The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies

The Logical Structure of Socrates’ Expert-Analogies

Petter Sandstad Universität Rostock

1 Introduction

Socrates’ expert-analogies are frequent in both Plato’s dialogues and the Socra- tic writings of Xenophon, and are also ascribed to Socrates by Aristotle and Aeschines. This is a group of arguments where Socrates makes an analogy from an uncontroversial expert, or an expertise, like the cobbler or ship-captain, to another often controversial expert like the statesman. The expert-analogy is a key component of Socrates’ philosophical practice, and without a proper understanding of the expert-analogy we cannot fully understand Socrates. Among the occurrences of Socrates’ expert-analogy the fragments of Aes- chines of Sphettus are the least known and discussed.1 One reason is that they are fragmentary; another is that they are quite simple. But these reasons make them good starting-points from which we can move on to the more complex occurrences in the other sources.

“Do you consider that men have to begin by being ignorant of music before they become musicians? Or ignorant of horsemanship before they become good riders?” “I think they have to begin by first being ignorant of music and horsemanship.” POxy. 1608 col. i, fr. 1 = ssr vi a 48; tr. field 1948, 148

This is from Aeschines’ Alcibiades, where Alcibiades criticizes the Athenian statesman Themistocles. One of Alcibiades’ arguments must have been based on the common belief that Themistocles was far from perfect in his youth. Socrates replies that just as a musician or a horseman must start out ignorant of his relative subject, so also a statesman like Themistocles must start out ignorant of statesmanship.2 Or take another fragment from Aeschines’ Miltiades:

It won’t be at all strange if the problem that stumps us doesn’t stump him. For it’s no surprise that, if I asked Euripides which craftsman he

1 Cf. Mársico and Brisson (in this volume) for biographical notes on Aeschines. 2 Cf. Field 1948, 147–148; Lampe 2015, 74–75.

should spend time with in order to deliberate best about making shoes, he could answer “cobblers”; or which he should spend time with in order to deliberate best about building houses, he could answer “architects.” But now … POxy. 2890 = ssr vi a 80; tr. lampe 2015, 63

Presumably, Socrates would here have continued the argument by asking Euripides the question: “But now, who should Miltiades spend time with in order to deliberate best about statesmanship?” Presumably, Euripides would answer that he should go to the expert of statesmanship, namely the statesman. To which Socrates would respond that just as we should learn shoemaking from the cobbler, so we should learn statesmanship from the statesman.3 There are good reasons for assuming that the expert-analogy has come down to us from Socrates. Aristotle says: “For two things may be fairly ascribed by Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science” (Metaph. μ.4, 1078b27–29; cf. pa 1.1, 642a24–31). Here “inductive arguments” translates ἐπαγωγή, but the argument that Aristotle must be thinking of are better viewed as an analogy or illustrative parallel (παράβολη):4

The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. “Public officials ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes,5 instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship’s crew, as if we ought to

3 Rossetti (this volume) argues that this fragment is a parallel of Xen. Mem. 4.4.5, and that Xenophon there discusses justice (in contrast to philosophy). However, that story connects justice to laws and concludes by saying that Socrates was a teacher of justice: “By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those who resorted to his company” (Mem. 4.4.25)—and by implication, also a teacher of statesmanship (βασιλική τέχνη); cf. Peterson (this volume). Thus, both Aeschines’ fragment and the passage from Xenophon seem to contain such an expert-analogy. For further discussion see Rossetti 1984, 276–277; Lampe 2015, 63–64. 4 Aristotle’s discussion of induction (ἐπαγωγή), e.g., in APr. 2.23, fits very poorly for the Socratic expert-analogies, and pace most of the secondary literature (which implicitly or explicitly refer to APr. 2.23), the emphasis on induction is misleading. Problems with treating the expert-analogies as inductions will become apparent in the next section’s discussion of pre- vious interpreters. I think the expert-analogies are much better seen as illustrative parallels, and will limit my discussion of ἐπαγωγή. 5 Prima facie the case of athletes is a poor example of experts, but cf. Alc. 119b1–e3; 2. Alc. 145c9–e5; and Thg. 123e12–15 (admittedly, all three of these are dubious; cf. the contribution by Tarrant in this volume).