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ARMORED CAVALRY UNITS ARMORED and INFANTRY :Dliyvisions Copy 3 E U7 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL :\ v,Q2( ' T.!1fi ' ARMORED CAVALRY UNITS ARMORED AND INFANTRY :DlIYVISIONS HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DECEMBER 1957 *FM 17-35 FIELD MANUAL I HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 17-35 WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 26 December 1957 ARMORED CAVALRY UNITS ARMORED AND INFANTRY DIVISIONS Paragraphs Page PART ONE. GENERAL CHAPTER 1. GENERAL ................................... 1-5 4 2. ORGANIZATION Section I. General ....................................... 6 8 II. Armored cavalry squadron ...................... 7-19 8 III. Infantry division cavalry squadron .............. 20-22 14 CHAPTER 3. FACTORS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT ..... 23-27 17 4. COMBAT SUPPORT ......... ............... 28-33 19 5. COMMUNICATION AND LIAISON .......... 34-40 22 PART TWO. PLATOON AND SECTION CHAPTER 6. GENERAL Section I. General ....................................... 41-43 31 II. Organization and capabilities, platoons and sections 44-50 32 III. Duties of personnel, platoons and sections ........ 51-55 40 IV. Platoon task organization ....................... 56-58 41 CHAPTER 7. ARMORED CAVALRY PLATOON TEAM Section I. General ....................................... 59-61 45 II. Platoon team in attack ......................... 62-70 45 III. Platoon team in defense ........................ 71-75 50 IV. Platoon team in delaying action ................. 76-86 56 V. Platoon team in reconnaissance missions ......... 87-92 63 VI. Platoon team in security missions ............... 93-99 73 CHAPTER 8. LIGHT-GUN TANKPLATOONAND SECTION 100-106 78 9. ARMORED RIFLE PLATOON AND SQUAD. 107-117 80 10. SCOUT PLATOON AND SECTION Section I. General ....................................... 118-122 85 II. Combat operations of scout units, general ...... 123-135 86 III. Offensive operations, scout units ................ 136, 137 103 IV. Defensive operations, scout units ............... 138 103 V. Scout units in delaying action ................... 139-141 107 VI. Scout units in reconnaissance missions .......... 142-146 109 VII. Scout units in security missions ................. 147-151 112 VIII. Helicopterborne operations, scout units .......... 152-155 117 *This manual supersedes FM 17-35, 1 March 1951, including C 1, 31 October 1952, and FM 17-22, 1 May 1950. including C 1, 31 October 1952. TAGO 3301-B, Dee. Paragraphs Page CHAPTER 11. RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLATOON Section I. General ...................................... 156-158 119 II. Capabilities, R&S platoon ...................... 159-165 122 III. Reconnaissance by R&S platoon ................ 166-172 124 IV. Surveillance by R&S platoon .................... 173-180 125 CHAPTER 12. MORTAR SECTION AND SQUAD ........... 181-188 128 PART THREE. RECONNAISSANCE TROOP CHAPTER 13. GENERAL Section I. General ....................................... 189-191 132 II. Organization, reconnaissance troop ............... 192-195 132 III. Employment, reconnaissance troop .............. 196-198 136 IV. Organization for combat, reconnaissance troop... 199-204 138 CHAPTER 14. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, RECONNAIS- SANCE TROOP ............................ 205-219 144 15. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, RECONNAIS- SANCE TROOP ............................ 220-228 151 16. RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS, RECONNAIS- SANCE TROOP Section I. Delaying action, reconnaissance troop ........... 229-238 163 II. Withdrawal from action, reconnaissance troop... 239-242 169 III. Retirement, reconnaissance troop ............... 243,244 175 CHAPTER 17. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS, RECON- NAISSANCE TROOP ....................... 245-251 176 18. SECURITY OPERATIONS, RECONNAIS- SANCE TROOP ............................ 252-269 187 PART FOUR. ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON CHAPTER 19. GENERAL Section I. General ....................................... 270-274 207 II. Employment, armored cavalry squadron ......... 275-277 208 III. Organization for combat, armored cavalry squadron 278-281 211 IV. Organization and employment, headquarters and headquarters troop, armored cavalry squadron. 282-288 213 CHAPTER 20. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON Section I. General ....................................... 289,290 218 II. Armored cavalry squadron in attack............ 291-296 218 III. Preparation for squadron attack................ 297-302 222 IV. Conduct of squadron attack ..................... 303-308 223 V. Squadron in exploitation and pursuit............ 309-311 226 CHAPTER 21. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON Section I. General ....................................... 312-317 228 II. Organization of defense, armored cavalry squadron 318-322 230 III. Mobile defense, armored cavalry squadron....... 323-326 232 IV. Position defense, armored cavalry squadron...... 327-330 233 V. Perimeter defense, armored cavalry squadron.... 331,332 235 2 TAGO 3301-B, Dec. Paragraphs Page CHAPTER 22. RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS, ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON Section I. General ....................................... 333-335 237 II. Delaying action, armored cavalry squadron ...... 336-348 238 III. Withdrawal from action, armored cavalry squadron 349-351 243 IV. Retirement, armored cavalry squadron .......... 352 244 CHAPTER 23. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS, ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON Section I. General ....................................... 353-355 245 II. Reconnaissance of routes, zones, and areas, armored cavalry squadron ............................ 356-359 248 III. Conduct of squadron reconnaissance missions .... 360-364 251 CHAPTER 24. SECURITY OPERATIONS, ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON Section I. General ....................................... 365-368 254 II. Squadron advance guard operations............. 369,370 255 III. Squadron flank guard operations................ 371-373 256 IV. Squadron fear guard operations................. 374,375 258 V. Squadron covering force operations .............. 376,377 258 VI. Squadron screening force operations............. 378,379 260 VII. Squadron rear area security operations .......... 380-382 261 APPENDIX REFERENCES ............................... ...... 263 INDEX ................................................... 264 TAGO 3301-B, Dec. 3 PART ONE GENERAL CHAPTER 1 GENERAL 1. Purpose a. This manual covers the specific organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate to all armored cavalry units of the armored and infantry divisions. b. This manual is to be used in conjunction with FM 17-1, Armor Operations, Small Units. General information contained in FM 17-1 is repeated in this manual only where necessary to insure clarity and understanding with respect to points of interest peculiar to armored cavalry units. c. While the employment of other types of units--such as infantry, artillery, engineers, and Army aviation-is mentioned in this manual, FM 20-100 and field manuals of the 5-, 6-, and 7-series should be con- sulted for the basic and detailed tactics and techniques of these units. This also applies in the fields of logistics and communication. In addi- tion to FM 17-1, manuals which supplement this manual are as follows: FM 17-100 Armored Division. FM 7-100 Infantry Division. FM 17-70 Signal Communication in the Armored Division. FM 17-50 Armor Logistics. FM 17-33 Tank Units-Platoon, Company, and Battalion. FM 17-20 Armored Infantry Units-Platoon, Company, and Battalion. d. Unless otherwise specified, the material presented herein is appli- cable without modification to both atomic and nonatomic warfare. e. Figure 1 gives the symbols most frequently used in illustrations throughout this manual. 2. Scope This manual consists of four parts. Part one covers general char- acteristics common to all armored cavalry units of battalion size and smaller, organization of armored cavalry units, factors affecting employ- 4 TAGO 3301-B, Dec. LEGEND --] LIGHT-GUN TANK U·ARMOREDPERSONNEL CARRIER HARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER USED BY THE SUPPORT SQUADS AND THE MORTAR SECTION mA4-TON TRUCK WITH MOUNTED MACHINE GUN ] M4-TON TRUCK WITHOUT MOUNTED MACHINE GUN NOTE: 1. For other military symbols see FM 21-30. 2. Illustrations of vehicles and equipment other than photo- graphs used throughout this training text are artist's drawings and are not intended to depict future design. Figure1. Symbols used in manual. TAGO WaO1-B,De., 5 ment, combat support, communication, and personnel and logistical considerations. Part two covers the employment of platoons and sections organic to armored cavalry units. Part three covers the employment of the reconnaissance troop. Part four covers the employment of the armored cavalry squadron. Throughout this manual, the term armored cavalry units is used to apply both to the armored cavalry squadron of the armored division and the infantry division cavalry squadron, as well as to their elements. Also, unless otherwise specified, the term armored cavalry squadron applies to both the armored cavalry squadron of the armored division and the infantry division cavalry squadron. 3. Role of Armored Cavalry Units Armored cavalry units in general are organized, equipped, and trained to perform three basic combat roles: reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions. The proper utilization of armored cavalry units in any of these basic roles permits the higher commander to concentrate the bulk of his force on more decisive objectives or opera- tions in the accomplishment of his mission. 4. Missions of Armored Cavalry Units Armored cavalry units are capable of executing the following type missions: a. Exercise surveillance over wide fronts and to extended depths. b. 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