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Edith Cowan University Research Online Theses: Doctorates and Masters Theses 2013 Countering-insurgency : a comparative analysis of campaigns in Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980) William J. Bailey Edith Cowan University Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses Part of the Military History Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons Recommended Citation Bailey, W. J. (2013). Countering-insurgency : a comparative analysis of campaigns in Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980). https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/579 This Thesis is posted at Research Online. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/579 Edith Cowan University Copyright Warning You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University does not authorize you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any copyright material contained on this site. You are reminded of the following: Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material into digital or electronic form. Countering-Insurgency: A Comparative Analysis of Campaigns in Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1980) William John Bailey BA (Hons) Modern Languages with International Studies, Polytechnic of the South Bank, London, MA European Studies with French, South Bank Polytechnic, London. Member of the Charted Institute of Linguists (MCIL), This thesis is presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Computing, Health and Science School of Computer and Security Science Edith Cowan University January 2013 ii USE OF THESIS This copy is the property of Edith Cowan University. However the literary rights of the author must also be respected. If any passage from this thesis is quoted or closely paraphrased in a paper or written work prepared by the user, the source of the passage must be acknowledged in the work. If the user desires to publish a paper or written work containing passages copied or closely paraphrased from this thesis, which passages would in total constitute an infringing copy for the purposes of the Copyright Act, he or she must first obtain the written permission of the author to do so. iii ABSTRACT History has lessons for the present; could this be the case for modern counter- insurgency operations in countries resembling Iraq and Afghanistan? This research set out to study three historical counter-insurgencies campaigns in, Malaya (1947-1960), Kenya (1952- 1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980), with a view to establishing whether or not the Colonial authorities had a substantial advantage over modern forces when combating insurgencies. If this was the case, are these advantages transferable to aid forces involved in modern counter- insurgencies? The research questions focussed on how important the role of the Colonial Forces was to the eventual outcome, examining the principal factors that contributed to their effectiveness? Included in this examination were aspects of strategy, together with an appreciation of the concept of ‘hearts and minds’, tactics and the evolution of counter- insurgency doctrine. A qualitative research design was adopted, using a case study methodology based upon comparative analysis of the data collected. Case studies were constructed for the three conflicts, based around the narratives obtained from a series of semi-structured interviews, with surviving members of the security forces; predominately police and Special Branch. The primary data was coded, using a thematic framework developed from the Literature Review. These themes were then synthesised, analysed and interpreted in response to the research questions related to the perceived problem. Lastly, the findings were compared and contrasted to provide theoretical recommendations and conclusions. The study indicated the significant role played by the Colonial Police Forces, especially Special Branch, which appears to have been instrumental in dominating initiatives against the rebels. Supporting the police, were Colonial army units together with locally recruited indigenous militias in a combined approach to prosecuting an effective counter- insurgency campaign. In addition, this was reinforced by the Colonial Government’s ability to apply draconian legislation in support of the strategic plan, to reinforce the rule of law by the police, coupled with its ability to garner popular support through civil projects, such as schools, clinics and housing. Evolving counter-insurgency doctrine advocated the need to cut off the insurgents from their supplies, by separating them from the general population. Separation was achieved by the forced movement of the population into ‘Protected Villages’ backed up by food control, harsh collective punishments, detention and curfews. Further key beneficial factors for the Colonial Forces included their knowledge of religious customs, iv culture and language, which enhanced their ability to gather vital intelligence direct from the population; rather than second hand. Analysing the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ since 1947, indicated it was evolving as a strategy and was not operationally as well accepted as it is today. Although often considered a benevolent approach to gaining the support of the population, the research also demonstrated the antithesis of this approach occurred by the insurgents applying power over ‘minds’ of the population though intimidation, terrorism, and physiological control. This psychological control was achieved through sorcery, spirit mediums and the taking of oaths. Ultimately, political solutions not military ones ended the insurgencies. The theoretical recommendations indicated that greater attention needs to be expended in training counter-insurgency forces to empathise with the local population when conducting overseas operations; especially improved knowledge of religious customs, culture and language. The outcome would enhance their capabilities through better population support resulting in superior intelligence. v DECLARATION I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief: (i) incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education. (ii) contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text; or (iii) contain any defamatory material. I also grant permission for the Library at Edith Cowan University to make duplicate copies of my thesis as required. Signature: Date: vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To Doctor David Brooks, my supervisor for his support, attention to detail and guidance throughout this study. The support from Professor William Hutchinson, Professor Narayanan Srinivasan for his insights, Major Paul Naish for his technical expertise and Doctor Mike Hickox; my long term mentor and friend. The former members of the Kenya Police, the Federation of Malaya Police Force, British Service personnel and the British South Africa Police (BSAP) who assisted and supported me in providing a voice for their contributions to countering insurgency in the colonies. There number are many and too numerous to name in this acknowledgment but my thanks for their time and support is directed at them all. My parents Barbara and John Bailey for their life time support vii TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE .................................................................................................................................................. i USE OF THESIS ............................................................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................... iv DECLARATION............................................................................................................................... vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ vii LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... xvii LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ xviii PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERNCE PRESENTATIONS ..................................................... xix Abstract: Creating a Counter-Insurgency Plan: ......................................................................... xix Abstract: Case Studies .................................................................................................................... xix Abstract: Hearts and Minds, Pseudo Gangs and Counter-Insurgency ...................................... xx Conference Presentations ................................................................................................................ xx Abstract: Counter-Insurgency and Intelligence Gathering Tactics Using Pseudo Gangs ....... xxi Abstract: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists