Naturalized Epistemology and The Construction of Normativity Karyn L. Freedman A thesis submitted in conformity with the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto @ Copyright by Karyn L. Freedman (2001) National Library Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 WelIington Street 395. nie Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON KI A ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distnbute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/f&n, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Nahrralized Epistemokgy and the Construction of Normutivity. Doctor of Philosophy, 200 1, Karyn L. Freednan, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto. Abs tract Naturalized epistemology gives epistemic priority to the question, 'why do people hold the beliefs that they do?', and it asks us to recognize that we can't hope to answer this question unless we look at the context in which beliefs are held. Like ail epistemic naturalists, 1 tiiink that the descriptive question about belief acquisition is the most important one, but I don? think that it is the ody genuine one. Normativity is a legitimate epistemic concern, and in this thesis 1 argue that there is a place for it in a naturalized epistemology. To this end, 1 discuss three contemporary accounts of epistemic naturalism: W.V.0 . Quine's 'Epistemology Naîuralized' , David B Ioor and Barry B mes' Strong Programme, and Larry Laudads 'normative naturalism'. Each of these accounts offer something important to the current debates on naturalism: Quine shows the significance of the descriptive question of belief acquisition; Bloor and Barnes illustrate the importance of causal explanations in answering this question; and Laudan provides an argument for a normative naturalism. What I offer is an account of the source of normative notions. My position is that noms of rationdisr are constructed: historically contingent, but not arbitrary. This position goes hand in hand with global epistemic relativism, the view that standards of rationality are relative to cultures. 1 embrace this view. 1 argue that it is the most honest way to make sense of our normative practices, and, importantly, 1 show that to accept it does not entail a great loss. Acknowledgements 1 cvant to thank my supervisor, Jim Brown, and my advisors, Cheryl Misak and Ian Hacking, for offering invaluable advice and criticism on this thesis. Extra thanks go to Ji.,who has been an unbelievable support to me since 1 began my graduate studies at the University of Toronto; 1 couldn't have asked for more generous and insightful supervision. 1 also want to thank my fiiends for their ongoing interest and involvement in my work. 1 am gratefùl to them dl, especialiy to John Gibson, for his discerning comments; John Sutton, for his understanding and kindness; and Glenn Tiller, for his solidarity right fiom the start. 1 want to extend a special thanks to my sisters, Lisa and Jacqueline, for their unfailkg enthusiasm and support. Most of dl, 1want to thank my parents, Roxy and Martin. More than anyone else, they have been a constant source of wisdom and encouragement throughout my academic life. I dedicate this to you both. Contents Title Page i.. Abstract Ll Acknowledgements iii contents iv Introduction I W.V.O. Quine: Epistemology Naturalized Introduction Conditions of Justification Foundationalism Coherentism Internalism and Externalism Reliabilism Epistemology Naturalized Norrnativity Objections to Epistemology Naturalized Conclusion: Individual vs. Social 2 Bloor and Barnes: The Strong Programme Introduction Naturalizing Epistemology The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) The Strong Programme Four Tenets of the Strong Programme The Causality Pnnciple Global Epistemlc Relativism Rationality and Causality Conclusion: A Normative Naturalisrn 3 Larry Laudan: Normative Naturalisrn Introduction Naturalizing Epistemology Theories of Scientifk Rationality Normative Naturalism The Reticulated Model of Scientific Rationality The Reticdated Model: Criticisms A Normative Naturaiism Realizability Revisited Global Epistemic Relativism Conclusion: Relativism and Beyond 4 The Construction of Normativity Introduction Normative Naturlism and Global Epistemic Relatiwkm Norms Constructivism Rationality Norms of Scientific Rationality Construction of Norms Objectivity: Rationality Within a Tradition Global Epistemic Relativism What Have We Lost? Naturalism and Constructivism Rationality and Justification Conclusion: The Construction ofNormativity Conclusion 181 References 184 Introduction Why do people hold the beliefs that dey do? In my view, this is the most important question that epistemology cm hope to answer. And 1 think the only way to answer it is to go out into the world and look. For these reasons 1espouse a nuturalized epistemology. As 1 see it, naturalized epistemology is a matter of philosophical orientation: it gives epistemic priority to the descriptive question about belief acquisition, and it tells us that we can't answer this question unless we examine the historical and social contexts in which beliefs are held. Only through empirical investigations can we determine, for instance, how justification proceeds - what people tuke tu be good reasons for holding the beliefs that they do. The descriptive question about belief acquisition may be the most important epistemic question, but 1 don? think that it is the only genuine one. As human beings trying to move about successfully in the world and with one another, we want to be able to provide and to receive guidance; we want to know how we ought to arrive at our beliefs; we want to know when our beliefs are rational or justified. Normativity is a genuine epistemic conceni, and it is fair to demand that an epistemology incorporate it. Forhmately, a naturalized epistemology can do just this. Empirical investigations are what supply the answers to important normative questions. In the course of investigating how justification proceeds, we tum up the standards of rationality prevalent in a community; we leam what, within any given community, counts as a 'good reason' or as 'genuine support' for a belief. This is given in the practices of a cornmunity, and these practices are what provide the answer to normative questions of justification. To Say that a belief is justifie& for instance, is just to Say that it conforms to the standards of rationality prevalent in the community in which it is held. On this view, norms of rationality are relative to particular cdtures, but within any culture they are objective standards that tell the individuais who adhere to them how to best formulate their beliefs. 1 cal1 this position gIobal epistemic relativism, and it is a view that 1embrace. In the account of naturalized epistemology 1 develop here, epistemic norms are grounded in the practices of a community. The community that the epistemic naturdist inhabits is a scientific community; for a variety of reasons, this is the cornmunity that she prizes above al1 others, and upon which she models her epistemology. Therefore, descriptive claims about belief acquisition within our scientific community are what dictate the epistemic naturalist7s prescriptive claims about how to best acquire and formulate beliefs. Naturalized epistemology is thus robustly normative, and it manages to be so without turning a blind eye to the ways that individuais actually acquire their beliefs. This idea, at once refkeshing and compelling, breaks more than a few epistemological habits. As we will see in Chapter One, it signifies a rejection of a priori theories of justification, theories that dominated epistemological circles at the time that W.V.O. Quine published his 'Waturalized Episternology" (1969). Quine, writing in the tradition of mainstream epistemology, was the harbinger of epistemic naturalism in this century. He struck out against the a priori epistemology of foundationalism, and sought to reconstrue epistemology by manying it with empirical psychology. Quine reinvented epistemology by giving epistemic pnonty to descriptive questions about beiief acquisition. This is his main contribution to naturalized episternology, and its importance shouid not be underestimated. By asking a novel question Quine changed the way we do epistemology, since, ui Quine's view, this is not a question that we can answer by looking at the logical relations between beliefs; we need to look, rather, at what causes individuals to hold the beliefs that they do. That said, there are two serious problems with Quine's naturalism. Critics of epistemic naturalism argue that descriptive questions about belief acquisition ca~ot answer important normative questions about belief acquisition - that a naturalized epistemology cannot be