Report of the Commission on Radio and Television Policy: Volume 6, Number 2

The Carter Center

August 1994

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 2. Communiqué on Broadcaster Autonomy and the State 3. Broadcast Freedom and the State: Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Commission on Radio and Television Policy 4. Broadcaster Autonomy and the State: Models and Options Report of the Working Group 5. Commission on Radio and Television Policy Members 6. Working Group Participants

Introduction: Co-Chair Jimmy Carter In September 1994, the Commission on Radio and Television Policy, bringing together the New Independent States, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the United States, met in St. Petersburg, Russia, to discuss the most important policy issue of the electronic media: how to strengthen the independence of radio and television. The members of the Commission represented several different approaches and types of government, but, in the end, there was unanimous agreement on a communiqué urging all parties to defend and extend autonomy of the media. Because television and radio have so much influence in the modern world, political leaders pay them a great deal of attention. Governments often attempt to apply undue influence to control the media in the hope that policies, programs, and elections will go their way. Unquestionably, the modern electronic media do have a profound influence on the opinions and attitudes of the public. It is sometimes less obvious - but no less important - that governments are, ultimately, best served by a free and autonomous media system. The credibility and effectiveness of the media depend on the perception that decisions affecting content are made independently of government control. And that is a fundamental condition of democratic governance. Independence from political interference is not the only condition of a democratic media system. Journalists must be protected (news decisions must be made independently of what investors might wish to see) and some predictable method of transmitting information must be assured. The Commission on Radio and Television Policy agreed that a number of buffer arrangements can contribute powerfully to the development and maintenance of broadcast freedom. What makes the battle for press autonomy especially difficult is the often invisible nature of the benefit it produces. The public may not always understand the democratic asset a free press provides, but access to and use of the media by ordinary citizens and the politically powerful alike is one of the best schools of democracy. There are new possibilities, with new technologies, and new forms of participation for national conversations. At the same time, autonomy for the press and the interests of the public are held in balance only by a respect for an understanding of mutual rights. The Commission strongly favored voluntary codes of journalists' ethics and voluntary practices concerning violence on television. It did not favor governmental or other controls, but also noted that civility is essential to democratic discourse. Since the first meeting of the Commission in 1991, the enormous role television and radio plays in the fates of nations has been amply demonstrated. It is our hope that the work of our Commission and the guidebooks it produces (the first, Television and Elections, has been translated at this time in 11 languages; the second, Television/Radio News and Minorities, is in three languages), will serve to further the development of democracy. Introduction: Co-Chair Eduard Sagalaev Five years ago, if you had asked a question regarding the autonomy and independence of the mass media, you would have received an answer containing a complete quotation from the works of V. I. Lenin. It would be based on Marxism and display the complete independence of radio and television in a country run by the dictatorship of the proletariat. You also would have received a long-winded and suffering attempt to show the outstanding examples of how free and independent the Soviet journalist is in his expression of social views and opinions. Today we can boldly say that those times have passed, but we can just as boldly and honestly admit that today our society still has not arrived at that moment when the mass media information can be considered truly free and independent. A great step forward has been taken from the time when our entire society and our media were mired in the euphoria of the building of developed socialism, or in other words - complete stagnation. For the most part, this progress is particularly visible in the acknowledgement and profound re- evaluation of the significance of the press, radio, and television. Present at the September 1994 meeting of the members of the Commission on Radio and Television Policy in St. Petersburg were scholars, public and political figures, and heads of both independent and state television stations from Russia, the United States, Poland, the Czech Republic, former republics of the Soviet Union, and the Baltics. They discussed the issue of media autonomy, and, in particular, electronic media - radio and television. They discussed these media as the most important factors in the preservation of the democratic development process in the post-communist territory. The history of Russia in the last few years has repeatedly demonstrated to us the attempts of government and other political circles to control the mass media. However, in all cases, these attempts led to the opposite results. Today, we can already say that our political and governmental officials take the opinions of the leading independent radio and television journalists to heart. They willingly take part in broadcasts and try not to undertake open attempts to regulate public opinion by seizing control of the media. Naturally, it would be an absurd claim to state that, at the present stage, our mass media have attained the standards of a developed democratic country. There are still a great many unresolved problems: the inability to protect journalists, finances, the mastery of modern technology, and the like. A long road lies ahead, but the first step has already been taken - the foundation of the infrastructure of democratic mass media has been laid. All that is needed now is time to strengthen this foundation and to introduce democratic journalistic principles. The Commission on Radio and Television Policy has already made its contribution to this process, but a great deal remains to be done. I am pleased to announce that in Russia a Commission on Radio and Television Policy is now registered. It is a natural extension of our Commission, and, in the near future, it will try to take on part of the burdensome load in assisting the development and strengthening of democratic mass media. Communiqué on Broadcaster Autonomy and the State September 13, 1994 The Commission on Radio and Television Policy, chaired by President Jimmy Carter and Eduard Sagalaev, met in St. Petersburg, Russia, on September 12- 13, 1994, to consider how to strengthen broad-casters' autonomy against the incursions of state power, or of economic interests. This communiqué treats issues to which the Commission gave highest priority; other important matters are discussed in the forthcoming Commission Report.

1. The stability of modern democratic states depends in large measure on the perception and reality of free broadcasting. Without an independent broadcasting system, ordinary citizens lose confidence in the state, its institutions and processes. Freedom of communication helps government to establish a civil society in which citizens' loyalty and participation is voluntary and authentic. As recent history teaches, attempts by governments to control information cannot last. 2. In the process of formation of democratic institutions, the state-owned television should be transformed into public-service television. 3. Buffer organizations should be formed according to legislation for broadcasting in each nation. Specifically, the Commission recommends that three buffer functions be established: a. Assigning frequencies and granting licenses. b. Making available a means for the public and the personnel of broadcast organizations to file complaints about abuses. This function would be dedicated to protecting free expression. c. In cases where states provide financial support to broadcasters, distributing the money so that government and ruling parties are removed from programming decisions. These functions may be undertaken by three separate buffer organizations, by two, or by one, depending on the desires of each nation. To minimize influence of ruling powers, members should represent a variety of political parties, movements, minority groups, and other organizations such as universities.

4. Broadcasters must enjoy technological autonomy, which is the ability to extend their signals without dependence on government, except for frequency management. This goal is especially difficult to attain if the state owns all of the available means of transmitting or distributing broadcast signals, such as satellites. Under these conditions, the government should open its distribution facilities to all broadcasters without discrimination. For example, this means nonstate and state broadcasters should pay the same fee for satellite time, transmission facilities, and equipment rentals or purchases.

To minimize any chance for discrimination, the Commission strongly recommends that nations should promote multiple means for dissemination of media programming, some of them privately owned.

In the exercise of their autonomy and commercial interests, broadcasts should be cognizant of societal needs. Among the most important such considerations have been the gratuitous depiction of violence and indecency in television entertainment programming. While televised violence does not by itself create violent conditions, studies indicate that children and perhaps adults are negatively influenced. Accordingly, the Commission calls for voluntary self-regulation by broadcasters. Images of violence should be transmitted with the utmost discretion. The Commission further recommends that broadcasters voluntarily agree to avoid broadcasting violent images while children are likely to be in the audience.

5. The Commission recommends that journalists be guided by voluntary codes of professional ethics. 6. False or misleading advertising on radio and television should be prohibited. 7. The Commission chairs will work with members of the Commission to encourage the exchange of television programs among the countries represented on the Commission.

Jimmy Carter Eduard Sagalaev Broadcast Freedom and the State Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Commission on Radio and Television Policy Saint Petersburg, Russia September 12-13, 1994 Television and radio exert significant influence over public opinion. This influence often leads government officials to seek control over the broadcast media, and government control harms democracy. Without freedom for broadcasters, the public cannot participate effectively in politics, for most people learn about politics and governmental actions mainly from TV and radio news. If government controls the messages, citizens have little ability to discover what is really happening in their countries - and hold public officials accountable for their actions. In the United States, the First Amendment recognizes the media's importance to democracy. It instructs government to "make no law abridging freedom of speech...or of the press." Yet even in the U.S., the government has occasionally succeeded in undermining freedom of expression by the media. In the New Independent States (NIS), press freedom is developing in a new era. The Commission, therefore, met this year to consider ways of protecting freedom of expression for broadcasters, thereby supporting democracy. In spite of obvious and serious differences among the countries, the Commission considers the basic issues it addresses as common to all participants. The Goals of a Free Media System President Carter observed that "people will have more confidence in government if they believe that the information they receive is balanced, diverse, fair, open, and free... .There must be more freedom, more autonomy for television and radio in the future if democracy is to survive and flourish." The absence of substantial media freedom destabilizes democracy, while its presence nourishes democracy. The co-chair of the Commission, Eduard Sagalaev, president of the Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corp., emphasized the ways in which "development of the mass media infrastructure supports development of pluralistic democracy." To achieve stable democracy, citizens must perceive the media system as independent from state control. The Commission identified three fundamental goals for broadcasting that enjoys independence from government interference:

Controlling abuses by government and by other centers of power. Stimulating the public's interest and involvement in such democratic processes as voting and working in election campaigns. Providing access to channels for self-expression by individuals, groups, and social institutions.

The Commission believes broadcasting organizations should be allowed to transmit the programs and messages they themselves choose, without consulting or obtaining permission from government. Most important, broadcasters should have the freedom to scrutinize and criticize all institutions that exercise political or economic power and authority - without fear of reprisal. Autonomy for broadcasters was upheld very strongly by the Commission's members. But that autonomy was also understood to be part of a balancing of rights and interests on the part of the public, the legal and political system, and the broadcasters themselves. The Working Group's report describes in some detail the nature of this balance. As Charles Firestone of The Aspen Institute put it, "Unbridled media autonomy is not an end in itself; it is a means toward a healthy, participatory democracy and society." In enjoying their guaranteed autonomy and pursuing their interests, the Commission agreed, broadcasters should recognize these larger societal needs. I. Political Freedom

a. Legal guarantees

Many Commissioners discussed the importance of developing a legal structure that supports freedom of broadcasting. In some nations, notably Russia, laws are in the process of development. This means the relationship between state authorities and broadcasters is subject to constant and unpredictable change. Aleksei Simonov, chairman of the board of the Glasnost Defense Foundation, estimated that in Russia "more than 400 broadcast stations have gone on the air without legal licenses, due to the absence of a legal basis for operation." Often more than one entity occupies - or believes it has the right to occupy - the same frequency. Mr. Sagalaev, noting that real autonomy requires a legal structure, stressed the urgent need for "special legislation on freedom of the press." The Commission's first recommendation embodies this observation.

Recommendation 1. As soon as possible, states that lack a legal structure protecting freedom of the press should adopt laws that establish legal guarantees of freedom for broadcasters.

b. Buffer organizations

Perhaps the most important mechanism for achieving freedom in practice, identified by both the Working Group and the Commission, is the creation of "buffer" organizations. Such agencies mediate between government and other powerful institutions and the mass media. They can moderate the influence of government on broadcasting organizations.

Laymonas Tapinas, general director of the Television and Radio Company of Lithuania, described tensions between government and media that seem common among many of the New Independent States. He said that "authorities try to manipulate media, both state and commercial broadcasters." Buffer organizations are not panaceas, he went on: "Although capable people are serving on the broadcast commissions, they are not specialists in communication and sometimes make ill-informed decisions." For example, members of one country's broadcast council suggested that commercials run in the middle of the night to avoid irritating the viewers. Certainly, such a course would defeat the purpose of advertising - to generate maximum revenue for stations by reaching the largest audience. It is important that national regulatory organizations be composed of knowledgeable specialists who have clear laws to administer.

Recommendation 2. Legislation in each nation should establish buffer organizations. Specifically, the Commission recommends that three buffer functions be performed. These functions may be undertaken by three separate buffer organizations, by two, or by one, depending on the desires of each nation.

a. Assigning frequencies and granting licenses. b. Making available a means for the public and the personnel of broadcast organizations to file complaints about abuses. This function would be dedicated to protecting free expression. c. Distributing money in cases where states provide financial support to broadcasters so that government and ruling parties are removed from programming decisions.

As an example of a buffer agency, Jacek Bochenek, news director of the Television Agency of Poland, described the Polish Council for Radio and Television. It has three members selected by the Polish president, three by the Polish Senate, and three by the Polish Parliament. Some members are politicians, others experts in broadcasting. Because of recent conflicts between the president and the Council, Mr. Bochenek predicted that Parliament will change the law so that the chair is selected not by the president of Poland but within the Council itself. Among other duties, the Council issues licenses and frequency assignments, and administers license fees and sets limits on advertising, for both public and private television.

The Commission further adds:

Recommendation 3. To minimize the influence of ruling parties over buffer agencies, members of the organizations should represent a variety of political parties, movements, minority groups, and other organizations such as universities.

Stuart Loory, vice president of Cable News Network, said that despite having broad representation of organizations, he feared "mistakes by government-appointed regulators." He suggested that "attention should be paid to the needs of the general public, and a way should be found to give them a voice in these commissions." c. The economic basis of political freedom for broadcasting Most Commissioners agreed that if broadcasters depend on outside sources of financing, especially government, their freedom of expression will inevitably be limited. This problem is particularly serious for broadcast outlets owned by the state. For example, Lithuanian National Television obtains 60 percent of its budget from the state (the rest of its revenue comes from commercials). "When we have to ask the prime minister for more funds, we always have to defend our programming. Even with good legislation, we're still exposed to some government domination," observed the head of Lithuanian Television.

Recommendation 4. While forming democratic institutions, converting state-owned television organizations into public-service broadcasting outlets should receive high priority. The freedom of these public service broadcasters should receive protection from government interference even if some funding comes from the state. d. Supporting the growth of independent broadcasting

Commissioners generally agreed that while government funding poses significant dangers to the freedom of broadcasters, it may be essential to help private broadcasters get started. Assuming that broadcast laws and buffer organizations are in place and protecting freedom of expression, the Commission therefore issued:

Recommendation 5. Government should provide subsidies for the formation and support of independent broadcast entities. e. Stimulating a democratic political culture

For broadcast freedom to flourish, it must enjoy support among the public, not just among specialists, intellectuals, and broadcasters themselves. In many of the New Independent States, the political culture is hostile or indifferent to the idea of free expression. For example, Konstantin Pyrtsak of the Television and Radio Company of Moldova observed that "while officials often demand a press subordinate to them, viewers also seem to dislike freedom of the press. Our public demands measures to restrict press freedom."

Recommendation 6. The public should be encouraged to recognize how media freedom benefits ordinary citizens.

The Commission issued two other general recommendations designed to protect democracy by enhancing broadcasters' freedom of expression.

Recommendation 7. Broadcasters must possess guarantees of access to information about government; with few exceptions, secrecy in government is incompatible with an independent press and a democratic process.

Recommendation 8. Corporations with interests outside the field of broadcasting may be tempted to censor news that affects those outside interests. The news operations of stations owned by such corporations should be insulated from the corporation's other interests.

II. Economic and Technological Independence

a. Concentration and diversity of ownership

The Commission addressed several issues that arise from the close connection of economics and technology to freedom for broadcasting.

First is concentration and diversity in ownership of broadcasting outlets. The danger of having only a few owners, whether inside the government or outside, is that a handful of people could exert too much control over the flow of information. This would harm the democratic process. Diversity in ownership of broadcast facilities reinforces the credibility and independence of the media. It also heightens the probability that broadcasters will produce and circulate diverse content. Ownership by a few entities can lead to private censorship of media content and even collusion with the state. On the other hand, ownership limits can go too far. It serves the general goal of freedom to allow broadcasters to grow and prosper. Economically healthy broadcasters are less vulnerable to state interference.

Recommendation 9. Public policy should limit concentration of broadcast ownership. However, any regulation should not prevent the development of strong broadcast organizations that can resist political pressure.

b. The need for an independent technical infrastructure

Mikhail Poltoranin highlighted the importance of developing technical facilities to transmit broadcast programming not controlled by government: "If there is a sharp turn in political course and rigid power returns, it will be easy for government to return broadcasting to the previous situation if we do not have an economic and technical base that is independent. We need investments to develop a parallel structure: transmitters, receivers, and the rest. Only in this case can guarantees of independent media work."

In Russia and some other NIS republics, conditions are far from satisfactory in this respect. For example, Igor Malashenko, president of NTV, an independent television broadcasting organization, argued that in Russia, mass media distribution mechanisms "are at the disposal of the Ministry of Communication. The facilities belong to them. In principle, there are normal relations with them, and we have contracts with them. But in practice we have to pay higher prices than state-owned broadcasters for the very same services, although we are using the identical technical facilities." Mr. Sagalaev said that prices for private stations such as the one he runs (Channel Six in Moscow) are anywhere from 1.5 to 6 times higher than state-owned stations must pay - for example, to rent time on the satellites that distribute Channel Six's signal in other parts of Russia.

Recommendation 10. Broadcasters must enjoy technological autonomy, which is the ability to extend their signals without dependence on government. This goal is especially difficult to attain if the state owns all the available means of transmitting or distributing broadcast signals, such as satellites. Where government does own distribution facilities, it should open them to all broadcasters without discrimination. For example, nonstate and state broadcasters should pay the same fee for satellite time, transmission facilities, and equipment rentals or purchases. A buffer organization could enforce this requirement.

Recommendation 11: To reduce any chance for discrimination, the Commission strongly recommends that nations create multiple technical means for disseminating media programming, some of them privately owned. c. Unfair competition from state-owned broadcasters

State-owned broadcasters also may have another unfair economic advantage that may be even more threatening to the survival of privately owned broadcast entities. Commonly, state-owned broadcast outlets rely heavily on advertising revenue. For example, in Russia, according to Mr. Poltoranin, "We don't really have state-owned TV companies in the traditional sense. Nominally they exist, but they only receive state subsidies amounting to about 30 to 35 percent of their budgets." The rest comes from other funding sources, especially advertising. What this means, said several Commissioners, is that large, subsidized state broadcasters are taking a substantial portion of the market for advertising. These broadcasters charge advertisers less than they would have to without subsidies. As a result the prices private broadcasters can charge (and revenues they can generate) are lower than they would be in a genuine competitive market. Therefore, the Commission advanced:

Recommendation 12. Market forces should set advertising rates. Because of their size and influence, government-owned stations should be careful when setting their own advertising charges not to undermine the ability of nonstate broad-casters to sell advertising.

d. The contribution of radio

Radio provides an effective means for citizens to participate in political learning and discussion. It is the most inexpensive of all mass media to operate and, therefore, has the greatest potential to maintain freedom from outside interference by powerful interests, including government. Imants Rakins, general director of the Television and Radio Company of Latvia, for example, described how use of radio allows a relatively small nation like his to afford a diverse range of programs and topics that serve many minorities. Alfred Sikes, former chair of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission and president for New Media and Technology of the Hearst Corp., observed that "mass media offer a constructive outlet for release of frustrations and expressions of citizenship ... The lower costs of radio allow it to produce inexpensive telephone call-in shows that often serve as better vehicles for citizenship and release of frustrations than television, which is largely commanded by professional journalists and entertainers."

Recommendation 13. In considering how to enhance the independence of their broadcasting systems, nations should explore and employ the capabilities of radio as fully as possible.

e. The contribution of new technologies

New technologies open opportunities for less expensive mass communication. Anthony Riddle, chair of the Alliance for Community Media in the U.S., offered a provocative example: "Rural areas are ignored by central broadcasters here in Russia and often in the U.S. also. Camcorders can supplement more expensive facilities and allow even small towns or groups to develop community-based video outlets, perhaps using inexpensive, low-power transmitters."

Recommendation 14. In the future, newer means of production, transmission and distribution may become more widely available. These include camcorders for production of video, international personal computer networks, cellular telephone, and other technologies that may allow more independent media production and distribution. The Commission believes broadcasting and other communication organizations should seek opportunities to use these emerging information media.

III. Professional Ethics and Self-Regulation Commissioners expressed great interest in the violations of journalistic ethics experienced in nations now enjoying an unprecedented degree of press freedom. St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak told the Commission that when the media are liberated from domination by the state, but legal and judicial regulation remain in flux, the media can become a "sort of demon let out from the bottle." He went on to say that "in our media you only hear all sorts of extreme things, armed conflicts, everything that is abnormal or ill ... Any negative fact becomes enhanced, raised to the tenth or hundredth power... During the transition period, media have special responsibilities." Mr. Sagalaev added to the indictment: "We see as day-to-day events the appearance on TV and radio of special materials paid for by certain circles of society. Journalists seem not to understand the difference between the first and second most ancient professions." Vsevolod Bogdanov, president of the Moscow Union of Journalists, echoed the charge that journalists are "living in an ethical wild forest ... It is most astonishing, but some journalists say they have the right to sell their labor and follow orders on what to write." The unfortunate outcomes of this include, perhaps most importantly, a loss of credibility for the media. As Yassen Zassoursky, dean of the Moscow State University School of Journalism, observed, "The public does not trust media, and this mistrust is the result of insufficiently high ethical standards." Pierre Salinger, vice chairman of Burson-Marsteller, who represented ABC News, emphasized that the problem of journalistic ethics is not limited to the NIS: "Ethical standards are breaking down around the world. The more they do, the more governments will attempt to impose laws on journalists. Real democratic journalism requires journalists to create and obey ethical standards, not just in the New Independent States but worldwide." Recommendation 15. The Commission recommends that broadcast organizations voluntarily adopt a code of ethical conduct for their journalists and other personnel. Ethical codes offer several benefits to broadcasters. They may find their independence threatened by governmental or commercial pressures, or by both. Lacking strong, clear legal protections, enforcing a voluntary code of ethical conduct and goals may strengthen the independence of the station directors. Such codes set norms before the public and before the professionals in the organization. If government violates publicly stated ethical norms or creates other forms of illegitimate pressure, it can be publicized in other media. This can arouse counter-pressure from the public, protecting the freedom of broadcasters. Mr. Shalakhmetov described the ethical standards at MIR, which is composed of seven affiliated companies from seven New Independent States. MIR requires that leaders of the companies and their journalists all sign an ethical code. He urged that "all professional TV companies should have similar codes." Recommendation 16. Train journalists in the responsibilities, opportunities, and risks that go with freedom of expression. Such training should convey methods of protecting news organizations from pressures brought through lawsuits. It should provide techniques for overcoming governmental attempts at censorship and at concealment of information, especially information the law requires government to reveal. Even where journalists are knowledgeable in the operation of a free media system, threats will arise. Beyond training, media organizations should create a fund for legal defense of broadcasters and journalists. IV. Programming Issues The content of television messages raises sensitive and complicated issues in most nations represented on the Commission, including the United States. Among these are violence on television, advertising, and protection of indigenous cultures. Yet solutions are not easy to identify. Critics believe violence on television may affect violence in real life, but regulation could limit artistic or journalistic expression. Advertising is necessary to the financial health of many broadcasting outlets, but it may have negative social and economic effects. A final complex issue of program content discussed by the Commission involves importation of foreign programming, and again a balance must be found between benefits and risks.

a. Televised violence

A concern with the effect of televised violence seems prevalent throughout the world. Many nations, though not the United States, have restricted or even prohibited the showing of certain kinds of violent programs or images. In a recent draft broadcasting law in Russia, violence is banned from programs shown before 23:00 (11 p.m.). In other countries, the hour is earlier - 21:00 in the United Kingdom - which assumes most children will be asleep by that time. It also assumes adults are less severely affected by the violent images than children. Some American Commissioners, citing the First Amendment, expressed concern about overzealous regulation of violence. Alfred Sikes made an important distinction: "Whatever approaches we take for entertainment, we must be careful in the area of news. The failure to display the violence of society keeps a representative government from acting as swiftly and effectively as it might." In other words, while television news may show disturbing images of violence, these reflect realities of the world that the public needs to know about. The Commission's deliberations led to:

Recommendation 17. Images of violence should be transmitted with the utmost discretion. Broadcasters should voluntarily agree to avoid broadcasting violent images while children are likely to be in the audience.

b. False advertising

False advertising is a problem in many broadcasting systems, but it may be worse in nations that lack clear legal guidelines and are just beginning to allow advertising. Fresh in the Commissioners' minds was the MMM scandal, in which a financial investment fraud was built through heavy use of TV commercials in Russia. Commissioner Leonid Zolotarevsky described how damaging the MMM affair was to the media, not just to those who lost money investing in MMM: "I am not talking about this particular company. The more important point is that millions of people are under the impression they were ruined by government, which allowed this activity to continue. Our government media structures, Channel 1 and Channel 2, advertised this corporation even after the government canceled MMM's activity! The result is to discredit the media in the eyes of public opinion." There was no dissent regarding:

Recommendation 18. False or misleading advertising on radio and television should be prohibited. c. Access to other nations' programming

Obtaining programming poses a continuing problem for NIS broadcasters. Generating high-quality local productions is often too expensive. Foreign programming is only a partial solution. In the words of Latvian Commissioner Imants Rakins, "We have access to U.S. programs for commercial stations, and they do show American entertainment. The main problem is that our state is small, and we don't have financial means to buy high enough quality programs from the United States." This observation led some American Commissioners to suggest lower-cost solutions. Catherine Stevens, the former Counsel for Occidential Petroleum, suggested that high-quality programming from such cable networks as The Discovery Channel and The Learning Channel - on nature, art, education - would be available at very low cost and easily delivered to NIS broadcasters via satellite.

On the other hand, the disadvantage of over-reliance on foreign programming was cited by some NIS Commissioners. For example, Mr. Poltoranin said, "The idea of protecting the cultural stability of Russia is urgent. We have to approach this problem carefully. We shouldn't be isolated from world culture on the one hand, but, on the other, we shouldn't destroy our Russian culture with mass culture from abroad." American Commissioner Preston Padden, president of Network Distribution for Fox Broadcasting, responded to these concerns by observing that "it should be possible both to provide local self-expression and give citizens access to all of the best programming from throughout world." The ensuing discussion focused on the advantages of giving all the countries at the table greater access to each others' programs, and the Commission agreed on their final recommendation:

Recommendation 19. The Commission co-chairs should work with members of the Commission to encourage the exchange of television programs among the countries represented on the Commission. Broadcaster Autonomy and the State: Models and Options Report of the Working Group Convened by The Aspen Institute Communications and Society Program in association with the Commission on Radio and Television Policy of The Carter Center and Duke University Wye Woods Conference Center Queenstown, Maryland May 4-7, 1994 Television has become a pervasive instrument of cultural and political power. In both the United States of America and in the New Independent States (NIS), TV is the communications medium that reaches the most people and has the greatest impact on their thinking. The influence of traditional mediating and socializing institutions, including schools, community groups, and the political party apparatus, has diminished. TV images now predominate in forming the public's consciousness of society's leaders and its agenda of problems, issues, and options. Nothing testifies more forcefully to the central role of television than the fact that armed rebellions are often started, fought out, and halted at a nation's broadcast stations. Television's influence over the public makes it a tempting target for those in government who would seek to control public opinion - to devalue democratic processes and eliminate the public voice as a factor in official decision-making. In the United States, the recognition of the media's importance to democracy is embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution, which instructs government to make no law abridging the freedom of speech or the press. Yet even in the U.S. the tradition of press independence has occasionally come under attack from government, and in the New Independent States, press independence may lack deep constitutional or cultural roots. The Working Group, therefore, met this year to consider ways of protecting television autonomy as a way to maintain the health of democratic institutions and processes. Though our initial focus was solely on the autonomy of the television and radio broadcaster, it soon became apparent that it was equally important to consider the participation of the community - its autonomy. For without the participation of citizens, the highest forms of public discourse cannot take place, and the concerns of the public may not reach the political agenda. To some extent this understanding of the importance of genuine and autonomous public participation is related to new opportunities offered by new technologies. But that is by no means the only consideration. The participants from the NIS noted that there were significant differences between the distribution of power and media resources in their countries and in the West. The Working Group does not underestimate the depth of these differences or the critical importance of timeliness in addressing the issues of television and radio autonomy. Lives have been lost in the battle for control of broadcasting. The Working Group is also mindful of the economic problems attendant on reconstitution of the national broadcast systems in the New Independent States. It recognizes the difficulties of operating a nascent, largely unregulated commercial television and radio system alongside a more established, state- owned broadcast system. Autonomy (or freedom, or independence) is about the discharge of power. In the case of the NIS, the state may seem to be the principal or only player from which protection needs to be guaranteed. They surely are not alone in that experience. In fact, there are three players which affect the freedoms enjoyed in an open society. A legal structure against which to plan and measure the establishment of democratic processes and institutions must respond to all of them. The state is often the most powerful and self-serving in denying autonomy. As free societies evolve, however, the press itself accrues power that can be inimical to free expression and accurate communication with the public, and between the government and the people. Equally, the public and individual citizens - though perhaps least powerful and organized - can, when aroused, run roughshod over the rights of institutions and individuals, including government, the press, educational institutions, and business. Balance among these centers of power - 1) the government, 2) the press, and 3) the people - is as desirable, and as problematic, in the United States as in the NIS. Though current agendas may differ, the goal of legal constraints and protections, and of operational standards and expectations for all three players - state, press, and public - seems fundamental to civic life in all societies striving toward the full expression of democratic principles. Therefore, in spite of these obvious and serious differences, the Working Group considers the basic issues it addresses as common to all the participants. Governments, media organizations, and citizens make up the three key elements of all arrangements governing autonomy. The elements may be unbalanced and the legal framework insufficiently elaborated in many of the New Independent States, but the options that follow suggest ways in which some compensation can be effected. Thus, even if the newest technologies may be unavailable in many parts of the world in the near future and even if resources to expand broadcast options may be limited for a while, citizens themselves can do much to support the autonomy of their television and radio systems. There are also arrangements, often voluntary, that can establish norms and a measure of public accountability for heretofore unresponsive bureaucracies. I. Goals and Fundamentals The Working Group discussed several goals for autonomy of broadcasting. This list is an inclusive one and its components are not mutually exclusive. It includes:

Ferreting out truth without fear or favor; countering untruthful ideas while uncovering facts the public needs to know. Empowering ordinary members of the public in the democratic process, activating their interest and involvement in civic life. Credibility for the news media is rooted in their genuine independence and believability; only credible media can minimize citizen alienation from and encourage participation in democratic processes. Controlling abuses of power by government and by other centers of power, including business corporations, through exposing misdeeds and establishing a countervailing center of power that works through the influence of an informed and mobilized public. Without autonomous sources of information, ordinary people cannot effectively press their interests upon and command resources from powerful institutions including but not limited to government. Providing access to means of self-expression for the average individual and for social institutions and groups: allowing the nation to talk to itself.

The Working Group also acknowledges the risks of unbridled media autonomy. Radio and television can, if they become too insulated from the rest of society, become a center of arrogant and unresponsive power themselves. For example, the electronic media are sometimes perceived to display an undue cynicism, distrust, and antagonism toward government leaders. This can damage democratic discourse and foment citizen alienation from politics. Media autonomy is not an end in itself; it is a means toward a healthy participatory democracy and society. Members of the Working Group suggested several definitions of media autonomy. Some of these notions are compatible with each other; others may conflict. Broadcasters should enjoy freedom of program choice without accountability to government for program content. Those who run broadcast outlets should have maximum freedom from all government involvement in their decisions; they should be free to maximize their economic profits, ideological satisfaction, or any other goals they choose, as disciplined and restricted by the pressures and incentives of a competitive free- economic market. Control over public debate should not be exerted by self-serving, powerful forces in society, including but not limited to government: Broadcast media should be free to stimulate and channel open, diverse, free-flowing public discourse. Broadcasters should have the freedom to maintain critical distance from all centers of political and economic power to establish an adversarial relationship with both government and corporate power. Broadcasters must possess guarantees of access to information about government; with few exceptions, secrecy in government is incompatible with an independent press and a democratic process. Option 1: Universal coverage should be a central goal of broadcasting systems. This may include some incentives for installing technologies that will allow signals to penetrate remote areas. Pro:

Ensuring to the extent feasible access for all citizens to the widest possible range of broadcast productions secures the larger democratizing goals of broadcasting.

Con: Potentially creates dependence on government. May result in curtailment of other services. May raise costs to consumer.

Option 2: Set limits on concentration and nature of broadcast ownership. Pro:

Diversity in ownership of broadcast facilities reinforces media credibility and independence. Ownership by a small number of entities can lead to private censorship of media content and even collusion with the state; ownership by certain corporate entities may lead to censorship of news when it clashes with the economic or other interests of those corporations. Diverse ownership heightens the probability that diverse content will be produced and circulated.

Con:

Vertical and horizontal integration of media enterprises may be economically efficient. Larger media enterprises may be able to afford higher-quality entertainment programming and bigger news operations. Larger private media organizations may have the resources and influence to resist state intimidation or compete in a rapidly changing marketplace.

II. Ownership and Regulatory Structures The Working Group discussed several ways of organizing the ownership and regulation of broadcast facilities and agreed that the best broadcasting system is a mixture of mechanisms. Such a mixed system is most likely to attain the proper balance between autonomous broadcasting and other social values. Similarly, diversity in media personnel (varied ethnicity, social class, nationality of producers, writers, reporters, and the like) should emerge from a variety of ownership structures. Specifically the configuration includes a choice from a continuum of control mechanisms, described in the appendix. The two most common variants, referred to in the proposals that follow, are:

1. "Public service" broadcasting, in which entities may receive the bulk of their funds from government, and have top executives appointed by and responsible to the government. Ownership of the broadcast facilities may be in the hands of a government, a quasi-governmental, or private organization. Public service broadcasters enjoy substantial or near-total independence in choosing programs and their content, subject to public service responsibilities. Other funds for public service broadcasters may come from corporations, audience subscriptions, or specially designated tax revenue pools such as a license fee paid by owners of TV sets. 2. 2) "Commercial" broadcasting, in which privately owned organizations receive little or no government financing and, with proper legal guarantees, enjoys a commensurately large degree of autonomy from government. The management of commercial stations is not selected or approved by government. The most common source of revenue is advertising. In some cases, revenue is supplied by direct audience payments (as for "Home Box Office" on U.S. cable television).

A. Buffer Organizations Autonomy for broadcasters can be greatly aided by the creation of buffer organizations to stand between government and commercial entities on the one hand and the broadcaster on the other. Such buffers are useful especially if one takes the view that neither the government nor the market can fully reflect the public's preferences. Buffer organizations can take the form of: 1) independent government regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Federal Communications Commission; 2) government-appointed oversight entities, such as the Board of Governors of the British Broadcasting Corp.; and 3) Citizens Advisory Councils, established by joint efforts of broadcasters and citizens or by one of the two other forms of buffer agencies. In the first two forms, buffer organizations promulgate broadcast regulations; in the latter, the councils provide less formal input to broadcasters. Option 1: Establish buffer organizations to protect the broadcasting system from government interference in programming decisions and content. Pro:

Buffer agencies can insulate broadcaster decisions from undue political (and commercial) pressure, legitimizing independence from both sectors and freeing the stations to offer the content they want.

Con:

Buffer organizations can become a bureau-cratic arm of the government itself. Buffers, in their regulatory capacity, can introduce their own inefficiencies.

Option 2: For initial period of time, buffer organizations may set requirements in the public interest, e.g. for regional or special minority cultural programming, public affairs programming, etc. Review requirements after such time as competitive structure becomes more developed. Pro:

Ensures responsiveness to a diversity of audience needs.

Con: Could intrude upon editorial and creative judgment of programmers and thereby conflict with the original purpose of buffer organizations.

Option 3: Method of appointment to buffer committees should ensure reasonable representation of a range of voices in the communities served by the broadcaster. Pro:

Enhances responsiveness of agency and ultimately of broadcasters to citizens. Fosters variety of transmitted views.

Con:

Appointment process can be politically manipulated. Buffer organization could become paralyzed with irreconcilable conflicting preferences.

B. The Public Service Broadcasting System While buffer organizations are central to the ability of the entire broadcasting system to carry out its ultimate goals, certain policies should be considered that relate specifically to this type of system. Option 1: Create separate regulatory bodies for individual public service broadcasting services (if more than one) with different sources of funding. Pro: A single unified committee might be too close to government. Con: Proliferation of bureaucracy and additional cost. Option 2: If corporate or government funding is accepted by public service broadcasters, strictly separate the production of programs from funding mechanisms and organizations. In the U.S., this is the purpose of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Pro:

Insulates programmers from external manipulation of content.

Con:

If financial benefactors cannot influence programming, they are less likely to contribute money; hence this option may reduce total funding available for public service broadcasting.

C. Commercial system Option 1: Notwithstanding Option #1 in Section A above, minimize governmental regulation of the commercial sector of broadcasting. Under this option, buffer organizations exist only to protect commercial broadcasters' decisions from intrusion by public officials. Pro: The market, combined with legal protections, has been shown in the U.S. and elsewhere to be an effective mechanism for insulating broadcasters from government pressure while promoting diverse and responsive programming decisions. Minimal regulation makes increasing sense as competition from newer outlets such as cable and Direct Broadcast Satellite expands.

Con:

The market can exert its own powers of censorship and restriction upon the creative and journalistic independence of broadcasters.

III. Technological Autonomy Television represents an enormous political asset to those who are in power and those who seek it. Therefore, governments may not willingly give up their control of the delivery system by which television signals reach the public. However, the Working Group strongly asserts that without technological autonomy, the independence of television broadcasters is severely compromised. All the options below are predicated on the overriding recommendation that privately owned transmission facilities and telecommunications infrastructure should be developed as soon as feasible where (as in the NIS) they are lacking. The following options should be considered as methods of protecting autonomy during the transition of a privately owned common carrier telecommunications infrastructure. Option 1: Government-owned satellites, transmitters and wireline networks should operate as common carriers made available to all television stations for a reasonable and stable fee. Common carrier operation means the facilities must be open to all stations desiring to use them that can pay the fee; the owners of a common carrier facility have no right to censor or modify the content of any communication. Pro:

Only if guaranteed affordable access can a stable broadcasting system flourish.

Con:

Changing economic conditions could require frequent reassessments of fee structures. Infrastructure maintenance and renewal require high fee structure beyond capacity of most broadcasters.

Option 2: Until alternative, privately owned means of transmission are developed, an independent board, not a government ministry, should supervise the allocation of and payment for technology. Though fees will be paid to the government as owner of the infrastructure, the decision to sell time or space is not taken by the government. Pro:

Removes government from temptation or ability to paralyze or shut down the system.

Con:

In an emergency, technology could be taken over by government.

Option 3: Create as many technological options as possible, and make sure that there is enough overlap and redundancy to continue broadcasting if one technology fails or is withdrawn. Minimize costs of these alternatives. Pro:

By linking individual systems of distribution (for example cable television) locally and internationally, can expand interconnected communication networks that multiply the number of available transmission paths. Fax and voice telephone can be substituted for video signal in an emergency.

Con:

It is expensive to purchase and install several alternative technologies Some technologies may depend on unreliable delivery systems, such as telephone lines.

Option 4: Autonomy for broadcasting institutions should be paralleled by autonomy of other organizations, such as colleges, unions, and community groups, which should be given low-cost production equipment and encouraged to distribute programming via broadcasting and other means. IV. Reinforcing Journalists' Demands for Autonomy A powerful instrument in support of television and autonomy are journalists who are trained to reject manipulation by government or commercial entities. Such journalists have behind them the power of the press and direct access to viewers and listeners. Option 1: Include in training of journalists information about their legal rights and methods or protection from pressures of lawsuits. Training should also convey information about the public role of a free press system. Option 2: Train journalists in overcoming governmental attempts at censorship and concealment of information, especially information which government is required by law to reveal. Option 3: Develop fund for protection and defense of journalists exercising their autonomy. Option 4: Adopt a code of conduct for the broadcast organization. Pro:

Sets norms visible to the public and the professionals in the organization. Violation of these norms because of outside pressure can be publicized in other media. Broadcasters may find their autonomy threatened by governmental or commercial pressures or, as is often the case, by both. In the absence of strong, clear legal protections, a voluntary code of conduct and goals may well serve to strengthen the independence of the station directors.

Con:

Overzealous implementation by authorities or private lawsuits could threaten individual broadcasters' autonomy and reduce distribution of controversial ideas. A code represents weak protection when compared to governmental powers on the one hand and commercial ones on the other.

Option 5: Establish organized mechanisms for critical feedback to and operation of journalism. These may include:

a. coverage of journalistic goals and ethics, and their violation, by news media and throughout the journalistic profession; b. collaboration among associations of journalists to exchange information and encourage provision of equipment and training in its use; c. publication of journalism review magazines; d. appointment of persons at news organizations whose function is to examine the ethics and effects of their operations (sometimes called an "ombudsman").

Pro:

Would likely improve the professional qualities of journalists.

Con:

Expensive to set up new programs; criticism may become intimidating to journalists.

V. Audiences and Community/Social Goals The Working Group discussed several social goals that might merit some degree of restriction upon broadcaster autonomy. Some members noted that rules that might operate in some perspectives as restraints upon autonomy can be seen in other lights as at least partial protection for it. A. Protecting National Culture and Television Autonomy Option 1: For some initial period, limit the proportion of foreign-made programming that broadcasters may show. Pro:

Lithuania has imposed a requirement that when a private entity rents a channel, it is obligated to devote 30 percent of its airtime to productions it originates. The draft broadcasting law in Russia mandates that not less than 60 percent of programs on state television should consist of locally produced material. In Britain, the mandate is for 80 percent British programming. Nations such as France also impose similar restrictions. Such restrictions create incentives to invest in local production facilities and employ local talent, and in this way, to nurture a local production base. Programming is more likely to reflect local norms and activities, address local agendas, and preserve indigenous languages and cultures.

Con:

Defining foreign-made programs can be difficult. Restrictions might accelerate efforts of foreign entities to "buy into" local markets. This, clearly, is also a "pro", as it might spur investment, while diluting local control. The process of labeling some programming "foreign" could be divisive, heightening interstate and ethnic tensions in the New Independent States. Quotas on foreign programming may be instituted by elites aiming to censor the products of other cultures or keep out economically competitive programming. Such policies may saddle audiences with undesired programming, thereby creating economic inefficiencies.

Foreign information technology and culture can enhance the capabilities and autonomy of local broadcasting; a free flow of information and technology may benefit both foreign and domestic entities. For example, high-quality foreign programming demonstrates possibilities to local broadcasters and audiences and raises their standards.

Foreign programming introduces diverse views and enhances the total amount of diversity in the system. Quotas are difficult to enforce; commercial broadcasters have incentives to evade them.

B. Television Violence and Society The Working Group addressed the issue of violence on television as an important case of the tension between media autonomy and other social goals, including the survival of the society itself. The "case" of violence on television represents a type of speech that may operate in opposition to commonly held community values, and where freedom and autonomy clash. It is important to recognize the need for balance among conflicting rights: the rights of those who create or market televised violence, the rights of the public, and the interests of the state. The Working Group's consideration of television violence and society recognized the conflict of rights and values posed by this issue. For some of the participants, any invocation of community norms and values raised the specter of a power- seeking government's intervention to destroy media autonomy altogether. Others saw governmental regulation as necessary to the well-being of society. Many looked to voluntary measures and self-regulation by the industry. Limitations on autonomy were most seriously considered with respect to children, because of the considerable body of scholarly study and support that identifies the effects of television violence on children. We provide a series of options related in part to television violence and children, since the priority accorded this vulnerable population was seen very clearly as essential to the well-being and future of the society. However, many of the options are as fully salient to the adult population and to the discussion of the balance of rights between the community as a whole and the television system. The Working Group developed a clear consensus that commercial stations competing in a free market will not solve the problem of excessive or inappropriately timed violence entirely on their own, nor will such stations provide significant quantities of educational programming. The former holds because violent programming is profitable, the latter because educational programming is not. One policy option is to impose regulations on commercial broadcasters to impel them to fulfill the desired standards. Another, favored by most in the Working Group, would rely upon a combination: limiting violence on commercial channels through various mechanisms, while employing noncommercial stations for educational material. Violence reduction. Children are a particularly vulnerable part of the population, and there is evidence that childhood viewing of violence has deleterious effects that adult viewing may not. The impact of TV violence on children is a classic case of market failure that may justify government intervention. The Working Group recognizes violent content may be essential to the integrity of a fictional program or to telling the full truth of a news event; here the concern becomes one of timing. Showing programs late enough in the evening should minimize the number of children watching. However, some violence on television is gratuitous, serving purely profit-maximizing interests. The precise combination of policy remedies depends on the value policy-makers place on free expression; on their belief in the efficacy of private as opposed to government action in reducing the effects of television violence; and on how they gauge the impact of TV violence on actual violence in society. The Working Group acknowledges that societal violence is a large and complex problem of which TV is only a part. Option 1: Self regulation. Rely upon broadcasters to develop standards for violent content, either individually or within their own organizations. Pro: Voluntary standards are by definition ones that broadcasters agree upon and, therefore, may feel obligated to obey. Externally imposed standards can be expensive and awkward to maintain and, at times, intrusive upon editorial and creative autonomy.

Con:

Without fear of enforcement mechanisms and sanctions, stations may ignore voluntary standards. Stations may dilute standards in order to minimize any diminution of profits they could cause.

Option 2: Voluntary, nongovernmental ratings and warning system for violent programming. Pro:

Highly compatible with creative and editorial freedom.

Con:

Requires parental participation and diligent attention to children's viewing habits.

Option 3: "V chip" implementation - a microprocessor added to television sets that would allow parents to block reception of programs whose signal carried a warning sign of violence. Pro:

Assuming chip is easily operated, should allow conscientious parents more ability to reduce viewing of violent programming at minimal financial cost and without interfering with station autonomy.

Con:

V chip won't deal with parents who are negligent. May be too expensive for some parents or too complicated to operate. Schedules are constantly changing. Defining what is too violent may become difficult and controversial; requires broadcaster willingness to transmit the signal that indicates violent content.

Option 4: Establish "zoning" regulations or voluntary standards for violent programs and images, in particular a "watershed" hour, before which violence is forbidden. Pro: The United Kingdom and other nations employ a voluntary standard; it is widely obeyed and successfully protects most children from excessive TV violence. In the U.K. the time is 9 p.m.

Con:

The "watershed" option still relies upon parents to police the viewing habits of children. Studies reveal that, at least in the U.S., many children under the age of 12 watch television as late as 11 p.m.

Option 5: Rely on the self-correcting mechanism of market; audiences upset by violent programming will stop viewing it, and it will become unprofitable. Pro:

In the U.S. there is some evidence from public opinion surveys that the public is tired of violent programming. Several U.S. stations have inaugurated "family-sensitive" news programs, which de-emphasize violent news yet obtain high audience ratings. One major study indicates violent incidents in prime time TV have declined in the U.S.

Con:

Violent entertainment programming and news remain highly popular and profitable. While violence in the media has become a faddish issue, this concern typically runs in cycles and is likely to fade shortly. When it does, history suggests, levels of TV violence in the U.S. will turn upward.

Option 6: Organize social groups to bring pressure to bear upon advertisers and stations, which might be encouraged to reduce gratuitous program violence. Pro:

Experience in the U.S. indicates that violence ratings by private organizations, coupled with pressure from social organizations and institutions such as doctors and educators, accounts for reduction and zoning of violence. Such efforts could raise the level of public taste and its awareness of the harmful effects of violent programming upon children and young people.

Con:

Media production and choice represent a complex interplay between various interests in society and broadcasters. In the NIS, old public organizations may not agree on democratic values, while newer organizations may be in the early formative stages. A new relationship between broadcasters and community is the objective. There is a danger in some nations that if social organizations try to solve the problem of TV violence, the state will use their complaints as an excuse to censor television or even fabricate such complaints.

Option 7: Rather than run the risk of censorship, it would be preferable to provide access to those opposing violence to criticize violent programs. Opponents of violence could speak out or advertise against it on the same stations that air the offending shows. Pro:

Cures offending expression with more expression; extends public discourse and potentially educates and sensitizes citizenry on the issue.

Con:

Station managers who deny calls to reduce violence voluntarily are unlikely to grant access to their facilities for criticism of their own leadership.

Option 8: Indirect government pressure; informal but strong urging by officials with the implicit threat of formal intervention if violence is not reduced. Pro:

History in the U.S. shows such pressure has sometimes been effective.

Con:

Threat of official sanction is never far behind and could be especially intimidating in states with weak constitutional and judicial protection of media autonomy. When official attention turns to other issues, violence levels escalate.

C. Television News and Violence The Working Group identified violence in news, not just entertainment programming, as capable of creating negative social effects. News organizations, especially on commercial stations, often use violence gratuitously, in order to draw and maintain audience attention. In the ideal world, news broadcasts would place all images of violence into social and political context, would avoid ethnic stereotyping in reports of violence, and would otherwise handle the images responsibly. Option 1: Limit gratuitous violence, but particularly graphic depiction in news programming, especially that shown during the day or early evening. Pro:

Research suggests images of actual violence at least as disturbing and socially damaging as those in fictional shows.

Con:

Limitations on violence in the news could reduce information available to adults about political conflicts and oppression or other forms of violence they need to know about, including abuse of power by government. Even if the images are unpleasant, they may be essential for an informed citizenry.

D. Advertising and Social Goals Option 1: Limit the amount of advertising on commercial television. Pro:

Commercials may in the NIS be offensive and inflammatory to the many citizens experiencing severe economic hardship. Advertising also is highly offensive to many Americans; research suggests, for example, that it may reinforce racial and gender stereotyping. Additionally, the stimulation of desires for material goods beyond the capacity of the economically deprived to acquire them, further exacerbates social cleavages in society. Research indicates that advertisers may at times exert undue influence over program choice and content, seriously compromising creative and editorial autonomy.

Con:

Advertising provides the financial bulwark of TV news and entertainment in the United States. Without advertising revenues, broadcasters would have to exact payments directly from viewers (many of whom might be unable to afford the fees) or from government (which carries attendant risks to autonomy). Advertising provides consumer information about products and generally stimulates economic activity. Limiting advertisements, by reducing revenue, may diminish the autonomy and strength of the privately owned commercial sector of broadcasting.

Option 2: Develop a system in which advertisers provide financial support for programming but have no direct influence over programming choice or content. This would work by having advertising charges paid into a public organization or third-party commercial enterprise. Advertisers would not select programs, and program producers would not deal with advertisers. Advertisers buy only the right to appear on a general program type or in a particular time period. The public body or third-party entity could establish minimal programming guidelines, within which broadcasters would be free to program as they wish. Commercials would thus support the programming without driving its content. Pro:

Addresses problem of financing "free" television. A variation of this mechanism is used in the U.K.

Con:

It is not clear that advertisers would buy time on television without knowing the nature of the program, since advertising is driven by the demographics of audiences and the kinds of programming that attract certain audience segments. Advertising entity could be associated with a program it finds undesirable. Interferes with the operation of the market and may introduce inefficiencies and limit choice.

Option 3: Impose a tax on advertising that appears on the commercial channels and use the revenues to support public service programming. Pro:

Offers mechanism for funding public service shows with less need to depend on government funds, which may be scarce.

Con:

By raising the cost of advertising, such a tax might reduce the amount of advertising revenue, diminishing the quality and independence of programs on the commercial system, and may increase the price of goods and services.

E. Measuring Community Goals The Working Group agreed upon the necessity for broadcasters to maintain independence from pressures that would limit the creativity of their entertainment productions and the critical edge of their news and public affairs programs. At the same time, the Group asserted the requirement that broadcasters remain closely connected to their audiences and their changing and diverse interests and needs. In making recommendations, the Working Group recognized the tension between audience desires - which may encourage programming that caters to the simple and sensational - and audience needs for fare that informs, challenges, and elevates. They discussed several options for balancing these tensions, keeping in mind that final discretion for program content remains in the control of the broadcasters. The presumption is that broadcasters who cannot or will not respond to the desires of their audiences risk having the size of their audiences decline. Option 1: Use of audience surveys and systematic monitoring of audience letters, recognizing that letters are not representative of the audience. Pro:

Application of sociological methods can identify audience needs and interests with some precision and help broadcasters serve them.

Con:

There is a danger of compromising creative and editorial autonomy in attempts to please audiences. Surveys might not detect the full range of potential audience interests and concerns, especially when minorities are in remote locations or difficult to survey because of language differences. Since surveys tend to reveal majority preferences, stations might not adequately serve the tastes or needs of smaller groups.

Option 2: Employ the Dutch system, in which viewers cast a form of vote on the type of programming they prefer. The more subscriptions a programming service obtains, the more broadcast time it obtains. Pro:

This is a direct method for audiences to express their preferences, and one that, by requiring them to commit money rather than simply answer a survey, might be more accurate. This form of voting allows for proportional representation of minority preferences.

Con:

Risk that majority preferences will lead to only token programming for the smaller minority tastes.

Option 3: Members of the community, the viewing public, appear on local television to voice their concerns, talk to broadcast personnel, and communicate with the rest of the public. These programs can include call- in questions. Pro:

Such regular interchange develops recognition among a community of its diverse views on issues. This, in turn, creates a level of tolerance among them; if they feel they have been heard, they will not demand the station acquiesce to their every desire.

Con: Direct communication can often be dominated by unrepresentative members of a community who press a special agenda on broadcasters.

F. Educational Broadcasting for Children Commercial television providers will normally provide only that programming they find profitable. In most cases, genuinely educational shows are not profitable, or not as profitable as alternative uses of the broadcast time. Again there is a market failure and case for government intervention. Educative programming can and should also serve adult needs. Option 1: Mandate a certain amount of educational programming on all stations, commercial and public. Pro:

Experience in the United Kingdom suggests such mandates can create a tradition of quality children's programming, an expectation among audiences and broadcasters that education is an important and legitimate function of television. The BBC has a long tradition of providing children's programs, and even the independent commercial TV service offers such programming. In the New Independent States, education and children's needs are widely respected, and market values are not as deeply entrenched as in the West; this may allow successful regulation of private and commercial broadcast entities in the interest of youth and education.

Con:

Experience in the U.S. shows commercial broadcasters may bend such rules and provide only a token amount of unprofitable programming and may try to avoid the intended goal.

Option 2: Establish a separate educational broadcasting system, one with sufficient financing to carry out high-quality programming designed by professional broadcasters (not by educators without broadcast training). Pro:

By focusing attention and resources on a specialized carrier whose sole reason for existence is educational programming, society and government avoid futile battles with broadcast corporations interested in profit maximization. A government-financed children's broadcasting authority could eliminate advertising from most programming that children watch, with benefits arising from the fact that younger people cannot distinguish readily between program and ad and are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to misleading commercials. A broadcast entity which specializes in education can create relationships with the educational community that will make its programming more effective and better used.

Con:

Expensive and may not be viewed as much as on mainstream channel.

Option 3: Contrary to the above, transmit programming that educates and enlightens on a general interest channel rather than a separate one. Pro:

Attracts larger audiences and minimizes what amounts to a stigma on educational programming as boring or intellectually difficult.

Con:

May decrease time available for educational material, which must share space with regular programming.

Appendix How these alternative mechanisms below are configured and combined represents a set of important policy choices. To preserve space, this report focuses on autonomy for the two most common variants: public service broadcasting, and commercial broadcasting, described in Section III. The report recognizes four primary groups that help constitute broadcasting systems, sometimes cooperating and sometimes clashing: broadcasters, government, advertisers and other commercial entities, and audiences. Depending on how it behaves, each group can impinge upon or bolster the autonomy of the other. The five categories identified were: "Public service" broadcasting, in which entities may receive the bulk of their funds from government and have top executives appointed by and responsible to the government. Ownership of the broadcast facilities may be in the hands of a government, a quasi-governmental, or private organization. Public service broadcasters enjoy substantial or near-total independence in choosing programs and their content, subject to public service responsibilities. Other funds for public service broadcasters may come from corporations, audience subscriptions, or specially designated tax revenue pools such as a license fee paid by owners of TV sets. "Commercial" broadcasting, in which privately owned organizations receive little or no government financing and, with proper legal guarantees, enjoy a commensurately large degree of autonomy from government. The management of commercial stations is not selected or approved by government. The most common source of revenue is advertising. In some cases, revenue is supplied by direct audience payments (as for "Home Box Office" on U.S. cable television). "State" broadcasting, in which government is the sole source of financing and exerts complete administrative control. "Educational" broadcasting, such as the university-owned and operated stations in the U.S., which televise educative programs for young people and correspondence courses for adults. Sometimes the functions of educational and public service broadcasting are melded in a single station. "Community" broadcasting, which is owned, supported, and programmed by interested local citizens, otherwise unaffiliated with any institution. Revenues come from fund-raising efforts by the managers, employees, staff, and volunteers who run the station. These stations are not designed to earn financial profits but to serve what their supporters consider community interests. Commission on Radio and Television Policy Co-Chairs: Jimmy Carter 39th President of the United States Eduard Sagalaev President, Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corporation; Chairman, Confederation of Journalists' Unions Members from the United States: Roone Arledge President, ABC News Ervin Duggan President, Public Broadcasting Service Reed Hundt Chairman, Federal Communications Commission Tom Johnson President, Cable News Network (CNN) Andrew Lack President, NBC News Edward Markey Member, U.S. Congress Ellen Mickiewicz Fellow, The Carter Center; Director, DeWitt Wallace Center for Communications and Journalism; James R. Shepley Professor of Public Policy, Duke University Eric Ober President, CBS News Preston Padden President, Network Distribution, Fox Broadcasting Company Monroe Price Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Anthony Riddle Chair, Alliance for Community Media Alfred Sikes President, New Media and Technology, Hearst Corporation; Former Chairman, Federal Communications Commission Ted Stevens Member, U.S. Congress Al Swift Member, U.S. Congress Daniel Yankelovich Chairman, Daniel Yankelovich Group Inc. (DYG Inc.); President, The Public Agenda Foundation Members from the New Independent States: Tigran Akopyan Chairman, State Board of Radio and Television for the Republic of Armenia Tatyana Bolshakova Executive Director, International Association of Radio and Television (MART) Mikhail Fedotov President, Russian Copyright Society Boris Grushin President, Vox Populi, Public Opinion Research Center Vitaly Ignatenko General Director, Information and Telegraph Agency of Russia (ITAR- TASS) Bobozhon Ikromov Chairman, State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of the Tajikistan Republic Vakhtang Khundadze General Director, Television and Radio Broadcasting Service of the Republic of Georgia Aleksandr Kopeyka Member, Commission for Draft Legislation for the President of Russia Bella Kurkova Chair, St. Petersburg Television and Radio Company (Channel Five); Deputy Chair, Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Babek Mamedov Chairman, State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of the Azerbaijan Republic Aygar Misan General Director, Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Moskva) Sherkhan Murtaza Chairman, Kazakh Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Nikolai Okhmakevich President, State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of Ukraine Kadyr Omurkulov Director, State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Annageldy Orazdurdyev Chairman, National Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of Turkmenistan Mikhail Poltoranin Director, Russian Federal Information Center Nugzar Popkhadze Vice President, Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corporation; Vice Chairman, Confederation of Journalists' Union Oleg Poptsov Chairman, Russian Federal Television and Radio Company Imants Rakins General Director, Latvian Television Gadilbek Shalakhmetov Chairman, Intergovernmental Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Mir); Vice President, Union of Journalists, Kazakhstan Khagi Sheyn General Director, Television Company of Estonia Aleksey Simonov Chairman of the Board, Glasnost Defense Foundation; Co-Chairman, Provisional Committee for Television and Radio Licensing; Secretary, Union of Cinematographers Sergei Stankevich Adviser to Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin Aleksandr Stolyarov Chairman, National Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of the Republic of Belarus Laymonas Tapinas General Director, Lithuanian Television Mikhail Taratura San Francisco Bureau Chief, Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Ostankino) Adrian Usaty General Director, National Radio and Television of Moldova Shavkat Yakhyaev Chairman, State Television and Radio Company of the Republic of Uzbekistan Alexander Yakovlev Chairman, Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Ostankino) Anatoly Yezhelev President, Telemak Television and Radio Corporation; Chairman, St. Petersburg Union of Journalists Tatyana Zaslavskaya President, Russian Center for Public Opinion Research; Member, Academy of Sciences of Russia Yassen Zassoursky Dean, Department of Journalism, Moscow State University; Professor, Journalism and Literature, Moscow State University Leonid Zolotarevsky Director, Center for International Relations, Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Ostankino) Members from Central Europe: Jacek Bochenck News Director, Television Information Agency of Poland Ivo Mathe General Director, Czech Television Working Group IV Participants Broadcaster Autonomy and the State May 4-7, 1994 The Aspen Institute, Wye Woods Conference Center Participants from the United States: Ron Alridge Vice President, Publisher and Editorial Director, Electronic Media, Crain Communications David Bartlett President, Radio-Television News Directors Association Edith Bjornson Program Officer, The Markle Foundation Geoffrey Cowan Director, Voice of America Robert Entman Associate Professor of Communications, Journalism and Political Science, Department of Communications Studies, Northwestern University Charles Firestone Director, Communications and Society Program, The Aspen Institute David Gibson Media Research Specialist, Acting Chief of Media Research, United States Information Agency Gary Gunderson Director of Operations, Interfaith Health Program, The Carter Center Jay Hamilton Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Economics and Political Science, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University Pam Hill Vice President and Executive Producer, CNN America, Inc. Ellen Hume Senior Fellow, The Annenberg Washington Program Nicholas Johnson Former Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission; Visiting Professor, University of Iowa-College of Law John Kamp Senior Vice President, American Association of Advertising Agencies Ellen Mickiewicz Director, Commission on Radio and Television Policy; Director, DeWitt Wallace Center for Communications and Journalism, and James R. Shepley Professor of Public Policy Studies, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University Dee Reid Program Director, DeWitt Wallace Center for Communication and Journalism, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University Anthony Riddle Chair, Alliance for Community Media; Executive Director, Minneapolis Telecommunications Network Colin Shaw Director, Broadcasting Standards Council, London, England Pierre Sutton Chairman, WBLS Radio Paul Symczak Former General Counsel, Corporation for Public Broadcasting Participants from the New Independent States: Marina Goldovskaya Documentary Filmmaker; Professor, Moscow State University; Visiting Professor, University of California-Los Angeles Gediminas Ilgunas Chairman, Television and Radio Board of Lithuania Oleg Manaev Professor, Department of Sociology, Belarusan State University; Director, Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, Belarus; Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University Sergei Muratov Academic Researcher, Department of Journalism, Moscow State University Gennady Shepitko Vice Chairman, Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Ostankino)