ROCCO CASAGRANDE
Viewpoint
Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture: The Threat to US National Security
ROCCO CASAGRANDE
Rocco Casagrande is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Biology at MIT. He is currently conducting research in the Pathology Department of Harvard Medical School, where he studies how viruses evade the immune system. Mr. Casagrande is also part of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Colloquium at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
he Midwest is reeling from an infestation of corn This fictional scenario illustrates a current national blight. Over 200 farms in Iowa alone have re- security problem: several non-state actors have the abil- Tported infections. Plant pathologists note that the ity to infect large swaths of US agriculture with patho- pattern of infestation is inconsistent with a natural out- gens that can cause severe economic disruption. Despite break since the infections occurred in many places at the severity of the threat, the US Congress has failed to once and were found in farms along major interstate provide adequate funding for countermeasures, and US highways. Scientists found that the infecting strain is agencies and agricultural industries have not taken the identical to one found in Asia. Recently, this news sta- necessary steps to prevent agroterrorist attacks. tion has received a letter from a group calling itself the Last year, Congress appropriated $10 billion to com- Guardians of Gaia. They have claimed responsibility for bat terrorism, most of which was spent to prevent at- the outbreaks and stated that they will continue to at- tacks using conventional weapons, the primary tool of tack America’s corn crops until farmers disavow the use terrorists today. One billion dollars of this allocation of genetically modified ‘franken-seed.’ Already, several were specifically earmarked to thwart terrorism involv- countries and food companies have turned to corn pro- ing weapons of mass destruction such as biological ducers from other nations to avoid consumer backlash weapons. Even though biological weapons that target ag- against the tainted produce. A USDA spokeswoman has riculture are capable of massive economic damage on a claimed that corn blight is completely harmless to hu- national scale, the US Department of Agriculture mans and consumers have nothing to worry about from (USDA) has not received the funds to combat terrorism eating infected corn. Furthermore, she stated that the that it requested out of this allotment. The USDA ad- actual damage to the crop has been minimal. However, vanced two counter-terrorism proposals in the 2001 bud- the $20 billion a year corn-growing industry is already get that totaled merely $15.9 million. However, the unable to sell its stores of corn…. House of Representatives has approved only $2.9 mil- lion and the Senate only $3.6 million for these purposes.1
92 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
This financial neglect is mirrored by the limited at- agriculture could appeal to politically motivated terror- tention given to anti-agriculture terrorism in US law and ists or criminal groups seeking financial gain, as well as policy directives. Biological weapons that do not kill to apocalyptic groups who seek to kill as many people people are not included in the definition of “weapons of as possible. A biological attack that targets agriculture, mass destruction” as stated in title 50, chapter 40 of the therefore, should be regarded as a “high-consequence, US Code (Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruc- high-probability” event and receive the attention it de- tion Act). In fact, terrorism targeting crops or livestock serves as a grave national security risk. is not mentioned in the unclassified portions of Presi- This viewpoint first outlines the relatively low tech- dential Decision Directives 39 or 62 (which both delin- nical barriers to obtaining non-human pathogens. It then eate policy on counter-terrorism) or, most surprisingly, argues that agricultural pathogens can be easily em- Presidential Decision Directive 63, “Protecting ployed to harm animals and crops, causing major eco- America’s Critical Infrastructure.” nomic disruption. Next it reviews the types of terrorists Response to a natural agricultural disease outbreak is most likely to be motivated to resort to agroterrorism. coordinated by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection This viewpoint concludes that measures must be taken Service (APHIS), which would therefore also be respon- both to prevent and to mitigate agroterrorist attacks, and sible for managing the response to a biological attack it offers several specific recommendations. on crops or livestock. Funding for this service, which is a branch of the USDA, has recently been diminished, THE ABILITY OF TERRORISTS TO OBTAIN thus reducing the number of plant and animal patholo- NON-HUMAN PATHOGENS6 gists who can recognize and react to an outbreak of dis- ease. A large-scale or multi-focal outbreak would likely Isolation from the Environment overwhelm the response capability of this service, al- To obtain a pathogen, a terrorist group could try to lowing for the catastrophic spread of disease.2 isolate the organism from the environment, order it from Agriculture is a major sector of the US economy a biological collection or laboratory, or be given it by a whose protection should be given a high priority. The state sponsor. To isolate a human pathogen from the US agricultural sector accounts for 13 percent of the environment would require a terrorist group to have at Gross Domestic Product and provides jobs for over 15 least a few members with expertise in microbiology. percent of Americans.3 Exports of agricultural goods However, even a trained microbiologist has difficulty accounted for more than $50 billion dollars in 1998.4 isolating the most highly pathogenic strains from nature In addition to its economic significance, the agriculture and, once isolated, these strains often prove difficult to sector also has special importance as a source of the culture effectively while maintaining virulence. For ex- nation’s food supply. ample, Aum Shinrikyo, a well-funded and organized cult Anti-agriculture biological terrorism may have re- that released nerve gas on the subways of Tokyo, at- ceived little attention because of a misconception that it tempted to culture Ebola virus and Bacillus anthracis is as difficult to obtain, weaponize, and disseminate ag- (the causative agent of anthrax) by collecting these ricultural pathogens as it is to take an anti-human bio- agents from infected individuals and the environment, logical weapon from bacteria to bomb. Biological agents respectively. Both attempts failed to produce a weapon that target people are extremely difficult to make into that caused any human deaths, despite the presence of weapons that would kill more people than conventional several highly trained microbiologists in their group.7 explosives. Combined with the fact that only a subset of The culturing of many animal and plant diseases from terrorists would want to kill thousands of people, this the environment is far easier. The former Soviet has led policymakers to conclude that such catastrophic bioweapons scientist Ken Alibek has noted that the So- terrorism is a “high-consequence, low-probability viets found anti-agriculture weapons easier to produce: event.”5 However, a major act of agricultural terrorism, In contrast to the sophisticated reactor tech- one that causes over a billion dollars in damage, could niques developed to produce anti-personnel be produced by a series of limited infections triggered biological weapons, anti-agricultural weapons by pathogens delivered by simple methods. Furthermore, were generally produced by more primitive depending on the agent chosen, biological attacks against
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 93 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
methods. For the anti-crop fungal diseases, this ted to obtain any of the 24 human pathogens that have involved basic surface cultivation techniques. the “potential to pose a severe threat to public health and For anti-livestock weapons, cultivation gener- safety.”11 Importantly, no plant pathogens or pathogens ally involved live-animal techniques. It is that infect only lower animals are on this prohibited list. worth noting that both of these basic tech- To obtain these non-human pathogens, a lab must in- niques could be easily adapted by terrorists.8 stead obtain a permit from the USDA. In fact, not only the Soviets but also the Iraqis used To determine if USDA guidelines were being followed simple plant-surface culturing techniques to harvest for the transfer of plant pathogens, I corresponded with anti-agricultural pathogens in the late 1980s.9 17 laboratories working with plant pathogens that could To culture a livestock or poultry pathogen, a terrorist be used by terrorists. When asked, a third of the research would first have to find an outbreak of the disease he labs contacted stated that they would require no paper- wished to isolate. The terrorist could then purchase an work to send viable samples of their plant pathogens infected animal and, after modest processing, have a inside the same state. All labs required a USDA permit sample containing the pathogen. This sample could then for the transfer of plant pathogens out of state. However, be smuggled into this country and used to cultivate more none of the labs stated that they would contact anyone pathogen. in law enforcement about the request (as would be done for the request of a human pathogen) or do any further The prospects for terrorist success can be gauged from checking if the permit seemed in order.12 a non-terrorist case, in which farmers in New Zealand sought to eradicate rabbits that were infesting their farms. However, laboratory strains of plant and animal patho- It appears that the farmers had rabbit calicivirus gens are often not as virulent as those found in nature. smuggled into the country through one of the tightest Furthermore, the most infectious foreign animal dis- airport/port biosecurity regimes in the world. Without eases, such as foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDv) using any special equipment, the farmers were able to and the Rinderpest virus, are studied in the United States 13 culture the virus and then disseminate it by contaminat- only at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. There- ing vegetables left out for the foraging rabbits.10 fore these animal pathogens could not be shipped to any- where in the United States by a laboratory or cell bank. Plant pathogens could also be obtained with little tech- Since the most dangerous animal and plant pathogens nical difficulty. The terrorist would find an outbreak of would be easier to isolate from the environment, well- a plant disease and purchase some infected plants. The informed terrorists are unlikely to try to obtain anti- terrorist would then smuggle the infected part of the agricultural agents by mail order. plants or spores of the pathogen into the United States. To mass propagate the pathogen, little special equipment Obtaining Pathogens from State Sponsors or expertise is required. Enemies of the United States may turn to biological Some of the most damaging crop pests have been in- weapons that target agriculture as a means of prosecut- sects accidentally introduced from foreign lands into the ing a “shadow” war. Several countries are suspected to United States. Smuggling in and rearing insects could possess anti-agriculture biological weapons. In the thus be another tactic, which again is not technically dif- 1950s and 1960s, the United States stockpiled weapons ficult, that terrorists might attempt. meant to destroy the staple crops of foreign nations, such as potatoes, soybeans, sugar beets, cotton, wheat, and Obtaining Pathogens from Laboratories or rice.14 In the 1980s, Iraq researched wheat cover smut Collections and camel pox for use as weapons.15 Also in the 1980s, There are fewer controls monitoring the possession the Soviet Union weaponized wheat and rye blasts, wheat of microorganisms that infect only plants or livestock rust, African Swine Fever, Rinderpest, and FMDv.16 than those that can sicken or kill humans. To prevent Any country whose agents commit acts of terrorists from acquiring harmful biological agents from agroterrorism against the United States might believe it microbe libraries, laboratories must first register with could evade attribution for the act. It is difficult to un- the Centers for Disease Control before they are permit- ambiguously attribute an agricultural disease outbreak
94 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
to a biological attack as opposed to a natural occurrence. struction of its own regime as a result of being caught in For a biological attack involving human pathogens, there the act of agricultural sabotage. are two potential indicators that a disease outbreak re- sulted from deliberate attack: the kinetics of the outbreak THE ABILITY OF TERRORISTS TO TURN and the route of infection. Explosive outbreaks, in which AGRICULTURAL PATHOGENS INTO hundreds of people all become ill at once, or outbreaks WEAPONS that occur simultaneously at geographically scattered The successful cultivation of a pathogenic organism areas are unlikely to occur in natural, person-to-person is neither the last nor the most difficult step in produc- spread of a disease. A second indication is a prevalence ing a weapon capable of killing people outside its im- of respiratory infections, because mass-casualty biologi- mediate area of release. Liquid cultures of bacteria or cal weapons rely on the victims inhaling the pathogen. viruses are not easily dispersed to create aerosols that For example, the few cases of anthrax infection that have stay suspended in air and lodge in the lungs. Also, most occurred in the United States have almost all been cuta- human pathogens lose virulence quickly when kept in a neous.17 If cases of inhalation anthrax were to show up liquid suspension.21 In order to make an efficient at hospitals, a biological attack would be highly suspect. weapon, the agent must be dried into a powder, a pro- Biological attacks on agriculture have fewer indica- cess that requires milling and drying, thereby necessi- tions to distinguish them from natural outbreaks. Al- tating the use of equipment that must be operated by an though anti-agricultural biological terrorism could also expert machinist. Even though the Iraqis possessed the cause explosive or multi-focal outbreaks, these infections milling and drying equipment necessary to produce dried would occur through the pathogen’s natural route of anthrax, they were apparently unable to solve technical entry into the host. A group looking to disguise an at- and safety problems associated with the dried agent and tack as a natural outbreak would have its agents spread so loaded their bombs with a wet suspension of Bacillus the pathogen over a single area near a port of entry into anthracis.22 the country, thereby mimicking the pattern of a natural Unlike biological weapons that target people, terror- outbreak. How could the USDA distinguish between an ists can choose among several plant or animal pathogens insect invader that came accidentally aboard wooden that need to come in contact with only the surface of the packing material from China (as did the Asian long- target host to cause infection—no special process to horned beetle18 ) from insects intentionally placed there weaponize the agent is required. When using pathogenic by terrorists or foreign agents? fungi of plants, one need not worry about creating a re- Unambiguous attribution of a lethal biological attack spirable aerosol; by simply spreading the agent over the would have severe military consequences for the state target hosts, several infections can be induced. Cattle can sponsor. For example, the United States threatened be infected by FMDv simply by coming in contact with “overwhelming” and “devastating” retaliation against the clothes of a contaminated herdsman; thus, major out- Iraq if it used chemical or biological weapons in the Gulf breaks can even be caused by accident.23 Therefore, a War.19 The consequences for a state sponsoring conven- terrorist group need not include a machinist to get a us- tional terrorism have been far less grave. In response to able biological weapon that targets crops or livestock. a particularly bold series of conventional attacks, the A knowledgeable individual could do severe damage to Reagan administration decided to retaliate with limited agriculture with a pathogen obtained from the environ- air-strikes against Libya in Operation El Dorado Can- ment of a foreign country. yon.20 The question arises as to what kind of retribution States have primarily developed biological weapons would be appropriate against a state sponsor of anti- that are lethal to humans but that do not spread easily agriculture biological terrorism. Since the primary dam- from one person to another. Non-communicable patho- age would be economic and few deaths would occur as gens have been chosen to prevent contagion from the the result of such a terrorist action, a full-scale war or target country back to the state that delivered the nuclear retaliation would likely be deemed excessive. weapon.24 Terrorists, however, could use biological A state sponsor could undertake a campaign to weaken agents that are highly communicable among their non- its adversary economically, yet not have to fear the de- human targets. Using communicable agents, a terrorist
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 95 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
could cause a widespread contagion from small, local- that a handful of attacks could cause widespread devas- ized, initial infectious foci. tation to an important sector of the US economy. After an initial infection is established, many plant and Another factor that facilitates the spread of an animal animal disease agents can spread by the wind to geo- disease is that animals and animal products are often graphically separated areas. For example, wind-borne moved to many locations in a short period of time. It is FMDv could spread throughout an entire cattle-raising common practice in several states to send diseased ani- region from one centrally located infected farm. mals to the Midwest for slaughter.28 Furthermore, new- Furthermore, organisms can be chosen with incuba- born pigs are routinely raised on a nursery farm and then tion periods that would disguise the presence of a patho- moved to a breeding or growing farm as they mature. gen until the animal has been introduced to other, These farms are often located in different states, allow- 29 uninfected animals. Some diseases can be carried in an ing for widespread dispersal of an infectious agent. In asymptomatic host, making identification of the disease a feedlot of 500 thousand cattle, about 3,000 cattle a day before it enters a large herd difficult.25 Also, certain are sent to slaughter, where they mix with cattle from pathogens can establish infections in wild animals, cre- other locations. More troubling still, several hundred ating a reservoir of virus that will continue to infect do- animals are sent to other feedlots each day, potentially 30 mesticated animals and make eradication of the disease spreading contagion. New animals are supposed to be from the country extremely difficult. quarantined; however, many farms do not follow this practice.31 THE ABILITY OF TERRORISTS TO EMPLOY ANTI-AGRICULTURAL PATHOGENS Targeting Crops Grown Over Vast Areas Once a terrorist group obtains an anti-agricultural Since crops are grown over wider areas than animals, weapon, the challenge remains to disseminate it widely contaminating a significant portion of any particular enough to damage an industry that occupies much of the crop is problematic. In the 1950s and 1960s, the US doc- land in the country’s interior. Crops require expanses of trine for using anti-crop weapons was to create several land to grow, and consequently are grown over thousands foci of infections distributed over a wide area, not to 32 of square miles. The modern animal farm, however, is a carpet every plant with agent. US planners expected huge operation with often several hundred thousand ani- the microbes would spread on the wind to the uninfected mals in one location. These two extremes of target con- portions of the crop. Terrorists could imitate this ap- centration require that a terrorist use markedly different proach simply by driving to multiple fields and distrib- techniques for targeting crops versus targeting livestock uting infected plant material or insects as they pass by. or poultry. In both cases, however, it would be possible Alternatively, terrorists could also attempt to trigger in- for terrorists to cause disease outbreaks that have major fections in multiple locations by contaminating products economic consequences. Terrorists also confront few that are distributed widely from a few central stockpiles. disincentives against employing anti-agricultural weap- ons, which also increases the likelihood of their use. The Ability of Attacks to Cause Economic Harm Agricultural pandemics can lead to economic losses Targeting Animals Raised in Large Herds of immense proportions. In 1983, an outbreak of highly The trend in animal farming is to consolidate herds pathogenic avian influenza in Pennsylvania cost farm- onto larger farms to reduce overhead. If current trends ers $86 million in control and cleanup, and increased the 33 continue, by 2002 the 40 largest pig producers will pro- price of poultry and eggs to consumers by a third. The vide 90 percent of pigs to the US market and by 2010 1997 FMDv outbreak in Taiwan decimated the country’s 34 the largest 30 feedlots will generate 50 percent of the pork industry, causing $7 billion in damage. The well- finished cattle. A typical poultry farm will have from publicized outbreak of mad-cow disease in Great Brit- 250 thousand to several million birds.26 Four meat pack- ain cost the country $4.2 billion in depopulation costs 35 ers process about 80 percent of the animals sent to alone. slaughter.27 This concentration of animals, combined Even limited infectious outbreaks can cause signifi- with the communicability of livestock diseases, suggests cant economic losses. To protect their local agriculture,
96 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
foreign countries will enact trade embargoes to prevent Weakness of Deterrents against Employing Anti- infected animals and plants from entering their country. Agricultural Biological Weapons These trade restrictions will be enacted even if an infec- A weapon that is easy to acquire and use may still pose tion is limited to a small area or a few animals. In 1951 an unlikely threat if the prospects of employing it are to 1952, a small outbreak of FMDv occurred in Canada. so horrible that terrorists refuse to disseminate it. The The disease only infected 2,000 animals and cost only enormity of using biological weapons that can kill thou- $2 million (1987 dollars) for disinfection and carcass re- sands increases the likelihood of dissention within a moval. Although the infection was very limited, trade group that plans to employ them. Many terrorist plots embargoes placed on Canadian meat cost the farmers $2 have been foiled by conspirators who succumbed to an 36 billion (1987 dollars) in lost revenues. Karnal bunt attack of conscience and informed on their partners.41 (Tilletia indica), a minor pathogen of wheat, caused A biological attack on agriculture may have no human large-scale economic disruption during a limited out- casualties and is therefore less likely to prompt mem- break. In 1996, the fungus was found in wheat seeds bers of the terrorist cell to sabotage the attack. Further- grown in the Southwest, a discovery that led other coun- more, if the terrorists are not using zoonotic organisms, tries to severely curtail the import of American wheat. they need not worry about becoming casualties of their Although the actual extent of the infections was limited, own weapons. the total impact on wheat exports was estimated to be roughly $250 million.37 These examples demonstrate The fact that the consequences for using a weapon of that a biological attack on agriculture need not be mas- mass destruction against agriculture are less severe than sive; the mere presence of a pathogen can have economi- using one that will inflict mass human casualties allows cally devastating consequences.38 terrorists who do not wish to sacrifice themselves to employ them. The law of the United States illustrates Additionally, consumers will turn away from a prod- the dichotomy of retribution visited upon terrorists who uct that is considered potentially tainted. Consider the use biological weapons that target people versus those case of Chilean grapes supposedly laced with cyanide that target crops. Section 2332a of title 18 of the US Code in 1989. Although no one fell ill as a result of the al- states that a person who uses or attempts to use “a leged poisoning and the FDA found no conclusive evi- weapon of mass destruction shall be imprisoned for any dence of the poison in any grapes, consumers refused to term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be buy all types of Chilean fruit. The suspected poisoning punished by death, or by imprisonment for any term of caused an estimated $210 million loss in profit and dam- years or for life” (emphasis added). Therefore, terror- aged the relationship between the United States and ists using biological weapons that target plants or live- 39 Chile. Although many agricultural pathogens are harm- stock but not people would not have to worry about less to people, the visceral fear of poison and disease paying the ultimate price for their actions. It is impor- can scare consumers into purchasing what they consider tant to note that anti-agriculture weapons are defined as 40 “safer” products. weapons of mass destruction in the criminal code (title If a terrorist group were to use a zoonotic agent, an 18 of the US Code), but as stated before, not in the De- agent that can harm people as well as animals, the con- fense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (title sumer reaction would be even stronger. If the terrorists 50, chapter 40). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that wished to cause no fatalities, they could inform the au- section 2332 applies to an agroterrorist incident only if thorities of the incident before the animal products the agent were used against a person or property of the reached the human food chain. By providing proof that United States.42 Importantly, section 177 of title 18 pro- they contaminated several animals in one herd, and hibits the stockpiling, acquisition, or possession of an claiming that they had contaminated unnamed others, agricultural weapon. Since possession of a biological the terrorists could create an economic disaster for the weapon is required in order to use a biological weapon, meat or dairy industry. agroterrorists who employ such a weapon could be found in violation of section 177 instead and still be impris- oned for a term of years.
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 97 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
If section 2332 cannot be stretched to fit the and new recruits. These resources may become scarce agroterrorist crime, the terrorists would be charged un- as the citizenry grows weary of the terrorists’ violent der section 43 of title 18. This section states that anyone tactics. To better sway their audience, many terrorist who causes economic damage in excess of $10,000 to groups have turned to causing economic damage, often an animal enterprise by causing the loss of animals or in addition to limited, violent action, to achieve their property without harming a person can be jailed for up political goal. In fact, the RAND Corporation proposes to only one year. Under the terms of this section, the ter- that terrorists will “...continue to destroy things and kill rorists would also have to pay the appropriate financial people, but their principal strategy may move toward the restitution.43 non-lethal end of the spectrum where command and control nodes and vulnerable infrastructures provide rich THE TERRORISTS WHO MAY RESORT TO sets of targets.”45 AGROTERRORISM Paul Rogers of Bradford University has reported that The fact that biological weapons that target agricul- several terrorist groups have changed from the deliber- ture are relatively simple to acquire, weaponize, and use ate injury of people to the destruction of property and does not necessarily mean that terrorists will use these the disruption of commerce as their method of choice.46 exotic weapons instead of conventional explosives. The He writes that, in the 1990s, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) weapons and tactics chosen by terrorist groups tend to attempted to keep civilian casualties to a minimum in change as the group becomes more convinced of its own their bombing campaigns in London’s central business rhetoric. Terrorists often begin with non-violent forms districts. These actions lie in stark contrast to the older of protest, graduate to the destruction of property, and tactics of the PIRA that killed over 2,000 civilians and then to violent action.44 A terrorist group could incor- military personnel in the IRA’s 30-year history of ter- porate non-violent anti-agriculture terrorism in the in- ror. Rogers cites several reasons for the change in strat- creasing spiral of criminal activity. egy: the British casualties did not lead to war-weariness among the English populace or a conciliatory response The level of violence a terrorist group will rise to var- from the British government, and the PIRA’s tactics in- ies depending on the motivation of the group. Therefore, cited counter-insurgency actions and reprisal bombings the goals of a terrorist group will affect the likelihood from Loyalists. Furthermore, in possible response to the that they will resort to anti-agriculture biological weap- violence, the nationalist community began supporting the ons as opposed to conventional weaponry. Groups with Social Democratic Labour Party instead of Sinn Fein, political, religious, and criminal motivations, or fanati- which had close ties to the PIRA. Starting in 1992, the cally devoted to a single issue, all might turn to PIRA began a bombing campaign that targeted economic agroterrorism. nodes, such as highway overpasses and empty shopping areas, instead of people. This campaign had a direct fi- Terrorists with Political Goals nancial cost in terms of rebuilding destroyed buildings, Violent groups with political goals will find it diffi- equipment, and roads, and an indirect cost in terms of cult to attract as much attention, create as much eco- insurance recovery and loss of business and tourism to nomic chaos, and suffer as few consequences by the area. Rogers attributes the British government’s will- employing any other type of weapon. Many terrorists ingness to risk dealing with Sinn Fein in 1994 to the want autonomy for a disenfranchised ethnic group, the damage incurred by this economic terrorism. release of prisoners sympathetic to their cause, or a Other terrorists also turned to economic destruction change in what they view as an oppressive government. to effect a change. For example, in 1979, Palestinian ter- To effect these changes, these groups need the support rorists poisoned Israeli oranges to sabotage the Israeli of the population. The use of indiscriminate violence, economy.47 Even terrorists who seek to kill with bomb- however, tends to harden the resolve of the populace to ing attacks often target tourists in hopes of doing eco- fight against those causing the bloodshed instead of nomic damage. Such is the case with Islamic militants against the terrorists intended targets. Furthermore, ter- in Egypt and the ETA in Spain, who, in addition to mur- rorists with a political goal often rely on sympathetic dering government officials, have killed many tourists.48 individuals for logistical support, financial assistance, Furthermore, terrorists could target a crop in which the
98 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
target country takes particular pride, such as Spanish suffer because of public backlash against violent attacks. olives or French wine-grapes. Such groups may be found among the American Chris- Terrorists have also resorted to cyberterrorism to in- tian identity/patriot movement, eschatologists who are flict economic damage on their targets. Through the de- seeking to foment the apocalypse, and sects or cults struction or infiltration of computer networks and motivated by religious ideals that encourage violent re- web-pages, cyberterrorists have caused hundreds of mil- prisal against those who impede their goals. These groups lions of dollars in damage yet have killed no one. This may attempt to use biological weapons to kill people on economic means of targeting perceived enemies is on a massive scale. It is fortunate, therefore, that religious the rise.49 Similar motivations might therefore produce motivation is behind only a minority, albeit a growing 50 attacks on agriculture intended to cause economic harm. one, of terrorist attacks. Anti-agricultural weapons can also satisfy a political These groups could attempt to inflict mass casualties terrorist’s goal of publicity. Even though no casualties using a zoonotic agent by infecting animals that would may result from a terrorist attack directed at agriculture, later enter the human food chain. However, these agents there would be enormous media attention to a confirmed are not as easy to culture and disseminate as are FMDv attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. The nov- and plant pathogens. Furthermore, the incubation time elty of an attack with biological weapons would cause of these pathogens must be timed so that the animal does the story to dominate the headlines for many weeks. not show symptoms that would prevent the animal prod- Biological weapons targeted at agriculture might be the ucts from coming to market. ideal weapon to allow a terrorist group to gain the atten- By attacking a nation that relies on one staple crop to tion of a large population without killing a large num- feed the majority of its population, terrorists can cause ber of people. When a bomb kills a handful of victims, widespread famine in a developing nation. The damage this atrocity only really affects those who are killed or done by famine can far outweigh the casualties inflicted maimed and their relatives and friends. The rest of the by conventional or even non-conventional weapons. The country looks on with pity for the victims and anger at attraction of fanatical religious groups to this type of the attackers, but is otherwise unaffected. As seen with biological weapon is the almost biblical scale of the con- the avian influenza outbreak in the 1980s, an agricul- sequences. It should be noted, however, that the US food tural disease outbreak could raise the price of meat or supply is diverse and plentiful enough that this type of produce, thereby affecting everyone in the country. The attack would not plunge the US population into starva- widespread effect of an attack on agriculture, combined tion. These groups would therefore use anti-agricultural with the relative mildness of a zero-casualty action, could weapons against the United States to cause economic increase the public outcry to meet the demands of the devastation as part of a larger campaign. terrorists. Although American patriot/Christian identity groups States hostile to the United States may turn to bio- have recruited supporters from rural areas where farm- logical weapons that target agriculture as a means of ing is the mainstay of the economy, these terrorists may practicing asymmetric warfare. Covert delivery of state- turn to a biological attack against agriculture because made biological weapons could cripple the agrochemi- advocacy of this type of attack is found in The Turner cal industry of a rival nation. Although retribution would Diaries, the fictional account of a revolution from which be likely if the sponsor-state was unambiguously re- Timothy McVeigh and other militiamen have taken in- vealed, nuclear or similar “overwhelming and devastat- spiration. In this book, the militia is frustrated with the ing” reprisal would not be likely in a case where few apathy with which mainstream, white America is greet- deaths occurred. ing the militia’s revolution against the American gov- ernment. To shock Americans out of their apathy, the Terrorists with Religious Motivations book records that the militiamen “began appealing to things they can understand, fear and hunger. We will take Many terrorist groups are not fettered by the same con- food off their tables and empty their refrigerators….”51 straints that shape the tactics of terrorists with political goals. These groups have no political agenda that would
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 99 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
Criminals ism of logging equipment, dynamiting of electrical Agricultural weapons will be pursued not only by plants, attempted sabotage of nuclear power plants, those who have ideological or theological goals, but also slaughter of cattle, and the destruction of whole fields 56 those groups whose concerns are more pragmatic and of genetically engineered crops. These groups have mercenary. Dr. Horn, administrator of the Agricultural bombed, ransacked, and burned various USDA facili- 57 Research Service, testified that anti-agriculture weapons ties. In fact, terrorists espousing environmental issues could be used by the greedy to manipulate the commod- and animal rights were the most active terrorists in the 58 ity and futures markets.52 By using pathogens that af- United States in the 1990s. Furthermore, the radical fect only one type of organism, these attacks could occur ecoterrorist group RISE, who espoused killing nearly all without inducing losses in other types of plants or live- humanity with biological weapons, was one of the few stock. For example, blackmailers might try to extort terrorist organizations to actually acquire human patho- 59 money from a target company by threatening to unleash gens in the hope of creating a weapon. a pathogen on the industry’s crops or livestock. Or, ag- Ecoterrorists could use biological agents to cripple the ricultural pests might be used by foreign agricultural production of a crop such as corn, which is predomi- concerns to gain a competitive edge.53 In addition, people nately produced from genetically modified seed in the with a grudge could use anti-agriculture weapons to get United States. Alternatively, a group could use a smaller revenge for a perceived wrong. For example, a group of scale dissemination to spread the disease only in the test individuals who lost loved-ones to lung cancer might fields of a biotechnology company or among experimen- target the tobacco crop. In all the above cases, the moral tal livestock. Ecoterrorists would be attracted to biologi- barrier to the criminal act is reduced because no people cal weapons in particular because of the irony of using would be injured in the attacks. nature to reverse the depredations of mankind. Further- Economic warfare might be employed by drug traf- more, many of these groups espouse a policy of non- fickers as revenge for the actions taken by the United violence, and biological agents targeted at agriculture States to winnow down the drug traffickers’ profits. could accomplish their goals without the death of any Drug-lords have sponsored terrorism in the past: the at- humans. In contrast to acts of mayhem by groups seek- tack on the Colombian Supreme Court in 1984 was per- ing to force a country into a particular plan of action, a petrated in response to Colombia’s willingness to biological attack against agriculture is a means and an extradite drug traffickers to the United States.54 Another end for many ecoterrorists. Biological agents could al- incentive for these “narco-terrorists” to use anti-crop low ecoterrorists to devastate genetically engineered weapons is the proposed US effort to weaponize plant crops, remove livestock from pristine grassland, or eco- pathogens that attack narcotic-producing crops.55 It is nomically ruin a fertilizer manufacturer. In fact, animal likely that drug cartels would want the capability to “re- rights terrorists have used chemical poisons in the past taliate in kind” in response to an American attack on to cause financial damage to specific industries. The narcotic crops. These criminal groups undoubtedly have British Animal Liberation Front allegedly poisoned the chemical laboratories, financial resources, and smug- candy bars, turkeys, and eggs to protest various crimes gling ability to sponsor an effective attack on US agri- against animals. To avoid human casualties, this animal 60 culture. rights group issued warnings about the attacks. Also, the only possible incident of bioterrorism directed against agriculture allegedly came from an ecoterrorist Radical Ecologists and Animal Rights Groups group. The rapid spread of the Mediterranean fruit fly Certain ecoterrorists might find biological weapons in California in 1989 was allegedly caused by a group particularly attractive. These groups have voiced goals called the Breeders, who stated that they spread the in- from an end to deforestation by the lumber and paper sects to protest agricultural practices.61 industries to the cessation the genetic engineering of “frankenfoods.” The most radical of these groups work MEASURES TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE toward the destruction of all agriculture because they ANTI-AGRICULTURAL ATTACKS believe it is a perversion of the natural order. Various ecoterrorist groups have claimed responsibility for fire- The above analysis indicates that nationalist/separat- bombings of university and biotechnology labs, vandal- ists, criminals, fringe ecologists, hostile nations, and the
100 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 ROCCO CASAGRANDE fanatically religious all have motivations to resort to the USDA is a sponsor of the Freedom Support Act, agricultural weapons. Furthermore, anti-agriculture which employs former Soviet scientists, engaging them weapons are relatively easy to obtain and employ, and in peaceful research.63 This program is valuable because an attack on agriculture can inflict grave economic dam- it adds incentives for veteran BW designers to stay home, age. Agricultural terrorism thus cannot be thought of as instead of potentially being recruited to work for terror- either a “low-probability” or a “low-consequence” inci- ists, and it should continue to be funded. dent. One way to make it more difficult for terrorists to This analysis suggests that the current state of fund- obtain agricultural pathogens from the environment is ing for agricultural disease control and detection is in- to make these pathogens more rare. This can be accom- adequate. More funding needs to be appropriated to the plished by having APHIS teams respond to outbreaks USDA and its Animal and Plant Health Inspection Ser- of animal and plant diseases throughout the world. By vice. Further measures are also needed to stop terrorist having the outbreaks controlled more quickly, the win- from obtaining and employing these anti-crop and live- dows of opportunity for terrorists to acquire pathogens stock weapons. Finally, because prevention may fail, would be narrowed. In addition to having obvious hu- more steps must be taken to recognize and respond manitarian benefits, these missions could provide APHIS quickly to an agricultural disease outbreak. teams with the experience they need to diagnose and control foreign animal and crop diseases that they have Preventing Acquisition of Anti-Crop and not seen in the United States. Furthermore, the United Anti-Livestock Biological Weapons States should assist and help fund foreign efforts to eradi- cate disease. Currently, the European Community is Even though terrorists are unlikely to request anti- sponsoring the Pan African Rinderpest Eradication Cam- agricultural pathogens from laboratories or cell banks, paign to expunge this devastating disease from the planet a few easy steps should be taken to prevent this method by 2010.64 As more pathogens are removed from the of acquisition. The paperwork requirements for obtain- planet, the terrorists’ arsenal shrinks. ing plant or livestock pathogens should be as stringent as those currently in use for obtaining human pathogens. The ability of APHIS’s Plant Protection and Quaran- Furthermore, any request for an agricultural pathogen tine staff to detect agricultural products and pathogens should be reported to the USDA, which can in the case that are smuggled into the country must be improved. of a suspicious-looking request notify the FBI to inves- This service often finds itself overwhelmed by the sheer tigate the solicitor further. These steps could help iden- volume of traffic entering the country.65 Any improve- tify and stop terrorists before they actually obtain ment in the ability of this service to prevent the entry of pathogens from other sources. pathogens into this country will increase the barrier to terrorists obtaining this type of weapon. Terrorists may look to state sponsors to provide them with anti-agricultural biological weapons. Many It should be noted that title 18, chapter 10 of the US policymakers have suggested that the Biological Weap- Code prohibits the acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or ons Convention needs to be strengthened to include no- development of anti-agricultural biological weapons. notice site inspections of suspected biological weapon However, this law does not apply if the pathogen is for facilities to make the acquisition and stockpiling of bio- peaceful purposes. As stated above, since little or no logical weaponry more difficult.62 No-notice inspections weaponization is required to make agricultural patho- would make a proliferating state take extra measures to gens into a weapon, it is difficult to tell whether patho- disguise their anti-agricultural biological weapons pro- gens are retained for peaceful or illegal purposes. gram. However, because agricultural weapons require Furthermore, a highly contagious animal virus that is little to no weaponization to employ, it may be impos- mishandled by someone with no terrorist intent could sible to determine if a stock of agricultural pathogen is accidentally cause severe disruption of agricultural com- for offensive or peaceful purposes. merce. If the purpose of the agent were immaterial, and the only exception to title 18, chapter 10 were organiza- Terrorists could also gain access to valuable exper- tions that had USDA permits for the retention of patho- tise through a proliferating state’s unemployed weapon gens, then both the legal loopholes and potential for scientists. To prevent this eventuality from occurring,
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 101 ROCCO CASAGRANDE accidental dissemination would be curtailed. In fact, this mal cost. The cost of these safeguards should be absorbed suggestion has been made by several policymakers in by the agricultural companies, as these measures allow order to more easily prevent unlicensed groups from the companies to better protect their own herds and crops obtaining human pathogens.66 and ensure a safer product to their consumers. The cost of these steps to prevent terrorists from ac- The United States should take steps to facilitate law- quiring anti-crop and anti-livestock weapons is minimal, suits filed by corporations and farmers who suffer losses and many of these measures have other desirable effects. at the hands of terrorists. If blame were unambiguously Biological weapons inspections and weapon scientist attributed, lawsuits could be brought against individual retraining would also help uncover covert biological anti- sponsors or the political branches of the guilty terrorist personnel weapons and prevent the spread of weapon group. Already a few such lawsuits have been settled expertise. APHIS’s assistance in helping mitigate dis- successfully: the Klinghoffer family won a suit against ease outbreaks in other countries not only has a humani- the PLO for their role in the hijacking of the Achille tarian benefit, but also provides training in exotic Lauro, for example. 67 Due to the potentially enormous pathogen control in case of a natural disease outbreak financial costs of a biological attack, a successful com- of a foreign pathogen. Increased border security makes pensatory lawsuit could spell financial ruin for a radical it more difficult for naturally occurring pests to acciden- political movement. By threatening the existence of the tally enter the United States. very movement itself, this measure could have a larger deterrent effect on a terrorist group than the incarcera- Preventing Use of Anti-Agriculture Biological tion of a few of their agents. Weapons Terrorists may attempt to contaminate centrally held Mitigating the Effects of a Biological Attack on stocks of agricultural products that are later dispersed Agriculture over wide areas. Both farms and companies that supply The sheer size and expanse of the American agricul- them with agrochemicals should make it more difficult ture industry, combined with the simplicity of obtain- for criminals to gain access to these goods. Locks and ing, weaponizing, and using anti-agricultural agents and tamper-evident seals that are checked before the prod- the diversity of terrorist groups who could be interested ucts are dispensed would ensure that warehoused agro- in employing these agents, make any combination of de- chemicals are safe before being given to animals or terrence and prevention unlikely to be fail-safe. There- spread on fields. In order to protect interstate commerce, fore, more steps should be taken to limit the damage Congress should mandate that any agricultural product incurred if terrorists do successfully deploy a biological that is stored in one location and then parceled out to agent against agriculture. more than one state be safeguarded by tamper-evident Several of the following proposals will take signifi- seals. cant investment at the federal level. However, all of these Terrorists may also attempt to introduce livestock suggestions would also help mitigate the consequences pathogens to animals that will later be moved elsewhere. of the more common case of natural disease outbreaks. Although it is already part of current biosecurity proto- Funding for these proposals could become available by cols, farms should always quarantine animals arriving first fixing an inconsistency in the law. As stated before, to their farms from other locations. Also, farms should biological weapons that sicken plants and animals (other not let outsiders have access to their herds. If a farm than humans) are not considered weapons of mass de- wishes to show part of a herd for sale or auction, this struction under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass portion should be kept separate from the rest of the herd Destruction Act (title 50, chapter 40) but are defined as and quarantined after the showing is done. If these simple such under the Criminal Code (title 18). In the Defense measures were followed, terrorists would have to trans- Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, specific pro- port the agents themselves to locations they wanted to posals for homeland defense against chemical, biologi- attack, thereby increasing the chances of being appre- cal, and nuclear weapons are delineated, and funding for hended. The use of both strict quarantine procedure and the proposals is allocated. Proper inclusion of anti-agri- tamper-evident seals, though inconvenient, has a mini- culture biological agents in the Defense Against Weap-
102 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
ons of Mass Destruction Act could provide a framework fee, and stone fruits. This one sequencing project dem- for funding allocation for the following proposals. onstrates how research can be the first step in the pre- Just as surveillance of the patterns of human disease vention of several plant diseases. can help law enforcement recognize and react to a ter- The creation of vaccine and antibiotic stockpiles has rorist attack involving biological weapons targeting our been proposed to provide treatment to the masses of population, enhanced surveillance of agricultural disease people who would be exposed to pathogens in a biologi- would help stem the spread of plant and animal patho- cal terrorist attack. The same strategy would hold for gens. An outbreak caused by a terrorist attack could be veterinary vaccines, insecticides, antibiotics, and anti- explosive, and the time it takes for the state agencies to fungals that would be useful in stopping the spread of notice and report a disease to APHIS could prevent ef- pathogens to uninfected sectors of agriculture. The fective disease management. APHIS should create moni- USDA currently has vaccine and antibiotic stockpiles, toring teams that patrol farms for disease. These teams but these are not sufficient should regular practices not should use antibody-mediated, real-time diagnostic tests contain an outbreak, such as would be the case in a multi- for the presence of plant pathogens on crops, and PCR- focal terrorist attack.71 Similarly, it would be wise for based assays for the detection of viruses in livestock private agricultural corporations and farming concerns hosts. These tests could detect diseases before symptoms (or the companies that insure them) to create their own became visible or before the diseases were communi- caches of drugs until federal stockpiles can be increased. cable to other animals and plants. Furthermore, the APHIS should be strengthened. APHIS is adequately sooner the infected herd is quarantined or the infected funded to rapidly respond to both animal and plant dis- crop is destroyed, the less likely the pathogen would ease outbreaks, but their current capabilities would be spread to other areas. Alternatively, farms and feedlots overwhelmed by a large, multi-focal outbreak, or sev- could provide samples on a regular basis to regional labs eral major disease outbreaks at once (which terrorists where the tests can be done as the samples are received. may try to trigger to overwhelm the responders).72 Fund- Furthermore, computer models, which calculate pos- ing to APHIS should be increased to create larger Early sible geographical ranges of plant disease, could guide Response Teams, three-member teams that can respond these patrolling teams, insofar as which pathogen should to a disease outbreak in 24 hours, and more Regional be tested for and in which regions they should test for Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organizations it.68 These models use information about weather pat- (READEO), who direct and assist in disinfection, vac- terns and pathogen temperature-and-moisture-tolerance cine administration, animal culling, and other duties.73 to determine areas where plant pathogens could live. By If more READEO teams were created, several of these creating models for the most dangerous anti-crop patho- teams could be deployed abroad to help combat foreign gens, the APHIS teams could save time and resources disease outbreaks. The patrolling teams proposed above by testing for diseases only where they are likely to can be mobilized to assist READEO teams when out- spread. breaks are found. The USDA should fund more research directed at To help combat an explosive outbreak, APHIS should pathogen genome sequencing and finding new vaccines create a reserve network of veterinary and plant patholo- and antibiotics. At the present time, there is no vaccine gists, chosen from academia and industry, that it can that provides protection against all families of FMD vi- mobilize in the case of a massive outbreak.74 A reserve ruses.69 Several veterinary laboratories have reported network reduces the cost of having hundreds of the increasing presence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. underused pathologists when disease outbreaks are rare. However, by unlocking the genetic makeup of the most One of the most devastating effects of even a small- dangerous agricultural pests, we can gain insight into scale outbreak is trade embargoes placed on the affected new strategies to prevent catastrophic outbreaks. Re- crop. Soon after an outbreak is confirmed, APHIS must searchers in Brazil have already sequenced the genome rigorously determine the extent of the disease and de- 70 of citrus variegated chlorosis (X. fastidiosa). Various lineate boundaries of infected and uninfected areas. By strains of this bacteria cause disease in a variety of agri- preventing the introduction of disease into the areas de- culturally important plants, such as alfalfa, grapes, cof- clared uninfected, economic losses can be diminished
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 103 ROCCO CASAGRANDE by the resumption of trade from areas assured to be un- 11 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, April 24, 1996. 12 75 Two principal investigators reported that the USDA papers could easily affected by the pathogens. be forged by criminals wanting to acquire the pathogens illegally. 13 Veterinary Services, “The Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Labora- The USDA should create a program to educate farm- tory at Plum Island Animal Disease Center,” United States Department of ers on how to recognize and react to foreign diseases Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Fact-sheet (Decem- and pests. Since some farms do not follow the appropri- ber 1992),
104 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 ROCCO CASAGRANDE
40 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- 67 The RAND Corporation suggested this measure to increase the economic sity Press, 1999), pp. 34-39. consequences for those groups sponsoring terrorism in Countering the New 41 For example, see Dan Barry, “Police Break Up Suspected Bomb Plot in Terrorism. Brooklyn,” New York Times, August 1, 1997, p. A4. In this case, the confi- 68 Ron Sequeira, “Safeguarding Production Agriculture and Natural Eco- dant of two terrorists, who planned to detonate suicide pipe bombs in the systems against Biological Terrorism,” Annals of the New York Academy of New York subway, informed the police of the plot just hours before it was Sciences 894 (1999), pp. 48-67. implemented. 69 Peter L. Nara, “The Status and Role of Vaccines in the US Food Animal 42 Wilson et al., “A Review of Agroterrorism.” Industry,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 894 (1999), pp. 43 Ibid. 206-217. 44 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 70 The Xylella fastidiosa Consortium of the Organization for Nucleotide 1998), p. 177. Sequencing Analysis, “The Genome Sequence of the Plant Pathogen Xylella 45 Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele fastidiosa,” Science 406, July 13, 2000. Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 71 Nara, “The Status and Role of Vaccines in the US Food Animal Industry.” pp. 71-72. 72 Adams, “National Animal Health Emergency Planning,” pp. 73-75. 46 Paul Rogers, “Political Violence and Economic Targeting—Aspects of 73 Veterinary Services, “APHIS’ Role in Animal Health and Trade.” Provisional IRA Strategy 1992-1997,” unpublished manuscript given to the 74 This suggestion for a reserve network comes from Kohnen, “Responding author. to the Threat of Agroterroism.” 47 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 178. 75 Ann H. Seitzinger, Kenneth W. Forsythe, Jr., and Mary L. Mandell, 48 Laqueur, The New Terrorism. “Regionalization’s Potential in Mitigating Trade Losses Related to Live- 49 Information about cyberterrorist attacks and trends is from Lacqueur, The stock Disease Entry,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 894 New Terrorism, pp. 74-78. (1999), pp. 95-99. 50 Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, figure 2, p. 16. Religiously 76 Kohnen (“Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism”) suggests that the motivated attacks accounted for a low of two out of 64 events in 1980 to a USDA should be responsible for a public relations campaign in the after- high of 26 out of 56 in 1995. math of an attack. However, the sheer variety of products that the USDA 51 Andrew McDonald, The Turner Diaries. This quote was cited by Lacqueur, oversees would make any preparation in advance of an attack on any par- The New Terrorism, p. 114. ticular foodstuff hopelessly complex. Also, promoting goods has always 52 US Senate, Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabili- been the purview of the private sector; federal government involvement in ties Subcommittee, October 27, 1999. the promotion of certain effected products would be in violation of fair trade. 53 Robert P. Kadlec, “Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare,” Airpower,
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2000 105