Topic A:Arms Proliferation to Terrorist Organisations

LIMUN HS 2017

25TH – 26TH NOVEMBER 2017

DISEC

CONTENTS

Introduction to the Chairs ...... 2 Introduction to the Committee ...... 3 Topic A: Arms Proliferation to Terrorist Organisations ...... 4 Introduction ...... 4 History ...... 4 Discussion ...... 8 A Threat Analysis ...... 8 Compliance with Resolution 1540 ...... 10 Installing and funding support programmes ...... 11 Evolving threats ...... 12 Bloc Positions ...... 12 Points a Resolution Must Address ...... 14 Further Reading ...... 14

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAIRS

Dear Delegates,

Chris and I will have the pleasure to serve as your Chairs for the Disarmament and International Security Committee at LIMUN-HS.

We will debate the issue of weapon proliferation to terrorist organisations. With the recent attacks throughout Europe, the Islamic State has become a prominent threat to the world. Therefore, we believe the implications of Islamic terror organisations acquiring more weapons needs to be explored. One of the tenants of the debate will be centred around weapons of mass destruction. This could potentially be a very dangerous situation, leading the world to jeopardy.

We expect from delegates to read this study guide carefully and use the bibliography for their research. Reading the study guide gives you a first approach to the topics, as well as guides you towards the issues that need to be tackled during the debate. We hope to see productive debating which will lead to thorough and constructive resolutions.

On that note, we look forward to seeing you all during the conference and feel free to contact us if you have any questions or inquiries.

Kind regards,

Camille Bigot, Director [email protected] Chris Trenk, Assistant Director [email protected]

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

The Disarmament and International Security Committee or DISEC is the first committee of the General Assembly which tackles issues related to disarmament and security threatening international peace. It abides to the United Nations Charter in order to promote cooperation in dealing with matters of international security such as controlling armaments and disarmament in order to provide stability. It often works with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and works with the Conference on Disarmament based in Geneva, Switzerland.

The General Assembly was built under Chapter IV of the Charter and consists of six specialized committees dealing with a plethora of different areas:

❖ First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee): security related issues ❖ Second Committee (Economic and Financial Committee): economic issues ❖ Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee): humanitarian and social issues, as well as culturally related matters ❖ Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization Committee): political matters and was useful during decolonization and the creation of new states ❖ Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Committee): administrative committee dealing with budget ❖ Sixth Committee (Legal Committee): legal issues

The First Committee meets every year for 4 to 5 weeks in October in order to debate security related matters. All 193 member states of the United Nations are members of DISEC and may attend these sessions through state delegations.

TOPIC A: ARMS PROLIFERATION TO TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Since 9/11, a general misconception of terrorism associated to religious extremism has been propagated in media narratives throughout the world. Terrorism is however a complex and multi-faceted mode of violence which has become an increasing important issue in our contemporary societies.

The relationship between globalization and terrorism is also difficult to define. Kiras states that ‘it is inaccurate to suggest that globalization is responsible for terrorism, but technologies associated with globalization have been exploited by terrorists’1. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, it was born in France under the Terror Regime by Robespierre. Before 1968, terrorists however remained localised. Transnational terrorism grew with the rise of technology and media. In this chapter, we aim to associate the threat of terrorism with new technology. Globalization may indeed allow terrorist groups to acquire, manufacture and use weapons of mass destruction in order to conduct catastrophic attacks.

HISTORY

Defining Terrorism The definitional discourse of terrorism is for one problematic. Indeed, post-modernist academics state that it is subjective as according to the popular expression ‘one man’s terrorist, is another man’s freedom fighter’. It however has often been negatively portrayed in Western media with a vilification of terrorist groups. Paul Wilkinson defines terrorism as an ‘activity or weapon which has been used by an enormous of non-state actors, regimes and governments’ (2011). There is an overall consensus in the discipline of International Relations that terrorism relies on violence or the threat of violence. However, this particularity of terrorism remains ambiguous with the emergence of cyberterrorism which could not be defined as violent. Terrorism is therefore about communication; meaning it is not violence for the sake of it but violence to promote a political message. Symbolic targets are therefore often used in terror attacks for emphasis such as the World Trade Centre representative of the United States economic power. Overall, a universal definition of terrorism does not exist with a lack of a United Nations General Assembly terminological explanation. However, national definitions have been elaborated for example in the UK Terrorism Act. The absence of an international agreement upon the meaning of terrorism proves to be problematic when tackling the issue on a global scale.

1 Kiras J. D. (2011) Terrorism and Globalization in J. Baylis et al., The Globalization of World Politcs, 5th ed., Oxford University Press. p. 397. 4

Misconceptions of terrorism are common, especially with its association to contemporary criminal groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Documented cases of terrorism go back the 1st century after Christ; it is not specific to Islamism.

In the realm of war fighting, terrorism is a tactic. It is the means to achieve an end which determine terrorism, and not the end itself. The actions of terrorist are often explained in media as representative of psychological madness of the people carrying them. Louise Richardson refutes this statement explaining the rational approach to violence within terrorism (2007). Suicide attacks are for instance an economical and effective way to engage in mass killings from an organizational perspective. Furthermore, terrorists may be coined immoral but they are amoral actors justifying violence through the belief in a cause. Al-Qaeda for example explained its targeting and killing of Westerns as a quid-pro-quo act for the killings by Western soldiers in the Middle-East in the promotion of their interventionist agenda post-9/11. Bin Laden added that terrorizing oppressors was justifiable but not terrifying the innocent; linking back to a justifiable sense of morality and rationality in the thought process of terrorism.

Causes of Terrorism There is not a single explanation for terrorism. Firstly, there are many kinds of terrorism: religious, political, separatist, apocalyptic, environmental and economic. Terrorism cannot be explained simply in terms of alienation or poverty, but they are both risk factors that are likely to increase the threat of terrorism. For a terror group to emerge there must be the creation of a life-minded group of disaffected individuals often resulting of relative depravation in a comparative lens to others. Furthermore, an enabling or complicit community allow for a terrorist group to last, often through the legitimization of an ideology or cause. Martha Crenshaw gives the example of a lack of opportunity for political representation explaining the emergence of political or separatist groups such as those in Myanmar2. She further adds that impatience is often a cause of terrorism with a historical moment presenting a unique momentum.

Going beyond the group mentality, individual motivation is also an important component of terrorism. Lone wolf terrorism is for instance hard to predict and have various causes. This is the case of violent shootings in the United States that are often labelled acts of lone wolf terrorism. In an organization, leaders of terrorist groups are often educated and older, whereas the terror agents at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy are usually disaffected individual with a perception of an injustice and identifying to an ideology. This is not always the case as for example the 9/11 terrorists were not only highly-educated, but also

2 Crenshaw, M. 2011. Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences. Abingdon: Routledge

thoroughly trained. However, agency of individuals in the recruitment process of terror organisation can also be limited due to propaganda.

Another misconception of terrorism is its association to sub-state actors. State-sponsored terrorism has been wildly used in the context of conflicts. Iran for instance has often been accused by states such as Israel and the United States of sponsoring terrorism in the Middle- Eastern region, such as backing Shia militias in Iraq. Moreover, Richard English differentiates terrorism with guerilla warfare, which he calls hypermobile warfare with military capabilities3. Terrorism is cheaper and cost-effective with often the use of bombing. Guerrilla warfare has also said to differ from terrorism in its targeting of the military, when terrorism is renowned for targeting civilians. This binary opposition however is problematic when thinking about 9/11 with the targeting of the Pentagon, a symbolic icon of defense par excellence.

Mass killings or the threat of killing are usually at the core of the success of terrorist organizations. The production of fear represents the important psychological component of terrorism. The use of social media has grown with terrorist relying on an audience to impact their cause onto the world. 9/11 particularly changed the face of terrorism by the scale of victims, as well as the deep psychological impact created through the media propagation of the event. Counter-terrorism has grown since then with the United States for instance spending one trillion dollar on security. When looking at the low-casualty represented by terrorism compared to other causes of death, one might ask if terrorism has not been over- exaggerated. Furthermore, terrorist acts targeting the West have seemed to gain much more attention than those in war zones in less economically developed countries which calls into question the prioritization of security.

Richardson concludes that there are two categories of terrorism: temporal terrorism where political goals can be met within the current socio-political configuration; and transformational terrorism which is not subject to negotiation and its satisfaction requires the complete destruction of the regional state system4. Even without the same facets of terrorism, goals differ. For instance, Al-Qaeda pursued jihad aimed at the killings of westerns, whereas the Islamic State hopes to create a sovereign state in Syria and Iraq with a future aim of ‘reestablishing a Khikafah from Spain to Indonesia’5. Furthermore, with its vast use of military equipment and artillery, the Islamic State has raised a problematic issue in the definition of terrorism as the ‘weapon of the weak’, as well as its binary opposition to guerilla warfare.

3 English, R. 2009. Terrorism How to Respond. Oxford: Oxford University Press

4 Richardson, L. 2007. What Terrorists Want. New York: Random House

5 Dabiq. 2014. Issue 4, ‘The Failed Crusade’

Terrorism is therefore an intricate and multi-faceted process of violence which cannot be explained by a single cause. Counter-terrorism organizations like Interpol should hold to a few principles when it comes to fighting terrorist organization. Firstly, they should have a defensive and achievable with a focus on the containment of specific terror threats. Furthermore, central intelligence agencies are crucial to the monitoring of terrorist organizations, and cooperation between countries is key to said-intelligence. Finally, the essence of counter-terrorism lies in the separation of terrorists from communities.

Nuclear Weapons Nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament have been two issues that have been at the heart of some heated international peace and security debates. Since Hiroshima, regulations of nuclear power took a whole new turn. Post-1945, the United Nations was seen as the clear international platform to elaborate such restrictions. The Cold War however hurt multilateral efforts in disarmament with realist and liberal intentions being in defiance.

Only China, France Russia, the UK and the USA are recognized as possessors of Nuclear Weapons or Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD) on the Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty. This does not mean that other states do not have the power to become Nuclear Weapon States with India and Pakistan having successfully shown their nuclear potential. Others have created Nuclear Free Zones like in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

Nuclear Weapons require massive infrastructures and advanced radiological technology. Nuclear reactors do not work the same way as nuclear weapons. Indeed, a reactor aims for a fixed sourced of energy which is generally regulated and sustained. On the other hand, nuclear weapons aim to create the biggest explosion they can which involves a chain of unstable radiological reactions.

In order to achieve an explosion, nuclear weapons use two types of technique. The first one involves splitting atoms rapidly in order to create a chain reaction. The second is to create thermonuclear weapons with the compression or fusion of hydrogen atoms.

The category of WMD was introduced in 1948. Recently, a more holistic categorization has been made including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities with the CBRN acronym. Nuclear testing has also allowed the phenomenon of electro-magnetic pulsing which disrupts electronic material to be discovered. Nuclear weapons have only been used as a weapon of war during WW2 and has not been used since. However, many academics fear the next international war to be a deathly nuclear war.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) is built on three pillars: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear states; progressive nuclear disarmament by these 7

states; ad access, under appropriate safeguards, to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It has now 188 parties with India, Israel and Pakistan having not signed it yet.

Therefore, with terrorism becoming a global threat, academics have been wearying of Nuclear Weapons falling into the wrong hands. Terrorist Organisations such as the Islamic State, heavily used artillery due to the constant military clashes with the Iraqi forces. In the Discussion, we will examine the repercussions of destructive weapons at the hand of terrorists.

DISCUSSION

With the global threat of terrorism as big as ever and numerous terrorist attacks in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas and especially the Middle East over the course of the last years, the probability of a terrorist attack utilizing unconventional weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) of a chemical, biological or nuclear nature is alarmingly high.

A Threat Analysis

Source: http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/isil.jpg

A close look at data collected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reveals the very real threat of nuclear and other radioactive materials coming into terrorists’ hands. The 2016 Fact Sheet by the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)6 records a total number

6 Cf. IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, “Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control: 2016 Fact Sheet”; p. 2f. 8

of 454 incidents of unauthorized possession of nuclear and radioactive materials and a total of 762 incidents of theft or loss of such materials between 1993 and 2015. Although the numbers of confirmed incidents involving unauthorized possession and related criminal activities has seen a general decline compared to the early 1990s, “[t]he persistence of these incident reports indicates a continuing nuclear security concern.”7 More alarmingly still, the numbers regarding confirmed incidents involving theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive materials have bin on a steady rise since the late 1990s, including incidents of theft/loss of highly radioactive materials (“Category 2 sources”) in 2015.8

It transpired in February 2016 that the investigations into Belgian ISIL affiliates after the November 2015 attacks in Paris had revealed about 10 hours of surveillance footage of a high- ranking Belgian nuclear official in one of the suspects’ living quarters. Authorities suspect that the footage had been filmed in the first place to prepare for the abduction of the Belgian official to gain access to secure areas of the Mol research facility, possibly to steal radioactive material and create a dirty bomb.9 The story gained additional momentum a few weeks after the footage’s leakage to Belgian press when the two brothers who were suspected of having taken the surveillance footage were identified as the suicide bombers involved in the attacks on Brussels airport and an underground station.10 The government of Belgium which had just deployed around 140 soldiers to guard nuclear sites a few weeks earlier reacted to the bombings by increasing military guards surrounding nearby nuclear sites as well as temporarily reducing staff there to a bare minimum.11

Even though this incident ended without nuclear contamination, it is shocking to imagine what might have become of Brussels, Belgium and the surroundings, had the ISIL terrorists been able to build even only a dirty bomb – a conventional bomb that has been mixed with

https://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/itdb-fact-sheet.pdf 7 IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, “Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control: 2016 Fact Sheet”; p. 2. 8 IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, “Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control: 2016 Fact Sheet”; p. 3f. 9 cf. Samuel Osborne, “Isis suspects secretly monitored Belgian nuclear scientists, raising dirty bomb fears”, Independent, February 19th 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-dirty-bomb-nuclear-scientists-paris-attacks- a6884146.html 10 David Chazan, Henry Samuel, Rory Mulholland, Camilla Turner, “Brussels attacks: Nuclear breach fears as two more charged with terror offences”, The Telegraph, March 27th 2016 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/26/brussels-attacks-nuclear-breach-fears-as-two-more-charged- with-t/

11 Angelique Chrisafis, „Belgium steps up security at nuclear sites in wake of attacks“, The Guardian, March 25th 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/25/belgium-steps-up-security-at-nuclear-sites-in-wake-of- attacks

radioactive material and will thus contaminate and eventually kill people far beyond the initial blast radius.

Having highlighted the continuous danger of WMDs in terrorists’ hands and the high probability of terrorists striving after such devices, the focus must now turn to shortcomings of international conventions to prevent this very catastrophe from happening.

Compliance with Resolution 1540 In its findings, the “Concept note on the high-level open debate of the Security Council on the theme ‘Preventing catastrophe: a global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors’, to be held on 15 December 2016” (S/2016/1013) details some of the main obstacles towards fully and effectively implementing Resolution 1540.

Noting in section IV the many positive developments with regard to legally binding national measures to prevent WMD proliferation, the note however draws attention to the many areas where more needs to be done in many nations. Especially when it comes to accounting for, securing and monitoring the export of WMDs or materials that could be used as parts of such weapons, many states still lack the mechanisms necessary to combat the global problem. 12

The 1540 Committee lacks the powers to force states to comply with and implement their suggested measures, so a major obstacle to the successful realization of Resolution 1540 remains its (lack of) implementation on national and regional levels. Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) Co-Chairman, former US-Senator Sam Nunn, notes in his foreword to the “2016 Nuclear Security Index: Theft and Sabotage” that progress towards the set goals for non-proliferation seems to have lost some of its momentum.13 The Executive Summary points out that: “no common set of international standards and best practices exists, there is no mechanism for holding states with lax security accountable, and the legal foundation for securing materials is neither complete nor universally observed.”14 States unwilling or unable to fully comply with the requirements in place cannot be coerced into adopting certain standards.

12 cf. S/2016/1030; p. 4. 13 Cf. Nunn, Sam, „Foreword“ in Nuclear Threat Initiative, „2016 NTI Security Index; Theft and Sabotage“; p. 3-5; p. 5. 14 Nuclear Threat Initiative, „2016 NTI Security Index: Theft and Sabotage“; p. 6. 10

Source: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/538c6881e4b09454bcb35f25/546e12cce4b0242597 691e76/54aef680e4b016e812ffa999/1425126309202/?format=1500w

Installing and funding support programmes Most countries who are found to have a less than optimal record with regards to nuclear security are not in that situation for a lack of goodwill: more than half the countries in the NTI’s most recent sabotage ranking are emerging nuclear powers, many of which are developing nations with new programmes15 which simply lack the necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure. The US’ contribution of about $500 million per year towards international support helping other countries improve nuclear security is seen as a welcome example that other countries are encouraged to follow, although one has to note with concern that US funds devoted to national and international nuclear security have been in a constant decline of more than 25%.16 Furthermore, many developing nations and nations new to nuclear energy lack the expertise to deal with and grant the security of nuclear and radioactive materials properly and therefore lack behind some of the IAEA’s requirements.

Moreover, as outlined in an analysis of IAEA safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, nations’ weapons grade nuclear stockpiles are subject to different oversight mechanisms based on a more restricted, voluntary basis so that full compliance with IAEA safeguards cannot be guaranteed due to most military stockpiles of nuclear material worldwide.17 The possibly insufficient security measures surrounding sites with nuclear material for military usage can amount to substantial security threats when theft occurs as in the case of the radioactive

15 Cf. Nuclear Threat Initiative, „2016 NTI Security Index: Theft and Sabotage“; p. 12. 16 Cf. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, „Preventing Nuclear Terrorism. Continuous improvement or dangerous decline?“, March 2016. 17 Cf. A. von Baeckmann, „IAEA safeguards in nuclear-weapon States“, IAEA Bulletin 1988, p. 22-25. 11

material vanished from a US military-related compound in Iraq in late 2015.18 The question remains how to enable countries to fully comply with sufficient safeguard mechanisms and how to encourage those who can to actually do so.

Evolving threats Technological advances or new, hostile uses of older technologies form one of the greatest threats in nowadays’ security environment. Recent cyber-attacks on US nuclear facilities19 not only showcase how volatile cyber infrastructures around such facilities are but also that such attacks are a very realistic threat. According to the NTI Security Index, most states are not well enough prepared to fend off such attacks that could either serve to enable theft of nuclear materials or be an attempt to wreak havoc onsite.20 In this field as well as in others, cooperation between states and expertise-sharing as well as the help of agencies such as the IAEA are paramount to ensuring continued global security. The NTI’s analysis on the matter comes to the conclusion “that the current approach to cybersecurity at nuclear facilities is not equal to the challenge”21 and proposes a number of possible solutions. Similarly, the preparatory note for the Security Council meeting on the matter highlights rapid technological advances as an obstacle to overcome throughout the document.22

BLOC POSITIONS Generally speaking, nations’ own use of nuclear materials (nuclear weapons as well as peaceful uses) and other WMDs will strongly influence their position on the issue. One needs to distinguish between two types of nuclear weapon states: i.e. nations who have an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and nations that maintain dual-use nuclear materials, i.e. materials that could be used for military or civilian purposes alike and nations that only maintain a stockpile of nuclear materials that can solely be used for peaceful (energy, medical, research) purposes. Nuclear weapon states oftentimes tend to object to calls for total disarmament.

It will also be important to look at whether nations comply with/fulfil all the requirements specified with regard to Resolution 1540 or IAEA regimes. Whoever already fulfils all requirements will be more likely to advocate for a stricter enforcement or even sanctions against non-compliant states than other nations. See Nuclear Security Indices or IAEA nation reports for more country-specific information.

18 Cf. Ahmed Rasheed, Aref Mohammed, Stephen Kalin, „Exclusive: Radioactive material stolen in Iraq raises security concerns“, Reuters, February 17th 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-radiation-idUSKCN0VQ22F 19 Cf. Nicole Perloth, „Hackers are targeting nuclear facilities, Homeland Security Dept. And F.B.I. say“, The New York Times, July 6th 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/technology/nuclear-plant-hack-report.html?mcubz=0 20 Cf. Nuclear Threat Initiative, „2016 NTI Security Index: Theft and Sabotage“; p. 47. 21 Nuclear Threat Initiative, „Outpacing Cyber Threats. Priorities for cybersecurity at nuclear facilities“; p. 5. 22 Cf. S/2016/1030. 12

It is also important in this regard to consider nations’ plans for the immediate future. A developing country intent on relying more on nuclear energy in the future will be less willing to accept additional burdens without sufficient financial and technological help from the international community. At the same time, a country committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, complete disarmament and a reduce in the usage of nuclear energy as well will be more intent on forcing other nations to comply with the strictest regimes imaginable.

Lastly, nations that face a high security threat will be more interested in having other nations implement stronger control mechanisms. For instance, many middle eastern countries lobby for a nuclear free zone in the middle east out of fear that a vigilante terrorist might be able to steal and detonate a device in their immediate vicinity.

One important bloc in this regard will be nuclear weapons states, i.e. nations maintaining an arsenal of nuclear weapons. If they have not yet committed to completely disarming, they will usually remain in favour of being allowed to maintain their arsenal. That means that they will rigorously oppose any move towards outright banning nuclear weapons.

Another important bloc will be developing nations who see nuclear energy as a way towards a brighter future. Strict regulations would impose financial and technological hurdles onto their project of developing a nuclear sector of their own. They will therefore be wary of any international instrument that infringes upon their sovereign power to develop national legislation at a speed that suits their needs and abilities.

In a more political sense, one will have to distinguish between European Union nations – and some other affiliates – who oftentimes are staunch supporters of a very strict implementation of Resolution 1540 and adequate national legislations to meet said requirements. Some nations in this bloc are also intent on making the resolution’s requirements more binding or developing a way of forcing individual nations to comply with suggestions.

One must not forget, however, that differences might arise between nuclear weapon states within the EU and NATO (or similar alliances) and non-nuclear states within the same group of nations.

The non-aligned movement generally supports radical nuclear disarmament. At the same time, however, many of their member states – which is a much less clear membership than that of NATO for example – are developing nations who will be wary of too much internationally binding regulations without proper funding to help them develop the necessary infrastructure.

Russia and China are generally very intent on being allowed to maintain their respective military arsenals and are especially wary of the United States and their allies further assuming the role of world police and working towards being the only nuclear powers in the world.

Generally, most states see the dangers of nuclear weapons and are committed to trying to keep any nuclear materials they might be dealing with safe from terrorists. Economic deliberations will often dictate a nations position in the debate. Delegates will have to ask themselves: Does our nation want to use nuclear weapons or energy? Can we afford expensive control mechanisms?

POINTS A RESOLUTION MUST ADDRESS

- How can worldwide compliance with safety measures be assured? Is there a way forward for comprehensive international oversight, mandatory best-practice etc? - Should more legally binding instruments be developed to force nations to comply? - Should nuclear weapon states be forced to agree to a time-frame for complete disarmament? - How can the international community properly fund support programmes to help nations struggling to comply with all regulations? - How can cyber-threats to security be effectively met?