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DIE Suid-Afrlkaanse INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONAIE AANGELEENTHEDE the SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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DIE Suid-Afrlkaanse INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONAIE AANGELEENTHEDE the SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIE SUiD-AFRlKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONAIE AANGELEENTHEDE THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Jan Smuts House/-Huis tj tJ^0*\\ ¥1 " P.O. Box/Posbus 31596 1 Jan Smuts Avenue/Laan 1 \k \k %$ ff i¥ 2017 Braamfontein o t * • * u L ^"^ %S, v/ /^ -/j^ South Africa/Suid-'Arnka Braamfontem, Johannesburg ^^^^k ^C&O^ -r A » • . m. ^ u Tel- 39-2021/22/23 ^^^a,^^^^^ T.A. 'Insintaif Johannesburg Background Briefing No, 10, 1981 CHESTER CROCKER ON AMERICAN POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Reproduced below is the text of a statement by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa (Chairman; Howard tfolpe) in Washington, DC, on September 16, 1981. It is followed by the text of Mr Crocker's speech in Honolulu, Hawaii, on August 29, 1981. September 16, 1981 Kr Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee,' I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to discuss an issue which is of primary concern both to you and to this Administration — our policies in Southern Africa, During the first eight months of this Administration, there is no part of Africa on which we have devoted so much energy and attention. As a result, we have formulated a strategy designed to address the major challenges and opportunities facing us in the region, a strategy responsive to our global and regional interests and to the aspirations of the peoples of Africa, The major elements of that strategy were outlined in some detail in my speech before the American Legion~ih Hawaii on August 29." Allow me to briefly underscore its central points. First, Southern Africa is a region of unquestioned importance to US and Western e'cononic and strategic interests. Its potential as a focal point of African economic progress warrants a substantial effort on our part to reinforce those prospects and to forestall heightened conflict and polarisation. Second, this region has the tragic potential to become a magnet for inter- nationalised conflict and a cockpit of East~West tension. It contains an explosive combination of forces — Soviet-Cuban military involvement, African guerilla operations across and within borders, and a politically isolated., but militarily and economically strong, South Africa. It is imperative that we play our proper role in fostering regional security, Full text of August 29 speech reproduced below. - 2 - countering Soviet influence, and bolstering a climate that makes peaceful change possible. We seek equitable and durable solutions to the region's conflicts, and the emergence and survival of genuine democracy and strong economies. Above all, we seek to dampen the chances for expanded turmoil by encouraging negotiated solutions and an opportunity for the peoples of this strategically located region to build their own futures. This will not happen if organised violence becomes the principal arbiter of.relations between states or the means of effecting needed change. Third, Southern Africa is a region characterised by both substantial interdependence and an absence of a political basis for regional cooperation. It contains within itself the seeds of growing violence. In Namibia there is a low level but increasingly dangerous conflict over the question of how independence — accepted in principle as a goal by all parties — should be brought about. In Angola, foreign intervention complicates and prolongs an ethnic and factional struggle that prevents economic progress and sDills across borders. Between South Africa and its African-ruled neighbours, there are growing pressures as well as substantial linkages. That country's apartheid policies are anathema to its neighbours who are torn between the urge to build upon existing ties with its neighbours and the determination militarily to deter guerilla action aimed at South Africa itself. In tbese circumstances, there is no easy course for American foreign policy. Some would have us conduct ourselves as though the future of Southern Africa had already been written. While all of us can conjure up gloomy scenarios, it does not befit a great power and a free people to act as though wa have written off the peoples and potential of Southern Africa to a future of . revolutionary strife. This Administration is well aware that in seeking to sustain the chances for negotiated solutions and bolster those committed to evolutionary change, it is walking in a minefield of contending fears, emotions and ideologies — in Africa and beyond. But our analysis leads us to conclude that any other course would be cowardly and irresponsible. Some would have us play down the seriousness of Southern Africa's conflicts, pursue our short-term interests but channel our major efforts to other priorities. This may be a superfically attractive course. But it XG incon- sistent with our African interests and our worldwide responsibilities as the leader of the Western Alliance*- It would ignore our own nature and history as a successful multiracial democracy with substantial and growing ties of culture, economics and national security — to Africa. We have concluded that, whatever the difficulties, it is incumbent on the IIS to help shape a regional climate of greater confidence, strengthened security, economic advance and, ultimately, greater justice for all who live in Southern Africa. Finally, there are some vho would have us take the easy road of'aligning ourselves with one side or another in these issues. At first glance, such a course might appear attrative — whether on grounds of diplomatic expedience or emotional identification with the issues or actors involved. This Administration has no intention of permitting our hand to be forced to choose between South Africa and its neighbours. That course will only ensure our ultimate isolation or irrelevance in the issues at hand. Our task, together with our key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties — some- thing we in the West are uniquely able to do. We intend to engage constructively in the region as a whole. Today, we enjoy fruitful tics with roost of the states in Southern Africa, and we are determined to build on that foundation — through our trade and investment, our diplomatic efforts to dampen and resolve conflicts, and our cultural and foreign assistance programs. Similarly, in South Africa it is not our task to choose between black and white, but rather to foster conditions in which all South Africans can more fully share and participate in the economy and political process. We seek through our policies neither to destabilise South Africa nor align ourselves with apartheid policies that are repugnant to us. The time has surely come for us Americans to be humble enough to recognise that our influence over events there is limited, realistic enough to grasp the awesome task facing South Africans of all races who seek to dismantle apartheid, and honest enough to recognise that a measure of change is already under way there. We seek a more constructive relationship with South Africa based on these principles, on our shared interests, and on a reciprocal willingness to act in good faith where, as in Namibia, our policies intersect. At the same time, we are conducting a purposeful diplomacy and a reinvigorated commercial and development effort with African governments .throughout the region. Let me be absolutely clear in summing up our strategy. There is a signi- ficant change in our approach when compared to that of previous administrations. To those who would say we have adopted an ambitious policy, full of pitfalls, we would insist that there are few alternatives consistent with the complex variety of our regional interests. To those who charge that we have intro- duced an East-West dimension into Southern Africa, we reply that that element is already inherent, aggravated by the past actions of, our global adversaries r. as one significant factor in the situation. Our talk is to control this factor, not delude ourselves. To those who would say this Administration .. has decided to tilt in favour of South Africa!s government or its white population, we simply reject the charge. If there is a tilt in our policies, it is towards developing greater influence and credibility as a regional partner, acting together with our Western allies and seeking to bolster the security of this key region. We fully recognise that this approach —- in Namibia and Angola and throughout the region — makes us a convenient whipping boy on issues that are highly emotive. But this is a price that can be paid if it produces results. That is the basis on which the policy should be judged, I would now like to indicate how we have applied these principles and this strategy to the inter-related questions of Namibia and Angola over the past eight months. First, we did not inherit a blank slate. Rather, we inherited a longstanding and highly contentious issue with the potential to damage our relationships with the nations of Africa, strain our Alliance ties and generally undermine the Western position in the region. We also inherited a stalemated diplomatic process involving the question of implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. There could, in our minds, be no question of abandoning Resolution 435 to which all parties had given concurrence in principle. Rather, the question was how to get it implemented and to ensure that its implementation would in fact produce the intended results: genuine independence for Namibia and strengthened security for the region. We have from the outset determined that these objectives are only attainable in the context of a settlement that would be internationally acceptable. - 4 - Second, ve have operated on the basis that the Namibia issue is indeed an urgent one. Our interests are in no way served by an indefinite delay in the process, and we know it.
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