Stine Marie Skov Og Casper Ju
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COMPOSITION, STRUCTURE & RISK-TAKING - a study on Danish bank boards 2003-2008 COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL 2010 STINE MARIE SKOV CAND.MERC(FIR) 270881-xxxx CASPER JUUL KAUFMANN CAND.MERC(FSM) 110683-xxxx SUPERVISOR: PROF., DR.MERC. FINN ØSTRUP CHARACTERSCHARACTERS:::: 272.481 PAGES: 226 Individual contribution to the thesis at hand: Casper Juul Kaufmann wrote all even pages Stine Marie Skov wrote all odd pages 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The thesis at hand is motivated by the criticism directed at Danish banks’ boards in the wake of the financial crisis and poses the research question: “Have the structure and composition of Danish bank board affected risk-taking in the period from 2003-2008?” To answer this, the thesis constructs ten hypotheses in a deductive, comparative research design: six hypotheses regard the composition of Danish bank boards, four regard the structure. The thesis defines five groups of stakeholders, who are all affected by the bank’s actions: the shareholders, the board of directors, the management of the bank, the depositors and society at large. The hypotheses emerge from a thorough review of the corporate governance literature field with a special dedication to agency theory, as well as from extensive literature reviews on the theory and empirical research. The answer to the research question is found through the subsequent data analysis, built on 4.829 manually collected, unique data points. The thesis finds that the structure and composition of Danish bank boards in the period 2003-2008 has indeed affected risk-taking in Danish banks, because: • Independent directors are found to allow more risk-taking than dependent directors. • Experienced board members are found to allow less risk-taking than inexperienced (less than five years of board experience) • Directors with more than three simultaneous directorships are found to allow more risk- taking than directors with three or less directorships • Directors are found to allow increasingly more risk as their years on the board increases • Directors with a master’s degree in finance, economics, business economics or accounting are found to allow more risk-taking than those without such an educational background • The existence of incentive programs (bonuses and stock (option) plans) is found to be positively related to risk-taking • It is found that if the CEO has been in place longer than the board on average, risk-taking has been increased relative to a situation in which the board has served longer than the CEO. “Gender” and “board size” are tested as well, but do not yield any results. The origins of the findings are then discussed at length, leading to a final part that draws up three models; an actuarial model that suggests pricing the banks’ risk insurance correctly, a soft-law model that recommends specific bank governance recommendations and finally, a society model in which a government representative is (re-) introduced to banks’ boards. 3 1 INTRODUCTORY PART 12 1.1 BACKGROUND , JUSTIFICATION AND MOTIVATION 12 1.2 RESEARCH OBJECT AND AREA 13 1.3 REAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS 13 1.3.1 THE HOUSING MARKET BUBBLE AND BUST 14 1.3.2 CREDIT AND LIQUIDITY FREEZE 15 1.3.3 STOCK MARKET TURBULENCE 16 1.3.4 OTHER IMPACTS 17 1.4 ACTORS AND ACTIONS 17 1.4.1 THE GENERAL POPULATION 17 1.4.2 THE REGULATORS 17 1.4.3 THE BANKS 18 1.5 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 18 1.6 AIM AND CONTRIBUTION 19 1.7 DELIMITATIONS 19 1.8 LIMITATIONS 20 1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 21 2 METHODOLOGY 22 2.1 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 22 2.1.1 EPISTEMOLOGY 22 2.1.2 ONTOLOGY 23 2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 23 2. 3 DATA 24 2.3.1 PRIMARY DATA 24 2.3.2 SECONDARY AND OTHER DATA 24 2.3.3 DATA QUALITY 24 2.4 THEORY 25 2.5 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 25 3 THE RESEARCH FIELD 26 3.1 THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN DENMARK 26 3.2 THE BANKS IN SOCIETY 26 3.3 THE STAKEHOLDERS 27 4 3.3.1 THE OWNERS 27 3.3.2 THE DEBTHOLDERS 28 3.3.3 THE MANAGEMENT 28 3.3.4 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 28 3.3.5 THE SOCIETY 29 3.4 RISK 29 3.4.1 CREDIT RISK 29 3.4.2 MISMATCHING 30 3.4.3 FUNDING LIQUIDITY RISK 30 3.5 REGULATION AND RISK -MONITORING 30 3.6 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 31 4 THEORY 32 4.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 32 4.2 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 33 4.3 AGENCY THEORY 33 4.3.1 FUNDAMENTAL AGENCY THEORY 34 4.3.2 THE EXTENDED AGENCY PROBLEM 34 4.3.3 CONTRACTS 35 4.3.4 EX-ANTE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY – HIDDEN CHARACTERISTICS 36 4.3.5 EX-POST INFORMATION ASYMMETRY – MORAL HAZARD 37 4.4 TYPES OF AGENCY PROBLEMS 37 4.4.1 TYPE 1: OWNER VS . MANAGER 37 4.4.2 TYPE 2: MINORITY VS . MAJORITY INVESTORS 38 4.4.3 TYPE 3: SHAREHOLDERS VS . STAKEHOLDERS 38 4.5 DEPOSIT INSURANCE 38 4.6 RISK AND RISK PREFERENCES 41 4.6.1 THE SHAREHOLDERS 42 4.6.2 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 42 4.6.3 THE MANAGEMENT 42 4.6.4 THE DEBTHOLDERS 43 4.6.5 THE SOCIETY 43 4.7 ALTERNATIVE CEO RISK PREFERENCES 44 4.7.1 OTHER MODELS OF CEO RISK PREFERENCES 44 4.8 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 45 4.8.1 THE ROLE OF THE BOARD 46 5 4.8.2 THE OPTIMAL BOARD 47 4.9 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 48 5 HYPOTHESES 49 5.1 DETERMINING THE TESTABLE PARAMETERS 49 5.2 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 49 5.2.1 INDEPENDENCE 50 5.2.2 BOARD EXPERIENCE 52 5.2.3 GENDER 53 5.2.4 MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 56 5.2.5 BOARD TENURE 59 5.2.6 FINANCIAL EDUCATION 61 5.3 HYPOTHESES - THE BOARD LEVEL 63 5.3.1 BOARD SIZE 63 5.3.2 INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 64 5.3.3 THE CEO’ S TENURE VERSUS THE BOARD ’S TENURE 67 5.4 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 68 6 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 69 6.1 THE TIMEFRAME 69 6.2 THE POPULATION AND SAMPLE 69 6.2.1 EXCLUDED BANKS 71 6.3 THE BOARD MEMBERS 72 6.4 WEIGHING THE INFLUENCE 72 6.5 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES 72 6.5.1 INDEPENDENCE 72 6.5.2 BOARD EXPERIENCE 73 6.5.3 GENDER 73 6.5.4 MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 73 6.5.5 TENURE 74 6.5.6 FINANCIAL EDUCATION 74 6.6 BOARD LEVEL VARIABLES 74 6.6.1 BOARD SIZE 75 6.6.2 INCENTIVES 75 6.6.3 THE CEO’ S TENURE VS . THE BOARD ’S TENURE 75 6 6.7 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 75 7 RISK MEASURES 76 7.1 ASSEMBLING RISK IN ONE MEASURE 76 7.2 STOCK VOLATILITY 76 7.3 ABSOLUTE GROWTH IN LOANS 77 7.4 ANNUAL RELATIVE INCREASE IN LOANS 77 7.5 GROWTH IN THE LOAN /DEPOSIT RATIO 78 7.6 THE ABSOLUTE LEVEL OF LOANS TO DEPOSITS 79 7.7 CHOICE OF RISK MEASURE 81 7.8 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 82 8 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 83 8.1 THE SAMPLE 83 8.2 THE RISK MEASURE 83 8.3 INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES 84 8.3.1 INDEPENDENCE 84 8.3.2 BOARD EXPERIENCE 84 8.3.3 GENDER 85 8.3.4 MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 85 8.3.5 TENURE 87 8.3.6 FINANCIAL EDUCATION 87 8.4 BOARD LEVEL VARIABLES 88 8.4.1 BOARD SIZE 88 8.4.2 INCENTIVE PROGRAMS ; BONUS AND STOCKS 89 8.4.3 CEO VS . BOARD 89 8.5 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 90 9 DATA ANALYSIS 91 9.1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 91 9.2 MODELS FOR ANALYSIS 91 9.3 STATISTICAL RESULTS 93 9.3 REFERENCE CATEGORIES 93 9.4.1 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL , INCLUDING EMPLOYEE -ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 94 7 9.4.2 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL , EXCLUDING EMPLOYEE -ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 94 9.4.3 BOARD LEVEL , INCLUDING EMPLOYEE -ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 94 9.4.4 BOARD LEVEL , EXCLUDING EMPLOYEE -ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 94 9.5 RESULTS 95 9.5.1 INDIVIDUAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 95 9.5.2. INDEPENDENCE 95 9.5.3 BOARD EXPERIENCE 95 9.5.4 GENDER 96 9.5.5 MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS HELD BY THE BOARD MEMBER 96 9.5.6 TENURE (TIME SPENT ON THE BOARD ) 96 9.5.7 FINANCIAL EDUCATION 97 9.6 BOARD LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 97 9.6.1 BOARD SIZE 97 9.6.2 STOCK PAYMENT / STOCK OPTIONS 97 9.6.3 BONUS SCHEMES 98 9.6.4 CEO VS . THE BOARD 98 9.7 CORRELATIONS 98 9.7.1 MODEL 1A AND 1B. 99 9.7.2 MODEL 2A AND 2B 99 9.8 FULL MODELS 100 9.9 MOST RISK -TAKING DIRECTOR AND BOARD 100 9.10 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 101 10 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 102 10.1 INDEPENDENCE 102 10.1.1 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 102 10.1.2 THE SAMPLE 103 10.1.3 IMPLICATIONS 104 10.2 BOARD EXPERIENCE 105 10.2.1 DISCUSSION 105 10.2.2 THE SAMPLE 106 10.2.3 IMPLICATIONS 106 10.3 GENDER 107 10.3.1 DISCUSSION 107 10.3.2 SAMPLE 107 10.3.3 IMPLICATIONS 107 8 10.4 MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 108 10.4.1 DISCUSSION 108 10.4.2 THE SAMPLE 108 10.4.3 IMPLICATIONS 109 10.5 TENURE 109 10.5.1 DISCUSSION 109 10.5.2 THE SAMPLE 110 10.5.3 IMPLICATIONS 110 10.6 FINANCIAL EDUCATION 110 10.6.1 DISCUSSION 110 10.6.2 SAMPLE 111 10.6.3 IMPLICATIONS 111 10.7 BOARD SIZE 112 10.7.1 DISCUSSION 112 10.7.2 THE SAMPLE 112 10.7.3 IMPLICATIONS 113 10.8 INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 113 10.8.1 DISCUSSION 113 10.8.2 THE SAMPLE 114 10.8.3 IMPLICATIONS 114 10.9 THE CEO VERSUS THE BOARD 114 10.9.1 DISCUSSION 114 10.9.2 THE SAMPLE 115 10.9.3 IMPLICATIONS 115 10.10 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 115 11 RECOMMENDATIONS 118 11.1 THE BANK AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 118 11.1.1 THE ACTUARIAL MODEL 120 11.1.2 THE SOFT LAW MODEL – WITH HARD LAW EXTENSIONS 121 11.1.3 THE SOCIETY MODEL 121 11.1.4 FINAL RECOMMENDATION 122 11.5 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 122 12.