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The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea

Costs of of from the and the Baltic The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea

Content

1. SUMMARY...... 3

2. INTRODUCTION ...... 3

3. FUNDAMENTALS ...... 3

4. MODEL COSTING ...... 6 4.1. Baltic Cod...... 6 4.2. North Sea Cod ...... 9 EXAMPLE OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OVERFISHING...... 12

LITERATURE AND WEBSITES USED...... 13

FURTHER LITERATURE ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE ...... 13

A report prepared for WWF-, October 2002

Authors: Ralf Döring and Henning Holst

LedA: the agency for agriculture and nature conservancy Fischstr. 20-21 17489 Greifswald Germany Telephone: +49 3834 88 45 22 Fax: +49 3834 88 45 24

2 WWF Germany The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea

1. Summary 2. Introduction Overexploitation of represents not only Seldom has fishing been the subject of such ex- a major ecological problem, but a major economic tensive public discussion. After 30 years of EU problem as well, because low stocks mean the loss policy we are still far from a sustainable of catch possibilities. This produces high opportu- use of stocks. Nor is it only the recovery plan for nity costs, from the global economic viewpoint. North Sea cod – long overdue and constantly de- On the one hand there is the revenue loss, on the layed for two years already – that has shown how other hand the knock-on cost of the necessary serious the situation has become. The EU Com- departure of fishermen from the industry. In addi- mission has had to state the sobering fact that tion, the fishing technology employed frequently many fish stocks in EU water present a of brings about external costs, which can lead to a mature fish of just 10% of the level of the early reduction of catch possibilities in the future. 1970s (European Commission 2001). The fol- We cannot continue to afford the further loss of lowing study sets out to make clear, with the help revenue potential in ’s fisheries. Every year of simple economic calculations, the magnitude of the EU pays out around € 1.4 billion in subsidies the financial loss not only for fishing enterprises, (IEEP 1999) for a sector that itself loses millions but also and in particular for the overall economy. upon millions of euros every year through overex- ploitation of its stocks. Simple model costings 3. Fundamentals have shown the high costs of overfishing in both Exploiting a always involves the Baltic and North Sea cod fisheries. Merely for arbitrating between short and long-term returns. the two stocks examined here, a cautious estimate The problem for fish stocks is that, in the absence suggests a loss of around € 400 million. On top of of individual ownership rights, short-term profit this come the costs that cannot be expressed in maximisation is the optimal solution for the user. monetary terms, like the negative consequences For fishermen this means: “Catch the fish today, for the ecosystem, which among other things will or someone else will catch it tomorrow”. Even so reduce future productivity. this fundamental economic problem does not ap- Overfishing and the loss of revenues is not only ply today to the full extent, as the state has taken ecologically problematic, but also produces major over management of fish stocks and issued rules social problems. The arguments put forward stat- governing how much can be withdrawn from ing that consistent stock protection measures rep- stocks. Since the 1950s, attempts have been made resent a danger for fishing carry little weight in to regulate the exploitation of individual stocks, the light of the above scenarios. On the contrary: with biologists calculating stock sizes and it is repeated decisions not to sufficiently reduce then setting catch amounts. In the opinion of catch volumes that have produced today’s prob- Pauly and others this attempt has failed for four lems. If we do not wish to totally lose certain fish- reasons (Pauly et al. 2002): eries in the coming years, it is once and for all 1. The results of scientific assessments that could time to act. have helped conserve fish stocks were often ignored on the excuse that they were not pre- cise enough to serve as a basis of tough eco- nomic cuts.

WWF Germany 3 The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea

2. The assessment methods (models) have in a of the individual countries. Hannesson (1996) few key cases totally failed. For example, with writes of Norwegian fisheries policy: The amount respect to the inclusion of natural rapid de- of the subsidies has much more to do with the clines in stocks. The assessment has led in state’s ability to pay than with any perceived need particular to a situation where the severity of for support. Currently the EU is paying out around the decline and the growing influence of fish- € 700 million of subsidies a year (Myers and Kent ing during this process of decline were badly 2001). underestimated. For this reason, despite the apparently optimal 3. No short-term regulatory systems were devel- solutions frequently found in models, fishing pol- oped or introduced, which could have served icy to date (national management) has not pre- to achieve the objectives. vented excessive use of the resource. Through 4. Our understanding of the marine ecosystem is intensive investment support over the past 30 still too incomplete, leading us to inaccurately years the EU has built up major overcapacities in estimate the recovery potential of fish stocks. the fishing fleets. are now forced by the loans they have taken out to continue fishing Today it is clear that earlier fisheries policy – at any cost, thereby further harming the already aimed at short-term economic successes – has acutely threatened stocks even further in order to produced undesired results. Worldwide fish stocks be able to service their loans. Fishing enterprises are limited – the number of fishing vessels, on the end up seeking to maximise short-term revenue, at other hand, can be increased “endlessly”. The EU the expense of long-term revenue security, in or- has for 30 years provided subsidies for the build- der to secure the continued existence of their en- ing and modernisation of fishing vessels – but the terprises. Hence it was frequently argued in public statistics show no investments for the conserva- that it was the decisive measures to maintain tion and increase of fish stocks. However, it is stocks that imperilled the existence of fishing en- vital that the use of fish stocks be subject to regu- terprises. This argument was frequently followed lations that first of all follow the objective of per- in the bodies tasked with setting fishing volumes, manent maintenance of the resource and only sec- which set excessively high maximum fishing vol- ondarily national political or individual economic umes. In fact this did not secure the existence of goals. the enterprises in question. In the following years, The goal of state “management” has until now, as stocks continued to fall, further enterprises and in particular between 1950 and 1990, not been went out of business and fishermen left the indus- the sustainable and sparing use of fish stocks, de- try, helped on their way with expensive and subsi- spite declarations to the contrary. The objectives dised wrecking programmes. have borne the stamp – and continue to do so – of From the economic viewpoint the question has short-term national interests. Appropriate terms therefore to be raised how the current situation of for describing fisheries policy are – in analogy to overexploitation can be modified, in order, for agricultural policy – increasing efficiency and example, to achieve higher returns in the longer productivity, securing the wage structure or term, as would be desirable from an economic maintaining jobs. It comes therefore as no surprise viewpoint (see illustration 1, page 5 ) that the amount of financial support has depended in the first instance on the economic possibilities

4 WWF Germany The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea

extensive environmental requirements and the Benefit to society

term - “polluter-pays” principle have been introduced

short revenues Until leading to a situation where (at least theoretically) now the washing plant is required to make good the Future consequential costs of the death of the fish. At the same time attempts are increasingly being made to have enterprises and households include external costs in their budgets, for example by taxes like Production possibilities the eco-tax in Germany, which render production or use of resources more expensive. The result is a long-term revenues more realistic image of the actual costs, but this

Note: The benefit to society as a whole is in the upper right part of the curves. remains the exception. In most cases the sustain-

Illustration 1 Arbitrating between short and long-term returns able exploitation of resources is honoured neither directly or indirectly. As presented in the above diagram, the benefit This fishing of the seas until now has produced to society would be higher if future fisheries substantial external costs. For example the col- policies were to follow the goal of sustainability lapse of regional fishing industries owing to over- and fishing quantities were to be adjusted op- fished fisheries is a direct result of the “fisheries timally to the long-term maintenance of large management” as exercised during the decades fish stocks. This would at the same time guar- prior to the collapse. The consequent social costs antee the supply of fish to the consumer and are borne, however, by society. Society must also maintain jobs in the . The re- carry the bill for any consequential ecological nunciation of a portion of fish catches today costs, as future generations will have fewer possi- and the resulting long-term securing of reve- bilities of exploitation. Not all these costs can be nues would make it possible to achieve a sig- expressed in monetary units. Who can, for exam- nificantly higher level of overall benefit to soci- ple, place a figure on the gravity of the loss or ety as a whole. This of course presupposes the changes in entire marine ecosystems when, for ability to subsequently avoid overfishing. Of example, heavy ground ropes on bottom trawl nets course such a diagram simplifies the situation, plough up the sea bed, destroying entire living and no one knows exactly how the curves run, communities. Nobody is able to place a precise but even so they assist in clarifying the prob- value on species which have no direct economic lem. value but are part of the natural heritage, like for example whales and seals. The overexploitation of individual stocks and the The proposals presented by the EU Commission destruction of also negatively affect the in June 2002 for revising the fisheries policy can long-term productivity of stocks. This damage be understood as an attempt to reduce external represents the so-called external costs of current costs. The reduction of, among other things, catch use. External costs very often arise in other eco- capacities, the introduction of more selective nomic activities as well. For example, a situation catching gear and the possibility of placing ecol- in which a washing plant discharges waste water ogically particularly sensitive marine ecosystems into a river, killing the fish, produces high costs under protection, could serve as an example. for the fishermen. In order to avoid such costs,

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A consistent strategy of including external costs in 4. Model costing fishing policy would, however, lead to the loss of One objective of fishing economy calculations is many fishing enterprises, whose economic situa- often to find a path for the optimal use of a stock tion is generally difficult nowadays owing to the over an infinite period. Our concern is to manage low level of stocks. The further decline in the the stock in such a way as to achieve the largest population of fishing enterprises would, in certain overall return from the present viewpoint. Such a cases, produce considerable social costs, the im- calculation naturally runs into major problems, as pact of which can be very significant at the re- it requires a very large number of assumptions to gional level (e.g. in Galicia). On top of this, once be made on stock and price development. In addi- an industrial branch has collapsed, it is very diffi- tion future revenues need to be discounted, as an cult to resurrect it, as lost along with it are in most amount of money placed on deposit in a bank (re- cases infrastructures, knowledge and experience ceived now instead of in the future owing to inten- built up over decades. sive exploitation of stocks today) would increase The EU Commission is therefore proposing the in value over time. In the following costings we following changes to its promotion of the fishing have foregone such calculations and have made industry: only approximate estimates, for the present year - the payment of retraining and wrecking pre- (2002) and the years prior to that, for two fish miums, in order to facilitate fishermen leaving stocks, Baltic cod and North Sea cod. the industry.

- greater encouragement for the introduction of 4.1. Baltic Cod selective catch technology, in order to mini- Illustration 2 shows cod catches in the Baltic since mise by-catches. 1977. It is clearly visible that catch levels today - making good the financial losses from capac- are the lowest of the past 20 years. Stocks stood at ity reduction and the abandonment of less effi- a very high level in the mid-1980s. This was due, cient catch technology. among other things, to very good environmental conditions, and should therefore not necessarily been seen as a normal situation. In those days many North Sea vessels went fishing in the Baltic.

Illustration 2: Cod catches 500 in the Baltic since 1977 450 (ICES 2002a). The land- 400 ings of the three stocks in 350 the , western and 300 central/eastern 250 were add together. 200 Note: The figure given for 2002 150 is the fishing quota set for this species.

Landings in 1000 t 100 50 0

1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Year

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The average catch between 1977 and 1997 was gives losses of around € 286 million. around 235,000t. We have opted for the average Assuming a buffer value of 30% in order to reflect catch for this time, so as to average out around 10 the in setting a theoreti- years of good fishing with 10 years of poor fish- cally sustainable catch volume, this gives a long- ing. From a fishing biology viewpoint it would be term possible catch volume of 165,000t a year. presumptuous to simply take this catch volume as Even so, this would equal a loss of around € 160 a ‘permanent catch volume’. In the absence of million in 2002. Illustration 3 shows the revenue ecologically certain figures, we use here instead losses, by way of example, for 2001 and 2002. these purely empirical figures, as the goal is to make clear what the effect would have been of 350 renunciation in better times. One could of course 300 say that there is a natural balancing out effect, as 250 Revenue loss good years are compared with bad years. With the against assumed sustainable over-exploitation continuing, however, the high 200 catch volume consequential costs of over-exploitation are be- 150 ginning to become visible. 1.000.000 € Revenue loss 100 against average Long-term stock management would also mean catch volume having the number of enterprises correspond with 50 the catch possibilities. Guaranteeing long-term 0 exploitation possibilities would give the remaining 2001 2002 enterprises greater interest in long-term stable Year catch quotas. In this way the problem of the lack of individual ownership rights could be circum- Illustration 3: Possible revenue losses due to overfishing of cod stocks in the Baltic vented. Comparing the fishing quota for 2002 (76,000 t) Illustration 4 shows the difference between the with the average catch over this period (235,000 actual catch volume and the ‘sustainable’ volume. t), we arrive at a difference of 159,000 t. At an Again we must point to the fact that the results of average current price of € 1.80 per kg of cod this the calculation cannot be generalised, as sales

Illustration 4: Sustainability 300 difference: Difference between actual and assumed 250 sustainable catch volume 200 150 100 50 0 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

catch volume in 1000t -50 -100 Difference, actual vs 'sustainable' -150 Year

WWF Germany 7 The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea prices would probably be lower in some countries, selective nets in order to spare young fish (Ernst et e.g. Germany if stocks were better. Even so these al. 2000). As part of a larger EU project figures illustrate the fact that a careful use of the (BACOMA (Baltic Cod Management), see Dahm resource, directed at sustainability, enables stable & Gabriel 2001) investigations have been under revenues to be achieved in the long term. way for several years on the selectivity of various The question then arises of why fishermen ac- types of trawl nets. Based its own research and the cepted this fall in cod stocks and the resulting results of this project, the following costings were economic situation for so long. Why was pressure made. constantly put on governments not to reduce catch A long-term gain from the use of a new net is ob- quotas by as much as was shown to be necessary tained after around four years1. At the start of this by economic recommendations? In seeking to period only small numbers of large cod are answer this question it is useful to look at the caught. Fishermen need to be able to pass through 1996-2000 turnover figures for the Mecklenburg- this lean period until the young fish have grown to Vorpommern fishery in Germany (table 1). maturity. For the western Baltic as a whole, the These figures prove that, despite reduced land- catch in the fifth year would be around 15,000t ings, revenues did not necessarily fall to the same higher than the starting value (today’s catch of extent, as prices rose sharply. In 1997 world cod around 34,000t), and the German fishing industry catches were higher, and prices therefore lower. alone could count on an additional catch value of After this landings fell and prices rose sharply. around € 7.5 million. This calculation is based on This means that for the fishermen it was better, 1997/98 prices (€ 1.46). Today these prices are despite falling stocks, to continue to exploit at higher: for January to May 2002 the average price lower levels than to agree to resolute stock recov- was € 1.80 (BLE 2002). ery measures. This described relationship between prices and landings is the case for the German cod fishery. In other countries, e.g. , the price has been much less flexible over the years. In a model costing for cod stocks in the western Baltic and the German fishing fleet, the Federal Fisheries Agency (Bundesforschungsanstalt für Fischerei) has calculated the effects of using more

Table 1: Development of catches and revenues in the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern cod fishery, Germany (BLE - various years) Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Fishing 5,436 3,243 3,039 3,964 3,471 3,774 volume in t Revenues 4,704 3,631,5 4,270,5 5,897 5,635 5,534 in 1000 €

1 A similar calculation for the Shetland fishing ground also concluded that higher revenues can be achieved five years after the introduction of more selective nets (Rommel and Napier 2001).

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Table 2 illustrates the possible effect on the Ger- sion’s proposals, support would be available to man fishing industry if selective nets were to be assist this reduction in cod fishing through fi- introduced (the calculation is based on data for nancing the departure of a number of fishermen 1995-1998). In this case known data from the past coupled with the ecological improvement of catch

Table 2: Short-term catch and revenue losses in the German cod fishing industry in the technology. western Baltic (based on Ernst et al. slightly modified 2000, p. 23)

Codend 4.2. North Sea Cod Fish size (catching Catch landings A second model costing is under- Base (years) (length) Value bag in by weight (cm) taken below, this time for cod trawl net) Standard Calculated fishing in the North Sea. The Results mt Euro mill. biological basis for the develop- 1998 ³ 35 10093 13 ment of the stock will also be ex- Average 95-98 ³ 35 11181 15 amined more closely. The subse- Actual landings quent costings will follow the 1998 9722 same structure as for Baltic cod. Average 95-98 10052 Fishing biology has, over many Alternative Calculated relative decades and at considerable ex- codend changes pense, developed models for ‘cal- 1998 ³ 35 0.78 0.80 culating’ the development of Average 95-98 ³ 35 0.85 0.86 stocks. An important parameter Calculated absolute changes mt Euro mill here is the so called fishing mor- 1998 (cm) ³ 35 7861 10,5 (-2,5) tality rate, that is, the quantity of Average 95-98 ³ 35 9471 13 fish lost to stocks both by direct fishing and by by-catches. This has been used, in order to avoid the uncertainties figure is not known exactly, because we often sometimes found in forecasts etc.. After a period have only limited information on by-catches. A of losses averaging € 2.5 million a year, catches major problem in many fisheries is by-catches of would clearly have started to rise from year 5 on- undersized fish of the target species. As these are wards (this would have been 1999). This model- not allowed to be landed, they are lost for the fu- ling shows clearly that a recovery program would ture development of the species, as most of them have made sense. Not included in the model are do not survive being caught and then thrown back the costs of acquiring the new nets, which would, into the sea. however, be eligible for subsidies under the EU Despite repeated warnings in recent decades, the Commission’s proposals for the future EU fisher- EU Council of Ministers has failed to follow the ies policy. Whilst certain alternatives exist for the proposals of fish biologists to reduce catch vol- lean years in cod fishing (e.g. the German umes in order to protect stocks. The use of selec- fishing quota in the Baltic has not been fully tive catch technology to avoid catching undersized used), many enterprises would probably be unable fish has not been consistently prescribed, out of to survive. For this reason, under the EU Commis- short-term economic considerations.

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Illustration 5 shows the stocks of mature fish over of the stock, with stock levels soon becoming so time and the volume of juveniles (in the case of low that direct catching no longer makes sense cod, these are around 3-4 years old) added to the and the recovery potential will diminish ever fur- stock in the year in question. ther. This diagram clearly demonstrates the disaster of over recent decades. De- spite years in which good numbers of young fish have been added to the stocks and intermediate periods of recovery (1977-1983), the development of stocks has been pointing downwards continu- ally for a number of years. Included in the dia- gram is the Bpa value, established by fisheries bi- ologists as the lower stock limit. This is a value that, under the so-called precautionary principle, should trigger an immediate reduction in fishing levels. A recovery programme has still not been decided on, although back in 2000 experts were already talking of the ‘commercial’ extermination

BPA Biomass tonnes) (1000 Spawning Stock

Recruitment is the number of new fish produced each year by mature part of the stock. Spawning Stock Biomass: The mature part a the stock BPA: Limit value for biomass after the precautionary approach

Illustration 5: Recruitment and stock of mature fish – North Sea cod (European Commission 2002)

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Illustration 6 shows catches in the North Sea since much earlier, if the precautionary principle had 1977. One particularly striking fact is that catch been applied consistently, with the intention of stock levels ending up a little above the lower 400 stock limit Bpa. A ‘sustainable’ catch volume de- 350 termined according to this method would have 300 been 140,000t a year. Comparison with actual 250 catches gives picture 7. 200 For 2001 this has produced a revenue loss in the 150 North Sea cod fishing industry, based on an aver-

Landings in 1000 t 100 age price of € 2.70, of around € 243 million (at 50 today’s prices). Illustration 8, page 12, shows the 0 loss for 2001 and 2002 for the North Sea cod fishing industry. 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Year For 2001 the calculation takes the average price for 2001. The same price is extrapolated for 2002.

Illustration 6: Cod catches in since 1977 from the entire North A fishery biologist we questioned stated that he Sea, Kattegat, and the eastern Channel (ICES works on the basis of a permanently possible volumes between 1985 and 1998 consistently re- catch volume of no more that 250,000 t. (Rätz, mained between 100,000 and 150,000t, although oral communication). One must of course bear in the stock of mature fish almost constantly de- mind here that the demersal fishing industry in the creased during this period. The dramatic devel- North Sea is a mixed industry, and that cod is opment in 1999 and 2000 has now led to a situa- landed also by vessels fishing for haddock and tion in which, among other things, catches have whiting. Even so this estimate clearly shows how been banned in certain areas in order to protect cautious an assumption of 140,000 t as a ‘sustain- juvenile cod. The development of the stock since able’ fishing volume actually is. And even with 1985 would have justified more decisive measures this estimate we arrive at a very high loss to the

Illustration 7: Balance of 250 actual and ‘sustainable’ catch volume. 200

150

100

50

0 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 -50 catch volume in 1000 t -100 Balance of actual vs. 'sustainable' -150 Year

WWF Germany 11 The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea economy as a whole. fortunately, for this reason only very few exam- In cod fishing in the North Sea the introduction of ples of costings are available for quoting. selective nets is no panacea, as cod cannot be - Rising costs and declining catches have cost caught in isolation in the same way as in the Bal- the Scottish demersal fleet between £19,000 tic. In the North Sea it is caught together with and £90,000 per boat (MacGarvin 2001). - The value of landings in reduced between 1960 and 1999 by around 80%, from 450 £880 million to £196 million (in 1999 prices) 400 Revenue loss (MacGarvin 2001). 350 against assumed sustainable catch - Payment to ships’ crews is constantly reduced. 300 volume The need to reduce wage costs is leading fleet 250 owners to register vessels in other states. 200 Revenue loss against average - The social knock-on costs (unemployment, 1.000.000 € 150 catch social security) of a weak fishing industry are 100 borne by the community at large. For example, 50 support to Canadian fishermen rose from C$ 0 2001 2002 150 million in the mid-1980s to C$ 700 mil- Year lion in the mid-1990s (MacGarvin 2001). - According to Bach & Spitznagel (1998) an

Illustration 8: Possible revenue losses caused by overfishing for unemployed person in Germany cost approx. North Sea cod. €1500 a month in 1998. A total collapse of, in particular, smaller fisheries would produce other demersal species like haddock and whiting extensive additional costs to the social system, and for this reason requires more extensive regu- given that 100 unemployed persons already lation (by-catch reduction in other fisheries, multi- produce an additional annual burden of € 1.8 species catch quotas owing to the mixed catch million. situation, etc.). Despite this, it is important to act quickly in order to prevent a total collapse. A con- sistently applied recovery plan is long overdue.

Example of the economic effects of overfishing Although the problem of the overfishing of the world’s oceans is acute and does not merit further postponement, hardly any experts tackle this problem area from an economic viewpoint. Ques- tions regarding global economic efficiency, such as whether today’s society or future generations will incur economic damage as a result of over- fishing, are neither asked nor investigated. Un-

12 WWF Germany The Economics of a Tragedy at Sea

The Institute for European Environmental Policy Literature and websites used 1999. Report of Activities 1999, 40 pp. Bach, H.-U. & Spitznagel, E. (1998): Was kostet die MacGarvin, M. 2001. Now or never: The cost of Arbeitslosigkeit wirklich? TAB Kurzbericht Nr. 27 ’s cod collapse and disturbing parallels Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung with the UK. A WWF Report, 49pp. (2002): Monatsbericht Juni 2002 – Bericht über die Myers, N. and Kent, J. (2001): Perverse Subsidies. – Fischerei und die Marktsituation für Washington (Island Press) Fischereierzeugnisse in der Bundesrepublik Pauly, D. et al. (2002): Towards sustainability in Deutschland. – Hamburg: BLE world fisheries. – In: Nature, Vol. 418, p. 689 - 695 Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung Rätz, H. J. (2002): Einschätzung des Ertragspotentials (versch. Jahrgänge): Der Markt für des Nordseekabeljaus. – Communication of Fischereierzeugnisse in der Bundesrepublik 04.09.02 Deutschland - Jahresberichte. – Hamburg: BLE Rommel, D. und I. Napier (2001): The effects of Dahm, E. und Gabriel, O. (2001): implementing technical conservation measures on Ostseedorschselektion – bestehende und small fisheries dependent economies. Paper vorgesehene neue technische Maßnahmen. – in: presented at the annual meeting of EAFE Informationen für die Fischwirtschaft, Jahrgang 48, (European Association of Fisheries Economists), S. 174-178 Salerno April 2001. Ernst, P.; Müller, H.; Dahm, E. and Gabriel, O. (2000): Konzept für eine bestandsschonende Nutzung der Further literature on the economics of the Dorschvorkommen in der westlichen Ostsee. – in: fishing industry Informationen für die Fischwirtschaft, Vol. 47, p. Abdullah,N.M.R., K.Kuperan, and R.S.Pomeroy. 1998. "Transac- 19 - 24 tion Costs and Fisheries Co-Management." Marine European Commission (2001): Green Paper on the Resource Economics. 13, Number 2:103-114. Future of the . – Anderson,L.G. 1995. "Privatizing Open Access Fisheries: Individual Transferable Quotas." In D.W.Bromley, editor, Luxembourg (Publications office of the European The Handbook of Environmental Economics. Basil Communities) Blackwell Ltd. Oxford. 453-474. European Commission (2002): Recruitment and Anderson,L.G. 0 AD. The Economics of Fisheries Management. Spawning Stock – North Sea Cod – downloaded on The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore, London. 03.09.02 from: Apostle,R. and G.Barrett. 1992. Emptying their nets: small capital http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/topics/cod/grap and rural industrialization in the nova scotia fishing industry. University of Toronto Press. Toronto. h1_en.pdf Arnason,R. 1991. "On the Optimal Harvesting of Migratory Spe- Hannesson, R. (1996): Fisheries Mismanagement – cies." In R.Arnason and T.Bjørndal, editors, Essays on the The Case of the North . – London Economics of Migratory Fish Stocks. Springer-Verlag. (Blackwell Science) Berlin, Heidelberg. 21-40. ICES (2002a): Total landings (tons) of Cod in Sub- Bell,F.W. 1997. "The economic valuation of saltwater marsh supporting marine in the southeastern divisions 22-32 by country. – Downloaded on united states." Ecological Economics. 21, No.3:243-254. 04.09.02 under: Christy,F. 1997. "Economic Waste in Fisheries: Impediments to http://www.ices.dk/reports/ACFM/2002/WGBFAS/ Change and Conditions for Improvement." In E.K.Pikitch, Cod%20in%20 Subdivisions%2025-32.pdf D.D.Huppert, M.P.Sissenwine, and M.Duke, editors, ICES (2002b): Cod in Sub-area IV and Devisions VIId Global Trends: Fisheries Management. American Fisheries Society. Bethesda, Maryland. 28-39. and IIIa – Landings. – provided by the Clark,C.W. and G.R.Munro. 1994. "Renewable Resources as Bundesforschungsanstalt für Fischerei on 04.09.02 Natural Capital: The Fishery." In A.-M.Jansson, M.Hammer, C.Folke, and R.Costanza, editors, Investing in

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