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Aspects of Objectivity and Objective Reference in Kant's Transcendental Idealism

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Aspects of Objectivity and Objective Reference in Kant's Transcendental Idealism Aspects of Objectivity and Objective Reference in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism Matti Saarni Reports from the Department of Philosophy Vol. 46 ASPECTS OF OBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVE REFERENCE IN KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM Matti Saarni f}t(t UNIVERSITY ~r~ OFTURKU Copyright © 2020 Matti Saarni SERIES EDITORS: Olli Koistinen Juha Räikkä Department of Philosophy University of Turku FI-20014 Turku Finland ISSN 1457-9332 ISBN 978-951-29-8187-8 (print) ISBN 978-951-29-8188-5 (pdf) Painosalama Oy, Turku 2020 KONE FOUNDATION Written by Matti Saarni Doctoral Programme of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Turku, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science Supervised by Professor Olli Koistinen University of Turku, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science Doctor Hemmo Laiho University of Turku, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science Reviewed by Associate Professor Marcel Quarfood University of Umeå Doctor Kari Väyrynen University of Oulu Opponent Doctor Marcel Quarfood University of Umeå Chairperson (custos) Professor Olli Koistinen Turun yliopiston laatujärjestelmän mukaisesti tämän julkaisun alkuperäisyys on tarkastettu Turnitin Originality Check -järjestelmällä. The originality of this dissertation has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin Originality Check service. Acknowledgements There are infinitely many things without which this work would never have been possible. I try to be grateful. It has been a long, interesting, tiring, frustrating and rewarding project, and I could not have done it alone. I would like, therefore, to thank some of the people who have helped, supported, contributed, or otherwise just been there for this work, for me, and my family. First of all, I heartfeltly want to thank my advisors, Professor Olli Koistinen and Dr. Hemmo Laiho, for supporting, criticizing and guiding me and my work, and, finally, believing in it. This is not to say that I think they ‘bought’ everything I claim here, but rather to say that they take what I claim, and overall write, to be meaningful and important enough to stand as a doctoral dissertation on Kant and objectivity. In addition to Olli and Hemmo, I want to thank everyone at the Turku University Philosophy department/discipline. Often discussions in the coffee room or hallways lead to some insights. For countless reasons, I am deeply grateful to Valtteri Viljanen. All parts of the way. I am also very grateful to Markus Nikkarla, with whom I’ve had countless hours of discussions on the elements of Kant’s critical philosophy, and on other, perhaps even more important matters. I want to thank Joseph Almog for support, criticism, and many a valuable insight. I also want to thank Arto Repo, Tapio Korte, Sakari Ollitervo and Tuomas Tolonen for comments at various stages, and for many fruitful conversations on Kant and other matters. Along the years I have read and discussed Kant and other related philosophers in both formal seminars and informal reading groups with many people such as Peter Myrdal, Miika Hellevaara, Jaakko Vuori, Pirkko Holmberg and Tommi Hjelt, among others. Thanks, guys. This work has been funded mainly by the Kone Foundation, to whom I am grateful. I would also like to acknowledge having received grants from the University of Turku and the Finnish Cultural Foundation. Most of all I want to thank my extended family. My parents, and my parents- in-law – thank you so much. My relatives and friends who have shown interest and support. There is no doubt, however, that the utmost gratitude should go and does go to my wife and our children. I dedicate this work to Toivo, Eino, Lilja and Roosa. Abstract This study analyzes and lays out different aspects of Kant’s account of the concept of objectivity and objective reference in the broad view, as well as their conditions, to show the relevance of Kant’s view to contemporary philosophy, and to answer some of the criticisms expressed toward Kant, which criticisms often seem to be based on misguided readings of his doctrines. I aim to show that Kant’s philosophy is not – contrary to what is often claimed – overly subjectivistic with the expense of losing objectivity. Rather, his theory of objectivity and objective reference is both coherent and relevant as a philosophical theory today. Furthermore, Kant's account of objectivity, as well as subjectivity, is essential in understanding the origin and meaning of the modern concept of objectivity, which concept is crucial to science in general. In the beginning chapters I outline the most important philosophers and traditions which Kant was both using and criticizing. After this I show how Kant’s transcendental idealism along with its notion of a priori forms of intuition and a priori concepts of the understanding proved to be requirements for objective reference. The key of objective reference lies in the necessary agreement of the categories to the objects of experience. However, these formal conditions are not the only conditions of proper, actual objective reference, as we also need to materialize the forms and concepts by both senses and language, which offer us sensations and words for judgments. Thus I argue that a more full list of the conditions of objective reference in Kant’s case would consist of the purely formal conditions of experience, that is, the forms of intuition and the categories as the concepts of an object in general, and most of all the capacity to unite representations in the act of apperception, and what I have called the material or empirical conditions of objective reference, that is, our actual senses, as well as a language by which we can materialize judgments. This work hopefully contributes first of all to the study of Kant's theoretical philosophy. In addition, the work is related to such fields as philosophy of science and conceptual history, because of the historical role of the concept of objectivity. Furthermore, the study may prove relevant to discussions in philosophy of language, and finally the discussion concerning the interpretation of Kant's philosophy among the contemporary speculative realists. Tiivistelmä Tutkimus analysoi ja esittelee Kantin objektiivisuuden ja objektiivisen referenssin käsitteiden eri aspekteja ja ehtoja, ja pyrkii osoittamaan Kantin näkemyksen merkittävyyden nykyfilosofialle. Samalla tutkimus vastaa joihinkin Kantia vastaan esitettyihin kritiikkeihin, jotka usein perustuvat puutteellisille tai virheellisille tulkinnoille Kantin opeista. Pyrin näyttämään, ettei Kantin filosofiaa ole syytä pitää kaiken objektiivisuuden kadottavan subjektiivisuuden filosofian esikuvana, kuten valitettavan usein tunnutaan olettavan. Sen sijaan Kantin teoria objektiivisuudesta ja objektiivisesta referenssistä on sekä koherentti että merkityksellinen nykyajan filosofian ja tieteen kannalta. Lisäksi Kantin käsitys objektiivisuudesta ja subjektiivisuudesta on olennainen pyrittäessä ymmärtämään nykyaikaista objektiivisuuden käsitettä, joka on keskeinen tieteelle ylipäänsä. Ensimmäisissä luvuissa hahmottelen Kantin filosofista kontekstia suhteessa niihin filosofeihin ja oppeihin joita Kant itse sekä hydynsi että kritisoi. Tämän jälkeen osoitan miten Kantin oppi transsendentaalisesta idealismista, mukaan lukien sen keskeiset käsitteet intuition a priori -muodoista ja ymmärryksen a priori - käsitteista, onnistuu perustelemaan objektiivisen referenssin mahdollisuuden, jonka ydin on ymmärryksen peruskäsitteiden (kategorioiden) ja kokemuksen kohteiden (objektien) välisessä välttämättömässä yhteensopivuudessa. Nämä muodolliset a priori –ehdot eivät kuitenkaan yksinään riitä todelliseen objektiiviseen referenssiin, johon tarvitsemme mys empiirisiä elementtejä, kuten aisteja ja kieltä. Näin ollen väitän, että kattavampi luettelo objektiivisen referenssin edellytyksistä sisältää muodollisten a priori -elementtien (intuition ja ymmärryksen muodot) lisäksi myös materiaalisia, empiriisiä ehtoja, kuten aistit ja näiden tuottamat aistimukset, sekä kielen, jonka avulla arvostelmat on mahdollista materialisoida. Tutkimuksella on toivottavasti annettavaa useammalle kuin yhdelle filosofian tutkimuskentälle, mutta lähtkohtaisesti se kuuluu filosofian historian tutkimukseen ja Kantin teoreettisen filosofian tutkimukseen. Ty sivuaa myös sellaisia filosofian aloja kuin tieteenfilosofia ja käsitehistoria, ennen kaikkea objektiivisuuden käsitteen historiallisen merkittävyyden takia. Lisäksi työllä saattaa olla relevanssia kielifilosofialle sekä lukuisille Kantiin liittyville kiistoille tämänhetkisten spekulatiivisten realistien piirissä. Contents 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 11 1.1 Kant and the Problem of Objectivity ................................................................... 11 1.2 Kant and the Concept of Objectivity .................................................................. 14 1.3 General theme, Aims and Questions ................................................................... 16 1.4 The Structure and Content ................................................................................... 21 2 The Humean Problem and Experience ........................................................ 27 2.1 The Humean Problem ...........................................................................................
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