Gavagai Redox Or ―Epistemology Naturalized‖ Through Lockean Spectacles (undetached draft parts)

1.) Introduction In this paper I pursue two ambitious goals. First, and foremost, I outline an alternative both to the standard interpretations of Quine‘s ―Epistemology Naturalized‖ and to the standard projects in naturalized epistemology. Second, I place this alternative view of naturalized epistemology in the context of recent epistemology as well as the recent and long-term history of philosophy, evaluating the outlined view both as an interpretation of Quine and as an epistemic project. Understanding the theory in a broader historical context is important to epistemology, which all too often evinces an indifference and/or ignorance of its historical roots. Indeed, in an ironic twist—given Quine's famous thesis regarding the indeterminacy of translation--I argue that the literature in epistemology exhibits a profound misunderstanding of Quine's position. Ultimately, the primary philosophical significance of the theory lies with its utility in epistemology. Therefore, I try to exhibit the consistent and strong motivations for Quine's rejection of traditional approaches to epistemology, outline his positive position, and defend that position against the skeptic as well as the charges of circularity.

2. The Standard Interpretations/Programs of Epistemology Naturalized Epistemologists standardly explicate Quine‘s essay, and hence, naturalized epistemology, in accordance with one of three interpretative traditions. Kim and Stroud famously assert that Quine rejects epistemology‘s normativity in ―What is Naturalized Epistemology?‖ and ―Naturalized Epistemology‖ respectively.1, 2 Kornblith articulates perhaps the clearest and best argued interpretation of Quine as an advocate of psychologism in ―What is Naturalistic Epistemology.‖3 Feldman discusses the interpretation of naturalized epistemology as project in conceptual reduction (or at least compatibility with physicalism) in ―Goldman on Epistemology and Cognitive Science‖ and ―Naturalized Epistemology‖4, 5, as does Kim1, 6, 7. This last approach to naturalized epistemology, whatever its merits as an interpretation of Quine, is probably the most active project in naturalized epistemology, including contributions from such theorists as Bayer8, Davies9, Hacker10, Horgan11, Mi12, Sinclair7, Timmons11, and Villanueva13.

Despite the earnest intent and intellectual prowess of the scholars responsible for each of the above-mentioned interpretative traditions, each faces several significant difficulties as an interpretation of Quine‘s actual works. All the standard accounts have tenuous textual bases. All the standard interpretations, likewise fail to provide consistent and strong motivations for the positions each attributes to Quine. Finally, all the standard interpretations combine an ill-defined positive project with a naïve and inconsistent understanding of, and response to, both the traditional epistemic project and the skeptic. I briefly outline each view and its general interpretive difficulties in the remainder of this section.

The Replacement Thesis

The replacement thesis represents a pervasive view of Quine‘s work. Kim1, Kornblith3, and Feldman4 among many others all base the replacement thesis interpretation largely on two quotes from Quine:14

The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? (p.75) and14

Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input--certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance--and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three- dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology: namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence.... … But a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology. (pp.82-82)

Epistemologists usually quote Kim in outlining the standard interpretation:1

Quine‘s proposal is more radical than that. He is asking us to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered epistemology. That is what is new in Quine‘s proposals. Quine is asking us to put in its place a purely descriptive, causal-nomological science of human cognition. (p.338)

Similarly, Stroud tells readers that the traditional epistemologist...2

...wanted to identify the indubitable information we could be said to acquire in perception so that he could pose more sharply and more precisely the question of how that information could ever justify our richer beliefs about an external world. But once the project of justification is abandoned, Quine thinks, we can sidestep the issue of awareness and simply try to explain how our torrential theoretical output arises from those events that take place at our sensory surfaces. (p.224)

Interpreters of Quine seek to answer three questions; Q1 Is naturalized epistemology autonomous? Q2 Is naturalized epistemology normative? Q3 What results might one expect from naturalized epistemology? Thus, one finds three elements to the replacement view:

Q1 Is naturalized epistemology autonomous? 1R Psychology replaces epistemology.

Q2 Is naturalized epistemology normative? 2R Epistemology renounces its normative character.

Q3 What results might one expect from naturalized epistemology? 3R The theory that emerges from a psychologized epistemology is a causal-nomological explanation of belief genesis.

In later sections I discuss the plausibility of R1. Here I emphasize the interpretive difficulties facing the replacement thesis as regards R2 and R3. The main problem with the replacement thesis as an interpretation of Quine lies in the fact that Quine clearly never abandons normativity. He consistently distinguishes science from other less laudable human pursuits, he never disavows justification (See for example15, 16), and he continues to use evaluative terms such as theory and evidence. He consistently distinguishes science from other less laudable human pursuits, he never disavows justification (See for example15, 16), and he continues to use evaluative terms such as theory and evidence. For instance, Quine tells readers of The Roots of Reference,17

Are we to conclude then that the old epistemologists' problem of bridging a gap between sense data and bodies was a pseudoproblem? No, the problem was real but wrongly viewed. The old epistemologists may have thought that their atomistic attitude toward sense data was grounded in introspection, but it was not. It was grounded in their knowledge of the physical world. …

The crucial logical point is that the epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science. The challenge runs as follows. Science itself teaches that there is no clairvoyance; that the only information that can reach our sensory surfaces from external objects must be limited to two-dimensional optical projections and various impacts of air waves on the eardrums and some gaseous reactions in the nasal passages and a few kindred odds and ends. How, the challenge proceeds, could one hope to find out about that external world from such meager traces? In short, if our science were true, how could we know it? (p.2)

Likewise, Quine begins From Stimulus to Science by asserting,18

We are faced with the problem of error. These are worries about our knowledge of the external world. To deal with them we have had to turn inward and seek a knowledge of knowledge. (p.1)

Similarly, Quine‘s numerous appeals to evolution and analogies between epistemology and engineering belie claims that he viewed the proper product of naturalized epistemology as a causal-nomological explanation/description of belief genesis (3r). Quine did seek explanations, but the explanations he sought were explanations of epistemic excellence. For example, Quine informs readers that,19

Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle for the indiscriminate description of ongoing procedures. For me normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking, or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction. (p.664-665)

In a similar vein, Quine opines,14

There is some encouragement in Darwin. ... Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind. ... For me then the problem of induction is a problem about the world: a problem of how we, as we now are (by our present scientific lights), in a world we never made, should stand a better than random or coin-tossing chances of coming out right when we predict by inductions.... Darwin‘s natural selection is a plausible partial explanation. (p.126-7)

Thus, those who try to interpret Quine as advocating the replacement thesis find themselves at great pains to try to reconcile the non-normative, causal-nomological explanatory project with Quine‘s body of work. Inevitably, they cannot reconcile these two elements, and paint Quine as not only having a profound lack of insight into the consequences of his own view, but as unrepentant long after several prominent philosophers make those consequences clear.

The Convergence Thesis The second interpretation of Quine goes under various names; The Weak Replacement Thesis, Psychologism, Ballpark Psychologism3, Cooperative Naturalism4, Epistemics20, and Virtue Epistemology21. For instance, Feldman tells readers that,4

…Cooperative Naturalism, holds that, while there are evaluative questions to pursue, empirical results from psychology concerning how we actually think and reason are essential or useful for making progress in addressing evaluative questions.

Kornblith similarly suggests that:3

This mutual readjustment will allow each discipline to advance at a more rapid rate than it would were it to proceed independently of the other. We may thus look forward to a long and fruitful relationship between philosophy and psychology. ... Even if we want to insist that revisions to our epistemological theories are always the product of a priori recognition of previous errors even when prompted by empirical results, it would be foolhardy to ignore this additional check on our a priori reasoning. (pp.10-13)

The central ideas in what I term the ―convergence thesis‖ are that:

Q1 Is naturalized epistemology autonomous? 1C Psychology does not replace Epistemology. Rather, the former is ―relevant‖ to the latter as an expedient.

Q2 Is naturalized epistemology normative? 2C Epistemology retains its normative character.

Q3 What results might one expect from naturalized epistemology? 3C Epistemology remains largely an armchair activity.

The idea behind 1C is simple: The belief-forming processes recommended by epistemology will, in the end, converge with processes empirically discovered by psychology. Or as Kornblith says,3

If the thesis under discussion is true, the psychology of belief acquisition and epistemology are two different fields, which ask different but equally legitimate questions and have different methodologies. In spite of these differences a complete (and true) psychology of belief acquisition will describe the same processes that a complete (and true) epistemology will prescribe. (p. 8)

Thus, 1C and 3C actually incorporate the idea that the psychology of belief formation need not be empirical--we could discover all the relevant facts about our belief-forming psychology through a priori philosophical investigation. Additionally, and equally suspect, 1C implies that the only area of overlap between epistemology and psychology consists in the discovery of belief-forming processes. Psychology, then, is irrelevant to discovering the nature of knowledge. Indeed, the naturalized epistemology literature after Quine is rife with such statements. Kornblith opines that,3 ―the claim that knowledge requires justified true belief is a mere truism.‖ (p.3) Goldman expresses similar thoughts in Epistemology and Cognition:20

(1) As the study of method, epistemology should be autonomous. It should be prior to the sciences; so it must not seek help from them. (2) Epistemology should only be concerned with the analysis of concepts, specifically epistemic concepts such as 'knowledge', 'warrant', 'rationality', and t he like. But conceptual or linguistic analysis is the province of philosophy; so epistemology needs no help from behavioral or social sciences. (3) The true aim of philosophy is to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle," that is, to dissolve puzzles and paradoxes that lead to skepticism. Such dissolution requires only linguistic analysis, not a model of the mind-brain or empirical models of intellectual influence. (4) Epistemology is the study of methodology, and proper methodology is the province of deductive logic, inductive logic, probability theory, and statistics. Epistemology reduces to these subjects, all of which are formal disciplines. Empirical sciences are not needed. (pp.1-2)

The combination of 1C and 3C raise serious troubles for the convergence thesis as an interpretation of Quine. To Quote Kim,1 ―Quine‘s proposal is more radical than that.‖ (p.388) Quine advocates the abandonment of traditional epistemology as practiced; he does not merely view psychology as an aid to epistemology in that it provides guidance to a priori philosophical theorizing. He likewise thinks that the methodologies of epistemology and psychology will overlap significantly. As Quine says,14 ―…better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned than to fabricate a fictitious structure to similar effect.‖ (p.78) The questions, then, I hope to answer in the next section of the paper are as follows: ―If Quine does not reject the normativity, what is he rejecting and why?‖ ―If he is not advocating a descriptive psychological project replace the epistemological one, what is the connection between epistemology and science?‖

Terminological Naturalism The final version of naturalized epistemology, and the least motivated by trying to understand Quine, goes under the headings of Naturalistic Accommodation11, Substantive Naturalism4, and Epistemic Supervenience1. Indeed, terminological naturalism is usually offered as alternative to Quine. For instance, Kim tells readers:1

But why should we think that there must be naturalistic criteria of justified belief and other terms of epistemic appraisal? If we take the discovery and systematization of such criteria to be the central task of normative epistemology, is there any reason to think that this task can be fruitfully pursued, that normative epistemology is a possible field of inquiry? ...The short answer is this: we believe in the supervenience of epistemic properties on naturalistic ones, and more generally, in the supervenience of all valuational and normative properties on naturalistic conditions. (p.50)

Feldman likewise suggests:4

Traditional epistemologists take these evaluative epistemological sentences to be objectively true or false, and thus they are committed to there being epistemological facts. The status and nature of these facts constitutes a second major issue falling under the heading of epistemological naturalism. ... Substantive epistemological naturalism is the view that all epistemic facts are natural facts. This is not informative unless it is supplemented with some account of what counts as a natural fact. One view is that the natural facts include all the facts that a complete science will acknowledge. Another way to characterize the natural facts is to provide a list of representative examples of the sorts of things that count as natural, with the hope that we have at least a reasonably good idea of what else might be included.

However, many epistemologists find a terminological interpretation of Quine plausible, and not without some superficial justification. I‘ll return to the difficulties with such an interpretation shortly. For now, I‘ll simply note that terminological naturalism is essentially analytical philosophy with a broadly physicalistic bent. The central tenets look something like this:

Q1 Is naturalized epistemology autonomous? 1T Psychology does not replace Epistemology, nor does Epistemology need to consult Psychology, though Epistemology is broadly naturalistic.

Q2 Is naturalized epistemology normative? 2T Epistemology retains its normative character.

Q3 What results might one expect from naturalized epistemology? 3T Epistemology remains largely an armchair activity of philosophical analysis. Its results will prove consistent with physicalistic theories.

The difficulties with terminological naturalism are straightforward. Quine rejects epistemology and analytical philosophy modeled on reductive analyses of meaning generally. Indeed, some philosophers suppose Quine‘s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction to be the primary motivation for Quine‘s epistemic view.10

In summary, each version of naturalized epistemology faces difficulties when considered as an interpretation of Quine. Each interpretation rests on sparse and/or problematic textual evidence. No interpretation offers a strong motivation for Quine‘s rejection of traditional epistemology. No interpretation offers a meaningful response to the skeptic. These interpretations either cannot reconcile Quine‘s rejection of epistemology as practiced with his seeming commitment to the normativity of epistemology, or they cannot reconcile his rejection of a robust analytic/synthetic distinction with reductionist naturalism. In short, each fails to respect Quine‘s general philosophical commitments and his corpus of work. In the next section I argue that such interpretive problems follow directly from the general misunderstanding of Quine‘s epistemological position.

3. Quine, Epistemology, and Science In this section I craft a conception of naturalized epistemology and defend it as a plausible interpretation of Quine‘s broad project. I anchor my interpretation of Quine in a slightly different place than any other commentator. I begin with the beginning of Quine‘s essay, specifically with his long analogy between the then relatively recent history of mathematics and the history of epistemology.

Quine‘s intellectual and professional life begins at a time when the formal tools of mathematics and logic appear to be progressing towards their fullest realization. Science flourishes, and to many people, the formal tools and the rigor of science, mathematics, and logic promise to offer insights into all areas of intellectual pursuit. Peano, Russell, and Whitehead shape Quine‘s thinking as an undergraduate. Graduate studies at Harvard, further expose Quine to Whitehead, then chair at Harvard, and to Russell. In 1936, the young Quine returns from studying with Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap, and Alfred Tarski. However, by 1969, when Quine publishes ―Epistemology Naturalized,‖ he is grappling with the limitations of the tools he has studied all his life and the failure of the many projects that had seemed so powerful and close to completion in those earlier years. Those projects trace their lineage to Euclid, and include the axiomatization of mathematics as well as the rational reconstruction of science.

Thus, I think the key to understanding Quine is really Gödel, Reichenbach, Tarski, and Turing as much as Hume, Carnap, or his oft-quoted references to psychology. Quine sees in Gödel‘s incompleteness theorem a repudiation of the unbounded power of subjective certainty to function as an independent means (epistemically and ontologically autonomous) of knowing about the world. As Quine explains,18

…Whitehead and Russell's … heroic project was to clarify the whole intricate structure of classical mathematics by deriving its principal concepts, step by step and definition after definition, from a slender basis of clear and simple primitive terms, and deriving its principal laws pari passu from a few postulates.

Such a project had seemed feasible because of the revolutionary advances in logic in the latter half of the nineteenth century, at the hands mainly of Gottlob Frege, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Giuseppe Peano. Progress in clarifying basic mathematical concepts had already been made by Richard Dedekind, George Cantor, and, again and especially, Frege and Peano. …

So mathematical truth is logical truth, they reasoned, and hence all of it must be logically deducible from self-evident logical truths. This is wrong, as transpires in part from Kurt Gödel's paper of 1931 and in part from findings by Russell himself away back in 1902. (pp.8-9)

For Quine, Hume22, 23, Gödel24, Turing25, and Tarski26 all converge upon a common result; all constructions of any sophistication based exclusively upon subjective certainty in intuition and immediate experience prove either inconsistent or incomplete.14

Moreover, we know from Gödel's work that no consistent axiom system can cover mathematics even when we renounce self-evidence. Reduction in the foundations of mathematics remains mathematically and philosophically fascinating, but it does not do what the epistemologist would like of it: It does not reveal the ground of mathematical knowledge, it does not show how mathematical certainty is possible. … Just as mathematics is to be reduced to logic, or logic and set theory, so natural knowledge is to be based somehow on sense experience. This means explaining the notion of body in sensory terms; here is the conceptual side. And it means justifying our knowledge of truths of nature in sensory terms; here is the doctrinal side of the bifurcation. (pp.70-71)

And18

…we know from Gödel's incompleteness theorem that every consistent proof procedure is bound to leave infinitely many closed sentences of classical mathematics indemonstrable and irrefutable. A stronger proof procedure will catch more of them, but never all. Nor can we banish the outliers, even by acquiescing in a heroically complex gerrymandering of grammar; for there is no way in general of knowing which ones they are. Should we declare them meaningful but neither true nor false? This only puts a name to the predicament while complicating the logic.

I see nothing for it but to make our peace with the situation. We may simply concede that every statement in our language is true or false, but recognize that in these cases the choice between truth and falsity is indifferent both to our working conceptual apparatus and to nature as reflected in observation categoricals. (pp.56-57)

And27

In the light of Gödel's result it is quite implausible that all truths of elementary number theory are, like the logical truths, absolutely demonstrable in our sense, derivable from self-evident truths by self-evident steps. Inasmuch as number theory is embedded in set theory Gödel's result has this consequence for set theory a fortiori.

Thus, it seems that mathematics generally (including geometry and number theory as well as set theory) is from an evidential point of view more like physics and less Iike logic than was once supposed. On the whole the truths mathematics can be deduced not from self-evident axioms, but only from hypotheses which, like those of natural science are to be judged by the plausibility of their consequences. (p.46)

It is not surprising, if viewed this way, that Quine seems to write-off the doctrinal project so completely and so quickly:14 ―The Humean predicament is the human predicament.‖ (p.72) In ―Epistemology Naturalized,‖ Quine attempts to understand the ramifications of the results of Gödel, Tarski, Turing as well as Carnap, Hume, and Quine, and to determine how best to continue his research. It is, ironically, the skepticism born of the dreams of his intellectual fathers that prompts the positive views Quine espouses. For Quine, certainty of intuition and of immediate experience necessarily creates incomplete or inconsistent world views--whether those experiences are certainty of what we might call logical intuition or the certainty of immediate sensory experience. Indeed, Quine‘s famous line,14 ―the most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasion actually to observe,‖ (p.74) is nothing more than what he thought Hume discovered and Carnap merely reaffirmed–the construction of objects from the certainty of immediate experience is doomed to incompleteness or inconsistency.

However, Quine does not abandon certainty. Rather, he recognizes (some of) its limitations. He tells readers that,28

In what way then do I see the Humean predicament as persisting? Only in the fallibility of prediction: the fallibility of induction and the hypothetico-deductive method in anticipating experience. (p.474)

In short, epistemology must proceed without exclusive reliance on certainty.

However, the picture regarding certainty and its ramification for epistemology proves more complex than indicated above. Quine sees incompleteness coming in two ways: On the doctrinal side, axiomatizations are possible, but necessarily incomplete. On the conceptual side, axiomatizations (in the form of definitions) are incomplete because the certainty of immediate experience provides one with no axioms—no definitions. He says,14

In giving up hope of such translation, then, the empiricist is conceding that the empirical meanings of typical statements about the external world are inaccessible and ineffable.

How is this inaccessibility to be explained? Simply on the ground that the experiential implications of a typical statement about bodies are too complex for finite axiomatization, however lengthy? No; I have a different explanation. It is that the typical statement about bodies has no fund of experiential implications it can call its own. (pp.78-79)

Thus, Quine follows Hume when he asserts that,22

The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. (section I, part I, ¶21)

I think the above helps to bring the significance of language into focus, and the difficulties with terminological naturalism to the forefront. I suggest that Quine assigns great significance to semantics in such passages as,14

It was sad for epistemologists, Hume and others, to have to acquiesce in the impossibility of strictly deriving the science of the external world from sensory evidence. Two cardinal tenets of empiricism remained unassailable, however, and so remain to this day. One is that whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence. The other, to which I shall recur, is that all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence. (p.75 See also pp.89-90)

Axiomatization in mathematics requires definitions to link the formal language to the domain. For example, Euclid‘s geometry needs definitions of points, lines, etc.. Likewise, one must link scientific theory to the world through definitions. However, Quine clearly sees the reductive goals of terminological naturalism as impossible. Neither rational intuition nor immediate experience provides such definitions. Yet, for Quine, humans obviously generate theory and test it against the world. If rational intuition and immediate experience do not provide such definitions, then one must seek to understand how such definitions emerge in actual practice understood through technical developments (like set theory) and observations.

Perhaps if Quine had further reflected upon Euclid, Descartes, Cantor, and Hegel, Quine would have devalued certainty even further. Hegel‘s famous pronouncement regarding the number of planets, i.e., they must be prime29, Descartes‘ certainty regarding, for instance, his causal maxim30, and Euclid‘s parallel lines hypothesis are all examples of subjective certainty leading reasoners into false views. Quine seems to view such failures, not as failures of certainty, but as failures to properly evaluate one‘s level of subjective confidence. For instance, in Web of Belief, Quine opines,27 ―one lesson of these paradoxes is that self-evidence is not to be attributed lightly.‖ (p.45)

Empirical results regarding overconfidence likewise give one pause. (For instance, see 31-38). Regardless, recognizing (some of) the inherent limitations of certainty has three general consequences for Quine. First, he realizes that science cannot rely upon certainty of intuition and immediate experience alone in its ambitious project to know the nature and operations of the world. Second, and of greater importance, Quine realizes that ontological/metaphysical and epistemic neutrality promised by certainty for epistemology proves chimerical given certainty‘s limitations.

Descartes holds that certainty both compels assent to judgments and allows one to know. For Descartes, those things about which one is certain are true without epistemic assumptions and no matter the constitution of the world.30, 39 Hence, Descartes30 presents readers with a relatively unreflective adoption of his principle of accent. (M1, ¶2) Certainty thereby, as Descartes30 famously suggests, provides an Archimedean fulcrum providing insight into the nature of reality free from any presuppositions about reality. (M2, ¶1) Descartes makes skeptical doubts legitimate and answerable on this view because inquiries into the nature of mind and knowledge can, through the attainment of certainty, provide a response holding true in any world--actual or possible. Third, the skeptical methodology of hyperbolic doubt appears legitimate, even attractive, precisely because people imprudently assume that certainty supplies one with an ontologically neutral, epistemically innocent, and sufficiently strong basis for constructing world views.

Certainty proves inadequate to this task. Moreover, the methodology of hyperbolic doubt does not, in fact, constitute epistemology without ontology. To wit, skeptical scenarios challenge knowledge claims by challenging the epistemic merit of those claims given certain metaphysical/ontological possibilities. Certainty would provide epistemic credentials valid in any actual or possible world, thereby providing an answer to the skeptic that has superlative epistemic credentials–even within the skeptic‘s suggested possible world. How do I know that I exist? Cogitio Ergo Sum...I cannot doubt my existence, or even be deceived about, it unless I exist. Such an answer holds in the evil demon world as well as in the actual world.

For Quine, I suggest, his positive views flow from his reconsidering the nature of skeptical questions, and the power of subjective certainty, specifically Descartes‘ own maxim:30

I ought to withhold my assent just as carefully from what is not obviously certain and indubitable as from what is obviously false, I can justify my rejection of my beliefs if I can find some ground for doubt in each. (M1 ¶2)

In practice, Descartes‘ above-quoted assertion has led to the following methodology: If one can conceive of an alternative ontology/metaphysics whereby the evidence for one‘s belief is misleading (i.e., the evidence remains the same subjectively, but the belief is false), then one should reject the belief. Quine faults epistemology for this methodology. He faults traditional epistemology because certainty cannot build a world view, and because hyperbolic doubt asks us, in effect, not to neutrally evaluate our beliefs, but to evaluate our beliefs from within every conceivable ontology as if each of these ontologies were equally relevant. Skeptical arguments are thus not ontologically neutral. Rather, each skeptical hypothesis contains the strong epistemic and ontological claims: Conceivability is possibility; Possibilities are all equally relevant alternatives to the current world (or my current understanding of the world). Traditional epistemologists might object that relevance is not a metaphysical claim. I deny the neutrality of relevance claims; I would assert that if one claims that one is not presupposing any ontological principles, then one has no means of determining the relevance of dimly conceived alternative ontologies—certainly not the standard means, i.e., distance from the actual world.

Instead, skeptical arguments assume an ontology of immediate sensation. Dreaming or evil demon hypotheses, skeptics claim, are not merely nomologically consistent with this ontology of immediate sensation, but as likely as any other hypothesis to be the complementary portion of the ontology of immediate sensation. For now, I‘ll just note that the skeptic does almost nothing to establish this claim. Later, I‘ll argue that, as normally formulated, the claim seems false.

Tie this in with Quine‘s disagreement with Carnap, especially the idea that conceptual frameworks dictate ontological commitments. That is, one cannot theorize or doubt without a framework [Carnap‘s term], and one cannot adopt a framework without adopting ontological commitments.

To understand what I mean, let me step back a moment and introduce a hopefully helpful metaphor. Suppose that you ask a mechanic if he can fix your car. He answers ―yes.‖ To which you respond, ―ah, but suppose that ‗cars‘ refers to something else, possibly nothing at all, and the same for your ‗tools,‘ and your ‗abilities‘; suppose that they could be quite different from your understanding of them--could you still fix my car?‖ Our hypothetical mechanic might punch you or he might simply walk away, but what he will not, and ought not, do is try to establish his mechanic‘s prowess by showing that no matter what cars are, tools are, and he is, he can fix cars. His status as a mechanic in this world is not diminished by his status in other vaguely imaginable worlds.

On my view, Quine sees the same absurd ontological/metaphysical requirements in the skeptical methodology practiced in epistemology. If one translates Descartes into the modern epistemic framework, one‘s mental states are justified or count as knowledge only in so far as these states would prove true either regardless of the nature of the world, the nature of our minds, and the nature of the possible interactions between the two or because those states reveal the impossibility of these alternatives. As Stroud aptly describes it,2

The traditional Cartesian examination aims at an assessment of all our knowledge of the world all at once, and it takes the form of a judgment on that knowledge made from what looks like a detached 'external' position. (p.2)

However, unlike Stroud, Quine does not follow Descartes‘ reasoning:2

All possible evidence is ultimately sensory...... it cannot be denied that any particular course of sensory experience could fail to give us reliable information as to how things are; the world can be different from the way it is perceived to be. ... If all our knowledge of the world around us is in question all at once we cannot then help ourselves to some independently reliable information about the world, as we usually do, to settle the question whether our present course of experience is or is not on this occasion a reliable guide to the way things are. (p.209)

Of course, in practice, each skeptical argument invokes a particular ontology/metaphysics, and this is what Quine realized. Skeptical hypotheses really ask one to evaluate (or perhaps to vindicate) the epistemic status of one‘s mental states in light of a particular ontology/metaphysics. Quine does not object to entertaining alternative ontologies, nor does he object to evaluating the impact of such ontologies on the epistemic status of our beliefs. Rather he objects to the claim that such ontologies and evaluations are always relevant to evaluating the epistemic status of our beliefs—relevant to the point of providing sufficient reasons to deny the epistemic status of beliefs. I suggest that such a line of reasoning best elucidates Quine‘s claim that…15

For the theory of knowledge has its origin in doubt, in scepticism. Doubt is what prompts us to try to develop a theory of knowledge. Furthermore, doubt is also the first step to take in developing a theory of knowledge, if we adopt the line of Descartes.

But this is only half of a curious interplay between doubt and knowledge. Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes; but knowledge, also, was what prompted the doubt. Scepticism is an offshoot of science. … The positing of bodies is already rudimentary physical science; and it is only after that stage that the sceptic's invidious distinctions can make sense. (p.67)

External world skepticism really asks one to vindicate the epistemic status of one‘s beliefs in light every conceivable (i.e., with weak internal consistency) ontology/metaphysics as if those ontologies were equally viable. As Quine notes, such an evaluation/vindication would stand as a tremendous intellectual triumph, were it possible. But, its relevance to the epistemic status of one‘s beliefs given the actual nature of one‘s mind, the world, and mind-world interactions remains far from clear. An atomic bomb will kill a fly, but it‘s not necessarily preferable to a fly swatter.

One might object that Quine begs the question by assuming the external world. But, Quine would deny such an assertion. It is true that our understanding presupposes a commitment, but to have a commitment does not beg the question if one remains open to revising or abandoning that commitment in the face of devastating flaws or superior alternatives, as I‘ll discuss later.14

This interplay is reminiscent again of the old threat of circularity, but it is all right now that we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from sense data. We are after an understanding of science as an institution or process in the world, and do not intend that understanding to be any better than the science which is its object. (pp.82-82)

Quine realized, albeit with sadness, that one bases one‘s important evaluation of the epistemic status of one‘s mental states upon one‘s best theory about the nature of human minds, the world, and the interactions between the two. It is this view, I suggest, that informs his famous (or infamous) quote:15

... skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. ... Epistemology is best looked upon, then as an enterprise within natural science. Cartesian doubt is not the way to begin. (p.68)

And28

Stroud finds difficulty in reconciling my naturalistic stance with my concern with how we gain our knowledge of the world. We may stimulate a psychological subject and compare his resulting beliefs with the facts as we know them; this much Stroud grants, but he demurs at our projecting ourselves into the subject's place, since we no longer have the independent facts to compare with. My answer is that this projection must be seen not transcendentally but as a routine matter of analogies and causal hypotheses within our scientific theory. True, we must hedge the perhaps too stringent connotations of the verb 'know'; but such is fallibilism. (p.474)

And28

Thus, in keeping with my naturalism, I am reasoning within the overall scientific system rather than somehow above or beyond it. The same applies to my statement, quoted by Stroud, that "I am not accusing the sceptic of begging the question; he is quite within his rights in assuming science in order to refute science.‖ [Stroud, p.3] The skeptic repudiates science because it is vulnerable to illusion on its own showing; and my only criticism of the skeptic is that he is overreacting. (p.475)

One can thus fruitfully contrast the epistemic pictures of Quine and Descartes with regard to humanity as follows: Descartes views the goal of epistemology as distancing oneself from all ontological commitments via hyperbolic doubt. The resulting picture is one where all knowledge must follow with complete certainty from the modifications of one‘s own mind by operations comprehended in their totality in a single instant. Quine, in contrast, sees humanity as unable to escape ontological presuppositions for the purposes of epistemic reflection. Humanity must, instead, make a forced choice among a limited range of ontological suppositions. While certainty still plays a diminished role, epistemic theorizing occurs against a background of ontological supposition. To be clear, Quine denies the power of subjective certainty, both in intuition and immediate experience, to serve as the sole tool with which one builds world views. He does not, as I do, doubt the epistemic integrity and ontological neutrality of subjective certainty.

4. Quininean Epistemology Suppose, then, that one follows Quine and pursues a naturalized epistemology. What would one do? Quine himself seems rather vague and programmatic when he discusses naturalized epistemology, offering only general guidelines such as,18 ―it seems natural at this point to follow the same maxim that natural scientists habitually follow in framing new hypotheses, namely, simplicity: economy of structure and ontology.‖ (p.56) Quine devotes much of the last half of the 1969 paper to speculation as to the impact of his suggestions. The epistemic literature, I suggest, shows that Quine‘s quotable comments have been more influential than either his paper or his subsequent work in shaping the general perception of the goals and methodology of naturalized epistemology.

Quine‘s own epistemic activities are well-known, though often ignored in speculating as to the nature of the naturalized epistemology he envisioned. Quine primarily pursues two general projects. He outlines a general coherentist view which includes a component of evidential prioritization and ontological commitment. He works on language and language-acquisition as a means to understanding the relation between observation and scientific theory. It is in this second project that he likely sees the true project of naturalized epistemology or, at least, his contribution thereto:14

It is no shock to the preconceptions of old Vienna to say that epistemology now becomes semantics. For epistemology remains centered as always on evidence, and meaning remains centered as always on verification; and evidence is verification. (p.89)

In essence, my position is simply that Quine thought that epistemology ought to continue to pursue its traditional projects. As Quine notes,14

But I think that at this point it may be more useful to say that epistemology still goes on, though in a new and a clarified status. (p.82)

Of course, Quine limits his conception of epistemology to those aspects of the project of rational reconstruction to which he feels one can still make important inroads. I have a gentleman‘s disagreement with Quine on this issue. So, I depart from Quine slightly by following one of his heroes–Hume. Quine and I agree that by advocating traditional projects, one does not say that epistemology will continue a priori speculation as to the nature of knowledge, nor does it attempt to derive all knowledge of the external world exclusively from the certainty of intuition and immediate experience. Rather, the traditional epistemology to which I refer is the tradition including elements of Plato‘s Theaetetus, Locke‘s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Hume‘s A Treatise of Human Nature, and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. [See 40 and 18 for discussions of this tradition.] Specifically, epistemology continues to seek the answer to three questions posited in some form or another by each of the British Empiricists:

(1) What is the nature of knowledge?

(2) What are the sources of knowledge for humans and others?

(3) What are the limitations of knowledge for humans and others?

The first of these questions exhausts traditional epistemology for many philosophers. An adequate answer to the first question would tell one what sorts of things can be or are knowledge, what sort of properties differentiate instances of knowledge from epistemically inferior entities, the virtues of knowledge, and so on. The Quininean Epistemologist remains very much concerned with the nature and value of knowledge. However, researchers must forward theories of knowledge informed by a systematic empirical attempt to understand the nature and goals of human cognition. In this way, naturalized epistemology, I suggest, bears as much or more affinity with Locke as with Hume.

The second and third questions have some currency under the title of applied epistemology, though thinking on these topics remains dominated by skepticism. An adequate answer to the second question, tells one the sources for human knowledge, how these sources give one knowledge, if these sources would provide knowledge for other creatures, how one could tell if other sources were potential sources of knowledge for some creatures, etc.. I mean sources here in a larger sense than mere carriers of information, included among sources are methods and cognitive processes. Applied epistemology seeks to understand both the nature and limits of natural cognitive processes. But it also asks how best to augment, amend, replace, or even sidestep that list. A subset of significant works in this areas includes among other things:

Perception: Bach y Rita,41, 42 Biederman,43 Davis,44 Findlay,45 Goldberg,46 Goodale,47-50 Hollingworth,51, 52 Hubel,53, 54 Lee,55 and Marr56

Learning and Memory: Aggleton,57 Atkinson,58 Baddeley,59 Bayley,60 Bayliss,61 Cohen,62 Daw,63 Doya,64 Jacoby,65 Kandel,66 Knowlton,67 Loftus,68 Nakahara,69 Postma,70 Reber,71 Schacter,72 Squire,73, 74 Steidl,75 and Yin76

Reasoning: Bechara,77 Brehmer,78 Burton,31 Carroll,79 Damasio,80 Dawes,81 Epley,82 Faust,83 Fischoff,32, 33 Gigerenzer,84 Gilovich,85 Hamill,86 Hastie,87 Kahneman,88-91 Kokis,92 Lichtenstein,93, 94 Meehl,95 Oskamp,34 Plous,35, 96 Risen,97, 98 Sá,99 Slovic,36-38 Stanovich,100-107 and West108

Social Cognition: Bargh,109-111 Eibach,112 Kruger,113 Mason,114 Pronin,115 Ross,116 and Williams,117

Introspection and Subjective Certainty: Bull,118 Dunning,119 Ehrlinger,120 Kruger,121, 122 Moore,123 Nisbett,124 Williams,125 and Wilson125-129

Readers may perceive the above lengthy list as self-indulgent, or as a failed attempt at exhaustiveness and/or definitiveness. To the contrary, my point here twofold: First, I wish to emphasize the tremendous resources to which only a handful of epistemologists avail themselves. Second, I note that this handful of epistemologists, though admirable in their efforts, avail themselves of only a handful of these resources.

Finally, an answer to the third question would tell one what, if anything, humans cannot know, and what conditions would prevent knowledge. Answering the third question also addresses the nature and limitations of human methods and cognitive processes. Included among the findings in this third area are the results which I claim shape Quine‘s intellectual perspective: Gödel‘s incompleteness proofs24 [Note: the second incompleteness theorem, the one normally presented as Gödel‘s theorem required formalization of the first theorem and seems to have been first rigorously proven in 130], Russell‘s criticism of Cantor‘s naïve set theory131, the Church/Turing proof that the halting problem has no universal solution25, 132, and Tarski‘s theorem that one cannot define arithmetic truth within arithmetic 26. Also included in these findings are works like Kyberg133, and such empirical works as Davis44, Dawes, Faust, and Meehl81, Hastie and Dawes87, Meehl95, Nisbett and Wilson124, Oskamp34, Stanovich, Davidson, and Sternberg,102, 106 Stanovich and West,104, 105, 107 and Tversky and Kahneman134.

Though the epistemology I outline here has broader contours than the normal practices of many epistemologists, its true point of divergence from the ―traditional‖ epistemological project lies in the nature of its methods and the scope of its results. Quininean epistemology pursues the answers to the three questions above against the background of the ontology and general understanding of science (i.e., rational inquiry). Its results are likewise contingent upon the supposition of that same scientific ontology. Thus, Quine‘s statements that14

....such scruples against circularity have little point once we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from observations. If we are simply to understand the link between observation and science, we are well advised to use any available information, including that provided by the very science whose link with observation we are seeking to understand. (p.76)

And14

The old epistemology aspired to contain, in a sense, natural science; it would construct it somehow from sense data. Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology. But the old containment remains valid too, in its way. We are studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his physics from his data, and we appreciate that our position in the world is just like his. (p.83)

And17

in recognizing that the skeptical challenge springs from science itself, and that in coping with it we are free to use scientific knowledge. The old epistemologist failed to recognize the strength of his position. (p.3)

And15

The positing of bodies is already rudimentary physical science; and it is only after that stage that the sceptic's invidious distinctions can make sense. Bodies have to be posited before there can be a motive, however tenuous, for acquiescing in a non-committal world of the immediate given. (p.67)

If one supposes, as I believe Quine does, that neither the skeptic nor the epistemologist will attain ontologically independent results, then one must pursue one‘s inquiries in the context of the best ontology one has available. One understands one‘s results as contingent upon this ontology, but one has no realistic reason to desire more. Nor does one need to abandon one‘s views—that is, unless and until it becomes clear that alternative undermining ontologies are relevant, i.e., truly as plausible as the one to which one has tied one‘s current understanding. I‘ll return to this point later in defending Quine.

As Quine notes in his reply to Stroud:28

Experience might, tomorrow, take a turn that would justify the sceptic's doubts about external objects. Our success in predicting observations might fall off sharply, and concomitantly with this we might begin to be somewhat successful in basing predictions upon dreams or reveries. At that point we might reasonably doubt our theory of nature in even its broadest outlines. But our doubts would still be immanent, and of a piece with the scientific endeavor.28 (p.475)

Contrary to common supposition, Quine does not intend that epistemology merely read its results off psychology. Quine suggests this at times, but I think it is incorrect to suppose that he has deep commitments to epistemology as psychology‘s toady. Indeed, even the psychology of human judgment abilities is not exclusively engaged in discovering human reasoning processes without interest in epistemic norms. Equally important, Quine thought that all of science may prove relevant at various points to one‘s inquiry, and that researchers will pursue inquiry at various levels of abstraction. For instance, as Quine tells readers:17

For we can fully grant the truth of natural science and still raise the question, within natural science, how it is that man works up his command of that science from the limited impingements that are available to his sensory surfaces. This is a question of empirical psychology, but it may be pursued at one or more removes from the laboratory, one or another level of speculativity. (p.3)

I should summarize Quininean Epistemology, or alternatively what I call ―Effective Epistemic Agency Under Uncertainty,‖ as I‘ve done with the other interpretations:

Q1 Is naturalized epistemology autonomous? 1Q Epistemology seeks to understand the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge in the ontological/metaphysical context of science generally, but especially in the context of such disciplines as the history of human inquiry, sociology of science, neuroscience, linguistics, and psychology.

Q2 Is naturalized epistemology normative? 2Q Epistemology retains a normative character in that it seeks to understand the goals of cognition and the processes involved in human cognition with an eye to a prescriptive understanding of the processes and methodologies used by cognizers as well as the ones that should be used by cognizers.

Q3 What results might one expect from naturalized epistemology? 3Q Epistemology formulates hypotheses as to the goals and processes of cognition as well as the best fashion to proceed in theory generation against a background commitment to ontological theory.

5. Defending Quine In my final section I offer a brief defense of Quininean Epistemology against the more common objections to naturalized epistemology. Specifically, I try to answer the following questions:

O1. Why (and how) favor the scientific ontology over any of the infinite possible ontologies consistent with the evidence?

O2. Isn‘t naturalized epistemology blatantly circular or changing the subject in a blatantly unmotivated manner– maybe even both?

Why favor the scientific ontology over any of the infinite possible ontologies consistent with the evidence?

The sort of objection lurking in O1 is explicit in many commentaries on Quine. For instance, Stroud2 opines that,

...I argued that the sceptical reasoning does not turn directly on the simple fact that illusions sometimes occur. That alone does not imply that we know nothing about the world around us. The sceptical conclusion comes only with the realization that everything we get through the senses is compatible with countless different 'hypotheses' about what is the case beyond those sensory data, so there is no way of telling which of the many different possibilities actually obtains. (p.231-2 my italics)

And2

But whether scepticism is the correct answer to the epistemological question is not something to be settled by further observation or experimentation. If the question is posed correctly--as Quine himself poses it--we already know that whatever future experience might be like, it can only give us more of what will remain laughably meagre sensory data relative to our rich set of beliefs about the world around us. We will always be faced with the question of whether we have any more reason for adopting the physical object 'hypothesis' rather than anyone of a hundred others that equally go beyond all possible data. (p. 232-3) and2

The results of an independently-pursued scientific explanation of knowledge would be in the same boat. They would be 'scientific' versions of Moore's 'common sense' remarks. But if we feel that the philosophical question is not and could not be answered directly in Moore's simple way (as I think we do), we should also find that it cannot be answered by apparently more scientific assertions to the same effect. The scientific story is not more true or more highly confirmed or more clearly based on experience than what Moore says; it is just more complicated. For Quine‘s science is self-conscious common sense' (WO, 3). (p.234) and2

Countless ‗hypotheses‘ or ‗theories‘ could be ‗projected‘ from those same slender ‗data‘, so if we happen to accept one such ‗theory‘ over others it cannot be because of any objective superiority it enjoys over possible or actual competitors. (248)

Rea suggests a more general naturalist‘s dilemma along similar lines:135

To regard naturalism as a thesis, then, is to suppose that what is really central to naturalism is dogmatic adherence to some view in metaphysics, epistemology, or methodology-such that if the view in question were overthrown by science, naturalists would not retrench, rather they would be refuted. But if that supposition is correct, naturalism is dissonant. For dogmatic adherence to any thesis of metaphysics, epistemology, or methodology is in direct tension with the sort of respect for science and disposition to follow science wherever it leads that Iies at the heart of the naturalist tradition? …

To avoid dissonance, then, naturalism must be characterized as something other than a thesis [research program, stance, value, etc.]. …

In characterizing naturalism as a research program, I have rendered it immune to a variety of objections. It is not a thesis, so it is not refutable. … Research programs can have consequences-the consequences of a research program are just those theses to which one is rationally committed by virtue of adopting the research program fully, consistently, and competently. But research programs do not, strictly speaking, imply anything. So one can't refute naturalism by showing that it entails a falsehood. (pp.108-109)

As I‘ve portrayed Quine, he really offers a relevant alternatives view against the skeptic. Given this fact, it seems appropriate that Quine offer a viable view of relevance for alternatives which excludes the skeptic‘s ontologies in favor of science. Unfortunately, as I read Quine, his efforts in this regard are woefully opaque. Most often, Quine merely points to science‘s standards in a rather oblique fashion. He discusses humanity‘s commitment to rudimentary physical science in ways that falsely suggest he views the skeptical hypothesis as likewise committed to such an ontology. Furthermore, Quine often appears to suggest that conservativism about belief revision and simplicity gives one license to reject skeptical ontologies. There is an inherent belief-revision- conservativism in the relevant alternatives approach I attribute to Quine. One uses what one sees as the best theory unless and until other alternatives rise to the level of plausibility necessary to become relevant. However, in light of confirmation bias and belief perseverance, I have deep suspicions as to the epistemic virtues of any conservativism about belief revision that extends beyond the basic view I‘ve just outlined. I do believe, however, that Quine and I can do a better job of specifying a relevant alternatives response to the skeptic. At least, I‘ll try.

First, I think the skeptical hypotheses, as commonly forwarded are not particularly viable alternatives to science on rather flat-footed grounds. I‘ll offer only two objections, both of which are directed at the evil demon hypothesis: SR1 Skeptical ontologies are, at least as commonly formulated, falsified, and SR2 skeptical ontologies explain and predict very little, and are thus not nearly as empirically adequate as their scientific rivals.

Consider the evil demon hypothesis as Descartes presents it:

I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me;.... 30

The evil demon, it is commonly asserted, acts to make all of one‘s beliefs about the external world false. Yet, it is this potential for universal falsehood that raises difficulties for the evil demon hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts the falsity of ALL of one‘s beliefs about the external world. However, in order to make sense of the evil demon scenario, one must have certain beliefs, beliefs which would be true on the evil demon scenario--thereby falsifying its central prediction. Such beliefs violate the very supposition of the evil demon hypothesis. For example:

―It‘s possible that this red object is not really exactly as I perceive it.‖

―It is at least remotely possible that I am wrong in many of my beliefs about the external world.‖

―Sensory experience does not rule out an evil demon with complete and utter certainty.‖

―Many of my experiences in the past seem to exhibit regular patterns.‖

So, the very nature of the beliefs one must find plausible in order to find the evil demon hypothesis remotely plausible, are beliefs, the falsehood of which is predicted by the evil demon hypothesis–beliefs that most open- minded people likely hold. This is not to say that no appropriately qualified version of the evil demon hypothesis could predict all and only the right false beliefs. I suspect that such a version would prove wildly ad hoc, but as Quine says...the naturalized epistemologist does not dogmatically assert the existence of an external world exactly as science describes it:

Experience might, tomorrow, take a turn that would justify the sceptic's doubts about external objects. Our success in predicting observations might fall off sharply, and concomitantly with this we might begin to be somewhat successful in basing predictions upon dreams or reveries. At that point we might reasonably doubt our theory of nature in even its broadest outlines. But our doubts would still be immanent, and of a piece with the scientific endeavor. 28

My point is simply that the versions of the evil demon hypothesis commonly offered by philosophers as relevant alternatives in epistemology are not remotely adequate to the task. Skeptics travel quite quickly from a very weak sense of conceivability, to ontological possibility, to relevant alternative. I suspect, as did Quine, that this ease of movement is greased by an unwarranted confidence in the power and ontological/epistemic neutrality of subjective certainty. If one thinks that certainty provides one with a way to step outside of the limitations of one‘s own perspective thereby discovering the ontological irrelevancy of such scenarios, one will be less worried or suspicious about allowing them. Likewise, such scenarios benefit from the feature of human thought whereby one will find possibilities more probable when one is told a story (or even imagines a story) about how those possibilities could come to be. [See for example, 79] Thus, people find the possibility of the universal failure of our cognitive systems more probable when given a story, even if the story itself is very vague and unlikely.

Turning next to the explanatory and predictive adequacy of skeptical hypotheses; here again Hume proves helpful to Quine and myself. The evil demon hypothesis has at least one of the same difficulties raised by Hume with regard to the teleological argument for the existence of a benevolent God, i.e., rational, even if evil, choice always requires explanation via the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore, such explanations only raise more difficult questions regarding reasons for which no obvious answer emerges:

What‘s up with this evil demon‘s perpetual obsession with creating false beliefs?!

If the evil demon wishes only to cause false beliefs, why these sensations and regularities as opposed to others?

Why regularities at all?

Why isn‘t evil better served by totally disorientating people?

How can this omni-malicious being allow for sensations of pleasure and fulfillment?!

Given that causing pain would be a greater imperfection that causing false beliefs, and that causing painful experiences and false beliefs that one isn‘t having painful experiences would be a lesser evil, wouldn‘t the evil demon create painful experiences with true beliefs about one‘s pain?

I don‘t consider the above questions and objections particularly profound. In a way, that is my point. The skeptic has always considered himself and herself exempt from even superficial requirements of plausibility, predictive power, etc.. Indeed, I would suggest that the notion of conceivable alternative operative in most skeptical arguments is little more than superficial internal consistency. In fact, I am often struck by philosophy professors who rail against intelligent design in the hallway and then pontificate on the pernicious and inescapable mental prisons of evil demons in the classroom.

As Quine aptly recognizes, these details only come into relief once one steps out of the mind set wherein skeptical hypotheses make no ontological claims, and in which certainty provides one with ontological and epistemic neutrality and universality. Philosophers--either by selection or education--seem to me particularly prone to making decisions on the basis of possibilities, the relevance of which are totally unknown. I‘ve often seen philosophers argue that something ought or not ought to be done because of some possible outcome without any consideration as to the likelihood, i.e., the relevance, of that outcome. ―The Dean might not like that,‖ is treated as data in departmental decisions without ever bothering simply to ask the Dean.

My brief list of relevancy considerations makes no pretensions towards completeness. However, for my part, I‘ll move on to worries about circularity, question-begging, and the epistemic relevance of empirical considerations. Specifically, I wish to discuss the dual objections made by asking, O2 above.

Isn’t naturalized epistemology blatantly circular or changing the subject in a blatantly unmotivated manner–maybe even both?

On my reading of Quine does not want to change the subject in the sense that he still recommends that theorists attend to the same sorts of epistemological questions that had occupied them previously. Likewise, while Quine rejects the methodology that would try to transfer the certainty of intuitive judgments and immediate experience to large portions of our world view. But here, again, he is neither alone, nor without reasons for his view. Indeed, as I suggested, the orientation of naturalized epistemology is far from uncommon in the history of philosophy. Nor is Quine‘s suggestion unmotivated. Quine actually sees his position as based upon, not merely the failure of Hume and Carnap, but upon theoretical results in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. Gödel rigorously demonstrates Hume‘s earlier thesis--that certainty proves inadequate to even the most basic of world building. Likewise, for Quine the augmentation of intuition with the certainty of immediate experience proves no more robust; immediate experience provides one with no continuity between experiences and no intrinsic demarcations within experience.

What of the alleged circularity in Quine‘s arguments? How could Quine possibly escape the charge that he is being circular?! There are, I think, two circularity concerns that one might raise for Quine. 1. Does Quine‘s rejection of external world skepticism amount to nothing more than dogmatically assuming the external world? 2. Can Quine justify any of his epistemic principles in a manner which is non-circular?

I think that the first concern is relatively straightforward. Quine does not answer the skeptic simply by asserting the existence of the external world. Rather Quine tells readers that the hypothesis of the external world is merely the most relevant of the alternatives presently available in the project of asking and answering epistemic questions. The move here is a shift from ultimate justification to constrained hypothesis formation: given that we wish to understand the relationship between theory and evidence, and such an understanding requires ontological commitments, we must ask, ―which of the ontological commitments available to us seem the most relevant ones upon which to base our further speculation?‖ Science helps one to understand how one might generate a veridical science, so science contains epistemology. But, epistemology also contains science in that, ideally, epistemology supports to some extent, the conditional veridicality of science–veridicality conditional on the processes and ontology specified within science. Such a mutual containment, unlike an externalist (to science) justification, makes the epistemic justification of science relative to a specific ontological context, i.e, the world as described by science. This is less beautiful than the original project, but it is rendered necessary once one understands that there is no stepping out of an ontology, either to ask epistemic questions or to answer them.

So long as one does not lose sight of the ontological commitments upon which one bases one‘s understanding, so long as one does not succumb to an indifference to the potential relevance of alternatives, the naturalized epistemologist makes progress by understanding how best to proceed in world building within the theoretical framework of the world that seems likely to be his or her own. There are assumptions here—Quine thinks of them as commitments--but the process does not devolve into dogmatic or question-begging circularity. Rather, the view represents the recognition of the hypothetical nature of all of our understanding. Ontological suppositions don’t beg the question since they don’t guarantee knowledge, nor do they attain immunity from scrutiny. Skeptical challenges are weighed on the basis of their potential to offer a superior explanatory framework.

To repeat:28

Experience might, tomorrow, take a turn that would justify the sceptic's doubts about external objects. Our success in predicting observations might fall off sharply, and concomitantly with this we might begin to be somewhat successful in basing predictions upon dreams or reveries. At that point we might reasonably doubt our theory of nature in even its broadest outlines. But our doubts would still be immanent, and of a piece with the scientific endeavor. (p.475)

Likewise,136

In Theories and Things I wrote that naturalism is ―the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described‖; again that it is ―abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy prior to natural science‖ (pp. 21, 67). These characterizations convey the right mood, but they would fare poorly in a debate. How much qualifies as ―science itself‖ and not ―some prior philosophy‖?

… Descartes‘ dualism between mind and body is called metaphysics, but it could as well be reckoned as science, however false. He even had a causal theory of the interaction of mind and body through the pineal gland. If I saw indirect explanatory benefit in positing sensibilia, possibilia, spirits, a Creator, I would joyfully accord them scientific status too, on a par with such avowedly scientific posits as quarks and black holes. What then have I banned under the name of prior philosophy?

…My point in the characterizations of naturalism that I quoted is just that the most we can reasonably seek in support of an inventory and description of reality is testability of its observable consequences in the time-honored hypothetico-deductive way - whereof more anon. Naturalism need not cast aspersions on irresponsible metaphysics, however deserved, much less on soft sciences or on the speculative reaches of the hard ones, except insofar as a firmer basis is claimed for them than the experimental method itself. (p.252)

Many people, people who knew Quine, may find the above answer to the second question problematic. Some believe that Quine did not wish to consider justification and knowledge per se. Likewise, many people deny that Quine‘s proposals escape the threat of circularity. These views have textual support to some degree. However, such worries find purchase in the fact that Quine is vague in discussing both the methodology of the normative project and in discussing its circularity. For instance, Johnsen suggests:137

There is no reason to suppose that Quine had any interest whatever in the concept of knowledge, much less that he saw his proposals in "Epistemology Naturalized" as bearing on its proper explication. (p.91) and137

As for justification, we have already seen one perfectly adequate explanation for his lack of interest in contemporaneous accounts of it: he thought he had already specified the right account in terms of scientific method. However, there is an equally important, and deeply ironic, point to be made about how he would have viewed externalist accounts of it framed in terms of such things as reliable processes and causal relations: he would have faulted them for abandoning the normative in favor of the descriptive. (p.91)

To my mind, Johnsen‘s assertion lacks plausibility. Quine uses forms of the word ―knowledge‖ 17 times in ―Epistemology Naturalized,‖ writes a paper called ―The Nature of Natural Knowledge,‖ 15, uses knowledge 13 times in the first chapter of Word and Object 138, 32 times in the first 17 pages of The Web of Belief 27, 14 times in the first chapter of From Stimulus to Science 18, etc.. Nevertheless, one finds interpretations like Johnsen‘s in views that assert either that the more concrete examples in Quine‘s writings on naturalized epistemology illustrate the circularity of the original view; or claim that the general tenure of his later writings indicate that Quine views himself as narrowly addressing the projects within logical empiricism. However, I‘m more inclined to suppose that such views are inadequate accounts of Quine‘s later writings and his more concrete proposals. Consider the following:15

I am not appealing to Darwinian biology to justify induction. This would be circular, since biological knowledge depends on induction. Rather I am granting the efficacy of induction, and then observing that Darwinian biology, if true, helps explain why induction is as efficacious as it is. (p.75) and15

Such speculations would gain, certainly, from experimental investigation of the child's actual learning of language. Experimental findings already available in the literature could perhaps be used to sustain or correct these conjectures at points, and further empirical investigations could be devised. But a speculative approach of the present sort seems required to begin with, in order to isolate just the factual questions that bear on our purposes. For our objective here is still philosophical--a better understanding of the relations between evidence and scientific theory. (p.78) and19

For me normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking, or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction. Like any technology, it makes free use of whatever scientific findings may suit its purpose. It draws upon mathematics in computing standard deviation and probable error and in scouting the gambler's fallacy. It draws upon experimental psychology in exposing perceptual illusions, and upon cognitive psychology in scouting wishful thinking. It draws upon neurology and physics, in a general way, in discounting testimony from occult or parapsychological sources. There is no question here of ultimate value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction. The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed. We could say the same of morality if we could view it as aimed at reward in heaven. (p.664)

For Quine, epistemic principles are hypotheses about how to reach a goal, i.e., truth, in an ontological context using a particular method. Moreover, one must use such principles. One‘s epistemic position is a forced choice. One must act, and to act, one must select from those principles available to one. In such a selection one has some guidance in one‘s ontological commitments, but these too must be chosen among available options. Neither the choice of ontologies nor the choice of principles is final, unreflective, or irrational. Quine sees two sources of hypotheses; humanity has inherited many hypotheses and humanity can speculate with regard to other potential hypotheses.15

We predict in the light of observed uniformities, and these are uniformities by our subjective similarity standards. These standards are innate ones, overlaid and modified by experience; and natural selection has endowed us, like the dog, with a head start in the way of helpful, innate similarity standards. (p.70)

Thus, the motivation for choosing one principle over another for Quine seems to be largely the same as the motivation for choosing an ontological background: Of the principles available to date, the chosen principle seems better suited to the goal of truth in the world as we understand it. The answer one gives possesses no immunity from doubt, nor exemption from revision; it is an engineering solution proposed in a specific context for a specific use. If it fails, if it fails to jive with one‘s general understanding of the way in which the world works, if something better comes along, then one must abandon it without hesitation or regret.

I suggest that Quine‘s comments make better sense when read in this fashion. One could rewrite Quine‘s comments to say something like ―Given the world as one‘s best commitments describe it, Darwin‘s theory provides inter-theoretic reasons to suppose our forced choice of induction is a reasonable alternative in such a world.‖

The approach I attribute to Quine is of a piece, though by no means identical, with Reichenbach‘s general approach to the justification of induction.139-141 As Reichenbach notes:139

Inductive inference cannot be dispensed with because we need it for the purpose of action. To deem the inductive assumption unworthy of the assent of a philosopher, to keep a distinguished reserve, and to meet with a condescending smile the attempts of other people to bridge the gap between experience and prediction is cheap self-deceit; at the very moment when the apostles of such a higher philosophy leave the field of theoretical discussion and pass to the simplest actions of daily life, they follow the inductive principle as surely as does every earth-bound mind. In any action there are various means to the realization of our aim; we have to make a choice, and we decide in accordance with the inductive principle. Although there is no means which will produce with certainty the desired effect, we do not leave the choice to chance but prefer the means indicated by the principle of induction. (p.346)

And141

To facilitate the discussion of induction in primitive knowledge, or primitive induction, we shall proceed by steps. We shall not begin with the analysis of a state in which nothing is known about the progress of sequences, but shall leave the discussion of that question to a later inquiry (§ 91). Rather, we shall introduce the assumption that the sequences under consideration have a limit of the frequency, although the limit is unknown. Let us see to what extent this assumption can help in the solution of the inductive problem. (p.445)

Reichenbach‘s view is often criticized on two grounds: RC1 The defense of induction provides no guarantee of inductive results. RC2 The defense offered by Reichenbach is ―weak‖ in that he only attempts to establish that some principle of inference exploiting regularities in nature proves at least as efficacious as any other predictive principle under any circumstances. More precisely, if one assumes limits--i.e., regularities in nature--then a general framework of probability revision based upon step-wise adjustment in light of evidence eventually converges to a range around that limit. For Reichenbach, this is what one might call a ―proof of concept.‖ Reichenbach‘s justification of induction, only lays the groundwork for formulating answers to a complex of problems that Reichenbach calls ―the problem of application,‖ following Zilsel 142.141 This complex divides into two other clusters of problems, ―the problem of the meaning of probability statements,‖ and a group of problems he terms ―the problem of the assertability of probability statements.‖141 Assertability divides into ―…the problem of how to find out whether a sequence has a limit according to (2) [Reichenbach‘s definition of a limit], and which value of p constitutes this limit.‖141 Reichenbach is clear as to the status of these problems of application:141

The exposition of this book has now reached a point at which the purely logico-mathematical line of thought is discontinued. The investigation turns into a new direction: its objective is the analysis of the relations between the mathematical calculus of probability and knowledge of nature, that is, the application of the calculus of probability to reality. (p.337)

As I portray it, Quine‘s approach further elaborates and clarifies the robust answers to both challenges available, if underappreciated, in Reichenbach. Ironically, Quine‘s conditionalization of epistemology on commitments to goals, methods, and ontologies—though making him less of a minimalist than philosopher‘s often portray him— provides Quine with the somewhat unfulfilled potential to formulate a more explicit and robust response to Reichenbach‘s critics. Reichenbach famously replies to Creed 143 by noting:140

The problem of the justification of induction includes both the question of the decision to attempt predictions and the question of the choice of the best means of making them. The decision on the attempt is justified if the aim is not proved to be unattainable. (p.103)

Similarly, he tells readers that,141

The aim of knowing the future is unattainable; there is no demonstrative truth informing us about future happenings. Let us therefore renounce the aim and renounce, too, the critique that measures the attainable in terms of that aim. It is not a weak argument that has been constructed. We can devise a method that will lead to correct predictions if correct predictions can be made--that is ground enough for the application of the method, even if we never know, before the occurrence of the event, whether the prediction is true. If predictive methods cannot supply a knowledge of the future, they are, nevertheless, sufficient to justify action. (p.480)

But is this approach, whether Quine‘s or not, circular in the ways that worry epistemologists? There are two ways in which epistemologists might worry about circularity. Both worries are really worries about begging the question: First, rules adopted exclusively upon the basis of self-prescription have no independent means to answer skeptical questions regarding their epistemic virtuosity. To take a concrete case: One cannot justify the inference rule, call it W, ―If Wallis says it, then it is true,‖ based upon nothing but the fact that, ―Wallis says W is a justified inference rule.‖ As Salmon notes144, if crystal ball gazing can prescribe itself in the same manner as induction, surely our reasons for the one can be no better than our reasons for the other. [See Reichenbach141 pp.444-450 for discussion of similar cases.] Second, rules adopted exclusively upon an assumption that has no more justification in the context than the rule itself--or worse, is justified only by the rule--have no independent means to answer skeptical questions regarding their epistemic virtuosity. So, Hume thought that if the principle of the uniformity of nature could be independently justified, then one could justify induction by appeal to the principle of the uniformity of nature—he just denied that the principle of the uniformity of nature could be independently justified.

However, the above worries rely upon a tight prescriptive connection between rules and the prescriptions of those rules. Quine suggests that one‘s ontological commitments provide one with a necessary framework for formulating and evaluating one‘s epistemic principles. One chooses/inherits a commitment to framework within which to evaluate epistemic principles. Such a commitment represents the best choice among the available hypotheses regarding a framework given one‘s current context. Importantly, once one formulates and commits to hypotheses regarding frameworks, one‘s commitment to that framework and the methods to which it gives rise is not ruled by one‘s original commitments. Experiences, as well as the principles themselves, can, and do, force changes to one‘s ontological commitments. Likewise, experiences or revisions to one‘s ontology can force a change in one‘s principles. Excellent examples of the how revisions in principles result in revisions in scientific frameworks and vice versa are the gist of any basic philosophy of science class. While neither Quine nor Reichenbach emphasize the revisability of goals, goals too must remain open to rational reconsideration and hypothesis.

For example, consider induction. Reichenbach‘s justification is a conditional relationship; if there are limits, regularities, then stepwise revision of probabilities driven by evidence will converge upon those limits eventually. This proof is not inductive in nature. But, the proof itself doesn‘t prescribe induction independently of the assumption of regularities and the goal of prediction. Reichenbach‘s justification for this assumption of regularities consists in the necessity to act, and the necessity of such regularities for effective agency, i.e., effective action requires choices guided by reliable prediction. If there are no regularities, then induction fails, but no method could find regularities. If there are regularities, then induction will find those regularities if any method would, and represents a methodological starting point. Again, this justification is not based upon induction. Reichenbach concludes that one‘s adoption of an induction-based framework is rational given the need for effective agency. That is, an induction-based framework will facilitate the goal of effective agency if any framework will. To this Quine adds that one has already de facto committed to an inductive framework prior to explicitly formulating the parameters of the problem of induction, and the supposition of regularities in experience best explains one‘s past experiences of seeming regularities. The inductive skeptic needs to do more than merely show us that there is some possibility the inductive framework will prove inadequate (ex., involves no contradiction with immediate experience), the skeptic must demonstrate that their alternative framework seems more reasonable given our current commitments. For instance, the skeptic could argue that their framework better explains past experience and/or current, better facilitates the goals of cognition, etc.. Again, one finds no appeal to induction in the rejection of the skeptic‘s arguments.

Hume and others might object that such justifications fail in that they do not demonstrate the hypothesis of an induction-based framework with certainty. In other words, one doesn‘t know that the future will resemble the past, because one cannot demonstrate it with certainty. Reichenbach, Quine, and Hume do not dispute the skeptic, either with regard to certainty or even the desirability of certainty. However, Reichenbach and Quine deny the necessity of certainty for the justification either of one‘s commitment to the induction-based framework or of the results of hypothesis formulation within that framework. As Reichenbach notes:141

Some critics have called my justification of induction a weak justification. Such judgments originate from a rationalistic conception of scientific method. In spite of the empiricist trend of modern science, the quest for certainty,…, still survives in the assertion that some general truths about the future must be known [certain] if scientific are to be acceptable. It is hard to see what would be gained by the knowledge of such general truths. … How does it help to know that similar event patterns repeat themselves, if we do not know whether the pattern under consideration is one of them? ...

The aim of knowing the future is unattainable; there is no demonstrative truth informing us about future happenings. Let us therefore renounce the aim and renounce, too, the critique that measures the attainable in terms of that aim. (p.480)

And141

The answer to Hume‘s question is thus found. Hume was right in asserting that the conclusion of the inductive inference cannot be proved to be true; and we may add that it cannot even be proved to be probable. But Hume was wrong in stating that the inductive procedure was unjustifiable. It can be justified as an instrument that realizes the necessary conditions of predictions, to which we resort because sufficient conditions of predictions are beyond our reach. (p.475)

But, what about using induction in the future; surely any justification of induction‘s future use requires an appeal to induction. However, once one has made the commitment to an induction-based framework, use of induction is conditionalized upon a rational commitment. Such a commitment can be undermined by future experience or by skeptical arguments. However, the skeptic must argue either (1) that the commitment to induction is not a reasonable forced choice, (2) that evidence tells against the supposition of limits, or (3) that induction is not a necessary method for non-demonstrative reasoning in a world with limits, i.e., that non-inductive methods will outperform induction.

In summary, the justification for an inductive framework in Reichenbach and Quine is not circular in the sense of self-prescriptive nor is it unjustified or dogmatic; both Reichenbach and Quine offer explicit reasons for its adoption.

6. Conclusion

I have argued that the standard characterizations of Quine within epistemology suffer from multiple interpretive problems that follow directly from the general misunderstanding of Quine‘s epistemological position. I have outlined an alternative interpretation of Quine‘s naturalized epistemology. I have placed that interpretation in the context of both Quine‘s own corpus and the history of philosophy. I have argued that the interpretation has significant textual grounding, provides a strong motivation for Quine‘s rejection of traditional epistemology, offers a principled response to the skeptic, articulates a promising alternative normative program for epistemology, and proves consistent with Quine‘s overall views. I have likewise defended the interpretation, though incompletely, against such standard charges as changing the subject, circularity, and begging the question.

I have little doubt that there remain objections and details to which I have not adequately responded. However, I will be satisfied if I have merely established the possibility of a different and potentially viable interpretation of ―Epistemology Naturalized,‖ an interpretation that is also a different and potentially robust conception of naturalized epistemology.

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