Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Financial Assessment
Yaya J. Fanusie Alex Entz December 2017
Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb1
FUNDING LEVEL2 Financial Overview Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), considered al-Qaeda’s wealthiest branch in 2012,4 $ $ $ may make tens of millions of dollars per year, and likely has enough funding to sustain itself and its Sahel affiliates. In 2014, the UN estimated that AQIM had a yearly budget of $15 million.5 The group’s funding has come predominantly from ransoms and from smuggling drugs, cigarettes, $ $ arms, and other contraband. AQIM’s first major kidnappings came in 2003, before it joined al-Qaeda, when it abducted 32 Western tourists.6 For the next ten years, ransoms yielded $ roughly $100 million,7 becoming the predominant source of funding that allowed the group to spread its influence across the Sahel region.8 Money from smuggling, particularly drug KEY AREAS OF ACTIVITY smuggling, displaced ransoms as AQIM’s predominant source of funding by 2015. The group’s • Primarily based in expenditures are opaque, but appear to go mostly towards paying its fighters, funding and Algeria and Mali developing a network of loyal tribes and other terrorist groups, and spreading its influence by 9 • Affiliate in Tunisia providing governance. • Attacks and Background movement throughout the In 1991, the Algerian military canceled elections to prevent the victory of an Islamist coalition, region, including in instigating a violent insurrection. In 1998, some leaders split away from a movement called the 10 Tunisia, Morocco, Armed Islamic Group – known for its violence against civilians – to form the Salafist Group Ivory Coast, Libya, for Preaching and Combat (GSPC, in French).11 In 2006, under its current leader, Abdelmalek Niger, and Burkina Droukdel, the group formally joined al-Qaeda and became AQIM. Several other Sahel-based Faso since 20143 Salafist jihadi groups merged into AQIM shortly afterward.12 AQIM’s expanded jihadist network • Smuggling and al-Qaeda-lent expertise led to a dramatic increase in its tempo of attacks. The new group networks stretch targeted neighboring countries in a bid to create an Islamist caliphate.13 In the early 2000s, across the Sahel famed smuggler Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an AQIM commander, established the group’s presence and Sahara regions in Mali.14 In 2011, AQIM stood up Ansar Dine to present a local face15 and develop local support in Mali.16 These groups cemented relationships with tribes across the Sahel to facilitate smuggling networks.17 Later in 2011, when Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi fell from power, AQIM acquired some of his weapons stockpile.18 Ethnic cleavages19 and leadership rifts20 in AQIM led to various offshoot groups, including the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in 2011, and one run by Belmokhtar in late 2012. AQIM co-opted an ethnic Tuareg uprising in Mali in 2012,21 taking control of the northern half of the country in conjunction with Ansar Dine and MUJAO.22 A French military incursion dislodged the militants in early 2013.23 More recently, AQIM has increased its influence, incorporating other militant groups like al-Mourabitoun, which included Belmokhtar’s splinter group.24 In March 2017, AQIM’s strength grew25 when it approved its Saharan offshoot allying with other Sahelian jihadist organizations to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, under allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of al-Qaeda.26 Prior to merging, the groups accounted for over 250 attacks in the region in 2016.27
Action Points (for additional details, see page 6-7) 1. Support France and regional actors committed to counterterrorist operations. 2. Formally identify and sanction transnational criminal organizations in West Africa. 3. Ensure European allies end ransom payments. 4. Invest in efforts to leverage media to undermine extremist narratives.
2 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book See more information in the Financial Details section Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Main Sources of Funding
SMUGGLING AND KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM DRUGS TRAFFICKING
• AQIM has likely made more than • Illegal drug trade is an increasingly • AQIM has been actively smuggling $100 million from ransoms. important funding source. people into Europe since at least 2009. • Most of these ransoms have been • AQIM tends to tax drug routes, • Regional governments have been paid by Western countries. rather than buy and sell drugs complicit in allowing smuggling. directly. • The group smuggles cigarettes, people, arms, and more.
LOOTING AND SPOILS TAXATION AND EXTORTION DONATIONS
• AQIM claimed significant weaponry • When in control of Mali in 2012, • Donations are likely a minor source from Libya after Gaddafi fell in 2011. AQIM taxed local residents. of funding. • The group looted arms from Malian • The group also taxes smugglers • Money comes globally, including forces in 2012. going through their territory. from Western Europe.
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND AGRICULTURE
• A Guinea Bissau-based cell raised funds for the group in 2016 by selling luxury vehicles.
Significant 2003 October 2011 March 2012-January 2013 Germany pays about The Gaddafi regime in Libya AQIM offshoot MUJAO Financial $5.7 million to GSPC for the falls, causing regional unrest. controls northern Mali and Events release of 32 hostages.28 The flood of weapons benefits taxes local populations.30 AQIM financially and militarily.29 June 18, 2013 Fall 2013 2015
G8 countries agree to stop Areva, a state-run French Shifting away from ransoms, taxing and paying ransoms to terrorist company, pays roughly $40 trafficking drugs becomes the primary groups such as AQIM.31 million to AQIM to free four source of AQIM’s revenue.33 French hostages.32
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ACCESS TO BANKING SYSTEM
According to the State Department, the Algerian banking sector, although small, is “tightly monitored,” making it unlikely that AQIM transacts much through the banking system when a large, cash-based economy operates in parallel to the formal system. The economy in Mali is similarly cash-based.34 Accordingly, much of the group’s focus is on raising funds in cash for ease of use across the Sahel’s vast unbanked territories. Ransoms, for example, are paid to AQIM in cash,35 and an AQIM cell robbing banks in Morocco was broken up in 2011.36 Cash couriers for AQIM have been known to exploit the region’s informally governed space and porous borders, using their ability to move with some freedom by maintaining numerous cell phones that work in different countries.37
Strategic Strengths Strategic Vulnerabilities
• Weak governance in regional states provides • France has shown a commitment to defending its opportunities for AQIM to exploit local grievances, interests in the region, blunting the possibility that including ethnic divisions,38 and gain support by AQIM takes large tracts of land without an international providing a sense of order. AQIM leadership has used response. French forces have shown an ability to quickly marriage with women from local communities to build roll back AQIM gains. alliances with tribes.39 • G8 countries have signed a pledge to not pay ransoms, • Porous borders and sparsely populated territory with providing a standard that should make hostage-taking little state authority allow for expansive smuggling less attractive if signatories stand by it. chains to continue without significant interdiction • Islamic State (IS) affiliates in Algeria, Tunisia, and or surveillance.40 elsewhere have competed with AQIM for resources and • The narcotics trade is booming in West Africa. Jihadists’ support.45 presence along Sahelian trade routes gives them access to consistent money flows.41 • The formation of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin allows AQIM to portray itself as “pan-Islamic,” rising above tribal and ethnic divisions,43 and demonstrates the group’s growing ability to co-opt local grievances.44
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U.S. Government Counter-Measures WILDCARDS The U.S. designated AQIM’s predecessor, GSPC, as a terrorist organization in 2002,46 and Unexpected updated the listing to include the new name AQIM in 2009.47 France took the lead role in developments which pushing MUJAO out of northern Mali in early 2013, but the U.S. assisted with some special would greatly impact the forces operatives, logistical support, $120 million in humanitarian aid, and $100 million group’s financing earmarked for the UN’s mission to stabilize Mali.48 In its 2017 Posture Statement, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) reasserted its commitment to working with France to stabilize Mali, including through “continued airlift and logistical support” to counter AQIM.49 Two dozen U.S. soldiers were deployed with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in early 2017.50 U.S. policymakers have resisted shifting additional resources towards fighting AQIM given France’s primary role in the region.51 AFRICOM works with the State and Defense Departments and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).52 The FUNDING INCREASE U.S. sent nearly $80 million to Mali from 2008 to 2014 to support TSCTP,53 which focuses Mali’s southern neighbors on degrading terror groups in part through fighting terror finance and providing social Burkina Faso and services.54 The State Department also runs a counterterrorism finance program in Africa.55 Cote d’Ivoire suffer The U.S. has also sought to curb AQIM’s main funding source by pushing for the G8 to ban destabilizing political ransom payments,56 and for the UN Security Council to warn against them.57 turmoil, creating power vacuums that spread AQIM’s influence and U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Sanctions smuggling networks. 4 organizations, 41 individuals Of the four organizations and 41 individuals affiliated with AQIM and designated by OFAC (as of October 20, 2017), two organizations and 33 individuals are also designated by the United Nations. For a detailed listing of designees, please see the Terror Finance Briefing Book Appendices, available on FDD’s website.58
Notable Designations FUNDING DECREASE AQIM is challenged by Mokhtar Belmokhtar tribes and ambitious, semi-autonomous This Algerian national was designated by OFAC59 and the UN in 2003.60 61 commanders for control Dubbed the “Marlboro Man” for his role in smuggling cigarettes, of the drug trade. Turf Belmokhtar has made millions for AQIM and various splinter groups he wars erupt. has led62 through smuggling across the Sahel.63 Belmokhtar established smuggling networks for goods through familial connections to tribal smugglers64 and has married into multiple tribes.65 He has also kidnapped a number of Westerners,66 netting an estimated $50 million in ransoms in 2013.67 If still alive,68 his current presumed location is Libya.69
Yahya Abu Hammam 70 This Algerian national was designated by the UN and the U.S. Treasury FUNDING INCREASE Department in 2013.71 Hammam was AQIM’s emir of Timbuktu when the 72 The collapse of the group held northern Mali in 2012, and of AQIM’s Sahara Emirate, a role Islamic State’s territorial 73 he assumed in late 2012. Hammam has played a major role in conducting holdings in Iraq and kidnappings and holding Western hostages for AQIM, and in executing a Syria prompt former IS hostage in 2010.74 He has previously threatened attacks against France.75 personnel to defect His current presumed location is Mali. to AQIM. 5 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Action Points
1. Support France and regional actors committed to counterterrorist operations. AQIM considers European nations like France and Spain to be its main enemies outside Africa, given their regional proximity and colonial past.76 As such, the U.S. should continue to maintain a light-touch approach to the region, supporting its allies’ efforts to destroy the group.77 Such an approach, paired with continued intelligence sharing, logistical support, and closer military-to-military relations with France and West African states,78 “saves the US from having to assume another major military mission.”79 Of further concern is that AQIM may be playing the long game, planning for French forces to eventually withdraw from Mali, at which point it could secure a large swathe of territory from which to launch attacks.80 The U.S. should thus support the Group of Five (G5) Sahel joint force,81 a counterterrorism coalition manned by troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, which was approved by the UN Security Council in June 2017.82 The U.S. should work in tandem with France and the UN to ensure that the G5 receives funding. Though the U.S. is scaling back its budget for UN initiatives,83 these funds should be seen as an investment in avoiding higher levels of assistance to a French-led fighting force down the line. Additionally, the U.S. should make clear to France that the G5’s development will take time, and that France must maintain a regional commitment for the foreseeable future.84 Also, the U.S. State Department should continue to allocate funding for Algeria through its Middle East Partnership Initiative85 as a way to support the country’s stability given its strategic location. A regional axis of instability across the Sahel and the Sahara would threaten a variety of American interests, particularly by creating potential safe havens for terrorists, deepening humanitarian crises, and potentially disturbing the economic and political progress which neighboring countries to the south86 have made in the past decade.
2. Formally identify and sanction transnational criminal organizations in West Africa. As early as 2008, UN sources reported that al-Qaeda had likely “forged mutually beneficial links with West African crime networks,” profiting from activities such as document forgery and trafficking in diamonds, drugs, and humans.87 AQIM also paid portions of money acquired from ransoms to drug traffickers as “a form of investment,” receiving a share of the profits in the form of arms and other equipment.88 Transnational criminal organizations threaten the stability of states.89 Fighting them could prove difficult, given that corrupt officials in Sahelian states are often complicit in smugglings or kidnappings90 and use criminal networks as a “political resource.”91 However, little is known to date about the extent or structure of transnational criminal organizations operating in the Sahel, perhaps because senior U.S. officials believe AFRICOM “receives only half of the surveillance assets it needs”92 and there is a dearth of independent local media outlets equipped to investigate and shed light on these criminal networks. Given the importance of smuggling networks to AQIM, the U.S. should commit to stepping up its intelligence resources dedicated to tracking African transnational criminal organizations. Congress could also make military aid contingent on West African countries showing an improved commitment to fighting corruption, which aids and abets transnational crime.93
3. Ensure European allies end ransom payments. AQIM became al-Qaeda’s wealthiest branch by 2012 because of the vast sums it obtained through ransoms. This cash influx coincided with AQIM’s acquisition of arms and its recruiting efforts that made the group deadlier, as exemplified by the takeover of northern Mali in 2012. In 2013, the G8, driven by the U.S. and UK, signed a declaration whereby member countries agreed to no longer pay ransoms.94 However, some countries may be getting around this by having state-run businesses pay ransoms, such as French-run Areva in 2013,95 or by paying ransoms indirectly through misallocated “aid” or other measures. The U.S. needs to take several steps to stop such payments entirely. First, reinvest diplomatically on the current commitment, in tandem with the UK, to make clear that ransoms in any form – even through state-run agencies or “aid” payments – are unacceptable. The U.S. should then seek, through bilateral talks with EU representatives, to expand the ban to all of Europe. Beyond diplomatic pressure, Congress should enable the president to designate countries of particular concern for directly or indirectly financing terrorism. This would allow the U.S. to maintain greater leverage over countries that are not State Sponsors of Terrorism, but may have a mixed record on counterterror finance issues. Lastly, the U.S. could push to provide the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee with the investigatory ability to refer ban infractions to the UN Security Council for more decisive action.96
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4. Invest in efforts to leverage media to undermine extremist narratives. Targeting AQIM’s financial pipelines may be a futile exercise if progress is not made in dampening the growth of jihadist ideology in northwest Africa.97 Stemming violent Islamist radicalization may seem like an elusive goal, but the U.S. should refrain from defeatism and instead identify the societal levers available and most amenable to influences that can compete with extremist narratives. In much of the Sahel, radio and television are highly influential platforms. An estimated two- thirds of the urban population in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger consume radio and television programming weekly.98 And while almost 80 percent of adults in Bamako, Mali consume radio, TV, or internet news daily, Voice of America programming reaches only 10 percent of adults in all of these platforms.99 AQIM runs its own robust media operations and communications strategy to support recruitment and messaging.100 The U.S. should expand the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ efforts to support local-language news and cultural programming that encourages respectful ideological debate, critical thinking, and appreciation for ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity, particularly via radio, which has greater reach in rural areas. While media engagement alone cannot be expected to fully deter jihadism, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy should emphasize the importance of strengthening the region’s social resilience so that these states can better enforce the peace, stability, and security of their populations.
An infantryman with MINUSMA on patrol in Timbuktu. The city fell under AQIM control in 2012-2013. Credit: Jane Hahn for the Washington Post/Getty Images
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Kidnapping foreign nationals was AQIM’s primary fundraising method since inception for nearly a decade,101 but the group is likely to rely more on making money off of drug smuggling and taxation in the near future, partly as a result of the region’s security disintegration.102 AQIM likely makes tens of millions of dollars per year, largely through its involvement with regional smuggling networks that currently move billions in illicit wares and drugs across the Sahel and Sahara each year. AQIM and its associated groups will likely remain opportunistic, growing their connections to the drug and migrants trade while trying to kidnap more Westerners when possible.
• An Algerian government investigation found that AQIM made $130 million through ransoms and drug smuggling alone from 2007 to 2010.103 • The UN estimated that AQIM’s annual budget was $15 million in 2014,104 though it may have been as high as $24 million in 2012 when the group held parts of Mali.105 • A 2016 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report noted “the use of smuggling to collect arms and ammunition, abductions, armed robberies, drug trafficking and taxes on traders” were AQIM’s main sources of income, though their compositions had evolved over time.106
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM ɦɦ According to then-Treasury Under Secretary David AQIM probably will continue to take hostages, as Cohen, the average ransom for an AQIM hostage was 114 ransoms have played a major role in the group’s $4.5 million in 2010 and $5.4 million in 2011. development.107 The group has largely focused on ɦɦ From 2010-2014 alone, AQIM made more than 115 taking hostages from Western countries that pay $75 million from ransoms, according to the UN. ransoms, and though the G8 banned ransom payments, ɦɦ AQIM was so effective at procuring large ransoms it is likely that this rule is not followed strictly. One that Osama bin Laden considered shifting al-Qaeda’s 116 AQIM affiliate currently holds six foreign hostages.108 funding model to be based centrally on ransoms as The money the group has previously received from funding from donations declined, based on findings ransoms is likely to sustain the group in years to come. from the deceased al-Qaeda leader’s computer hard drives.117 • From 2008-2013, AQIM made $91.5 million on • Mali authorities reported to FATF that in 2011, AQIM had seven ransom payments for 20 individuals, for some of its operatives focus solely on traveling around roughly $4.6 million per hostage. Payers of those northern Mali to find Europeans to kidnap.118 ransoms included the governments of Austria, Spain, Switzerland, a state-run French company, and two • Per a 2013 report by the NGO West Africa Commission undetermined sources.109 on Drugs, there existed “obvious links of complicity ɦɦ AQIM kidnapped 57 individuals from 2003-2011, between state agents and AQIM or MUJAO over the including 54 Westerners.110 kidnapping business.”119 ɦɦ An AQIM commander claimed that Western ɦɦ Facilitators, including individuals with access to the countries were the source of much of the group’s presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso, received some funding from ransoms.111 of the ransom payments. ɦɦ AQIM’s forerunner, GSPC, started making • In 2015, Belmokhtar and AQIM’s Saharan entity raided money from ransoms in 2003, when it kidnapped a hotel in Bamako, Mali, leading to the group holding 32 European tourists and received at least over 170 hostages. AQIM hoped to use the hostages $5 million from an unknown European country for 112 as bargaining chips to get their imprisoned fighters their release. released; rather than negotiate, Malian commandos ɦɦ In 2009, Switzerland paid about $3.75 million to free stormed the hotel and freed the hostages.120 two hostages.113 • In August 2017, AQIM received a $4.2-million ransom payment for a South African hostage, negotiated by a
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South African charity and delivered by a French security DRUGS 121 services agent in Mali. This followed the June release The taxation and direct sale of drugs will likely continue of a hostage by AQIM, though it is unclear what the to be AQIM’s most consistent stream of funding in the 122 group received as payment for that release. years to come,135 as the drug trade in West Africa is • AQIM kidnappings are done “sometimes in coordination growing.136 AQIM has spent over a decade cultivating with local criminals,” according to Treasury Under relationships with Latin American drug cartels, tribes, Secretary David Cohen.123 and smugglers. The opportunity for tapping the narcotics ɦɦ Captured al-Qaeda documents show coordination market is huge; in 2012, cocaine smuggling alone through and a common playbook for AQIM, al-Qaeda in the Western Africa was valued at $1.25 billion.137 As drugs Arabian Peninsula, and al-Shabaab.124 are increasingly made in Africa, AQIM may move towards ɦɦ A 2012 letter from AQIM’s leadership rebuked direct production in addition to facilitation. Belmokhtar for securing a “meager price” (roughly • AQIM provides a “vital Sahel way station between $1.1 million from the Canadian government125) for suppliers in Latin America and European markets.”138 a pair of Canadian diplomats he had taken hostage. Latin American drug traffickers smuggle drugs across The leadership decried him for not coordinating the Africa en route to Europe as a way to diversify away ransom negotiations with them. AQIM’s leadership from only sending drugs to Europe by sea, a route that typically oversaw kidnappings in the Sahara and, in has been increasingly interdicted.139 In addition, African turn, often worked with al-Qaeda’s central leadership gangs are increasingly producing drugs which are also in Pakistan.126 smuggled on these routes.140 ɦɦ AQIM does not conduct the majority of the ɦɦ MUJAO leaders were linked to the 2009 “Air kidnappings from which the group profits. Instead, Cocaine” incident, wherein the fuselage of a Boeing local groups sell captured foreigners to AQIM.127 727 was found in the Mali desert, destroyed after ·· AQIM was offering $100,000 to local criminals having transported as much as ten tons of cocaine for non-American hostages in 2008-2009, from Latin America.141 hoping to make more money on eventual ɦɦ By 2010, Latin American drug cartels were ransom payments.128 increasingly resorting to flying planes loaded with • European governments that have paid ransoms often pay drugs to “disused runways or improvised air strips” through state-run companies or label the ransom money in Africa, where AQIM was believed to be helping to as an “aid payment” to a certain country.129 move the drugs into Europe.142 ɦɦ The governments of Austria, Britain, France, • The involvement of local elites in the drug trade Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and make regional governments hesitant to institute Sweden have all been implicated in paying a crackdown.143 ransoms to AQIM.130 ɦɦ France, Switzerland, and Spain have paid most of the • AQIM has tended to profit from drug smuggling by ransoms accruing to AQIM.131 taxing shipments and charging smugglers for “providing ɦɦ AQIM and MUJAO have been known to target protection.” MUJAO was more consistently involved in “nationals of states that were known to be willing to directly smuggling the drugs, though the two groups negotiate ransom payments.”132 often “operated jointly.”144 ɦɦ AQIM continued kidnapping Western hostages, ɦɦ The full extent of AQIM’s cooperation with Latin taking a French aid worker and a Swiss missionary in American drug cartels is not clear, though there December 2016 and January 2017.133 have been reports that AQIM had at least one official meet with a Latin American cartel representative • According to the Australian government, “AQIM has also in Guinea-Bissau in 2010 to discuss improved used kidnapping to obtain political concessions such as coordination.145 the release of Islamist prisoners.”134 ɦɦ Reports in 2010 indicated that AQIM had agreed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
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(FARC) to provide protection for drugs being • Algerian press reporting from 2013 indicates that AQIM transited across northern Africa.146 may have traded drugs for weapons in Libya.157 Officials ·· In 2009, the U.S. arrested three individuals who from Niger reported in 2015 that AQIM operatives sought to act as liaisons between AQIM and FARC were captured with money obtained from selling in Western Africa,147 though it is unclear the drugs in Libya.158 extent to which these individuals were working • In 2015, a majority of the funding for AQIM, Ansar Dine, with AQIM as opposed to name-dropping to and MUJAO was coming from their control of “ancient “impress their supposed business partner.”148 trade routes through the Sahara” used for trafficking ɦɦ The extent to which drug trafficking benefitted AQIM drugs. Jihadist groups likely make the bulk of their and MUJAO is unclear, though MUJAO seems to income from drugs through taxes on shipments going have benefitted more. A 2013 report from the West through their territory.159 African Commission on Drugs states that “there are ɦɦ AQIM, al-Mourabitoun, and MUJAO were “still reasons to believe that AQIM has not been a major benefitting from their links to drug cartels” as player in regional narcotics smuggling networks ... of late 2016.160 though it may have made a significant contribution ɦɦ With $1.25 billion worth of cocaine transiting to MUJAO’s war chest.”149 through West Africa annually, a 2015 NGO report • AQIM charged 10 percent of the value of a shipment to estimated that West African traffickers could make provide protection to drug traffickers in the late 2000s.150 up to $150 million per year.161 ·· Hashish is also a major source of revenue for • In 2008, Morocco’s interior minister made public the drug smugglers. suspected connection between AQIM and the drug trade. A Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) case brought • AQIM has underwritten drug traffickers with funds the next year against three Malians who had worked obtained from ransoms in exchange for up to half of the with AQIM marked the group’s increasing involvement in profits, paid back as arms and other equipment.162 trafficking cocaine and hashish.151 ɦɦ In the DEA sting, one of the arrested drug traffickers noted that AQIM would protect the shipment of SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING cocaine at a rate of $4,200 per kilogram.152 Without strong interdiction efforts from regional • AQIM’s involvement in the drug trade spans numerous governments, smuggling networks are likely to countries and numerous illicit drugs, as marked by a persist, continuing to fill AQIM’s coffers. AQIM is 2012 seizure of “two tons of Indian hemp drugs” linked opportunistic and will smuggle – or tax the smuggling to AQIM in Mauritania.153 of – any goods that it can. In the past, the group has smuggled arms, people, and cigarettes. The group may • Also in 2012, AQIM was making money off drug focus increasingly on trafficking migrants, particularly trafficking through the Sahel by requiring traffickers to into Europe.163 pay the group for “protection” and “permissions.” The group charged $50,000 for a “convoy of hashish” to pass • In 2009, the DEA arrested an individual in a West African through its territory unimpeded in 2011.154 smuggling ring who stated that “his organization and ɦɦ It is likely that AQIM’s leadership approved of [AQIM] have collaborated in the human smuggling of charging for facilitating convoys of drugs, but that Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian subjects into Spain.”164 prices were set by “very autonomous battalion ɦɦ At the time, the group’s main smuggling routes commanders.”155 to Europe ran through “Morocco into Spain and through Libya and Algeria into Italy.” • In 2013, an official at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre stated that AQIM and its • In 2012, the commander of AFRICOM stated that forerunner had been involved in the cocaine trade for trafficked Libyan arms had bolstered AQIM’s efforts to about a decade, and that this involvement had led to “a take over Mali.165 massive increase in the quantities of cocaine involved.”156
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• Arms smuggled from Gaddafi’s stockpiles were worth • After the Gaddafi regime fell in late 2011, AQIM acquired around $15-$30 million annually in 2015. A report on “most of the weapons,” and used some of those transnational organized crime estimated that human weapons to equip other regional jihadist groups.175 trafficking across the Sahara was usually worth $8-$20 ɦɦ AQIM stole Gaddafi’s arms, including anti-aircraft million, though this number had ballooned to $255-$323 and anti-tank missiles, or purchased them from million due to the incipient migrant crisis.166 AQIM would mercenaries who had looted the wares.176 have earned part of both of those figures, based on ɦɦ AQIM made money off arms looted from the Gaddafi direct sales and taxation. regime that were smuggled through territory it held. The group also stood to benefit from selling arms • In 2017, AQIM was taking government-subsidized fuel in it had taken.177 southern Libya and selling it “for at least ten times the ɦɦ These weapons enabled the group to take control of price” in neighboring countries.167 northern Mali.178 • The former commander of AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, • AQIM and associated groups seized extensive weaponry, was known as “Mr. Marlboro” due to his cigarette including heavy artillery, from Malian forces during their smuggling operation into Italy.168 takeover of the northern part of the country in 2012.179 ɦɦ The market for smuggled illicit cigarettes is massive. In 2009, it was estimated to be worth • A 2016 FATF report noted that AQIM and its affiliates $468 million in Libya and Algeria alone;169 in 2015, are suspected to raise funds through robberies, but such $1 billion in illicit cigarettes were transacted across connections are hard to prove.180 the Maghreb annually, much of them through Belmokhtar’s network.170 TAXATION AND EXTORTION • AQIM has trafficked individuals, mostly economic migrants, from Nigeria and Burkina Faso into Mali to AQIM will continue to tax networks and individuals smuggle them into Europe.171 passing through its territory, though it may use taxes sparingly in order to build a base of support. If the • Smuggling caravans exploit the trails and hideouts that group recaptures territory, it is likely to levy light taxes have been developed over the previous centuries of again as a means to build a state-like apparatus. cross-Saharan smuggling.172 • Prior to his split with AQIM, Belmokhtar did not • Much of the smuggling done across the Sahel has tax populations under his direct control in Mali.181 occurred with the complicity of state governments However, according to then-Treasury Under Secretary in the region. This indirectly facilitates AQIM’s for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, funding streams.173 other AQIM battalions did tax residents in northern ɦɦ Arms smugglers, including at least one individual Mali in 2012.182 smuggling arms to AQIM, have been released by ɦɦ AQIM did, however, abolish “customs, duties, tolls, Niger. AQIM killed one high-ranking Malian army tariffs and frontiers” when in control of Timbuktu in officer over “an arms deal with AQIM gone awry.” 2012, likely to curry favor with the local population.183 ɦɦ MUJAO ended taxation in areas it controlled 184 LOOTING AND SPOILS in 2012. 185 Barring major territorial gains or another state • AQIM taxes criminal smuggling in southern Libya. failing, AQIM is not likely to acquire significantly • The group has extorted individuals with mafia-like more weapons or other goods from spoils. Similarly, protection rackets and robbery.186 the group is unlikely to loot to a significant extent, unless under dire financial pressure, as doing so would undermine its attempts to build inroads with local populations. Unlike the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, AQIM leadership has prioritized building tribal alliances and not alienating the local population.174
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DONATIONS • AQIM uses some of its funds to support its affiliated As al-Qaeda retrenches and the Islamic State draws groups. The group has funded and worked with Boko back, AQIM is likely to see an increase in donations. Haram, al-Shabaab, and other al-Qaeda affiliates and 195 The group maintains a global reach and probably will sympathetic groups throughout the region. continue to draw resources from regional funders, as ɦɦ Then-Treasury Under Secretary David Cohen said well as those in Western Europe and elsewhere. that ransom funds allowed AQIM “to expand its reach and influence” by providing “hundreds of • The Nigerien army seized over half a million dollars in thousands of dollars in financial support to other cash from AQIM-linked militants in 2015. This cash had Africa-based extremist organizations.”196 been obtained in part through donations.187 ɦɦ AQIM has funded Ansar Dine, an offshoot organization, since its formation in 2011,197 including • In 2015, the U.S. Department of State stated that at least one lump payment of roughly $500,000 “AQIM also successfully fundraises globally,” with to the group.198 some assistance coming from “supporters residing in ɦɦ A former member of the UN’s al-Qaeda and Taliban Western Europe.”188 Monitoring Team reported that AQIM sent Boko Haram $250,000 in 2012.199 COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND AGRICULTURE ɦɦ AQIM funded Ansar al-Sharia, a terrorist group in Libya200 involved in the 2012 attacks on the U.S. AQIM’s involvement in commercial enterprises is likely Consulate that killed four Americans.201 minor and opportunistic. However, given the weak ɦɦ In 2013-2014, AQIM sent more than $100,000 to the financial regulatory infrastructure in the region, AQIM is Mujahidin Shura Council in Gaza, a U.S.-designated likely to continue to launder money from local businesses. terrorist organization.202 • An AQIM cell in Guinea Bissau uncovered by authorities • AQIM gives cash payouts to community members to in early 2016 was using profits gained from the sale secure “services and short-term loyalty.”203 of luxury vehicles to finance its recruitment and ɦɦ In Timbuktu in 2012, AQIM funded religious 189 arms purchases. teachers, influencing them to espouse AQIM’s brand of Salafism.204 ɦɦ AQIM used ransom money to procure “vehicles, EXPENDITURES arms, medical supplies and electronics” from AQIM’s expenditures reflect the broad nature of the traffickers. The connections built from these trades group’s interests. Money is spent largely on fighters, led to influential traffickers supporting AQIM’s but the group also spends to develop tribal alliances takeover of northern Mali in 2012.205 and other terror organizations. • AQIM receipts discovered in early 2014 showed • Varying reports from the UN and journalists indicate a “mundane financial reality,” with meticulous Ansar Dine and AQIM in 2012 were paying yearly bookkeeping of money spent on workshops, salaries of between $1,000 and $4,800 to the parents ammunition, and bars of soap.206 of recruited children, with the UN also reporting that • AQIM has often used its funding to win favor with parents of children recruited for AQIM received a $600 populations under its control, including by financing 190 191 bonus. Mali’s GDP per capita was $777 in 2012. weddings and paying for medicine for children.207 ɦɦ MUJAO paid its recruits $100-$400 per month in ɦɦ In 2011, AQIM gave residents of towns in northern 192 Mali in 2013. Mali free cash, clothes, food, and medicine. The • In 2016, AQIM paid more than $800 to individuals group engaged in trade with the locals, and also paid “providing information that (could) be used to target for residents to establish small local mosques.208 MINUSMA convoys.”193 • MUJAO gave its fighters in northern Mali each at least a $300 bonus when the group received ransom payments, according to Reuters.194
12 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Financial Details
Conclusion A patchwork network of violent Islamist groups and transnational criminal organizations have run rampant in the Sahel region for decades. The U.S. should be careful to avoid combatting these networks and AQIM directly, as France has already taken a leadership role in the region. Instead, the U.S., in collaboration with European partners, should support better governance by Sahelian countries and encourage wealthy nations to stop paying ransoms. Degrading AQIM’s financing starts with a strict enforcement of a ransoms ban. Further, AQIM cannot be allowed to control significant tracts of land from which it could tax and extort a population to pay its expenses. Most of the remainder of AQIM’s funding comes from smuggling drugs and other contraband across the Sahel and into Europe. The international effort to deprive AQIM of its funding should therefore focus on mapping and destroying transnational criminal networks, particularly those focused on smuggling drugs. Nevertheless, the group is resilient and low cost, focused on gradualism, and thus, as with other al-Qaeda affiliates, simply denying the group consistent funding is unlikely to destroy it entirely. In the long run, AQIM must be denied sanctuary through the development of states that can stem the tide of the region’s Salafi jihadist movement, which includes other groups like the Islamic State of Greater Sahara, the IS affiliate whose leadership defected from al-Qaeda. This requires that the nations whose territory jihadists operates in become more formidable in governing their vast swaths of land and securing their borders.
Mauritanian soldiers monitor the Mali-Mauritania border for any signs of AQIM movement.
13 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
1. This report focuses on the fluid network of groups and 10. Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s ‘War on offshoots associated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Terror’,” The Washington Institute, October 2, 2002. (http:// (AQIM), with particular emphasis on those that recently formed www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/algerias-gspc- an alliance with AQIM, known as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal- and-americas-war-on-terror) Muslimin (“Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims”). 11. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the 2. Based on a scale out of 3 dollar signs, where 1 dollar sign Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, represents tens of millions in funding per year, 2 dollar signs 2015. (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic- represents low hundreds of millions, and 3 dollar signs represents maghreb); Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, high hundreds of millions or more in current funding. “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. 3. “Al Qaeda-linked attacks in Mali and neighboring Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http://www. countries since 2014,” Military Edge, accessed October rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/ 20, 2017. (http://militaryedge.org/embedmap/?map_ RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf) id=12253&mapZoom=6&mapCenter=14.392118083661728% 12. Bill Roggio, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group joins al 2C-2.373046875) Qaeda,” FDD’s Long War Journal, November 3, 2007. (http:// 4. David Lewis, “Al Qaeda’s richest faction dominant in north www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/libyan_islamic_ Mali: U.S.,” Reuters, July 26, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/ fight.php) article/us-mali-usa-africom-idUSBRE86P1IC20120726) 13. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North 5. United Nations Security Council, “Fifteenth report of the Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http://www.rand. pursuant to resolution 2018 (2012) concerning Al-Qaida and org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ associated individuals and entities,” January 23, 2014, page 14. RAND_RR415.pdf) (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/41) 14. Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian 6. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Jihad’s Southern Amir,” The Jamestown Foundation, May 8, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” 2009. (https://jamestown.org/program/mokhtar-belmokhtar- Stability International Journal of Security and Development, the-algerian-jihads-southern-amir/) September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ 15. United Nations Security Council, “QDe.014 The articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” 7. The group received roughly $92 million from 2008-13, and September 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ at least another $5 million before 2008. Rukmini Callimachi, sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the- “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic) New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https://www.nytimes. 16. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe- in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 13, 2017. becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html); David Lewis and Adama (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al- Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of “gangster-jihadists,” qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php) Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us- 17. Anouar Boukhars, “Simmering Discontent in the Western mali-crisis-crime-idUSBRE89O07Y20121025) Sahara,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8. Activity by AQIM, or an associated group, has been March 12, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/12/ reported in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory simmering-discontent-in-western-sahara-pub-47461) Coast, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, 18. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Senegal, Western Sahara, and Tunisia, among others. Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say,”The Huffington 9. Scott Barber, “Kidnapping: Al-Qaeda’s cash cow Post, February 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost. terrorizes Western tourists and workers in Africa’s Sahel com/2013/02/20/libyan-weapons-al-qaeda-north- region,” National Post (Canada), February 24, 2013. (http:// africa_n_2727326.html) nationalpost.com/g00/news/kidnapping-al-qaedas-cash-cow- terrorizes-western-tourists-and-workers-in-africas-sahel-region/); Morten Boas, “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 28, 2014. (https://ctc.usma.edu/ posts/guns-money-and-prayers-aqims-blueprint-for-securing- control-of-northern-mali)
14 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
19. Mohammed Mahmoud Abu al-Ma’ali, “Al-Qaeda 26. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize and its allies in the Sahel and the Sahara,” Al-Jazeera in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 13, 2017. Center for Studies (Qatar), May 1, 2012, page 5. (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al- (http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/ qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php) Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20 27. Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda linked to more than 250 West Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20 African attacks in 2016,” FDD’s Long War Journal, January 7, and%20the%20Sahara.pdf); Andrew Lebovich, “The Hotel 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/01/over- Attacks and Militant Realignment in the Sahara-Sahel 250-al-qaeda-linked-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2016.php) Region,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 28. David Weinberg, “Terrorist Financing: Kidnapping Antiq- 19, 2016. (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-hotel-attacks- uities Trafficking, and Private Donations,”Hearing before the and-militant-realignment-in-the-sahara-sahel-region); Note that House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 17, 2015, page 4. some scholarship has questioned the role that ethnic cleavages (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/ played given that MUJAO was largely composed of Arabs Terrorist_Financing_Kidnapping_Antiquities_and_Private_Do- and Berbers. See: Morten Boas, “Guns, Money and Prayers: nations.pdf); Based on a 2003 exchange rate of 1.13 euros AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali,” per dollar. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 28, 2014. (https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/guns-money-and-prayers-aqims- 29. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda blueprint-for-securing-control-of-northern-mali) Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say,”The Huffington Post, February 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost. 20. Damien McElroy, “Al-Qaeda’s scathing letter to com/2013/02/20/libyan-weapons-al-qaeda-north- troublesome employee Mokhtar Belmokhtar reveals inner africa_n_2727326.html) workings of terrorist group,” The Telegraph (UK), May 29, 2013. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 30. Jon Lee Anderson, “State of Terror,” The New Yorker, al-qaeda/10085716/Al-Qaedas-scathing-letter-to-troublesome- July 1, 2013. (http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/07/01/ employee-Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-reveals-inner-workings-of- state-of-terror); Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, terrorist-group.html); Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http://www.rand.org/ the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013. (http:// content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/ RAND_RR415.pdf) RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf) 31. George Parker, “G8 leaders pledge to stop paying ransoms 21. Conor Gaffey, “Peacekeeping in Mali: The U.N.’s Most to terror groups,” Financial Times (UK), June 18, 2013. (https:// Dangerous Mission,” Newsweek, June 12, 2016. (http://www. www.ft.com/content/10cc2546-d832-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de) newsweek.com/mali-un-mission-northern-mali-conflict-aqim- 32. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls africa-peacekeeping-468907) Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// 22. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens- 2015: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2016. europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) 33. Kathleen Caulderwood, “Drugs And Money In The Sahara: 23. Bruce Crumley, “France’s Mali Mission: Has al-Qaeda How The Global Cocaine Trade Is Funding North African Already Been Defeated?” Time, February 5, 2013. (http:// Jihad,” International Business Times, June 5, 2015. (http://www. world.time.com/2013/02/05/frances-mali-mission-has-al-qaeda- ibtimes.com/drugs-money-sahara-how-global-cocaine-trade- already-been-defeated/) funding-north-african-jihad-1953419) 24. “Belmokhtar’s militants ‘merge’ with Mali’s Mujao,” 34. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism BBC News (UK), August 22, 2013. (http://www.bbc.com/ 2015: Chapter 2. Africa Overview,” June 2016. (https://www. news/world-us-canada-23796920); “Mali extremists join state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257514.htm) with al-Qaida-linked North Africa group,” Associated 35. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Press, December 4, 2015. (https://www.apnews.com/ Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// eb6aaa78c8cc40d6bbe21f401acd1b06) www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens- 25. Caleb Weiss, “Analysis: Merger of al Qaeda groups europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) threatens security in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War 36. “Morocco arrests five soldiers over militant arms,” Journal, March 18, 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/ Al-Arabiya (UAE), January 12, 2011. (https://www.alarabiya.net/ archives/2017/03/analysis-merger-of-al-qaeda-groups-threatens- articles/2011/01/12/133257.html) security-in-west-africa.php)
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37. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West 48. Jon Lee Anderson, “State of Terror,” The New Yorker, and Central Africa,” October 2016, page 28. (http://www.fatf- July 1, 2013. (http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/07/01/ gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West- state-of-terror) Central-Africa.pdf) 49. General Thomas Waldhauser, “United States Africa 38. General Thomas Waldhauser, “United States Africa Command Command 2017 Posture Statement,” Testimony before the 2017 Posture Statement,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2017, pages 12-13. Committee, March 9, 2017, page 12. 50. United Nations, “UN Mission’s Summary detailed by 39. Modibo Goita, “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Country,” April 30, 2017, page 40. (http://www.un.org/en/ Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy,” Africa Center peacekeeping/contributors/2017/apr17_3.pdf) for Strategic Studies, February 2011. (http://africacenter. 51. General Thomas D. Waldhauser, “Advance Policy Questions org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ASB11EN-West- for Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Africa%E2%80%99s-Growing-Terrorist-Threat-Confronting- Marine Corps,” Senate Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2016, AQIM%E2%80%99s-Sahelian-Strategy.pdf) pages 7-8. (https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/ 40. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias doc/Waldhauser_%20APQs_06-21-16.pdf) Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February 52. General David M. Rodriguez, “Advance Policy Questions 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyan- for General David M. Rodriguez, U.S. Army Nominee for weapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html) Commander, U.S. Africa Command,” Senate Armed Services 41. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In Committee, February 13, 2013, pages 7-8. (https://www.armed- the land of “gangster-jihadists,” Reuters, October 25, 2012. services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez%2002-14-13.pdf) (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime- 53. Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca idUSBRE89O07Y20121025) Zimmerman, “Mali’s Next Battle: Improving Counterterrorism 42. Anouar Boukhars, “The Drivers of Insecurity in Mauritania,” Capabilities,” RAND Corporation, 2017, page 18. (https://www. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 30, 2012. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/ (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/30/drivers-of- RR1241/RAND_RR1241.pdf) insecurity-in-mauritania-pub-47955); Jason Howerton, “Radical 54. U.S. Department of State, “Programs and Initiatives,” Islamists in Mali Recruit, Pay for Child Soldiers,” Associated Press, accessed October 23, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/ October 3, 2012. (http://www.theblaze.com/news/2012/10/03/ programs/index.htm#TSCTP) radical-islamists-in-mali-recruit-pay-for-child-soldiers/) 55. The White House, Press Release, “Fact Sheet: Partnering 43. Jacob Zenn, “AQIM’s Alliance in Mali: Prospects for to Counter Terrorism in Africa,” August 6, 2014. (https:// Jihadist Preeminence in West Africa,” The Jamestown Foundation, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact- April 21, 2017. (https://jamestown.org/program/aqims-alliance- sheet-partnering-counter-terrorism-africa) mali-prospects-jihadist-preeminence-west-africa/) 56. George Parker, “G8 leaders pledge to stop paying ransoms 44. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael to terror groups,” Financial Times (UK), June 18, 2013. (https:// Shurkin, August 14, 2017. www.ft.com/content/10cc2546-d832-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de) 45. Emily Estelle and Brenna Snyder, “AQIM and ISIS in 57. United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Adopts Algeria: Competing Campaigns,” American Enterprise Institute, Resolution 2133 (2014), Calling upon States to Keep Ransom June 2, 2016. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/aqim-and- Payments, Political Concessions from Benefiting Terrorists,” isis-in-algeria-competing-campaigns); Jaclyn Stutz, “AQIM and January 27, 2014. (http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ ISIS in Tunisia: Competing Campaigns,” American Enterprise sc11262.doc.htm) Institute, June 28, 2016. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ 58. “AQIM Appendix,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies. aqim-and-isis-in-tunisia-competing-campaigns) (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/terror-finance-briefing-book- 46. U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” appendices) accessed October 23, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ 59. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Recent OFAC Actions,” des/123085.htm) October 24, 2003. (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 47. U.S. Department of State, Press Release, “The Re-Designation sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20031024.aspx) of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as a Foreign Terrorist 60. United Nations Security Council, “QDi. 136 Mokhtar Organization,” October 27, 2009. (https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/ Belmokhtar,” September 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/ pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130969.htm) suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/ individual/mokhtar-belmokhtar)
16 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
61. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North 73. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Designates an Additional Senior Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013, page 5. (http://www.rand. Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,” February 14, 2013. (https:// org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1855.aspx) RAND_RR415.pdf) 74. Bill Roggio, “US adds senior AQIM commander to terrorist 62. “Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” BBC News (UK), June 15, list,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 16, 2013. (http:// 2015. (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21061480) www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/us_adds_aqim_ 63. Lee Ferran, “Alive After All? U.S. Offers $5M for Mokhtar command.php) Belmokhtar,” ABC News, June 3, 2013. (http://abcnews.go.com/ 75. Caleb Weiss, “AQIM commander threatens France in blogs/headlines/2013/06/alive-after-all-u-s-offers-5m-for- audio statement,” FDD’s Long War Journal, December 24, mokhtar-belmokhtar/) 2015. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/aqim- 64. United Nations Security Council, “QDi. 136 Mokhtar commander-threatens-france-in-audio-statement.php) Belmokhtar,” September 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/ 76. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/ Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015. individual/mokhtar-belmokhtar) (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb) 65. “Captured wife of Mokhtar Belmokhtar confirms militant 77. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North leader ‘alive,’” Middle East Eye, November 23, 2016. (http:// Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy www.middleeasteye.net/news/mokhtar-belmokhtar-still-alive- Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013, pages 1, 14-15. (http:// one-his-wives-confirms-1187655554) www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/ 66. Samuel L. Aronson, “AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf) in the Sahel,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 78. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael 28, 2014. (https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqims-threat-to-western- Shurkin, August 14, 2017. interests-in-the-sahel) 79. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Military Offers Support, but Not Troops, 67. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Press Release, “Chairman to Aid France in Africa,” The New York Times, May 12, 2017. Royce Statement on Reported Killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/africa/africa-us- March 2, 2013. (https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/ military-aid-france.html) chairman-royce-statement-on-reported-killing-of-mokhtar- 80. Christopher Chivvis, “Mali’s Persistent Jihadist Problem,” belmokhtar/) The Cipher Brief, January 12, 2017. (https://www.thecipherbrief. 68. Geoff Porter, “AQIM Ten Years On,”The Cipher Brief, com/article/africa/malis-persistent-jihadist-problem-1089) January 12, 2017. (https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/ 81. “UN Security Council: G5 Sahel counterterrorism force to africa/aqim-ten-years-1089) move forward,” Africa Times, June 22, 2017. (http://africatimes. 69. “Captured wife of Mokhtar Belmokhtar confirms militant com/2017/06/22/un-security-council-g5-sahel-counterterrorism- leader ‘alive,’” Middle East Eye, November 23, 2016. (http:// force-to-move-forward/) www.middleeasteye.net/news/mokhtar-belmokhtar-still-alive- 82. Somini Sengupta, “U.N. Security Council Welcomes one-his-wives-confirms-1187655554) Deployment of New Counterrorism Force in Africa,” The 70. United Nations Security Council, Press Release, “Security New York Times, June 21, 2017. (https://www.nytimes. Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Djamel Akkacha com/2017/06/21/world/africa/security-council-sahel-france- to Its Sanctions List,” February 5, 2013. (https://www.un.org/ united-states.html) press/en/2013/sc10908.doc.htm) 83. Colum Lynch, “Trump Administration Eyes $1 Billion in 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Cuts to U.N. Peacekeeping,” Foreign Policy, March 23, 2017. Designates an Additional Senior Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the (http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/23/trump-administration- Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,” February 14, 2013. (https:// eyes-1-billion-in-cuts-to-u-n-peacekeeping/) www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1855.aspx) 84. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael 72. Bill Roggio, “US adds senior AQIM commander to terrorist Shurkin, August 14, 2017. list,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 16, 2013. (http:// 85. “U.S. Relations with Algeria,” U.S. Department of State, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/us_adds_aqim_ February 2, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm) command.php)
17 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
86. Vera Songwe, “Africa’s Democratic Transitions Under 96. Annelies Pauwels, “Competing for ransom: AQIM vs. Construction: Some Lessons from Burkina Faso,” Brookings, Daesh,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (France), November 6, 2014. (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ June 2016. (http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special- africa-in-focus/2014/11/06/africas-democratic-transitions- interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ under-construction-some-lessons-from-burkina-faso/); Ron Alert_23_Terrorist_kidnapping.pdf) Dellums, “Will Guinea’s experiment in democracy succeed?” 97. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Jihad Comes to Africa,” The Wall Street The Hill, October 7, 2015. (http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits- Journal, February 5, 2016. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/jihad- blog/international/256178-will-guineas-experiment-in- comes-to-africa-1454693025) democracy-succeed) 98. U.S. Agency for International Development and Equal 87. Amado Philip de Andres, “West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Access, “Exploring New Media in the Sahel,” 2016. (https:// Organized Crime and Terrorism as the New Threats to Global blumont.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Exploring-New- Security,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, January Media-in-the-Sahel.pdf) 2008. (https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72513/ 99. Broadcasting Board of Governors, “BBG, Gallup Issue UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf) Findings on Media Use in the Sahel,” November 14, 2013. 88. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: (https://www.bbg.gov/2013/11/14/bbg-gallup-issue-findings-on- the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation media-use-in-the-sahel-region/) in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 100. Hannah Armstrong, “Analyzing AQIM Jihad Recruitment (Norway), January 2015, pages 3-4. (http://www.clingendael. Propaganda,” Al-Wasat (Bahrain), July 18, 2011. (https:// nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ thewasat.wordpress.com/2011/07/18/analyzing-aqim-jihad- Azawad_Dec2014.pdf) recruitment-propaganda/) 89. The White House, “Strategy to Combat Transnational 101. Olivier Guitta, “The re-emergence of AQIM in Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Africa,” Al-Jazeera (Qatar), March 20, 2016. (http://www. Security,” July 19, 2011. (https://obamawhitehouse.archives. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/emergence-aqim- gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_ africa-160320090928469.html) Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf) 102. Kathleen Caulderwood, “Drugs And Money In The Sahara: 90. Xenia de Graaf, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) How The Global Cocaine Trade Is Funding North African and the Political Economy of Terrorism,” Center for Security Jihad,” International Business Times, June 5, 2015. (http://www. Studies, January 17, 2012. (http://isnblog.ethz.ch/conflict/al- ibtimes.com/drugs-money-sahara-how-global-cocaine-trade- qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-aqim-and-the-political-economy- funding-north-african-jihad-1953419) of-terrorism) 103. Robin Yapp, “South American drug gangs funding al- 91. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Qaeda terrorists,” The Telegraph (UK), December 29, 2010. Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/ Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. colombia/8230134/South-American-drug-gangs-funding-al- org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara- Qaeda-terrorists.html) region-pub-49360) 104. United Nations Security Council, “Fifteenth report 92. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February submitted pursuant to resolution 2083 (2012) concerning 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyan- Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” January 23, weapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html) 2014, page 14. (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. 93. Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, “Check your blind spot: asp?symbol=S/2014/41) Confronting criminal spoilers in the Sahel,” Institute for Security 105. Timothy Kustusch, “AQIM’s Funding Sources - Studies (South Africa), March 14, 2013. (http://www.ceipaz.org/ Kidnapping, Ransom, and Drug Running by Gangster Jihadists,” images/contenido/sahel-crimenorganizado.pdf) 361 Security, November 28, 2012. (http://www.361security.com/ 94. George Parker, “G8 leaders pledge to stop paying ransoms analysis/aqims-funding-sources-kidnapping-ransom-and-drug- to terror groups,” Financial Times (UK), June 18, 2013. (https:// running-by-gangster-jihadists) www.ft.com/content/10cc2546-d832-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de) 106. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West 95. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls and Central Africa,” October 2016, page 34. (http://www.fatf- Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West- www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens- Central-Africa.pdf) europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html)
18 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
107. Katherine Bauer and Matthew Levitt, “Al-Qaeda Financing: 119. Wolfram Lacher, “Challenging the Myth of the Drug- Selected Issues,” How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and Terror Nexus in the Sahel,” West Africa Commission on Drugs, the Islamic State, Ed. Aaron Y. Zelin, (Washington, DC: The August 19, 2013, pages 8. (http://www.wacommissionondrugs. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2017), page 94. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the- (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf) PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf) 120. Mamadou Tapily, Peter Walker, and Charlie English, 108. Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda video shows its hostages in “Mali attack: more than 20 dead after terrorist raid on Bamako northern Mali,” FDD’s Long War Journal, July 2, 2017. (http:// hotel,” The Guardian (UK), November 20, 2015. (https://www. www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/07/al-qaeda-video- theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/mali-attack-highlights- shows-its-hostages-in-northern-mali.php) global-spread-extremist-violence); Rukmini Callimachi and 109. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Nabih Bulos, “Mali Hotel Attackers Are Tied to an Algerian Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// Qaeda Leader,” The New York Times, November 21, 2015. www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens- (https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/africa/mali-hotel- europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) attackers-are-tied-to-an-algerian-qaeda-leader.html) 110. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many 121. Rukmini Callimachi and Sewell Chan, “Hostage Held Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for by Al Qaeda in Mali for 5 Years Is Freed,” The New York Times, Security Policy (Switzerland), May 2011. (https://www.files.ethz. August 3, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/ ch/isn/129338/GCSP%20Policy%20Paper%2015.pdf) world/africa/mali-stephen-mcgown-south-africa-al-qaeda. html?smid=tw-share) 111. Adam Nossiter, “Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants’ Clout in West Africa,” The New York Times, December 12, 122. Christina Anderson, “Former Hostage Held by Al Qaeda 2012. (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/africa/ Describes 6-Year Ordeal in the Sahara,” The New York Times, kidnappings-fuel-extremists-in-western-africa.html) September 24, 2017. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/ world/africa/sweden-mali-qaeda-gustafsson.html) 112. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: In the land of ‘gangster-jihadists,’” Reuters, October 25, 123. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Kidnapping for Ransom: 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime- The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,”Remarks at idUSBRE89O07Y20121025) Chatham House, October 5, 2012. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx) 113. Ibid; Report cites expenditures of 5.5 million francs ($5.9 million), of which about two million francs were spent on “Swiss 124. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls staff involved in the operation.” Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens- 114. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Kidnapping for Ransom: europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,”Remarks at Chatham House, October 5, 2012. (https://www.treasury.gov/ 125. Doug Saunders, “Canada doesn’t negotiate with terrorists. press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx) Until it does,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 1, 2013. (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/canada-doesnt- 115. United Nations Security Council, “Sixteenth report of the negotiate-with-terrorists-until-it-does/article12293766/) Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014) concerning Al-Qaida and 126. “Letter from Leaders of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associated individuals and entities,” October 29, 2014. (http:// to a Sahara-Based Militant Commander,” The New York www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/770) Times, July 29, 2014, page 4. (https://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2014/07/29/world/africa/31kidnap-docviewer1.html) 116. Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), page 363. 127. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” 117. “In villages, al-Qaida lures with cash, candy,” ABC 6 Action Stability International Journal of Security and Development, News, December 3, 2011. (http://6abc.com/archive/8453758/) September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ 118. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) Africa,” October 2013, page 25. (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/ 128. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: fatf/documents/reports/tf-in-west-africa.pdf) In the land of “gangster-jihadists,” Reuters, October 25, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime- idUSBRE89O07Y20121025)
19 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
129. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls 140. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Transnational Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014. (https:// Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” February www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens- 2013, pages 19-24. (http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and- europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html) analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf) 130. Christina Schori Liang, “The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights 141. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: into Modern Terrorist Financing,” Geneva Centre for Security the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation Policy (Switzerland), August 2016, page 7. (http://www.gcsp.ch/ in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights- (Norway), January 2015, pages 5-6. (http://www.clingendael. into-Modern-Terrorist-Financing) nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ 131. Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Azawad_Dec2014.pdf) insurgency, or organized crime?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 142. Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, “Al Qaeda linked August 5, 2016, page 929. (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ to rogue aviation network,” Reuters, January 13, 2010. pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280?needAccess=true) (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-drugs-security-aviation- 132. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the idUSTRE60C3E820100113) Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International 143. Wolfram Lacher, “Challenging the Myth of the Drug- Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. Terror Nexus in the Sahel,” West Africa Commission on Drugs, org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara- August 19, 2013, pages 8-9. (http://www.wacommissionondrugs. region-pub-49360) org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the- 133. Bennett Seftel, “Mali’s Instability: Advantage, Al-Qaeda Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf) in the Islamic Maghreb,” The Cipher Brief, January 12, 2017. 144. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West (https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/exclusive/africa/malis- and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 21 and 42. (http:// instability-advantage-al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-1089) www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist- 134. Australian National Security, “Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf) Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” accessed October 23, 2017. (https:// 145. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/ Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for Al-Qaida-in-the-Lands-of-the-Islamic-Maghreb.aspx) Security Policy (Switzerland), May 2011. (https://www.files. 135. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ethz.ch/isn/129338/GCSP%20Policy%20Paper%2015.pdf); “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and David O’Regan and Peter Thompson, “Advancing Stability and the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 7. (https://www.gov. Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ Narco-State,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 2013, file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf) pages 4-5. (http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ SpecialReport-Guinea-Bissau-JUN2013-EN.pdf) 136. Carley Petesch, “UN says drug trafficking is a growing problem in West Africa, as production of synthetic drugs and 146. Robin Yapp, “South American drug gangs funding al- their use increases in the region,” Associated Press, March 2, 2016. Qaeda terrorists,” The Telegraph (UK), December 29, 2010. (https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-03-02/ (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/ drug-trafficking-production-up-in-west-africa-un-says) colombia/8230134/South-American-drug-gangs-funding-al- Qaeda-terrorists.html) 137. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region,” 147. United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New June 14, 2013, page 3. (http://www.securitycouncilreport. York, Press Release, “Malian Man Sentenced in Manhattan org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- Federal Court to 57 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Provide CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_354.pdf) Material Support to Terrorists,” March 12, 2012. (https:// www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/March12/ 138. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the issaoumarsentencing.html) Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015. (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb) 148. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International 139. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, “Cocaine trafficking between Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. Latin America and West Africa,” Institute for Defence Studies org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara- and Analyses, January 2016. (http://www.idsa.in/africatrends/ region-pub-49360) the-cocaine-trafficking-between-latin-america-and-west-africa_ sbmaharaj_0316)
20 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
149. Wolfram Lacher, “Challenging the Myth of the Drug- 160. Christina Schori Liang, “The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights Terror Nexus in the Sahel,” West Africa Commission on Drugs, into Modern Terrorist Financing,” Geneva Centre for Security August 19, 2013, pages 6-7. (http://www.wacommissionondrugs. Policy (Switzerland), August 2016. (http://www.gcsp.ch/News- org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the- Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-into- Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf) Modern-Terrorist-Financing) 150. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 161. “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara,” The Global the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 6. (https://www.gov. Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 11, 2015, page 3. (http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf) uploads/2015/05/2015-1.pdf) 151. Sebastian Rotella, “U.S. prosecution links drugs to 162. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: terrorism,” The Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2009. (http:// the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/19/nation/la-na-al-qaeda- in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre cocaine19-2009dec19) (Norway), January 2015, pages 3-4. (http://www.clingendael. 152. Ibid. nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ Azawad_Dec2014.pdf) 153. Anouar Boukhars, “The Drivers of Insecurity in Mauritania,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 30, 2012. 163. Interview with RAND Senior Political Scientist Michael (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/30/drivers-of-insecurity- Shurkin, August 14, 2017. in-mauritania-pub-47955) 164. Sebastian Rotella, “U.S. prosecution links drugs to 154. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: terrorism,” The Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2009. (http:// In the land of “gangster-jihadists,” Reuters, October 25, articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/19/nation/la-na-al-qaeda- 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime- cocaine19-2009dec19) idUSBRE89O07Y20121025) 165. David Lewis, “Al Qaeda’s richest faction dominant in north 155. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mali: U.S.,” Reuters, July 26, 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/ “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and article/us-mali-usa-africom-idUSBRE86P1IC20120726) the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 6. (https://www.gov. 166. “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara,” The Global file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf) Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 11, 156. Afua Hirsch, “Cocaine flows through Sahara as al-Qaida 2015, pages 1-2. (http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ cashes in on lawlessness,” The Guardian(UK), May 2, 2013. uploads/2015/05/2015-1.pdf) (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/02/cocaine- 167. “Militants find sanctuary in Libya’s wild south,”Associated flows-through-sahara-al-qaida) Press, July 13, 2017. (https://www.voanews.com/a/militants-find- 157. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, sanctuary-in-libya-wild-south/3942381.html) “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and 168. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 7. (https://www.gov. Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ Stability International Journal of Security and Development, file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf) September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ 158. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 19-20. (http://www. 169. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing- Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International West-Central-Africa.pdf) Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. 159. Kathleen Caulderwood, “Drugs And Money In The Sahara: org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara- How The Global Cocaine Trade Is Funding North African region-pub-49360) Jihad,” International Business Times, June 5, 2015. (http://www. 170. “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist ibtimes.com/drugs-money-sahara-how-global-cocaine-trade- Financing in the Trans-Sahara,” The Global Initiative Against funding-north-african-jihad-1953419) Transnational Organized Crime, May 11, 2015, page 3. (http:// globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-1.pdf)
21 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
171. Michael Duffy, “The Sahel, Libya, and the Crime-Terror 183. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: Nexus,” Foreign Policy Journal, October 30, 2015. (http://www. the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/10/30/the-sahel-libya-and-the- in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre crime-terror-nexus/) (Norway), January 2015, page 7. (https://www.clingendael. 172. Colin Freeman, “Revealed: how Saharan caravans of cocaine nl/sites/default/files/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_ help to fund al-Qaeda in terrorists’ North African domain,” The Azawad_Dec2014.pdf) Telegraph (UK), January 26, 2013. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 184. Ibid. news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9829099/Revealed- 185. Hans-Jakob Schindler, “The United Nations View on how-Saharan-caravans-of-cocaine-help-to-fund-al-Qaeda-in- al-Qaeda’s Financing Today,” How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, terrorists-North-African-domain.html) Uprisings, and the Islamic State, Ed. Aaron Y. Zelin, (Washington, 173. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2017), Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International page 89. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf) org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara- 186. Australian National Security, “Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the region-pub-49360) Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” accessed October 23, 2017. (https:// 174. Thomas Joscelyn, “Libya’s Terrorist Descent: Causes and www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/ Solutions,” FDD’s Long War Journal, September 27, 2016. Al-Qaida-in-the-Lands-of-the-Islamic-Maghreb.aspx) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/libyas- 187. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West terrorist-descent-causes-and-solutions.php) and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 19-20. (http://www. 175. David Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing- Across North Africa, Officials Say,” The Huffington Post, February West-Central-Africa.pdf) 21, 2013. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyan- 188. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism weapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html) 2015: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2016. 176. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for 189. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West Security Policy (Switzerland), May 2011. (https://www.files.ethz. and Central Africa,” October 2016, pages 23-4. (http://www. ch/isn/129338/GCSP%20Policy%20Paper%2015.pdf) fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing- 177. General David M. Rodriguez, “Advance Policy Questions West-Central-Africa.pdf) for General David M. Rodriguez, U.S. Army Nominee for 190. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: Commander, U.S. Africa Command,” Senate Armed Services In the land of ‘gangster-jihadists,’” Reuters, October 25, Committee, February 13, 2013, page 7. (https://www.armed- 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime- services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez%2002-14-13.pdf) idUSBRE89O07Y20121025); Jason Howerton, “Radical 178. Ibid. Islamists in Mali recruit, pay for child soldiers,” Associated Press, 179. “Rebel Forces in Northern Mali,” Conflict Armament October 3, 2012. (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/islamists-in- Research and Small Arms Survey, April 2013. (http://www. mali-recruit-pay-for-child-soldiers/) conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Rebel_Forces_ 191. The World Bank, “GDP per capita (current US$),” accessed in_Northern_Mali.pdf) September 28, 2017. (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 180. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing in West NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2012&start=1960) and Central Africa,” October 2016, page 11. (http://www.fatf- 192. Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West- the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation Central-Africa.pdf) in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 181. Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, (Norway), January 2015, page 8. (https://www.files.ethz.ch/ Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” isn/192065/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_Azawad_ Stability International Journal of Security and Development, Dec2014.pdf) September 10, 2014. (http://www.stabilityjournal.org/ 193. Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, articles/10.5334/sta.ea/) insurgency, or organized crime?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 182. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats August 5, 2016, page 924. (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280?needAccess=true) American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx)
22 | CSIF: Terror Finance Briefing Book Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Endnotes
194. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, “Special Report: 205. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, In the land of ‘gangster-jihadists,’” Reuters, October 25, “Traffickers and Terrorists: drugs and violent jihad in Mali and 2012. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime- the wider Sahel,” October 2013, page 6. (https://www.gov. idUSBRE89O07Y20121025) uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 195. Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War, (New York: PublicAffairs, file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf) 2013), page 365. 206. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats 196. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Kidnapping for Ransom: in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,”Remarks at American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/ Chatham House, October 5, 2012. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx) press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx) 207. Ibid. 197. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in 208. Rukmini Callimachi and Martin Vogl, “Candy, cash -- al- West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 13, 2017. (http:// Qaida implants itself in Africa,” Associated Press, December 4, 2011. www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda- (http://archive.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2011/12/04/ groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php) candy_cash____al_qaida_implants_itself_in_africa/) 198. United Nations Security Council, “QDe.014 The 209. Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” September Sahel-Sahara Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International 9, 2014. (https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/ Peace, September 13, 2012. (http://carnegieendowment. aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida- org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara- in-the-islamic) region-pub-49360) 199. Tim Cocks, “Boko Haram too extreme for ‘al Qaeda in West Africa’ brand,” Reuters, May 28, 2014. (http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-bokoharam-analysis- idUSKBN0E81D320140528) 200. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” June 2016. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) 201. Bill Roggio, “Ansar al Shariah issues statement on US Consulate assault in Libya,” FDD’s Long War Journal, September 12, 2012. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/09/ ansar_al_shariah_issues_statem.php) 202. Under Secretary David Cohen, “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,” Remarks before the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/ press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx); U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” accessed October 23, 2017. (https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm) 203. Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response,” RAND Corporation, 2013, page 6. (http://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/ RAND_RR415.pdf) 204. Morten Boas, “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 28, 2014. (https://ctc. usma.edu/posts/guns-money-and-prayers-aqims-blueprint-for- securing-control-of-northern-mali)
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