [email protected], [email protected]) Received 28 October 2010; accepted 19 June 2011 Abstract Crucial challenges for multiparty mediation processes include the achievement of adequate cooperation among the mediators and consequent coordination of their activities in the mediation process. Existing literature goes only as far as to make it clear that successful mediation requires necessary cooperation and coordination between mediators, as if these features were exogenous to the process. Available research does not consider whether these features might change over time and if such change could have an impact on the overall mediation process. Experience shows that it is not rare for mediators who were initially willing to pool their resources and act in concert with one another to decide at a later point to stop coop- erating. Using a game theoretical model and a comparative analysis of three recent cases of multiparty mediation, this research illustrates the importance of maintaining necessary levels of cooperation and coordination to achieve successful outcomes and provides insights on how to achieve them in case the mediating coalition is faced with internal conflict of interests. Keywords multiparty mediation; theory of moves; Tajikistan; Cambodia; Kosovo Current scholarship generally describes mediation as a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps opposing parties achieve a solution that they could not arrive at on their own (Touval and Zartman 2006: 428).1 While in certain settings (such as domestic or legal disputes), it is customary for mediation to be *) Siniša Vuković is a PhD candidate at Leiden University’s Institute of Political Science. He received a BA in from the University of Rome “La Sapienza” and an MA from Leiden University and the Nether- lands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael.” He was a YSSP fellow of the Processes of Inter- national Negotiations group (PIN) at IIASA (Laxenburg, Austria) and a Visiting Research Associate with the Conflict Management Program at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. His research focuses on comparative analysis of multiparty mediation processes. 1) This article was originally written as a research report during the Young Summer Scientist Program for the PIN group. The author would like to express his gratitude to Ben Allen for his help in developing and improving the game-theoretical model. The author would also like to thank I. William Zartman, Kate © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/157180612X651449 266 S. Vuković / International Negotiation 17 (2012) 265–293 conducted by a single trustworthy actor with a necessary degree of authority, international conflicts usually draw all sorts of outside actors into the mediation process that are “just as numerous and frequently as diverse in their interests as the warring parties themselves” (Hampson and Zartman 2012: 93). Several scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution have emphasized that this multiplication of mediators is less a matter of choice and more a fact of life (Crocker et al. 1999; Sisk 2009). Mediation processes with multiple mediators are commonly called “multiparty mediation processes” (Crocker et al. 1999; Crocker et al. 2001). The most significant advantage of multiparty endeavors is that they allow pool- ing of resources and leverage from many sides, so that attractive incentives – which are generally unattainable by a single mediator – can be created to entice conflicting sides to move toward an agreement. At the same time, mediation costs are significantly reduced as the overall burden is shared among several third par- ties. However, as the number of participants rises, chances of conflicting interests and positions among them will increase. Crucial challenges that must be overcome in multiparty mediation processes include the (1) achievement of adequate cooperation among the mediators and (2) consequent coordination of their activities in the mediation process. However, neither aspect has undergone proper academic analysis. Existing literature high- lights the importance of achieving a necessary level of coordination among actors, but treats cooperation as a preexisting condition. Looking at coordination, Crocker notes that when broad policy objectives diverge, confusion and a lack of coordination in negotiation efforts tend to be the result (emphasis added, Crocker et al. 1999: 687). Similarly, according to Zartman, “if a number of conciliators are available to the parties themselves and if a number of friends of the conflicting parties can coordinate their good offices and pressure, the chances of success are improved” (emphasis added, Zartman 1989: 276). By contrast, cooperative activ- ities are sidelined and treated as binary – as being either present or not present – without considering changes in the level or type of cooperation over time and the impact this could have on the negotiation process. In principle, cooperation represents “a situation where parties agree to work together to produce new gains for each of the participants unavailable to them by unilateral action, at some cost” (Zartman and Touval 2010: 1). Coordination involves the careful crafting of a coherent political strategy, building support and finding resources for that strategy, and diminishing the possibility that other third parties – and interested outsiders – will undermine the peace process by pursuing their own agendas (Crocker et al. 1999: 58). The fact that some media- tors might resist coordination is directly related to their concerns about coopera- Tennis, Madeleine O. Hosli, Paul Meerts, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable advice for improving the quality of this article. S. Vuković / International Negotiation 17 (2012) 265–293 267 tion. They may fear losing a certain degree of independence in the process, especially given that each mediator enters with their own self-interested goals. As numerous cases of multiparty mediations indicate, it is not a rare occur- rence that parties who are initially willing to pool their resources and act in con- cert will, at a certain point, decide to stop cooperating with the rest of the coalition. However, without this willingness to continue cooperating with other mediators, it is premature to talk about coordinated activities. Given that coop- eration is a precondition for coordination, how can we talk about coordinating mediation with potential dropouts? Under what conditions will potential drop- outs see cooperation as their dominant strategy? How does cooperation or lack of cooperation affect the outcome of peace talks? This article starts from the premise that cooperation by potentially defecting mediators might increase the likelihood of success. However, potential dropouts will not cooperate for altruistic reasons. They must be convinced that cooperation is in their self-interest. Using insights from a game theoretical model, this study will argue that once the multiparty mediation begins, cooperative behavior pro- duces higher payoffs for mediators than defection. Those outside actors who con- tinue to defect because they are unable to perceive that higher utility is created through cooperation with other mediators are subject to myopic rationality. This study identifies three potential mechanisms through which a defecting party might be induced to recognize the benefits of cooperation. These are: external changes in the conflict dynamics; exogenous geo-political shifts; and changes in the potential dropout’s perception of the efficacy of cooperation created through a bargaining process with other mediators. Using the Theory of Moves (ToM) to interpret a game-theoretical model, the article examines the utility of cooperation and defection for multiple mediators and explores the effects of each strategy on the overall mediation process. The insights from the model will be used to examine three recent cases of multiparty mediation – two that were successful (Tajikistan and Cambodia) and one that was unsuccessful (Kosovo) – in order to assess the effects of cooperation and coordination on the overall mediation process. Using insights from the model and the case studies, the article provides a comparative analysis on notions of cooperation and coordination between mediators, their effects on the overall peace process and how defection from cooperation might be discourageditor. Cooperation and Coordination It is not plausible to expect mediators to be driven only by humanitarian con- cerns to intervene. Bearing in mind the considerable investment of resources that mediation requires, it is reasonable to presume that mediators are at least as moti- vated by self-interest as by humanitarian impulses (Touval and Zartman 1985: 8). 268 S. Vuković / International Negotiation 17 (2012) 265–293 Mediators play their role in negotiations and spend resources not only because they aim to resolve a dispute, but also because they seek to gain something from the resolution (Greig 2005; Touval 1992). In a similar vein, just as their involve- ment needs to be compatible with their self-interests, their choice to cooperate once they have committed to mediation also needs to be perceived as useful for