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Home , August Offer, Cripps Mission, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Partition of India, Simla Conference

Masaryk University Faculty of Arts

Department of English and American Studies

English and Literature

Martin Hulman

Partition of and its Leading Figures (1935-1947)

Bachelor‟s Diploma Thesis

Supervisor: Stephen Paul Hardy, Ph.D.

2013

I declare that I have worked on this thesis independently, using only the primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

…...... Author's signature

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank you my family for unconditional support and ever-present encouragement during my studies.

Table of contents

Introduction 5-7

1. On the Road to (1935-1939) 8

1.1 1935 Act and Provincial Elections 8-10

1.2 Aftermath of the Elections 11-13

1.3 The Rise of Ali Jinnah and the 13-16

2. In the Shadow of the War (1939-1945) 16

2.1 The Congress resignation 17-18

2.2 Jinnah-Linlithgow co-operation and ' Resolution' 18-22

2.3 The British proposals – '' and '' 22-27

2.4 The 27-31

2.5 Towards the Peace 31

2.5.1 Gandhi-Jinnah talks 31-33

2.5.2 The 33-35

3. Endgame of the and Partition (1945-1947) 35

3.1 Elections and the 'Cabinet Mission' 34-44

3.2 The Direct Action 45-48

3.3 The Breakup 48-52

3.4 Mountbatten Plan and 52-59

Conclusion 59-60

Bibliography 61-65

Introduction

The of the struggle for and partition of India from

British stronghold have been subjects of countless studies and academic publications. The fact that it caught the attention of so many scholars and historians certainly speaks volumes about the importance of these events. This thesis concentrates primarily on the latter, even though both events were necessarily interconnected. The emphasis is going to be laid on the timeframe from 1935 to

1947 when the actual partition happened. From the 1935 Act, which had started the course of events leading to the partition, all the way to the 3

June Plan of 1947 which eventually decided the fate of millions of people. During the process, important figures raised and made crucial decisions behind the negotiating table. Their influence was of huge importance for the and ethnically diverse communities. Therefore, it is going to be studied in detail for the purposes of better understanding of the whole issue of partition which brought about one of the worst human tragedy in modern history. The main aim is to present how the state of

Pakistan came into being by a configuration of forces and events. Secondly, to find out whether the partition and enormous suffering of people could have been avoided and thirdly, who is to blame for such drastic operation.

Partition of India was one of the most significant events in the history of this vast and multicultural subcontinent. Long-lasting struggle for freedom and independence from the shackles of the had finally come to an end and two new states emerged on the world map, India and . However, the price of freedom and self-rule was enormously high. Resulting in a dislocation of millions of people, countless deaths, rapes and other atrocities which spread across the new-established borders as well as inland. It was, indeed, its hastened nature, imposed implementation by the British authorities, along with seemingly unsolvable differences in attitudes and priorities between the two principal communities of the sub-continent, and , which led to colossal communal violence and misery. The discrepancies among these two ethnic groups had existed long before the British arrival but grew out of proportion under the aegis of imperialism.

The was divided on the forceful demand of the Muslims represented by Jinnah and the Muslim League. They admittedly feared united India, especially after the debacle in 1937 elections, in which Muslims would be a minority. It was neither the goal of the British nor the dream of the

Hindu Congress to see India divided. The fact that Pakistan was, nonetheless, created speaks volumes of a leader's perseverance and a 's will to sacrifice for the cause of independence (Ali 115-16).

India was partitioned in and power was transferred from the

British hands to India and Pakistan on the basis of status in accordance with the 3 June Plan, which was accepted by and acquiesced in by the principal

Indian leaders. It was a task of tremendous responsibility and entailed all the complications of partition of territory and division of resources, at a time of heightening tension and turmoil (Mansergh and Moon xi). For this purpose, British government appointed new , Lord Mountbatten, who played probably the most crucial role in the whole process. As put it: “the destiny of millions light on him” (4). The British decided to divide India mainly along the religious lines and failed to foresee or imagine the consequences of such division. India had never been a homogeneous entity and therefore, not one that could be easily handed over and governed. Actually, majority of common people was for 'One

India', but it was this communal divide between the Hindus and the Muslims, which brought matters into cry for partition. After all political negotiations in the early

1940's had reached an impasse, the British started to believe that the partition remained the only option to avoid outright civil war and anarchy, and the only way to conduct a graceful retreat. However, this 'graceful retreat' turned into a tragedy and some scholars, e.g. Gyanendra Pandey or , even use the term

'holocaust' with casualties of around 1 million, some 15 million refugees and thousands of women raped. The critical element in the planning of the partition was time and unsettled disputes between political leaders. Mountbatten established his credibility by designating the precise date - 30 June 1948, by which the British intended to retreat and make a peaceful transfer of power. It gave the British a mere

15 months to wrap up an empire which political, administrative and constitutional decisions were far too tricky to be resolved in such a short period of time. In reality, they even dared to shorten it by almost a year in order to prevent violence and sustain an image of 'peaceful liberators' in the eyes of the world. On the top of that nobody knew where the new borders would be drawn.

1. On the road to Partition (1935-39)

First chapter maps the events which set the country on the road to partition, particularly provincial elections and an immediate aftermath which considerably deteriorated Hindu-Muslim relations and undeliberately gave rise to the Muslim

League and who became one of the most influential figures of the partition history. It was the fear of Hindu domination, after its landslide victory in

1937 elections, and Jinnah's insistence that Hindus and Muslims constituted two different , that gave the ground for the Pakistan demand.

1.1. 1935 Act and Provincial Elections

The early decades of the twentieth century saw a growing demand, from the educated middle class Indians, for power sharing and responsibility to run their own institutions, to which the British response was reluctant and evasive (Panigrahi 1-2).

“Protests against British rule and the rise of nationalist consciousness had risen in tandem, bringing with it unintended divisive elements between Hindus and Muslims, which had surfaced with call for unity between these 'two nations' in India”

(McMenamin 71).

Realizing the need for gradual introduction of parliamentary democracy, the

British promulgated a series of bills, reforms and acts guaranteeing increased representation and greater participation of Indians in legislative matters to assuage the common sentiment of the population. Probably the most critical one that sharpened relations between two major forces of political spectrum, the Muslim

League and the , and set the country on the road to Partition, was the 1935 Government of India Act and subsequent provincial elections two years later. The Act provided for the establishment of full responsible

Government subject to „safeguards‟ in the eleven provinces of British India; It provided also for a federation of India, comprising both provinces and states, with a federal central Government and legislature for the management of all subjects except foreign affairs and defence (Philips 188). It became operative on 1 April 1937 except its second part, the Federal Structure, which could not function until a specific number of princely states had joined the Federation (Coupland 2).

Jawaharlal Nehru, the future leader of the Congress, initially rejected the Act entirely, declaring that the New Constitution offered India only responsibility without power (Shakoor 7) because the principle of autocracy was retained (Menon 14). The

Congress, with its avowed nationalist and democratic-socialist view demanded absolute authority in the provinces and at the centre (Shakoor 8). It also stated that the future could only be framed by a Constituent Assembly based on adult franchise (Singh 2). Nevertheless, they decided to participate in 1937 elections with the Manifesto dwelt upon the economic crisis in India, poverty, unemployment and resistance to British imperialism with ultimate goal of free united

India (Sitaramayya 12-24).

With regard to the Muslim League, “it was in a state of hopeless confusion, with interests clashing at all levels, provincial, local and personal” (Shakoor 9). It had existed only 'on the paper' and without a leader until Muhammad Ali Jinnah returned from England in 1936. Despite his tireless effort to unite Muslims in all parts of the country, he could not bring together all the factions of fragmented Muslim politics.

Therefore, the principal aim of his programme was to maintain solidarity of the Muslims in order to protect their 'interests' in any future constitutional fabric, asserted that such a demand did not 'savour of '. For it was not “only natural, but essential for securing stable national government by ensuring whole- hearted and willing cooperation of the minorities who must be made to feel that they can rely upon the majority with a complete sense of confidence and security” (11).

Even though he supported unity of India at that time, he believed that this unity could not be attained without Muslims having a strong organization of their own

(Sisson and Wolpert 309). His desire of separate electorate was in direct clash with

Congress of one organization representing all Indians and he did not seem to realise it could diminish the chances of future Hindu-Muslim cooperation (Shakoor

11).

The programs of both parties were actually quite similar, in terms of addressing people's needs (Hasan 9) and securing the freedom from the British rule.

However, they differed in important question of communal leadership and the results of the provincial elections – the Congress' overwhelming victory and miserable performance of the Muslim League – considerably altered the outlook of the different political groups in India. The most significant factors, that seriously disrupted

Congress-League relations and pointed to between them, were

“the Congress tendency towards a one-party polity in India that assumed the submersion of other Indian parties and the emergent unity of Muslim India”

(Shakoor 16).

1.2 Aftermath of the Elections

The conclusion of the 1937 elections had fully exposed the inability of the

Muslim League to attract Muslim voters which resulted from Muslim political disunity.

The Muslim League failed to win majority in any of the Muslim provinces, where regional non-communal parties like the Unionists in the won majorities and formed ministries. Jinnah and his colleagues faced the future of permanent inferiority and exclusion from office in Hindu-majority provinces and the proposed all

India federation. They could stand a chance in Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab and ), provided they would create as effective organization as that of

Congress. (Shakoor 19). With characteristic daring, the Muslim leaders clutched at this off-chance, but very soon they started to realize that their ambition could not be fulfilled without detaching the Muslim majority provinces from the main body

(Mehrotra 192). The demand for separate Muslim homeland accelerated rapidly after the provincial elections. Specifically after the Congress ill-advised political decisions targeted to strengthen Hindu domination over the Muslims.

The Congress emerged as the dominant parliamentary party in India, winning

716 out of the 1161 seats it contested, but it fared poorly in Muslim constituencies.

In order to break the communal impasse, new approach was conducted. Since the negotiations between the Congress and Muslim politicians, regarding cooperative relationship based on genuine sharing of power and Indian , had failed in the past, Nehru launched the programme of Muslim mass contact in rural and urban areas with emphasis on the urgency of tackling economic issues such as poverty and unemployment (Sisson and Wolpert 311) along with struggle for freedom. He believed to resolve Hindu-Muslim disputes by highlighting that ultimate goals of both communities were identical and they should act like a one body. This tactics was primarily aimed to lure the masses away from their communal organizations (as well as the Muslim League) and rally them under the banner of the sole national organization (Shakoor 18). Shortly after the elections, Nehru stated: “We have too long thought in terms of pacts and compromises between communal leaders and neglected the people behind them . . . It is for us now to go ahead and welcome the

Muslim masses and intelligentsia in our great organization and rid this country of communalism in every shape” (Rao 88). Although the movement ultimately met with little success, the Muslim league, other parties and communal leaders considered it a serious threat to the very existence of their organizations. (Sisson and Wolpert 341).

Jinnah “took serious umbrage at what he described as an adroit effort on the part of the Congress to take advantage of the weakness of the League and the presence of splinter parties among the Muslims, and so to divide the community” (Menon 56).

The Congress was hoping to gain governmental authority by recruiting Muslims to its fold which added to Hindu-Muslim bitterness. It also received a fair share of criticism and more or less resulted in the defeat of the Congress candidates in subsequent by- elections.

Moreover, at the beginning of Congress' reign there was a proposal it should form coalition ministries with the Muslim League in UP. However, no such agreement had ever been reached between Congress and the Muslim League. In fact,

Jawaharlal Nehru said that “it was unthinkable for him to have a member of the

Muslim League in the Congress ministry unless there was congruence of purpose between the two elements and a workable agreement regarding policies and programmes.” He also mentioned that they “had differed so radically from each other that there was hardly any possibility of an agreement” (Panigrahi 70).

Understandably, the Congress decided to have homogeneous ministries of its own and chose Muslim ministers from amongst those who were members of the

Congress Party, i.e. those who agreed to the programmes and policies of the

Congress government (Menon 56). The leaders of the Muslim League found this prospect completely unacceptable because they wanted to maintain their separate identity and at the same time secure a substantial share in power. The attitude of the Congress towards other parties opened the eyes of all sections of politically conscious people and the status of the Muslim League began to rise all over India

(27). Penderel Moon, distinguished member of the in Punjab during Partition years, thought that this ministry episode was “the prime cause of the creation of Pakistan” (Moon 15).

1.3 The Rise of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League

Those events further hastened the transformation of a Mohammad

Ali Jinnah into the 'Quaid-i-Azam' (The Great Leader) and sole spokesman of the

Muslims in the 1940's. Until 1937 and Nehru's declination to take two Muslim

Leaguers in the U.P. ministry, he continued to co-operate with the Congress in the pursuit of unity. Nevertheless, from this point onwards, he started to agitate for separate Muslim state within India.

He was hugely influenced by the poet-philosopher of Muslim nationalism,

Muhammad Iqbal, who suggested that “the only proper solution of the Indian problem lay in the Muslim-majority areas (North-west and East) of India emerging as an independent state or states”. In one of his letters, Iqbal also brought Jinnah's attention to importance of addressing problems of Muslim masses, especially poverty and stressed “the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam1” which is likewise “impossible without a free Muslim state or states” (Sisson and Wolpert 321).

Iqbal can be perceived as a father of two-nation theory, the ideology that the primary identity of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent is their religion rather than their language or ethnicity, and therefore Indian Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nationalities, regardless of ethnic or other commonalities. Jinnah translated this theory into the political reality in his famous speech at Lahore conference in 1940.

However, he had to gain substantial support from fragmented Muslim community first.

Jinnah made the best of the adverse situation during Congress rule and in a few years he transformed the Muslim League into a mass organization commanding the allegiance of the Muslim community (Shakoor 64). In his presidential address to the annual session of the Muslim League meeting at Lucknow, on 15 October 1937, he gave a resounding reply to the Congress policies and exposed the anti-Muslim acts of the Congress ministries:

“The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last 10 years,

has been responsible for alienating the Muslims of India more and more, by

pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu; they are in a majority, they have

by their words, deeds and program shown, more and more, the Muslims

cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands” (Bonney 89).

1 The body of doctrines that regulate the lives of those who profess He also addressed Muslims and called for an active resistance against Hindu oppression:

“To the Muslims of India in every province, in every district, in every , in

every town, I say: your foremost duty is to formulate a constructive and

ameliorative program of work for the people's welfare, and to devise ways and

means for the social, economic and political uplift of the Muslims […] There

are forces that may bully you, tyrannize over you and intimidate you, and you

may even have to suffer. But it is going through this crucible of the fire of

which may be levelled against you, the tyranny that may be

exercised, the threats and intimidations that may unnerve you - it is by

resisting, by overcoming, by facing these disadvantages, hardships and

suffering, and maintaining your true glory and history” (90).

The speech had an electrifying effect and contributed to the growth of League's popularity. Jinnah resolved to strike all communal chords to win the Muslims for the

League. He made tours across India and roused the Muslims with stirring speeches about the dangers of Hindu Raj2. He was making “a forceful emotive appeal for

Muslim solidarity with the sole object of wrestling power from the 'Hindu' Congress”

(Panigrahi 73). Panigrahi argues that Jinnah's “relentless, loose and malicious campaign” against the Congress governments which had been accusing them of “tyranny and oppression over the minority community” is very questionable because no details were given or discussion with the Congress ever taken regarding such allegations (74). In fact, various reports had been conducted by different community bodies and none of them found serious cases of faulty play. However,

2 Hindu for “reign” Jinnah never really cared to justify his claims, he only needed to appeal to the masses and gain power. According to Harry Haig, “one of the few fair-minded and well-wishers of India”, the essential grievance of Muslims was not religious but rather political one, stemmed from the fact that the community was in opposition, thus lacked power (78). Jinnah used the Islam religion as a weapon against Muslim consciousness and the masses “converged and supported him once the slogan 'Islam in danger' was raised and gained ground” (72). Consequently, many members of provincial assemblies joined his all-India Muslim organization and the Muslim unity which Jinnah yearned for seemed to be within reach. Within short period of time

“Jinnah suceeded in creating a sense of deep communal cleavage and separateness in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community. His hate campaign created feelings of antagonism” (81) and could be perceived as one of the causes of the

Partition of India. Beverly Nichols argues that it was the “hate” and “inferiority complex” of the Muslims which founded Pakistan (Nichols 178-87). However, Jinnah only gained decisive support for his demand when the Second World War broke out and he sidelined with the British government.

2. In the shadow of the War

Before the Second World War started in 1939, Jinnah's position as the voice of the Muslims had substantially strengthened. However, it will be argued that without the help of the British, he could have probably never succeeded in the creation of

Pakistani sovereign state. The British wartime politics showed its interest in pitching the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League against each other. This chapter covers their ostensible attempts to break the political deadlock by series of proposals known as the 'August Offer' and the 'Cripps Mission'. None of these proposals had envisaged the Indian independence or separate state of Pakistan. As a response, the Congress launched 'Quit India' campaign to win the independence, while Jinnah was spreading webs of his influence across the country with the encouragement of the British and defined the two-nation theory in Lahore. The situation had radically changed with a cessation of the war and an emergence of

Attlee's Labour Government in 1945 which were set to grant India the long-awaited independence. However, the partition had not been in the cards yet.

2.1 The Congress resignation

The outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September, 1939, “signalled a new crisis in Indian Politics” (Parveen 133). Viceroy Lord Linlithgow declared the war against Axis powers without consent of Indian leaders and India was forcefully dragged into the conflict. Only after this unilateral declaration did he invite Jinnah and Gandhi, who returned to high politics, to ask for their support in war effort.

Gandhi and the Congress considered it “a national affront” and demanded from the government an immediate explanation of the war aims in order to consider its support. On the other hand, Jinnah and the Muslim League did not outrightly denounce or question the British war agenda in return for certain concessions. The question of the declaration and war aims became a major issue of wartime politics between the Congress and the central British government. (Panigrahi 86). Now, the

Congress found itself in conflict with the League and with the British as well. Although the Congress sympathized with the British in their effort to defeat the Nazis, it was not willing to abandon its desire for freedom and swaraj3. Nehru, in his book “Discovery of India”, wrote: “Without that freedom the war would be like any old war, a contest between rival imperialisms and an attempt to defend and perpetuate the British Empire as such. It seemed absurd and impossible for us to line up in defence of that very imperialism against which we have been struggling for so long. Only freedom could release mass energy and convert bitterness into enthusiasm for a cause. There was no other way” (370). On 14 September, the

Congress demanded immediate independence with a constituent assembly to decide a constitution; when this was refused, its eight provincial governments resigned on

10 November, and governors in those provinces thereafter ruled by decree for the remainder of the war (Jalal 47). The British only had promised to negotiate about the modifications to the Act of 1935 with Indian leaders when the war was over.

They also refused to define British war aims apart from stating that the country was

“resisting agression” (Chandra 454). Had the British acted in more liberal way, the course of events might have been different. In the meantime, it was a 'clever' move from their point of view.

2.2 Jinnah-Linlithgow co-operation and the ''

When Jinnah was invited by Linlithgow to talk about the League support in war effort, his position was elevated and he was satisfied that the League and its leadership was recognized as political entity. Jinnah offered “full effective cooperation of the Musalmans'” by taking into “confidence the Muslim League which

3 Hindu for “self-rule” is the only organization that can speak on behalf of Muslim India” but also demanded a safeguard of the Muslim interests particularly in the Congress governed provinces, and an assurance that no constitutional headway in the country would be made without their involvement and acceptance (Panigrahi 124-5). The British could not afford to lose another 'big player', so the Viceroy appeased the League that “full weight would be given to their views and interests”, and that it was unthinkable to proceed with planning India's future constitution without taking them. Jinnah dreaded the idea of “federation because of the risk involved in it of Hindu domination at the centre” (Panigrahi 130). It was clear that the hallmark of British rule in India was to keep the two parties divided and pitched against each other in order to maintain its 'most precious asset' under control and Jinnah was proving to be the most convenient instrument and best guarantee for the British against a united political demand (Jalal 46). Perhaps the most revealing is Linlinthgow's statement from November 1939 that he had a “vested interest” in Jinnah's position

(French 122). He was confident that “Britain's hold on India was safe so long as the discords between communities and classes remained” (Shakoor, 132). It is not hard to imagine that “with such mindset, it was impossible to reach any settlement of the political problem in India” (Panigrahi 132). For the time being the alliance with the

British also suited Jinnah's interests, as he needed time and support of the government to rebuild the League and secure the support of Muslim community after the debacle in 1937 elections (Jalal 49-50).

His position as a leader of Muslim India considerably strengthened during the war and partition became synonymous with independence in the Muslim definition of the struggle after the 'Lahore Resolution' of 23 March 1940 had been presented by him at the annual meeting of the All Muslim League. There, he observed:

Musalmans are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood . . .

Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must

have their homelands, their territory and their state . . . (Jinnah)

Then went on to define his two-nation theory based on what he called the real nature of Islam and :

They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact,

different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and

Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality . . . and Muslim

belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature.

They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two

different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and

conceptions . . . To yoke together such nations under a single state, one as a

numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing

discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the

government of such a state . . . (Jinnah)

Jinnah alleged that “there were two parallel cultural streams with divergent religions, traditions and social orders which hardly ever interacted; and if they did, they ended in conflict” (Panigrahi 152). Such observation contradicts with the nature of Indian history where different religious groups lived together in peace and amity for centuries, respecting different customs and traditions of Hindu and Muslim culture. There might be occasional conflicts between those communities in the past but they were, in vast majority of cases, spearheaded by secular forces such as politics and power ambitions of the rulers rather than religious belief. The religious lines under which were distinguished had been drawn unambiguously at the very beginning of the British rule in 19th century. Nearly two hundred years of its reign were 'dedicated', apart from undeniable infrastructural and cultural development, to exploitation of country's resources and widening of the gulf and social cleavages between those religious groups, , classes and communities of

India (Panigrahi 159). It is highly questionable whether if it would have been possible for Jinnah to fulfil his demand for separate state had it not been for the

'encouragement' of the British. He believed that religion constitutes the foundation stone of nation-state. Such assumption seemed to be quite inaccurate and undemocratic, given that “none of the European countries were products of religious beliefs or sentiments” (Panigrahi 161). Nevertheless, Jinnah succeeded in rooting this idea into the minds of Muslims.

The 'Pakistan Resolution', as it became known, can be summarized into following points:

1. The Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935,

is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country

and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India;

2. Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is

reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the

Muslims, unless it is framed with their approval and consent;

3. No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to

the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that

geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be

so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-

Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute

"Independent States" in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and

sovereign;

4. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically

provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions

where Muslims are minority for the protection of their religious, cultural,

economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in

consultation with them (Ambedkar)

The resolution altered the character of Indian politics and made all meaningful negotiations about future of India more intractable (Panigrahi 143). From this point, it was quite clear that anything short of partition would not be acceptable for Jinnah and his followers.

2.3 The British proposals – 'August Offer' and 'Cripps Mission'

Meanwhile, the events of the Second World War created great difficulties for the British, who were losing their hold in North Africa and Southeast . Moreover, the was about to unleash its vicious air raids onto the British Isles.

Situation was gradually getting critical, therefore in order to “associate Indian public opinion with the conduct of the war” as well as ostensibly tackle Indian constitutional issue, the viceroy Lord Linlithgow had proposed the so-called 'August offer' on 8th August 1940. Apart from expansion of his executive council with representative Indians and the establishment of a War Advisory Council consisting of party leaders and representatives of Indian States it promised to set up an Indian representative body with the right to enact new constitution after the conclusion of war (Kuracina) and to grant Dominion Status in the unspecified future. Furthermore,

Linlithgow stressed once again that special consideration would be given to the minorities, especially Muslims, and the British government would not transfer power to any party “whose authority is directly denied by a large and powerful element in

India's national life” (Chatterji 126). Ironically enough, he stated that no constitutional advancement could be settled before the Congress and the Muslim

League had not resolved their disputes. Not surprisingly, the Congress rejected the offer because it completely ignored their demand for the acknowledgement of independence and the establishment of a provisional National Government at the centre (Sharma 17). Even the Muslim League repulsed the offer, although on different grounds, declaring that “the partition of India was the only solution” to break the political deadlock. The August offer further deteriorated already-massive communal problem (Chatterji 127).

In the context of widespread dissatisfaction that prevailed over the rejection of the Congress' demands, , selected by Gandhi, launched the

Individual movement based on or non-violence. Anti- war speeches spread to all corners of the country, with satyagrahis earnestly appealing to the people not to support the Government in its war endeavours. The

Congress effectively gave up its bargaining power after it had already lost control by resigning from office previous year and the campaign resulted in imprisonment of more than 20,000 thousands Congress men and women, including members of the working committee, erstwhile Congress ministers, speakers, leaders of the Congress in all provinces and other local members during 1940-41 (Rizvi 166-7). Gandhi and

Nehru were put in prison as well and stayed there until winter of 1941, when the viceroy ordered the acquittal of all the satyagrahis. They were released to negotiate after India found itself in great peril.

The situation in the Asia underwent radical change with Japan's sudden attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. Within a few months they had been occupying much of the south-east Asia and the Far East. They advanced as far as

Burma, threatening India's west coast. Imminent danger caused the change in the

Congress policy; civil disobedience movement was withdrawn and negotiations with the British concerning war support were reopened. The British government, with

Prime Minister , realized that securing co-operation of India's political leaders is of urgent need. Actually, it was the combination of “the exigencies of war and the pressure of world opinion”, especially that of American president

Roosevelt regarding initiation of constitutional reforms in India to solve the political impasse, which “set the stage for the Cripps Mission” (Chatterji 128). The mission was designated to convince the world of British liberal and democratic intentions in

India rather than engaging in sincere quest to settle communal rift. Sir Stafford

Cripps was sent to India on 22nd March, 1942, as emissary of the War Cabinet, to talk terms with the representatives of a very broad spectrum of Indian opinion. The declaration was drafted in a short space of time essentially by , the leader of the Labour Party. Discussions were related to these long-term mission proposals:

1. Creation of a new Indian Union which would have full status of a Dominion

with the power to secede, if it chose, from the British Commonwealth; 2. The establishment of a constitution-making body representing both British

India and the States immediately on the cessation of hostilities;

3. For this purpose, all members of the lower Houses of the provincial

legislatures would meet as a single electoral college and choose

representatives equal to one-tenth of its own number, seats being fixed for

communities on the basis of their proportion to the total population. As for

the states, they were to appoint their representatives in proportion to their

population.

4. The British Government undertook to accept and forthwith implement the

constitution framed by this body subject to two conditions viz., (a) the right of

any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new

constitution to retain its present constitutional provision. The issue of

accession would be finally decided by means of a plebiscite in the province if

its Legislative Assembly did not decide in favour of it by a 60 per cent

majority. With non-acceding provinces, His Majesty's Government would be

prepared to agree upon a new constitution; (b) the signing of a Treaty

negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making

body.

Moreover, for the time being, “the British Government was to retain control of the defence of India but the leaders of major Indian parties would be invited to an immediate and effective participation in the counsels” (Chatterji 127-8).

The Cripps' proposal once again failed to take into account Indian strong desire for self-government and independence. It also indirectly conceded the demand for Pakistan and “indefinite number of partitions”, as it accepted the principle of non-accession on an unwilling province (130). It was readily rejected by all the parties involved in negotiations. The Shiks, who unconditionally opposed the creation of Pakistan, declared that they would “resist by all possible means the separation of the Punjab from the All-India Union” (129). At first, the Congress leaders – Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, Asaf Ali and others – also refused to accept any proposal which would cut India into parts yet they could not “think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will” (130). Partition proposals were actually kept at abeyance by common agreement after the series of discussions. But two insurmountable difficulties relating to the immediate present arose. At the beginning of the negotiations, Cripps had assured Maulana Azad, the Congress President, that the provisional National Government would be a responsible government on the pattern of the cabinet system with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head like the King of England, i.e. possessing only limited power. But later, Cripps resiled from this position and insisted that such a far reaching constitutional change was impossible and that the Viceroy's autocratic powers were to remain unaltered. This fraud shattered any prospect of reaching settlement between the Congress and the

British Government. Nehru stated at press conference on 11 April: “Before the last interview with Sir on the night of April 10 there was a seventy-five per cent chance of settlement” because “his language had led us to conclude that the new government would function as a cabinet and that the Viceroy would not intervene” (Morrow 268-273). Another important point of discussions was the question of Defence. Despite Congress' agitation, the Government gave no real control over Defence to responsible ministers except for the appointment of an Indian Defence Member with the ridiculously trivial duty of looking after canteens or printing of stationery. These difficulties uncovered the Government's unwillingness to trust Indian people and to transfer real power to them. Stubborn and imperialistic attitude of the British proved to be one of decisive factors in ultimate failure of the

Cripps Mission and subsequent unleashing of the 'Quit India' movement.

Shortly after the Congress, the Muslim League also turned down the Cripps offer on account of its rigidity and the fact that it did not explicitly recognize the demand for Pakistan. The League expressed “their gratification that the possibility of

Pakistan is recognised by providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India.” However, “the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's

Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification” left them “no alternative but to say that the proposals in the present form are unacceptable” due to lack of “clear and precise pronouncement on the subject”

(Wolpert 203).

2.4 The 'Quit India' Movement

As mentioned earlier, the Indian National Congress was willing to co-operate with the British in war effort on condition of immediate independence and transfer of power into Indian hands. But proposals drafted by the British government between

1940 and 1942 showed no intention of fulfilling these demands and the Congress as well as other parties rejected them. The relations between the Government and the

Congress deteriorated enormously during this period, even to the point of hostility. It seemed to be the clash of ultimately adversarial : imperialism versus nationalism; slavery versus freedom; inequality versus equality, etc. After the talks with Cripps had abruptly ended in , particularly when the agreement had practically been within the reach, the Congressmen and Indian people in general felt

“deep sense of betrayal and resentment” (Panigrahi 229). With constitutional advance towards self-rule and India's freedom shattered by unacceptable offers of the British, the leaders of the Congress met in Bombay on 7-8 August to decide on a course of action for the liberation of India. On 8th August 1940 the All India Congress

Committee passed the 'Quit India' Resolution which called for “the withdrawal of

British power from India” and the establishment of “the institution of a provisional national government with full powers to Indian representatives forming the government. It promised cooperation in the war effort, only after independence was granted and not otherwise: A free India will assure this success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom against the aggression of Nazism,

Fascism and Imperialism” (231). Gandhi made a passionate speech at the gathering and urged people to mass action in order to achieve these aims. He declared that nothing short of freedom will satisfy Indians and they should fight for it till the very end: “We shall either free India or die in the attempt; we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery . . . Take a pledge with God and your own conscience as witness, that you will no longer rest till freedom is achieved and will be prepared to lay down your lives in the attempt to achieve it“ (Gandhi 83: 197).

Upon this event, the very next day, Linlithgow ordered to arrest all Congress leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, and entire working committee. Therefore, the

Congress had no time to clarify the movement strategy and detailed plan of action.

Gandhi's last words to the country were written shortly before he was taken into custody: “Everyone is free to go the fullest length under ahimsa. Complete deadlock by strikes and other non-violent means. Satyagrahis must go out to die not to live.

They must seek and face death. It is only when individuals go out to die that the nation will survive. Karenge ya marenge4” (208).

The masses were left without any guidance, except for Gandhi's non-violence tactics, and swift imprisonment of the Congress leaders created a massive upheaval in the country. The movement “swept across the country as a mighty tidal wave”

(Panigrahi 228). It had started with the launching of individual satyagraha in form of peaceful processions, workers' strikes and demonstrations but, without proper leadership, it inevitably ended up with widespread riots, violence and heavy losses to both life and property. Nehru wrote: “The sudden and unorganized demonstrations and outbreaks on the part of the people, culminating in violent conflicts and destruction, and continued against overwhelming and powerful armed forces, were a measure of the intensity of their feelings . . . There were no directions, no programme. There was no well-known person to lead them or tell them what to do, and yet they were too excited and angry to remain quiescent” (430-2). The British adopted a policy of harsh repression and ferocity to suppress the movement.

Thousands of people were killed or imprisoned without trial by the end of 1942.

They crushed the rebellion and the imprisonment of the Congress leaders practically guaranteed sustaining of the British power in India, at least for the duration of the

War when leaders of the Congress were finally released. Even though the rebellion was not successful, its significance in struggle for freedom should not be derogated.

According to an Indian historian, Bipan Chandra, the Quit India movement “placed

4 Hindu for “We will do or die.” the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of the national movement .

. . Any future negotiations with the British Government could only be on the manner of the transfer of power. Independence was no longer a matter of bargain. And this became amply clear after the War” (475). In the retrospect, it also served the British cause of using the pretext to intern its leadership, and unwittingly supported the

League's rise.

Jinnah and the Muslim League deplored “the decision of the AICC to launch an open rebellion for the purpose of establishing Congress Hindu domination in India.”

They believed that the movement was “an attempt to force the Musalmans to submit and surrender to Congress terms and dictation” (Wolpert 209). Furthermore, Jinnah advised the Muslims to stay away from the Congress initiated movement and once again stressed that Pakistan was the only solution of India's constitutional problem

(Panigrahi 244). The events of 1942 and the removal of Congressmen from the limelight gave him another opportunity to rally the Muslim strength around his demand (Khan 23). Moreover, Lord Linlithgow helped him with securing the strong position of the League in the Muslim-Majority provinces before resigning from the

Viceroy office in late 1943 (Panigrahi 256). It was clear that anything short of separate Muslim state would have not satisfy resilient Jinnah. Until 1945 the British had worked on the assumption that the empire had all the potential to survive; they had used Pakistan only as a counterpoise to Congress demand for independence5

(Singh 244). Only after the War and failure of Congress-League countless negotiations did the Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan seem to be

5 Most British officials did not take the Pakistan demand seriously and were content at using it only as a convenient ploy to keep the Congress pressure at bay, which for them was a far more crucial issue than heeding to the unpractical and absurd slogan of the Muslim League for a separate state. inevitable.

2.5 Towards the Peace

Lord Wavell, a professional soldier, replaced Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy of

India in October 1943. His appointment was clearly aimed to sustain a political status-quo and order in India for the duration of the War but he made personal efforts to resolve the constitutional and political deadlock. He also agitated for an early and smooth transfer of power into Indian hands with ultimate goal of India's unity (“Wavell's Relations” 69). He realized the magnitude of issues on the Indian political scene (“Wavell's Breakdown Plan” 220) and wanted to reopen talks with

Indian leaders as soon as possible but was strictly obliged by the British Cabinet, especially Winston Churchill, to forget about any political changes or negotiations for the time being (“Wavell's Relations” 70). However, he managed to release seriously- ill Gandhi from prison in May 1944 despite strong reluctance of the Government

(71). An opportunity to initiate much needed dialogue presented itself.

2.5.1 Gandhi-Jinnah talks

On Gandhi's proposal he and Jinnah engaged in series of discussions concerning the Pakistan demand and related issues in September. Jinnah explained the basis of the demand of Pakistan. “We maintain”, he wrote to Gandhi, “that

Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a 100 million . . . We have our distinctive outlook on life and of life.

By all the cannons of international law, we are a nation” (Gandhi 84: 467). He added that he was “convinced that the true welfare not only of the Muslims but of the rest of India lies in the division of India as proposed in the Lahore Resolution” (84: 469).

Gandhi on the other hand observed that India was one nation but he tried to reach an agreement with Jinnah to satisfy his demand. He suggested that if Pakistan had to be conceded, the areas in which the Muslims were in absolute majority, i.e.

Baluchistan, Sind, North-Western Frontier Province and part of Punjab, Bengal and

Assam where they were in absolute majority “should be demarcated by a commission, approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of these areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population . . . If the vote is in favour of separation . . . these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after free from foreign domination

. . . There shall be a treaty of separation, which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Communication,

Customs, Commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be the matters of common interest between the contracting countries” (84: 407-8). This proposition was rejected by Jinnah because he wanted “Pakistan now, not after independence”

(84: 370). Furthermore, he would not approve of self-determination of non-Muslim minorities, i.e. right to vote on separation, in those Muslim-majority provinces

(Panigrahi, 171) and opposed the idea of shared responsibility of foreign affairs, defence and other mentioned matters since he envisaged full partition (172). The right of self-determination was particularly tricky question, especially regarding

Punjab and Bengal provinces where substantial number of non-Muslims (,

Hindus, Christians, etc.) lived. Jinnah claimed the right of self-determination of

Muslims as a nation but would deny the same right to the other 'nations'. Following his logic that what constitutes the nation is religion, it seemed to be quite shallow way of reasoning (169-170). The talks eventually failed and proved conclusively the stubbornness and rigidity of Jinnah mind and inability to work on any compromise.

Wavell was disappointed about the result of Gandhi-Jinnah talks because he hoped that it would “bridge Hindu-Muslim divide” (“Wavell's Viceroyalty” 40). He was alos frustrated with regard to the general lack of the Government's interest and enthusiasm towards complex affairs in India. Right at the outset, Wavell had been urging London on numerous occasions to take necessary steps to deal with political dilemma in order to prevent social breakdown and looming Partition of India.

However, Churchill explicitly instructed him to deal with the crucial issues after the

War and not earlier (“Wavell's Relations” 69). His die-hard imperialistic mind-set, vehemently ruling out the possibility of self-government in India, had not changed until the very end of his reign in summer 1945.

2.5.2 The Simla Conference

The situation underwent dramatic change with Allied victory and the end of the War in sight. Wavell undertook an official trip to England in spring 1945 to vindicate his, previously refused, proposal on Indian problem known as the 'Wavell plan'. After prolonged and exhausting discussions with the Cabinet and the Indian

Committee, the plan had been finally approved to be presented before Indian political spectrum6 at the Simla Conference in June 1945 (75). The main goal of the conference, based on Wavell's scheme, was to make proposals for the composition

6 22 representative Indian leaders were invited to the conference including members of the Congress – Nehru, Azad, the party President, and others – who had been released from prison prior to discussions. of an interim government in India. It was intended to form a new Executive Council, which would represent the dominant political opinion in the country and important communities represented by “an equal number of Hindus and Muslims.” Except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief all members of the Council were to be

“Indian political leaders.” Even “the portofolio of External Affairs would be placed under the Charge of an Indian member of the Council.” And “the proposals would not prejudice or prejudge the essential form of the future permanent constitution or constitutions of India which must be framed by Indian themselves” (Chatterji 134).

The proposal did not mention independence of India as both Gandhi and

Jinnah rightly pointed out. Nevertheless, the talks eventually broke down on communal and not political grounds. Jinnah was persistent and uncompromising in the League's claim to be the sole representative of Indian Muslims with the right to nominate Muslims to the Executive Council. Both Lord Wavell and the Congress resisted this claim because former felt it is his “prerogative to select men for the council” and latter because it would be a denial of its national character (Panigrahi

263). On the rock of Jinnah's intransigence and the fact that Wavell gave him a right of veto, the Simla conference foundered on 14 July (265). “That the British let

Jinnah wreck the conference, rather than proceed without him, was testimony to the leverage the League had secured by its wartime collaboration with the imperial government” (Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf 212). Moreover, utter failure of the conference strengthened Jinnah's presidential position “as the demand for Pakistan gained credence among Muslims across the land” (Wolpert, 245). It also cast grim shadow over future prospects of a British sponsored settlement to the Indian political impasse and brought the unwanted and impractical proposition of partition out in the open to be considered much more seriously than ever before.

3. Endgame of the British Raj and Partition (1945-47)

This last chapter aims to delineate the crucial two-year period after the war when the British engaged in a last-ditch effort to settle political disputes of the

Congress and the Muslim League by sending the Cabinet Mission's delegates to

India. Their proposal caused a lot of confussion, and seemingly endless political negotiations finally led to the partition of India. Nevertheless, in the end, it was Lord

Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, whose hasty decisions failed to considerate the magnitute of the communal problem, and Jinnah's direct action which set the country ablaze. It was thought that partition would solve the long-lasting constituent impasse and save the country from complete social breakdown. It will be revealed that, in reality, brutal swallowed the country and, like many times in the history, common people were unfortunate victims of mind games and decisions of the political elite.

3.1 Elections and the 'Cabinet Mission'

The landslide victory in favour of Clement Attlee's Labour party in July 1945 marked a significant transformation of the Indian political scenario and the last stage of the British rule in India. As opposed to Churchill's hard core imperialism, Attlee was set on (Victoria Schofield, Wavell 340). After discussions in

London, it was announced on 19 September 1945 that “it was the intention of the

Attlee government to transfer power for full self-government in India.” Based on the results of general elections, which were to be held in the coming winter, a central body would start designing the future constitution of India under 1942 scheme, with possible modifications if needed, and Executive Council of the Governor-General was to be Indianized (Panigrahi 268). The partition of India was not generally envisaged yet, as it suited the strategic needs of Britain to leave behind a united India.

However, Wavell knew only too well that ignorance of its possibility would not make it fade away. (Wolpert 249). As a matter of fact, as soon as the elections were announced in August, tempestuous political campaigns spread like a wildfire and effectively divided the country and its people. While the Congress claimed to speak for all Indians, irrespective of religion, the League claimed to be the mouthpiece of all Muslims. The elections ultimately “evolved into a plebiscite in favour of, or against, the idea of Pakistan” (Khan 32). Jinnah unleashed his 'poisonous propaganda' on the sole platform of Pakistan demand stating that it was a matter of life and death for Muslims (Wolpert 250-1) and every vote cast against the League

“would help create Hindu Raj”. Once again, Jinnah was playing on consciousness of

Muslims using religion and fear of Hindu domination. But he was not the only one who was manipulating religious feelings in order to gain votes. Similar practices were adopted by the Congress, the Socialists, the Unionists and others. Bigotry, chauvinism and exaggerated statements were to be the precursors of violent encounters that followed. The Congress manifesto underlined economic development and reforms but not even Nehru did refrain from utopian remarks; he observed that

“Pakistan was a useless idea which meant slavery forever” (Khan 33-4). In addition to spreading anti-Pakistani sentiment, Congress was also mobilizing people against the British Government and towards immediate independence. Series of , workers' strikes and nationwide anti-British protests (Khan 25), encouraged by speeches of the Congress leaders, especially Nehru and Patel (Panigrahi 270), conclusively showed the British Government and Lord Wavell that transfer of power in India was inevitable7. Last attempt to resolve political impasse without having to confront partition and ensure smooth withdrawal was made in a form of the 'Cabinet

Mission' after general elections.

The 1945-46 elections were held first for the Central Legislature and soon after for the provincial legislative. The results clearly showed keen interest of

Muslims in Pakistan idea and once and for all proved that the League was the sole representative of Indian Muslims, as it secured approximately 87 per cent of the vote in Muslim-majority areas and won all 30 seats reserved for Muslims in Central

Legislature. Likewise, the Congress swept the polls in general constituencies with 91 per cent tally and captured 57 out of a total of 102 seats in central assembly, thus emerged as the strongest national party and formed ministries. Although the Muslim

League had won almost all Muslim seats in the provinces, it could not form the government in any Muslim-majority province, except for Bengal and Sind. In the

Punjab, the Congress came up with an offer of coalition on a condition that the

League would abandon the claim for Pakistan (Panigrahi 271). It seemed as if it had been deliberately placed only to be refused since the Punjab province was “the key” to Pakistan in prevailing opinion (Mujahid 6). The Congress teamed up with the

Unionists instead, who were predominantly of Sikhs. These developments struck massive blow to Jinnah ambitions of sovereign state and members of the League

7 Riots in Calcutta on account of trials of the officers, who tried to liberate India by force in 1943, and the of naval ratings of the Royal in February 1946 underscored the fact that the loyalty of the subordinate services could no longer be relied upon. were threatening with violence if their dream was denied them. Hindu-Muslim bloody confrontations had already occurred during the election campaign, though on relatively small scale. Nobody could predict what would happen this time around.

Social disorder bordering on civil war was surely not an exaggerating scenario, bearing in mind bitter antagonism between the communities, and later events unfortunately confirmed that. Reports made by the British delegation, which visited

India in early 1946, suggested that “some form of Pakistan would have to be conceded” considering the heated attitude of Muslims, especially in Punjab (Wolpert

255). Everything depended on the outcome of the Cabinet Mission whose members,

Stafford Cripps, Pethick Lawrence and V. Alexander, had been in India since March

1946.

The purpose of the mission was to bring the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League to an agreement regarding the framing of a new constitution for a self-governing, independent India through a constitution-making body and to set up a new Executive Council or interim government that would hold offic e while the constitution was being hammered out (Qureshi 209). There was a great deal of discussions whether India should be partitioned or whether union of India comprising British India and the states should be formed. Furthermore, central and provincial responsibilities were discussed; residuary powers were to be assigned to the provinces and the questions relating to communal issues were to be voted upon by the two major communities representatives in the legislature. Jinnah was persistent on his stand for partition and fully independent sovereign state encompassing whole Muslim-majority areas in the North West (Baluchistan, Punjab,

Sind and North-West Frontier Province) and in the East (Bengal and ) (Menon 246). He once again referred to the two-nation theory and Pakistan to be the only possible solution. But Petick Lawrence, the Secretary of State, ensured him that such

'combo' had very “little chance of acceptance” considering that large parts of Bengal and Punjab were inhabited by substantial number of non-Muslims, especially Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab (Wolpert 259). In addition, a set-up “on the lines claimed by the Muslim League would not solve communal problem” (Panigrahi 275). Partition of these areas would not be acceptable for Jinnah either, so the whole idea of sovereign state was put on hold. The Congress leadership represented by Azad (the

President), Nehru, Patel and Khan also strictly opposed any kind of partition and wanted to establish strong Federal Government with the power gathered at the centre. Jinnah was forced to consider the Union, sustaining critics from his followers, which would have consisted of the Pakistan and the groups, so-called

'three-tier Federation'. But insisted on separate constitution-making bodies for these groups. He mentioned that it would be the price for entering into the Union. He also demanded a parity of representation between the groups in the Union Legislature that might be established. The Congress on the other hand wanted “one constitution-making body for the whole of India and later for the groups, if so desired, by the provinces concerned” (Menon 263). It opposed two separate bodies for it would in principle allow the League to pursue Pakistan and disrupt the unity of

India. It also rejected the possibility of the parity between 90 million Muslims and

200 million Hindus; Gandhi termed the idea “worse than partition” (Wolpert 266).

The gap between the Congress and the League was so huge that after nearly three months of exhausting negotiations the leaders still could not reach a consensus.

Their political views were apparently irreconcilable. The British, frustrated at Congress-League 'tussle', resented to present its own settlement on 16 May 1946 based on prolonged discussions. It was a last hope for a single Indian unity and a peaceful transfer of power.

The Cabinet Mission Plan envisaged a Union of India, embracing both British

India and the States, which would deal with defence, foreign affairs and communications and have the power to raise finances for these areas of government activity. All other areas would be delegated to the provinces. The Union would have an executive and legislature representing both British India and the states. Any communal issue or question would be decided by a majority of votes of two major communities in the legislature. Provinces had an option to form groups and to elect their own executives and legislatures and were given right to call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution of the union and the group after every ten years by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly. The Mission proposed the setting up of an Interim Government having the support of major political parties, in which all the portfolios would be held by Indian leaders, while constitution-making body would frame the constitution. Regarding constitution- making body, it would consist of representatives of all provinces proportional to its population (in the ration of one to a million) and divided between the main communities (General, Muslims and Sikhs) in each province in proportion to their population. Representatives allocated to each community in a province would be elected by members of that community in its Legislative Assembly. Those would be separated into three sections:

Section A – Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, , Central Provinces and Orissa

Section B – Punjab, NWFP and Sind Section C – Bengal and Assam

These sections would decide the provincial constitutions within their group and whether any group constitution should be set up. Provinces would have the power to opt out of the groups when the new Union constitution had come into force. After the group constitution had been settled the sections would reassemble, together with representatives of the Indian States, for the purpose of settling the Union constitution (Menon 264-6).

The plan gave the opportunity to the Muslim-majority provinces to form groups with full legislative and executive powers with a weak central union only dealing with defence, foreign affairs and communications. Moreover, these groups were allowed to frame their provincial and group constitutions “unfettered by the

Union in any way” and would have the power to secede from the union after ten years. Disappointed as they were, this 'version of Pakistan' had to be good enough for the League and Jinnah, at least for now, and they accepted the plan on 6 June

1946. However, “separate sovereign Pakistan was still the unalterable objective”

(Menon 273) of the All-India Muslim League. The plan had encouraged them to do so in principle. Jinnah agreed to the Mission for another reason. Communal tensions were rising up and extremists of his own party “were ready to launch jihad without further delay” (Wolpert 269-270) if instructed.

The proposal was complex and grouping of the provinces was probably the most controversial issue. Even though the Cabinet Mission rejected the concept of two separate and fully independent sovereign states of Pakistan and India and opposed the principle of partition, “Congress felt that the plan envisaged not one but several partitions after a few years.” There was a question of protection of minorities in these groups with no reliable answer (Panigrahi 278). Ambiguity of the 16 May statement caused it was interpreted differently. The Congress thought it was not compulsory for the provinces to enter particular group (Chatterji 138). Gandhi mainly objected the idea of grouping of the provinces on a religious or communal basis and their option of from the union. Another contentious problem was the composition and formation of the interim government. On 16 June the Cabinet

Mission announced short term plan about its composition (Ghose 147). It was to be a coalition represented equally by the Congress and the Muslim League and other elements8. Gandhi expressed in his letter to Pethick Lawrence that the National

Government, as he labelled it, ought to be “strong, capable and homogenous . . .

Without it, deep and universal corruption cannot end . . . There can therefore be no question of parity whether the Government is allowed to be formed by the Congress or the Muslim League. He also pointed out that “National Government [should be] resposible in fact, if not in law, to the elected members of the Central Legislative

Assembly, should precede the summons of the election of members of the

Constituent Assembly.” (Gandhi 91:5-6). This last statement suggested, according to

Lord Alexander, that Gandhi was trying “to secure power without a constitution coming into being and so to abandon the just claims of the Muslim League” (Wolpert

270). Finally, Gandhi criticised presence of the British troops in India and requested an unconditional withdrawal if the British intentions of granting independence to

India was genuine (Gandhi 91:5). These ideas were not knew at all, only underlined existed parallels between the Congress and the League.

8 14-member Executive Council was proposed to have the proportion of the parties and communities as 5+5+4: five from the Congress, five from the Muslim League and one each from the Sikhs, the Scheduled Castes, the Indian Christians and the . The crux of the problem was the parity in the interim executive. The Congress was not willing to accept it after grabbing most of the 'general seats' in recent elections and Jinnah could not afford to waive it, as he had been fighting for it for too long. The Congress finally 'accepted' the 16 May proposal, on 25 June 1946, with reservations about “the limitations of the Central authority” and “the system of grouping of provinces” (Menon 277) but did not agree to 16 June Statement and refused to enter the interim government on two grounds. Jinnah, as the President of the Muslim League, insisted that he alone should nominate Muslim members to the

Executive Council. The Congress, being a national organization, declared that it would nominate members from any community including Muslim and others. It also claimed the right to nominate a member of the Depressed Classes community by virtue of the communal award agreed to earlier. Thus it would have six members to which Jinnah objected (Panigrahi 292). While the Congress had “turned down the scheme for the interim government”, it signified “its willingness to participate in the deliberations of the constitution-making body” (Tongo 13). Since the Congress had not accepted the plan in its entirety, Jinnah now thought that the Viceroy, Lord

Wavell, would invite him to form the interim government as he stipulated earlier in discussions (Wolpert 272). Instead he decided to appoint a “caretaker government” for “a short interval” and remarked that they could “go ahead with the Constituent

Assembly and constitution-making” during that interlude since cabinet mission was returning to England. (Menon 277). Jinnah was absolutely shocked at dishonesty of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Ministers who committed “a breach of faith” (Menon

283). He pointed to the paragraph 8 of 16 June statement which clearly stated that

“in the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a on the above lines, it is the intention of the

Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an interim Government which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the Statement of May 16th.” The

Viceroy answered that Jinnah had just misinterpreted the statement and he was not obliged to do anything of that sort (278). Jinnah's bitterness was multiplied by the statements of Jawaharlal Nehru who became President of the Congress on 6 July. At the press conference on 10 July he stated that “the Constituent Assembly . . . would be a sovereign body regardless of the policy statements from London [the Cabinet

Mission] . . . Any further delay in the transfer of power would compel the Congress to directly clash with England. [He went on and said that], The Grouping scheme was unworkable . . . It would never come to fruition because in section A the Hindu majority provinces would be opposed, the North West Frontier Province would oppose its section B as would Assam in Section C, and provincial jealousies would thwart it . . . He also stressed the likelihood of a much stronger central government .

. . because it cannot exist otherwise.” Maulana Azad, Muslim leader of the Congress, labelled it as “one of those unfortunate events which changed the course of history”

(Dube 131). Jinnah characterized the statement as “complete repudiation of the basic form upon which the long-term scheme rests and all its fundamentals and terms and obligations and rights of parties accepting the scheme” (Menom 281).

Reassurances from Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps that the clauses of the

Mission still stood had had little effect. There was no point of return. The period of

“power vacuum” was to be substituted by “systematic breakdown” (Tsugitaka 112) of the society as Jinnah had called for direct action to achieve Pakistan.

3.2 The Direct Action

At the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League in Bombay on 27

July 1946, Jinnah “accused the Cabinet Mission of bad faith and of having played into the hands of the Congress . . . He said that the League had gone to the limit of concession, but the Congress had shown no appreciation of the sacrifices it had made; the League therefore had no alternative but to adhere once more to the national goal of Pakistan” (Menom 283). Two days later, Jinnah and his Working

Committee presented two resolutions hammered out after hearing the council's opinions. The first withdrew League acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's May proposals; the second charted the League's course of future direct action:

Whereas Muslim India has exhausted, without success, all efforts to find a peaceful solution of the Indian problem by compromise and constitutional means; and whereas the Congress is bent upon setting up Caste-Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the British; and whereas recent events have shown that the power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs; and whereas it has become abundantly clear that the Muslims of India would not rest contended with anything less than the immediate establishment of an

Independent and fully sovereign State of Pakistan . . . the time has come for the

Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination (Wolpert 282).

After both resolutions were enthusiastically adopted, Jinnah concluded:

We have taken a most historic decision. Never before in the whole life- history of the Muslim League did we do anything except by

constitutional methods and constitutional talks. We are today forced

into this position by a move in which both the Congress and Britain

have participated. We have been attacked on two fronts . . . Today we

have said good-bye to constitutions and constitutional methods.

Throughout the painful negotiations, the two parties with whom we

bargained held a pistol at us; one with power and machine-guns

behind it, and the other with non-co-operation and the threat to

launch mass civil disobedience. This situation must be met. We also

have a pistol (282).

'' or 'universal Muslim hartal'9 was set for Friday, August 16, 1946.

Wavell did not seem to take this threat too seriously and failed to foresee the magnitude of the events which were about to come. It was not quite clear what

Jinnah meant by direct action and against whom was it directed but it was presumed that riots between Hindus and Muslims are likely to occur, especially in the cities

(Panigrahi 298-9). Jinnah instructed his followers “to conduct themselves peacefully and in a disciplined manner although his own usually precise and legalistic prose was vague enough to allow for violent interpretation (Khan 63). And indeed his call for direct action triggered carnage between the Muslims and the Hindus on unprecedented scale. A few days before the riots, Muslims of Calcutta had been preparing plans for direct action day. There was to be a massive gathering of

Muslims and propaganda of Pakistani cause. By late afternoon on 16 August, the people went berserk and Calcutta turned into a battlefield. Mass killings, looting,

9 'Strike action' arson and rapes swallowed the city. The streets were soon congested by piles of dead bodies. Police and the military were deliberately deployed too late and there were signs that “state resources had been exploited by the murderers with the

League's blessing.” There were heavy casualties on both sides as the violence was anticipated by the Hindus as well (Khan 64). “The fire of violence spread to East

Bengal . . . Abductions, forced marriages, compulsory conversion to Islam, destitution of whole families created distress . . . which was not to be compared to the mass deaths three years earlier by starvation in the province” (Chatterji 141).

The implementation of politics “granted the violence legitimacy in the eyes of rioters.” They were told to fight for freedom, space and history even though very few could have imagined what these notions would mean (Khan 65).

Merciless skirmishes between the communities in Calcutta lasted almost a week. In first three days at least 4,000 people died and another 10,000 were injured

(Khan 63). “Unofficial sources claimed that as many as 16,000 were murdered between 16 and 20 ” (Wolpert 286). This '' initiated by the Muslim League will be forever remembered as 'the Great Calcutta Killings'. It was

“a sound warning of what was likely to happen if Jinnah's Pakistan was not granted”

(Panigrahi 302). The riots and terror continued well after the Day Action Day in many parts of India. The country was on the verge of civil war and the British did not seem to be able to handle it. On account of communal holocaust, Jinnah remarked:

If Congress regimes are going to suppress and persecute the

Musalmans, it will be very difficult to control disturbances . . . there is

no alternative except the outright establishment of Pakistan . . . We guarantee to look after non Muslim and Hindu-caste-minorities in

Pakistan . . . and protect and safeguard their interests in any way . . .

That is the quickest way to India's real freedom and to the welfare and

happiness of all the peoples inhabiting this sub-continent

(Wolpert 287)

It is noteworthy that in Bengal, where the bloodshed took place, a League ministry, headed by Suhrawardy, was in power. Thus, they could have mitigate the tragedy.

Instead, “the police remained inactive and the army was not called” (Ghose 148).

The end justified the means; the situation changed dramatically after the Calcutta killings and Wavell realized that “a much greater measure of toleration is essential if

India is to survive the transition to freedom” (287).

3.3 The Breakup

As the League revoked the 16 May plan on 29 July 1946, Wavell turned to the

Congress, on 6 August, regarding the formation of the Interim Government. Nehru accepted the responsibility and voluntarily tried to negotiate the cooperation in coalition with Jinnah. They met twice, prior to the Direct Action Day, but both discussions ended up to be futile (Wolpert 283-4). Given the state of affairs it was not so surprising. It was understood that the Government was to be formed in early

September without Muslim League. Then, the Calcutta killings altered drastically the general view on Pakistan and left the country in turmoil. Deeply disturbed by the havoc that the slaughters in Calcutta had caused, Wavell appealed to Gandhi and

Nehru on 27 August 1946 to accept a new formula of “grouping”, threatening not to convene the constituent assembly until they did so (Menon 302). He felt, obviously intimidated by recent events, that the Interim Government could not be formed without the League. Nehru did not fail to realize that Wavell was trying to appease the League and reported Wavell's attitude to his friends in England. Subsequently,

Clement Atlee “overruled Wavell” and instructed him “to form the government with the Congress even if the League did not join” (Ghose 141). The Congress took over the interim government on 2 September and Nehru became, virtually, the and head of foreign affairs portfolio, with Patel in charge of home affairs and in charge of defence (Wolpert 289). It was “a day of mourning” for the Muslim League as Jinnah put it (Ghose 149). But it was a historic day for the Congress in a sense. Gandhi recorded: “At last the way to purna has been opened. The whole of India has waited for this day for years and years . . .

[but insisted] So far we have not secured full independence.” On 26 September, he had an interview with Wavell. Viceroy was eager to bring the Muslim League into government, so was Gandhi, but the issue of appointing Nationalist Muslim by the

Congress to Executive Council remained. (Gandhi: 92-465). As before, Nehru and

Gandhi opposed the Jinnah's claim to nominate all the Muslims. Wavell was convinced that the Congress would not change its stand (Wolpert 291) and approached Jinnah in secret allowing him to nominate five Muslims and a Scheduled

Caste member from the ranks of the Muslim League (according to 6-5-3 scheme) and join the government (Tharooor 148). Jinnah's position was desperate; he had realized that he had to be more flexible in order to secure position in the government, recognizing that “it would fatal to leave the entire field of administration . . . in the hands of the Congress” (Jalal 225). In early October, he was negotiating with Nehru and Gandhi about the set-up of the interim government.

In a letter from 6 October, Nehru expressed his willingness to co-operate with Jinnah only “as a united team” and recognized the Muslim League “as the authoritative representative organization of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India [but not all of them]. . .” (Gandhi 92:459). Jinnah refused to work as a team, which speaks volumes about his true intentions behind joining the interim government.

According to Tharoor, Jinnah had done so tactically, “only to wreck it from within”

(148). And subsequent events clearly justify her point.

The coalition was announced on 15 October, but the tussle was far from over, with communal rioting spreading to Bihar and the North Western Frontier. Jinnah forfeited all of his demands in order to be able to join the government on October

26, 1946. Apart from the parity, “monopoly of Muslim representation” and the “right to veto on issues concerning Muslims”, Nehru was not willing to relinquish any of the three major portfolios either (Jalal 225). He used all its power to prevent the League from entering the government, since on the provincial level the League's influence was weak. Nehru was quite aware of Jinnah's real intentions because the League leaders, especially , made their ultimate goal – Pakistan – no secret.

In the end, the League was able to nominate a Scheduled Class member and take over the finance portfolio. Tension between the Congress and the League was glaring and there was no reconciliation or solution to “fundamental mistrust, suspicion, fear and hatred” (Wolpert 293-4). Appointed League's members of the government “worked as a separate and distinct wing” and Wavell was unable, due to his lack of political skills, “to ensure more effective co-ordination.” Smooth functioning of the government was thereby virtually impossible (Moraes 343). Immediately after the formation of the government, Nehru insisted on

League's acceptance of the May 16 Plan, since it was the condition for its entry into office. Jinnah argued that the Congress had never accepted the Mission's proposals unequivocally (Menon 321) and wanted the grouping cut, before he would bring the

League into the Constituent Assembly, which was scheduled on December 9 (321).

The Congress suggested that the grouping clause might be referred to the Federal

Court for its interpretation. This was the major flaw of the Cabinet Mission all along, since the British had failed to guarantee the procedure of the Constituent Assembly and were unable to forestall the Congress from misinterpreting its spirit. On 21

November, Jinnah announced that no representative of the Muslim League would participate in the Constituent Assembly, thus he effectively “cramped constitutional process” (Moraes 343). Jinnah, Nehru and other Leaguers and Congressmen had been invited to London, in December, “in a last-ditch effort to salvage the situation”, but the talks failed because neither of them showed willingness to accommodate

(Zakaria 126). However, the British government released the statement on 6

December declaring that “Should a Constitution come to be framed by a Constituent

Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been represented, His Majesty's Government could not of course contemplate–as the

Congress have stated they would not contemplate-forcing such a Constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country” (Wolpert 301) and confirmed grouping of the provinces (Jalal 231). Nevertheless, the League would not participate in framing of the constitution till the very end. Not even after the Constituent Assembly meeting was held on 9 December 1946 (Chatterji 139) and Nehru accepted the 6 December statement. Attempts to compile “an agreed constitution for a united India [were] an idle dream” (Wolpert 309). Apparently, Jinnah had made his mind some time ago; the League “continued to instigate violence across the country” and Jinnah declared that bloodshed “would not stop unless Pakistan was created” (Tharoor 148). By the end of 1946 onwards, the law and order situation had worsened considerably and even the capital felt insecure and incapable of dealing with communal outbursts

(Jalal 178). Gandhi observed: “We are not yet in the midst of a civil war. But we are nearing it” (Khan 79). Untenable situation forced the British to a radical decision. On

20 February 1947, Clement Attlee announced “to take necessary steps to effect the peaceful transfer of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than

June 1948.” It was desired that by fixing the exact date of withdrawal Indian politicans would come to an agreement about constitution. But given the circumstances, it was unlikely to happen and the question of how and to whom it should transfer powers was yet to be decided. Moreover, Lord Wavell was being replaced by Lord Mountbatten on the position of the Viceroy (Menon 338). He was to be the last Viceroy of India with enormously difficult task of wrapping up the British

Raj. Penderel Moon recollected, in his book Divide and Quit: “This announcement [of transfer of power] meant Partition, and Partition within the next seventeen months”

(63).

3.4 Mountbatten Plan and Partition of India

Prior to his arrival on 22 March 1946, Mountbatten was instructed by the

Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, to avoid Partition and obtain a unitary Government for India. The hallmark was to secure British interests of keeping the army undivided and retaining India in the Commonwealth. It took, however, just a few weeks and a couple of meetings with Indian leaders to come to the conclusion that partition was inevitable, and the “only possible alternative” (T.O.P. Vol 10,294). Although undesirable, by both the British and the Indian National Congress, it became abundantly clear that some sort of Pakistan had to be conceded, given Jinnah's stubborn attitude and communal violence that had spread to, virtually, all parts of the country, Punjab being affected the most. It was, however, the division of Punjab and Bengal that caused misery and suffering of millions of Hindus, Muslims and

Sikhs. This could have been avoided only if the Congress had not insisted on this division and the British had not taken side with its leaders. Both failed to realize or rather neglected, despite warnings from Jinnah and others, the possibility of horrible consequences of such fragmentation of ethnically diverse provinces. They hoped to avoid further conflict but, in reality, it made the matters worse. Another reason was the hastened nature with which the final decision was made.

By the time Mountbatten arrived in India, the communal violence and riots in

Punjab, once peaceful 'jewel' of the British India, had reached considerable heights.

Lahore, and other cities were ablaze and mobs of young League's followers and armed gangs were attacking government buildings, as well as private houses, hoisting Muslim League flags. The situation was rapidly going out of control, and

Congressmen “started to use the vocabulary of Partition” as a possible solution for the disaster unfolding in the region (Khan 81-5). The Congress Working Committee's resolution from March 8 demanded for immediate Dominion Status and the handing over of power to the interim government which would “function as a Cabinet with full authority and responsibility.” It also called upon all parties and groups to discard violent and coercive methods, and co-operate peacefully. Nehru urged “the Muslim

League to join Congress in the Assembly and work together amicably toward reaching a final settlement.” If this would not have been possible, a division of the

Punjab and Bengal, with bearing in mind the will of large groups of non-Muslims in these provinces, had become inevitable. Jinnah insisted that ideology and goal of the

Congress and the League are fundamentally different and in conflict and therefore

“there is no common ground for co-operation” (Wolpert 311-2).

Nehru and the Congress had been “attached to the idea of a United India” but eventually reluctantly conceded to partition, in the expressed hope of avoiding conflict and destruction of the country (T.O.P. Vol.10, 519). The only other solution was presented by Gandhi who suggested that “India could be kept united if Jinnah were offered the leadership of the whole country.” This idea, however, was unthinkable for Nehru and Patel and Mountbatten “did not seem to take it seriously” either (Tharoor 154).

Crucial discussions between Mountbatten and Jinnah were held in April 1947.

They ultimately determined the resolution of the Indian dilemma. Mountbatten was very skilful negotiator but not even him could persuade Jinnah “to shake [his] resolve to have partition.” Jinnah was a true leader of the Muslim League and the

Muslims for that matter. His position was strong enough to adamantly stick to his demand, especially after the killings in Calcutta in 1946 (Zakaria 131-2). In his talks with Mountbatten, Jinnah thought that “he had only to keep arguing to ensure that

Pakistan came into being” (Morris 3). They did agree on the urgency of speedy decision, given the state of uncontrollable communal conflicts in the country. In the

BBC documentary „The Day India Burned: Partition of India‟, Bir Bahadur Singh recollects how their Sikh village in the Punjab was being attacked by the Muslims and his father and other men decided rather to kill their own daughters and women than to see them being taken away by Muslims. Such horrible scenes of communal frenzy repeated again and again behind the curtain of political negotiations.

Mountbatten warned Jinnah that partition might produce even more violence and bloodshed and it is in the best interests of the Muslims and the Hindus to avoid partition. But Jinnah reassured him that such 'surgical operation' would resolve all the troubles in the subcontinent. He also agitated against the division of Punjab and

Bengal, despite the fact that they contained enormous Hindu and Sikh population.

Mountbatten did not agree; he run Jinnah to the wall and told him that “as a part of the bargain” to earn any Pakistan at all, those provinces must be divided (Zakaria

132-4). Mountbatten, being a friend of Nehru, would not listen to any proposal or suggestion that would not hold ground with the Congress. Jinnah's insistence on the unity of the Punjab and Bengal was very logical and based on a realistic and peaceful solution to the impasse. Such a settlement would avoid the probable dislocation, violence and above all confusion rampant in the country. But

Mountbatten in his final plan utterly disregarded the possibility of massive that was naturally attached with the partition of these two large provinces

(Ghose 160). Likewise, the Sikhs of the Punjab were overlooked altogether. In the words of Mountbatten, “a psychopathic case”, Jinnah, was given a choice, either “a moth-eaten Pakistan” or the united India with safeguards that would allow him to have his Pakistan later (Wolpert 318-9). This ultimatum forced deeply saddened

Jinnah to accept the 3 June plan prepared by Mountbatten and approved after considerable discussion by London. Gandhi was strongly against the partition but could not prevent it in the end and “felt helpless to carry on any more with his life- long mission.” Mountbatten had to convince Nehru and Patel first and he secured their consent with the help of Krishna Menon and V.P. Menon (Zakaria 136-40).

Nehru hated the vivisection of India, but as he said on 3 “they could not let India bleed continuously” (Moraes 357) Later, in 1960, he admitted that “partition offered a way out . . .” (Ghose 161). Mountbatten wanted to proceed as quickly as he could, in order not to be blamed for law and order of the country (The Day India

Burned), and deliberately “swept the Indian leaders along” (Tharoor 154). Panigrahi hold the view that the Indian leaders, mostly tired old men, sacrificed the national cause by seizing the first opportunity to grasp power and thus hastily accepted partition of India (12). However, it was the fundamental divergence of aims of the

Congress and the Muslim League which constituted the crux of the whole issue: unity vs. partition (Ali 117).

The partition plan was broadcasted on June 3, 1947, and it specified the division of India into two of India and Pakistan with immediate independence; “Pakistan was to be of the truncated contiguous area variety involving the partition of both the Punjab and Bengal.” The partition would have to be approved by the Legislative Assemblies of these provinces by majority of votes, first as a whole and then as two parts, one representing the Muslim-majority districts and the other the rest of the province. If either part voted for partition, then the province would be divided (Moon 66). The bisection was highly anticipated, therefore necessary steps were to be initiated, with hastened nature, for dividing the army, debt, and all the assets. In case of partition of the Punjab and Bengal, a

Boundary Commission was to be appointed “to demarcate the boundaries on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, and also to take into account other factors” (67). Furthermore, the very next day,

Mountbatten declared that the transfer of power to the two states “was [to be] advanced from June, 1948 to , 1947” (Moraes 356).

The Quaid-i-Azzam had finally earned Pakistan for the Muslims although

“there was no firm line between winners and losers”. The plan inevitably caused an utter confusion and disorientation in the minds of all communities. The country was to be divided but it was not clear whether they would be expected to relocate and where the actual boundaries would lie (Khan 89). The cardinal mistake of the

Boundary Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe who had never been in India before, was that it had kept the already-drawn boundaries a secret until the independence was granted to Pakistan and India on 14 and 15 August 1947 respectively (Wolpert 334). The uncertainty of the borders and fixed date of the partition (Pollack,The Day India Burned: Partition of India), more or less, led to the worst ethnic cleansing between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in the history of British

India, particularly in the Punjab (Morris). The law and order considerably weakened after the British had decided to bring most of their armed troops home in June 1947.

The remaining ones, “feeble and polarised police forces and undermanned Punjab

Boundary Force” could hardly make much of difference, considering a vastness of the Indian Territory, to stop colossal human tragedy from happening. The British completely failed to guarantee any safeguards to the Indian people because

Mountbatten had instructed the remaining troops to stay away from the frenzy with only one exception: they could intervene “in [case of] an emergency to save British lives” (Khan 128-9). This cold-blooded attitude cast a gloomy shadow on Mountbatten's viceroyalty and Attlee's government as well.

At the end of June 1947, the Bengali and Punjabi legislative assemblies voted for partition of their provinces as a “solution to the communal problem that had burned much of Lahore and Amritsar to the ground” (Wolpert 332). The provinces had been cut in half with taking into account religious population of each individual district, which was based on outdated figures, and other factors such as connections of railways, canals, irrigation channels, etc. (Pollack,The Day India Burned: Partition of India). The fate of millions of people had been decided and resulted in a massive movement of civilians prior to the announcement of boundaries but mainly in an immediate aftermath. The boundaries had been drawn in extremely rushed manner, in thirty six days, and the people who found themselves on the 'wrong' side of the boundary “were forced to embark upon unplanned migrations under extremely unguarded and dangerous circumstances” (Ali 126). Communities were literally running for their lives on foot or by trains which were often attacked by armed gangs who slaughtered the passengers. The roads were crammed with refugees and their tracks were soon covered with blood; many villages of Punjab were levelled to the ground and inhabitants executed. On top of that, countless women of all religious communities were brutally raped and often disfigured (Khan 129). The price of freedom and the emergence of Pakistan was enormously high; roughly 1 million people died and some 15 million had to relocate in the process (Hartnack

244). The evidence presented in this thesis put the question of inevitability of the partition beyond any doubt but the number of casualties could certainly have been alleviated if the British had taken full responsibility for the law and order in the country. Unfortunately, Mountbatten turned a deaf ear to the warnings of both Nehru and Jinnah (Khan 107). Celebrations of freedom, which were boycotted by its

“architect” (Zakaria 154), were overshadowed by the holocaust across the boundaries and bitter legacies of the partition continue to haunt people of

India and Pakistan even today.

Conclusion

There were several reasons for the birth of a separate Muslim homeland and the evidence suggests that all three parties – the British, the Congress and the

Muslim League were responsible. First of all, the British followed a divide-and-rule policy in India and from the very beginning of their rule were categorizing people according to religion and viewed and treated them as separate from each other.

Secondly, there was an ideological divide between the Muslims and the Hindus of

India. While there were strong feelings of nationalism in India, there were also communal conflicts that were based on religious communities rather than class or regional ones. Jinnah played probably the most crucial role in rooting this religious divide into the minds of Muslims. Other communities inevitably answered with the same violence and India was on the verge of civil war in 1946-47. Indian Congress made several mistakes in their policies which convinced the League that it was impossible to live in an undivided India after freedom from colonial rule because their interests would be completely suppressed. The British did not hide its interest in pitching two sides against each other and in the end did not take responsibility of the law and order in the country. If they had, there would probably not have been so much suffering. There had been some hope of an undivided India, with a government consisting of three tiers along basically the same lines as the borders of

India and Pakistan at the time of Partition. However, Congress' rejection of the

Cabinet Mission plan of 1946 convinced the leaders of the Muslim League that compromise was impossible and partition was the only course to take.

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Résumé

Partition of Indian subcontinent in August 1947 was truly a remarkable event accompanied with independence and an emergence of a sovereign Pakistan state.

The reasons and circumstances which led to the partition can be determined, primarily, from the events of 1935 onwards. Two main political organizations, the

Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, had contested in provincial elections two years later and their outcome changed the political situation in India substantially. The Congress had won persuasively and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru claimed to represent all Indians, irrespective of religion. But the Muslim League's leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, feared Hindu domination over the Muslim minority in united India and started to agitate for a separate state which the Muslims could call their own. All his future negotiations with the British Government and the Congress were based on the assumption that the Hindus and Muslims constituted two different nations. He appealed to the Muslims when he declared that their Islam religion was in danger. The Viceroys of India, especially the last one, Lord Mountbatten, played a crucial role in the process of creation of Pakistan, even though their main goal was undivided India. They were ostensibly trying to resolve political impasse by series of proposals from the August offer of 1942 to the Cabinet Mission offer of 1946. Their real intention, though, was to preserve the Empire as long as possible. In the end, all negotiations had inevitably failed and riots in the Punjab and Bengal provinces escalated in a shocking ethnic cleansing finally forced the British Government to concede Pakistan. Moreover, the boundaries were drawn and the power was transferred in extremely short space of time. It was considered to be the only solution to prevent the country from complete social breakdown. However, the partition of India and division of the Punjab and Bengal along religious lines caused a staggering human tragedy on an unprecedented scale with some 15 million refugees and casualties of around 1 million.

Resumé

Rozdělení Indického subkontinentu v srpnu 1947 bylo v skutku nevšední událostí, která byla spojená s nezávislostí a vznikem samostatného státu Pakistan.

Důvody a okolnosti, které vedly k tomuto rozdělení se dají určit zejména z událostí, které následovali po roku 1935. Dvě hlavní politické organizace, Indický národní kongres a Liga muslimů, se utkali ve volbách do provincií a výsledek těchto voleb výrazně pozměnil politickou situaci v Indii. Kongres přesvědčivě vyhrál a jeho lídr

Džaváharlál Néhrú prohlásil, že reprezentuje všechny Indy bez ohledu na náboženství. Jenomže lídr Ligy muslimů, Muhammad Alí Džinnáh, měl strach z dominance hinduistů v jednotné Indii a začal agitovat za samostatný stát, který by muslimové mohli nazývat svým vlastním. Všechny jeho budoucí vyjednávání s britskou vládou a kongresem byly založené na předpokladu, že hindové a muslimové tvoří dva odlišné národy. Samotné muslimy přilákal, když vyhlásil, že jejich islámské náboženství je v ohrožení. Místokrálové Indie, zejména ten poslední, Lord

Mountbatten, hrály důležitou roli při vytvoření Pákistánu, i když jejich hlavním cílem byla jednotná Indie. Zdánlivě se pokoušeli vyřešit politický rozkol předložením návrhů v srpnu 1942 až do Mise kabinetu v roku 1946. Jejich skutečným cílem však bylo udržet britské impérium tak dlouho jak jen bude možné. Všechny vyjednávání nakonec nevyhnutelně selhaly a nepokoje v provinciích Paňdžáb a Bengál byly vyhrocené až do šokujících etnických čistek. Tyhle události nakonec přinutili britskou vládu uznat Pákistán. Co víc, ve velmi krátkém čase byli stanoveny hranice spolu s předáním moci. Tohle rozhodnutí bylo považované za jediné možné řešení, které mělo zamezit absolutnímu zhroucení společnosti. Rozdělení Indie a provincií Paňdžáb a Bengál však způsobilo ohromnou lidskou tragédii, která neměla obdobu – 15 miliónů utečenců a zhruba jeden milión obětí na životech.