INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND UNDERSTANDING

POLICY BRIEF

February 2007 Policy Brief # 19

American Immigration Policy since 9/11: Impact on Muslim Migrants Christopher R. Counihan ISPU Fellow

settling in the United States, the events It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists of September 11th brought the issue of It is perhaps cannot plan and carry out attacks in the Muslim migration to the top of the obvious to state United States if they are unable to enter the domestic policy agenda as part of the country. Yet prior to September 11, while broader conception of ‘homeland that terrorists there were efforts to enhance border security.”

cannot plan and security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border security as a tool in the In the days after 9/11, many policy carry out attacks in counterterrorism arsenal. Indeed, even analysts assumed that the terrorist after 19 hijackers demonstrated the relative attacks would create a political the United States if ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining groundswell in favor of broad new they are unable to admission into the United States, border immigration restrictions toward those security still is not considered a cornerstone entering the United States from enter the country. of national security policy. We believe … predominantly Muslim countries. “Policies that it must be made one.1 leading to a moratorium on immigration, or at least a fundamental re-examination of the numbers and categories of immigrants that are admitted to the B etween 8:45 and 10:10 on the morning United States, were thought to be 4 of September 11, 2001, four aircraft inevitable.” Public opinion polls took a carrying 265 people (including nineteen dramatic swing supporting more restrictive immigration policies. A hijackers) crashed into several sites around the United States killing all those onboard, November 2001 Fox News poll indicated as well as 2,595 people in the Twin Towers that “65 percent of Americans favored and on the ground near the World Trade stopping all immigration during the war Center in New York City and 125 more on terror, and a January 2002 Gallup poll 2 people at the Pentagon in Washington. reported that 58 percent of Americans While there were many changes in thought immigration levels should be response to the events of September 11th decreased, up from 45 percent in January 2001.”5 Yet while there have both within the United States and in how the United States interacted with the world, been many alterations to immigration one of the immediate focuses was the policy, especially towards Muslims, and country’s immigration policy. In the minds of its enforcement since 9/11 is the degree to which the legislative branch did not the American public, the nineteen hijackers were united by two characteristics: their take more dramatic action. religion and their immigration status. A supplemental staff report by the 9/11 Of course there have been several significant changes to the country’s Commission solidified Americans’ growing 43151 Dalcoma Road, Suite 6 fears that the country’s immigration control immigration policy since 9/11, most of Clinton Township Michigan 48038 system had failed when it reported that “all which were aimed, if not expressly then 586-416-1150 www.ispu.us 19 airplane hijackers from September 11th at least in practice, at Muslim immigrants. broke U.S. immigration laws.”3 While “Indeed, of the thirty-seven known U.S Muslims had long been traveling to and government security initiatives

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND UNDERSTANDING POLICY BRIEF

implemented since the September 11th slowed down the pace of immigration however, did not fit into the conceptual attacks, twenty-five either explicitly or policy reform in the United States. The framework provided by the prevailing implicitly target Arabs or Muslims.” 6 Very Bush administration was elected in 2000 cultural/economic lens. The nineteen few of these policy changes, however, on a largely pro-immigration platform that hijackers were not American citizens, were crafted through the standard sought to refocus the immigration debate and these “immigrants” came into the legislative process where they would away from one centered largely on country not to find employment or to have been subjected to public debate cultural and economic fears to one that seek the freedom to live in peace. and scrutiny. Rather, the majority of the attempted to shape labor migration into a Instead, they came to inflict damage on policy changes, regulations, and guestworker program that the president the country that had granted them enforcement procedures have been believed would be to the country’s entrance. Although in strict public implemented by executive fiat through economic benefit. Just weeks prior to policy terms the hijackers were not the Attorney General’s office, the State 9/11, Mexican President Vincente Fox immigrants but rather visitors who Department, and the Immigration and visited the Bush White House, where the came into the country on “non- Naturalization Service (INS). 7 The fact main topic of discussion between the two immigrant visas,” this legal distinction that the executive, not the legislative presidents was creating a guestworker was acknowledged only rarely in the branch, was responsible for the majority program to provide a new legal popular discourse on immigration after of these changes has given hope to framework for migration between the 9/11. For the general population, some scholars that these measures lack neighbors in order to create a smooth immigration and its control are most a degree of permanency and/or flow of labor across the southern border often viewed in broad terms to include legitimacy that would otherwise be of the United States.11 A report issued by all forms of cross-border transfers: attached to changes enacted by the the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas short-term visits, permanent settlers, legislative branch and, therefore, may stated that: and trips for business or for pleasure: only signal a temporary shift in the overall direction of American immigration policy. Despite the common perception that 9/11 … the man on the street rightly views triggered a crackdown on immigration immigration as a broad phenomenon While some feared that the political (the enactment of the USA Patriot Act, encompassing visitors or sojourners as rhetoric following the terrorist attacks the reorganization of the Immigration and well as settlers. Immigration, which had presaged imminent and drastic changes Naturalization Service into Homeland seemed to offer him nothing but to the scale and intention of the country’s Security, and other changes), pre-9/11 bargain nannies and gardeners, immigration policies, the actual impact policies actually constituted a much more suddenly appeared to harbor a has not been as severe as many had substantive effort in this direction. The threat. 15 predicted. While the initial post-9/11 post-9/11 period is most striking for the security initiatives had a dramatic chilling lack of change. Significant immigration To the great majority of the American effect on Muslim immigrants coming into reform pending before the terrorist public, 9/11 forever merged previously the Untied States as well as those attacks was taken off the table and separate issues of immigration and already here, some commentators have remains on indefinite hold.12 security into a single issue, which been impressed by the degree to which scholars have termed the “migration- 9/11’s long-term policy impact has What significantly changed since 9/11 security nexus.” This altering of our veered away from the isolationist path was policy debate’s tone, which from one cognitive framework changed the way advocated by some popular political that emphasized economic issues to one immigration was both regulated and commentators. As one commentator that focuses more exclusively upon regarded by the American government noted, “even after September 11, not a security concerns. The “securitization” 13 and Americans. single member of Congress proposed of the policy debate, especially in regards cutting off Middle Eastern immigration.”8 to immigration from Muslim-majority The month after the terrorist attacks, This is not to say that Congress countries, has dramatically changed the President Bush signed Homeland remained silent, passively allowing the way that policymakers and Americans in Security Presidential Directive 2, executive branch to shape the future of general think about migration controls. “Combating Terrorism through immigration policy on its own. While The United States has traditionally Immigration Policies,” which firmly Congress had not passed any significant viewed immigration issues on the basis established in bureaucratic regulations immigration acts since enacting three of economic and/or cultural criteria, and procedures the connection new immigration laws in 1996,9 9/11 did concerned as to whether or not between security and immigration. This cause it to pass several pieces of immigrant labor will “displace” native presidential directive promoted inter- legislation: the USA PATRIOT Act of workers or “disturb” the social ties agency cooperation on a federal level 2001, the Enhanced Border Security and binding the country together. “Despite the between those bureaus responsible, Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, and the flow of immigrants into the United States inter alia, for visa issuance, border Homeland Security Act of 2002.10 during the last third of the twentieth control, internal immigration century, national security was rarely a enforcement, and counter-terrorism Furthermore, while many experts concern. Protection of natives’ jobs and functions in an effort “to deny entry into predicted that 9/11 would dramatically culture from the encroachment of the United States of aliens associated impact immigration policy, some experts newcomers was typically as far as it went with, suspected of being engaged in, believe that the terrorist attacks actually in peacetime.”14 The 9/11 attacks, or supporting terrorist activity; … [and]

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to locate, detain, prosecute or deport any such aliens already present in the United States.”16 By extension, from what was known about the identity of the nineteen hijackers (which was – and still is – rather limited17), this presidential directive to protect the United States from dangerous “immigrants” has led to a bureaucratic “culture of no” within the agencies responsible for processing visa Refugees Flow into the United States

60,000 45.00% 40.00% 50,000 35.00% 40,000 30.00% 25.00% 30,000 20.00%

Refugees 20,000 15.00% States

Total Number of Total 10.00% 10,000 Percent from 5.00%

0 0.00% Muslim Predominantly 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Fiscal Year

Worldwide Total Muslim % of Total

applications, a bureaucratic bias that specifically (but not exclusively) focuses on “male applicants from a list of 26 predominately 18 Islamic nations.”

Of the three channels 19 for legal entrance into the United States, 9/11’s impact was most severely and immediately apparent on the refugee stream, to the point where refugee resettlement levels fell to their lowest point in twenty-five years. Asylums granted20 from all regions around the globe declined signific antly as the screenings to detect both fraudulent claims and potential security threats were dramatically tightened. However, the presidential directive’s impact was felt most strongly on the number of refugee admissions from Muslim-plurality countries. According to data from the Office of Immigration Statistics,21 the percentage of refugees admitted from such countries peaked at over 40% of the total refugee flow and fell below 15% in 2005.22 However, this reduction

Percent of Allocation Filled 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1 1 Worldwide 0.8 0.8 Plurality Total 0.6 0.6 Muslim Total 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Fiscal Year Worldwide Total Near East/South Asia

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began its decline in 1999, three fiscal after 9/11 – in the two fiscal years prior to 9/11, refugee admissions from the region years before the 9/11 attacks,23 a trend reached 123.3% of the authorized ceiling (22,189 admissions versus a ceiling of which the attacks only appear to have 18,000), while between FY 2002-05 the region only achieved 77.4% of its allocated accelerated. Yet, while the level of amount (35,983 admissions versus a program limit of 46,500) – the percentage for the Muslim-country refugee admissions program as a whole dropped from 83.8% (142,451 admissions versus 170,000 seems to have been negatively impacted authorized) for FY 2000-01 to 69% (310,664 admitted versus a program limit of by 9/11, a comparison of the number of 450,000).29 refugees admitted by region versus the level of refugee admissions authorized by the government appears to give a different, or at least a more complex, picture. LPR Flows into the United States While the president and Congress had sanctioned the entrance of as many as 70,000 refugees annually in Fiscal Years 1,500,000 10.00% 8.00% Percentage 2002-06, the actual number of Worldwide 1,000,000 admissions under this category dropped 6.00% from Muslim 4.00% from nearly 68,500 in FY 2001 to Total 500,000 Countries approximately 27,100 in FY 200224 and 2.00% 25 0 0.00% 28,500 in FY 2003. Based on the most recent information available through the 96 97 98 01 02 03 04 05 State Department, however, the numbers 19 19 19 1999200020 20 20 20 20 have begun to rise again, to nearly 52,900 in FY 2004 and a projected Fiscal Year 54,000 for FY 2005. But these numbers are still below the legally authorized Worldwide Total "Muslim" Percent of Total ceiling.26 The drop in the number of refugee admissions (both in absolute Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Data on Legal Permanent Residents numbers and as a percentage of that authorized) arose from the increased scrutiny that refugee application screeners were expected to employ. This The immigration channel that was least impacted by the securitization of immigration policy of more careful application reviews after 9/11 was legal permanent residence (LPR), through which immigrants can gain sought to solve two problems: reduce the the right to live and work here permanently and become eligible to for citizenship level of fraudulent refugee applications after five years. The permanent admission stream is comprised of three sub associated with “economic migrants” streams: family reunification (immediate family and family-sponsored), employment- attempting to enter through the asylum based, and diversity-based immigration.30 process, and an increased emphasis on national security and counter-terrorism Between FY 2001-02, the Congressional Budget Office reported that the total efforts, as authorized by the president’s number of permanent admissions remained constant (at approximately 1,064,000) 27 directive. in the fiscal year directly before and directly after 9/11. However, that number dropped significantly in 2003 to 706,000 and remained off its previous level in 2004 One might well expect, in conformity with at 958,000, before rising above its pre-9/11 levels to 1,122,000 in 2005.31 In light of the apparent post-9/11 rhetorical and the dramatic change in the post-9/11 tone of popular opinion and some of the regulatory bias against Muslim migrants, political rhetoric, however, the pattern in the absolute number of Legal Permanent that the impact of this precipitous fall in Residents admitted from Muslim countries remained largely similar to the overall refugee admissions would fall pattern for all LPRs. What may actually surprise some pundits is that the percentage disproportionally on refugees coming of LPRs from the 39 countries with a Muslim plurality (a percentage that had been from Muslim countries. However, data declining in the years before 9/11) actually rose from its low of just under 7% in FY collected by the Congressional Research 2002 to over 8.5% in FY 2005. Service appears to indicate that, except for FY 2002 (the first year immediately A similar, but even more noticeable, pattern can be seen in the data regarding after the terrorist attacks), the State naturalizations between 1996 and 2005. After a seemingly stable pattern in the Department’s regional category of “the distribution of source countries for naturalized citizens in the first three years of this 28 Near East & South Asia” was the period of slightly over 7.5%, FY 2000 saw the beginnings of a dramatic increase in source of a larger percentage of refugee the share of naturalized citizens who came from countries with a population plurality admissions versus the authorized of Muslims to over 15.25% in 2004.32 maximum allocation than that of the program’s total percentage as a whole. This phenomenon is relatively well reported by social scientists, who also have While the percentage from the Near East & South Asia dropped from before to

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detailed such upward movements in the levels of naturalizations by those born in Naturalizations in the United States “enemy” countries during most of the United States’ conflicts. It can be seen, in part, as an attempt to distance oneself 1,500,000 20.00% from one’s prior fealties and assert one’s 15.00% patriotic association with their adopted 1,000,000 homeland. “In times of political stress, 10.00%

immigrants seek citizenship in much from Total 500,000

larger numbers; it leapt significantly after 5.00% Muslim Countries Worldwide September 11 for the ensuing six 0 0.00% Percentage months, a pattern also visible during the 1920s and the Second World War.”33 The 6 7 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 199 199 1998 199 200 200 200 200 2 00 200 securitization of Muslim immigration (as well as all immigration) can be seen in Fiscal Years the rising concern from some corners of the political arena about the changing Total % from Muslim States demographic characteristics of the Arab- American (which is used in many American political discourses to identify, Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Data on Naturalizations incorrectly, all Muslim Americans), a group that had been nearly statistically

invisible prior to 9/11. 36 According to the data provided by the Office of Immigration Statistics, the category The first official attempt to track the of Muslim immigration most dramatically impacted by 9/11 and its aftermath has number of Arab-Americans was only been that of temporary visitors – “nonimmigrants.” From a high in FY 2001 of over issued in 2003. Prior to that survey, they 710,000 business and personal visitors from Muslim countries tracked by the were lumped under the racial category of American government, the number dropped to only 465,000 the following year. “The “White, non-Hispanic.”34 The increased largest numerical drop between 2000 and 2004 (70 percent) has been in the number of tourist and business visas issued to individuals from Gulf countries, which include scrutiny and concern over this previously 37 overlooked ethnic community can be Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.” While seen in a National Review article part of this drop mirrored the broad slowdown in international travel caused by 9/11, published after 9/11, which stated that: these Gulf countries were also specifically (although not exclusively) singled out on the list of twenty-six predominately Muslim countries (with the exception of North While the Mideast itself is Korea) that became the focus of many of the Bush Administration’s more aggressive overwhelmingly Muslim, historically this immigration enforcement policies and more rigorous visa application screening has not been true of the region’s procedures. immigrants to the U.S. Up until the 1960s, Middle Eastern immigrants were mostly Christian Arabs from Lebanon, or Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, and other Christian minorities fleeing predominantly Nonimmigrant Admissions to Muslim countries. In 1970, roughly 15% of Middle Eastern immigrants were Muslim; by 2000, almost 73 percent the U.S. were.35 40,000,000 3.00% In the post-9/11 world where immigration, 30,000,000 2.00% especially immigration from the Islamic 20,000,000 world, is viewed through a security lens, 1.00%

Total 10,000,000

this data point took on a decidedly 0 0.00% Countries Percentagef rom Muslim Muslim rom sinister meaning for some analysts. This Worldwide is despite the fact that the same article 94 95 96 98 99 00 also indicated that Middle Eastern 19 19 19 19 19 20 2001200220032004 immigrants have proven and continue to Fiscal Year be a wealthier, more highly educated, and more assimilated group than All countries Percent from Muslim Countries immigrants as a whole, a fact that when read through an economic lens would otherwise indicate that Arab immigration Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Nonimmigrant Population Estimates: 2004 was a positive trend that ought to be encouraged.

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In October 2001, the State authority to interview and detain these American government’s increased Department [the agency with the individuals.46 immigration enforcement has responsibility for authorizing visa focused almost exclusively on applications] issued a classified The implementation of the National Muslim migrants seems to be cable imposing a mandatory twenty- Security Entry/Exit Registration System confirmed by the fates of two day hold on all nonimmigrant visa (NSEERS) on September 11, 2002, programs designed to expedite visas applications submitted by men aged continued to build upon the immigration to the United States. The Saudi eighteen to forty-five from twenty-six enforcement officials’ specific focus on Arabian Visa Express program, countries, subjecting them to special the country’s alien Muslim population. through which three of the nineteen security clearance. Applications from The program was partially suspended47 hijackers entered the country, was males in most of these countries in December 2003. But while it had been cancelled on July 19, 2002, after eventually required approval in fully operationa,l 290,526 immigrants and much public criticism. However, the Washington, with no time limit visitors from a total 150 countries were Visa Waver Program, which allows imposed on the response.38 had been registered both at specific citizens of twnety-seven countries Ports of Entry and through in-person (only one of which, Brunei, is While the average level of interviews at domestic INS offices.48 predominantly Muslim) to receive nonimmigrant admissions between While the larger NSEERS program American visas without appearing in- 1994 and 2001 actually increased by registered these people, the “Special person at an American consulate for 2% in the three fiscal years after Registration” program’s in-person an interview, and through which 9/11,39 the average percent of interviews were prioritized by a list of four suspected terrorists Zacarias visitors coming from Muslim “Call-In groups” drawn from twenty-five Moussaoui and Richard Reid both countries (never the embarkation specific countries, “focusing on aliens entered the United States, is still in point for a large percent of global who present the highest risk of place despite numerous calls for its visitors into the United States) involvement in terrorist organizations.”49 cancellation.53 dropped by 20%. Of these countries only North Korea did In the months after 9/11, the not have a plurality Muslim population. In the face of limited intelligence on Congress passed legislation aimed “The order in which nationals of countries the actual membership of al Qaeda specifically at the existing and future such as Iran, Iraq and Libya were called and associated groups that advocate immigrant and nonimmigrant first, whereas Saudis and Egyptians were (or actually employ) political population, especially those from called third and last, respectively, may violence, this focus on the migrant predominantly Muslim countries. It have corresponded to foreign policy population from predominantly quickly passed the USA PATRIOT priorities but not to terrorism profiles or to Muslim countries has been justified Act of 2001,40 which provided, inter the political composition of expatriate on the grounds that the most alia, expanded powers and funding communities.”50 obvious characteristic shared by that to the federal government, including membership is their Islamic faith. the ability “to detain foreigners While the INS was careful to specify that According to one captured al Qaeda without charges … provided the Special Registration was based on training document, “Military Studies additional funds for border security country of origin rather than religious in the Jihad against the Tyrants,” and granted the US Attorney belief, “[n]onetheless, it was clear to “the first condition of membership is General the power to detain any members of the public that the special that ‘member(s) of the organization foreigner who he/she certifies is a registration program was tied to religion. must be Muslim(s).’”54 Broad danger to US national security.”41 ‘U.S. Ends Muslim Registry’ announced religious, ethnic, and/or national This new act legitimized an earlier the headline of the December 2, 2003, profiling, such as that used in the INS regulatory42 amendment that Chicago Tribune.”51 The American period immediately after 9/11, extended the agency’s power to government attempted to justify its choice however, has proven to be a poor detain an alien without charges.43 of these particular countries by claiming guide for building an effective Soon after this change, attorney that they were known supporters of Al counter-terrorism immigration policy. general announced that his office Qaeda or contained a large Al Qaeda Nearly 200,000 individuals were had secretly detained as many as presence. subjected to the NSEERS program, 1,200 mainly Arab and Muslim 1,200 “persons of interest” were individuals as part of the FBI’s Although at times government officials detained under conditions of utmost investigation of the 9/11 terrorist stated that the countries whose citizens secrecy in the post-9/11 attacks, dubbed PENTTBOM. In his and nationals were required to register PENTTBOM security sweep, and later announcement that dealt with were selected because of [an] Al-Qaeda 8,000 people participated in two creating a program of over 8,000 presence, countries with no proven Al- “voluntary” interview programs, the “voluntary” interviews44 of individuals Qaeda presence were included, and overwhelming majority of whom from “countries suspected of countries with [a] known Al-Qaeda were Muslim immigrants to the harboring relatively large numbers of presence, such as Germany and United States. terrorists,”45 U.S. Attorney General England, were excluded.52 John Ashcroft cited the USA Profiling is not in and of itself PATRIOT Act as the basis for his This generally held belief that the problematic as a mechanism to

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identify potential terrorists. If based impossible to prove or disprove, the confirmed dead and missing but presumed on solid information encompassing a counter-terrorism value of these dead. wide range of indicators and used in programs is difficult to verify. conjunction with other law 3 Betsy Cooper. 2004. “Security Checks enforcement tools, profiling becomes The 9/11 attacks changed how Affect Legal Immigration.” Migration one among an arsenal of techniques Americans and their policymakers view Policy Institute. Available at to give greater scrutiny to certain and administer immigration into the www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/di individuals than to others. However, United States. The nineteen hijackers splay.cfm?id=258. when profiling is based on crude were characterized as “Muslim characteristics, such as race, immigrants” in the popular discourse, 4 Muzaffar Chishti. 2002. “Immigration ethnicity and religion, it can be a and therefore both Muslims and and Security Post-Sept. 11.” Available counterproductive tool for law immigration came to be viewed through the Migration Information Source enforcement that places an through the lens of security. While at excessive burden on innocent immigration had previously been www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/dis persons.55 defined through economic and cultural play.cfm?ID=46. terms, 9/11 brought about the 5 Furthermore, some people maintain securitization of the country’s Philip Martin. 2002. “Immigration: that the government’s narrow focus immigration policy and focused its Shaping and Reshaping America.” on young men from predominantly regulation and enforcement on Muslim Available at Muslim countries is misguided on a migrants. Both in terms of the tone of www.npc.umich.edu/news/events/PRB- practical level: Terrorist popular political rhetoric and in the Monograph-Final.pdf, 13. organizations have recognized this differentialized adjudication of enforcement strategy and adjusted immigration policy toward young men 6 Louise Cainkar. 2004. “The Impact of the their recruitment strategy to bring in from predominantly Muslim countries, September 11th Attacks and Their members that do not fit the existing Muslim migrants became the focus of Aftermath on Arab and Muslim “profile.” For example, they are much negative attention. Considering communities in the United States.” GSC focusing their recruitment efforts on the nearly hysterical level of popular Quarterly, vol. 13 (Summer/Fall). “white Muslims” from countries not opinion after 9/11, however, for all of Available at listed as having significant terrorist the inconveniences, delays, www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/publications/q populations, for their immigration detentions, and (most likely, even) uarterly13/cainkar.pdf. applications would not face such injustices visited upon the Muslim strict scrutiny. 56 migrant population, it is perhaps 7 Originally an agency within the Justice remarkable that the impact of the Department, but now split between the From a criminal prosecution point of terrorist attacks was not even more Department of Homeland Security’s view, the post-9/11 immigration severe. A preliminary review of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration enforcement programs were data that isolates and compares the Services, the Bureau of Customs and successful in that they identified and immigration statistics for countries with Border Protection, and the Bureau of punished hundreds of lawbreakers a plurality of Muslims reveals a more Immigration and Customs Enforcement. for criminal violations ranging from complex picture, one that calls for a severe infractions (e.g., drug deeper statistical analysis before 8 Steven A. Camarota, 2002. “The Muslim dealing) to relatively minor drawing any final conclusions. Wave: Dealing with Immigration from the immigration offenses. However, from Middle East.” The National Review. a counter-terrorism point of view, Available at such success is harder to Christopher R. Counihan is a Fellow www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m128 substantiate. While thousands of at the Institute for Social Policy and 2/is_17_54/ai_90888287 mainly Muslim immigrants were Understanding (ISPU) and a Ph.D. placed in removal proceedings candidate at the University of 9 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death and/or detention, not a single Delaware. Penalty Act, the Personal Responsibility individual was ever prosecuted on ______and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, terrorism-related charges as a result and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 57 of these ‘security measures,’ “In 1 Thomas Eldridge, Susan Ginsburg, Immigrant Responsibility Act. June 2005, President Bush stated Walter Hemple, Janice Kephart, and Kelly 10 that over 400 charges were made as More. 2004. “9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Philip Martin. 2002. “Immigration: a result of terrorism investigations, Shaping and Reshaping America.” Staff Report of the National Commission but in almost all of these cases, the on Terrorist Attacks upon the United Available at federal prosecutors chose to charge States.” Available at www.9- www.npc.umich.edu/news/events/PRB- the plaintiffs with nonterror charges, 11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_T Monograph-Final.pdf; the Migration such as immigration violations.”58 Information Service’s “Chronology of errTrav_Monograph.pdf. Unless one speaks in counter-factual Events since September 11, 2001 Relating terms of what plots may have been 2www.september11victims.com/september to Immigration and National Security.” foiled, a line of reasoning that is 11victims/. These numbers include those Available at

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www.migrationinforma tion.org/chronolog Nonimmigrant Visitors. y.pdf. 32 Office of Immigration Statistics. 20 Both Affirmatively and Defensively. “Table 21 -- Persons naturalized by 11 Martin.“Immigration: Shaping and region and country of birth: fiscal years 21 Reshaping America, pp. 18-19. Covers fiscal years 1996 through 2005. 1996 to 2005.” Yearbook of Available at Immigration Statistics, 2005. U.S. 12 Pia M.Orrenius, 2003. “U.S. www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/. Department of Homeland Security. Immigration and Economic Growth: Available at 22 Putting Policy on Hold.” Southwest The most recent data available. www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistic Economy, no. 6 (November/December). s/yearbook/2005/Table21D.xls. 23 The U.S. government tracks its fiscal years 13 This term is being used as set forth by from October 1t to September 30. 33 Tirman. “The Migration-Security Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Nexus.” p. 5. Wilde in Security: A New Framework for 24 MPI Staff. 2003. “Immigration since Analysis (Bounder, CO: Lynne Rienner September 11, 2001.” Published by the 34 Randa A.Kayyali 2006. “The People Publishers, 1998) as the process of Migration Policy Institute: p. 3-4. Available Perceived as a Threat to Security: Arab th bringing (or attempting to bring) issues at Americans since September 11 .” previously considered to be non-security www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Immigration_ Published on-line by the Migration issues into a discourse defined by Since_9-11.pdf. Policy Institute at perceived existential threats to the survival www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/ 25 or well-being of a political community. Erin Patrick. 2004. “The U.S. Refugee display.cfm?id=409. See also, Tomas Faist’s “The Migration– Resettlement Program.” Published by the security Nexus: International Migration Migration Policy Institute. Available at 35 Steven A. Camarota 2002. “The and Security before and after 9/11.” www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/disp Muslim Wave: Dealing with Working Paper 4/03 of the Willy Brandt lay.cfm?ID=229. Immigration from the Middle East.” Series of Working Papers in International National Review (September). Available Migration and Ethnic Relations. Available 26 Bureau of Population, Refugees and at at Migration. 2005. “Proposed Refugee www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1 http://dspace.mah.se :8080/dspace/bitstrea Admissions for Fiscal Year 2006 Report to 282/is_17_54/ai_90888287. m/2043/686/1/Willy+Brandt+2003-4.pdf the Congress.” U.S. Department of State; Washington, DC: pp. 6. Available at 36 Which only reports nonimmigrant 14 John Tirman, 2004. “The Migration- www.state.gov/documents/organization/5247 entrance data on 18 of the 39 Security Nexus.” GSC Quarterly 5.pdf. predominately Muslim countries. (Summer/Fall). Available at www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/publications/q 27 MPI Staff. “Immigration since September 37 Camarota, “The Muslim Wave,” pp. uarterly13/tirman.pdf . 11, 2001.” p. 4. 3& 4 of 6.

15 Robert J.Leiken “Bearers of Global 28 The nearest available proxy for “Muslim- 38 Louise Cainkar. 2004. “The Impact of Jihad? Immigration and National Security countries” based on the categories by which the September 11th Attacks and Their after 9/11,” 14-15. Available through The the Congress sets annual ceilings for refugee Aftermath on Arab and Muslim Nixon Center at admissions. Communities in the United States.” GSC www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monogr Quarterly 13 (Summer/Fall). Available aphs/ 29 Andorra Bruno. 2006. “Refugee Admission at Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf . and Resettlement” Congressional Research www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/publications Service, updated January 25. Available at /quarterly13/cainkar.pdf. 16 www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2006,0215- Tirman, “The Migration-Security crs.pdf. 39 Through FY 2004, the last year of Nexus.” 2. complete publicly available data. 30 17 In this preliminary data analysis, these four A BBC news report indicated that four streams are combined together to represent 40 Uniting and Strengthening America people who had been identified as one of all Legal Permanent Resident admissions Act by Providing Appropriate Tools the nineteen suicide hijackers were still both from new applicants and from those Required to Intercept and Obstruct alive in various locations. who changed their status from another entry Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)

18 classification. Lee Hockstader. 2003. “Post-9/11 Visa 41 Philip Martin. 2003. “Immigration: Rules Keep Thousands from Coming to 31 Office of Immigration Statistics. 2006. Shaping and Reshaping America.” U.S.” Washington Post, November 11; p. “U.S. Permanent Legal Residents: 2005.” Available at A1. Available at Department of Homeland Security. Available www.npc.umich.edu/news/events/PRB- http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=37322. at Monograph-Final.pdf, pp. 29.

19 www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/pub Refugees & Asylum-Seekers, Legal lications/USLegalPermEst_5.pdf. 42 Issued on September 17, 2001. Permanent Residents, and Temporary

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INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND UNDERSTANDING POLICY BRIEF

43 Originally limited to 24 hours, it was extended by an 50 Robert J. Leiken “Bearers of Global Jihad? amended regulation to 48 hours without charge and for Immigration and National Wecurity after 9/11,” 14-15. longer, a “reasonable period of time” in case of Available through The Nixon Center at “emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/ Quoted in MPI’s “Chronology of Events since Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf. September 11, 2001 Related to Immigration and National Security.” Published May 1, 2003. Available 51 Louise Cainkar. “The Impact of the September 11th at www.migrationinformation.org/chronology.pdf. Attacks.”

44 5,000 announced in Nov. 2001 and a “request” for a 52 Louise Cainkar. 2004. “Post 9/11 Domestic Policies further 3,000 issued in March 2002. Affecting U.S. Arabs and Muslims: A Brief Review.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 45 MPI Staff. Chronology of Events.” Middle East 24(1): 246.

46 The American government also cited the 1789 Alien 53 Robert J.Leiken, “Bearers of Global Jihad? and Sedition Acts and the 1940 Smith Act (a.k.a., the Immigration and National Security after 9/11,” 14-15. 1940 Alien Registration Act), among others. Louise Available through The Nixon Center at Cainkar. 2004. “The Impact of the September 11th http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/ Attacks and Their Aftermath on Arab and Muslim Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf. Communities in the United States.” GSC Quarterly,no. 13 (Summer/Fall). Available at 54 Ibid., 139. www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/publications/quarterly13/c ainkar.pdf. 55 Susan Martin. 2003. “The Politics of US Immigration Reform.” The Political Quarterly, 74(1): 142. 47 Portions of the program are still active; others have been rolled into the US-VISIT program for non- 56 Robert J. Leiken. “Bearers of Global Jihad? immigrant visitors or the SEVIS program to register Immigration and national security after 9/11”, 14-15. and track foreign students. Available through The Nixon Center at http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/ 48 Office of the Press Secretary. 2003. “Fact Sheet: Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf. Changes to National Security Entry/Exit Registration 57 System (NSEERS).” Department of Homeland Tirman, “The Migration-Security Nexus.” 3-4. Security. 58 Randa A. Kayyali, 2006. “The people perceived as a 49 International Information Program. 2002. “National threat to security: Arab Americans since September th Security Entry/Exit Registration Program: System 11 .” Published on-line by the Migration Policy Institute at Designed To Protect U.S. Citizens from Terrorism.” U.S. State Department. Available at www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/EntryExit_Reg =409. istration_System.html.

ISPU normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views presented here do not necessarily reflect the views of ISPU, its officers, staff or trustees. ©2007 Institute for Social Policy and Understanding

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